The Positions of China and the Soviet Union Regarding the National Bourgeoisie of Developing Countries

Department of Diplomacy 67296

Table of Contents

I. Starting Point of the Problem Awareness

II. Revolution and the National Bourgeoisie III. Lenin and Mao Zedong's Positions IV. The Process of Change in the Positions of Both Countries

V. Several Reasons for the Divergent Positions VI. Conclusion

* Notes and References

59

I. Starting Point of the Problem Awareness

The field of study known as Area Studies, which originated in the United States, can be said to have had its initial motivation in building a foundation for the more effective execution of U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, the significance of regional studies within the context of Korea cannot be considered separate from Korea's foreign policy. From this perspective, the primary object of our study should be the regional complex, commonly referred to as the Far East, formed by the U.S., USSR, China, Japan, and Korea (South and North). Among these, a thorough understanding of the relationship between China and the Soviet Union, which is often taboo due to excessive ideological narrowness, must precede an accurate grasp of phenomena and the formulation of appropriate actions. Therefore, this brief study aims to clarify, as a preparatory step, the "Positions of China and the Soviet Union Regarding the National Bourgeoisie of Developing Countries" within the context of the relationship between the Communist bloc and developing regions.

As for the methodology, we will first grasp the position of the national bourgeoisie within Marxist revolutionary theory in Section II, then compare the initial fundamental positions of both countries, namely Lenin's and Mao Zedong's stances on the role of the national bourgeoisie in Section III. This will be followed by an examination of the historical development process in Section IV, and finally, a tentative discussion of several reasons for the divergence in their positions in Section V.

60

II. Revolution and the National Bourgeoisie

In the concluding part of "The Communist Manifesto," Marx states the following: "The Communists do not conceal their aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions." ① The existing social conditions, as perceived by Marx at the time, were the capitalist system, divided into two mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable classes. In such a state of conflict between the ruling class (capitalists) and the oppressed class (laborers), true freedom, equality, and democracy could not exist, and state power became a tool of the minority ruling class, serving as an instrument of violent exploitation of the proletariat. ② Then, how is the liberation of the working class possible under these circumstances? The answer lies in his theory of proletarian revolution. ③ For him, revolution was an inevitable development of class struggle, and a new society could not be born without revolutionary change. Therefore, the revolution of the proletariat, the oppressed class, was inevitable in the transition from capitalist society to communist society, and it was bound to be violent in nature due to the antagonistic relationship. ④ Marx's concept of proletarian violent revolution presupposes the level of development of the productive forces as a condition for its success, and it does not signify a spontaneous uprising of disorganized masses but rather a nationwide uprising of laborers organized as a single class. Since "all class struggle is a political struggle," the organization of the proletariat as a class naturally becomes the organization of a political party. ⑤ According to Engels' definition, this proletariat class refers to the "wage-earning working class," a product of modern capitalism, and did not encompass the entire propertyless class or all classes opposed to the bourgeoisie. This theory of proletarian revolution can be seen to be developed more radically later in Lenin's "State and Revolution." ⑥

61 The development of the productive forces, and it signifies a nationwide uprising of laborers organized as a single class. Since "all class struggle is a political struggle," the organization of the proletariat as a class naturally becomes the organization of a political party. ⑤ According to Engels' definition, this proletariat class refers to the "wage-earning working class," a product of modern capitalism, and did not encompass the entire propertyless class or all classes opposed to the bourgeoisie. This theory of proletarian revolution can be seen to be developed more radically later in Lenin's "State and Revolution." ⑥

Although it is a brief examination of Marx's theory of revolution, one thing that should not be forgotten is that this theory was formed within the reality of Western Europe and was intended for application in Western Europe. This is well illustrated by Marx's reply to a letter from the Russian female revolutionary Vera Zasulich. ⑦ When asked in 1881 how socialists in agricultural Russia should act according to Marx's views, Marx stated the following: 1. My analysis of the capitalist system pertains to Western Europe, and therefore the "historical inevitability" of the path of capitalism that I describe is clearly confined to Western European countries. 2. Private property based on alienated labor is supplanted by capitalist private property based on the exploitation of others, i.e., wages. Therefore, if one follows this Western path, the issue becomes transforming one form of private property into another. 3. In the case of Russian peasants, on the contrary, their communal property must be transformed into private property.

