Revisiting Zunyi: The Formation of the Chinese Communist Party's Political Self-Awareness

Choi Yeon · Yonsei University

Introduction

The period in China from 1912 to 1949 was complex and chaotic, and it is unrealistic to expect a perfectly systematic explanation of its history. An un-unified and un-independent China was a political stage of unprecedented breadth, with protagonists from various dramas performing their roles to create a multifaceted picture. This article seeks to find clues to this intricate history by analyzing the political growth of the Chinese Communist Party.

3 To understand how the "weak beginnings" of the Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921, led to its great victory in 1949, and particularly how it achieved independence from its political patrons, the Soviet Union and the Comintern, to develop into a powerful and autonomous political force, this article aims to reconstruct the Zunyi Conference and its international political context. To do so, it will first explain the international political situation of the 1930s in relation to the Soviet Union's circumstances and the Comintern-CCP relationship, and then elucidate the Zunyi Conference and its political implications through the 1945 Resolution on Historical Issues, the 1935 Zunyi documents, and Otto Braun's memoirs.

The International Political Situation of the 1930s: (1) The Soviet Situation

Following the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union's identity was layered with that of a motherland of revolution on the world revolutionary stage and that of a new great power on the international political stage. As these two identities were governed by distinct political logics, the Soviet Union faced the dual task of supporting revolutions in other countries while simultaneously seeking its own political survival as a single nation. This situation inherent in the Soviet Union's circumstances bred political contradictions between proletarian internationalism and the political survival of a single nation, along with the potential for ideological conflict. It was therefore inevitable that Trotsky would clash with Lenin and Stalin over his theory of continuous revolution, which emphasized the international character of the revolution. In this context, Lenin's theory of revolution in one country and Stalin's theory of socialism in one country emerged, denying the existence of such contradictions by arguing that world revolution and Russia's survival were compatible. (After Trotsky's purge in the late 1920s, the terms "Trotskyism" and "Trotskyite" within the communist bloc became commonly used rhetoric by revolutionaries to criticize each other by appealing to Soviet authority. These terms implied both a criticism that the attacked revolutionary line lacked a realistic basis and a condemnation for not adequately reflecting Russia's political interests.)

As is often the case with the relationship between ideals and reality, the balance between the Soviet Union's internationalist objectives and its national interests as a single state did not last long. Stalin wished to transform the Soviet Union into an economic and military power, which necessitated "peaceful coexistence" with other great powers. To meet this political need, Stalin pursued a realistic foreign policy through the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gaining state recognition from established Allied powers such as Britain, and particularly from the United States, thereby facilitating various diplomatic and economic collaborations. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's obligation towards world revolution was delegated to the Comintern, an international organization that guided the communist parties of various countries. Although the Comintern was nominally an organization mediating cooperation and solidarity among national communist parties, it was effectively subordinate to Soviet power, thus functioning as an agency executing Soviet foreign policy concerning world revolution. This tendency became overt after the 6th Comintern Congress in 1928, which adopted the Stalinist line, and decision-making within the Comintern was directly dictated by Stalin's leadership. For instance, at the 9th Enlarged Plenary Session of the Comintern, held prior to the 6th Congress in the same year, when Luo Mingna argued that "a bourgeois revolution cannot occur in China, and a socialist revolution must be initiated immediately," Stalin and the Soviet delegation criticized this argument as a Trotskyite error. (Xiang Qing, 1992, pp. 151-154)

5 The adoption of the Stalinist line at the 6th Comintern Congress in 1928 further intensified this tendency, with decisions within the Comintern being directly dictated by Stalin's leadership. A notable example is the 9th Enlarged Plenary Session of the Comintern, held before the 6th Congress in the same year, where Luo Mingna argued that "a bourgeois revolution cannot occur in China, and a socialist revolution must be initiated immediately." Stalin and the Soviet delegation criticized this argument as a Trotskyite error. (Xiang Qing, 1992, pp. 151-154)

The strengthening of realism in Soviet foreign policy in the early 1930s was influenced by political changes in Germany and Japan. In 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army, taking advantage of domestic political turmoil, launched the Manchurian Incident, attacking Northeast China and creating significant instability in the Soviet Far East. In 1933, the rise of Nazism in Germany further exacerbated Soviet anxieties. From this point onward, Soviet security concerns overshadowed the commitment to world revolution. Stalin actively pursued diplomacy to build a collective defense system with capitalist powers and, simultaneously, sought cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government to counter the Japanese threat. (In this sense, the anti-fascist united front of the 1930s was established as much out of realistic considerations as out of ideological ones.) In fact, 6 the Comintern, politically subordinate to the Soviet Union, could not remain unaffected by these international political considerations. (Shen, 2020, p. 55)

