Reading the Future Through Words: The U.S. De-risking Strategy Towards China and China's Response Lee Hae-rin, Kyushu National Museum of History

Viewing the World in a Snow Country: The Young People of Sarangbang Embrace Kyushu

B.A. in International Relations, Peking University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: February 11, 2025

B.A. in International Relations, Peking University

I. Introduction

In November 2024, Donald Trump was selected as the next President of the United States. With a 60% tariff on China as one of his main campaign promises, predictions are rampant that the 'competition' between the U.S. and China will intensify to an unprecedented degree over the next four years.

During Trump's presidency, the term 'Decoupling' was increasingly used to describe U.S. economic policy toward China. Until 2017, this term was an academic term used to describe a phenomenon of 'moving independently, separate from the mainstream.' For example, questions about how 'independent' the development of the 'green energy industry' could be from the existing energy industry often saw the verb 'decouple' used. Decoupling began to be frequently used in international relations in 2018. After Peter Navarro, Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, stated that 'it is necessary to politically and economically 'decouple' from China,' 'decoupling' began to be used as a noun to describe the U.S. movement to break away from its mutual relationship with China, particularly from interdependence in trade.

Nearly seven years have passed since 2018. Many view Trump's return as a resurgence of 'decoupling.' However, the decoupling of 2018 will not be the same as the decoupling of 2025. The direction of decoupling and its outcomes will differ. Two significant changes have altered the situation. The first is undoubtedly the change in players. The new player, 'Biden,' who replaced Trump, attempted to contain China using a different narrative. Biden's de-risking strategy has primarily shaken up the landscape.

The second change is the alteration of the game settings. Technology has advanced between 2018 and 2024. While semiconductors were important in 2018, they have since become the key determinant of the framework for future industries. Even if a 'trade war' were to break out again, the items of conflict in 2025 will be fundamentally different from those in 2018.

A player from seven years ago has entered a game renewed over seven years. What does this mean? How will the 'game' between the U.S. and China unfold over the next four years, and what consequences will it bring for East Asia, including South Korea and Japan, and indeed the entire world?

Predicting the future is always difficult. However, examining the process by which world politics, more precisely the U.S. and China, have reached their current state since Trump first advocated 'decoupling' will provide clues as to what may happen next.

This article attempts to outline the future trajectory of U.S.-China relations and global politics based on how the Biden administration's de-risking strategy unfolded and how China responded to it.

II. De-risking Strategy

1. The Origin of De-risking

The main players in the game presented in this article are undoubtedly the U.S. and China. However, the world we live in today is one where all players are intricately intertwined. Reflecting this complex world, the entity we must first focus on when discussing the 'de-risking' strategy is not the U.S. or China, but the European Union. It is there that we can find the person who first uttered the term 'de-risking' instead of 'decoupling'.

In January 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen first used the term 'de-risking' at the World Economic Forum in Davos to describe changes in relations with China (Von der Leyen 2023).

We must continue to work and trade with China. Especially when it comes to major transitions (towards achieving 'net

zero'). Therefore, we aim to focus on 'de-risking' rather than decoupling.

While this may sound like China's cooperation is essential for environmental goals, the latter part of the statement is key. The EU clearly and unequivocally said 'no' to Trump's economic policy toward China, 'decoupling.' This means they cannot remove China from Europe's trade network right now.

However, 'de-risking' does not solely imply that Europe cannot completely abandon cooperation with China. In March 2023, the EU again used the term 'de-risking.' This time, the focus shifted from the environment to the economy (MERICS 2023).

The distortions created by China's state-led capitalist system have significantly contributed to the imbalance in relations between Europe and China. ... This is why we need 'de-risking'.

The distortions created by China's state-led capitalist system have significantly contributed to the imbalance in relations between Europe and China.

relations between Europe and China. ... This is why we need 'de-risking'.

