Japan's 'Moral Realism' Diplomacy: The Discourse of Hibakusha Experience in Nagasaki's Atomic Bomb Museum

Future World Politics in East Asia: Embracing Kyushu with the Youth of Sarangbang

Song Seung-yun Sungkyunkwan University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: February 22, 2024

Song Seung-yun · Sungkyunkwan University

Introduction

Since Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's declaration of the 'Three Non-Nuclear Principles' in 1967, Japan has emphasized its identity as the 'world's only atomic-bombed nation' to create and develop a diplomatic brand as a 'peace-loving state contributing to the international community' (Oros, 2018, 232). Japan's efforts have manifested in its participation in multilateral denuclearization regimes and its active promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agendas on platforms like the UN General Assembly to shape international public opinion (Park Young-joon, 2009, 36). From 1994 to 1999, Japan submitted resolutions to the UN General Assembly titled "Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament Towards the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," and in 2000 and 2004, it submitted "The Road to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," which were adopted by an overwhelming majority. Notably, in 2009, the United States, which had previously opposed these resolutions, co-sponsored one with Japan, leading to its adoption.

Japan continued to submit resolutions related to nuclear weapons in the 2010s. In 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration's abstention on such a resolution drew criticism from the then-opposition conservative party, which questioned it from a security perspective. The government explained that it could not agree because the resolution, which included condemnation of North Korea's nuclear program, overly emphasized Japan's experience as a victim of atomic bombing. It was explained that the resolution "Joint Action Towards the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," which Japan had been proposing since 2015, excessively highlighted the term 'hibakusha' (被爆者), meaning atomic bomb survivor, implying an intention to internationalize the term and officially recognize Japan's victim status on the international stage (Hankyoreh, 2017). This incident is a significant case where Japan's experience of atomic bombing and its victim identity were questioned in the international political arena, and it is an interesting example of how official memories, endorsed by nation-states in response to civilian memories from below (survivors' testimonies), clashed in the post-colonial Northeast Asian space.

The offensive shift in Japanese diplomacy, which intensified from the 2010s onwards, has raised further questions about the true nature of Japan's post-war pacifism. There are assessments that Japanese diplomacy has completely broken away from the legacy of the post-war era and transitioned into the 'contemporary' period since the Abe administration took office.

168 Some diagnose Japan's rearmament as a regression to the pre-war period, focusing on the Prime Minister's personal beliefs or the rightward shift in Japanese society. In either case, the evaluation is the same: Japanese diplomacy has shown a fundamentally different aspect compared to the post-war era, indicating a fundamental change in its identity. However, it is crucial to note that the moral conviction and sense of victimhood consistently stand out in the official diplomatic language used by Japanese central politicians. This self-definition of Japan cannot be understood without considering the post-war socio-historical context of internalizing the experience of atomic bombing. This paper argues that existing discussions in international relations tend to exaggerate the discontinuity between the post-war and contemporary periods, and instead focuses on the continuity of Japan's diplomatic identity across the pre-war, post-war, and contemporary eras.

To understand the ideological and historical context of Japan's current foreign policy, it is necessary to critically re-examine Japan's security identity, as traditionally defined in international relations, from the perspective of critical Japanese studies. This paper will broadly review existing discussions that evaluate Japan's diplomatic identity by focusing on the 'continuity and discontinuity of Japanese intellectual history' and argue that Japan's diplomatic identity can be defined as 'moral realism' based on a 'victim consciousness nationalism.' This definition will clarify that the shift in Japanese diplomacy in the 2010s is not a departure from post-war pacifism but rather an manifestation of a unique nationalism that it had been preparing for. In particular, it must be emphasized that both post-war Japanese nationalism and peace discourse cannot be discussed without excluding the unilateral experience of destruction, namely the atomic bombings. From this perspective, this paper will examine how Japan's diplomatic identity is being verbalized through the Prime Ministers' speeches at the peace ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead (2005-2023).

169 4. Japan's 'Moral Realism' Diplomacy: The Discourse of Hibakusha Experience in Nagasaki's Atomic Bomb Museum Realism' and Constructivism: Discontinuity between Post-war and Contemporary Periods

Realism and Constructivism: Discontinuity between Post-war and Contemporary Periods

2 In post-war Japan, the term 'fallen soldier' (senshi) was used exclusively for combatants killed in action. However, religious scholar Akira Nishimura proposed the term 'war victim' (sensaishi) to include non-combatants killed by air raids or atomic bombings (re-cited from Lee Young-jin, 2018, p. 4). The term 'unilateral' in the main text is used with this distinction in mind, noting that while 'fallen soldiers' are directly involved in combat and thus have a 'war-perpetrator' character, civilian 'war victims' due to atomic bombings are closer to 'pure (unilateral)' victims.

170 Japan's diplomatic behavior has been a peculiar phenomenon and a long-standing subject of inquiry in international relations. Realist international relations scholars predicted that Japan's militarization would be a matter of time, given its growing national power and the shifting East Asian international order (rise of China and North Korea's nuclear threat) (Waltz, 1993). However, as Japan did not embark on the path of a military power as structural realists had anticipated, international relations began to focus on the state's 'identity.' The unique case of 'Japan' became a catalyst for the resurgence of constructivist international relations in the 1990s (Hagström, L., & Gustafsson, K., 2015, 4-5). Early 'norm constructivists' like Katzenstein and Thomas Berger, focusing on the case of Japan, paid attention to Japan's domestic norms and culture. Since norms and culture change very slowly, Japan's non-nuclear policy seemed well explained by Japan's 'peace-loving culture' as it was pursued with relative consistency.

When the second Abe cabinet attempted a foreign policy shift by advocating 'proactive pacifism,' condoning collective self-defense, announcing the 'US-Japan Security Guidelines 2015,' and reorganizing 11 security-related laws (Park Young-joon, 2015), the constructivist explanation began to be challenged. The rise of China and the resulting changes in US Asian policy seemed to be the cause of Japan's normalization into a regular country, and the explanations of structural realists appeared to regain traction. Constructivist international relations scholars sought to explain the changes in Japanese diplomacy by revising the early constructivist premise that norms and culture 'do not change easily.' Relational constructivists view state identity as being formed relatively within relationships with other countries, understanding culture and identity as elastic and flexible (Hagström, L., & Gustafsson, K., 2015). They focused on Japan's perceptions of its neighboring countries, viewing Japanese diplomacy in the 2010s as undergoing a temporary adjustment phase. Expressing confidence in the 'narrative power' of Japan's pacifist narrative, they also anticipated the continuation of pacifism (Hagström, L., & Gustafsson, K, 2019). However, even they recently declared 'Japan's Pacifism is Dead,' stating that 'academic debates have failed to fully explain the Abe government's security policy changes' (Gustafsson, K., Hagström, L., & Hanssen, U., 2023, 151). Their diagnosis that 'all factors that constrained Japan's foreign behavior after World War II have been removed, and there are almost no security actions Japan cannot take' seems to declare the ultimate failure of constructivist international relations.

