Seeking the ‘Structure of Peace’ in the 21st Century: Reading Kissinger-Zhou’s 42-Hour Dialogue in the Forbidden City

Hwang Yeojun · Sungkyunkwan University

Introduction

From 1950 to the present, Taiwan has always been situated within the fissures of the rift between the United States and China. The "Opening to China" policy of 1972, which marked a transition from 22 years of estrangement to the first joint communiqué, is considered a dramatic moment in American diplomatic history. The conditions and strategies that enabled reconciliation with Communist China, despite the potential for backlash from anti-communist factions still remaining within the American political establishment, hold significant meaning and resonance even today. Furthermore, the complex situation created by multiple security anxieties surrounding China and the war on the Indochinese Peninsula, along with the triangular relationship between the US, China, and Russia, bears a resemblance to the current geopolitical landscape, including the Russia-Ukraine war.

There are points of overlap with the current situation. Given that the US and China adjusted their policies towards each other and initiated dialogue almost simultaneously, a close analysis of the conditions that made such an alignment possible is crucial. This report focuses on the 42-hour dialogue between Kissinger and Zhou during Kissinger's two visits to China (July and October 1971), which shaped the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. It examines the motivations and conditions from the US perspective that allowed for the pursuit and continuation of the American "Opening to China" policy and evaluates the outcomes of the US-China negotiations.

US Adjustment of China Policy: Up to the Johnson Administration

It is well-known that only a handful of individuals, including Nixon and Kissinger, were involved in the process leading up to Nixon's visit to China in 1972. There is no doubt that Nixon's intentions played a major role in the full-scale pursuit of normalizing relations with China. However, the conditions that enabled Nixon to boldly pursue a policy toward China had been ripening even before he took office.

The 'image' of China held by the US bureaucratic system has evolved based on China's internal situation, foreign policy, and external conditions. Evelyn Goh categorizes the US image of China into four types: the 'Red Menace,' perceiving China as a communist state and a unified force with the Soviet Union; the 'Revolutionary Rival,' viewing China as having an aggressive revolutionary ideology but also recognizing the rivalry between the Soviet Union and China; the 'Troubled Modernizer,' looking sympathetically at China's struggles with economic development and modernization, such as the failure of the Great Leap Forward; and the 'Resurgent Power,' focusing on China's past glory and humiliation. While the first two images reflect a traditional Cold War perspective, the latter two incorporate revisionist viewpoints that emerged in response to changing domestic and international circumstances. The shift towards a revisionist image of China can be traced back to the Kennedy administration. While wary of China's growing threats, such as the Sino-Indian border conflict, the Taiwan Strait crises, China's development of nuclear weapons, and its expanding influence in the Third World, the Kennedy administration continuously explored possibilities for modifying its policy toward China, considering the conflict between the Soviet Union and China and the failures of the Great Leap Forward. By 1965, with the Johnson administration in power, voices began to emerge within the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee suggesting engagement with China, taking into account the Sino-Soviet conflict. Fearing a recurrence of the tragedy of the Korean War in Vietnam, the Johnson administration quickly aligned with this shift in sentiment, signaling a desire for improved relations with China. (Xia, 2006) However, due to the Cultural Revolution reaching its peak in China at the same time, which destabilized the Chinese bureaucracy and made the pursuit of foreign policy itself impossible, the task of reconciliation with China was passed on to the next administration.

The background for the US's adjustment of its China policy can be summarized in four points.

First, the failure of the Great Leap Forward generated a degree of sympathy towards China. Second, as indicated by the narrow defeat of the resolution to grant the People's Republic of China membership in the UN in 1965, international opinion gradually began to turn away from the US's uncompromising policy toward China. Third, with the escalation of the Vietnam War, it became necessary to prevent direct conflict with China, and more broadly, war-weariness led to the pursuit of a more relaxed policy toward the Communist bloc. Finally, with the visible Sino-Soviet conflict and the deepening political and economic instability in China, discussions on how to respond to the changed situation could begin in earnest.

