The 'Yangwu' Operation of the 'Fanli' System: Li Hongzhang's Theory of Joseon as a Vassal State and Treaty-Making Rights

The Future of World Politics in East Asia: Young People in the Sarangbang Embrace Kyushu

Song Ji-hye Seoul National University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: February 22, 2024

Song Ji-hye · Seoul National University

1. Li Hongzhang's Theory of Joseon as a Vassal State and Treaty-Making Rights

In the late 19th century, Joseon's status as a vassal state of Qing was called into question as it entered the order of the 'Law of Nations.' While Japan was the first to officially challenge this, the basis for Japan's challenge lay in Joseon's conclusion of trade treaties with various countries. Once Joseon became the subject of treaty negotiations itself, rather than relying on Qing as its legal representative, a foundation was laid to dispute Joseon's international legal status as not being a 'vassal state' of Qing. In response to Japan's provocations, Qing consistently and strongly maintained the position that Joseon was its vassal state. In 1894, when Qing dispatched troops to Joseon to suppress the Donghak Peasant Revolution, Japan dispatched a considerable number of troops in response and subsequently refused to withdraw, questioning whether Joseon was a vassal state of Qing. Even as Japanese troops surrounded Hanseong and threatened that "if [they] acknowledge it as a vassal state, peace cannot be guaranteed" 1, Li Hongzhang instructed that "[Japan's] coercion of Joseon to not acknowledge it as a vassal state of China is something that absolutely must not be followed." 2 The confrontation between Qing and Japan over whether Joseon was a vassal state continued until Qing's defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War, at which point Qing was forced to recognize Joseon's status as an independent state.3

Interestingly, it was Li Hongzhang who persuaded and guided Joseon to trade with various countries, and it was also Li Hongzhang who decided that Joseon would be established as the subject of trade directly, rather than through Qing's representation. In other words, Li Hongzhang, who sought to maintain the position that Joseon was a vassal state of Qing until the end, was the very person who created the room for dispute over whether Joseon was a vassal state of Qing. The fact that Li Hongzhang advocated for the theory of Joseon as a vassal state and acted accordingly, while also guiding Joseon to become the subject of trade with various countries, appears to have been perceived as contradictory behavior by his contemporaries. In 1901, Liang Qichao, in his biography of Li Hongzhang, criticized him as follows:

2 May 26, Guangxu 20th year (1894): I replied, "The telegrams were not received for two days, and then suddenly a telegram arrived, and the additional dispatch of troops by Japan is not certain. Coercing Joseon to not acknowledge it as a vassal state of China is something that absolutely must not be followed. Discussions with Russia regarding Japan are currently urgent, and if we can be patient, there will likely be a way to handle it flexibly. I earnestly request that Joseon be persuaded." G20-05-166 [Li Hongzhang Quanji, p. 226]

3 Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which concluded the war between Qing and Japan in 1895, stipulated Joseon's status as an independent state as follows: "Qing recognizes Joseon as a state of complete and perfect independence. Therefore, all contributions, ceremonies, etc., from Joseon to Qing that would harm its independent and sovereign status shall be completely abolished in the future (Liang Qichao, 2013, p. 207).

330 According to principle, since Joseon is a vassal state of China,

Joseon's foreign affairs should naturally be managed by China.

This is also a fact stipulated in international law (Liang Qichao, 2013,

p. 160).

Initially, he did not understand international law and wrongly advised Joseon to conclude treaties with various countries. This is his first responsibility. Once the treaties were concluded, he should have tacitly acknowledged Joseon's independence, but he interfered in Joseon's internal affairs by dispatching troops. This is his second responsibility (Liang Qichao, 2013, p. 183). 331 8. 'Yangwu' Operation of the 'Fanli' System_Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall Here, Liang Qichao understands the relationship between Joseon and Qing based on the concept of 'vassal state' in international law. In his view, judging the traditional relationship between Qing and Joseon based on international law, Joseon is clearly a 'vassal state' of Qing. However, Li Hongzhang, perhaps due to his lack of understanding of international law, acted contradictorily by guiding Joseon to become an 'independent state' by concluding treaties with various countries, while simultaneously treating Joseon as a 'vassal state' by interfering in its internal affairs, which ultimately provided the pretext for the Sino-Japanese War. In short, Liang Qichao attributed Li Hongzhang's simultaneous adherence to the theory of Joseon as a vassal state and his guidance of Joseon's trade with various countries to Li Hongzhang's ignorance of international law.

Initially, he did not understand international law and wrongly advised Joseon to conclude treaties with various countries. This is

his first responsibility. Once the treaties were concluded,

he should have tacitly acknowledged Joseon's independence, but he interfered in Joseon's internal affairs by dispatching troops.

This is his second

responsibility (Liang Qichao, 2013, p. 183).

331 8. 'Yangwu' Operation of the 'Fanli' System_Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall Here, Liang Qichao understands the relationship between Joseon and Qing based on the concept of 'vassal state' in international law. In his view, judging the traditional relationship between Qing and Joseon based on international law, Joseon is clearly a 'vassal state' of Qing. However, Li Hongzhang, perhaps due to his lack of understanding of international law, acted contradictorily by guiding Joseon to become an 'independent state' by concluding treaties with various countries, while simultaneously treating Joseon as a 'vassal state' by interfering in its internal affairs, which ultimately provided the pretext for the Sino-Japanese War. In short, Liang Qichao attributed Li Hongzhang's simultaneous adherence to the theory of Joseon as a vassal state and his guidance of Joseon's trade with various countries to Li Hongzhang's ignorance of international law.

Left: Li Hongzhang, Right: Liang Qichao

332 However, considering that Li Hongzhang was fully and consciously distinguishing between 'vassal state' (屬邦, sokbang) and 'vassal state' (屬國, sokguk) in his handling of Joseon affairs in the latter half of the 19th century, Liang Qichao's interpretation warrants reconsideration. When informing the countries with which Joseon was concluding trade treaties about the traditional relationship between Qing and Joseon, Li Hongzhang emphasized that Joseon was a 'vassal state' (屬邦) of Qing, but never claimed it was a 'vassal state' (屬國). Furthermore, from the time the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Joseon and the United States began to be discussed in the 1880s until the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Li Hongzhang consistently referred to Joseon as a 'vassal state' (屬邦) or 'tributary territory' (屬土) in official documents, never directly using the term 'vassal state' (屬國). Indeed, the reason Qing required Joseon's monarch to separately inform the government or parliament of the other country whenever concluding a treaty was not because Joseon was a 'vassal state' (屬國) of China, but because it was a 'vassal state' (屬邦).4

