The North Korean Nuclear Issue of Continuity and Change, Focusing on North Korea and U.S. Policies Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum · Nagasaki Peace Park Go Ha-eun

Master's Graduate, Department of North Korean Studies, Dongguk University, Major in International Relations

I. Introduction

With Donald Trump of the Republican Party winning the U.S. presidential election on November 5, 2024, defeating the incumbent Vice President Kamala Harris of the Democratic Party, significant changes are anticipated in the international order. Particularly concerning the Korean Peninsula, given that two inter-Korean summits were held during Trump's first term (January 20, 2017 - January 20, 2021) – the Singapore Summit (June 12, 2018) and the Hanoi Summit (February 27-28, 2019) – there is a possibility of change during Trump's second term (January 20, 2025 - January 20, 2029).

Indeed, President Trump has emphasized, "I know Kim Jong Un very well and have a very good relationship with him," and stated, "I am probably the only one he has dealt with properly." Reuters reported on November 27, 2024, citing sources, that "President-elect Trump is discussing plans to pursue direct dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un." President-elect Trump appointed former U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell as a special envoy on December 14, 2024. According to reports from the Financial Times (FT) and Reuters, in a post on his social media platform Truth Social, he stated, "Rick (Richard) will be working in some of the hottest spots in the world, including Venezuela and North Korea," and added, "Grenell has experience working with North Korea during his eight years at the UN Security Council." This suggests an increased possibility of resuming North Korea-U.S. summits during Trump's second term.

On the other hand, North Korea, through the Korean Central News Agency on December 29, 2024, announced that at the expanded plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, held in anticipation of the start of Trump's second term (December 23-27, 2024), "the strongest hardline response strategy against the U.S., which will be resolutely implemented for national interests and security, was proclaimed." North Korea also asserted, "The United States is the most reactionary national entity that maintains anti-communism as its unchanging national policy, and the reality of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea military alliance expanding into an aggressive nuclear military bloc and the Republic of Korea degenerating into a thorough anti-communist outpost of the United States clearly shows the direction we must take and what we must do." However, since North Korea has not clearly specified what its 'strongest hardline response strategy against the U.S.' entails, it is likely that more concrete messages toward the U.S. will be revealed after President Donald Trump's inauguration on January 20, 2025.

Therefore, amidst this rapidly changing international order, the South Korean government needs to examine more closely, from the perspective of 'continuity' and 'change,' the policies that both the U.S. and North Korean governments are pursuing regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, in preparation for the potential resumption of North Korea-U.S. summits following the administration of U.S. President Trump. This study aims to understand the policy stances of the U.S. and North Korea on the nuclear issue, primarily by examining primary source materials. First, to understand North Korea's policies related to the nuclear issue, we will examine official documents and government statements published by the Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency, with a particular focus on analyzing two documents: the Supreme People's Assembly decree of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated April 1, 2013, "On Further Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear-Weapon State," and the "Law on Juche Nuclear Force Policy" adopted at the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on September 8, 2022. Second, to understand the U.S. policies related to the North Korean nuclear issue, we will analyze official documents from the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense, as well as the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Third, based on the analysis of the primary source materials from North Korea and the U.S. examined above, we will analyze the factors contributing to the failure of the two North Korea-U.S. summits held in Singapore (June 12, 2018) and Hanoi (February 27-28, 2019). This study is conducted with the aim of gaining insights into the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea-U.S. relations in the context of Trump's second term in 2025.

II. North Korea's Withdrawal from the NPT and Declaration of Nuclear Force Completion

The North Korean nuclear issue poses a security threat not only to the Korean Peninsula but also to Northeast Asia and the international community. After joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on December 12, 1985, North Korea delayed and then on January 11, 1992, signed the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and announced its acceptance of IAEA inspections. On January 30, 1992, North Korea concluded the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. North Korea submitted its Initial Report to the IAEA on May 4, 1992, reporting seven nuclear facilities and plutonium holdings. However, during temporary inspections conducted by the IAEA in North Korea between May 25, 1992, and February 6, 1993, significant discrepancies were discovered.

of Nuclear Weapons) is an international treaty established by the UN to address concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasing risk of nuclear war. It is the first multilateral treaty in human history. The NPT began to be signed on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. It consists of a preamble and 11 articles. The core principle of the NPT is 'horizontal nuclear non-proliferation,' which stipulates that only states that possessed nuclear weapons before 1967 can own them, while states that did not possess nuclear weapons are prohibited from acquiring them.