The Nixon Administration and Initial Contact with China

In 1968, when Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller were competing for the Republican presidential nomination, both Nixon and Kissinger (who was with Rockefeller's campaign) believed in abandoning the containment of China and moving towards improved relations, though their approaches differed. While Nixon cited the inability of the US to pursue a containment policy toward China due to the Vietnam War and advocated for the 'principle of self-reliance' for the security of allies in Asia, Kissinger, in a speech he drafted, stated that "as part of a new balance-of-power policy that Nixon has not yet grasped," it was necessary to "pursue a new policy toward Communist China." (Tudda, 2013, p.3) This indicates that Kissinger recognized the need to improve relations with China from the perspective of US-China-Soviet triangular diplomacy and power balance even before being appointed National Security Advisor. Impressed by Kissinger's approach, Nixon recruited him as the next National Security Advisor a few weeks after winning the nomination.

Although Nixon signaled a shift in foreign policy in his inaugural address by declaring a move from an "era of confrontation" to an "era of negotiation," it does not appear that he initially envisioned a "Opening to China" policy in the form it took in 1972. Alfred Jenkins, a China expert at the State Department during the Johnson administration, acknowledged that the Sino-Soviet conflict provided China with an incentive to engage in dialogue with the US, but he doubted whether China had a "fundamental" desire for improved relations, and this skepticism made the US hesitant to pursue reconciliation. This skepticism carried over into the Nixon administration, with officials in the State Department uncertain about the possibility of negotiations with the Chinese leadership. 2 2 There appear to be differing views between Tudda and Goh regarding the origin of the framework for the "Opening to China" policy. Tudda places emphasis on Nixon, explaining the process leading to the 1972 summit, while Goh views the Nixon-Kissinger negotiation strategy and policy framework as having been first proposed within the bureaucratic system, including the State Department. This report primarily refers to Goh's perspective.

In February 1969, a document discussing the Warsaw ambassadorial talks (which China unilaterally canceled two days before the meeting) proposed showing China a willingness to reconsider the issue of US military presence in Taiwan. However, this was rejected by then-Secretary of State Rogers and Kissinger. Thus, in the early days of Nixon's presidency, US policy toward China remained in an 'exploratory phase.' (Goh, 2004, p.130)

The Nixon administration's image of China changed as the Sino-Soviet border conflict intensified in March. Taking a cue from the Soviet Union's anxiety about the growing closeness between the US and China, Nixon and Kissinger began to formulate the "Opening to China" policy from mid-1969. At a NSC meeting in May 1969, Kissinger proposed that "history will take the side of the weaker of two hostile powers," indicating a willingness to improve relations with China based on a balance-of-power policy. (Quoted in Xia, 2006, p.141) In September of the same year, Nixon and Kissinger instructed Ambassador Stossel in Poland to convey a request to Chinese counterparts to resume the Warsaw ambassadorial talks, marking the first contact between the US and China during the Nixon administration.

Two Warsaw Talks, and the Interplay Between the White House and the State Department

Quarterly

After taking office, Nixon, along with Kissinger, undertook organizational reforms to shift the initiative in foreign policy from the State Department to the White House and the NSC. Kissinger's distrust and disdain for the bureaucracy are evident multiple times, even in the jokes exchanged between him and Zhou Enlai in their dialogue. Perhaps due to Nixon and Kissinger's distrust of the bureaucracy, the "Opening to China" policy was pursued by a very small group of individuals through a 'secret channel' via Pakistan and Romania, following the breakdown of the third Warsaw talks during the Nixon administration. However, contrary to Kissinger's portrayal of the State Department as an obstacle to China policy in various contexts, the guidelines provided by the State Department to Stossel during the two Warsaw talks were largely reflected in the subsequent negotiations between Kissinger and Zhou.

The Taiwan issue was the primary reason for the 22-year estrangement in US-China relations following the Korean War, and it was also the issue that caused the 134 rounds of Warsaw talks to remain stagnant. The main agenda of the two Warsaw talks during the Nixon administration was also the Taiwan issue. The guidelines provided by the State Department to Stossel during the first Warsaw talk included three new proposals regarding the Taiwan issue. These new proposals stated that "the United States would not stand in the way of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan situation by Beijing and Taipei," "would not support aggressive military actions by Taiwan toward the mainland," and "hoped to reduce US military forces stationed in Taiwan as peace and stability were established in Asia."