This statement reflects an awareness of the unbalanced economic competition that arises from cooperation with China in the long term, even though it is impossible to build supply chains excluding China immediately. It can also be interpreted as an intention to impose certain penalties to allow European companies to thrive, given the immense power of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

While it is impossible to build supply chains excluding China immediately, this statement reflects an awareness of the unbalanced economic competition that arises from cooperation with China in the long term. It can also be interpreted as an intention to impose certain penalties to allow European companies to thrive, given the immense power of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

On the same day, von der Leyen emphasized the close ties between China and Russia and the significant military threat posed by China in the South China Sea territorial disputes, explaining the considerable risks China poses in the political sphere (MERICS 2023). Therefore, the 'de-risking' advocated by von der Leyen has a centrist orientation. It implies that while not complying with U.S. containment of China, Europe will not blindly maintain the current level of cooperation with China. What Europe aims to create through de-risking, rather than decoupling, is undoubtedly a 'fair' playing field where European companies can possess genuine competitiveness. (To quote von der Leyen directly: 'a level playing field with diversification'). Thus, de-risking is a different strategy from decoupling. De-risking involves deliberate ambiguity. Decoupling declares non-alignment with China's economic growth or the global supply chains China aims to build, whereas de-risking merely signifies caution against the 'possibility' of risks inherent in China. It is highly ambiguous where 'risk' begins and ends, and where 'caution' should be applied.

Furthermore, de-risking is multifaceted. It allows for cooperation with China in some areas while excluding China in others deemed risky. This is because it does not imply severance.

2. Expansion of De-risking: U.S. Adoption

The adoption of the concept of 'de-risking' by the United States elevates it to a more significant strategy. On April 27, 2023, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan directly addressed the idea of de-risking in a speech at the Brookings Institution (Sullivan 2023).

I will speak more broadly about China. As President von der Leyen recently stated, we are pursuing diversification and de-risking, not decoupling.

We will work to create a level playing field for our workers and businesses and will push back against abuses.

The main reason the U.S. adopted the EU's 'de-risking' strategy is that decoupling was not very successful.

[Figure 1] Intra- and Extra-Bloc Trade Indices from January 2019 to December 2022, as surveyed by the WTO

Intra- and Extra-Bloc Trade Indices from January 2019 to December 2022

According to a WTO survey in 2023, not only did the trade index significantly decline after COVID-19, but trade between different geopolitical blocs surpassed trade within geopolitical blocs (World Trade Organization 2023). The strategy of completely excluding China from the global trade cycle did not work effectively. The trade index, which fell until the end of the first Trump administration in January 2021, did not recover. Even during the Biden administration, until the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the argument for dividing global supply chains or trade networks based on geopolitical situations was not practically reflected. The U.S. needed to present a new economic policy orientation to replace decoupling. Internally, it was about asserting a difference from Trump, and externally, it was about finding a policy orientation that could gain the support of Europe, which was skeptical of decoupling.

Decoupling is a goal that cannot be achieved if the U.S. alone attempts to sever ties with China. It requires all of the U.S.'s allies, united by shared values, to exclude China for the formation of a global supply chain without China to be possible. Therefore, if Europe is to exclude China within acceptable limits, adopting an idea that originated in Europe is the most natural approach. The intention to protect the U.S. economy, gain the support of traditional allies in Europe, and create a different orientation from Trump can be directly read in Sullivan's speech (Sullivan 2023).

In short: trade policy today must be more than just lowering tariffs,

and it must be fully aligned with our domestic and foreign economic strategies.

Sullivan specifies which areas will exclude China and which areas will cooperate with China (Sullivan 2023).

Economic integration has not prevented China from pursuing its military ambitions in its region.

[...] The 'China shock' has dealt a significant and difficult-to-overcome blow to our domestic manufacturing industry [...]

[...] We will protect our foundational technologies through a 'small yard, high fence' policy. [...] We have introduced tailored regulations on the export of the latest semiconductor technology to China. These regulations are presented on the premise of fundamental national security objectives.

President Biden argued that the U.S. and China can and should jointly confront global challenges such as climate change, macroeconomic stability, health security, and food security.

The U.S. is wary of the risks China poses in the semiconductor sector but simultaneously opens a channel for cooperation on non-traditional security agendas. De-risking has transformed into a more concrete and actionable strategy than initially proposed by Europe. By reducing the ambiguity of the term 'de-risking' and emphasizing its multi-faceted nature, the U.S. has provided clear guidelines to its allies. While complete severance from China is difficult now, the idea is to exclude China at least in the semiconductor sector. As Sullivan stated quite directly, the U.S. does not need to surpass China in every field. However, in technological fields, China must be surpassed 'so that U.S. technology is not used against the U.S.' Maintaining superiority in technology, especially semiconductors, is the primary goal to be achieved by adopting de-risking in the U.S.