The NPT is an international treaty established by the UN to address concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasing risk of nuclear war. It is the first multilateral treaty in human history. The NPT began to be signed on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. It consists of a preamble and 11 articles. The core principle of the NPT is 'horizontal nuclear non-proliferation,' which stipulates that only states that possessed nuclear weapons before 1967 can own them, while states that did not possess nuclear weapons are prohibited from acquiring them.

The NPT is an international treaty established by the UN to address concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasing risk of nuclear war. It is the first multilateral treaty in human history. The NPT began to be signed on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. It consists of a preamble and 11 articles. The core principle of the NPT is 'horizontal nuclear non-proliferation,' which stipulates that only states that possessed nuclear weapons before 1967 can own them, while states that did not possess nuclear weapons are prohibited from acquiring them.

The NPT is an international treaty established by the UN to address concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasing risk of nuclear war. It is the first multilateral treaty in human history. The NPT began to be signed on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. It consists of a preamble and 11 articles. The core principle of the NPT is 'horizontal nuclear non-proliferation,' which stipulates that only states that possessed nuclear weapons before 1967 can own them, while states that did not possess nuclear weapons are prohibited from acquiring them.

The NPT is an international treaty established by the UN to address concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasing risk of nuclear war. It is the first multilateral treaty in human history. The NPT began to be signed on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. It consists of a preamble and 11 articles. The core principle of the NPT is 'horizontal nuclear non-proliferation,' which stipulates that only states that possessed nuclear weapons before 1967 can own them, while states that did not possess nuclear weapons are prohibited from acquiring them.

The NPT is an international treaty established by the UN to address concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasing risk of nuclear war. It is the first multilateral treaty in human history. The NPT began to be signed on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. It consists of a preamble and 11 articles. The core principle of the NPT is 'horizontal nuclear non-proliferation,' which stipulates that only states that possessed nuclear weapons before 1967 can own them, while states that did not possess nuclear weapons are prohibited from acquiring them.

The IAEA requested access to two undeclared facilities on December 22, 1992, and February 9, 1993. However, North Korea refused both requests and warned in the Rodong Sinmun on February 21, 1993, that demanding special inspections would lead to war. On February 25, 1993, the IAEA regular board of governors adopted a resolution for special inspections, and on March 8, 1993, North Korea declared a semi-wartime state and officially announced its withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993.

Following North Korea's announcement of withdrawal from the NPT, the IAEA special board of governors adopted a resolution against North Korea on March 18, 1993, and a resolution reporting North Korea's non-compliance with safeguards to the UN Security Council on March 31. On April 8, the UN Security Council adopted a presidential statement regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, and on May 11, it adopted Resolution 825, urging North Korea to accept nuclear inspections and withdraw its NPT withdrawal. Furthermore, after North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT, working-level contacts were made to hold high-level North Korea-U.S. talks, and North Korea provisionally suspended its NPT withdrawal on June 11, 1993, following the first round of high-level talks held from June 2 to 11, 1993. Subsequently, North Korea and the U.S. confirmed principles such as non-use and non-threat of nuclear weapons, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and support for peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula in a Joint Statement. In the second round of high-level talks, held from July 14 to 19, the replacement of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactors was discussed. However, due to differing positions between North Korea and the U.S., a final agreement was not reached. North Korea, after its first NPT withdrawal declaration on March 12, 1993, made a second declaration of withdrawal on January 10, 2003, and has not returned to the NPT regime to date in 2025.