4 The explicit statement that Joseon was a vassal state of Qing was a major point of negotiation in the process of Li Hongzhang drafting the treaty with U.S. Plenipotentiary Admiral Shufeldt on behalf of Joseon. Li Hongzhang intended to include in Article 1 of the treaty the statement, "Joseon is a vassal state of China, but its internal and foreign affairs have always been managed autonomously (Collected Records of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations in the Late Qing Dynasty, Vol. 3, p. 234)," but Shufeldt strongly opposed this. As a compromise, this content was not included in the treaty, and the King of Joseon sent a separate inquiry to the President of the United States. The content of the inquiry sent by Joseon to the United States at the time was as follows: "We humbly consider that Joseon is originally a vassal state of China, but its internal administration and foreign affairs have always been managed autonomously by the monarch of Joseon. Currently, when Joseon and the United States conclude a treaty, both parties must treat each other equally. The monarch of Joseon hereby declares that all provisions in the treaty will be faithfully implemented in accordance with autonomous practice. Joseon, as a vassal state of China,

333 8. 'Yangwu' Operation of the 'Fanli' System_Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall

Given the circumstances at the time, when various arguments were being made within the Qing court to make Joseon a 'vassal state' of Qing, it is reasonable to understand Li Hongzhang's assertion that Joseon was a 'vassal state' (屬邦) rather than a 'vassal state' (屬國) as a conscious choice. At the time, Lu Ch'eng-hsiang, the Qing Minister to Japan, even "proposed deposing the King of Joseon and establishing prefectures and counties," and Zhang Peilun, a reader in the Hanlin Academy, "memorialized to conquer Joseon and appoint a Minister of Trade for Joseon to manage foreign affairs (Yu Bada, 2016, p. 184)." The memorial submitted by Hai Zhang to the Zongli Yamen, titled "On Managing Joseon's Foreign Affairs," also confirms the argument that making Joseon definitively a 'vassal state' of Qing was the best course of action for Qing.

If Joseon is in peril, China's situation will also become increasingly

precarious. Therefore, considering China's current situation,

the best course of action is to establish a resident minister in Joseon, similar to Mongolia and Tibet, and have China manage all domestic politics and treaties with foreign countries, so that foreigners dare not covet it. (Collected Records of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations in the Late Qing Dynasty, Vol. 3, p. 99)

treaties, all with China, so that foreigners dare not

covet it. This is the best strategy. (Collected Records of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations in the Late Qing Dynasty, Vol. 3, p. 99)

Collected Records of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations in the Late Qing Dynasty, Vol. 3, p. 99)

as a vassal state, but all matters that should be carried out within its duties have no relation whatsoever with the United States (Collected Records of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations in the Late Qing Dynasty, Vol. 4, pp. 74-75).

334 Regarding how Qing should manage Joseon's foreign affairs, Hai Zhang explicitly proposed sending officials directly to Joseon as the best strategy. The method of indirectly guiding Joseon's foreign affairs by sending secret letters to Joseon's ministers, as Li Hongzhang did, is considered a secondary strategy to be pursued when the best strategy cannot be implemented, in Hai Zhang's view.

However, Li Hongzhang clearly and consistently opposed the idea of making Joseon a 'vassal state' of Qing, and sought to maintain his policy of encouraging Joseon to conclude treaties with other countries, actively guiding the process, but not acting as its representative in treaty negotiations. He presented several reasons in various documents for opposing the theory of Joseon as a vassal state. One reason was that making Joseon a 'vassal state' would entail significant costs for Qing. For example, in a document opposing Zhang Peilun's proposal, Li Hongzhang expressed concern that if officials were dispatched to represent Joseon's foreign affairs, "subsequently, for all matters of negotiation between various countries and Joseon, China would be solely held responsible, and I fear that the court and the Zongli Yamen would not be able to bear the burden of such complexity (Collected Records of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations in the Late Qing Dynasty, Vol. 4, p. 285)." He also pointed out that Qing lacked the capacity to effectively intervene in Joseon's internal affairs, and feared that if such intervention failed, the traditional status of Joseon as a 'vassal state' (屬邦) of Qing might not even be maintained.5 Thus, Li Hongzhang clearly expressed his opposition to representing foreign affairs and intervening in internal affairs, citing issues of cost and lack of capability.6

5 "However, China has never intervened in Joseon's internal politics. Even if we were to subtly control its power, the climate is different, and talented individuals are scarce, so the success or failure of various measures would not necessarily turn out as we wish. If Joseon were to outwardly obey but inwardly resist, or be instigated by others and drift apart, how would the court handle it? This is the difficulty that would arise. After repeated consideration, I cannot rashly decide on this method and must request that the Minister of Military Affairs, in conjunction with the Zongli Yamen, discuss it comprehensively and then submit a memorial with their conclusion (Collected Records of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations in the Late Qing Dynasty, Vol. 4, p. 286).

6 In interpreting this same historical source, Yu Bada argues that Li Hongzhang's assertion that "Joseon could be treated like a Western vassal state" (與泰西屬國之例相符) by having ministers dispatched to manage Joseon's trade and intervene in its internal affairs means that "Joseon would become a vassal state of Qing under international law, and its international legal status would be that of a semi-sovereign state." (Yu Bada, 2019, p. 181). However, "與泰西屬國之例相符" is more faithfully translated as "it aligns with the example of Western vassal states" rather than "it can be treated like a Western vassal state," as translated by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. Furthermore, considering that the sentence immediately following this one, although not cited by Yu Bada, is the sentence in footnote 5, it is incorrect to interpret the meaning of this sentence within that paragraph as Li Hongzhang arguing for making Joseon a vassal state of Qing by "dispatching ministers to manage Joseon's trade and intervene in Joseon's internal affairs." Considering the context, Li Hongzhang views the act of "dispatching ministers to manage Joseon's trade and intervene in Joseon's internal affairs" as aligning with the example of Western vassal states and considers the intention good, but he opposes it due to concerns that it would ultimately lead to failure in Qing's intervention in Joseon's internal affairs. In other words, contrary to Yu Bada's interpretation that Li Hongzhang argued that Qing "could treat Joseon like a vassal state," Li Hongzhang in this document

336 In arranging Joseon's trade treaties with various countries, Li Hongzhang chose not to treat Joseon as a 'vassal state' (屬國) of Qing and directly represent its internal and foreign affairs. Instead, he opted for an indirect approach, offering recommendations and guidance based on the precedent of dealing with 'vassal states' (屬邦), thereby allowing Joseon to act autonomously. This approach is clearly distinguished from the attempts by Qing at the time to actively incorporate regions like Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, which it had indirectly controlled, and establish them as definite 'vassal states' (屬國) of Qing. Indeed, Zuo Zongtang, who clashed with Li Hongzhang in the 1870s over defense budget allocations, contributed to the recovery of the Xinjiang region and the establishment of Qing's direct rule over it. Hai Zhang's assertion that the best strategy for Joseon was to "establish a resident minister in Joseon, similar to Mongolia and Tibet, and have China manage all domestic politics and treaties with foreign countries" was made with Qing's aggressive policies in its northwestern regions in mind.