In this context, mainstream international relations generally assesses that Japanese diplomacy has deviated from post-war pacifism. However, the explanations for this deviation are inadequate. Constructivists fail to explain why Japan's identity suddenly changed, and realists fail to explain how the previous post-war pacifism could have been maintained for so long. Attempts to find causes in the dynamics of Japan's domestic politics or the revisionist beliefs of individual leaders are merely descriptive. Both realists and constructivists exaggerate the discontinuity between post-war and contemporary Japan, thus failing to provide convincing

172 answers. However, if we view the essence of Japan's security identity as nationalism, the shift in Japanese diplomacy in the 2010s can be understood not as a deviation or discontinuity from post-war pacifism, but rather as a continuation of it. Contrary to the diagnosis that 'Kantei (prime ministerial office) diplomacy' led by the prime minister only began in earnest in the 2000s (Seo Seung-won, 2009; Lee Ju-kyung, 2021), the structure of invoking the nation's name (nationalism) has long persisted in Japan, and this should be considered the continuous core of Japan's foreign identity. To support this argument, it is first necessary to reorganize the existing 'debate on Japan's diplomatic identity,' which has been understood solely within the framework of realism versus constructivism, through a Japanese discourse framework of 'continuity and discontinuity between the pre-war and post-war periods.'

Exploring Japan's Diplomatic Identity: The Merchant and the Monk

Diplomacy of 'No Ideology'

Due to its geopolitical location, Japan has continuously grappled with its national identity since the 19th century, oscillating between continental and maritime powers, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ideology and the theory of civilization and enlightenment, and development and cooperation (Iobe Makoto, 2003, 11-22). When Akira Iriye described Japanese diplomacy as 'diplomacy of no ideology,' he was diagnosing that Japanese diplomacy had been swayed by external conditions without a distinct identity. Iriye contrasted Japan's 'diplomacy of no ideology' with 'private idealism,' emphasizing that Japan's diplomacy was based on thorough realism. According to him, it is a 'characteristic of the origins of modern Japanese diplomacy' for leaders to be engrossed in managing situations and handling current issues 'from a position of no ideology' without philosophical grounding (Akira Iriye, 1993, 42). The private sector, as a reaction to the government's 'lack of ideological depth in diplomacy,' proposed idealistic 'Asianist ideas' such as Japan needing to 'become the leader of Asia and confront the West,' which emerged in the context of criticizing the government's realism. However, Iriye explains that such 'ideas' only dominated Japanese diplomacy in the 1930s and played a decisive role as a guiding principle of diplomacy for only 'a few years before 1941' (Akira Iriye, 1993, 142). In his book published in the 1990s, Iriye concluded by urging that Japanese diplomacy should engage in 'ideological and cultural responses beyond the strategic level' in the contemporary era, reflecting on the arrogance of Asianism and advocating for a 'new globalism' in Japanese diplomacy that aims to 'share the benefits of civilization and expand freedom and human rights, cooperating for a more humane life for the people of Asia' (Akira Iriye, 1993, 304). Iriye assesses that Japanese diplomacy, even in the contemporary era, still leans towards realism and has failed to form a distinct identity.

Kent Calder, focusing on Japan's trade policy in the 1980s, characterized Japan as a 'reactive state,' suggesting that Japanese diplomacy exhibited a passive behavior of responding to external conditions.

174 A 'reactive state' is defined as a state that does not pursue an independent foreign policy despite sufficient domestic motivation or national power, and acts only in response to external pressures. Calder attributes Japan's thorough passivity to its economic and diplomatic dependence on the United States, as well as the fragmentation of its decision-making structure and the pressure of interest groups (Kent Calder, 1988). Samuels and Heginbotham defined Japan's focus on technological and economic interests over military security as 'mercantile realism,' attempting to explain Japan's economy-centric diplomacy within the framework of structural realism. The authors viewed Japan's identity as a trading state as originating from the obsequious disposition and customs of merchants during the Edo period (Samuels & Heginbotham, 1998, 201), which resonates with Iriye's assessment that 'lack of ideology is the origin of modern Japanese diplomacy.'

The 'lack of ideology' in Japanese diplomacy, as captured by Iriye, is twofold. While Iriye's perspective fundamentally views Japanese diplomacy as subordinate to the international political environment, similar to the views of Western neo-realists, it also acknowledges the dynamics of various domestic actors seeking to fill Japan's unique identity void. For instance, in Iriye's view, Japanese diplomacy in the 1930s and 1940s was the result of domestic political dynamics driven by 'private idealists' overwhelming external realism. Because Japanese diplomacy lacked a distinct identity, debates over foreign policy lines within Japan could continuously occur, and in some cases, lead to catastrophic outcomes. From this perspective, focusing on the differentiation of domestic political forces in Japan regarding its grand strategy can also be seen as implicitly acknowledging the 'lack of ideology' in Japanese diplomacy. Samuels, while paying close attention to the debates on national identity that emerged in Japanese domestic politics in the 2000s, argues that there is fundamentally nothing new in Japan's grand strategy debates, and they are merely a repetition of historically existing competing positions (Samuels, 2007). Unlike China, where challenges to the fundamental values of Western democracy and freedom have not emerged, he believes that the lack of ideology and passivity in Japanese diplomacy remain unchanged.

Kenneth Pyle, witnessing the 'revolutionary shift' in the Abe administration's foreign policy, predicted that the decline of the US-led world order from the 2010s onwards would provide an opportunity for a fundamental change in Japanese diplomacy (Kenneth Pyle, 2018). If the material foundation of the post-war Japanese diplomatic framework, characterized by light armament and economic centrality, was the US-Japan alliance and the San Francisco System, then the phase of relative decline in US hegemony would necessitate a fundamental revision of the Yoshida Doctrine. Pyle interprets Abe's proactive diplomacy towards regions like India as implying a shift in Japanese diplomacy towards an 'Indo-Pacific strategy,' and contrary to the view that Abe is a leader with right-wing convictions, he assesses Abe as pursuing a thoroughly

176 pragmatic and strategic diplomacy. In this case as well, the view is classified as one that fundamentally sees Japan's national identity as passive, predicting that the change in Japanese diplomacy will stem from changes in the external environment and viewing Abe as a politician with 'no ideology.'

Theory of the Peaceful State

Another major perspective on Japanese diplomacy is the view of Japan as a peaceful state. Japan not only professes to be a 'peace-loving country' externally, but its citizens also widely share pride in being 'peaceful citizens of an advanced nation' (Kim, 2010). Pacifism as Japan's national identity is sustained by Japan's 'nuclear allergy,' widespread anti-war and anti-military sentiments among the public, and support for the pacifist constitution. Proponents of the 'diplomacy of no ideology,' who view Japanese diplomacy as passive and reactive, tend to focus on the continuity between the pre-war and post-war periods, seeing the characteristics of Japanese diplomacy as extending from the early modern period. In contrast, the 'theory of the peaceful state' emphasizes the uniqueness of post-war diplomacy and its discontinuity with the past, arguing that Japan learned historical lessons from its experience of the Pacific War and the atomic bombings, leading to a change in its national ideology. The basic perspective of the theory of the peaceful state is that sentiments of wariness and anti-militarism, formed from the experiences of air raids and atomic bombings during the war, the public's resentment of being 'deceived' by militarist leaders, and the experiences of students in the military (Nam Ki-jeong, 2014), decisively severed the pre-war and post-war diplomacy. Furthermore, proponents of the theory of the peaceful state tend to view Japanese foreign policy as inelastic and path-dependent, focusing on the durability of institutionalized post-war pacifism.