The International Political Situation of the 1930s: (2) The Chinese Communist Party-

Comintern Relations

Founded in 1921 with Soviet support and supervision, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was, until the first half of the 1930s, in a state of absolute dependence on the Soviet Union and the Comintern in all aspects. Before the CCP significantly expanded its influence through the eight-year Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and ultimately succeeded in the Chinese Civil War to establish the People's Republic of China, the relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union-Comintern was closer to that of a general and his soldiers than a relationship between states or partners. From the Soviet perspective, the CCP was like a tactical asset that could be manipulated for Soviet survival strategies, while from the CCP's perspective, the Soviet Union was the only pillar of support. Consequently, the Soviet Union, at various times, collaborated with warlords like Wu Peifu and "national bourgeoisie" such as Sun Yat-sen, and repeatedly instructed and urged the CCP to form a united front with the Kuomintang. The CCP, in turn, had no choice but to comply. The CCP's subordination to the Comintern was also explicit; the "First Program of the Chinese Communist Party," adopted after its founding, stipulated "alliance with the Comintern," and the "First Resolution of the Chinese Communist Party" stipulated the "linkage between the Party and the Comintern." (Xiang Qing, 1992, p. 38)

7 The "First Program of the Chinese Communist Party," adopted after its founding, stipulated "alliance with the Comintern," and the "First Resolution of the Chinese Communist Party" stipulated the "linkage between the Party and the Comintern." (Xiang Qing, 1992, p. 38)

It is beyond the scope of this article to precisely trace how the members of the CCP prior to the Zunyi Conference responded to this unilateral relationship. However, a form of "party purification" campaign among students at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow from the summer of 1927 to 1930 exemplifies that differences of opinion regarding the CCP's autonomy already existed among its members before the Zunyi Conference. A struggle ensued between the "Wang Ming factional group," which followed the Comintern and the Comintern's representative, and the "anti-Wang Ming group." It appears that the Soviet side persecuted the "anti-Wang Ming group," with its leaders being expelled from the party and some being arrested.

The Wang Ming group unilaterally adopted the "Third Period" theory adopted at the 6th Comintern Congress. The "Third Period" theory, replaced by the theory of the anti-fascist united front after the rise of Nazism in 1933, was a form of revolutionary optimism that assessed the international situation in 1928 as a period of global capitalist economic failure and escalating revolutionary conditions. (In this sense, the period between 1928 and 1933 was the last period where the dual performance of survival and revolution was prominent from the Soviet perspective. Therefore, during this period, slogans such as "defend the Soviet Union" and "achieve proletarian victory in the Far East" were complexly intertwined within the Comintern and the CCP.) The "Third Period" theory, which mechanically demanded that revolutions in various countries proceed in step with the world revolution of the Third Period, also influenced the Comintern's interpretation of the Chinese situation, leading to the so-called "Li Lisan Leftist Line" in China, which advocated for "combining urban worker uprisings with attacks by the rural Red Army to achieve victory in one or several provinces." In other words, the "Comintern's Leftist Line," the "Third Period" theory, gave rise to the Li Lisan Leftist Line (which would soon be replaced by Wang Ming's Leftist Line). (Xiang Qing, 1992, pp. 174-175) What should be noted here is that while there was considerable internal consensus within the CCP regarding the First and Second United Fronts, there were significant disagreements concerning the plan to carry out armed uprisings on the Chinese mainland, particularly the organization of urban worker uprisings.

Wang Ming was originally a supporter of the Li Lisan line. However, despite the fact that the difference in their positions that emerged after 1930 was ultimately relative (Wang Ming's line was more aggressive, for example, by asserting the infallibility of the "Third Period" theory), Wang Ming, with the support of the Comintern, gained control over the Soviet areas and the Red Army by taking advantage of the deteriorating situation of the Chinese Civil War after 1930. During the encirclement and suppression campaigns, Wang Ming resided in Moscow and was responsible for transmitting Comintern military strategy directives to the Red Army.