1. North Korean Government Statement of March 12, 1993: First NPT Withdrawal Declaration

On March 12, 1993, North Korea officially announced its withdrawal from the NPT through a government statement titled "Government Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Declaring Self-Defensive Measures to Defend the Sovereignty of the Nation and the Supreme Interests of the Country." The main points of the government statement included: ▲ the resumption of the Key Resolve ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, ▲ the resolution for a special inspection of North Korea by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ▲ infringement of sovereignty and interference in internal affairs,

internationalization of the nuclear issue, collective sanctions and pressure against North Korea by the UN Security Council,

the U.S.'s anti-DPRK machinations, military threats against North Korea, political and ideological offensives, and blockade.

These points were included.

<Figure 1> North Korea's First NPT Withdrawal Government Statement

First, through its government statement, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT, arguing that although it had faithfully fulfilled its treaty obligations after joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the resumption of the Key Resolve ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and the proposal for a special inspection of North Korean military bases by the IAEA had created a grave situation threatening the nation's sovereignty and security. Second, North Korea strongly protested that the U.S. retaining nuclear weapons in South Korea and reinforcing them with more modern nuclear weapons and equipment posed an increasing nuclear threat to North Korea, and declared its rejection of the unfair actions of the IAEA Board of Governors. Third, regarding its NPT withdrawal, North Korea viewed the IAEA's adoption of a resolution for a special inspection of North Korean military facilities as an act of joining the U.S.'s anti-DPRK machinations to internationalize the nuclear issue and impose collective sanctions and pressure. North Korea argued that in the unique circumstances of a divided Korean Peninsula and the constant threat of U.S. nuclear weapons, opening its military bases was unthinkable, and that the Key Resolve joint military exercises were entirely contrary to the spirit and objectives of the NPT in terms of respecting territorial stability and sovereignty and ceasing nuclear threats. Fourth, North Korea contended that the IAEA's special inspection deviated from the principles of fairness and neutrality of the NPT and reflected the U.S. position, and expressed dissatisfaction that no action was taken regarding North Korea's protests against U.S. nuclear weapons and bases in South Korea. North Korea further claimed that the IAEA was pressuring only North Korea regarding nuclear weapons development while condoning the nuclear armament efforts of Japan and South Korea.

In its government statement, North Korea revealed that its accession to the NPT was aimed at eliminating the U.S. nuclear threat. It also emphasized that it could no longer fulfill its NPT obligations in an abnormal situation that threatened the sovereignty and security of a non-nuclear state and sought to crush its socialist system, and thus declared its withdrawal as a measure to protect the supreme interests of the state through the Government Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Furthermore, North Korea highlighted the peaceful use of nuclear energy as presented in the NPT, pledged to make efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and called for support and solidarity for its self-defensive measures.

2. North Korean Government Statement of January 10, 2003: Second NPT Withdrawal Declaration

On January 10, 2003, North Korea officially announced its second withdrawal from the NPT through a government statement titled "Government Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." This bears similarities to the first NPT withdrawal declaration on March 12, 1993, titled "Government Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Declaring Self-Defensive Measures to Defend the Sovereignty of the Nation and the Supreme Interests of the Country." The main points of the government statement included: ▲ the U.S.'s hostile policy toward North Korea, ▲ IAEA resolutions against North Korea, ▲ infringement of sovereignty, ▲ UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea, and ▲ the violation of the Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea.

<Figure 2> North Korea's Second NPT Withdrawal Government Statement

First, using the IAEA resolutions adopted on November 29, 2002, and January 6, 2003, as grounds, North Korea claimed that its national sovereignty and security were being violated due to the U.S.'s hostile policy toward North Korea. North Korea questioned the fairness of the IAEA, arguing that it was demanding disarmament only from North Korea, which would mean abandoning its right to self-defense, while taking no action against the U.S. for violating the NPT and the Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea. Second, North Korea asserted that the IAEA resolutions constituted a grave infringement of its sovereignty and that the U.S. was the entity jeopardizing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea cited the Bush administration's designation of North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" and a target for preemptive nuclear strike, and criticized the U.S. for violating the Agreed Framework, halting heavy fuel oil provisions based on suspicions of North Korean nuclear development, opposing the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the U.S. and North Korea, and imposing blockades and punitive measures, calling these actions an attempt to crush North Korea. Third, North Korea claimed that its first NPT withdrawal in March 1993 was due to the U.S.'s nuclear war machinations against North Korea and the unfairness of the IAEA. North Korea stated that the last possibility for a peaceful and fair resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula had disappeared due to actions that internationalized the North Korean nuclear problem.