Thus, for Marx, a socialist revolution in a developing country like Russia at the time was not considered, and therefore, the role of the national bourgeoisie was inconceivable within his theory of revolution based on the reality of Western Europe. However, the situation changed after the October Revolution succeeded in Russia, led by the Bolsheviks under Lenin, and the anticipated revolutions in Western Europe, starting with Germany, failed. Lenin's "State and Revolution," published just before the October Revolution, was based on Marx and Engels' theory of proletarian violent revolution. But as the focus shifted to Asia due to the change in circumstances, the existing schematic of revolutionary theory became difficult to apply. At that time, Asia was characterized by a complex interplay of contradictions such as the proletariat and bourgeoisie, the masses and feudalism, and colonies and imperialism. Furthermore, the proletariat, armed with a thorough class consciousness necessary to be the subject of revolution, was weak. Consequently, the role of the national bourgeoisie in the revolution inevitably emerged as a significant issue. Meanwhile, China's revolutionary process inherently made the position of the national bourgeoisie a question, and they also

63 formed a position based on their experiences. Therefore, in the following section, we will examine the initial positions of both countries regarding the national bourgeoisie through Lenin and Mao Zedong.

III. Lenin and Mao Zedong's Positions

When Lenin turned his attention to Asia, a completely different situation existed there. In the case of China, the center of Asia, the workers were immature both qualitatively and quantitatively. Most of them still held patriarchal ways of thinking, and kinship and local ties were very strong. Therefore, even after transitioning from handicraft workers to industrial workers, they did not recognize the necessity of political action. ①

In this reality, the roles of the peasantry (in quantity), the national bourgeoisie (in quality), and the intellectuals in the revolutionary process could not be overlooked. Moreover, before addressing the liberation of the "fourth class" like in Western Europe, fundamental issues such as breaking free from imperialist forces and destroying feudal power were necessary. Thus, even for Lenin, it was unavoidable to recognize the national-bourgeois revolution as the first stage. ② To gain a clearer understanding of Lenin's position on the national bourgeoisie of developing countries, let us briefly review the contents of "On the National and Colonial Question" (Zur Nationalen und Kolonialen Frage), which Lenin presented at the Second Congress of the Communist International in June 1920. 64 This can be broadly summarized into the following seven points. ③

1.) In the colonies, there are already broad movements against capitalism for national independence. However, it is impossible for these nations to achieve equal rights without Soviet assistance.

2.) The movements for freedom are carried out by the indigenous national bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants. Therefore, it is an alliance of many classes.

3.) Within this alliance, indigenous communists must support the "bourgeois democratic" freedom movements, but at the same time, they must fight against backward classes (clergy and landlords). In particular, they must implement land reform.

4.) International communism may support the bourgeois democratic national movements in colonies and backward countries, provided that the elements of a future proletarian party are being cultivated within these countries with the specific task of struggling against the bourgeois democratic movement within their own nation.

5.) This is a direct struggle against those governments in areas where imperialist powers have politically recognized independence but have completely subjugated them economically, financially, and militarily.

65 6.) However, where an alliance is formed, it will only be a "temporary alliance." Through such an alliance between national bourgeois democratic revolutionaries and Soviet power, a new direction of attack against world imperialism is established.

7.) Following the Soviet model, developing countries can bypass the capitalist stage and build a socialist society with Soviet aid and the help of the revolutionary proletariat in the West.