9

Reconstructing the Zunyi Conference

After Wang Ming secured control and the Chinese Soviet Republic was established, the CCP entered a period of hardship, facing five difficult encirclement and suppression campaigns. Nevertheless, the CCP, through twists and turns, managed to survive the fourth encirclement and suppression campaign in 1933. (Wang Ming still maintained the position that the goal should be the occupation of major cities.) In September 1933, Otto Braun (Li De), the military advisor to the Chinese Soviet Republic, arrived in the Chinese Soviet Republic and subsequently commanded the Red Army along with Bo Gu, Wang Ming's junior and successor (this group is conventionally referred to as the "28 Bolsheviks"). Wang Ming and Otto Braun argued that the situation of the Chinese revolution in 1933 and 1934 was favorable after the fourth encirclement and suppression campaign. However, as a result, after the fifth encirclement and suppression campaign, a series of military failures occurred. Finally, in October 1934, the Red Army, which had taken refuge in the Jiangxi Soviet (established earlier by Mao through peasant movements), began the Long March. After repeated setbacks, the Zunyi Conference was held from January 15 to 17, 1935. This section aims to reconstruct the Zunyi Conference and evaluate its political and historical significance through the 1945 Resolution on Historical Issues, adopted under Mao's leadership, the 1935 resolution of the Zunyi Conference, presumably drafted by Mao, and Otto Braun's memoirs. 10

(National Museum of China, Beijing)

11

Reconstruction of the Zunyi Conference:

(1) Mao's Zunyi - 1945 and 1935

In 1945, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted a "Resolution on Historical Issues" at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee (6th CC 7th ENP). (There have been two subsequent resolutions on historical issues: Deng Xiaoping led the second resolution in 1981, and Xi Jinping passed the third resolution in 2021.) As early as 1941-1942, Mao Zedong had secured agreement from top leaders that the "Wang Ming Leftist Line" was erroneous, and from 1942 to 1943, this understanding was taught to party members. From 1943 to 1945, historical discussions criticizing lines such as the "Wang Ming Leftist Line" were conducted among high-ranking party and government officials, culminating in the adoption of the 1945 Resolution on Historical Issues. The Yan'an Rectification Movement, which spanned four years, was a historical endeavor to distill the core thread of Mao Zedong Thought from the fragmented and turbulent early revolutionary history. The resulting 1945 Resolution on Historical Issues presents the most official and influential interpretation of the CCP's early revolutionary history.

In this process of ideological distillation, historical tendencies that were actually much more ambiguous had to be condensed around a few narrative elements. The storytelling of the 1945 Resolution on Historical Issues positions elements that can be captured within the framework of Mao Zedong Thought as protagonists, and "erroneous" lines to the left and right as antagonists. Meanwhile, what the resolution designates as "leftist lines" were not a single event in actual history. The resolution's explanation in this regard states that "leftist adventurists" such as Wang Ming, Li Lisan, and Bo Gu held power on three occasions: in 1927, 1930, and 1934. These three periods are depicted not as reflecting distinct historical tendencies, but as a linear progression of the "leftist line" deepening.

The 1945 Resolution on Historical Issues consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction, Chapters 2 and 3 are historical narratives, and the remaining chapters are evaluations of the history. Chapter 2 narrates the history of the period 1921-1927, and Chapter 3 covers the history after 1927, namely, the end of Chen Duxiu's rightist line in 1927, the rise of the leftist line, the growth of the three aforementioned leftist lines, and the end of the leftist line at the 1935 Zunyi Conference. Chapter 4 criticizes the errors of the leftist line in four aspects: political, military, organizational, and ideological. Chapter 5 attributes these errors to "the reflection of class struggle outside the Party within the Party." Chapter 6 emphasizes the necessity of education and ideological reform, and Chapter 7 states the resolution's conclusion: "Comrade Mao Zedong's words were completely correct. The great victory and decisive role our Party has achieved in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression today is vivid proof of this correct line." "The Marxist-Leninist thought represented by Comrade Mao Zedong" was the "source of victory for the Chinese revolution," and "The Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Zedong will surely lead the Chinese revolution to complete victory."

13 "The Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Zedong will surely lead the Chinese revolution to complete victory."

The introduction to the Resolution on Historical Issues defines the history of the Chinese Communist Party as divided into three periods: the First Revolutionary Civil War (1921-1927) and its failure, the subsequent Land Revolution (1927-1937), and the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1937-1945). The period of the Land Revolution, a somewhat ambiguous term, refers to the time between the First United Front (the "First Revolutionary Civil War") and the Second United Front. The 1945 Resolution on Historical Issues aims to establish an authoritative interpretation of this period. Why, then, was it important for the Chinese Communist Party in 1945 to organize and explain its actions over those ten years? The CCP evaluates the decade of the Land Revolution as follows:

During the ten years from 1927, when the revolution failed, to 1937, when the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression broke out,

for ten years, only the Chinese Communist Party, united as one under the anti-revolutionary and

vicious reign of terror, raised the banner of anti-imperialism and

anti-feudalism, leading workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary

intellectuals, and other revolutionary masses in great battles in the political, military, and ideological spheres.