In international relations, constructivists pay attention to these aspects. Katzenstein argued that the 'depth of social learning' among the Japanese people after World War II created a pro-peace public opinion, which fundamentally constrained Japan's foreign behavior (Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996). Thomas Berger, comparing Japan's experience with that of Germany, another defeated nation, analyzes how the experience of defeat shaped a unique anti-militarism among the Japanese. In response to the question 'Will Japan rearm?', he predicted that Japan would not become a military power in the near future, noting that, unlike Germany, Japan widely shared a revulsion towards the military itself, stemming from a sense of victimhood towards Western imperialism (Berger, T., 1995, 135-137). Andrew Oros, examining the same question in the context of the 2010s, also analyzed that the strategic culture Japan had developed would sustain domestic antimilitarism as a security identity, leading to very limited expansion of Japan's military capabilities (Oros, 2017).

178 Tetsuya Sakai, focusing on the reception history of international relations in Japan during the interwar period, highlights the distinctiveness of post-war Japanese diplomacy compared to the pre-war and wartime periods. According to Sakai, viewing Japan's post-war pacifist constitution as an implementation of interwar idealistic international relations overly focuses on Kisaburo Yokota. The international relations in the 'minds' of post-war intellectuals were not Yokota's Wilsonian collective security theory or idealistic world government theory, but rather Vattel's 'progressive, protest-oriented concept of sovereignty' as highlighted by Shigejiro Tabata. Collective security, supported by Yokota, emerged in opposition to the theory of total war reinforcement during the Cold War, which was close to typical Western anti-communist idealism and distant from the protest-oriented concept of sovereignty that was mainstream in Japanese international relations. Sakai argues that the leadership of post-war Japanese peace theory was held not by Yokota, but by the 'Peace Problems Discussion Group' (Dankai), led by Masao Maruyama and others. The Peace Problems Discussion Group, advocating for total war reinforcement and concerned about the UN functioning as an 'anti-communist crusade,' formulated a 'post-war diplomatic theory that integrates universalism critique, civil society theory, and anti-imperialism theory with a concept of sovereignty sustained by bottom-up nationalism' (Tetsuya Sakai, 112). Sakai evaluates the uniqueness of post-war pacifism as a genuine peace theory that 'arose from the complex sentiments of a generation that came of age in the 1930s when Wilsonianism collapsed' (Tetsuya Sakai, 113).

179 4. Japan's 'Moral Realism' Diplomacy: The Discourse of Hibakusha Experience in Nagasaki's Atomic Bomb Museum

The attempts by Japanese international relations scholars reviewed above are also largely unsatisfactory. If the 'diplomacy of no ideology' views Japan as a cold and efficient 'subsistence merchant,' the 'theory of the peaceful state' views Japan as an 'ascetic monk' who has lost the will to fight. However, viewing Japan as a merchant or a monk is merely a result of a cultural bias. The greatest weakness of the 'diplomacy of no ideology' proponents is that they tend to dismiss Japan's militaristic experience as too trivial or exceptional. They treat Japan's specific historical experiences only at an abstract level, like 'merchant disposition,' and merely organize the domestic debate structure surrounding foreign policy from a contemporary perspective. Following this stance leads to satisfaction with vague answers like 'it will not be easy' regarding the shift in Japanese diplomacy in the 2010s and the possibility of becoming a military power, or forces one to abandon an intrinsic explanation based on Japanese societal uniqueness, as in Kenneth Pyle's case. The 'theory of the peaceful state,' while treating Japan's war experience as an important event and viewing Japan's diplomatic identity as fundamentally changed before and after the war, oversimplifies the nature of post-war pacifism and thus cannot provide a sufficient explanation of Japan's diplomatic identity. For example, proponents of the theory of the peaceful state cannot intrinsically understand Abe's 'proactive pacifism' rhetoric and ultimately end up seeking the causes of the shift in Japanese diplomacy from external factors like changes in the international structure, betraying their own premise of focusing on non-material ideas and norms. Above all, the theory of the peaceful state, which perceives a complete break between the pre-war and post-war periods, does not consider the post-colonial context of the post-Cold War Northeast Asian space at all. Therefore, it is necessary to reveal the multi-layered nature of 'post-war pacifism' by referencing the 'politics of memory' attempted in the field of history.

180 The politics of memory: Masao Maruyama's Post-war Nationalism and Counter-memories

Politics of Memory:

Masao Maruyama's Post-war Nationalism and Counter-memories

The activation of memory studies in history is related to the post-Cold War era, when grand narratives collapsed and concrete, individual human testimonies and narratives began to emerge from below. Historical studies of memory understand nationalism as a continuous reconstruction within the tension between the official memory of the nation-state and grassroots memories from below. From the perspective of the politics of memory, Japan has consistently pursued a 'Japanese people' in the modern sense.

While other countries refer to the 1950s as 'postwar' and the period thereafter as 'contemporary,' Japan has publicly used the term 'sengo' (postwar) until the 1990s. This indicates that Japan's postwar period is not just a specific past era, but a 'long postwar' as a 'multi-layered memory' constituting the fundamental premises of contemporary Japanese society, such as peace and (liberal) democracy (Gluck, 1993, 93). The 'official memory' of postwar Japan was Masao Maruyama's version of 'postwar nationalism.' The core of Japanese 'postwar nationalism' was the discontinuity between the wartime and postwar periods to pursue 'proper modernity,' characterized by the synthesis of (liberal) democracy and nationalism. Maruyama Masao believed that the reason Japan deviated from the normal path of modernization and was defeated was that nationalism was equated with top-down statism, making voluntary political participation impossible. Therefore, Maruyama discovered the seeds of healthy modernity in the Confucian thought of the Edo period, bypassing the 1930s and 1940s, and presented the 'patriotism' of the modern individual based on this as a new national identity for the reconstruction of postwar Japan. Article 9 of the pacifist constitution was also the basis for a new nationalism for Japan's new beginning. This is because 'claims of peace or morality' were the 'last basis of national identity left for Japan' (Oguma Eiji, 2019, 193).

