Bowing Empire and Open Seclusion: Reading Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740

Forging a Future World Politics in East Asia: Young People of the Sarangbang Embrace Kyushu

Choi Yeon Yonsei University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: February 22, 2024

Choi Yeon · Yonsei University

Introduction

What are the conditions for peace? What conditions must be met for peace to be established and maintained between two powers, two cultures, or two perspectives? Dutch merchants first set foot in Japan in 1609, and they began living on Dejima in 1641. From 1641 until 1860, Japan and the Netherlands maintained relations for over 200 years, separated by the small artificial island of Dejima. While short and intense friendships are common in international political history, long and slender friendships are rare. Moreover, international political common sense does not expect negotiations, peace, and friendship between entirely dissimilar entities to be historically realized. In this regard, the Sino-Dutch relationship in the early modern period is a historical event and subject that calls for political explanation and interpretation. What kind of empire was the Dutch colonial empire, and what kind of seclusion was Tokugawa Japan's seclusion, that made such a relationship possible? What was the nature of the relationship between the two countries, and how were they able to maintain their unique friendship for over two centuries? This article traces the content of the adjustments that characterized the Sino-Dutch relationship, symbolized by Dejima, and how those adjustments were maintained and managed in the 18th century, based on an analysis of Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740.

221 5. Bowing Empire and Open Seclusion_Analysis of Dejima

Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740

Bibliographical Information

Almost all diaries, letters, notarial deeds, and accounting books written by Dutch merchants residing in Japan between 1633 and 1860 are extant (Massarella, 1988, p. 372), totaling over 35,000 pages (Massarella, 1992, p. 553; van der Velde, 2023, pp. 21-27). According to Nakashima Nobuyuki, president of the Japan-Netherlands Society, who wrote the preface to Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740, the University of Tokyo Historiographical Institute and the Research Group for the History of Japan-Netherlands Relations, established under the Japan-Netherlands Society by Professor Iwao Seiichi, have been engaged in projects to translate the Dejima diaries into Japanese. However, judging that translating the entire original diaries would take a very long time, the Japan-Netherlands Society, centered around the students of Professor Leonard Blussé, has long promoted a project to translate the marginalia written in the margins of the Dejima diaries into English (The Deshima Diaries Source Publication Project), which is still ongoing (van der Velde & Bachofner, 1992, p. xi). One year's worth of Dejima diaries amounts to about 300 pages, making it inconvenient for the chief merchants (Opperhoofd)1 at the time to use as a reference. 1 The term Opperhoofd is used in Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740, which roughly corresponds to the English term 'chief'.

222 Therefore, from 1673 onwards, the notes written in the margins of the main text were transcribed into a separate list to function as a table of contents for the main body of the Dejima diaries. The idea of translating this list was first proposed by Professor M. Roessingh, who published a complete catalog of the Dejima archives in 1964. His colleagues, Professor Opstall and Professor Blussé of Leiden University, were able to launch the project in 1985 with substantial support from the Isaac Alfred Ailion Foundation (van der Velde, 2023, p. 21). The translation project was carried out in two phases: the first was a series titled The Deshima Dagregisters; the Original Tables of Contents, translated and edited by Professor A.C.J. Vermeulen, and the second was the Deshima Diaries Marginalia series, translated and edited by Professor Paul van der Velde, who took over from the previous series. While the first series was undertaken for the purpose of archival reference, the second series was created in response to the reality that the first series was being used as primary source material by historians who lacked Dutch language proficiency or access to archives in The Hague. 2 The Dejima diaries were originally compiled to serve as a guide for the chief merchants, who were replaced annually, regarding their conduct and negotiations with the Japanese. One copy was sent to the headquarters of the Dutch East India Company in Amsterdam via Batavia (Jakarta). For details on how the Dejima diaries were utilized by the chief merchants, refer to “A Glimpse behind the Screens: Some Remarks on the Significance of the Deshima Dagregisters for the Study of Tokugawa Japan,” an introductory essay in Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740.

223 5. Bowing Empire and Open Seclusion_Dejima, many of the notes, which were merely indicative, were replaced with texts reconstructed based on the actual content of the main text, such as 'Reasons why,' 'Thoughts on the subject,' 'Events at the meeting,' and 'The inside story of the event.' (van der Velde & Bachofner, 1992, pp. xii-xxiii) Deshima

The Deshima Diaries Marginalia series currently consists of three volumes: the diaries from 1700 to 1740, published in 1992; the diaries from 1740 to 1800, published in 2004; and the diaries from 1641 to 1660, published in 2023. Currently, the only volume accessible online is Deshima Diaries

Marginalia 1700-1740

Cover

only.

The Dutch Perspective (1): The Trade Network of the Dutch Colonial Empire

The trade between the Netherlands and Japan was an indispensable link in the inter-Asian network of trade links established by the Dutch colonial empire in the first half of the 17th century. They transported Indian textiles to Indonesia, exchanged Chinese raw silk from Taiwan for silver and copper in Japan, transported Indonesian spices to India and Persia to purchase Indian textiles and Persian raw silk, and sold the obtained textiles and raw silk in the European market (Israel, 1995, p. 941). Silver was at the center of the economic interests that triggered Sino-Dutch trade. The economic and military influence exerted by the Dutch East India Company in Asia in the early 17th century could only be sustained by a continuous supply of silver. The Dutch War of Independence, resumed in 1621 when Dutch maritime dominance was expanding, greatly hindered the flow of silver from Spain. In this situation, the Netherlands was able to solidify its commercial and military position in Asia by concluding exclusive trade with Japan and allowing Japanese silver to flow and circulate in the Asian market (Israel, 1989, pp. 171-173).3

224 The overall Asian trade, including the Dutch trade strategy with Japan, faced a crisis in the 1660s. In 1662, Taiwan was expelled by Koxinga's forces, and in 1666, the Qing dynasty, which had already restricted Dutch trade, also revoked the limited trade privileges previously granted to the Dutch. This situation further exacerbated the trade with Japan, which had been rapidly declining since its peak in 1639. In 1668, the Tokugawa Shogunate banned the export of silver, making trade with Japan no longer as essential for the Dutch. Subsequently, copper replaced silver as a substitute in Sino-Dutch trade, and Dutch merchants continued their intra-Asian trade by selling large quantities of copper to India and Persia (Israel, 1989, pp. 254-255). The frequent negotiation scenes in Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740, where Dutch merchants constantly complain and demand that the Japanese increase copper exports and lower prices, are based on these economic interests.

Asia trade in general, including the Dutch trade strategy with Japan, faced a crisis in the 1660s. In 1662, they were driven out of Taiwan by Zheng Chenggong's forces, and in 1666, the Qing Dynasty, which had previously restricted Dutch trade, imposed restrictions on the trade privileges previously granted to the Dutch. At that time, Japan was producing 200 tons of silver annually, accounting for one-third of global production. For statistics on the value of silver that flowed out through the East India Company, refer to Table 5.16 in Dutch Primacy in World Trade 1585-1740.