Without all this, the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression could not have been realized, and even if it had been, without the backbone of the Chinese Communist Party, rich in experience in people's war, it would not have been possible to sustain and win the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. This is beyond doubt.

realized, and even if it had been, without the backbone of the Chinese Communist Party, rich in experience in people's war, it would not have been possible to sustain and win the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. This is beyond doubt.

sustained and won the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. This is beyond doubt.

doubt.

doubt.

The ten years from 1927 to 1937 were a period of political, military, and ideological development for the Chinese Communist Party, rising from the failure of 1927. However, the main theme of the Resolution on Historical Issues is revealed in the following passages.

However, it must be pointed out that during those ten years, our Party not only achieved great accomplishments but also made mistakes during certain periods. The most serious of these was the "leftist" errors in political, military, and organizational lines committed from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931 to the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Political Bureau in January 1935 (Zunyi Conference). (...) To learn the historical lessons of the Chinese revolution, we must punish past failures and be cautious thereafter, treating the illness to save the patient, and the following cart must learn from the overturned one. (...) The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is a summary of the mistakes made during these ten years.

made mistakes during certain periods. The most serious of these was the "leftist" errors in political, military, and organizational lines committed from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931 to the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Political Bureau in January 1935 (Zunyi Conference). (...) To learn the historical lessons of the Chinese revolution, we must punish past failures and be cautious thereafter, treating the illness to save the patient, and the following cart must learn from the overturned one. (...) The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is a summary of the mistakes made during these ten years.

15 Central Committee in January 1931 to the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Political Bureau in January 1935 (Zunyi Conference). (...) To learn the historical lessons of the Chinese revolution, we must punish past failures and be cautious thereafter, treating the illness to save the patient, and the following cart must learn from the overturned one. (...) The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is a summary of the mistakes made during these ten years.

15 Central Committee in January 1931 to the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Political Bureau in January 1935 (Zunyi Conference). (...) To learn the historical lessons of the Chinese revolution, we must punish past failures and be cautious thereafter, treating the illness to save the patient, and the following cart must learn from the overturned one. (...) The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is a summary of the mistakes made during these ten years.

Central Committee in January 1931 to the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Political Bureau in January 1935 (Zunyi Conference). (...) To learn the historical lessons of the Chinese revolution, we must punish past failures and be cautious thereafter, treating the illness to save the patient, and the following cart must learn from the overturned one. (...) The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is a summary of the mistakes made during these ten years.

political, military, and organizational lines committed from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931 to the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Political Bureau in January 1935 (Zunyi Conference). (...) To learn the historical lessons of the Chinese revolution, we must punish past failures and be cautious thereafter, treating the illness to save the patient, and the following cart must learn from the overturned one. (...) The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is a summary of the mistakes made during these ten years.

historical lessons of the Chinese revolution, we must punish past failures and be cautious thereafter, treating the illness to save the patient, and the following cart must learn from the overturned one. (...) The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is a summary of the mistakes made during these ten years.

and be cautious thereafter, treating the illness to save the patient, and the following cart must learn from the overturned one. (...) The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is a summary of the mistakes made during these ten years.

treat the illness to save the patient, and the following cart must learn from the overturned one. (...) The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is a summary of the mistakes made during these ten years.

The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is a summary of the mistakes made during these ten years.

historical problems of the various parties, and especially the problem of the central leadership line during the period leading up to the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee

was useful and necessary to draw a formal conclusion.

It is useful and necessary to draw a formal conclusion regarding the problem of the central leadership line during the period leading up to the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee.