However, in the 'sites of memory' where the testimonies and narratives of various actors struggle, official memory is inevitably challenged by grassroots memories from below. While Maruyama presented a new nationalism as an ideology for postwar reconstruction, abstracting and depersonalizing the war experience, the war experience was something that could not be dealt with without bypassing the concrete memories of death. Franziska Seraphim analyzes the dynamics of interest group politics in how individual war memories and mourning cultures for the war dead were incorporated into or created tension with Japan's official memory. Lisa Yoneyama more specifically analyzes the process by which the memory of atomic bomb victims created fissures in Japan's official memory. Japan has consistently emphasized its victim identity in relation to the atomic bomb issue, attempting to 'nationalize' the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, with the emergence of testimonies from Korean atomic bomb survivors, the selective memory and selective silence adopted by the 'Hibakusha narrative,' and the remnants of colonialism were exposed. Eiji Oguma offers a post-colonial critique, arguing that the anti-nuclear pacifism advocated by postwar Japan was based on a single-nation ideology. The criticism that the postwar nationalism of post-empires excluded Koreans and Okinawans, whom the empire sought to annex, in the process of completely severing the pre-war and post-war periods also applies to the nationalization of the hibakusha narrative. Masao Maruyama sought to construct the postwar era as an idea through domestic democracy and external pacifism, but in reality, Japanese nationalism was formed through continuous intermingling with the civilian mourning memories of the war era. As will be discussed later, its essence was none other than 'victim consciousness nationalism.'

182 In the 1990s, the task facing Japanese intellectuals was to delineate Japan's 'contemporary' period, distinct from the postwar era, by mobilizing memories. Norihito Kato's <Post-Defeat Theory> (1995), published in the 50th anniversary year of the end of the war, was part of such an effort. <Post-Defeat Theory> argues that for a national subject to take responsibility for Japan's war, 'mourning for Japan's three million war dead must precede mourning for Asia's twenty million victims.' In any case, the perspective of <Post-Defeat Theory> can be seen as an advancement compared to right-wing historical revisionism, as it clearly states that Japan must acknowledge its war responsibility and apologize to the 'twenty million in Asia.' However, Harootunian viewed Kato as essentially far-right, stating that he was 'reviving a colonial hierarchy among the dead' (Harootunian, 2000, 727). The core intellectual problem of <Post-Defeat Theory> is that Japan could not form a proper modern nation because the 'worship of its own war dead' was taboo, and that for Japan to end the postwar era and form 'normal' international relations, it must 'first' remember its Japanese victims. Harootunian distinguishes between memory and history, discovering a structure where contemporary Japanese right-wing ideologues repeatedly use 'memory' to deny 'history.' They seek to overcome the problems of contemporary Japanese society by revising 'history' through 'true memory,' thereby concluding the 'postwar' period (Harootunian, 2000, 725). Thus, in Japanese society, memories of war and mourning for the war dead have been repeatedly invoked by contemporary demands, serving as a mechanism for constructing Japanese identity and national self.

The essence of the 'politics of mourning and memory' that continues in Japan is its strong orientation towards modernity. And this has not newly emerged in the 1990s but has been ongoing since the postwar era. The complexity of the 'memory regime' in post-colonial Northeast Asia has led to Japan's victim consciousness nationalism functioning as a diplomatic identity. In the context of colonization, decolonization, and nation-state formation, East Asian countries were continuously exposed to the need to establish new national identities, and memories of World War II were mobilized and utilized in various ways. After the end of the Cold War, 'bottom-up memories' that had been suppressed under the San Francisco System re-emerged. As democratized Korea and a growing China sought to introduce new official memories that responded to these, a fundamental revision of the 'Northeast Asian memory regime,' which postwar Japan had sealed by accepting selective forgetting, began to be attempted. This can be seen as the essence of the 'historical conflicts' that the East Asian region is currently experiencing, erupting as conflicts at the individual, social, national, and international political levels (Fujitani et al, 2).

The essence of Japan's persistent 'politics of mourning and memory' is its strong orientation toward modernity. This did not newly emerge in the 1990s but has been ongoing since the postwar era. The complexity of the post-colonial Northeast Asian 'memory regime' has allowed Japan's victim-consciousness nationalism to function as a diplomatic identity. Within the experiences of colonization, decolonization, and nation-state formation, Northeast Asian countries have continuously been exposed to the need to establish new national identities.

184 In this process, memories of World War II were mobilized and utilized in various ways. Following the end of the Cold War, as 'bottom-up memories' suppressed under the San Francisco System re-emerged, and as the official memories sought by a democratized Korea and a rising China were introduced, fundamental revisions to the 'Northeast Asian memory regime,' which postwar Japan had sealed by accepting selective amnesia, began to be attempted. This can be seen as the essence of the 'historical conflicts' currently experienced in the East Asian region, erupting as conflicts at the individual, social, national, and international political levels (Fujitani et al, 2).

Victim Consciousness Nationalism and Moral Realism

Japan's Victim Consciousness Nationalism

Moving beyond historicizing nationalism as a 'site of memory' where multi-layered memories and testimonies struggle, referencing anthropology's perspective that the worship and mourning of war dead are central to the civil religion that enables the modern nation-state allows us to approach the modern-oriented essence of postwar Japanese nationalism more closely. Civil religion bestows sacred status upon secular entities like the nation or homeland by sublimating meaningless deaths into 'great sacrifices' for the nation and community (Lim Ji-hyun, 2021). The nation-state institutionalizes this through rituals of commemoration and ceremonies. As Benedict Anderson states, 'there is nothing more impressive than the monument to the Unknown Soldier or his grave' as a symbol of modern nationalism; the worship of war dead and civil religion are the essence of modern nationalism.

Lim Ji-hyun introduces 'victim consciousness nationalism,' distinguishing it from classical war hero worship by incorporating the context of 'globalization' and the emergence of 'universal human rights norms.' In the past, the objects of collective worship were limited to classical nationalist heroes, and these heroic deaths were sublimated into elite martyrdom, naturalizing nationalism in each country. However, 'victim consciousness nationalism' in the era of globalization presupposes a 'democratization of death,' where not only war heroes but also innocent civilian deaths are objects of worship. The narrative of victimhood that dominated the Cold War was reorganized into the language of universal morality with the end of the Cold War. Lim Ji-hyun sets the year 2000, with the Stockholm Declaration that universalized the memory of the Holocaust as a human tragedy for all humanity, not just the Jewish people, as 'Year 0 of the Global Memory Regime.' Lim Ji-hyun's argument is that victim consciousness nationalism is a new form of nationalism that operates primarily based on moral legitimacy, on the horizon of 21st-century human rights sensitivity that unequivocally condemns massacres and war crimes in the name of humanity. The core of victim consciousness nationalism lies in the moral superiority as a collective victim, and the endless 'competition of morality' among the official memories that nation-states seek to adopt leads to the reinforcement of another form of nationalism. Along with the democratization of death,

186 and the 'nationalization of martyrdom,' nationalism is reinforced within the flow of globalization.