3 At that time, Japan produced 200 tons of silver annually, accounting for one-third of the world's production. For statistics on the value of silver exported by the East India Company, refer to Table 5.16 in Dutch Primacy in World Trade 1585-1740.

Trade network published on the Dutch Trading Post Heritage Network website

Map 226

The Dutch Perspective (2): The Worldview of the Dutch Colonial Empire

While many facts regarding the background and content of Sino-Dutch trade have already been revealed, and much of that information originates from studies based on the Dejima archives, it is necessary to point out that there is still considerable room for interpretation regarding the nature and character of the Dutch colonial empire as an empire. For instance, there is the question of whether the Dutch colonial empire was truly imperialistic. Wesseling, in his examination of the 'strange history' of Dutch imperialism, points out that the Netherlands is not discussed in the international discourse on imperialism (Wesseling, 1988, p. 59). Koekkoek and his colleagues attempt to historically expose the notion that the dominant self-image in the Netherlands, both historically and historiographically, that Dutch colonial policy was commercial, non-violent, and essentially non-imperialistic, is a historically constructed and contested idea (Koekkoek et al, 2017, p. 83). Compared to other European powers, the Dutch colonial empire had a strong commercial character and was non-violent, but it also involved considerable exploitation, violence, slave trade, and colonial rule. 4 To understand the nature and worldview of the Dutch colonial empire, it is necessary to adopt an approach that constructs the overall truth through various individual scenes, rather than judging whether it conforms to the concept of imperialism, which is itself controversial.

227 5. Bowing Empire and Open Seclusion_Dejima One example of this type of research is a study suggesting that Grotius's theories on natural law and natural rights were intended to justify the expansionism and monopolistic policies of Dutch colonial expansion. For related information, see Martine Julia van Ittersum, “The long goodbye: Hugo Grotius’ justification of Dutch expansion overseas, 1615-1645.” History of European Ideas 36:4 (2010).

One reason for the coexistence of various perspectives regarding the Dutch colonial empire is that the relationship between the East India Company and the Asian regions varied greatly from region to region. For example, the controlling and violent behavior of the East India Company in Indonesian regions such as Mataram, Banten, and Makassar was similar to that of imperialist powers. However, this was not the typical case. In regions with military power far exceeding that which the East India Company could muster, such as Ming/Qing China, the Mughal Empire, the Safavid Empire, and the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, the East India Company could not secure dominance in its relations with these regions. Relations with China were intermittent and not always friendly, with occasional military conflicts5, and in the case of Ayutthaya in Siam, a stable relationship was established, but it was based on the Dutch-Siamese Treaty of 1664, concluded under pressure of a naval blockade. 5 Conflicts between China and the Netherlands were chronic in the first half of the 17th century, but the expulsion from the Pescadores Islands to Taiwan by the Ming fleet in 1624 and the expulsion from Taiwan by Koxinga in 1662 are representative examples.

228 In light of these facts, the submissive attitude shown by the East India Company in the Sino-Dutch relationship was a significant deviation from the norm (Clulow et al, 2014, pp. 255-262).

The Japanese Perspective (1): The Worldview of the Tokugawa Shogunate

While the Dutch side engages in debates about imperialism, the Japanese side has debates about the historiography of seclusion. The historiography of seclusion refers to the view that Japan was internationally isolated in terms of diplomacy, trade, and culture due to a series of 'seclusion policies' implemented in the 1630s (Toby, 2013, p. 97). It is true that in the 1630s, Japan suppressed Christianity, banned Japanese from traveling abroad, expelled the Portuguese, and confined Dutch merchants to Dejima. However, according to Ronald Toby, a leading scholar critical of the historiography of seclusion, "the Tokugawa shogunate in the 1630s, when the so-called 'seclusion' was supposedly completed, had no concept of its policies as 'seclusion,' nor was the word 'seclusion' used." (Toby, 2013, p. 99) Toby suggests that terms such as 'Taigun diplomacy,' 'kaikin,' and 'four gates' most accurately describe the basic foreign policy stance of early modern Japan. 6 The term 'kaikin' (海禁) is proposed because the prohibitions issued five times in the 1630s, commonly referred to as seclusion edicts, were called 'kaikin,' 'okimari,' or 'okimari' at the time. The term 'Taigun' is proposed because the shogun's diplomatic title was 'Great Lord of Japan.' This title was later changed to 'King of Japan' by Arai Hakuseki.

7 Chinese merchants in Nagasaki resided in the Tōjin Yashiki (唐人屋敷).

8 Ezo (蝦夷) is a term that collectively refers to the peoples of northeastern Japan, including the Ainu.

9 In Japan, foreign relations with official diplomatic ties were classified as 'tsūshin' (通信), while foreign relations involving only commercial and trade ties were classified as 'tsūshō' (通商).

229 (Toby, 2013, p. 128) The 'four gates' is a term used at the time, referring to Nagasaki, which traded with China and the Netherlands; Tsushima, which traded with Joseon; Satsuma, which traded with Ryukyu; and Matsumae, which traded with Ezo. Toby emphasizes that the four gates were not an exception to seclusion but were the shogunate's policy (Toby, 2013, p. 131). Examining Japan's foreign relations during the Edo period one by one, the relationship between Japan and China was limited to informal business transactions by Chinese merchants visiting Nagasaki. There were no official diplomatic relations between the two countries, nor did they consider their relationship as a hierarchical one based on tributary relations. From the perspective of the Ming and Qing courts, the trade activities of their merchants in Nagasaki were nothing more than smuggling. Joseon and the Tokugawa Shogunate officially established diplomatic relations in 1607, and since then, Joseon dispatched envoys 12 times.

times. Trade between Joseon and Japan was managed by the Sō clan of Tsushima, and the Korean legation located in Busan was also established by the Sō clan. Although the diplomatic documents exchanged between Joseon and Japan assume a relationship of equality, it is important to note that this does not fully explain the actual perceptions each country held towards the other. The Ryukyu Kingdom, under the Zhongshan dynasty, was a tributary state to both China and Japan. The relationship between the Netherlands and Japan was fundamentally informal and commercial, but the chief merchant of Dejima was required to form a delegation annually to visit the Shogun in Edo (Kazui, 1982, pp. 288-289). 231 5. Bowing Empire and Open Seclusion_Dejima

This foreign policy of Japan was outside the control of the Sinocentric world order, and this deviation was intentional. Recent studies suggest that the Tokugawa Shogunate promoted a Japanese-style 'Hwai' (civilized) order, considering itself 'civilized,' to legitimize its rule. In this context, Toby suggests that the 'Hwai' order promoted by the Tokugawa Shogunate was not internationally recognized but should be understood as "an ideological construct (fiction) that Japan itself created," and therefore the term 'Japanese concept (or consciousness) of Hwai' is more appropriate (Toby, 2013, pp. 125-128). The fact that Japan internally promoted the Korean envoys as tributary missions and demanded that Dutch merchants send tributary missions annually should be understood in this context. 10

10 Adam Clulow, in The Company and the Shogun, interprets this not as a form of tributary mission but as a modified form of sankin-kōtai (参勤交代), which required daimyo to reside in Edo periodically.