The expression to note here is the trichotomy of politics, military affairs, and organization. The expressions that the "leftist line" of Li Lisan, Wang Ming, and Bo Gu committed errors in all three dimensions of politics, military affairs, and organization, or that Mao corrected the errors in the three dimensions at the Zunyi Conference, appear dozens of times in the main text of the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party. (The category of ideology also appears, mainly related to the introduction and development of Marxism-Leninism, and is not discussed controversially in the Resolution on History.) It is not clearly defined what each of these refers to in history. However, from the context, it can be understood that 'politics' relates to theoretical problems of revolution, such as the relationship between the bourgeois revolution and the socialist revolution, or the relationship between peasant uprisings in the countryside and armed strikes in cities, and the political decisions that the Chinese Communist Party had to make in carrying out the Chinese revolution. 'Military affairs' refers to the strategic and tactical problems of the Red Army, and 'organization' refers to internal party conflicts and cooperation. The main point of the historical resolution's critique of the leftist line since the Fourth Plenum is as follows: The leftist line adopted incorrect military strategies, leading to the precarious situation caused by the Fifth

anti-encirclement campaign, and organizationally, it caused sectarianism and internal party conflicts. Politically, it is evaluated as follows:

The nature of the Chinese revolution was misunderstood as

“continuous revolution (permanent revolution),” which confused the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution, and the situation of the Chinese revolution was understood as a “continuous upsurge” (denying the failure of the 1927 revolution).

Therefore, they not only failed to organize an orderly retreat but, disregarding the enemy's strength and the situation of the masses after the failure of the revolution, ordered small-scale peasant uprisings to be organized nationwide, which had no hope of success.

The conclusion of the Resolution on History is that Mao succeeded in completely correcting these mistakes starting from the Zunyi Conference. "The political line adopted by the Party Central Committee led by Comrade Mao Zedong after the Zunyi Conference was completely correct. The leftist line was gradually overcome politically, militarily, and organizationally. Since 1942, the rectification movement led by Comrade Mao Zedong throughout the Party and the study of Party history have opposed subjectivism, sectarianism, and dogmatic historical narratives,

and have corrected the leftist and rightist deviations stemming from the ideological roots of Party history." And this interpretation was the most influential and direct statement about the Zunyi Conference until the publication of the Zunyi Conference documents in 1985. For 50 years, even critical Western scholars cited the "myth of Zunyi" in explaining Mao's rise to power.

However, the documents from 1935 published in 1985 present a Zunyi that is quite different in tone from the 'plotted' Zunyi in Mao's political origin myth. Among the documents most directly related to the Zunyi Conference, three are extant today. These three documents, included in the "Documents of the Zunyi Conference" compiled by the Communist Party of China in 1985, have been translated and commented on by Chen and Yang.1

1 Amidst the limited research on Zunyi, three episodes remain prominent. In 1969, Jerome Chen translated and commented on the "Resolution of the Zunyi Conference" through The China Quarterly, and in 1986, Benjamin Yang translated and commented on the "Outline Resolution of the Zunyi Conference" and "Notes on the Zunyi Conference." In 1989, Thomas Kampen published an article criticizing Yang's 1986 commentary. The central theme was "Mao's Rise to Power." While Yang, through his review of the documents, deconstructed the dramatized narrative of Zunyi in the official Party history but acknowledged Zunyi as a decisive event in Mao's political ascent, Kampen emphasized that the premise of the narrative of the two-line struggle itself was significantly distorted, arguing that Zunyi was merely one stage in Mao's political rise.

These studies and discussions in the English-speaking world have made significant contributions to verifying Zunyi, given the reluctance of Chinese historians to actively explore the truth about Zunyi. However, their fundamentally critical stance means that 18 1. Resolutions of the Centre of the CCP Adopted by the Conference

17 opposed and corrected the left-right biases originating from the ideological roots of the party's history." And this interpretation, prior to the public release of the Zunyi Conference documents in 1985, was the most influential and direct statement about the Zunyi Conference, leading to a situation where even critical Western scholars cited the 'myth of Zunyi' in explaining Mao's rise for 50 years.

of the Politburo, Tsunyi, 8 January 1935 [General Resolution]

2. The Outline Resolution of the Enlarged Politburo Conference on

These series of studies and discussions conducted in the Anglophone world made significant contributions to verifying Zunyi in a situation where Chinese historians were reluctant to actively explore the truth of Zunyi. However, their basic stance is critical, 18 1. Resolutions of the Centre of the CCP Adopted by the Conference

of the Politburo, Tsunyi, 8 January 1935 [General Resolution]

2. The Outline Resolution of the Enlarged Politburo Conference on

Summing up Experiences and Lessons in Smashing the Fifth

“Encirclement” Campaign (The Secretariat of the Central

Committee, 8 February 1935) [Resolution Outline]

3. Notes for Communicating the Enlarged Politburo Conference at

Zunyi (By Chen Yun, February-March 1935) [Telegram]

While the content of the three documents is largely similar, as mentioned in the introduction, the Resolution Outline is presumed to have been directly drafted by Mao around the time of the Zunyi Conference (to present his position at Zunyi). Therefore, this paper aims to clarify how Mao in 1935 differed from Mao in 1945 by comparing the Resolution Outline and the Resolution on the History of the Party.