Furthermore, the State Department provided guidelines to the Chinese side proposing that a Chinese delegation meet in Washington or a US delegation meet in Beijing, and the Chinese participant, Lei Yang, also proposed a 'high-level meeting.' As both sides showed a willingness for progress in the first Warsaw talk, Kissinger advised Nixon that the US needed to consider what it would gain and what it would concede to China in improving relations. (Quoted in Accinelli, 2006, p.14)

In preparing for the second meeting, the State Department proposed a negotiation strategy that divided the Taiwan issue into political and military aspects. Specifically, citing the increase in US troops stationed in Taiwan due to the Vietnam War, the State Department suggested a strategy linking the end of the Vietnam War with a reduction of forces stationed in Taiwan, an idea that was subsequently reflected when Kissinger visited China. On the other hand, the State Department's position on Taiwan from a political perspective was more conservative than the US stance that Kissinger later conveyed to Zhou. The State Department's strategy document argued that the position on the Taiwan issue should be "kept sufficiently ambiguous so that both sides (the US and China) can continue to pursue what they desire." Previously, the US had maintained the position that the status of Taiwan was "Undetermined." The State Department's strategy document suggested that this position was advantageous for the US in continuing to guarantee Taiwan's security and proposed that the US should not 'abandon' Taiwan in the negotiation process with China. Nixon requested a stronger expression of intent to pursue a high-level meeting, but he was generally satisfied with the State Department's strategy. (Accinelli, 2006, p.16)

In preparation for the third Warsaw talk, which was canceled due to the US military incursion into Cambodia, the State Department presented six basic principles for a high-level meeting.

(1) Disputes related to Taiwan should be peacefully resolved between the directly involved parties on the mainland and Taiwan.

(2) The United States will not interfere in such an agreement.

(3) As tensions in the region decrease, US forces stationed in Taiwan will be gradually reduced.

(4) The United States and the People's Republic of China will resolve disputes between them through peaceful negotiation.

(5) It is desirable to expand mutual contact and trade from both perspectives.

(6) The (five) principles of peaceful coexistence are consistent with the preceding principles.

It will be resolved through peaceful negotiations.

(5) Expanding mutual contact and trade from both sides' perspectives

is desirable.

(6) The (five) principles of peaceful coexistence are consistent with the preceding principles.

The breakdown of the third meeting provided an opportunity for the White House to seize complete control of China policy. The framework presented by the State Department in the Warsaw talks guidelines, as mentioned earlier, was maintained in subsequent negotiations with China. However, the State Department's intention to maintain the position that Taiwan's status was "undetermined" appears to have been stronger than that of Nixon and Kissinger. As will be discussed later, Kissinger quickly conceded in his first dialogue with Zhou, stating that he would no longer repeat that position. Furthermore, the State Department was more reserved than the White House about proceeding to a high-level meeting, arguing that China's intentions needed further examination, whereas Kissinger believed that China's security anxieties provided sufficient motivation for fundamental improvement in relations with the US. The subtle differences in attitude toward Taiwan and disagreements on policy speed became the background for Nixon-Kissinger to independently pursue China policy.

Reading the 42-Hour Kissinger-Zhou Dialogue (1) Hasty Concessions?

Reading the Kissinger-Zhou 42-Hour Talk (1) Hasty Concessions?

As noted, this report aims to analyze the process leading to the détente between the US and China in February 1972 from the US perspective. In other words, the core question to be answered by reading the Kissinger-Zhou dialogue is how the US détente policy was pursued and maintained, and what were the domestic and international conditions and will that ultimately led to the agreement on the 'Shanghai Communiqué.' The 'POLO I' briefing book, personally prepared by Kissinger before his first secret visit to China, outlines the objectives of Kissinger's overall pursuit of the visit and détente policy. The objectives he stated are:

① Assurances that China would use its influence to move North Vietnam towards a peaceful and acceptable settlement of the Vietnam War.