232

The Japanese Perspective (2): The Economy of the Tokugawa Period and

Arai Hakuseki

The Deshima Diaries

Marginalia 1700-1740 is set in a period of economic instability and turmoil in Japan due to the rapid expansion of commerce, leading to the emergence of various monetary policies and economic ideas.

The economic crisis faced by Japan was twofold: first, the rapid growth of market transactions was not matched by adequate monetary management; and second, the continuous decline in precious metal reserves due to the almost entirely import-based Sino-Dutch trade. The shogunate's response to the economic crisis was currency debasement (kaichū). There were 12 instances of debasement between 1695 and 1868, but each instance only provided short-term profits for the shogun, leading to inflation and the collapse of the financial system (Suzuki, 1989, pp. 30-35).

The economic crisis was twofold: firstly, market transactions were growing rapidly, but monetary management was poor; and secondly, the balance of trade, almost entirely imports, led to a continuous decline in precious metal reserves. The Shogunate's response to the economic crisis was currency debasement (kaichū). There were 12 debasements from 1695 to 1868, but each time they only provided short-term profits for the Shogun, ultimately triggering inflation and collapsing the financial system. (Suzuki, 1989, pp. 30-35)

233 5. Bowing Empire and Open Seclusion_Dejima Arai Hakuseki, one of the most prominent Confucian scholars of the time, unlike the physiocrats of his era, did not argue that agriculture was the source of all wealth but emphasized the importance of precious metals. Hakuseki argued that gold and silver are "made by heaven and earth" and "cannot be remade once lost," thus they must be carefully conserved. Hakuseki was deeply involved in policy proposals as a top advisor to the 6th Shogun Tokugawa Ienobu and the 7th Shogun Tokugawa Ietsugu from 1709 to 1716, paying particular attention to trade issues and the resulting outflow of precious metals (Suzuki, 1989, pp. 30-45). Based on data collected from the Nagasaki magistrate's office, he reached the following conclusions regarding the outflow of precious metals:

Arai Hakuseki, one of the most prominent Confucian scholars of his time, unlike the physiocrats of his era, did not argue that agriculture was the source of all wealth but emphasized the importance of precious metals. Hakuseki argued that gold and silver were "created in heaven and earth" and "once lost, cannot be remade," thus they must be carefully conserved. Hakuseki was deeply involved in policy proposals as the chief advisor to the 6th Shogun Tokugawa Ienobu and the 7th Shogun Tokugawa Ietsugu from 1709 to 1716, paying particular attention to trade issues and the resulting outflow of precious metals. (Suzuki, 1989, pp. 30-45) Based on data collected from the Nagasaki customs office, he drew the following conclusion regarding the outflow of precious metals.

For 107 years since the Keichō era, the Nagasaki Magistrate's Office...

period, we find that one-fourth of the gold and one-

fourth of the silver

We can see that three-quarters have been lost. Therefore, in the next century, we will lose all of our gold and silver.

and our copper will be insufficient not only for trade volume but also for domestic demand.

11 Arai Hakuseki (1657-1725)

12 Ackroyd, Joyce (ed.), Told Round a Brushwood Fire: The Autobiography of Arai Hakuseki, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 279. Re-quoted from Japanese Economic Thought, translated by Park Woo-hee (Sol, 1989), p. 35.

234 As mentioned earlier, the export of silver was already banned by the shogunate in 1668, so it was not a relevant issue in Hakuseki's time. In any case, Hakuseki considered trade, except for the import of books and medicinal herbs, to be unnecessary and wasteful, and argued for further reduction of trade. In 1715, he enacted the Shōtoku Shinrei (正徳新例), which significantly restricted the scope and items of trade with Qing China and the Netherlands. His measures are evaluated as conservative in that they aimed to reduce trade itself as a harm, rather than to increase exports and create a trade surplus. Hakuseki also attempted to resolve currency issues, but his policy of significantly reducing the amount of circulating gold and increasing its quality, arguing that currency value and commodity value must be balanced, failed due to the inadequacy of the financial system. (Suzuki, 1989, pp. 36-37) He met with Dutch merchants several times and is frequently mentioned in the Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740. The diary entry for April 3, 1712, records his meeting with the chief factor Cornelis Lardijn as follows:

13 Hakuseki was interested in foreign culture and also benefited greatly from imported medicines, as recorded in the Dejima diary.

14 Shōtoku Shinrei (正徳新例); also called Kaihō Koshi-rei (海舶互市新例) or Nagasaki Shinrei (長崎新令).

235 5. The Bowing Empire and Open Sakoku_Dejima

He finished wrapping the gifts. Gen'emon (源右衛門)15 announced the arrival of Arai Haku-

seki.16 Hakuseki was shown into a small room, and I

met him there. Knowing that Westerners find it painful to sit in the Japanese style, he told me to sit as I pleased. He said that he had come out of curiosity and to show me some very old but well-preserved world maps.

He said that he had come out of curiosity and to show me some very old but well-preserved world maps.

Among them was a map translated at Dejima last year. He then showed me several old Dutch prints depicting the surrender of Breda and some small maps showing Dutch possessions on the coast of Brazil.

As I answered his questions about the items, he was taking notes on adhesive paper and attaching them to the items. After he had finished his business with us, he

Among them was the map translated at Dejima last year. He then went on to Breda

confided that he had visited Father Sidotti in prison. Father Sidotti was

still in good health. When Hakuseki left, it was already dark outside,

and he said he would visit again. (April 3, 1712)

In 1714, C. Lardijn, who had served in Japan, met Hakuseki again in Edo on April 16, 1714. While he was very negative about trade from a policy perspective, Hakuseki was very enthusiastic about studying the outside world and interacting with foreigners.

15 Gen'emon (Gen'eimon) was the alias of the interpreter Imamura Eisai (今村英生; 1671-1736). Gen'emon, who had served Engelbert Kaempfer in his youth, was one of the most important interpreters during the Edo period. He also knew some Portuguese and had a Latin dictionary.