Meanwhile, Motegi Toshio (1987) also pointed out that Li Hongzhang sought to keep Joseon as a 'vassal state' (屬邦) rather than making it a 'vassal state' (屬國). According to him, Li Hongzhang intended to treat Joseon with respect for "traditional frameworks" regarding its opening to Western countries. He argues that this respect for the principle of traditional vassal autonomy was a much less efficient method than the colonial rule proposed by Hai Zhang, but that Qing lacked the "power" to seize Joseon's foreign affairs rights and exercise colonial rule, as it would have to handle all issues between Joseon and foreign countries.

337 8. 'Yangwu' Operation of the 'Fanli' System_Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall

In conclusion, Li Hongzhang's actions of establishing Joseon as the subject of treaty negotiations with various countries while simultaneously ensuring its status as a 'vassal state' (屬邦) of Qing were not a contradiction stemming from his ignorance of international law, as Liang Qichao understood, but a deliberate contradiction created with intent. Unlike Liang Qichao, who definitively asserted that Joseon's traditional status corresponded to that of a 'vassal state' (屬國) under international law, Li Hongzhang meticulously recognized and utilized the similarities and differences between the traditional 'vassal state' (屬邦) status and the international legal 'vassal state' (屬國) status. Li Hongzhang diligently sought to persuade both the Qing court and Joseon of the advantages of this seemingly contradictory approach. For instance, in a direct meeting with Kim Yun-sik, he actively argued that it was beneficial for Joseon to conclude treaties with various countries to gain the protection of the Law of Nations and the balance of power among nations, while remaining a vassal state of Qing to receive Qing's protection as before (Collected Records of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations in the Late Qing Dynasty, Vol. 3, pp. 267-276). The background of Kim Yun-sik's "dual benefit system theory," which advocated for "recommending Joseon to conclude treaties with Western countries in accordance with the Law of Nations while maintaining an autonomous vassal relationship with Qing" (Ha Young-sun, 2019, p. 49),

338 was rooted in Li Hongzhang's 'deliberate contradiction' of simultaneously pursuing the policy of Joseon's treaty-making rights and the theory of Joseon as a vassal state.

Then, what considerations and judgments led Li Hongzhang to deliberately pursue these two seemingly contradictory actions—Joseon's treaty-making rights and the theory of Joseon as a vassal state—at that time? In this paper, as an attempt to understand Li Hongzhang's 'deliberate contradiction,' I will focus on his view of Joseon as China's 'fence,' or 'Fanli' (藩籬). His series of decisions regarding Joseon from the 1880s to the 1890s can be understood more consistently when considering his efforts to solidify the 'Fanli system' as Qing's traditional security system by defending Qing's eastern fence. In particular, Li Hongzhang's guidance of Joseon's conclusion of trade treaties with various countries can be re-examined as a new method of operating the 'Fanli system,' which I will refer to as the 'Yangwu' (洋務) operation of the Fanli system, and explore its specific aspects. Through this, I hope to provide a theoretical discussion in this paper that persuasively reconstructs a context for consistently understanding Li Hongzhang's seemingly contradictory actions of advocating for Joseon as a vassal state and pursuing treaty-making rights.

2. The Fanli System and the Security Paradigm of Continental Empires

339 8. 'Yangwu' Operation of the 'Fanli' System_Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall

Li Hongzhang: However, if Joseon can conduct contact and

diplomacy with other countries and strengthen its own fence, then

Tianjin, Jilin, Shandong, and Zhili will all benefit from the protection of the fence.

[November 22, 1880]

(Collected Records of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations in the Late Qing Dynasty, Vol. 3, pp. 111-112)

Lu Ch'eng-hsiang: This year, the Joseon people (who came as the second envoy to Japan)

were greatly surprised and impressed by Japan, and they

have come to hold the opinion of wanting to be aligned with both

(China and Japan). China should urgently dispatch an envoy

to Joseon to handle matters such as treaty negotiations for Joseon. Also, it is necessary to find one port among Busan, Wonsan-jin, etc.

to serve as a place for warships to anchor.

If we consider it, the cunning schemes of other countries can be suppressed, which will be the most important measure to build a fence in the East. [Date Month Day, 1882] (Translated Korean-Sino-Japanese Relations Materials 4, p. 306)

This will be the most important measure to build a fence in the East.

[Date Month Day, 1882] (Translated Korean-Sino-Japanese Relations Materials 4, p. 306)

(Translated Korean-Sino-Japanese Relations Materials 4, p. 306)

Li Hongzhang and Li Shuchang find the reason why Qing should guide Joseon to trade with various countries in the necessity of building a fence in the East and protecting it. Both shared the perception that Joseon is Qing's eastern fence, and protecting this fence is equivalent to protecting Qing. This perception is also confirmed in Li Hongzhang's letter to Li Yu-yuan. Li Hongzhang wrote to Li Yu-yuan, "China and your country are like one family, and your country is like a screen protecting the Three Eastern Provinces... Your country's worries are China's worries."7 According to their perception, strengthening the eastern fence is directly related to Qing's security, hence its importance. The reason Qing wants to protect Joseon is precisely because it is about strengthening the eastern fence. Joseon's security is treated as important within the context of Qing's security. And Qing's guidance for Joseon to conclude trade treaties with various countries is mentioned as a concrete method for strengthening this eastern fence. Indeed, Li Shuchang juxtaposes the guidance of Joseon's foreign affairs with another fence protection policy: the dispatch of warships to Joseon. Li Hongzhang also anticipates that if Joseon can conduct diplomacy with other countries under Qing's guidance, Qing will benefit from a strengthened eastern fence.

340 The operation of the fence system in Yangwu studies_Yilchong Peace Memorial Hall. By maintaining the fence strongly, the understanding of building Qing's security was not a special opinion of certain high-ranking officials like Li Hongzhang or Li Shuchang, but a common understanding among Qing's political elites. For example, in 1881, when discussing the necessity of Qing protecting Vietnam, Liu Zhang-wu formalized the security importance of the fence as follows: "Border provinces are the gateway of China, and outer dependencies are the fences of China. If the fences collapse, the gateway will be in danger, and if the gateway is in danger, the inner chambers will shake."8 Furthermore, Qing's use of surrounding smaller states as 'fences' was not limited to Joseon. Qing also regarded Vietnam as its 'fence,' and in a situation where that fence's security was threatened by France, it intended to dispatch troops to protect Vietnam. While the necessity for Qing to protect Joseon was discussed in the context of defending the eastern fence, the necessity for Qing to dispatch troops to protect Vietnam to prevent the Tongking region of Vietnam from being occupied by France was discussed in the context of defending the southern fence.9