The 'Resolution Outline' consists of 11 points, each with the following content: (1) The Party's overall political line in the Fifth Encirclement Campaign was correct. What was wrong was the military line. (2) In response to the Kuomintang's protracted war, an 'active defense' and 'offensive defense' line should have been adopted. The research focuses more on what the subject is not, rather than what it is.

19. (3) (4) (5) The Red Army's purely defensive (passive) line benefited the National Revolutionary Army. (6) (7) If the National Revolutionary Army employed a protracted war strategy, the Red Army could only achieve military success through a mobile warfare strategy. (8) The conflicts within the reactionary forces could be exploited to the advantage of the Red Army. (9) The core reason for the failure was the inability to resolve the chaos and panic that ensued after the withdrawal from the Soviet areas, and the failure to change the line even after the withdrawal. (10) The purely defensive line was a remnant of the right-opportunist line. Responsibility for this should be placed squarely on Bo Gu. (11) Guerrilla warfare should continue in the evacuated Soviet areas, and all efforts should be made to build new Soviets.

The discussions at Zunyi in 1935 differed in content and language from those in the Resolution on the History of the Party in 1945. The most striking difference is that while the 1945 resolution criticized the decisions of the left-wing line, which held power before Zunyi, as incorrect in all aspects—political, military, organizational, and ideological—the 1935 Resolution Outline acknowledges that the Party's decisions during the Fifth Encirclement Campaign were not politically incorrect.

The Party's overall political line during the Fifth Encirclement Campaign was correct, and the failure to

break through was caused not by objective factors but by subjective ones. In other words, it was due to the error of a purely defensive line in military command, which violated the fundamental laws of strategy and tactics in the Chinese civil war.

In other words, it was due to the error of a purely defensive line in military command,

which violated the fundamental laws of strategy and tactics in the Chinese civil war.

which violated the fundamental laws of strategy and tactics in the Chinese civil war.

20 (The general political line of the Party in the Fifth “Encirclement”

For these reasons, Mao appears to have raised only the most certain criticisms at Zunyi in 1935. How, then, should we understand the reinterpretation of Zunyi in the 1945 Resolution on History? As scholars have consistently pointed out since 1985, the Zunyi depicted in the 1935 documents is not as dramatic as the Zunyi in the Resolution on History. If this is the case, one might argue that Mao fabricated a personal narrative of Zunyi posthumously to consolidate power (indeed, the rectification movement greatly contributed to Mao's consolidation of power). However, the 1945 Resolution on History gives the impression of belatedly expressing what Mao in 1935 could not say, as if voicing older grievances than Zunyi.

Reconstruction of the Zunyi Conference:

(2) Otto Braun's Zunyi - Recollections from the 1960s

Finally, we will examine how Otto Braun's recollections from the 1960s align with the explanations provided earlier. Otto Braun, whose identity was concealed until the 1960s, harbored deep resentment towards Mao and did not attempt to hide his feelings in his memoirs. He also offered unreserved criticism of the way the Communist Party of China chose to remember Zunyi. From the perspective of Otto Braun, a German who participated in the cause of world revolution from a young age, Zunyi was a politically incomprehensible experience. Ironically, however, Otto Braun's recollections confirm that an independent political consciousness was already forming within the Communist Party of China in 1935. The internal landscape of the CPC, politically isolated during the Long March, must have seemed strange and indeed "peculiar" to Braun, who had been commanding the Red Army only a few months prior and reportedly remained silent throughout the conference, merely smoking cigarettes. Braun recalls Zunyi as abnormal in two aspects: first, that majority rule was introduced to enforce Mao's political will, and second, that the Zunyi Conference discussed only military matters, with no mention of "fundamental problems of the revolution" such as "proletarian hegemony, the contradictions of the capitalist world, the international situation, and relations with the Soviet Union."