In the sorrow and pain of defeat, Japan quickly shifted its position from perpetrator to victim, reinforcing victim consciousness nationalism. For victim consciousness nationalism to take root, top-down political-religious attempts must combine with bottom-up grassroots memories. In Japan's case, this process was facilitated because it had long been gripped by a deep grassroots sense of victimhood. The first pillar was a racist sense of victimhood towards the Western world. The perception of being a 'victim of Western colonialism' as an Asian has been prevalent among the Japanese grassroots since the early modern period. The starting point of Japanese nationalism was resistance nationalism in the early Meiji period, and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was also an attempt driven by a historical sense of mission to liberate and defend Asia from American imperialism (Lim Ji-hyun, 2021, 242). This anti-Western nationalism manifested as a racist sense of victimhood after the defeat. In Japan's view, the US's use of atomic bombs on Japan, not Germany, was a result of racist prejudice on the part of Westerners. Regarding the Tokyo Trial, the Japanese also believed that the US was unilaterally applying the 'justice of the victor.' The perception that the favorable stance of Radhabinod Pal, the sole Indian judge at the Tokyo Trial, towards Japan was a fair judgment untainted by racism is a representative example (Dower, 2009). In this way, Japan perceived itself as being in a 'post-colonial situation' under the Allied Powers Supreme Commander (SCAP) (Lim Ji-hyun, 2021, 266).

The second pillar reinforcing victim consciousness is the 'decontextualization' of memory, achieved through 'separation – discourse formation – philosophization.' First, a separation was made between militaristic leaders and the general Japanese populace. The most frequently used passive expression after the defeat was "damasareta (だまされた, I was deceived)," a language reflecting the conviction that ordinary Japanese people were deceived by their leaders (Dower, 2009, 633). This indicates that contemporary Japanese people, forgetting the complicity between the military and civilians under the wartime mobilization system, recognized abstract entities like 'the military, militarism, and the regime' as the true perpetrators of the war. The Tokyo Trial, which selectively punished only leaders, also justified this 'separation.' Under Maruyama Masao's 'postwar nationalism,' Japan's war crimes were 'discursively framed' as an 'unavoidable consequence of abnormal modernization.' It was argued that Japan's defeat in the war was because 'warlords, bureaucrats, and official organizations stifled the people's autonomy and creativity, preventing the full mobilization of national strength' (Lim Ji-hyun, 2021), and that Japanese people believed they had to follow the Western path of 'normal modernization' again to avoid defeat. Post-war Japan's emphasis on 'peace' and 'liberal democracy,' and its policies prioritizing education and science and technology, are not unrelated to this perception. Crucially, the overwhelming destructive power of the atomic bomb itself decontextualized Japan's memory of victimhood. The perception of the atomic bomb's

188 destructive power was already philosophical and religious at the time (Dower, 2009). In Nagasaki's case, due to its unique Christian atmosphere, the deaths of the victims could easily be idolized as 'martyrdom.' Lim Ji-hyun impressively describes how the memory of atomic bombing was juxtaposed with the suffering of Auschwitz, thereby essentializing and justifying victim consciousness nationalism, mediated by Dr. Takashi Nagai, a Nagasaki physician and Catholic (Lim Ji-hyun, 2021, 369-370).

Japan's victim consciousness nationalism was completed through its 'nationalization' via post-war reconstruction and rituals of mourning for the war dead. Due to censorship by GHQ for several months immediately after the defeat, free mourning and grieving were not possible. Themes reminiscent of war, such as Pan-Asian rhetoric, death, destruction, and defeat, as well as sorrow and mourning for the war dead, were all subject to censorship (Dower, 2009, 523). The delayed grief and mourning under the occupation forces' censorship system later erupted in various forms of political religion in civilian and local communities, such as the memorial ceremonies at Yasukuni Shrine and the Special Attack Corps memorial services (Lim Ji-hyun, 2021, 139-141; Lee Young-jin, 2018). Among the numerous war memorial events in August, the 'National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead' and the 'Peace Memorial Ceremonies' in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the Japanese Prime Minister's visit is formalized, are government-hosted events. The memory of atomic bombing 'further strengthened the sense of victimhood in Japanese society and accelerated the nationalization of memory' (Lim Ji-hyun, 2021, 221). As will be discussed later, the Prime Minister's speeches at these events implicitly, and sometimes

189 4. Japan's 'Moral Realism' Diplomacy: The Discourse of Hibakusha Experience in Nagasaki's Atomic Bomb Museum explicitly, limit the objects of mourning to Japanese war dead, thus performing the 'nationalization of martyrdom.'

Moral Realism

190 etc., are not awkward in international relations (Crawford, 2000; Bleiker, R., & Hutchison, E. 2008). The expectation that 'by playing a leading role for world peace, Japanese people may be reborn from 'losers of war' to 'winners of peace'' (Dower, 2009) well illustrates the essence of post-war pacifism. In short, Japan sought to become a 'winner' by appealing to universal morality. Therefore, in the 21st-century context, Japan's 'victim identity' is not a passive and melancholic self-definition, but a diplomatic 'strength' and 'resource.'

The second core point is that the essence of victim consciousness nationalism is ultimately 'self-centered nationalism,' and even if it takes the form of universal moral language, its content strongly carries power-political attributes. While victim identity may appear passive and reactive at first glance, the consolidation of cultural memory and the strengthening of collective belonging through victim narratives ultimately risk leading to a 'competition of morality over who is the greater victim.' The 'memory war' among Korea, China, and Japan is a case in point, demonstrating how the competition of morality in victim consciousness nationalism can manifest as realistic diplomatic conflict. The transnational re-arrangement of memory can also lead to solidarity and reconciliation, but as the analysis of speeches will show later, the overwhelming nature of the atomic bombing experience has led Japan to intensify the competitive aspect of memory's morality. In fact, Japan's victim identity has evolved to the level of ontological security, specifically leading to the perception of Korean and Chinese nationalism as 'security threats' to Japan (Suzuki, S., 2015; Tamaki, T., 2004). If the substance of post-war pacifism was nationalistic nationalism (Oguma Eiji, 2019), then loudly proclaiming peace externally is a form of identity diplomacy with a very strong nuance. This is because 'speaking of peace as a victim of war' is closer to language of blame and reproach towards the perpetrator.

To highlight the dual nature of 'discourse-ized victim consciousness nationalism,' new language is needed. It is necessary to pay attention to Yan Xuetong's concept of 'moral realism,' which focuses on the political utilization of morality. Yan Xuetong argues against mainstream international relations, which has ignored the function of morality, stating that morality has been considered an important diplomatic resource since classical realism. This is because the capabilities (capability), power (power), and authority (authority) that mainstream international relations presents as components of 'national power' are regulated and controlled by their relationship with morality. When a state's external actions conform to universal moral standards, the legitimacy of those actions is secured, directly impacting the enhancement of national power. Yan Xuetong presents this concisely with the formula "CC=(M+E+C)*P" (Yan, 2019, 13), where "M is military power, E is economic power, C is culture, and P is Political Capability." In the tradition of Chinese thought, political capability is closely related to morality. Yan Xuetong distinguishes this political capability from Joseph Nye's concept of soft power (13-14).