② A modus vivendi on the Taiwan issue that would allow the US to develop relations with China while maintaining diplomatic relations and a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.

③ Direct communication channels to discuss matters of mutual understanding, including the discussion of details for Nixon's visit to Beijing (such as arms control, expansion of trade and tourism, and easing of tensions in East and Southeast Asia).

Indications firm enough to be taken as assurances

② A modus vivendi on the Taiwan issue that would allow the US to develop relations with China while maintaining diplomatic relations and a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.

for the US to develop relations with China while maintaining diplomatic relations and a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.

US-China consultation on the Taiwan issue (modus vivendi)

③ Direct communication channels to discuss matters of mutual understanding, including the discussion of details for Nixon's visit to Beijing (such as arms control, trade and tourism expansion, and easing of tensions in East and Southeast Asia).

including the discussion of details for Nixon's visit to Beijing (such as arms control, trade and tourism expansion, and easing of tensions in East and Southeast Asia).

easing of tensions in East and Southeast Asia).

in the form of continued US-China relations.

in the form of continued US-China relations.

④ An assessment of how China views the Soviet Union's role in global affairs and how this relates to Soviet military capabilities.

and how this relates to Soviet military capabilities.

assessment

These are four objectives in total. Although a similar 'POLO II' briefing book was likely prepared before the second visit, unfortunately, the materials accessible online are limited to the POLO I briefing book. However, even if the prospects for realistically achievable goals changed, the ultimate objective of détente remained the same, allowing us to evaluate Kissinger's 42-hour negotiation record based on these four objectives.

Among the four objectives, the highest priority for Nixon and Kissinger was likely to enlist China's influence to bring the Vietnam War to an acceptable conclusion. As will be discussed later, Zhou firmly stated that he would not intervene in the peace negotiations between Vietnam and the US, despite Kissinger's repeated polite requests. This intuitively seems to undermine the most important and urgent motivation for improving relations with China. Moreover, given the extreme security threats faced from all directions (from the Soviet Union, India, Japan, and the US), it is reasonable to assume that the US held leverage in the negotiations. Nevertheless, it is worth questioning why the US continued to pursue détente policy, even risking significantly shrinking the scope of negotiation on the Taiwan issue in future US-China relations.

The 42-hour dialogue consisted of exchanges and negotiations on "substantive matters," as described by Kissinger and Zhou, including Taiwan, the Vietnam War, the Korean Peninsula, relations with "great powers" such as Japan and the Soviet Union, and the Indo-Pakistani conflict, as well as discussions on "technical matters" for Nixon's visit to China. Substantive matters can be further divided into "fundamental issues" where disputes and negotiations occurred to advance bilateral relations, exchanges of views where positions were confirmed without contentious debate (particularly the US position to alleviate China's security anxieties), and issues related to communication to facilitate the future process of improving relations (such as official government statements or the establishment of a Washington-Beijing "hot-line"). While the two countries engaged in informal exchanges of views on fundamental issues, they also reached agreements on the level and form of formalizing their respective positions through Nixon's visit to China. This report will focus on the dialogue surrounding two fundamental issues, Taiwan and the Vietnam War, and examine the dialogue record with a focus on these issues.

On July 9, 1971, during his first meeting with Zhou, Kissinger proposed approaching the Taiwan issue by dividing it into matters of "political progress" and matters of "troop withdrawal," emphasizing that political progress should be achieved gradually. Zhou countered Kissinger's approach by stating that Taiwan was an internal issue for China and that the withdrawal of foreign troops from U.S. territory could not be separated from "political progress." Zhou viewed the withdrawal of troops from Taiwan as at least equivalent to a political declaration acknowledging that Taiwan is a territory over which the People's Republic of China holds sovereignty. While not agreeing with Kissinger's approach, Zhou did acknowledge that an agreement and official announcement on the Taiwan issue would eventually be made through gradual steps. Mao, who provided guidelines for Zhou, made it clear that the United States' recognition of the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government representing all of China was a prerequisite for the final normalization of relations, but he did not make this a prerequisite for Nixon's visit to China in 1972. Thanks to the time Mao and Zhou afforded for resolving the Taiwan issue, negotiations between the two countries on Taiwan were confined to discussions about "the timing of political steps" rather than debates reflecting fundamental differences in their positions.