III. Achievements of De-risking

1. Tailored Regulations by the U.S.

So, has de-risking fulfilled its role and purpose?

To conclude, the Biden administration has dedicated four years to the goal of constraining China in the semiconductor sector. The following are the major policies announced by the Biden administration with China's semiconductor chip export regulations in mind. We can see a shift from simple sanctions against Chinese companies to a thorough regulatory framework for the export of manufacturing equipment and investment in the semiconductor industry as a whole (York 2024).

Date Department Content

On December 16, 2021, the U.S. Department of Commerce added 34 Chinese companies, including semiconductor manufacturing firms, to a sanctions list for allegedly aiding China's military modernization.

Added to the sanctions list for Chinese companies.

New export controls were implemented on October 7, 2022, requiring licenses for the export of advanced U.S. computing and semiconductor products to China.

requiring licenses for the export of advanced U.S. computing and semiconductor

products to China. -ASML, in accordance with these regulations, informed its Chinese customers

U.S. Department of Commerce

13. Suspension of Services

-TSMC obtained a one-year license to continue using U.S. components in its Chinese operations.

to continue using U.S. components in its Chinese operations.

obtained a one-year license.

Americans in China (Hong Kong, Macao

investing in three sectors in China (including Hong Kong and Macau)

prohibiting U.S. persons from investing in three sectors in China (including Hong Kong and Macau) (Outbound Investment

President Biden

2023.8.9. Program)

President

-Semiconductors

-Quantum Information Technology

-Certain Artificial Intelligence Systems

On October 17, 2023, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security announced three additional rules regarding the export of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China.

announced three additional rules regarding the export of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. -Rule 1: Requires a license for the export of semiconductor chips to any company headquartered in a country or region subject to U.S. arms embargoes.

Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce

Requires a license for the export of semiconductor chips to any company headquartered in a country or region subject to U.S. arms embargoes.

-Rule 2: Expands the scope of semiconductor manufacturing equipment subject to export controls.

Expands the scope of semiconductor manufacturing equipment subject to export controls

(aimed at preventing major chip manufacturers like Nvidia from exporting high-performance semiconductors to China).

preventing major chip manufacturers like Nvidia from exporting high-performance semiconductors to China).

-Rule 3: Adds Chinese entities engaged in activities contrary to U.S. national security and interests to the sanctions list.

activities contrary to U.S. national security and interests

entities engaged in activities contrary to U.S. national security and interests to the sanctions list. Companies producing chips for such entities will also require additional licenses from the Bureau of Industry and Security.

Companies producing chips for such entities will also require additional licenses from the Bureau of Industry and Security.

will also require additional licenses from the Bureau of Industry and Security.

require additional licenses from the Bureau of Industry and Security.

On September 5, 2024, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security issued interim regulations on export controls for quantum computing and advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

issued interim regulations on export controls for quantum computing and advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

Licenses will be required for the export or re-export of quantum computing or advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China and other countries.

export or re-export of quantum computing or advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China and other countries

U.S. Department of Commerce

Licenses will be required for the export or re-export of quantum computing or advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China and other countries, and these licenses will be reviewed on a 'presumption of denial' basis.

2024.9.5

Bureau of Industry and Security

-However, participating countries in the Wassenaar Arrangement, which covers exports of conventional arms and dual-use goods, will have their licenses reviewed on a 'presumption of approval' basis.

-However, participating countries in the Wassenaar Arrangement, which covers exports of conventional arms and dual-use

goods, will have their licenses reviewed on a 'presumption of approval' basis.

reviewed on a 'presumption of approval' basis.

On September 13, 2024, the U.S. Trade Representative finalized tariff measures against China (Section 301 tariff finalization).

finalized tariff measures against China (Section 301 tariff finalization). -Tariff rate on Chinese electric vehicles increased to 100%.

increased to 100%.