In its government statement, North Korea declared that its second withdrawal from the NPT was a justifiable self-defensive measure against the U.S.'s oppressive actions and the unjust measures of the IAEA that followed. In particular, North Korea criticized the U.S. for violating the Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea and proceeding with resolutions through the IAEA, and clearly stated that by withdrawing from the NPT, it was freed from the constraints of the IAEA. Article III of the NPT stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty shall enter into an agreement with the IAEA to prevent diversion of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfillment of their obligations, in accordance with the IAEA's regulations and safeguards system. Furthermore, it stipulates that negotiations for the IAEA agreement shall commence within 180 days from the initial entry into force of the treaty, and for states depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the aforementioned 180 days, negotiations for the agreement shall commence prior to the date of deposit and the agreement shall enter into force within 18 months from the date of commencement of negotiations. However, North Korea has failed to comply with both the provisions of the NPT and the regulations of the IAEA.

3. Declaration and Legalization of Nuclear Force Completion under Kim Jong Un

As indicated in the two government statements examined above, North Korea joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on December 12, 1985, then issued its first NPT withdrawal government statement on March 12, 1993, followed by a government statement regarding its second NPT withdrawal on January 10, 2003, and has not returned to the NPT regime to date. North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT is the most crucial primary source material for understanding the "North Korean nuclear issue" as it marks the starting point of its development. This is because North Korea's announcement of its NPT withdrawal statement heightened the nuclear crisis in the international community, and it has persisted for approximately 30 years to the present.

<Table 1> Status of North Korean Nuclear Tests: 2022 Defense White Paper, p. 339

Through a process of continuous and gradual nuclear development spanning three generations – Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un – North Korea has finally declared the completion of its nuclear force under Kim Jong Un. A brief overview of North Korea's nuclear development process across these three generations is as follows: First, during the Kim Il Sung era, while outwardly maintaining a stance of not developing nuclear weapons, North Korea pursued a dual nuclear policy, including training its nuclear technicians with Soviet assistance and establishing nuclear research complexes. In terms of nuclear weapons, Kim Il Sung established reprocessing capabilities, accumulated weapons-grade plutonium, and acquired the capability to manufacture plutonium bombs through high-explosive tests.

Second, during the Kim Jong Il era, North Korea pursued a policy of simultaneously engaging in nuclear negotiations and developing nuclear weapons to materialize nuclear deterrence. Following Kim Il Sung's death, Kim Jong Il continued nuclear weapons development based on the Songun (military-first) policy. Violating or exploiting loopholes in the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks agreements, he conducted two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, successfully developing nuclear weapons and completing intermediate-range missiles, which he bequeathed to Kim Jong Un.

Third, during the Kim Jong Un era, based on the nuclear capabilities developed by Kim Jong Il, nuclear weapons were miniaturized, lightened, and diversified. Through four nuclear tests over five years, starting with the third nuclear test on February 3, 2013, and culminating in the sixth nuclear test on September 6, 2017, North Korea completed plutonium bombs, uranium bombs, and hydrogen bombs. On November 29, 2017, the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), capable of striking the U.S. mainland from approximately 12,000 km away, shocked the world. Immediately after the Hwasong-15 launch, North Korea officially declared the completion of its state nuclear force. Furthermore, since Kim Jong Un took power, North Korea adopted the Supreme People's Assembly decree of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated April 1, 2013, "On Further Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear-Weapon State," and enacted the "Law on Juche Nuclear Force Policy" at the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on September 8, 2022. These actions clearly articulate North Korea's official stance on possessing and using nuclear weapons, serving as evidence that it considers its nuclear force a crucial element for national defense and sovereignty.

<Table 2> Key Milestones in North Korea's Nuclear Development: 2024 Understanding North Korea by the Ministry of Unification, p. 117

(1) Promulgation of the Decree "On Further Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear-Weapon State" in 2013

Following North Korea's third nuclear test in 2013 under Kim Jong Un's leadership, and facing strong international sanctions and pressure, North Korea established and sought to communicate its official position at the government level that nuclear weapons would be utilized as a self-defensive means. Consequently, North Korea adopted the Supreme People's Assembly decree dated April 1, 2013, titled "On Further Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear-Weapon State."