The understanding that Qing's security is built by maintaining the fence strongly was not a special opinion of certain high-ranking officials like Li Hongzhang or Li Shuchang, but a common understanding among Qing's political elites. For example, in 1881, when discussing the necessity of Qing protecting Vietnam, Liu Zhang-wu formalized the security importance of the fence as follows: "Border provinces are the gateway of China, and outer dependencies are the fences of China. If the fences collapse, the gateway will be in danger, and if the gateway is in danger, the inner chambers will shake."8 Furthermore, Qing's use of surrounding smaller states as 'fences' was not limited to Joseon. Qing also regarded Vietnam as its 'fence,' and in a situation where that fence's security was threatened by France, it intended to dispatch troops to protect Vietnam. While the necessity for Qing to protect Joseon was discussed in the context of defending the eastern fence, the necessity for Qing to dispatch troops to protect Vietnam to prevent the Tongking region of Vietnam from being occupied by France was discussed in the context of defending the southern fence.9

341 8. The Yangwu operation of the fence system_Yilchong Peace Memorial Hall. If the gateway is in danger, the inner chambers will shake."8 Furthermore, Qing's use of surrounding smaller states as 'fences' was not limited to Joseon. Qing also regarded Vietnam as its 'fence,' and in a situation where that fence's security was threatened by France, it intended to dispatch troops to protect Vietnam. While the necessity for Qing to protect Joseon was discussed in the context of defending the eastern fence, the necessity for Qing to dispatch troops to protect Vietnam to prevent the Tongking region of Vietnam from being occupied by France was discussed in the context of defending the southern fence.9

Qing sought to defend its surrounding fences by dispatching troops to the respective smaller states or arranging diplomacy. One of the main reasons Qing volunteered to 'protect' smaller states like Joseon and Vietnam stemmed from these security considerations of Qing. So, what kind of security threat did Qing face when it failed to defend its fences? One clue can be found in the geographical locations of Vietnam and Joseon. In 1882, Zhang Shusheng pointed out the geographical configuration of Vietnam becoming a buffer zone for China as follows: "Vietnam, collectively called Jiaozhi, borders Yunnan and the Liangguang regions, so if France occupies the Tongking region ('Northern圻'), the border fences will all be dismantled, and there will be endless future troubles."10 What is noteworthy here is that from Qing's perspective, it was not the security of Vietnam as a whole that was important, but the security of the northern Tongking region of Vietnam, which bordered China. The occupation of territories bordering Qing's borders by Qing's potential enemies, or their indirect subordination, was perceived as a security threat to Qing.

9 Zhang Shusheng: Vietnam's national strength is very weak, so if the French intend to annex Vietnam, this country will have great difficulty preserving itself. In terms of the meaning of tributary relations, China should immediately dispatch troops to rescue it... [March 1882] (Re-quoted from Hong Seong-hwa (2019, p. 480))

342 The security importance of the fence system in Yangwu studies_Yilchong Peace Memorial Hall. What is noteworthy here is that from Qing's perspective, it was not the security of Vietnam as a whole that was important, but the security of the northern Tongking region of Vietnam, which bordered China. The occupation of territories bordering Qing's borders by Qing's potential enemies, or their indirect subordination, was perceived as a security threat to Qing.

Hai Zhang: Currently, Russian Admiral Lessovsky is

anchored near Hunchun with more than 10 warships.

As the weather gets colder and the ice forms, they will surely move south.

If, unfortunately, they invade and occupy Joseon,

they will surely divide the land to defend themselves.

Leaving someone snoring beside your bed will only worsen the future troubles.

If, fortunately, such a thing does not happen,

Russia will use the strength of the Joseon people to develop Siberia and transport Joseon's rice, and their intention has been like this for more than a day...

and transport Joseon's rice, and their intention has been like this for more than a day...

In general,

10 Re-quoted from Hong Seong-hwa (2019, p. 480).

343 8. The Yangwu operation of the fence system_Yilchong Peace Memorial Hall.

Vietnam has already divided its land with France, and Burma is now under British control.

Fortunately, Joseon has managed to preserve its territory, but it clings to old customs and stubbornly adheres to its mistakes, failing to realize them, and has not changed despite repeated advice.

clings to old customs and stubbornly adheres to its mistakes, failing to realize them, and has not changed despite repeated advice.

and has not changed despite repeated advice.

[October 16, 1880] (Translated Korean-Sino-Japanese Relations Materials 3, p. 101)

(Translated Korean-Sino-Japanese Relations Materials 3, p. 101)

Hai Zhang's discussion more clearly shows that what Qing specifically referred to as a 'fence' was not the political entities of its tributary states like Joseon and Vietnam, but the 'territory' in the regions bordering Qing's imagined external boundaries. The fact that Qing showed more active interest in the 'territory' of surrounding smaller states from the 1880s onwards has been understood in relation to Qing's transformation from a traditional empire to a modern empire, and its intention to make Joseon, a formerly autonomous dependency, a subordinate state. However, as seen in the above materials, the reason Qing was interested in the territories of surrounding smaller states was precisely because if those territories fell under the direct jurisdiction of another country, Qing's 'fence' would disappear. The reason Qing sought to prevent the territories of smaller states from falling under the jurisdiction of other countries was not an ambition to make those territories part of Qing, but an act of security measure to maintain those territories as Qing's fences.

This perception of Qing regarding the territories of its dependencies can also be confirmed in Li Hongzhang's stance on Vietnam. In 1883, on the eve of the Sino-French War, Li Hongzhang sought to resolve the Vietnam issue by signing a treaty with France, and in the process, he told the French envoy Tricou the following: "All the land of Vietnam belongs to China's tributary territory, but we have no intention of profiting from its territory from the beginning... What we want to discuss today is the boundary of China's protection of Vietnam. The land within the borders still belongs to Vietnam. However, if 'bandits' cause unrest within Vietnam, China can dispatch troops to suppress them."11 In this regard, it is appropriate to view the autonomy of dependencies in the tributary system not as something the empire 'allowed,' but as a matter that was essential for the empire's security. A situation where a dependency, unable to quell internal unrest with its own strength or losing territory to another country, was a state of emergency for the empire that considered that territory its fence, and a problematic situation that required increased security costs to resolve.

344 The security importance of the fence system in Yangwu studies_Yilchong Peace Memorial Hall. In this regard, it is appropriate to view the autonomy of dependencies in the tributary system not as something the empire 'allowed,' but as a matter that was essential for the empire's security. A situation where a dependency, unable to quell internal unrest with its own strength or losing territory to another country, was a state of emergency for the empire that considered that territory its fence, and a problematic situation that required increased security costs to resolve.