-Tariff rate on Chinese solar cells increased to 50%.

increased to 50%.

-Tariff rates on Chinese electric vehicle battery components, critical minerals, steel, aluminum, masks, and maritime container cranes increased by 25%.

critical minerals, steel, aluminum, masks, and maritime container cranes increased by 25%

increased by 25%

On September 13, 2024, the U.S. Department of Commerce added 140 companies to its sanctions list.

U.S. Department of Commerce

Registered and expanded export controls on semiconductor chips, December 3, 2024, under its jurisdiction.

(Specifically, controls on manufacturing equipment

Bureau of Industry and Security

required to produce advanced node circuits)

[Table 1] Biden Administration's Policies to Contain China (~December 2024)

However, containment was not the only path pursued. From 2021 to 2024, the United States and China also engaged in dialogue. Cooperation was particularly prominent in the environmental sector. Starting with the U.S.-China Joint Statement on Climate Action at the end of COP26 on November 10, 2021, environmental agendas were also included in the first online summit held on November 15, 2021. Even from September 4 to 6, 2024, precisely when the United States significantly increased tariffs on China, the U.S. maintained open dialogue channels with China mediated by climate issues. 1) Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech

Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,

India, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico,

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Romania, Russia,

Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,

United Kingdom, United States, and 39 other countries (exemplified by U.S. Special Envoy for Climate John Podesta's visit to Beijing for U.S.-China climate talks). This is a clear contrast to the period of the Trump administration's first term, during which dialogue channels between the U.S. and China were virtually nonexistent, excluding summit meetings.

The containment of China in the semiconductor sector was also observed in Europe, which similarly espoused a de-risking strategy. The Chips Act, passed on July 25, 2023, serves as a decisive example (European Union 2023). The legislation, aiming to increase the European Union's share in the global semiconductor market from 10% to 20%, was faithful to the goal of creating a 'fair playing field' that Europe sought to achieve by advocating for 'de-risking.'

The United States thus compensated for both loopholes that emerged from the decoupling strategy. It did not demand unrealistic severing of ties, but rather sought to gradually minimize risks associated with China. As this strategy closely aligned with the goals pursued by the European Union, it also reduced backlash from allies.

Consequently, Jake Sullivan, upon his return to the Brookings Institution on October 23, 2024, proudly declared the 'success' of the de-risking strategy (Sullivan 2024).

[...] Currently, the United States has five advanced memory chip manufacturers operating at scale.

No other country has more than two. And we are continuing to foster U.S. leadership in artificial intelligence,

and we are taking steps to ensure that the physical infrastructure needed to train next-generation AI models can be built right here in the United States.

This is not something we have achieved alone. We have achieved this with our partners.

It is crucial to recognize that returning to a Cold War paradigm, where trade, including technological trade, was nonexistent between geopolitical rivals,

would be a clear mistake. However, as mentioned earlier, we must compromise because we are in fundamentally different geopolitical contexts.

This means we must aim to control and restrict only the most sensitive technologies that define national security and strategic competition.

This is precisely [...] de-risking, not decoupling.

2. China's Response

It is evident that the United States, at least the Biden administration, overestimates its de-risking strategy. However, to truly assess whether the U.S. de-risking strategy has been successful, one must also consider the opposite perspective. How does China perceive de-risking? Since 2019, China has consistently substituted the term 'decoupling' with 'breaking off ties and severing connections' (脱钩断链) or simply 'breaking off ties' (脱钩). The most recent instance of Chinese President Xi Jinping mentioning 'breaking off ties' was on March 27, 2024. Meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Rutte, he stated (International Online 2024):

[...] The great tide of history will not change. 'Breaking off ties and severing connections' is a path with no exit; openness and cooperation are the only options.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi interprets 'breaking off ties' similarly. During a press conference of the National People's Congress, China's national decision-making body, on March 8, 2019, a reporter asked Wang Yi if the trade war between the U.S. and China could end (Xinhua Net 2019). Wang Yi's response was as follows:

I have heard some people talking about China and the U.S. needing to 'break off ties.' I believe this is an unfeasible endeavor. To 'break off ties' with China means to 'break off ties' with opportunities, to 'break off ties' with the future, and in a sense, to 'break off ties' with the world. [...] Cooperation is not only the mainstream of China-U.S. relations and a common understanding of the leaders of both countries, but also the consistent and unified opinion of all sectors on both sides.