16 Arai Chikugo is written in the Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740. Giovanni Battista Sidotti, a Jesuit priest, was an Italian priest and is known as the last missionary martyr in Japan. The diary records that the Dutch merchants were concerned about potential repercussions when Sidotti was first arrested. Arai Hakuseki was in charge of the so-called 'Sidotti Incident.' Hakuseki wrote 'Seiyō Kibun' (西洋紀聞) based on the knowledge gained from interrogating Sidotti. Hakuseki argued that Sidotti should be repatriated, but this did not happen. He is also referred to as Father Joan in the diary.

236 still in good health. When Hakuseki left, it was already dark outside,

and he said he would visit again. (April 3, 1712)

Arai Hakuseki visited me. He inquired about the customs of Europe and India, especially Manila,

and told me about his conversation with Father Sidotti. Father Sidotti had claimed to Hakuseki that the Pope would soon send an envoy to Japan.

He also claimed that the body of Francis Xavier, who had proselytized in Japan 150 years ago, had not decayed and was enshrined in Goa, India.

Hakuseki asked me to confirm if this story was true.

I told him that I knew Xavier was buried in Goa, but that we did not attach any value to Catholic nonsense about bodies.

The conversation with Hakuseki lasted for three hours. (April 16, 1714) This also offers a glimpse into the attitude of the Dutch merchants towards Catholics. Later, when the Arion, the ship on which Lardijn was to leave Japan, was shipwrecked near Cochinchina, Hakuseki expressed his regret and promised support.18 The diary entry for March 19, 1716, reports the following:

The official in charge of Machibu-gyō, Ōuka Kiyosuke, had not yet informed the shogunate of the shipwreck of the Arion, but I informed Arai Hakuseki of the news. He said that Chief Factor Lardijn had been a very good friend of his and that he was sorry to hear such news. (March 19, 1716)

The anecdote of Hakuseki and the chief factor shows precisely what kind of sentiment the Japanese had regarding Sino-Dutch trade. Why did the Japanese continue trade with the Dutch for over 200 years? As Hakuseki himself criticized, imports exacerbated Japan's economic instability, and they did not necessarily bring in essential goods. Japan would not have suffered greatly if it had not imported goods from the Netherlands. Engelbert Kaempfer wrote that Japan consumed more silk and various materials in a week than it imported from the Dutch in a year. (Jansen, 2006, p. 140) Nevertheless, Japan continued trade because there was an inherent demand in Japanese society at the time for contact with the outside world. The encounters with foreigners, which took place annually through the official Dutch Wind Reports (furan-setsu) and in various other official and unofficial ways, were already a component of Japanese society.

237 5. The Bowing Empire and Open Sakoku_Dejima

On the other hand, the fact that Hakuseki refers to the chief factor as a friend in the anecdote of Hakuseki and the chief factor is quite unusual, even considering the special circumstances and individuals involved. It is difficult to find similar examples in the Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740.

238 were officially presented annually, and the encounters with foreigners that occurred through various official and unofficial channels were already a part of Japanese society.

Reading Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740

(1): Acceptance of Tokugawa Order

In the early modern period, the Netherlands and Japan each constructed their own world order or worldview. As examined earlier, the Netherlands, as a new republic and colonial empire, possessed a unique self-awareness and perception of the world, while the Tokugawa shogunate constructed a worldview based on the Japanese-centric Sinocentric order and the 'four gates' system. These two worldviews were not only completely different but also ominously similar in their self-centeredness. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy in the history of cultural exchange that a stable and peaceful relationship was maintained between the two for over 200 years, rather than a harsh clash of these disparate worldviews. This relationship was possible because, in the process of establishing relations with Japan in the early 17th century, the Dutch East India Company set as its basic guideline for trade the full acceptance of the Tokugawa order within Japan's sphere of influence.19 And the reason the Dutch East India Company adopted such a policy specifically towards Japan was precisely because, unlike other Asian regions at the time, the Netherlands had no means of leverage in its negotiations with Japan. Direct military action, as well as indirect pressure such as a naval blockade, were impossible in the case of Japan. In December 1638, the Governor-General of Batavia explained the East India Company's strategy towards Japan as follows:

We must not offend the Japanese. To gain anything, we must wait for the right time and opportunity with the utmost patience.

They will not tolerate backtalk. The more we make ourselves small, acting as the small, humble, and obedient merchants that live by their grace,

the greater the benefits and respect we will receive in their land. From long experience, we have learned this... There is no such thing as being too humble in Japan.20

19 For a detailed account of the establishment of Sino-Dutch relations in the 17th century, refer to Adam Clulow's The Company and the Shogun.

20 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, 1:704. Re-quoted from Adam Clulow, The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), p. 260.

240 The Seventeen-Member Committee in the Netherlands also expressed the same view.

We can give our officials no other instruction than to satisfy this arrogant, grand, and difficult nation in every way.

Thus, the relationship established between the shogun and the East India Company was analogous to that between a lord and his vassals or a suzerain and a tributary state. Accordingly, the East India Company assumed the obligations of a vassal or tributary state, which included direct and indirect military support, including intelligence gathering, prohibition of maritime military activities, and recognition of the shogun's legal authority. (Clulow, 2014, p. 261) The consistent and sustained humility and subservience of the Dutch merchants are most starkly depicted in the scenes describing the humiliation they endured while dealing with the shogun. Although not as detailed as Engelbert Kaempfer's famous description,22 the Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740 also records the humiliation experienced by the Dutch merchants. The following is an entry from March 26, 1702:

Finally, we were brought before the shogun. To allow us to eat, they served us paste

21 Mijer, Verzameling van Instructiën, Ordonnanciën en Reglementen, 99. Re-quoted from Adam Clulow, The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), p. 261.

22 This can be confirmed in Marius B. Jansen, Kim Woo-young et al. (trans.), Finding Modern Japan 1 (Isan, 2006), pp. 136-138.

241 5. The Submissive Empire and Open Sakoku_Dejima

The table was set. The rest was wrapped in paper. Three retainers

through the retainers, the shogun ordered us to act out a scene of taking off our coats and holding a meeting.

When asked to cry, we refused, stating it was a womanly act and that the son of the chief retainer could not dance due to his disability.

The refusal was based on the grounds that it was a womanly act and that the chief retainer's son could not dance due to his disability.

(March 26, 1702)

Dutch merchants were often subjected to impertinent demands, such as being asked to take off their coats, walk around, sing and dance, speak Japanese, fence, and act out meetings, and they could not refuse these requests without a special reason.