The above remarks by Lenin clearly articulate his position on the national bourgeoisie of developing countries, and it can be seen that he is generalizing the experience of the Russian Revolution (February Revolution (bourgeois democratic revolution) → October Revolution (communist revolution) → (land reform, socialization, industrialization according to a non-capitalist model) → socialism). However, one point to note is that when this thesis was adopted, there was an opposing opinion from the Indian communist M. N. Roy. ④ His argument that the revolution should proceed under the leadership of communists from the initial stage aligns with Mao Zedong's later arguments.

From this position, Lenin issued the directive for "Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation" to the Chinese Communist Party in 1922. However, the result was the emergence of Chiang Kai-shek's military dictatorship (1927) and the tragic defeat of the Communist Party. Subsequently, through bitter experiences like the Long March, Mao Zedong developed his own position on the national bourgeoisie.

66 In his earliest work, the "Report to the Party on His Native Province of Hunan," he divided the types of bourgeoisie into three categories: first, the landlord and compradore bourgeoisie (enemies of revolution with whom alliance is impossible); second, the national bourgeoisie (whose attitude is ambivalent; they sympathize with the anti-imperialist revolution but oppose the proletarian revolution); and third, the petty bourgeoisie (including self-employed farmers, artisans, students, lower-level officials, small traders, etc., who will sympathize with the revolution when the dawn of revolution breaks). ⑤ As seen above, from Mao Zedong's perspective, to effectively utilize the national bourgeoisie, which has a dual character, his unique position emerged—that is, to cooperate in the revolution while the Communist Party retains leadership. To grasp this position more clearly, let us examine his subsequent theoretical development. In "On Contradiction," written in August 1937, he explains the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction, stating the following: ⑥ "In the development process of complex things, there are many contradictions, but there is always a principal contradiction, and its existence and development affect the existence and development of other contradictions." Under this theory, he identifies the principal contradiction in China as the semi-colonial, semi-feudal state, and states that Chinese society will transform into a new democratic society when the people, led by the proletariat, transform from the ruled to the rulers. ⑦ This is further elaborated in "On New Democracy," published in 1940,

67 "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party." In "On New Democracy" ⑧, he emphasizes that a stage of New Democracy is necessary to move towards socialism in the current situation. To achieve this, he argues that a republic led by a dictatorial regime formed by the alliance of, first, the peasantry; second, the workers, petty bourgeoisie, and intellectuals; and third, the national bourgeoisie, should lead the revolution. However, he clarifies the dual character of the national bourgeoisie and states that they cannot be given leadership. ⑨ "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" provides the theoretical basis for the preceding work, elucidating the history of China from the perspective of historical materialism (here too, China after the Opium War is understood as semi-feudal and semi-colonial) and the nature of the New Democratic Revolution. Summarizing the nature of this revolution, it can be seen as "politically, a dictatorship of the revolutionary classes and opposition to bourgeois dictatorship; economically, the preservation of large capital and enterprises..." and therefore, it is argued to be distinct from bourgeois dictatorship and socialist revolution.

As seen above, Mao Zedong's position differs from Lenin's in the following respects. First, in the revolution for liberation from feudal and colonial status in developing countries, he joins hands with the national bourgeoisie but does not recognize their autonomy (negation of bourgeois revolution). Second, with the establishment of New Democracy through revolution, he simultaneously carries out land reform and socialization, eliminating other classes, thus making socialist revolution possible. Third, the transition from the New Democratic Revolution to the socialist revolution is achieved through peaceful means, not violent ones, upon the completion of the aforementioned reforms. Mao Zedong's position thus offers another model alongside Lenin's revolutionary model for developing countries. Therefore, in the next section, we need to examine how these two models, and consequently the two positions on the national bourgeoisie, have changed in concrete historical circumstances and what results they have yielded.

IV. The Process of Change in the Positions of Both Countries

1. Formation of Positions

In accordance with the thesis he outlined in 1920, Lenin issued the following directive to the Chinese Communist Party in 1922. ① "It is the worst opportunism for communists in the colonies to refuse to participate in the struggle against imperialist oppression (by bourgeois nationalists) on the grounds that they must defend the interests of their own class... The slogan that must be emphasized in Asia today is a united front against imperialism (in cooperation with bourgeois nationalists)."