192 Yan Xuetong presents Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine as an example of 'Japan's actions deviating from international moral standards, resulting in damage to its political leadership' (Yan, 2019, 20). However, what Yan Xuetong overlooks is that both the visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the Peace Memorial Ceremonies in Hiroshima/Nagasaki and the National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead are mechanisms that reinforce victim consciousness nationalism as rituals of commemoration for the nation-state. Furthermore, unlike the case of visiting Yasukuni Shrine, the Peace Memorial Ceremonies in Hiroshima/Nagasaki are also utilized as a platform to showcase the universal moral code of 'anti-nuclear pacifism.' Japan's increased international influence can, ironically, be understood as possible because Japan, as a former war criminal nation, has asserted its victimhood internationally and acted as a 'moral power.'

When moral realism is understood within the framework of victim consciousness nationalism, the basis of morality, unlike what Yan Xuetong suggests, should be seen not in Chinese traditional thought but in the universal human rights norms and the atmosphere of empathy for victims that have newly emerged in the 21st-century global memory regime. This approach, which defines the nature of postwar Japanese nationalism as victim consciousness nationalism, has the strength of explaining the shift in Japanese diplomacy in the 2010s without exaggerating the discontinuity between the pre-war and post-war periods, and between the post-war and contemporary periods. The shift in Japanese diplomacy is explained not solely by external variables or domestic political dynamics, but because the victim identity inherent in the attributes of Japanese nationalism, combined with the 'victim narrative' that has become mainstream with the emergence of the 21st-century global memory regime, has taken on the character of competitive nationalism. Within the framework of moral realism, understanding Japanese nationalism and pacifism as having power-political attributes based on moral conviction as a victim allows for a coherent understanding of the complex attributes of Japan's normalization into a regular country. Because Japan's normalization into a regular country is based on the universal moral language of 'peace,' it may appear internationalistic to the United States and Western countries. However, Korea and China, as 'victim nations of Asia,' find it difficult to 'empathize' with Japan's assertion of victim identity (= moral superiority), and thus perceive the power-political substance of the normalization attempt more clearly.4

Linguistic Analysis of Japanese Prime Ministerial Speeches

The official statements of the Japanese government have often been used as a barometer of Japan's perception of its past. The 'Kono Statement' in 1993, which acknowledged the forced mobilization of 'comfort women' by the Japanese military, and the 'Murayama Statement' in 1995, which acknowledged Japan's responsibility for its colonial rule, are considered to represent the Japanese government's official stance on historical issues. They have also served as important benchmarks for evaluating subsequent Japanese government statements and actions regarding historical issues. The Korean media has also reacted sensitively to the specific wording and nuances of Japanese prime ministerial statements, raising issues about the Japanese government's perception of historical issues.

The 'Murayama Statement' in 1995, which acknowledged Japan's responsibility for its colonial rule, is considered to represent the Japanese government's official stance on historical issues. It has also served as an important benchmark for evaluating subsequent Japanese government statements and actions regarding historical issues. The Korean media has also reacted sensitively to the specific wording and nuances of Japanese prime ministerial statements, raising issues about the Japanese government's perception of historical issues.

In relation to the shift in Japanese diplomacy, analyses of Japanese prime ministerial diplomatic language often focus on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II commemorative speech (Abe Statement) delivered on August 14, 2015. The Abe Statement was the first to feature 'proactive contribution to peace,' the current official slogan of Japanese diplomacy, and has often been evaluated as demonstrating Abe's revisionist stance on history. Park Chan-seung (2016) analyzed the reactions of South Korea, China, the United States, and Taiwan to the Abe Statement's passive and ambiguous apologies for historical issues and its self-centered mourning, thereby analyzing the clash of collective memories of war. Choi Soon-yuk (2016) focuses on the literary rhetoric of the Abe Statement, evaluating that Abe, while circumventing a direct apology for historical issues and revealing his right-wing vision, delivered a speech akin to an emotional appeal to make it acceptable to international society and domestic public opinion. In contrast, Lee Jeong-hwan (2019) argues that the Abe Statement has a stronger internationalist character than a revisionist one. If the intended audience of the Abe Statement was the United States rather than the victimized Asian countries, the statement emphasizes global universality rather than emphasizing Japan-centric right-wing beliefs. Meanwhile, Kwon Hyuk-tae (2009) analyzes the process by which the expression 'the only country to have experienced atomic bombings' became established in Japanese political circles, concluding that this was a process of nationalizing the experience of atomic bombings and victimizing the Japanese people. Kwon's observation that victim nationalism forms one pillar of post-war pacifism is closest to the problematic awareness of this paper.

This paper focuses on the prime ministerial speeches delivered at the annual national memorial ceremonies: the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies and the National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead, from the perspective of victim consciousness nationalism. While the Peace Memorial Ceremonies and the Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead are fundamentally spaces of mourning and remembrance where 'language of mourning' is paramount, the language of the prime ministerial speeches in this context reinforces victim consciousness nationalism through 'decontextualized association of memories' and simultaneously positions Japan as a 'victim of war' while advocating the moral language of world peace. This paper analyzes all prime ministerial speeches from these ceremonies from 2005 to 2023, tracing the changes in the association and arrangement of memories chronologically.

Language of the Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies

The speeches at the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies are relatively shorter and more concise than those at the National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead.

The solemn and reverent atmosphere of the Peace Memorial Ceremonies, stemming from the experience of overwhelming suffering caused by the 'absolute evil' of atomic bombs, forms the basic mood of these ceremonies. Despite being the same atomic-bombed sites, there are subtle differences in how Hiroshima and Nagasaki are perceived in Japan.

As the expression 'Angry Hiroshima, Praying Nagasaki' suggests, Hiroshima gives the impression of being political, left-wing, and anti-American, while Nagasaki conveys a meditative, religious, and compromising image. However, such differences are not found in the Japanese prime minister's speeches at the Peace Memorial Ceremonies. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki speeches for the same year consist of completely identical sentences, excluding proper nouns, making it important to compare differences between cabinets and years rather than differences between Hiroshima and Nagasaki when analyzing the speeches.

From 2005 to 2023, the speeches at the Peace Memorial Ceremonies consistently include mourning for the victims, support measures for atomic bomb survivors, and Japan's ongoing efforts for denuclearization based on the 'lessons learned' from the experience of atomic bombings. Unlike the speeches at the Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead, it is customary not to mention reflections on the war of aggression. At the Peace Memorial Ceremonies, the prime minister has never once mentioned the causes or circumstances of the atomic bombings. While this could be criticized in principle for decontextualizing the memory of the atomic bombings and reinforcing Japan's victimhood, it may be an unreasonable demand to expect a nation's prime minister to discuss the circumstances that 'warranted the atomic bombings' in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of all places, when hundreds of thousands of their own citizens died and continue to suffer. However, the symbolic violence of generalizing the category of 'Hibakusha' (atomic bomb survivor) to limit survivors to Japanese nationals and marginalize victims of other ethnicities, such as Korean atomic bomb survivors, is clearly open to criticism. 5 The irony that survivors from other regions must be incorporated into the Japanese government's bureaucratic approval system to receive compensation (Oh Eun-jung, 2013) is also evident in the prime ministerial speeches.