The fact that the Dutch accepted the Tokugawa order meant that they relinquished their sovereign rights as a maritime power within Japan's sphere and accepted Japan's power structure. From an international political perspective, this implies that they cooperated with Japan's sinocentric worldview without asserting their own. It is necessary to reiterate here that Japan's sinocentric worldview did not align with Japan's objective foreign relations. While the sinocentric worldview could be said to align with the objective foreign relations concerning Ryukyu and Ezo, this was not the case with Joseon and the Qing Dynasty. Although Joseon and Japan maintained official diplomatic relations on an equal footing, according to Japan's sinocentric worldview, Joseon should have been a tributary state of Japan. In the case of the Qing Dynasty and Japan, there was only an informal trade relationship between the two countries, and even this was characterized by a discrepancy in perception, as the Shogunate directly managed Chinese merchants in Japan, whereas the Qing Dynasty had never approved of commercial activities with Japan. Furthermore, considering that Japan's sinocentric worldview was a worldview that opposed the Qing's world order, it can be seen that there was a greater discrepancy on a subjective level. Japan not only denied the Qing world order but also treated the Manchus as 'Northern Barbarians' (北狄), proclaiming itself as the civilized center.

242 Furthermore, Japan's sinocentric worldview was a worldview that opposed the Qing's world order, and it can be seen that there was a greater discrepancy on a subjective level. Japan not only denied the Qing world order but also treated the Manchus as 'Northern Barbarians' (北狄), proclaiming itself as the civilized center.

To what extent, then, did the Dutch accept Japan's sinocentric worldview? Firstly, the Dutch merchants themselves were willing to be treated as barbarians, indicating that they accepted the sinocentric framework to define their relationship with Japan. Regarding the Sino-Japanese relationship, since the Dutch were not bound by the Qing world order in any way, there would have been no reason for them to object to Japan's perception of China. As mentioned earlier, the relationship between the Dutch East India Company and the Qing court was far from friendly, and they were fierce competitors with Chinese merchants in the Asian trade arena. This competitive relationship was also replicated in Nagasaki; as there were only two sellers in the Nagasaki market and the items sold in Japan largely overlapped, competition and vigilance were chronic. In fact, Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740 could be considered a 'Chinese surveillance diary' due to the detailed records of surveillance. For example, the diary written by the vice-chief retainer in March 1703 meticulously records the surveillance of Chinese people while the chief retainer was away in Edo.

243 5. The Submissive Empire and Open Sakoku_Dejima

Junk ships began to unload their cargo. The number of junk ships is expected to be higher than last year.

(March 3, 1703)

Junk ships are arriving daily. One junk ship was towed from Satsuma.

(March 11, 1703)

According to Gen'uemon, the Chinese brought more raw cane sugar [muscovado] than powdered white sugar.

(March 18, 1703)

There is still no information about the cargo of the junk ships. There is also no information from last year. The Japanese said that they were being heavily monitored and that one of them was recently banned.

Four junk ships were towed in. (March 20, 1703)

Four junk ships were towed in. (March 20,

1703)

All appraisers were busy sorting gifts from the Dojin Yashiki.

(March 25, 1703)

It is reported that the Chinese have been granted unrestricted activity in Satsuma. Many junk ships were 'forced' to dock there and could transport goods without inspection.

Many junk ships were 'forced' to dock there and could transport goods without inspection.

Thirty-eight junk ships arrived in one month. (March 31, 1703)

In this manner, the Dutch recorded as much information as possible about the number of junk ships arriving in Nagasaki, the types and prices of goods sold by the Chinese, and the volume of trade. They also kept detailed records of frequent smuggling and riots by Chinese merchants and conflicts with the Japanese.

23 In context, it appears that the Japanese who cooperated with the Dutch were collecting information at the Dojin Yashiki when one of them was banned from entry.

244 They also kept detailed records of frequent smuggling and riots by Chinese merchants and conflicts with the Japanese. The Dutch merchants appear to have uncritically accepted the Japanese assertion that Joseon was a tributary state of Japan in relation to the Joseon-Japan relationship. In Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740, the assertion that Joseon was a tributary state of Japan is mainly mentioned in relation to dates that Dutch merchants spelled as siks, seecon, sicq, sick, or cataber. These all refer to the fifth day of the fifth lunar month, Tango no Sekku. Cataber refers to the Japanese summer garment katabira (帷子), which the Japanese reportedly wore during festivals on Tango no Sekku. Although the editors of Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740 explain in the glossary that the meaning of siks, seecon, sicq, and sick is unclear, it is presumed that they were phonetic transcriptions of Sekku (節句; festival) from the Japanese term for Tango no Sekku (端午の節句).24 Sekku means festival and primarily refers to March 3rd or May 5th.

According to the Japanese, Katabira (帷子) day is celebrated throughout the empire. On this day, the Japanese commemorate the fact that Joseon has become a tributary state of Japan. (June 18, 1703)

According to the Japanese, Katabira (帷子) day is celebrated throughout the empire. On this day, the Japanese commemorate the fact that Joseon has become a tributary state of Japan.

On this day, the Japanese commemorate the fact that Joseon has become a tributary state of Japan.

(June 18, 1703)

24 According to the editors of Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740, the arbitrary notation of Japanese words and names by Dutch merchants made the translation work difficult.

245 5. The Submissive Empire and Open Sakoku_Dejima

Most of the Dejima servants offered me congratulations regarding the Sekku (節句).

This day commemorates Japan's conquest of Joseon. (June 6, 1704)

Sekku (節句). Most of the servants offered me congratulations regarding their Sekku.

This day commemorates the victory of making Joseon their tributary state. This day also marks the beginning of summer when the Japanese start wearing katabira.

This day also marks the beginning of summer when the Japanese start wearing katabira.

The servants left for the village, saying they would enjoy themselves to their heart's content all day.

(June 8, 1712)

Tomorrow marks the commemoration of Joseon's submission to Japan, either voluntarily or by force, one hundred years ago.

(June 5, 1715)

There were also instances where Dutch merchants encountered the Joseon Tongsinsa (Korean diplomatic mission). During the period covered by Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740, the Joseon Tongsinsa visited Edo twice: in 1711-1712 and 1719-1720. In 1711-1712, the envoy Jo Tae-eok, vice-envoy Im Su-gan, and adjutant Im Bang-eon visited Edo to congratulate Tokugawa Ienobu on his enthronement. In 1719-1720, the envoy Hong Chi-jung, vice-envoy Hwang Seon, and adjutant Yi Myeong-eon visited Edo to congratulate Tokugawa Yoshimune on his enthronement. Although the 1719-1720 visit is not mentioned in the diary, there is an interesting record regarding the 1711-1712 Tongsinsa. In 1712, the envoy's delegation returning from Edo encountered the Joseon Tongsinsa in Shimonoseki.

246 The envoy's delegation returning from Edo encountered the Joseon Tongsinsa in Shimonoseki.

We heard that three envoys from the King of Joseon had congratulated the Shogun on his enthronement. Their retinue numbered 660 people. About a hundred years ago, the Taikō (太閤)25 conquered them and made them a tributary state.