Kissinger also narrowed the distance by one step to match China. As discussed earlier, during the Warsaw talks, the U.S. stated that it would not obstruct the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. This was a progressive stance that did not explicitly oppose an agreement between both sides of the Taiwan Strait towards "One China," yet it could also be interpreted as maintaining the existing position that Taiwan is in an "undetermined" state. Here, Kissinger began negotiations from a position already one step ahead of the existing U.S. stance. When Zhou pointed out to Kissinger the U.S. State Department spokesperson's statement that Taiwan was in an "undetermined" state during their first conversation on July 9, Kissinger retorted that he had not repeated the same stance (followed by what was likely a chuckle from the Chinese side). When Zhou reconfirmed the next day during their second conversation on the same issue whether the State Department spokesperson had not repeated the stance, Kissinger replied, "It was not a mistake."

In the second conversation, Zhou (likely after reporting to and consulting with Mao the previous day's conversation) presented more specific conditions for advancing relations with China.

- Recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

- Recognize that Taiwan is part of China.

- Accept the premise that the United States does not support the principle of "Two Chinas" or "One China, One Taiwan."

- Do not support the Taiwan independence movement.

To these was added the condition, "The State Department spokesperson should not repeat what he said, that is, that Taiwan is in an undetermined state," making it five conditions. Kissinger stated, "The President will certainly say that he does not support the Two Chinas solution. Therefore, regarding your second point, Prime Minister, that Taiwan is part of China, that very point will resolve all the remaining three points." In other words, except for the first condition presented by China, which Kissinger summarized, the remaining four conditions had already been informally accepted.

Therefore, the only issue we must leave until after the election (the next U.S. presidential election) is the official recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. However, the direction is clear.

According to Kissinger's objective outlined above, his goal regarding Taiwan was to maintain diplomatic relations and the defense treaty with Taiwan. This objective could be upheld without recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, as recognizing the Republic of China government as lacking representation and legitimacy would also make it difficult to consider it qualified to sign treaties. However, Kissinger did not outright state that the U.S. could not recognize the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China government. Instead, he stated, "There is no possibility that we will officially recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China for the next year and a half (until the end of Nixon's first term)." While not explicitly answering on this point, Kissinger repeatedly stated only that "political evolution" was possible from the second term onwards. If one acknowledges that there is no intermediate step between the stance of "not supporting the principle of 'Two Chinas' or 'One China, One Taiwan'" and the stance of recognizing the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China government, then Kissinger's "political evolution" would inevitably mean accepting Zhou's first condition for establishing diplomatic relations with China. Therefore, it must be assumed that Kissinger had already concluded from the outset that normalizing relations with China would necessitate approving the People's Republic of China government while denying the Republic of China government. The objective Kissinger set was likely a short-term goal valid only during Nixon's first term.

The "Japan card" that Kissinger actively used when discussing the issue of U.S. troops in Korea did not appear in the discussions on the Taiwan issue. Zhou expressed serious concerns on several occasions about the possibility of Chiang Kai-shek colluding with Japan or the Soviet Union if U.S. troops withdrew from Taiwan.

Zhou: (...) On the other hand, now, the troop withdrawal (from Taiwan) must be carried out in stages, and the United States will also establish normal diplomatic relations with us. Then the United States will have the responsibility to ensure that Taiwan is not lost, or that Japan does not interfere in Taiwan's affairs, or that independence movements do not erupt in Taiwan.

Therefore, the only issue we must leave until after the election (the next US presidential election) is

official recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China.

However, the direction is clear.