One point to note here is that the context in which the security of dependencies like Joseon and Vietnam was important was precisely because these dependencies were the subjects capable of directly defending and managing their respective 'territories.' If dependencies, in order to preserve themselves, were to hand over their territories to other countries ('Joseon will surely divide the land to defend itself,' 'Vietnam has already divided its land with France') or significantly relinquish their jurisdiction over territories ('Russia will use the strength of the Joseon people to develop Siberia and transport Joseon's rice,' 'Burma is under British control'), then the preservation or security of the dependency itself would no longer be the object of Qing's protection. In such situations, Qing would either passively watch or actively lead to the downfall of its dependencies to protect its own fences. Indeed, in the case of the Ming Dynasty, which operated a tributary system similar to Qing, it dispatched troops to Joseon to protect its fence territory during the Imjin War, but when the war situation turned unfavorable, it showed a considerably compromising attitude towards ceding the southern part of Joseon to Japan. In response, many political elites of Joseon at the time, including Ryu Seong-ryong, recognized that this war was a 'fence war' (藩籬之戰), and that the Ming's objective was not the survival of the political entity of Joseon, but to establish the northern region of Joseon as Ming's fence (Song Bok, 2014).

345 8. The Yangwu operation of the fence system_Yilchong Peace Memorial Hall. In such situations, Qing would either passively watch or actively lead to the downfall of its dependencies to protect its own fences. Indeed, in the case of the Ming Dynasty, which operated a tributary system similar to Qing, it dispatched troops to Joseon to protect its fence territory during the Imjin War, but when the war situation turned unfavorable, it showed a considerably compromising attitude towards ceding the southern part of Joseon to Japan. In response, many political elites of Joseon at the time, including Ryu Seong-ryong, recognized that this war was a 'fence war' (藩籬之戰), and that the Ming's objective was not the survival of the political entity of Joseon, but to establish the northern region of Joseon as Ming's fence (Song Bok, 2014).

Another point to consider is that the 'territory' that Qing uses as a fence is limited to areas connected to Qing by land. For example, in the case of Ryukyu, although it shared the title of 'tributary state' with Qing like Joseon and Vietnam, when Japan moved to annex Ryukyu, Qing, after much deliberation, decided to abandon Ryukyu. Although Ryukyu had been a tributary state of Qing for a long time, it was not a 'fence' that Qing needed to maintain and protect from a security perspective. Indeed, regarding the situation where Japan was attempting to annex Ryukyu,

346 Li Shuchang stated the following: "In fact, the survival of Ryukyu is not of great concern to China's gains and losses. It is only China's face that diminishes (Translated Korean-Sino-Japanese Relations Materials 4, p. 306)." Whether Li Shuchang's opinion represented the majority opinion of Qing's political elites at the time requires further examination, but at least Li Shuchang's statement is in contrast to the situation where, although there were arguments for directly ruling Joseon, no direct argument for abandoning Joseon was raised.

From this, it can be inferred that Qing's claim of suzerainty over Ryukyu was a symbolic gesture, not significantly mediated by security considerations. And precisely because of this, Qing recognized the situation of Ryukyu falling under Japanese control as a threat, but did not pour as many resources into resolving it as it did for Vietnam or Joseon.12 In this sense, the criticism by Fuma Susumu (2019) of the fictionality of China's tributary-investiture system, based on the incompleteness of Qing's suzerainty over Ryukyu, needs reconsideration. He argued for the fictionality of the China-centric tributary-investiture order based on the fact that Ryukyu had maintained tributary-investiture relations with both China and Japan for a long time, and China knew this but took no action. However, considering the 'fence' security system of a continental empire like Qing, Ryukyu, which was not connected to China by land, was originally of little security importance within that security system. Although the smaller states around China shared the name of 'tributary states' of China, the nature of the relationship China had with these smaller states differed depending on whether they were connected to China by land and considered Qing's 'fence'.

347 8. The Yangwu operation of the fence system_Yilchong Peace Memorial Hall. In this sense, the criticism by Fuma Susumu (2019) of the China-centric tributary-investiture system, based on the incompleteness of Qing's suzerainty over Ryukyu, needs reconsideration. He argued for the fictionality of the China-centric tributary-investiture order based on the fact that Ryukyu had maintained tributary-investiture relations with both China and Japan for a long time, and China knew this but took no action. However, considering the 'fence' security system of a continental empire like Qing, Ryukyu, which was not connected to China by land, was originally of little security importance within that security system. Although the smaller states around China shared the name of 'tributary states' of China, the nature of the relationship China had with these smaller states differed depending on whether they were connected to China by land and considered Qing's 'fence'.

348

Map of Qing Administrative Divisions

Now, in the context of such security considerations for defending the 'fence,' we will re-examine Li Hongzhang's theory of Joseon as a tributary state and his policy of seeking treaties through historical materials.

Li Hongzhang: When Joseon previously concluded a treaty with Japan,

China merely offered indirect advice and did not send officials to approve it. 349 8. The Yangwu operation of the fence system_Yilchong Peace Memorial Hall.

In the treaty text, there is also no phrase stating "receives the mandate of the Chinese government."

If Joseon now concludes a treaty with a Western country and states "must receive the mandate of the Chinese government," Joseon would gladly comply, but Western countries would not necessarily comply.

but Western countries would not necessarily comply.

would gladly comply, but Western countries would not necessarily comply.

Hai Zhang is concerned that if Joseon concludes treaties with other countries on its own and other countries fully recognize its autonomy, the status of Joseon as a Chinese tributary state will suddenly be removed. This is not without basis in his understanding.

However, if Joseon can interact with other countries and conduct diplomacy to strengthen its own fence, then Tianjin, Jilin, Shandong, and Zhili will all benefit from the protection of the fence.

the status of Joseon as a Chinese tributary state will suddenly be removed.

This is not without basis in his understanding.

However, if Joseon can interact with other countries and conduct diplomacy to strengthen its own fence,

then Tianjin, Jilin, Shandong, and Zhili will all benefit from the protection of the fence.

will all benefit from the protection of the fence.

Considering the courtesy Joseon has shown us, Joseon's attitude will not change immediately due to the conclusion of treaties with Western countries...

Joseon's attitude will not change immediately due to the conclusion of treaties with Western countries...

If China rectifies its internal affairs, repels foreign enemies, trains its military, and defends its coasts to achieve self-strengthening day by day,

then Joseon, although weak, will not dare to disrespect (China).

Furthermore, the Western great powers will also not be able to avoid respecting and fearing (China).

However, if measures for self-strengthening are not pursued, there is concern that it will ultimately be impossible to achieve independence.

Would this also be related to whether Joseon, as a tributary state, follows our lead?

Upon repeated consideration, it seems that only covert assistance and protection, as instructed by the Zongli Yamen, would be possible.

[November 22, 1880] (『Collected Korean Translations of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations Archives 3』, pp. 111-112)

In the above historical material, Li Hongzhang emphasizes two points that Joseon values more than the 'pretext' of being a tributary state of Qing: first, the benefit of protecting Qing's periphery through Joseon's self-reliance; and second, China's own self-strengthening efforts. Both are matters directly related to Qing's security. In Li Hongzhang's view, the reason why Haiyuan emphasizes the pretext of Joseon being a tributary state is related to the issue of China's authority and face, i.e., 'whether the tributary state follows our lead.' However, Li Hongzhang believes that China's authority and face over its tributary states are not related to the issue of China's self-strengthening and self-reliance, that is, the issue of security. What is important to Li Hongzhang is China's security, and what contributes to China's security is strengthening Joseon as a protective barrier. To make this possible, the 'pretext' of Joseon being a tributary state of Qing is a negotiable matter.