Their retinue numbered 660 people. About a hundred years ago, the Taikō (太閤)25 conquered them and made them a tributary state.

The Shogunate ordered all daimyo to receive them with the highest protocol and lavish gifts.

The gifts from the Joseon people consisted of ginseng and furs. (February 28, 1712)

We arrived in Shimonoseki. Upon arrival, small boats full of Joseon people were heading towards us.

Upon arrival, small boats full of Joseon people were heading towards us.

Our escort hastily led us to the inn and closed the doors, but it was useless. The Joseon people climbed over the walls, to the astonishment of our interpreters.

The Joseon people climbed over the walls, to the astonishment of our interpreters.

The interpreters asked the Joseon escort to restrain them, but some Joseon people replied in perfect Japanese that they had no intention of harming us, further astonishing the interpreters.

Nevertheless, I ordered my subordinates to go inside. The Joseon people said that since we were all foreigners, they wondered if we could understand each other.

The Joseon people said that since we were all foreigners, they wondered if we could understand each other.

It would be good to look into it and share information about each other's home countries, I said in Chinese.

I kept shouting. After a while, the shouting subsided. After eating,

we secretly left the inn and went to the ship, where we were harassed by the Joseon people. 25 Taiko is written, referring to Toyotomi Hideyoshi. 247 5. The Submissive Empire and Open Seclusion_Dejima

we decided to stay there to avoid it. (February 29, 1712)

We did not have enough fresh water to sail. The Joseon people tried to contact us again,

but were blocked by our escort. (March 1, 1712) The Dutch perception of Joseon as a tributary state of Japan or in a similar position existed from the early 17th century. After commencing trade with Japan, the East India Company attempted to trade with Joseon. In a letter from 1609 from Prince Maurice (stadtholder), the highest leader of the Netherlands at the time, to Tokugawa Ieyasu, there is an expression of wanting to "enjoy trade with Coree through Your Excellency's grace and former assistance," and a request to "kindly issue a vermilion seal permit when we express a desire to visit the country of Goryeo." At that time, the Netherlands had not received a response from Japan regarding trade with Joseon. Even after that, the East India Company considered trading with Joseon several times but could not execute it, and after the Hamel incident, they actively reconsidered its possibility. However, in the end, they gave up on trading with Joseon, one of the reasons being that Joseon was "a vassal of both China and Japan," and it was believed that China and Japan would "not permit trade with Joseon." (Shin Dong-gyu, 2003, pp. 78-104) Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740 shows that this perception of Joseon did not change thereafter.

In summary, the Dutch merchants did not raise any objections to Japan's positions and assertions regarding international relations such as Sino-Dutch relations, Sino-Qing relations, and Joseon-Japan relations.

248 They accepted Japan's perspective, enduring the Sino-Dutch relations, agreeing with the Sino-Qing relations, and passively accepting the Joseon-Japan relations.

Reading Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740

(2): Contained Conflict26

As the Netherlands accepted the Tokugawa order, an agreement was reached on the form of Sino-Dutch relations, but elements of conflict remained regarding its content. In the context of trade between the two countries, the volume and prices were unilaterally determined by the Japanese side, so the Dutch side, which needed to make a profit, inevitably had constant complaints, big and small. From Japan's perspective, Sino-Dutch trade was a trade that exchanged products for precious metals, as pointed out by Hakuseki, so it was difficult not to regulate it. The Nagasaki Kaisho (長崎会所), established in 1698 to comprehensively manage and regulate trade in Nagasaki, imposed fees and tariffs on Dutch merchants and regulated copper prices. This was not welcome by the Dutch merchants, and shortly after the establishment of the Kaisho, the chief official Dijkman left the following record:

249 5. The Submissive Empire and Open Seclusion_Dejima, and the payment for the servants of the bugeyo who towed the sailing ships while the Chinese and other Japanese brought gifts for the inspectors28. We came to hear our answer.

while the Chinese and other Japanese brought gifts for the inspectors

payment for the servants of the bugeyo who towed the sailing ships. We came to hear our answer.

Contrary to their expectations, I replied that the Batavia Governor-General's office had no intention of giving gifts to the inspectors, because the prices were already high, these inspectors were private servants of the shogun, and they were not people we hired, and they had sworn not to accept any gifts.

the prices were high and these inspectors were private servants of the shogun and we had hired

people and they had sworn not to accept any gifts

Therefore, the Batavia Governor-General's office had no intention of giving gifts to the inspectors.

Furthermore, Batavia did not wish to pay the bugeyo's servants,

because of the unfavorable trade terms and the profits from the trade that the city conducted through the Nagasaki Kaisho.

(August 9, 1701) Regarding the surveillance of the Chinese, as well as the Nagasaki Kaisho, and the price lists in Miyako (Kyoto) and the reduction of envoy expenses, the profits are the main subject of the diary.

27 Nagasaki Kaisho is pronounced as Nagasaki Kaisho and is written as geldkamer in the diary.

28 This refers to Metsuke (目付) and is written as dwarskijker.

250 The prices of goods sold by the Dutch merchants were largely determined by merchants trading in the Miyako market, and the price of copper was determined by the Nagasaki Kaisho. Therefore, understanding the trends in the Miyako market and continuously demanding a reduction in the copper price were important tasks for the merchants.

The fact that conflicts were contained in Sino-Dutch relations meant that the only way for Dutch merchants to express their dissatisfaction in Japan was limited to making requests and demands here and there. As the Japanese side responded very passively to these demands, and as trade regulations expanded and trade itself decreased, the East India Company's dissatisfaction occasionally escalated to the point of considering abandoning trade with Japan. The year after the promulgation of Hakuseki's Jōtoku Shinrei, in 1716, the following record exists:

I also asked (Tōtsūji Gen'uemon and Gohei) to find out if our requests related to the Arion had been conveyed and what decisions had been made in this regard.

I also asked them to find out if it would be permitted to sell the remaining goods and the goods purchased by our ships if the East India Company were to leave Japan, and if we would be allowed to purchase as much copper as we needed.

If the East India Company were to leave Japan, it would be permitted to sell the remaining goods and the goods purchased by our ships, and if we would be allowed to purchase as much copper as we needed.

and if we would be allowed to purchase as much copper as we needed.

They said they would do so, but also said that if the East India Company left Japan, the bond of friendship would be broken, and considering the great profits the East India Company had made in the past, they would have to bear the losses.

They said they would do so, but if the East India Company left Japan, the bond of friendship would be broken, and considering the great profits the East India Company had made in the past, they would have to bear the losses.

they would have to bear the losses. 251 5. The Submissive Empire and Open Seclusion_Dejima

Nothing has been decided yet. (March 15, 1716)

The Japanese do not care whether we leave or stay. This is because they maintain the position that they gain nothing from our presence.