China's perception of decoupling is quite straightforward. 'Breaking off ties' is the opposite of cooperation. China argues that it is practically difficult to not cooperate with China and that doing so goes against the global trend (Shangguan 2020). The limitations of decoupling have already been acknowledged in Sullivan's speech and have been factually revealed by WTO investigations, making it difficult to argue that China's perception is incorrect.

What about the perception of 'de-risking'? While decoupling and 'breaking off ties' were translated relatively quickly, the terms used to refer to 'de-risking' are quite diverse. 'Risk minimization' (去风险), 'China minimization' (去中国化), and 'breaking off ties' (脱钩) have all been used to refer to the de-risking strategy. Why is there no direct term in Chinese to refer to de-risking, unlike decoupling? The reason lies in China's policy perception. China does not acknowledge that de-risking is a different strategy from decoupling.

In fact, until 2023, Wang Yi did not frequently mention de-risking directly. When he did, it was often in the context of perceiving it as a concept created by Europe to counter the U.S. concept of 'decoupling.' The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official publication in 2023, <U.S. Coercive Diplomacy and Its Harms>, reveals how the U.S. strategy announced by Sullivan in March 2023 was received.

According to this document, the U.S. is portrayed as the originator of 'coercive diplomacy' (胁迫外交), which has long hindered global development through means such as economic sanctions, military threats, and technological blockades (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2023). In contrast, China is depicted as pursuing equality regardless of national size, not forcing military alliances, exporting ideology, or provoking trade wars. This indirectly indicates that China perceives the 'de-risking' announced by the Biden administration in 2023 as part of its coercive diplomacy.

I have heard this. I believe this is an impossible task. Decoupling from China is decoupling from opportunity, decoupling from the future, and in a real

sense, it is also decoupling from the world. [...] Cooperation is the mainstream of China-US relations, and not only the common perception of the leaders of both countries, but also the consistent and unified opinion of all sectors of both societies.

of both societies.

China's understanding of decoupling is very straightforward. 'Decoupling' is the opposite of cooperation. China argues that it is practically difficult not to cooperate with China and that it goes against the trend of the world (Shangguan 2020). One aspect of decoupling has already been acknowledged by Sullivan in her speech, and it has been revealed as fact by WTO investigations, so it is not difficult to see that this Chinese perception is not wrong.

What about the perception of 'derisking'? Decoupling has been translated relatively quickly. However, there are truly various terms used for 'derisking'. 'Risk minimization' (去风险), 'de-Sinicization' (去中国化), and 'decoupling' (脱钩) have all been used to refer to the derisking strategy. Why is there no direct Chinese term for derisking, unlike for decoupling? This is due to China's policy perception. Because China does not recognize that derisking is a different strategy from decoupling.

In fact, until 2023, Wang Yi did not often directly mention derisking. When he did, it was often perceived as a concept created by Europe to counter the US concept of 'decoupling'. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official publication in May 2023, <America's Coercive Diplomacy and Its Harms>, reveals how the US strategy announced by Sullivan in March 2023 was received.

According to the document, the US is the originator of 'coercive diplomacy' (胁迫外交), and has long used means such as economic sanctions, military threats, and technological blockades to hinder global development (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023). In contrast, China pursues equality regardless of national size, and does not engage in acts such as forcing military alliances, exporting ideology, or provoking trade wars. This indirectly indicates that China perceives the 'derisking' announced by the Biden administration in 2023 as part of its coercive diplomacy.

The term 'risk minimization' began to appear more frequently starting in 2024. On February 17, 2024, Wang Yi attended the Munich Security Conference and stated concisely and clearly (Observer Net 2024):

Those who attempt to 'minimize China' under the guise of 'minimizing risk' are making a historical mistake. [...] Because the 'next China' is still China.

On the same day, in a conversation between U.S. Secretary of State Blinken and Wang Yi, the equivalence between China's view of de-risking and decoupling becomes even clearer.

because.