The Chinese Communist Party diligently followed this directive, but the result was the tragic establishment of Chiang Kai-shek's military dictatorship. However, Stalin, who succeeded Lenin, maintained the traditional position despite this outcome.

69 The reason for this is twofold: first, a consolidated China was necessary as a shield against Japan's territorial expansionist efforts; and second, at the time, domestic opposition accused those who supported Chiang's regime of prioritizing Soviet national policy objectives over the goals of international communism, leading to a state of confrontation. Therefore, it is believed that Lenin's position was maintained. ② Stalin justified this by arguing that revolution also needs "breathing room (Atempause)" and that it is necessary to maintain relations with capitalism to preserve the success achieved in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, to carry out the First Five-Year Plan, it was unavoidable to establish normal diplomatic relations with capitalist countries, including Western Europe (e.g., joining the League of Nations on September 16, 1934). Consequently, the Soviet Union focused on industrialization under the banner of "socialism in one country," and the issue of colonies faded from Soviet attention for the next ten years. Amidst this, World War II broke out, and the Soviet Union entered into alliances with countries that possessed colonies, leading to the abandonment of the Comintern itself. After World War II, the Soviet Union, as a victorious power, attempted to pursue an expansionist policy through its own strength but could not achieve practical results.

Meanwhile, in China, after the establishment of the Yan'an regime in 1934, based on Mao Zedong's theory of New Democracy, they allied with the national bourgeoisie to drive out the forces of Japanese imperialism. From 1945 onwards, a struggle for dominance within China unfolded, leading to the birth of the People's Republic of China in October 1949. 70 Along with this, the theory of New Democracy was transformed into the People's Democratic Dictatorship, with no significant difference in its basic concept. To understand this, Mao Zedong's essay "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," published on June 30, 1949, presents the following argument. ③ "The foundation of the People's Democratic Dictatorship is the alliance of the working class, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie, primarily the alliance of the workers and peasants. This is because these two classes constitute 80% to 90% of the Chinese population... To transition from New Democracy to socialism, it is essential to rely mainly on the alliance of these two classes." He clarifies the basic nature and points out that the success of the revolution is possible only if this People's Democratic Dictatorship is led by the working class, which has the most revolutionary character. Regarding the national bourgeoisie, he states that to confront the current powerful imperialist forces and to improve China's backward economic status, it is unavoidable to maintain ties with them. However, "the national bourgeoisie cannot be the leader of the revolution, nor can they occupy a major position within state power. This is because the socio-economic position of the national bourgeoisie determines their weakness; they lack a long-term perspective and sufficient courage, and many of them also fear the masses." ④

Mao Zedong's position, coupled with the establishment of the CCP and the Soviet Union's temporary passive stance towards colonies, led to the emergence of a position within world communism

71 that became the starting point of the Sino-Soviet dispute in late 1950.

2. The Non-Colonial Process and the Positions of Both Countries

After World War II, contrary to the expectations of the Soviet Union and China, most former colonies gained independence non-violently (with exceptions like Indonesia, Indochina, Algeria, etc.). This led both countries to adopt the stance that, according to Lenin's famous proposition, ⑤ such colonial independence was merely formal, and new colonialism was established through economic, financial, and military subjugation. Therefore, they argued that a people's liberation front should be built through guerrilla warfare. However, amidst this, the regimes of newly independent nations began to defend themselves against communism and allied with their former colonial powers, leading to the formation of a bloc against the communist bloc. Consequently, a revision of the policies of both countries towards former colonies became unavoidable. Concrete examples include the Panchsheel Treaty signed by China with India in 1954 ⑥ and the Soviet Union's "zone of peace" theory in 1956. ⑦ Faced with this reality arising from overly schematic theories, a step backward in the strategy of world revolution had to be taken. 3. The Sino-Soviet Dispute