According to Kissinger's objective introduced earlier, Kissinger set the goal regarding the Taiwan issue as maintaining diplomatic relations and a defense treaty with Taiwan. This objective can be maintained without recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China. This is because the moment the government of the Republic of China is deemed to lack representation and legitimacy, it becomes difficult to consider the government of the Republic of China as qualified to sign treaties. However, Kissinger does not outright state that the United States cannot recognize the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China government. Instead, he states, "There is no possibility that we will formally recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China for the next year and a half (until the end of Nixon's first term)." While not explicitly answering this point, Kissinger reiterates that "political evolution" is possible from the second term onwards. If we acknowledge that there is no intermediate step between the position of "not supporting the principle of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan'" and the position of recognizing the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China government, then Kissinger's "political evolution" can only mean accepting Zhou's first condition for establishing diplomatic relations with China. Therefore, it must be assumed that Kissinger had already concluded from the outset that normalizing relations with China would necessitate approving the People's Republic of China government while denying the Republic of China government. The objective set by Kissinger was likely a short-term goal valid only during Nixon's first term.

The 'Japan card' that Kissinger actively used when discussing the issue of US troops stationed in Korea is not brought up in the discussion of the Taiwan issue. Zhou expresses serious concern multiple times about the possibility of Chiang Kai-shek colluding with Japan or the Soviet Union should US troops withdraw from Taiwan.

On May 26, 1971, during a meeting of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, discussions were held regarding the upcoming high-level talks between the U.S. and China. It was anticipated that if China's intentions were clearly conveyed to the U.S. through the U.S.-China dialogue, it would also have a positive impact on the resistance in Vietnam and the Paris Peace Talks. On July 5 of the same year, four days before Kissinger's visit to China, Zhou stated in a conversation with the leader of the Australian Labor Party that he had proposed holding an international conference in Geneva, including non-Asian countries, to resolve the Indochina Peninsula issue. Both China and the United States had the intention of peacefully concluding the Indochina Peninsula issue in the near future. (Danhui, 2006, p.190) Even if Nixon and Kissinger had not grasped this fact, it was plausible to assume that China, for whom the Indochina issue was also a security concern, would desire regional stability.

During Kissinger's second visit to China, both sides concluded the Taiwan agenda at a level that reaffirmed the positions discussed in the July talks. Fierce tug-of-war continued over how the U.S. would express its position on Taiwan in the future joint declaration. However, this was not a reflection of fundamental differences in their positions on Taiwan, but rather a back-and-forth regarding the pace of "political progress."

Kissinger-Zhou 42-Hour Conversation Reading (2) Firm Rejection and Lingering Expectations

In a portion of the conversation during Kissinger's second visit to China, he stated, "We will certainly oppose Japan deploying troops or exerting military influence in Taiwan, and to the same extent that we have influence over Japan, we will also oppose Japan's attempts to support Taiwan's independence movement," even suggesting direct influence over Japan.

Zhou's expression of such concerns appears throughout the transcripts. Each time, Kissinger simply replied, "We strongly oppose Japan deploying troops in Taiwan."

During Kissinger's second visit to China, both sides conclude the Taiwan agenda at the level of reaffirming the positions discussed in the July talks. Fierce tug-of-war continues regarding how the United States will express its position on Taiwan in a future joint declaration. However, this does not reflect a fundamental difference in positions on Taiwan, but rather a back-and-forth regarding the speed of "political evolution."

Reading the 42-Hour Kissinger-Zhou Dialogue (2) Firm Rejection and

During the 42-hour conversation, when expressing its position on Indochina, Kissinger's main objective was to demonstrate the difficulties encountered in negotiations with Vietnam and the U.S.'s sincere intention to withdraw. It is unknown whether Kissinger expected advice from Zhou regarding negotiations with Vietnam, but on several occasions, when Kissinger expressed difficulties, Zhou responded with lengthy discourses.

Kissinger: North Vietnam is excessively suspicious and firmly believes that we are trying to deceive them, so they will either find a trap in our proposals or reject our proposals until they find one. They believe our minds are filled with thoughts of cleverly manipulating them. This is not true. (...)

Kissinger repeatedly and politely requested China's assistance in negotiations with Vietnam during both of his visits to China.

Kissinger: North Vietnam is too suspicious, and they firmly believe we are trying to trick them,

so they will reject our proposals, either by finding a trap in them or until they find one.