This decree defines North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons as an essential measure to protect its security and sovereignty and declares the consolidation of its status as a nuclear-weapon state. This can be seen as North Korea's effort to justify and legalize its nuclear weapons development. North Korea frames its nuclear weapons development as self-defense against the U.S.'s hostile policy toward North Korea, emphasizing them as "peaceful purposes" or "defensive weapons for free development." The decree further explains the reasons for North Korea's nuclear development as "self-defense" and "the sovereign rights of the nation," clearly indicating North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons development and justifying its possession.

(2) Enactment of the "Law on Juche Nuclear Force Policy" in 2022

Following the decree "On Further Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear-Weapon State" adopted on April 1, 2013, which aimed to continue nuclear weapons development for self-defensive purposes, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test in September 2017. Subsequently, Chairman Kim Jong Un officially declared the completion of the state nuclear force. After the declaration of nuclear force completion, North Korea enacted the "Law on Juche Nuclear Force Policy" at the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on September 8, 2022. This law represents an advancement from the 2013 decree and can be considered a document that officially codifies the legal basis for the use and management of North Korea's nuclear weapons.

The Law on Juche Nuclear Force Policy reiterates that North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is an unavoidable self-defensive choice in response to the U.S.'s hostile policy toward North Korea, stating that North Korea's nuclear force is defensive and based on nuclear deterrence and retaliatory capabilities. Furthermore, unlike the 2013 decree, the 2022 Law on Juche Nuclear Force Policy addresses the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons and their permanent maintenance, which warrants examination. First, the law specifically outlines the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, stating that North Korea reserves the right to nuclear retaliation if attacked by hostile forces. Second, it defines North Korea's nuclear force as a "permanent defensive means," emphasizing that possessing nuclear weapons is a strategic decision to ensure national security and defend its sovereignty in the international arena. Through this law, North Korea has expressed a strong determination never to abandon its nuclear weapons and has clearly communicated to the international community that it may use nuclear weapons if attacked in the future.

North Korea's Law on Juche Nuclear Force Policy can be seen as a threat to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Through the 2013 decree "On Further Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear-Weapon State" and the enactment of the "Law on Juche Nuclear Force Policy" in 2022, North Korea has justified its development and use of nuclear weapons, emphasizing them as means of sovereignty and defense, and clearly articulating its position to protect its national security.

In response to North Korea's policies, the international community, including South Korea, the United States, and Japan, has strengthened Security Council sanctions and condemned the use of nuclear weapons. While North Korea strives to advance its nuclear capabilities and gain international recognition, this is unacceptable as it fuels an arms race in Northeast Asia, destabilizes regional security, and contravenes the international non-proliferation NPT regime. The North Korean policies examined in the primary source materials above are exacerbating international tensions and conflicts surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue, significantly impacting the security situation in Northeast Asia and the international community. Therefore, in this context, South Korea needs to make sustained efforts toward North Korean denuclearization through various means.

III. U.S. Policy on the North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Failure of North Korea-U.S. Summits

1. Analysis of the 2018 Trump Administration and 2022 Biden Administration NPRs

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which provides insight into U.S. nuclear policy, is an official review document on nuclear strategy published by the U.S. Department of Defense, outlining the U.S.'s strategic stance on the North Korean nuclear issue. The NPR is published every four years and primarily addresses nuclear issues, analyzing four countries—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—and outlining U.S. policies and strategies. Recent documents include: first, the NPR published during the Trump administration's first term in 2018; second, the NPR published by the Biden administration in 2022; and a new NPR is expected to be released by the Trump administration's second term in 2026. Therefore, in analyzing recent North Korean nuclear issues, we will examine the contents of the 2018 NPR from the Trump administration and the 2022 NPR from the Biden administration.

Both the 2018 and 2022 NPRs address the North Korean nuclear threat and present countermeasures, but the two reports, published by the Trump and Biden administrations respectively, differ in their approaches and emphasis.