Following the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, which proposed the theory of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union began to adopt a more positive evaluation of the national bourgeoisie. Through the writings of Zukov, known as an expert on Asia at the time, ⑧ it is stated that "although the peasants are overwhelmingly numerous, they are dispersed and lack internal cohesion, thus a tightly knit force cannot be formed. Therefore, in Asia and Africa, where the working class has not yet generally occupied a recognized leadership position, the national bourgeoisie is leading the anti-colonial movements." He emphasizes mutual cooperation between communists and the national bourgeoisie, as the disintegration of any colony weakens the capitalist system.

With this more active evaluation of the national bourgeoisie and based on the theory of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union shifted its focus from military struggle to political and economic struggle, making a revision in its stance towards newly developing countries unavoidable. Consequently, in former colonies, communists were to be allowed to operate with diplomatic and economic support, with the primary goal of exerting significant communist influence before the collapse of the bourgeoisie and detaching them from the imperialist bloc. Therefore, the issue was considered more from the dimension of Soviet foreign policy, and concrete examples include aid to Nasser, who suppressed domestic communists, and a passive attitude towards the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria (due to relations with France).

73 China, which had shown a conciliatory attitude towards the national bourgeoisie since around 1954 but with little effect, began to react against this Soviet stance. By 1959, as the third stage of the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute since 1956, disagreements over the "People's Liberation Front" became overt. While the Soviet Union argued that the struggle against imperialism and feudalism could be carried out within the existing regime, and that the ultimate outcome of the revolutionary dilemma in these countries would be decided not only by the struggle of local communists but also in the process of peaceful competition between East and West, China argued the following: ⑨ "To some extent, cooperation with the bourgeoisie in the struggle against imperialism and feudal forces is possible. However, the bourgeoisie are bourgeoisie after all. Once they seize power, they do not follow a firm revolutionary line and attempt to waver and compromise. Consequently, not only socialist revolution but even national democratic revolution becomes impossible, and furthermore, the independence they gain becomes unstable."

Thus, while both countries agree on the necessity of revolution in developing countries for the sake of world communism, there are completely different views regarding the speed of revolution and the role of the national bourgeoisie. This difference in their positions led the Soviet Union to advocate for a "National Democratic Front" ⑩ at the Congress of 81 Communist Parties in 1960. Conversely, China, although signing the Moscow Declaration of the 1960 Party Congress, adhered to its position advocated in New Democracy and People's Democracy, arguing first that the old state apparatus must be destroyed, making it impossible to transition from a bourgeois government to a "workers' and peasants' government"; and second, that aid cannot be provided to neutral countries that do not actively fight against Western imperialist forces.

In the 1960s, the positions of both countries were maintained and developed as described above. However, due to insufficient data collection and limitations, a detailed explanation will be reserved for future research. It is sufficient to note that in the basic document "Tasks of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle at the Present Stage and the Unity of Action of All Anti-Imperialist Forces" ⑪ adopted at the World Communist Party Congress held in June 1969, there were no significant policy changes compared to the Soviet position. Similarly, China's position, as reflected in the People's Daily article "Long Live the Victory of People's War" (Lin Biao) on September 3, 1965 ⑫ and the communique of the 11th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in August 1966 ⑬, showed no substantial policy shifts.

V. Several Reasons for the Divergent Positions From the review so far, it is evident that while both China and the Soviet Union recognize the necessity of alliances in the anti-imperialist struggle concerning newly independent countries that were formerly colonies, they do not agree on the role of the national bourgeoisie in the process of carrying out this struggle.

If this is the case, what are the reasons for these divergent positions on the national bourgeoisie? In this brief study, we will tentatively point out only a few aspects.