They will reject our proposals, either by finding a trap in them or until they find one.

They will reject our proposals, either by finding a trap in them or until they find one. They believe our minds are full of them,

---“National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 70: Negotiating U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement: New American and Chinese Documentation Leading up to Nixon’s 1972 Trip”. 2002.

which is not true. (...)

Kissinger politely requests China's help in the negotiations with Vietnam multiple times during both of his visits to China.

Kissinger: If one of our friends, perhaps you would not wish to answer, could help them (the Vietnamese) understand from their perspective that they need a certain political evolution, the war could end rapidly.

However, whenever Kissinger made a request, Zhou either did not answer or clearly indicated his refusal.

Zhou: The relationship between our two countries (China and the United States) has been severed for many years. The vocabulary we use is very direct and without hesitation. And we do not impose our will on each other. Not imposing our will on each other is what Chairman Mao has taught us. (...)

Zhou also made it clear that China would not intervene in matters between the U.S. and Vietnam when Kissinger proposed discussing the timing of a ceasefire and withdrawal, stating, "We are not Vietnamese. These are matters to be discussed with the Vietnamese. You should not try to discuss their interests with us." Furthermore, during the second visit, when Kissinger introduced the U.S.'s eight proposals in response to Le Duc Tho's nine-point peace proposal and claimed they were the "most generous" the U.S. could offer, Zhou adopted a wait-and-see attitude, stating that it was difficult to evaluate as he had not seen the proposals himself. While Zhou sometimes defended the Vietnamese perspective or offered advice to Kissinger, such as stating, "We cannot ask the Vietnamese to abide by the Geneva Accords, which the U.S. violated first," he was very cautious about China becoming a direct participant. However, Zhou's expressed hope for progress in peace negotiations between the U.S. and Vietnam seemed sincere. Kissinger emphasized that "even without negotiations, we will eventually withdraw unilaterally, but this will take longer, and the Saigon government will be further strengthened with more equipment," arguing that the longer negotiations were delayed, the further away Vietnam's independence and unification, and the end of the war, would be. This strategy seemed effective with Zhou, as on July 13, Zhou explained the results of the first high-level meeting with the U.S. to the Vietnamese, persuading them to focus on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam rather than insisting on the overthrow of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime.

In a document explaining the results of his visit to China to Nixon after his October visit, Kissinger expressed expectations that China would play a role in persuading Vietnam. Summarizing the discussions on the main agenda items, Kissinger reported to Nixon that "Beijing will be helpful to a limited extent. In both official and unofficial conversations, the Chinese have made it clear that they hope the negotiations will be successfully concluded and will convey this to Hanoi." Interestingly, although Zhou expressed his hope for smooth negotiations several times, there is no record of him stating that he would convey this to Vietnam.

Concluding Remarks

The transition from a "red danger" to a "tacit ally" required numerous events, re-evaluations of China policy within the bureaucracy, and shifts in domestic and international public opinion. The early 1970s and the present differ significantly in terms of national power, so a simple comparison with the past can be misleading. It is important to distinguish how the balance tilted during the détente and negotiation process, driven by the small leadership of both the U.S. and China, what factors contributed to that tilt, what could have been attempted, and what was inevitable, in order to keenly predict, detect, and respond to shifts in the phases of compromise and confrontation between major powers as a nation at the center of global affairs. Recalling the situation Taiwan faced during the U.S.-China détente, it is evident that the ability to infer dialogues between major powers from limited, superficially apparent documents is crucial for South Korea as well.

As Kissinger argued in his memoirs, the U.S.-China détente was an event that would have occurred regardless of which leaders were in power on both sides. As seen through the adjustment process of U.S. policy toward China, the "opening to China" policy was closer to a historical trend than Nixon's unilateral decision. Examining the discussions that constitute the 42-hour transcript, even on the Taiwan issue, which was the primary factor that severed U.S.-China relations, there appear to have been no fundamental differences in positions that could not be overcome. With China removing its preconditions for dialogue (ending the Vietnam War or recognizing the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China government) and the U.S. making forward-looking concessions, the path from the end of the Warsaw talks to Nixon's visit to China in 1972 appears to have unfolded relatively smoothly according to the needs of both countries.