Here, 'backfire' (反噬) literally means 'to bite back,' implying repaying kindness with malice and harming those who have shown favor. The narrative that the U.S. is putting itself in a difficult situation suggests that the criticisms leveled against the U.S.'s 'decoupling' policy are being applied identically here.

On April 26, 2024, grounds emerged for understanding precisely which policy decisions by the U.S. China considers actions that could provoke a 'backfire.' Meeting with Blinken once again, Wang Yi stated (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2024):

Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act must be repealed. The right of the Chinese people to development cannot be deprived. The pressure the U.S. exerts on China's economy, trade, and technology is incessant. This is not fair competition but a policy of encirclement and suppression; it is not minimizing risk but creating risk.

The strongest evidence that China does not acknowledge the difference between de-risking and decoupling comes not from what China says, but from what it does not say. Unlike 'breaking off ties,' the policy of 'risk minimization' has never been officially mentioned by President Xi Jinping. This implies that China is disregarding the U.S.'s attempts to differentiate between de-risking and decoupling, even though the Biden administration's U.S. is indeed pressuring China in the areas of tariffs and semiconductors, albeit differently from Trump's approach.

2. China's Response

Those who attempt to 'minimize China' under the guise of 'minimizing risk' are making a historical mistake. [...] Because the 'next China' is still China.

On the same day, in a conversation between U.S. Secretary of State Blinken and Wang Yi, the equivalence between China's view of de-risking and decoupling becomes even clearer.

'Risk minimization' is synonymous with 'China minimization,' and building 'high fences in a small yard' is equivalent to 'decoupling from China.' Such attempts will ultimately lead the U.S. to 'backfire' against itself.

From 2021 to 2024, the Biden administration has progressively tightened pressure on China's semiconductor supply chain. While it had previously allowed the export of relatively lower-quality semiconductor manufacturing equipment, its intention to implement more comprehensive regulations was clearly revealed when it announced on December 23, 2024, that it would initiate action against unfair trade practices concerning general-purpose semiconductors from China. In response, China has consistently protested. China has retaliated by announcing export restrictions on critical minerals such as gallium, germanium, and antimony to the U.S. (This occurred on July 3, 2023, and again on December 3, 2024).

However, these retaliatory measures do not appear to have had a significant impact on the U.S. economy. Gallium is typically used in radar, satellites, microwave ovens, and LEDs, and the U.S. was not heavily reliant on China for gallium wafer procurement in the first place. (Prior to export controls, only 4.8% of the U.S.'s total gallium wafer imports came from China.) Furthermore, there is an analysis suggesting that China's restrictions on raw material exports have actually served as a catalyst for Western countries to explore more diverse import routes for raw materials (Hendrix 2024).

In short, China's retaliatory measures against the U.S. for its de-risking strategy are not proving effective. This could explain why China is reluctant to emphasize or acknowledge the distinction between decoupling and de-risking. If de-risking is an effective measure for constraining China, it suggests that China currently lacks a potent countermeasure. This brings the term 'backfire' back into discussion. It may not be that China is unwilling to speak of causing difficulties for the U.S., but rather that it is unable to do so.

3. Changes in the Framework

The United States assesses its de-risking strategy as a success. Europe aligns with the de-risking strategy. China hopes the de-risking strategy is not very successful, but it has no sharp means to prevent it. However, China is not in complete distress just because it cannot significantly influence the United States.

China describes countries with which it has diplomatic relations using the term 'Partnership' (伙伴关系). This is because China, declaring itself a member of the Third World in the 1960s, decided to adhere to the 'Non-Aligned Principle' (不结盟原则). Instead of forming alliances, it agreed to establish 'partner' relationships with various countries, in different areas and with varying depths (Zhao Jizhou 2010). Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership of a New Era

Russia (新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系)

All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership

Pakistan (2005)

(全天候战略合作伙伴关系)

All-Weather Strategic Partnership Ethiopia (2023), Venezuela (全天候战略伙伴关系) (2023)

All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Belarus (2022), Hungary (2024) (全天候全面战略合作伙伴关系)

New Era All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Uzbekistan (2024)

(新时代全天候全面战略合作伙伴关系)

Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia,

Laos, Mozambique, Congo, Namibia Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership

Zimbabwe, Guinea, Kenya, Tanzania (全面战略合作伙伴关系)

Maldives, Angola, Italy

(2024)

Strategic Cooperative Partnership India, South Korea, Afghanistan, Sri (战略合作伙伴关系) Lanka

Germany, Belgium (Comprehensive Friendly Cooperative Partnership), Singapore (All-round High-Quality All-Round Strategic Partnership

Prospective Partnership) (全方位战略伙伴关系)

Indonesia, Brazil, Australia, South Africa, EU, UK (21st Century Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership) Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

UK (21st Century Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership) (全面战略伙伴关系)

Strategic Partnership ASEAN, AU, Canada, UAE, Chile, Qatar, etc. (战略伙伴关系)

Strategic Partnership ASEAN, AU, Canada, UAE (Strategic Partnership), Qatar, etc.

[Table 2] Countries in China's 'Partnership' as of 2024

[Figure 3] Countries in China's 'Partnership' as of 2020 'Partnership' is extremely diverse. The term 'comprehensive' (全面) implies a greater potential for cooperation across various fields than cases without it, while 'cooperative' (协作) without 'strategic' suggests more room for trade or economic cooperation. Thus, the complex and varied names attached to China's 'partnerships' indicate what China expects from its relationship with the partner country (Zhao Jizhou 2010).

The Chinese government has never officially explained a formal ranking of 'partnerships.' It is speculated that the 'Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership' maintained by Russia and China since 2014 might be the highest tier, but this has not been directly stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, there is an adjective that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has officially stated can only be obtained by countries in an 'enhanced' partnership: 'all-weather' (全天候) partnership (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2015).

As the name suggests, 'all-weather' means regardless of any weather or climate. More directly, it signifies a commitment to maintain a strategically cooperative partnership irrespective of changes in the international landscape or any ensuing shifts. Originally, 'All-Weather Strategic Partnership' was a designation specifically for Pakistan. After more than 15 years, this 'all-weather' partnership, held solely by Pakistan, began to be used to solidify relationships with more countries starting with Belarus in 2022. While the case of Belarus in 2022 can be attributed to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the redefinition of the 'partnership' with Ethiopia and Venezuela in 2023, followed by Hungary and Uzbekistan in 2024, as a 'solid strategic partnership regardless of international changes' is a noteworthy shift.

This can be interpreted as China predicting, as early as 2022 or at the latest by 2023, that global affairs have changed and will continue to change more rapidly. The attempt to build a unique Chinese network described as 'all-weather partnerships' across Eurasia, Africa, and South America, starting from 2023, reveals an intention to solidify its position against the United States' de-risking offensive.

IV. Conclusion

The United States' de-risking has hindered China's expansion. It is making every effort to prevent China from gaining dominance, particularly in core industries like semiconductor chips that can lead to future global industrial and political leadership. This trend is likely to continue even if Trump returns to power.

Marco Rubio, the new Secretary of State in the Trump administration, stated the following on September 9, 2024, in a report titled “The World Made by China: Nine Years After ‘Made in China 2025’” (Rubio 2024).

The Chinese Communist Party controls the world's largest industrial base. Through theft,

market-distorting subsidies, and strategic planning, Beijing now leads in many industries that shape 21st-century geopolitical

hegemony. [...]

We need a whole-of-society effort to rebuild our country, overcome China's challenges, and keep the torch of freedom burning for future

generations.

Rubio also acknowledged China's achievements, stating that it has exceeded its targets in electric vehicles, energy generation (especially solar power), high-speed rail, and shipbuilding, and has made some progress in legacy semiconductor chip production. His remarks offer a glimpse into how specific strategies might evolve under the Trump administration in response to China's growth and the concerns it raises. A book that provides insight into this is 'The Strategy of Denial,' written by Elbridge Colby, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration, in 2021.

The core U.S. national interest lies in preventing other countries from establishing hegemony over major regions of the world, and the primary threat to that interest is China in Asia. [...] Asia is where the United States should concentrate its will and national strength and maximize its unique trust.

formation in Asia. [...]