First, "The October Revolution began with an uprising of the armed working class in the capital. Its development proceeded by first occupying the cities and then expanding into the countryside. However, the Chinese revolutionary war, which began under the independent leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in 1927, was based on a peasant revolution, succeeded in some rural areas, and eventually succeeded in the cities as well." ①

As compared in "Hongqi" in 1960, the revolutionary experiences of China and the Soviet Union were entirely different. In the Soviet Union, because the revolution began with urban workers over a short period without relying on guerrilla warfare, there was no significant relationship with the national bourgeoisie in that process. In contrast, in China, the revolution was carried out over twenty years, relying on peasant forces and employing guerrilla warfare, starting from the countryside and encircling the cities. Therefore, the manipulation of the national bourgeoisie was important, and the failure of the First United Front in 1927, in particular, had a profound impact on establishing China's unique model. ② Consequently, based on their experiences, China adopted a position of alliance with the national bourgeoisie under the leadership of the Communist Party in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, while the Soviet Union, following its model of bourgeois revolution → proletarian revolution → socialism, presented the national bourgeoisie's role in developing countries as a stage in the process.

Second, the changes and decisions in the positions of both countries are heavily influenced by "revolutionary interests," to borrow Zagoria's expression. ③ From the perspective of "the Soviet and Chinese outlooks," the world is in revolutionary turmoil and is destined to be communized. However, in pursuing this process, differences arise in priorities, regionalism, and timing. ④ That is, their differing revolutionary interests often determine these differences. The Soviet Union prioritizes advanced Western imperialist powers and requires greater flexibility in its stance towards developing regions to weaken them. In contrast, China wishes for revolutionary lines to ignite in developing regions, leaving Western Europe to the Soviet Union, and primarily leading their own revolution. These differing revolutionary interests between the two countries did not significantly clash until Stalin's death, but after Khrushchev's era, a more flexible attitude towards developing regions emerged, causing many disputes with China.

Third, the difference in economic levels and the superiority or inferiority of military power between China and the Soviet Union also constitute another important reason. ⑤ Despite considerable efforts, China still belongs to the category of "have-not" nations, while the Soviet Union has grown into an industrial nation over fifty years, belonging to the group of "have" nations. Therefore, the Soviet Union tends to support anti-imperialist movements in developing regions through diplomatic and economic means, while China adopts a more proactive stance, with an underlying intention to compensate for its economic weaknesses. Militarily, the Soviet Union has emerged as a superpower rivaling the United States, while China remains a secondary potential power. Consequently, the Soviet Union adopts a more cautious attitude, whereas China adheres to the theories of protracted war and anti-nuclear weapons.

77 Therefore, the Soviet Union, considering the risk of world war, has temporarily postponed the direct global communization through military means, but China still advocates for global communization through the transformation of capitalist systems via revolution.

The above attempts to theoretically explain several reasons for the divergence in the positions of both countries. However, a more profound study of world wars by both countries is necessary to elucidate this issue at a higher level. At the current level of the author's knowledge, it is only possible to stop here for now.

VI. Conclusion

The first is that the national bourgeoisie in underdeveloped countries was considered in the revolutionary theory of Marxism only after the failure of the expected continuous revolutions in Western Europe following the success of the Russian Revolution, and when Asia came into view. The second is that the fundamental difference between Lenin and Mao Zedong lay in the divergence of their respective revolutionary models for underdeveloped countries, determining who should take the lead in the initial revolutionary process. The third is that despite subsequent changes in circumstances, the positions of Lenin and Mao Zedong form the basis for both countries. The fourth is that the reasons for these differing positions can be found in historical experiences, national strength, and the interests of the revolution.

The author will address the questions raised by these findings in a future study, after conducting more concrete research on the relationship between China, the Soviet Union, and Korea. For this brief paper, this matter will be postponed to a later opportunity. (Deleted)

Through the above considerations, the positions of China and the Soviet Union regarding the national bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries have been historically understood. This has been one of the important issues in the current Sino-Soviet conflict, and furthermore, this Sino-Soviet conflict has become one of the major factors in international pluralization.