Furthermore, the historical material indicates that Li Hongzhang understood Joseon's conclusion of trade treaties with various countries as a Qing security policy aimed at strengthening Qing's protective barrier by enabling Joseon's self-reliance. In implementing this security policy, Haiyuan proposed either directly dispatching Qing officials to Joseon or at least including a clause in the treaties stating that Joseon was a tributary state of Qing. The reason for this was that if Joseon were allowed to conclude treaties with other countries without such measures, various countries would recognize Joseon as an independent state and not as a tributary state of Qing, thus eliminating the pretext of being a tributary state. However, Li Hongzhang opposed both measures, arguing that they would hinder Joseon's ability to conclude treaties with Western countries. Instead, he sought to promote a policy of 'covert assistance and protection' by writing to and guiding key Joseon officials.

Haiyuan: According to Western practice, when two countries are at war, other countries maintain neutrality and cannot assist either side, but tributary states are an exception. If Joseon is to be saved from the urgent danger of Russia swallowing it,

it is unavoidable to borrow the strength of other countries to enable mutual deterrence. However, if Joseon concludes treaties with other countries on its own, all other countries will recognize Joseon as a sovereign state, and the name of being a tributary state of China will disappear. If this happens, the urgent matter will be resolved temporarily, but the worries will be left for the future, so preparations must be made for this as well. [October 16, 1880] (『Collected Korean Translations of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations Archives 3』, p. 100)

However, Haiyuan's actual logic differed significantly from Li Hongzhang's understanding. The reason Haiyuan argued for retaining the name of Joseon as a tributary state of Qing, either by dispatching Qing officials to Joseon or at least by including relevant clauses in the treaties, stemmed from the dilemma of Qing's security policy, which aimed at Joseon's self-reliance through trade with various countries. In Haiyuan's view, drawing in the interests of other countries to create a balance of power in Joseon to defend against the urgent situation of Russian invasion or unrest in the northwestern border was Qing's short-term security policy. And in the event of an actual war in Joseon, dispatching Qing troops to defend Joseon as a protective barrier was Qing's long-term security policy. The problem was that pursuing the short-term security policy of allowing Joseon to conclude trade treaties with various countries would eliminate the foundation for Qing to pursue its long-term security policy. This is because while dispatching troops to other countries in the traditional East Asian context was justified by the logic of moral conquest, in the context of relations between Western countries, dispatching troops to other countries required justification under international law. Haiyuan believed that Qing needed to prepare so that not only East Asian countries but also Western countries would not object to troop deployment in the future, should Joseon face a situation requiring such deployment. In other words, like Li Hongzhang, Haiyuan understood the issue of guiding Joseon's diplomacy from the perspective of Qing's security policy, and he argued for retaining the 'pretext' of Joseon being a tributary state of Qing only to prevent potential long-term problems arising from that security policy. That is, for Haiyuan, the issue of whether Joseon was a tributary state or not was understood entirely within the context of establishing Qing's security.

It appears that Li Hongzhang did not fully comprehend Haiyuan's logic at the time, in the winter of 1880. However, Li Hongzhang soon accepted Haiyuan's logic, stating the following in a report to the Zongli Yamen on February 10, 1882, regarding the progress of discussions on the draft US-Joseon treaty: "(The draft US-Joseon treaty sent by Shufeldt) did not mention the clause of China's tributary state at all, making it difficult for us to intervene in this matter. In the future, other countries will emulate this, and over time, they will not recognize Joseon as our territory, leading to greater future troubles. (If the clause of tributary state is included) under international law, dependent states that cannot be independent are also inconvenient in concluding treaties with other major powers, so there are problems on both sides (『Collected Korean Translations of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations Archives 3』, p. 230)."

353 8. Yangwu Operation of the Tributary System_Ilcheonganghwa Memorial Hall. Subsequently, in matters concerning its tributary states in its relations with other countries, Li Hongzhang focused on preserving Qing's justification for dispatching troops to its tributary states. For example, in 1883, on the eve of the Sino-French War, Li Hongzhang sought to resolve the Vietnam issue by concluding a treaty with France. In the process, he told the French envoy Tricou: "Vietnam has always been our tributary state, and all its land is Chinese territory, but we have no intention of profiting from its territory. ... What we wish to discuss today is the boundary of China's protection of Vietnam. The land within the borders still belongs to Vietnam. However, if local bandits cause unrest (within Vietnam), China can dispatch troops to suppress them."13 It can be confirmed that Li Hongzhang emphasized Vietnam's status as a tributary state of Qing in order to preserve Qing's right to dispatch troops to Vietnam.

13 『Complete Works of Li Hongzhang』, Vol. 33, p. 273; cited in Hong Seong-hwa (2019, p. 484).

354 In subsequent matters concerning informing Western countries of Joseon's status as a tributary state of Qing, Li Hongzhang consistently maintained the same position as Haiyuan. However, he adopted a more compromising attitude than Haiyuan in the method of informing them. For example, when the US Minister Shufeldt strongly opposed including the clause of Joseon being a tributary state of Qing in the treaty, Li Hongzhang compromised by sending inquiries to various countries regarding tributary status. Furthermore, until the situation became urgent due to the Imo Incident, Li Hongzhang maintained a very cautious attitude regarding the dispatch of Qing officials to guide Joseon's diplomatic affairs. Rather, it was the Joseon royal court that repeatedly requested the secret dispatch of Qing officials to guide trade treaty negotiations, and it was also the Joseon side that requested that Ma Jianzhong's return to Tianjin be delayed when Li Hongzhang dispatched him to conclude the US-Joseon Treaty of Amity and Commerce. Until the Joseon side officially requested the dispatch of Qing officials to assist in concluding trade treaties, thereby maintaining the precedent of Qing providing assistance when a tributary state requested it, Li Hongzhang maintained a cautious attitude regarding the dispatch of officials. In summary, within the context of operating the tributary system, Li Hongzhang's theory of Joseon as a tributary state and his policy of treaty rights can be understood as a consistent series of security policies.

355 8. Yangwu Operation of the Tributary System_Ilcheonganghwa Memorial Hall.

3. Yangwu Operation of the Tributary System

If the tributary system was not Li Hongzhang's unique invention but rather a context that had traditionally defined the relationship between China and Joseon, then why was there strong resistance within Joseon to Li Hongzhang's proposal for concluding trade treaties with various countries at that time? Examining Li Hongzhang's letter persuading Li Youyuan of the necessity of Joseon trading with various countries and the resistance within Joseon to it reveals how Li Hongzhang's guidance on Joseon's trade was within the framework of the traditional operation of the tributary system and in what aspects it was new.