Asia is where the United States should concentrate its will and national strength and maximize its unique trust.

special trust.

In this book, Colby argues that the United States must prioritize strategic objectives among its allies based on its own interests (Colby 2021). In other words, if the fundamental U.S. approach has so far focused on not acknowledging the limitations of value-based alliances, Colby's perspective suggests withdrawing from countries that should be abandoned for a more effective balance of power strategy.

Vice President J.D. Vance's views are even more unconventional. His acceptance speech for the vice presidential nomination on July 17, 2024, clearly illustrates his definition of the United States (Vance 2024).

This is not just an idea, folks. [...] Even if ideals and principles are great,

this is the homeland. This is our homeland. People

do not fight for abstractions, but they will fight for their homes.

[...] Our leaders must remember that America is one nation, and American citizens deserve leaders who prioritize their country's interests.

should have leaders who prioritize their country's interests.

Vance defines the United States not by liberal values but by 'blood and soil.' His notion that those who have defended 'America' across generations are the true Americans reinforces the principle of America First.

Vance defines the nation of America not by liberal values but by 'blood and soil.' His idea that those who have defended 'America' over generations are the true Americans further solidifies America First.

Although Colby and Vance seem to have similar ideas about the ideal America, there is a crucial difference. Colby's America strategically retreats from some regions but ultimately aims to remain a hegemonic power. To prevent China from rising as a new hegemon and to remain a power that shapes the world order, the importance of 'regions that do not affect the balance of power' needs to be adjusted. However, Vance's America is different. Vance's America is a strong America, an America that prioritizes itself (Jeon Jaesung 2025). Within his vision of America, there is no 'world that considers outside of America.'

As Marco Rubio acknowledges, China remains the strongest rival in the new Trump administration. But to what extent will this rival be contained? De-risking has not completely isolated China, but it has not allowed China to grow further either. In response, China is showing moves to strengthen its network capabilities. The United States' approach will differ depending on whether its goal is 'hegemony' or 'great power status.' Will the United States expand its value-based alliances and contain China? Or will it, in its pursuit of 'America First,' ironically allow room for China's network capabilities to grow?

It is not clear how both can be achieved. It remains uncertain whether Trump's strong emphasis on American protectionism can be reconciled with Europe's desire for a 'level playing field.' If Trump prioritizes national interests and seeks to impose restrictions not only on China but also on allied nations, it is unknown how this will backfire on the U.S. strategy to contain China. Just as no one knew that the decoupling strategy would lead to de-risking.

China is taking cautious and indirect steps. While not seeking to resolve this issue through bilateral negotiations with the United States, its efforts to solidify existing relationships with neighboring countries can be seen as a passive approach given China's domestic instability. However, it also indicates an intention to broaden the scope of the confrontation between the U.S. and China to a more global perspective, which is a significant difference from 2019. China's biggest remaining challenge is how to catch up with the United States in the advanced semiconductor industry. With the U.S. having already established a framework to exclude China, China's ability to survive by creating a competitive advanced semiconductor market on its own will determine the winner of this competition.

The reason de-risking was an effective strategy was its justification of not harming allies with comparable technologies and, instead, strengthening alliances. Therefore, China's 'all-weather strategy' may also depend on the speed of technological encouragement. If China's pace of technological development with its allies is sufficiently fast and the United States decides its goal is to be a great power, the global hegemonic power could change. However, if China is not fast enough, the answer to this question now rests with third parties. How much loss will be incurred when U.S. alliances weaken, and how much can China offset it? What calculations will third parties make, and what results will they derive?

This is the new and complex world order that de-risking has created over the past four years. Trump is returning, but the rules of the game have already changed. While decoupling in 2018 meant a simple severance with China and forced neighboring countries to choose sides, the world in 2025 opens a multi-layered arena of competition centered on technological hegemony. The technological barriers that the United States has built with its allies through de-risking will not be easily dismantled. China, too, is striving to find solutions by expanding its network.

Even the United States and China cannot attempt complete severance or unconditional cooperation with each other. In the fierce competition for technological leadership, all nations must seek their own survival strategies. The new four years, beginning with Trump's return, will unfold within these changed game rules.

References

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*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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