The Japanese do not care whether we leave or stay. They maintain the position that they gain nothing from our presence.

This is because they maintain the position that they gain nothing from our presence.

Hachizaemon29 and Gohei30 asked if a new chief official had been appointed. I replied that I did not know how the superiors had decided. They think that we will definitely trade in Japan next year as well. (May 24, 1716)

I replied that I did not know how the superiors had decided. They think that we will definitely trade in Japan next year as well. (May 24, 1716)

They think that we will definitely trade in Japan next year as well. (May 24, 1716)

We went to the residence of Ōoka Kiyosuke. He spoke about the new regulations regarding trade [Jōtoku Shinrei]. His subordinate said the same, but he said that this Jōtoku Shinrei would not be as detrimental to us as we imagined. He said that this was for the welfare of the East India Company and invited us to ask questions freely on this matter. Since this was the first time Ōoka Kiyosuke31 had expressed such an intention, I hesitated to believe him. Except for food, nothing could be brought onto the island before he inspected it. 29 Namura Hachizaemon was a senior interpreter who was exceptionally proficient in Dutch and was one of the most influential interpreters along with Gen'uemon.

He said that this was for the welfare of the East India Company and invited us to ask questions freely on this matter. Since this was the first time Ōoka Kiyosuke31 had expressed such an intention, I hesitated to believe him. Except for food, nothing could be brought onto the island before he inspected it.

Since this was the first time Ōoka Kiyosuke31 had expressed such an intention, I hesitated to believe him. Except for food, nothing could be brought onto the island before he inspected it.

Except for food, nothing could be brought onto the island before he inspected it. 29 Namura Hachizaemon. He was a senior interpreter who was particularly skilled in Dutch and was one of the most influential interpreters along with Gen'uemon.

252 Nothing could be brought onto the island before he inspected it. (May 26, 1716) On September 1, 1716, the ships Ternissen and Rijxdorff arrived with the superior's decision regarding the acceptance of Jōtoku Shinrei and whether to continue trade. The conclusion was to accept Jōtoku Shinrei. As examined earlier, Hakuseki had no intention of stopping trade with the Netherlands. Therefore, it can be inferred that the regulations were designed to regulate the scale of trade while allowing enough profit for the Netherlands not to abandon trade. From the perspective of the East India Company, they would not have engaged in a losing business, so it is presumed that they judged that they could make enough profit to continue trading, even if not as much as before. The situation thereafter is recorded as follows:

30 Namura Gohei. An apprentice interpreter frequently mentioned in the diary, with many records indicating incompetence and poor Dutch language skills.

31 Ōoka Kiyosuke analyzed trade in detail at the time and reported it to Arai Hakuseki. Ōoka Kiyosuke's report played a significant role in the promulgation of Jōtoku Shinrei.

We conveyed the superior's decision regarding Jōtoku Shinrei to the Japanese. We will follow Jōtoku Shinrei. The interpreters said that the prices of our goods would be much lower than last year. The Machibugyō relayed our superior's answer to Edo. (September 4, 1716)

We will follow Jōtoku Shinrei. The interpreters said that the prices of our goods would be much lower than last year. The Machibugyō relayed our superior's answer to Edo. (September 4, 1716)

The Machibugyō relayed our superior's answer to Edo. (September 4, 1716)

Jōtoku Shinrei was proclaimed at the residence of the Machibugyō. (1) Japanese servants should no longer stay on the island. (2) Our ships should not directly fetch water. Henceforth, Japanese ships will supply the water, and the Machibugyō will cover the costs. (3) Money should not be carried on the island. / All payments must be remitted through the Nagasaki Kaisho. (4) Henceforth, mo

Our ships should not directly fetch water. Henceforth, Japanese ships will supply the water, and the Machibugyō will cover the costs. (3) Money should not be carried on the island. / All payments must be remitted through the Nagasaki Kaisho. (4) Henceforth, mo

Henceforth, Japanese ships will supply the water, and the Machibugyō will cover the costs. (3) Money should not be carried on the island. / All payments must be remitted through the Nagasaki Kaisho. (4) Henceforth, mo

Money should not be carried on the island. / All payments must be remitted through the Nagasaki Kaisho. (4) Henceforth, mo

All payments must be remitted through the Nagasaki Kaisho. (4) Henceforth, mo

everything will be inspected. Food will be stored in the warehouse. (5) Netherlands 253 5. The Submissive Empire and Open Seclusion_Dejima

A new guardhouse will be built where both Dutch and Japanese can be inspected.

(6) A new food price list will be received every month. (7) All departing Japan

items will be packed by the servants of the pontoon bridge. We had to express our acceptance for every clause

in Japanese as 'Casiamatta'32. (September 19, 1716)

In the 1730s, similar patterns of incidents occurred at a higher level. Fukuda Rokuzaemon was an elder of Nagasaki who was displeased with trade with the Dutch. He argued with another elder, Tokasawa Sakbe, who favored trade and argued that Dutch merchants should be allowed to trade with three ships. The content of the argument was as follows:

A conflict arose between Elder Rokuzaemon and Sakbe. Considering the poverty of the Nagasaki residents, Sakbe wanted to inform us that we had received permission from the administration to trade with three ships and would receive sufficient copper.

However, Rokuzaemon opposed this. They wanted to fight, but this was prevented. They have very bad feelings towards each other. 32 The editors explain in a footnote that Casiamatta [Kashikomatta] means 'Very well, Sir'.

33 Refers to a person who holds a government position as an elder of the city.

Sakbe wanted to inform us that we had received permission from the administration to trade with three ships and would receive sufficient copper.

However, Rokuzaemon opposed this. They wanted to fight, but this was prevented. They have very bad feelings towards each other.

The editors explain in a footnote that Casiamatta [Kashikomatta] means 'Very well, Sir'.

33 Refers to a person who holds a government position as an elder of the city.

254 I hope Scabe's perspective wins someday. (June 3, 1729) In the price-setting process in September 1732, when the price was set too low, Chief Factor Boockesteijn asked the interpreters to request that the price level be raised to the 1725 level. When the interpreters refused, he asked them again to request the 1727 level.

Gen'uemon asked if I would be satisfied with the 1731 price level. I

repeatedly stated that they should request the price level be raised to 1725. Furthermore, I proposed that I discuss this matter directly with Inaba and Rokuzaemon.

Gen'uemon said that both proposals were nonsensical. / So I asked them to request that the price level be raised to the 1727 level. However, this was also rejected by the group of interpreters. Gen'uemon

said that both proposals were nonsensical. / So I asked them to request that the price level be raised to the 1727 level. However, this was also rejected by the group of interpreters. Gen'uemon

asked if we wanted to trade or not. I asked him who he was representing when he said that. He replied that he was speaking for himself.