However, explaining the Nixon-Kissinger approach to China, their secret diplomacy strategy, and the speed of improving relations as historical inevitability is not very productive and does not align with the facts. While the end of the Vietnam War was an important and urgent task for the U.S., it is difficult to ascertain from the transcripts alone whether it was so pressing as to accept China's conditions (recognition of the People's Republic of China government as the sole legal government of China) without significant debate, essentially from the beginning. The transcripts, which extensively cover the perspectives of both countries on international political issues across Asia, remain valuable historical materials and a starting point for various research topics. We hope this report will serve as a catalyst for future studies and conclude the report.

56 Bibliography 1. Primary Sources National Security Archive. “National Security Archive Electronic

Briefing Book 66: Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China: The Beijing-Washington Back-Channel, September 1970-July 1971”. 2002.

persuade them to focus on withdrawal. (Danhui, 2006, p.193)

In documents explaining the results of his visit to China to Nixon after his October visit, Kissinger expresses his expectation that China will play a role in persuading Vietnam. Summarizing the discussion on the main agenda items, Kissinger reports to Nixon regarding Indochina: "Beijing will be helpful to a limited extent. Both in official and unofficial conversations, the Chinese have made it clear that they hope the negotiations will be successfully concluded and will convey this to Hanoi." Interestingly, while Zhou expressed his hope for smooth negotiations several times, there is no record of him stating that he would convey this to Vietnam.

Conclusion

The situation ripening for the 'Red Menace' to become a 'tacit ally' involved numerous events, reassessments of China policy within the bureaucracy, and shifts in public and international opinion. Since the early 1970s and the present differ significantly in aspects such as the national power of each country, simple comparisons with the past can be misleading. It is important to distinguish, for the sake of national leaders positioned at the center of global affairs to keenly predict, sense, and respond to shifts in the phases of compromise and confrontation between major powers, how the balance tilted during the détente process between the US and China, and the negotiations driven by a small leadership on both sides; if it tilted, what factors contributed; what could have been attempted, and what was inevitable. Recalling the situation Taiwan faced during the US-China détente process, it is keenly realized that Korea also urgently needs the capacity to infer dialogues between major powers from limited, outwardly apparent documentation.

As Kissinger argued in his memoirs, the US-China détente would have occurred regardless of which leaders were in power on both sides. As revealed through the adjustment process of US policy toward China, the "openness toward China" policy was closer to a historical trend than Nixon's personal decision. Even concerning the Taiwan issue, which was the primary factor that severed US-China relations, the discussions that make up the 42-hour dialogue suggest that there were no fundamental differences in positions that could not be overcome. With China removing its preconditions for dialogue (ending the Vietnam War or recognizing the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China government) and the US making forward-looking concessions, the path from the end of the Warsaw talks to Nixon's visit to China in 1972 appears to have unfolded relatively smoothly according to the needs of both countries.

However, explaining the Nixon-Kissinger approach to China, their secret diplomacy strategy, and even the speed of improving relations as historical inevitabilities is not very productive and does not align with the facts. While the end of the Vietnam War was an important and urgent task for the United States, it is difficult to ascertain from the dialogue alone whether it was so pressing as to accept China's

conditions (recognizing the People's Republic of China government as the sole legitimate government of China) with virtually no debate from the beginning. The dialogue, which broadly encompasses the perspectives of both countries on international political issues across Asia, remains a valuable historical source and a starting point for various research topics. We hope this report will serve as a catalyst for future studies and conclude the report.

56 References 1. Primary Sources National Security Archive. “National Security Archive Electronic

Briefing Book 66: Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China:

The Beijing-Washington Back-Channel, September 1970-

July 1971”. 2002.

---“National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 70:

Negotiating U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement: New American

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POLO I, “Briefing Book for the President” (Taiwan), July 1971, box 1032, NSCF.

2. Secondary Literature Accinelli, Robert. “In Pursuit of a Modus Vivendi: The Taiwan Issue and Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969–1972”. In Kirby, William C., Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li,

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