Specifically, the section on North Korea in the 2018 NPR of the Trump administration identified North Korea as a nuclear threat, viewing its nuclear development and missile tests as major threats to U.S. national security. It concluded that strengthening nuclear deterrence and modernizing nuclear forces were necessary to prevent North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Furthermore, it adopted a hardline stance, stating that nuclear weapons could be used as a last resort in response to a North Korean nuclear attack or the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This approach, part of the "maximum pressure" strategy against North Korea, aimed to prevent North Korea's nuclear development through sanctions and diplomatic pressure, while also considering military responses depending on the situation.

Next, the section on North Korea in the 2022 NPR of the Biden administration, while also considering North Korea a nuclear threat as in the 2018 NPR, shows a greater emphasis on diplomatic solutions, such as negotiations, for nuclear non-proliferation. It also sets policy to limit the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, considering them a last resort and aiming to deter their use. While considering the use of nuclear weapons in response to a North Korean nuclear attack, the use of nuclear weapons is set to be limited. The Biden administration proposed solutions for North Korean denuclearization through diplomatic pressure and international cooperation, and clearly stated its commitment to protect U.S. allies such as South Korea and Japan through a nuclear umbrella in response to the North Korean nuclear threat. <Figure 3> 2018 Trump Administration NPR vs. 2022 Biden Administration NPR

Based on this importance, this paper will examine in more detail the commonalities and differences between the 2018 Trump administration's NPR and the 2022 Biden administration's NPR. To summarize the commonalities, first, both reports address North Korea's nuclear weapons development and nuclear threat as significant security issues. They emphasize that North Korea is increasing its threat to the United States and its allies through nuclear tests and missile development, and that a response is essential. Second, both reports adopt nuclear deterrence as a core strategy. They state that a strong nuclear deterrent force will be maintained to prevent a North Korean nuclear attack, and that the U.S. is prepared to respond and retaliate strongly if North Korea threatens to use nuclear weapons or actually uses them. In particular, they specify the provision of a nuclear umbrella to protect allies, and mention that U.S. nuclear weapons will be an important means of protecting allies against North Korean threats. Third, both reports did not rule out the possibility of using nuclear weapons as a response to North Korea's nuclear attack or use of weapons of mass destruction. However, there is a difference in that the Biden administration in 2022 considered its use as a last resort and set it as limited. Fourth, both reports identify denuclearization of North Korea as an important goal under the NPT regime of international nuclear non-proliferation, and state that diplomatic efforts will continue to encourage North Korea, which is not an officially recognized P5 country, to voluntarily abandon its nuclear weapons.

To summarize the differences, first, in terms of the approach to the use of nuclear weapons, the 2018 Trump NPR broadly defined the scope of nuclear weapon use, stating that the use of nuclear weapons could be actively considered in response to North Korea's nuclear attack or use of weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, the 2022 Biden NPR set the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort, handled the conditions for their use more restrictively, and adopted an approach aimed at minimizing the use of nuclear weapons in response to the North Korean nuclear threat. Second, in terms of diplomatic approaches, the 2018 Trump NPR supported a hardline approach centered on military response and economic sanctions, viewing negotiations with North Korea as having uncertain outcomes and leaving open the possibility of nuclear weapon use. Conversely, the 2022 Biden NPR emphasized diplomatic solutions and nuclear non-proliferation, highlighting the direction of pursuing denuclearization through the resumption of negotiations with North Korea and international cooperation. Third, regarding the modernization of nuclear forces, the 2018 Trump NPR emphasized the modernization of nuclear forces and the development of tactical nuclear weapons to counter the nuclear threat from North Korea, presenting various nuclear weapon options. In contrast, the 2022 Biden NPR acknowledged the need for modernization of nuclear forces but placed less emphasis on the necessity of developing tactical nuclear weapons, presenting a strategy focused on minimizing the use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, in terms of the nuclear regime, the 2018 Trump NPR tended to expand the role of nuclear weapons, whereas the 2022 Biden NPR emphasized the long-term goal of denuclearization aiming for a world without nuclear weapons, pursuing a policy of minimizing and limiting the use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, in addition to the 2018 and 2022 NPR reports, let us examine the diplomatic policies of the Trump and Biden administrations toward North Korea. First, the Trump administration, based on a strategy of maximum pressure, imposed economic sanctions and military pressure while pursuing direct dialogue and negotiations for a diplomatic resolution. This manifested in the North Korea-U.S. summits, such as the Singapore Summit in 2018 and the Hanoi Summit in 2019, as aspects of denuclearization negotiations; however, the negotiations ultimately failed between North Korea and the United States. Second, the Biden administration has taken a cautious and strategic stance in dialogue with North Korea, prioritizing multilateral cooperation and international pressure over direct dialogue. It also emphasizes military responses and nuclear deterrence strategies toward North Korea, focusing on strengthening nuclear deterrence cooperation with allies, which appears to be manifested in the pursuit of strengthened ROK-U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. Therefore, from the perspective of the current year 2025, facing the second Trump administration, it is necessary to analyze the materials that represent the past official positions of the United States on North Korea's nuclear issue and prepare for the future.