The second peculiar aspect is that, as if prearranged, fundamental problems of the revolution requiring urgent resolution, such as proletarian hegemony, the basic contradictions of the world, and the necessity of a national united front, were not considered at all. The international situation, the relationship between the CPC and the Soviet Union, and even the struggle of the Communist Party in the Kuomintang-occupied areas were not discussed. The future of the anti-Japanese struggle and the slogans for the Party and the revolutionary government were also ignored. The only issues permitted on the agenda were the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's Fifth Anti-Encirclement Campaign and the first phase of the Long March. Considering the composition of the conference, this selection of topics guaranteed the success of Mao's reactionary plan. He was very careful not to attack the overall line of the Central Committee. Instead, he briefly declared the line to be correct and attributed the "partial right opportunist errors" to

The 1935 Resolution Outline focuses entirely on military discussions. However, the Resolution on the History of the Party emphasizes the political errors as the most significant among political, military, and organizational failures, indicating a considerable gap. (This does not absolve Bo Gu of responsibility; it is not a political failure but a military one. Mao makes it very clear that the situation arose not from 'objective' conditions (such as an absolute military disparity) but from incorrect judgments and strategies, i.e., 'subjective' errors.) Furthermore, the 1935 Resolution Outline criticizes Bo Gu's 'partial and serious' military failures not as a left-wing line but rather describes his purely defensive line as a remnant of the right-opportunist line, suggesting that the situation in 1935 was more complex than depicted in the resolution adopted in 1945.

Several explanations can be offered for these contradictions. First, concerning the situation of the Red Army leadership at the time, the mobilization of over 100,000 peasants in the Jiangxi Soviet just before the start of the Long March can be seen as a political achievement that fully utilized revolutionary potential. Therefore, it is plausible that attributing 'political errors' only three months after Mao left Jiangxi, the very place he had helped establish the Soviet, would have been temporally inappropriate.

21 began, the mobilization of over 100,000 peasants in the Jiangxi Soviet represents a political achievement that fully utilized revolutionary potential. Therefore, it is plausible that attributing 'political errors' only three months after Mao left Jiangxi, the very place he had helped establish the Soviet, would have been temporally inappropriate.

Second, an explanation can be found in the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Comintern. As discussed earlier, the political relationship between the Comintern and the CCP was unbalanced. The Comintern exerted political control over the CCP through figures like Wang Ming and Bo Gu, who were associated with Zhongshan University, and Comintern advisors like Otto Braun. As evidenced by the Zhongshan University incident in 1927, dissatisfaction related to this likely existed within the CCP prior to this. However, the political realities of the time did not permit the CCP's political independence, and even CCP members with more independent thinking lacked viable alternatives, thus preventing them from translating such dissatisfaction into political action. Amidst this situation, the Long March led to the first communication breakdown between the Comintern and the CCP since 1921. Heavy communication equipment had to be abandoned during the hasty retreat. This isolation provided Mao with a significant political opportunity: there were clear and universally acceptable targets for blame and responsibility (namely, Bo Gu and Otto Braun), and the absence of interference from patrons (i.e., the Comintern's intervention) who could obstruct his political actions created the necessary conditions.

For these reasons, Mao appears to have raised only the most certain criticisms at Zunyi in 1935. How then should we understand the reinterpretation of Zunyi in the 1945 Resolution on the History of the Party? As scholars have consistently pointed out since 1985, Zunyi as depicted in the 1935 documents is not as dramatic as Zunyi in the Resolution on the History of the Party. If this is the case, one might argue that Mao created a biographical novel called Zunyi to consolidate his power posthumously (although the Rectification Movement did indeed greatly contribute to Mao's consolidation of power). However, the 1945 Resolution on the History of the Party rather gives the impression that it is belatedly voicing what Mao in 1935 could not say, as if expressing grievances older than Zunyi.

23 belatedly voicing what Mao in 1935 could not say, as if expressing grievances older than Zunyi.

Reconstruction of the Zunyi Conference:

(2) Otto Braun's Recollections of Zunyi - 1960s

Finally, we will examine how Otto Braun's recollections from the 1960s align with the explanations provided earlier. Otto Braun, whose identity was concealed until the 1960s, harbored deep resentment towards Mao and made no attempt to hide these feelings in his memoirs. He also offered unreserved criticism of the way the CCP chose to remember Zunyi. From the perspective of Otto Braun, a German who participated in the cause of world revolution from a young age, Zunyi was a politically incomprehensible experience. Ironically, however, Otto Braun's recollections confirm that an independent political consciousness was already forming within the CCP in 1935. From Braun's standpoint—who, only a few months prior, had been commanding the Red Army and reportedly spent the entire conference smoking in silence—the internal landscape of the politically isolated CCP during the Long March must have seemed unfamiliar and indeed "peculiar." Braun recalls Zunyi as abnormal in two respects: first, the introduction of majority rule to enforce Mao's political will, and second, the Zunyi Conference's exclusive focus on military matters, with no discussion of "fundamental revolutionary issues" such as 'proletarian hegemony, the contradictions of the capitalist world, the international situation, and Sino-Soviet relations.'