The Japanese government has developed comprehensive support measures covering health, medical care, and welfare to assist atomic bomb survivors. Last fall, the government revised its system to allow atomic bomb survivors residing overseas to apply for financial assistance through institutions located outside of Japan. The government will actively promote these measures, taking into account the actual circumstances of surviving atomic bomb victims.

welfare. Last fall

the government revised its system to allow atomic bomb survivors residing overseas to apply for financial assistance through institutions located outside of Japan.

institutions located outside of Japan.

The government will actively promote these measures, taking into account the actual circumstances of surviving atomic bomb victims.

victims.

measures.

(August 9, 2006, Nagasaki Peace Park, Junichiro Koizumi)

Koizumi

Twenty years have passed since the Atomic Bomb Survivors Support Act was enacted. This law was established to provide support for the aging atomic bomb survivors. Our government will thoroughly develop comprehensive relief measures covering health, medical services, and welfare.

This law was established to provide support for the aging atomic bomb survivors. Our government will thoroughly develop comprehensive relief measures covering health, medical services, and welfare.

welfare.

(August 6, 2015, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, Shinzo Abe)

The next point to note is the expression "the world's only country to suffer atomic bombings." The phrase "the world's only country to suffer atomic bombings" has been included in the speeches of every prime minister. For discussions on the problematic nature of the term 'hibakusha,' refer to Yoneyama (1999), Oh Eun-jeong (2013), and Oh Eun-jeong (2018).

198 It has appeared every year without fail. The term "only country to suffer atomic bombings" means "only Japan (or Japanese people) in the world suffered atomic bombings." This reflects an intention to limit the historical inheritance of the experience of atomic bombings and the subject of anti-nuclear peace advocacy to Japan (Kwon Hyuk-tae, 2009, pp. 80-81). No prime minister has been sensitive to the political impropriety of this expression. Eventually, in the speech delivered during President Obama's visit to Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park in 2016, the United States was explicitly referred to as "the only country to use nuclear weapons," highlighting America's role as the perpetrator. Abe mentioned Obama's visit in his speech the following year, 2017.

Having experienced the suffering of atomic bombs not once, but twice,

despite such hardships, we endured the pain and sorrow, and by

our own efforts, we rebuilt our homeland and restored Nagasaki to a beautiful city. ... We Japanese are the only humanity to have experienced the devastation of nuclear weapons in war. As such, we have a responsibility to achieve a world without nuclear weapons without fail."

nuclear weapons in war. As such, we have a responsibility to achieve a world without nuclear weapons without fail."

As such, we have a responsibility to achieve a "world without nuclear weapons" without fail.

responsibility to achieve a "world without nuclear weapons" without fail.

fail."

(August 9, 2013, Nagasaki Peace Memorial Park, Shinzo Abe)

Last May, President Barack Obama became the first sitting U.S. President to visit Hiroshima. The President of the only country to have used nuclear weapons witnessed the reality of the atomic bombings and, together with the atomic bomb survivors, appealed to the world to pursue a world without nuclear weapons, strongly urging nuclear-armed states to have the courage to pursue such a world.

The President of the only country to have used nuclear weapons

witnessed the reality of the atomic bombings and, together with the atomic bomb survivors, appealed to the world to pursue a world without nuclear weapons,

and, together with the atomic bomb survivors, appealed to the world to pursue a world without nuclear weapons,

to pursue a world without nuclear weapons, strongly urging nuclear-armed states to have the courage to pursue such a world.

world.

199 4. "Moral Realism" in Japanese Diplomacy: Discourse on the Experience of Atomic Bombings_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

(August 6, 2016, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, Shinzo Abe)

Along with emphasizing being the world's only country to suffer atomic bombings, another expression that appears almost every year is praise for the post-war efforts to rebuild Hiroshima and Nagasaki into "beautiful cities." The exception was the 2011 Peace Memorial Ceremony speech, likely because in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, it was difficult to mention past successful reconstruction efforts. What is noteworthy in Prime Minister Kan Naoto's 2011 speech is the connection between the memory of atomic bomb suffering and the memory of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, mediated by "nuclear." At the end of his speech, Prime Minister Kan mentioned the Great East Japan Earthquake, expressed gratitude for the disaster recovery support for Hiroshima (Nagasaki), and regarding the Fukushima nuclear power plant, expressed the will for Japan to revise its energy policy, moving away from the "myth of nuclear energy safety" based on this event.

Japan has embarked on a review of its energy policy from the outset.

I deeply regret believing in the "security myth" of nuclear energy,

I deeply regret believing in the "security myth" of nuclear energy, and will conduct a thorough verification of the causes of this incident and implement fundamental measures to ensure safety.

and implement fundamental measures to ensure safety. At the same time, Japan will lower its dependence on nuclear energy, aiming to become a society that does not rely on nuclear energy.

and lower its dependence on nuclear energy. I believe it is our responsibility to accept this incident as a new lesson for all of humanity and to convey what we have learned to the people of the world and future generations.

I believe it is our responsibility to accept this incident as a new lesson for all of humanity and to convey what we have learned to the people of the world and future generations.

generations.

(August 6, 2011, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, Kan Naoto)

By juxtaposing "suffering" from different contexts within the Prime Minister's language, the victimhood of the Japanese people was reinforced. The danger of juxtaposition lies in the potential for the specific context of each event to be abstracted away. The atomic bombings occurred within the context of Japan's initiation of the Pacific War in the 20th century, while the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake was closer to a pure natural disaster. Therefore, apart from the commonality of being overwhelming disasters, the two events had little room for mutual reference. Nevertheless, it was not awkward for the Japanese people to connect the two events within the sense of "experiencing suffering" and "the end of Japanese society," and this was directly reflected in the Prime Minister's speeches. In short, for the Japanese people, the Great East Japan Earthquake was akin to a 21st-century atomic bomb. The problem is that this abstracts and idealizes the Japanese memory of atomic bomb suffering.

The international political core of victimhood nationalism is to appeal for moral superiority by highlighting the victim identity of one's own people. In the Peace Memorial Ceremony speeches, almost every year, reports are made on various non-nuclear/disarmament international conferences and diplomatic achievements of the year. From an international political perspective, the Prime Minister's Peace Memorial Ceremony speech is less a "language of mourning" and more a language of "influential diplomacy" that expands Japan's voice in nuclear-related matters within the international community by expressing its moral will for anti-nuclear peace.

Last year, at the UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament, I declared a resolution to achieve a "world without nuclear weapons."

201 4. "Moral Realism" in Japanese Diplomacy: Discourse on the Experience of Atomic Bombings_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

The resolution on nuclear disarmament submitted by the Japanese government secured over 100 co-sponsors for the first time and was adopted by an overwhelming majority. Moving toward the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Japan is also working on related initiatives.

Treaty) for the first time and was adopted by an overwhelming majority. Moving toward the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Japan is also working on related initiatives.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

efforts such as requesting the ratification of resolutions directly from heads of state

are being made to promote realistic and practical nuclear disarmament.