2. Analysis of Failure Factors in North Korea's Nuclear Issue, Denuclearization, and North Korea-U.S. Summits

Following the development of nuclear weapons, the world paid close attention when the first-ever summit between then-U.S. President Trump and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un was held in 2018. Ultimately, however, denuclearization negotiations failed due to differences in opinion between the United States and North Korea. Nevertheless, as two U.S.-North Korea summits were held during Trump's first term (January 20, 2017-January 20, 2021) — the Singapore Summit (June 12, 2018) and the Hanoi Summit (February 27-28, 2019) — it is highly probable that U.S.-North Korea summits will resume during Trump's second term (January 20, 2025-January 20, 2029). Therefore, South Korea needs to prepare diplomatic efforts for the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue.

The reasons for the failure of the two North Korea-U.S. summits were not only a lack of mutual trust between the United States and North Korea but also a combination of various complex factors. First, the definition of denuclearization differed between the United States and North Korea. North Korea stated its readiness to dismantle its nuclear weapons but maintained an ambiguous stance on how denuclearization would be specifically implemented, effectively seeking regime security and international status guarantees while retaining nuclear weapons. In contrast, the United States demanded "Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID)" of all nuclear weapons and related facilities, holding a different perspective from North Korea by stipulating that regime change or security guarantees for North Korea must be achieved.

Second, there were differing stances on nuclear weapons and sanctions against North Korea in the context of North Korea's denuclearization. North Korea demanded the lifting of economic sanctions as part of the nuclear dismantlement process, but the United States stated that sanctions could not be lifted before North Korea took denuclearization measures. The United States demanded concrete nuclear weapon dismantlement or the dismantling of nuclear facilities as a condition for lifting sanctions, while North Korea argued that it should receive economic benefits first through sanctions relief. Consequently, they failed to achieve a simultaneous resolution regarding nuclear weapons and sanctions, leading to the breakdown of the talks.

Third, the demands and expectations of North Korea and the United States operated differently. North Korea prioritized regime security and economic assistance, thus demanding that the United States guarantee the security of the Kim Jong Un regime, lift sanctions, and conclude a peace treaty in exchange for abandoning its nuclear weapons program. Conversely, the United States viewed the elimination of North Korea's overall military threats, including nuclear, missile, and chemical weapons, as a prerequisite along with nuclear dismantlement, and also demanded reforms regarding North Korea's human rights issues and regime. However, North Korea found these U.S. demands difficult to accept, and strongly opposed measures related to regime change.

Fourth, North Korea and the United States held different positions on the verification of nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons. One of the most critical issues at the North Korea-U.S. summits was the extent to which North Korea would transparently disclose and allow verification of its nuclear weapons and facilities. The United States demanded complete verification of North Korea's nuclear facilities, but North Korea refused or sought to minimize external international monitoring and verification, thus deepening mistrust between the two countries. Furthermore, although North Korea promised to dismantle some of its nuclear facilities, the United States questioned the means to verify its sincerity, and ultimately, the two countries failed to reach an agreement on specific verification procedures related to nuclear weapon dismantlement. Therefore, if North Korea-U.S. summits are resumed during Trump's second term, efforts will be needed to reconcile these differing positions between North Korea and the United States.