Li Hongzhang: Your country also needs to establish defensive measures. What Japan fears is the West. Although Joseon's strength alone may be insufficient to suppress Japan, it would be more than sufficient if it traded with the West and deterred Japan. According to general Western practice, countries do not invade others without reason. Generally, when countries trade with each other, international law is naturally applied. Last year, when Turkey was invaded by Russia and the situation was very dangerous, countries such as Britain and Italy intervened and argued, and only then did Russia withdraw its troops. If Turkey had been isolated and without aid at that time, the Russians would have already satisfied their desires. Furthermore, Belgium and Denmark in Europe are also very small countries, but because they have concluded treaties with various countries, no one dares to invade them. This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

356

If a country is isolated and without aid, the Russians would have already satisfied their desires. Moreover, Belgium and Denmark in Europe are also very small countries, but because they have concluded treaties with various countries, no one dares to invade them. This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Furthermore, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

355 8. Yangwu Operation of the Tributary System_Ilcheonganghwa Memorial Hall.

3. Yangwu Operation of the Tributary System

What Japan fears is the West. Although Joseon's strength alone may be insufficient to suppress Japan, it would be more than sufficient if it traded with the West and deterred Japan. According to general Western practice, countries do not invade others without reason. Generally, when countries trade with each other, international law is naturally applied. Last year, when Turkey was invaded by Russia and the situation was very dangerous, countries such as Britain and Italy intervened and argued, and only then did Russia withdraw its troops. If Turkey had been isolated and without aid at that time, the Russians would have already satisfied their desires. Furthermore, Belgium and Denmark in Europe are also very small countries, but because they have concluded treaties with various countries, no one dares to invade them. This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

Although Joseon's strength alone may be insufficient to suppress Japan, it would be more than sufficient if it traded with the West and deterred Japan. According to general Western practice, countries do not invade others without reason. Generally, when countries trade with each other, international law is naturally applied. Last year, when Turkey was invaded by Russia and the situation was very dangerous, countries such as Britain and Italy intervened and argued, and only then did Russia withdraw its troops. If Turkey had been isolated and without aid at that time, the Russians would have already satisfied their desires. Furthermore, Belgium and Denmark in Europe are also very small countries, but because they have concluded treaties with various countries, no one dares to invade them. This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

If it traded with the West and deterred Japan. According to general Western practice, countries do not invade others without reason. Generally, when countries trade with each other, international law is naturally applied. Last year, when Turkey was invaded by Russia and the situation was very dangerous, countries such as Britain and Italy intervened and argued, and only then did Russia withdraw its troops. If Turkey had been isolated and without aid at that time, the Russians would have already satisfied their desires. Furthermore, Belgium and Denmark in Europe are also very small countries, but because they have concluded treaties with various countries, no one dares to invade them. This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

According to general Western practice, countries do not invade others without reason. Generally, when countries trade with each other, international law is naturally applied. Last year, when Turkey was invaded by Russia and the situation was very dangerous, countries such as Britain and Italy intervened and argued, and only then did Russia withdraw its troops. If Turkey had been isolated and without aid at that time, the Russians would have already satisfied their desires. Furthermore, Belgium and Denmark in Europe are also very small countries, but because they have concluded treaties with various countries, no one dares to invade them. This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

Generally, when countries trade with each other, international law is naturally applied. Last year, when Turkey was invaded by Russia and the situation was very dangerous, countries such as Britain and Italy intervened and argued, and only then did Russia withdraw its troops. If Turkey had been isolated and without aid at that time, the Russians would have already satisfied their desires. Furthermore, Belgium and Denmark in Europe are also very small countries, but because they have concluded treaties with various countries, no one dares to invade them. This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

Last year, when Turkey was invaded by Russia and the situation was very dangerous, countries such as Britain and Italy intervened and argued, and only then did Russia withdraw its troops. If Turkey had been isolated and without aid at that time, the Russians would have already satisfied their desires. Furthermore, Belgium and Denmark in Europe are also very small countries, but because they have concluded treaties with various countries, no one dares to invade them. This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

If Turkey had been isolated and without aid at that time, the Russians would have already satisfied their desires. Furthermore, Belgium and Denmark in Europe are also very small countries, but because they have concluded treaties with various countries, no one dares to invade them. This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

Furthermore, Belgium and Denmark in Europe are also very small countries, but because they have concluded treaties with various countries, no one dares to invade them. This is clear evidence that the strong and the weak deter each other. Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

Moreover, attacking a distant land by bypassing intervening countries was considered difficult even by the ancients. Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

Western countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the United States are tens of thousands of miles away from your country, have no other demands, and their purpose is only to trade and to protect ships passing through your country's territory. ... If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

If your country first establishes relations with Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, not only will Japan be deterred, but the Russian encroachment can also be prevented.

Russia will also necessarily follow and strengthen its ties.

It will also engage in trade. [1879] (Li Hongzhang to

a letter sent to Yu Won, Veritable Records of King Gojong, Vol. 16, 7th Month, 9th Day, 16th Year of King Gojong's Reign

Article 1 of the 1st day of the 4th lunar month)

Li Hongzhang's reason for proposing that Joseon should trade with various countries is that establishing trade treaties with Western countries would serve as a good means to attract Western powers and create a balance of power to check Russia. More specifically, Li Hongzhang suggests utilizing the principle of the Law of Nations and the mutual deterrence of naval fleets. First, 357 8. Yangwu (洋務) Operation of the Fence System_Ilcheong Peace Treaty Memorial Hall Li Hongzhang argues that the Western Law of Nations prevents countries from destroying others without just cause, and that by trading with Western countries, Joseon could become a nation subject to this law. It is important to note that Li Hongzhang is not presenting the Law of Nations as a force that can replace the reality of power politics. The reason he emphasizes the Law of Nations is that it serves as a justification for balance of power among Western countries. The Law of Nations provides a basis for other great powers to "dispute" when Russia attempts to destroy Turkey. This dispute did not deter Russia's aggressive intentions because Turkey was not "isolated and without recourse," meaning Turkey could leverage the mutual deterrence of various great powers. In other words, Li Hongzhang's point is not that Turkey was saved by the Law of Nations, but that the Law of Nations provided the justification for Western powers to mutually deter each other regarding Turkey. If Western powers were to check Russia's aggressive intentions toward Joseon, they would have no grounds to interfere with Russia's actions unless Joseon were included within the order of the Law of Nations. Therefore, Li Hongzhang strongly proposed that Joseon should become a nation subject to the Law of Nations by signing trade treaties with Western countries and utilize them to check Russia.