79 Note II. Revolution and the National Bourgeoisie

① K. Marx, The Communist Manifesto, (Quoted from Man & The State, The Political Philosophers, p. 532)

② V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution, Chap. I, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965)

In this book, Lenin emphasizes the violent nature of the political system of proletarian dictatorship more than Marx.

③ H. Arendt, On Revolution, (New York: The Viking Press, 1965) Although Chap. I, 'The Meaning of Revolution' in this book is not directly related to this paper, it provided significant insights into understanding the nature of modern revolutions. The significance of Marx's theory of revolution is discussed on pp. 56-61.

④ Although Marx and Engels never abandoned their belief in revolution, in their later years, they advocated the theory of violent revolution, limited to the European continent. Marx-Engels, Ausgewählte Briefe, Berlin, 1953. p. 307. [Quoted again in Yang Ho-min, Marxism-Leninism (Theoretical Critique Volume)]

⑤ K. Marx, op. cit. Chap II.

⑥ V. I. Lenin, op. cit. Chap I, V

⑦ E. Boettcher, Politische Begründung und Methoden Kommunistischer Entwicklungspolitik, in: Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik, hrsg. von Eric Boettcher, Tübingen, 1964, p. 103 III. Lenin and Mao Zedong's Positions

① Ch’en Tu-hsiu, quoted in Schwatz, Communism, p. 48 [Quoted again in Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, (N.Y.: A Mentor Book, 1964) pp. 157-158]

② Refer to Chap. VI, 'With or Without the Bourgeoisie?' in K. Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, (N.Y.: A Mentor Book, 1964).

③ Quoted again from E. Boettcher, op. cit. p. 126

④ See Note 27 on p. 129 of E. Boettcher, op. cit.

For this debate, refer to Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China 1917-1924, (New York, 1954) and E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-23, Vol. 3, (London, 1953).

⑤ Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works (London and New York), Vol. I, pp. 13-20. [Quoted again in K. Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, p. 174] This report was submitted to the Party by Mao Zedong after a 32-day stay in his hometown of Hunan Province in 1926, emphasizing the importance of the peasants in the revolutionary process.

⑥ Mao Zedong, On Contradiction (Tokyo: Heibonsha's World Culture Series 15, 1968) p. 215. ⑦ Mao Zedong, ibid. p. 218

⑧ Mao Zedong, On New Democracy (January 19, 1940)

81 Quoted again from pp. 185-190 of the excerpt and summary in Robert Payne's chapter 'Mao Tse-Yung's Eight, Five Books'.

⑨ Mao Zedong, The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China (1940) [Quoted again from Robert Payne, op. cit. pp. 191-196]

IV. The Process of Change in the Positions of Both Countries

① Degras, Communist International, Vol. I, pp. 389 ff. ② E. Boettcher, op. cit. p. 129

③ Mao Zedong, 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship – Commemorating the 28th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China.' In this paper, it is quoted from pp. 324 of 'The Independence of Nations' (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1968), Volume 17 of the 'Modern Thinkers' series, edited and annotated by Yoshie Hotta.

④ Mao Zedong, ibid. p. 325

⑤ E. Boettcher, op. cit. p. 126

This proposition still holds considerable influence today. Examples include Kenzo Gushima's 'Modern Colonialism' (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1969, 12th printing) and Harry Magdoff's 'The Age of Imperialism' (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1969), recently translated into the Iwanami Shinsho series. ⑥ An agreement concluded between the People's Republic of China and India in April 1954, with the following provisions: First, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; second, non-aggression; third, mutual non-interference in internal affairs; fourth, improvement of international relations based on equality and mutual benefit; fifth, peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation. (Refer to W. W. Kulski, Peaceful Co-Existence)

⑦ Proposed at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, this theory posits that the region of peace includes socialist countries in Europe and Asia, as well as non-socialist peace-loving countries (primarily newly independent nations from former colonies), and that these should pursue peace together. (Refer to W. W. Kulski's Peaceful Co-Existence).