The second peculiar aspect was that, as if prearranged, fundamental revolutionary issues requiring urgent resolution, such as proletarian hegemony,

The fundamental problems of revolution, such as the hegemony of the proletariat,

the fundamental contradictions of the world, and the necessity of a national united front, were not considered at all.

The international situation, the relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union,

and even the struggle of the Communist Party in Kuomintang-occupied areas were not discussed.

The future of the anti-Japanese struggle and the slogans for the Party and the revolutionary government were also

ignored.

The only issues permitted on the agenda were the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the first phase of the Long March.

Considering the composition of the conference, such a selection of topics guaranteed the success of Mao's reactionary scheme.

He was very careful not to attack the general line of the Central Committee.

Instead, he briefly declared the line correct and pointed out "partial right-opportunist errors."

Instead, he briefly declared the line correct and pointed out "partial right-opportunist errors."

only mentioned. He later criticized the same "errors" as "third

leftist errors." His main criticism targeted the strategy and tactics

of the Central Red Army, focusing solely on military matters.

25

Moving forward,

To summarize the above discussion on the Zunyi Conference, the following points can be made. First, the Zunyi Conference can be more accurately understood not merely as an internal party power struggle, but in the context of the contemporary international political situation, particularly the relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Given the inherent and continuous directives and interference from the Comintern and the Soviet Union, and the inevitable support from pro-Soviet factions, Chinese revolutionaries accumulated grievances. The Long March, by severing communication between the Comintern and the CCP, provided Chinese revolutionaries with the opportunity to make entirely independent political decisions for the first time since the party's founding.

Second, this international political approach offers an answer to the discrepancy between the explanation in the 1945 Resolution on History and the discourse on the ground revealed in the 1935 Zunyi documents (i.e., why something that was not an error in 1935 became an error in 1945). Under the conditions of 1935, when the CCP's capabilities were not yet mature enough for complete political independence from the Comintern and the Soviet Union, it was unnecessary for Mao to criticize Comintern advisor Otto Braun and pro-Soviet faction leader Bo Gu on "political" matters. Furthermore, with communication severed and an implicit consensus formed among the Long March revolutionaries, it was sufficient to politically impeach these individuals (Otto Braun and Bo Gu) by pointing out only the most obvious "military" blunders among their various errors. Nevertheless, Mao meticulously exposed the political mistakes of the leftist line prior to Zunyi in the historical resolution a decade later, demonstrating that although only "military" criticisms were made at the 1935 Zunyi Conference, their political grievances were not confined to military affairs. Moreover, Otto Braun's recollections of the Zunyi Conference, maintaining his dissenting views on Mao's decisions even into the 1960s, lend credibility to the reality of this international political background.

27 References 1. Primary Sources (1) 1935 Zunyi Documents

Ch'En, Jerome. "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference." The China

Quarterly 40 (1969): 1-38.

Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference (Translated in 1969 with a

Commentary by Jerome Chen)

The Outline Resolution of the Enlarged Politburo Conference on

Summing up Experiences and Lessons in Smashing the Fifth

“Encirclement” Campaign (The Secretariat of the Central

Committee, 8 February 1935) (Translated in 1986 by Benjamin

Yang)

Notes for Communicating the Enlarged Politburo Conference at

Zunyi (By Chen Yun, February-March 1935) (Translated in

1986 by Benjamin Yang)

(2) Historical Resolutions 1945 Resolution on History (关于若干历史问题的决议)

(https://www.12371.cn/2021/11/09/ARTI163645573220114 28 9.shtml)

1981 Resolution on History (Resolution on Certain Questions in the History

of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of

China)

(https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/resolution

-certain-questions-hist ory-our-party-founding-peoples-

republic-china)

2021 Resolution on History (Resolution of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of China On the Major Achievements and

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(https://yizhiyoudao.kuaizhan.com/85/75/p85870037710de9) (3) Otto Braun's Memoirs

Braun, Otto. A Comintern Agent in China 1932–1939. Translated

from the German by Jeanne Moore, Stanford University Press,

1982.

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29 Ishikawa, Yoshihiro. Translated by Kang Jin-a. "The Chinese Communist Party: Its 100 Years."

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32