358 Yu Won: I have one point that is perplexing and raises doubts.

… Belgium and Denmark are

small countries, like praying mantises, caught between several large powers,

but they are sustained by the mutual deterrence of the strong and the weak. Yet, the King of Ryukyu, whose country has existed for hundreds of years, could not sustain itself. Is this because the region is separate and isolated from other countries, and the Law of Nations does not reach it? Our country is unfortunately situated at the very edge of the globe, poorer and weaker than small countries like Turkey, Ryukyu, Belgium, and Denmark. Moreover, the distance to the West is very great. [1879] (Yu Won's reply to Li Hongzhang,

The ancient kingdom of Goguryeo, having endured for hundreds of years, could not sustain itself.

Was this because its territory was separated and isolated from various

neighboring countries, preventing the reach of its public law?

Our nation, by unfortunate circumstance, is situated at the

extremity of the globe, making it poorer and weaker than small countries like Turkey, the Ryukyu Kingdom, Belgium,

Denmark, and others. Furthermore, the distance to the West is very great.

[1879] (Reply from Yi Yu-won to Li Hongzhang,

The six states united to defeat Qin because their territories

Veritable Records of King Gojong, Vol. 16, 7th Month, 9th Day, 16th Year of King Gojong's Reign

Article 1 of the 1st day of the 4th lunar month)

Yi Man-son et al.: Indeed, as Huang Junxian said, if Russia

truly has the power to swallow us and the intention to invade us,

would we wait for salvation from ten thousand li away while fighting alone against the nearby barbarians?

This is a matter of clear mutual interest. … In ancient times,

the six states united to defeat Qin because their territories

Song Bok, 2014, "Was it time to rebuild the nation for Ryu Seong-ryong?", Siru. Yu Bada, 2016, "The Conclusion of the 1882 Treaty and Vassal States (屬國) and Co-Sovereign States (半

heard of establishing diplomatic relations of lip-and-teeth (唇齒) by crossing thousands of miles of sea over heavily fortified borders. [1881]

I have never heard of establishing diplomatic relations of lip-and-teeth (唇齒) by crossing thousands of miles of sea over heavily fortified borders. [1881]

[1881]

(A critique of Huang Junxian's "Treatise on Joseon," submitted by the Yeongnam scholars) 359 8. Yangwu (洋務) Operation of the Fence System_Ilcheong Peace Treaty Memorial Hall

Joseon understood Li Hongzhang's proposal precisely based on the theory of balance of power. The reason Joseon intellectuals could not agree with Li Hongzhang's proposal to attract Western countries into creating a balance of power against Russia by engaging in trade with them was the efficacy of drawing Western countries into creating a balance of power in East Asia. In their view, mobilizing countries located across the sea into the mutual deterrence of the East Asian continent was impossible. This was because it would take too long for them to dispatch troops and arrive in Joseon. The small countries Li Hongzhang cited as examples, such as Belgium and Denmark, were not only connected to larger countries by land but were also very close. The reason great powers could mutually deter small countries was that the distances between them were short enough to threaten each other by moving troops. In contrast, when Japan invaded Ryukyu, no Western country could act in time because Ryukyu was very far from Western countries, separated by the sea. If Russia or Japan were to invade Joseon, it would take too long for Western countries to send military support, and the Law of Nations would not apply to a country that had already been destroyed.14 Therefore, even if Joseon engaged in trade with Western countries, 14 In his letter, Yu Won asked the following: "Given that the Law of Nations saved Turkey from the brink of destruction, what is the difficulty in its application to revive the destroyed Ryukyu Kingdom?"

360 there would be no practical benefit in creating the balance of power that Li Hongzhang expected.

Then why did Li Hongzhang believe it was possible to mobilize countries across the sea into a balance of power? While Joseon intellectuals failed to see it, what Li Hongzhang observed was the operation of naval fleets. In his previous letter, Li Hongzhang had stated: "It is merely to protect the ships passing through your country's territory." Li Hongzhang's intention was a situation where the fleets of various countries would mutually deter each other. However, Joseon's long-standing relations were with the Ming and Qing dynasties, which had long chosen to remain continental empires and did not operate their states through the deployment of naval forces. Therefore, while Joseon could understand Li Hongzhang's policy of creating a balance of power using the military strength of various nations, it did not easily comprehend Li Hongzhang's perception that the scope of military strength included the operation of distant countries' fleets.

361 8. Yangwu (洋務) Operation of the Fence System_Ilcheong Peace Treaty Memorial Hall

Beiyang Fleet's 'Zheng Yuan Ho'

I conclude this paper's preliminary discussion by stating that Li Hongzhang actively considered the operation of naval fleets in handling the Joseon issue within the paradigm of the fence system, which I refer to as his "Yangwu (洋務) operation of the fence system." By the time Liang Qichao wrote his biography of Li Hongzhang, the term 'Yangwu' had not yet become a noun (Liang Qichao, 2013, p. 137). However, Liang Qichao used the term 'Yangwu' "according to the principle that a name is called as the owner designates" to organize Li Hongzhang's activities over 20 years (Liang Qichao, 2013, p. 137), and listed Li Hongzhang's 'Yangwu' projects in a table (p. 139). It is noteworthy that more than half of the items listed in this table relate to the construction and operation of naval fleets and the associated administrative reforms. Indeed, while 'Yangwu' has been highlighted for its aspect of introducing Western military technology,

362 I believe it is necessary to more actively consider that a significant portion of the 'Yangwu' that Li Hongzhang was involved in was related to the construction of naval fleets when contemplating the meaning of 'Yangwu.' Although the conceptual history of 'Yangwu' requires separate research, unlike Liang Qichao, who conceptualized 'Yangwu' by emphasizing 'the West,' there is ample room to conceptualize 'Yangwu' by emphasizing 'the sea.' Considering that Li Hongzhang's stance, which contrasted with Zuo Zongtang, a proponent of coastal defense, was referred to as 'coastal defense theory' (海防論) at the time, it is entirely possible to lay the groundwork for future research by naming Li Hongzhang's efforts to supplement the traditional logic of balance of power by actively considering the operation of naval fleets in Joseon's diplomatic strategy as a "Yangwu (洋務) operation of the fence system."

363 8. Yangwu (洋務) Operation of the Fence System_Ilcheong Peace Treaty Memorial Hall

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Song Bok, 2014. *Ryu Seong-ryong, Is It Time to Rebuild the Nation?* Siru. Yu Ba-da, 2016. "The Conclusion of the 1882 Treaty and the International Legal Status of Joseon as a Semi-Suzerain State (半主之國)." *History and Reality*, No. 99.

52.

Ha Young-sun, 2019. *A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity*. Hanul Academy. Hong Sung-hwa, 2019. "Perceptions and Responses to the Sino-French Conflict in Vietnam during the Late Qing Dynasty." *Journal of Ming and Qing Studies*

52.

Fuma Susumu, 2019. *Joseon Yeonhengsa and Joseon Tongsinsa*, translated by Shin Ro-sa et al. Sungkyunkwan University Press.

Sungkyunkwan University Press.

365

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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