IV. Conclusion

The North Korean nuclear issue, which began in earnest with North Korea's announcement of its first withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993, and its second announcement on January 10, 2003, has persisted for approximately 30 years until the present day in 2025. North Korea, through a continuous and gradual process of nuclear development across three generations—Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un—finally declared the completion of its nuclear armament during the Kim Jong Un era. On April 1, 2013, it adopted the Supreme People's Assembly decree "On Further Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear-Weapon State," and on September 8, 2022, it legislated the "Law on Juche-Based Nuclear Force Policy" through the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly.

Over the past 30 years, the North Korean nuclear issue has been characterized by periods of crisis and military confrontation, as well as periods of dialogue and negotiation, in terms of "continuity" and "change." North Korea claims to have developed nuclear weapons in response to the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea since the establishment of its regime, and the United States is undoubtedly the most central country in this policy. Therefore, South Korea needs to more clearly examine and analyze the policies of North Korea and the United States regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. In particular, given that two North Korea-U.S. summits were held during Trump's first term (January 20, 2017 - January 20, 2021), namely the Singapore Summit (June 12, 2018) and the Hanoi Summit (February 27-28, 2019), it is necessary to analyze the reasons for the failure of denuclearization negotiations and prepare for a phase of resuming North Korea-U.S. dialogue to avoid a situation of "engaging the U.S. while isolating South Korea (通美封南)" during Trump's second term (January 20, 2025 - January 20, 2029).

North Korea and the United States have a decades-long history of hostile relations, conflict, and confrontation, resulting in a profound lack of trust and differing stances on the North Korean nuclear issue and denuclearization. In practice, during the North Korea-U.S. summits, North Korea did not trust that the United States would lift sanctions or conclude a peace treaty in exchange for complete nuclear weapon dismantlement, while the United States doubted North Korea's willingness to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons. Therefore, a clearer and more comprehensive analysis of the possibility of North Korea-U.S. summits during Trump's second term is needed.

Is denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula truly possible? Can negotiations succeed at North Korea-U.S. summits? The failure factors of the North Korea-U.S. summits are a complex result of differing definitions of nuclear denuclearization, the interrelationship between sanctions relief and nuclear dismantlement, a lack of mutual trust, difficulties in verifying nuclear facilities, and furthermore, domestic political factors in both North Korea and the United States. The mistrust and differing views between the two countries act as factors leading to the breakdown of talks, and resolving these issues is expected to be a crucial task for complete negotiations between North Korea and the United States. Amidst the start of Trump's second term on January 20, 2025, I intend to contemplate, from the perspective of a student studying North Korean studies, the direction South Korea should take regarding the North Korean nuclear issue.

References

<Domestic Materials>

National Unification Education Institute. 2024. *Understanding North Korea 2024*. Seoul: Ministry of Unification. Ministry of National Defense. 2023. *2022 Defense White Paper*. Seoul: Ministry of National Defense.

Ministry of National Defense website: https://www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/mnd/index.jsp. Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/main.do.

Ministry of Unification website: https://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/. <North Korean Materials>

"Government Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Declaring Self-Defensive Measures to Defend National Sovereignty and the Supreme Interests of the Country." (March 12, 1993)

"Government Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." (January 10, 2003)

"On Further Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear-Weapon State." (April 1, 2013) "Law on Juche-Based Nuclear Force Policy." (September 8, 2022)

Rodong Sinmun, Korean Central News Agency <Foreign Materials>

U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. “2018 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW”.

______. 2022. “2022 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW”.

______. 2018. “2018 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW Executive Summary Translated (Korean)”.

______. 2023. “2022 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW Executive Summary Translated (Korean)”. U.S. Department of State website: https://www.state.gov/. U.S. Department of Defense website: https://www.defense.gov/. The White House website: https://www.whitehouse.gov/. <Other Reference Materials>

Ko, Ha-eun. 2024. *A Study on North Korea's Foreign Relations and Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons: Focusing on the Six-Party Talks*. Master's thesis, Dongguk University.