I replied that we were selling our goods and asked him to request it again. However, they did not back down, and Gen'uemon

said he would return in the evening to hear our decision. / When he returned,

Gen'uemon asked if we were still willing to trade even if the request was not granted. To this ambiguous question, I proposed a compromise and requested that the price level be raised to the 1729 level.

I added that I did not know how the directors of the East India Company would react to being treated this way. 255 5. The Submissive Empire and Open Seclusion_Dejima

I warned that the directors would probably cease trade with Japan.

This assertion, like others, did not significantly affect the interpreters. Finally, around eleven o'clock, Gen'uemon

said that they had decided to request that the price level be raised to the 1729 level. He also said that Rokuzaemon was unlikely to accept this request.

This was because the fourth bid was the price after deducting the tax paid to the Shogun, which the machibugyos were barely able to pay. He said they were struggling to pay taxes to the Shogun.

Gen'uemon said he would be dismissed after the ships departed. He added that he wanted to spend the rest of his life in peace. (September 29, 1732)

255 5. The Submissive Empire and Open Seclusion_Dejima

Gen'uemon told me that he had submitted the request. / Rokuzaemon replied that our words were correct and that he also no longer considered our trade with Japan to be profitable.

Nevertheless, he said he could not pay a higher price for our goods. (September 30, 1732)

Compromises were not easily reached thereafter. When the request to raise the price to the 1729 level was rejected, the chief factor asked them to request a raise to the 1730 price on the condition that they could buy as much camphor and copper as they wanted. However, Gen'uemon submitted a request to raise the price to the 1731 level, and Rokuzaemon rejected even this, citing the taxes that had to be paid to the Shogun. Finally, Gen'uemon delivered a fifth bid, and the Dutch merchants accepted it, making the trade of 1732 arduously successful. The following year,

When Rokuzaemon declared even stricter trade regulations than before, the Dutch dissatisfaction intensified. In 1734, a letter from the Governor-General of Batavia to the Shogun arrived at Dejima, but the Japanese dissuaded them from delivering it, stating that sending letters to the Shogun was prohibited. This pattern of conflict continued throughout the 1730s, but trade was never actually suspended.

How should the conflict phase of the 18th century be understood? From the Dutch perspective, the core of their strategy towards Japan was that if they offered political loyalty to the Japanese, they could maximize profits in Asian trade through a surplus in Japanese trade. In other words, it was a business of selling submission to buy silver and copper. However, from the mid-17th century, they prohibited the export of silver, and in 1715, due to the Jokyo Edict, they were only allowed to operate two ships. In 1733, Rokuzaemon further tightened regulations, leading them to strongly feel that the fair balance of trade had been broken. Meanwhile, from the Japanese perspective, as exemplified by Hakuseki, the economic benefits of Sino-Dutch trade were not quantitatively or qualitatively significant. While the irreplaceable utility of trade with the West, often emphasized, existed, trade with economically powerful empires inevitably carried risks and side effects.

What, then, does the fact that trade was not ultimately suspended tell us? First, the value of Sino-Dutch trade for both Japan and the Netherlands was not limited to economic aspects. From the Dutch perspective, the strategic value of monopolizing trade with Japan itself meant that the trade was worth maintaining even with low profits.

From the Japanese perspective, the cultural, political, and strategic value of Sino-Dutch trade was of a kind that could not be obscured by the ambiguity of its economic value. Second, the Sino-Dutch relationship exhibited a strong path dependency, strong enough in the 18th century to suppress economic inefficiencies and trade conflicts.

The Sino-Dutch relationship in the early 18th century had already been maintained for nearly a hundred years. This fact particularly explains why the Japanese did not abandon Sino-Dutch trade. From the Japanese perspective, the merit of having a safe, proven, and 'docile' Western power was not insignificant, and having interacted with the West for over a hundred years, they could not easily abandon trade with the West. However, as seen in the example of Rokuzaemon above, opinions within Japan were divided regarding Sino-Dutch trade, and this was intertwined with the political conflicts within Japanese society at the time. In the 18th century, negative views on trade tended to gain more traction, which was expressed through various trade regulations.

Conclusion

Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740 tells the stories of individuals who, historically situated in the middle of two hundred years of relations and politically navigating and sustaining the international politics of Dejima from the Dutch side. During this period, conflicts of interest, which were not prominent in the 17th century, began to emerge in earnest between Japan, which started to calculate the economic gains and losses of Sino-Dutch trade, and the declining colonial empire.

Nevertheless, the conflicts unfolded in a controlled manner, and trade continued. Compared to the golden age of Sino-Dutch trade, the first half of the 18th century was a period of frequent stagnation and discord, but it was also a time to observe how a hundred years of friendship entered a new phase.

What Dejima's international politics reveals is that the undercurrent of peace is by no means tranquil, and peaceful relations are maintained dynamically and intentionally. Dejima was a mechanism of negotiation established by agreement between two countries or two worlds, but it was the people of Dejima who allowed that agreement to be maintained for 200 years. Someone had to mediate the adjustments and compromises between the most disparate of worlds. Therefore, the international politics of Dejima, characterized by tense peace and controlled conflict, can only be fully understood when considering the macro and micro realities surrounding Dejima. From that perspective, Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740 testifies to the lived experiences of individuals standing at the intersection of East and West, micro and macro.

Perhaps, considering the implications of Dejima's international politics, it contains more truth than the Dutch merchants, the authors, intended.

256 Rokuzaemon was unlikely to accept this request. This was because the fourth bid was the price after deducting the tax paid to the Shogun, which the machibugyos were barely able to pay. He said they were struggling to pay taxes to the Shogun.

Gen'uemon said he would be dismissed after the ships departed. He added that he wanted to spend the rest of his life in peace. (September 29, 1732)

257 When Rokuzaemon declared even stricter trade regulations than before, the Dutch dissatisfaction intensified. In 1734, a letter from the Governor-General of Batavia to the Shogun arrived at Dejima, but the Japanese dissuaded them from delivering it, stating that sending letters to the Shogun was prohibited. This pattern of conflict continued throughout the 1730s, but trade was never actually suspended.

From the Japanese perspective, the cultural, political, and strategic value of Sino-Dutch trade was of a kind that could not be obscured by the ambiguity of its economic value. Second, the Sino-Dutch relationship exhibited a strong path dependency, strong enough in the 18th century to suppress economic inefficiencies and trade conflicts.

258 Deshima Diaries Marginalia 1700-1740 is historically situated in the middle of two hundred years of relations and politically tells the stories of individuals who, from the Dutch side, lived and sustained the international politics of Dejima. During this period, conflicts of interest, which were not prominent in the 17th century, began to emerge in earnest between Japan, which started to calculate the economic gains and losses of Sino-Dutch trade, and the declining colonial empire.

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*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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