⑧ Yu. Zukhov, “Znamenatel’nyi Faktor Nashegs Vremeni” (Pravda, August 26, 1960) [Quoted again in D. S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962) pp. 254-255] ⑨ Whang Chia-hsiang, in Ten Glorious Years, 1954-1959 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960) p. 4, [Quoted again in D. S. Zagoria's aforementioned work pp. 276-279]

⑩ Adopted at the Conference of 81 Communist Parties held in Moscow in December 1960. The content can be summarized as follows: 'The political basis of a national democratic state is a bloc of all progressive patriotic forces struggling for complete national independence, for comprehensive democracy, and for the completion of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution. (...) The aims of the communists are in line with the supreme interests of the nation. (...)' (From E. Boettcher's aforementioned work).

⑪ Asahi Shimbun, June 19, 1969.

⑫ Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War” (Tokyo: Kyodo News Service's World Yearbook, 1967) pp. 99-101

83 Lin Biao published this article in the People's Daily on September 3, 1965. It praises Mao Zedong's people's war up to the establishment of the PRC and further argues that his contemporary world revolution should be carried out by encircling the world's cities, thus emphasizing the people's revolutionary struggle in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

⑬ The essence of this communique is as follows: 'First, US imperialism, though appearing strong, is in reality a "paper tiger." Second, the new leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is promoting Khrushchev revisionism without Khrushchev, forming a new holy alliance against communism, the people, and China, in conjunction with imperialism led by the United States and the reactionaries of various countries. Third, therefore, to oppose imperialism, one must also oppose modern revisionism. There is no middle ground in the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism.'

V. Several Reasons for the Divergent Positions

① Red Flag, No. 20-21, 1960. From text released by NCNA, November 2, 1960. “A Basic Summing Up of Experience Gained in the Victory of the Chinese People’s Revolution” Quoted again in G. F. Hudson, R. Lowenthal & R. MacFarguhan (eds.), The Sino-Soviet Dispute (The China Quarterly, 1961) pp. 162-163 ② Donald S. Zagoria, op. cit. p. 16

③ Donald S. Zagoria, op. cit. p. 19 Zagoria explains that while revolutionary interests are influenced by national interests, they transcend the dimension of world revolution.

④ Donald S. Zagoria, op. cit. p. 19 ⑤ Donald S. Zagoria, op. cit. pp. 18-19

85 Bibliography K. Marx, The Communist Manifesto, (The edition in Man & the State, The

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———“Speech at the National Propaganda Work Conference of the Communist Party of China” (Tokyo: Heibonsha,

1968)

Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War” (Tokyo: World Yearbook, 1967)

G. F. Hudson, R. Lowenthal & R. MacFarguhan, The Sino-Soviet

Dispute (London: The China Quarterly, 1961)

World Yearbook, 1967, (Tokyo: Kyodo News Service)

Asahi Shimbun, 1969.

Collection of Declarations on Human Rights (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 1968, 14th printing)

H. Arendt, On Revolution (N.Y.: The Viking Press, 1965)

K. Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (N.Y.: A Mentor Book, 1964) A. Fremantle, Mao Tse-tung (N.Y.: A Mentor Book)

R. Payne, Mao Tse-Tung (N.Y.: A Pyramid Book, 1966)

D. S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton,

Princeton Univ. 1962)

86 Kim Sang-hyup, Mao Zedong Thought (Seoul: Jimun Gak, 1964)

Kenzo Gushima, Modern Colonialism (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1969, 12th printing) W. W. Kulski, Peaceful Co-Existence

Yonosuke Nagai, The Price of Peace (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1967)

E. Wilson, To the Finland Station, (N. Y. Doubleclay & Company,

1953)

E. Boettchen, Politisch Begründung und Methoden

kommunistischen Entwicklungspolitik, in:

Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik, hrsg, von Eric

Boettchen, Tübingen, 1964.

87

Position on the National Bourgeoisie of Developing Countries"

is written.

88