In April of this year, a ministerial meeting on the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Initiative (Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Initiative Ministerial Meeting) was held here in Hiroshima. From this

atomic-bombed city, our message was powerfully conveyed to the world.

Next year marks the significant 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings, and the Review Conference of the

Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons), which is held every five years, is also scheduled to take place. Japan

will continue to strive to advance efforts toward realizing a "world without nuclear weapons."

We will continue to strive to advance efforts toward realizing a "world without nuclear weapons."

(August 6, 2014, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, Shinzo Abe)

If Japan's diplomatic identity is understood as 'moral realism,' this does not merely entail niche diplomacy, such as preempting specific issues (nuclear weapons) to expand influence, or enhancing international appeal by securing competitiveness in non-military domains through soft power diplomacy. Within the framework of moral realism, morality functions as a kind of political alibi, legitimizing the country's other actions. What is most striking in the speech at the Peace Memorial Ceremony is the mention of the will to defend the "Peace Constitution" and the "Three Principles of Nuclear Abstinence." While the will to defend the Peace Constitution has

not been mentioned in some administrations, the Three Principles of Nuclear Abstinence have been consistently mentioned by all cabinets. Therefore, Japan's Three Principles of Nuclear Abstinence can be seen as functioning as a political alibi for domestic constitutional revision. All these aspects are, of course, explained within the framework of political realism.

<Table 1. Analysis of Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremony Speeches> 203

4. Japan's Diplomatic 'Moral Realism': Discourse on the Experience of Atomic Bombings_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

(Mourning for the war dead, support for atomic bomb survivors, and efforts in the international community are mentioned annually. It is customary not to mention repentance for the war.)

The language of the National Memorial Service for the War Dead (全国戦没者追悼式)

The language of the National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead (全国戦没者追悼式)

The National Memorial Service for the War Dead, attended by the Emperor, is more politically charged and symbolic than the Peace Memorial Ceremony, thus receiving greater attention. In the Prime Minister's address at the National Memorial Service for the War Dead, as befits a national memorial rite, mourning for the war dead, Japan's post-war reconstruction and development, and the Japanese government's efforts for world peace are mentioned annually. However, unlike the Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies, it has been customary not to address political agendas such as "the world's only atomic-bombed nation," the "Peace Constitution," or the "Three Principles of Nuclear Abstinence." Above all, what should be noted in the speech at the National Memorial Service for the War Dead is the appearance of expressions of repentance and apology for the war of aggression. The Korean media also pays attention to this point every year, expressing concern about Japan's historical revisionism. The expressions of repentance and apology at the National Memorial Service for the War Dead were not precisely apologies, but rather an expansion of the objects of regret and mourning to include "the people of other countries, especially the people of Asian countries," not just Japan. This highly formalized paragraph was a mandatory inclusion until the launch of the second Abe administration.

204 In the last war, Japan inflicted immense damage and suffering upon the people of many countries, especially those in Asia.

I express my profound remorse and sincere mourning to the war victims and their bereaved families who suffered because of this.

However, precisely from the second Abe administration onwards, this expression disappeared, and was replaced by the expression 'freedom and democracy,' which had not existed before (2013, 2015), or by new, sentimental expressions (2013, 2014).

The peace and prosperity we enjoy today were built upon your precious sacrifices.

Thinking of your beloved children and spouses, you wished for the happiness of the mothers and fathers you left behind,

and you sacrificed your precious lives, wishing for the green radiance of the mountains and rivers of your homeland.

We will never, not for a moment, forget this.

... Since the end of World War II, Japan has diligently walked the path of peace, valuing freedom and democracy.

(August 15, 2013, 68th National Memorial Service for the War Dead, Shinzo Abe)

The accusation of 'martyrdom nationalization' becomes even clearer when examining the expressions used to refer to the victims. While the victims were simply referred to as 'many people' during the Koizumi administration, from the first Abe administration onwards, they were habitually accompanied by the modifier 'three million people' (三百万余の方々), which indicates the number of Japanese victims. From the second Abe administration onwards, expressions like 'mitama' (みたま), a Japanese term referring to 'spirits,' or even 'three million compatriots' (三百万余の同胞の命) began to be used, specifically identifying the victims as Japanese. In Abe's 2014 speech, he uniquely mentioned his visit to the Japanese war memorial in Papua New Guinea that year, indirectly referring to the Pacific War and expressing for the first time the will to excavate and repatriate the remains of overseas soldiers. 2014 was the year the Japanese government decided through a cabinet meeting that the exercise of collective self-defense was possible, and the visit to the South Pacific and the project for the excavation of war remains were linked to this. The pledge to return overseas soldiers' remains 'to their homeland' in the name of the state is repeated in subsequent memorial service speeches. At this point, the international political character of the victimhood nationalism presented in this article becomes evident. The politics of death and mourning are closely linked to Japan's foreign policy. Japan's identity as a victim is not a passive or defensive self-definition, but rather implies strong nationalism and a modern orientation, manifesting as actions close to realism in international politics.

We will also never forget the remains of the war dead who have not yet returned to their homeland.

A few days ago, I prayed and clasped my hands in thought of the more than 120,000 people who lost their lives in the jungles and seas of Papua New Guinea.

(August 15, 2014, 69th National Memorial Service for the War Dead, Shinzo Abe)

We will never forget the numerous war dead whose remains have not yet been recovered.

206 We accept this as the responsibility of the state, and

We accept this as the responsibility of the state, and we will spare no effort to ensure that their remains can be returned to their homeland as soon as possible.

(August 15, 2022, 77th National Memorial Service for the War Dead, Fumio Kishida)

From the 2019 National Memorial Service for the War Dead speech onwards, Hiroshima and Nagasaki began to be directly mentioned. The addition of a paragraph in the speech at the National Memorial Service for the War Dead that explicitly mentions specific wars during World War II, such as the Tokyo air raids and the Battle of Okinawa, in addition to the atomic bombings, precisely demonstrates that Abe is strengthening the nationalistic aspect of victimhood nationalism through symbolic politics. The following paragraph is also inherited and used by subsequent Prime Ministers Suga and Kishida.

More than three million compatriots lost their lives during the war. Some lost their lives on the battlefield, concerned about the future of their country, while others lost their lives in distant lands after the war.

Some lost their lives on the battlefield, concerned about the future of their country, while others lost their lives in distant lands after the war.

Among the many battles, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the air raids on Tokyo and other cities,

and the ground battle in Okinawa, among others, ruthlessly claimed many lives.

Today, before the souls of all those who lost their lives, we sincerely pray for their repose.

(August 15, 2019, 68th National Memorial Service for the War Dead, Shinzo Abe)

The diplomatic term 'Proactive Contribution to Peace' began to appear in the speeches at the National Memorial Service for the War Dead in 2020. Japan's victimhood nationalism has begun to overtly combine with external realism. At first glance, it may seem contradictory for Japan to justify its possession of military forces, free formation of military alliances with foreign countries, and the comprehensive exercise of collective self-defense under the name of 'peace.' However, within the framework of moral realism, military alliances are understood as moral acts where 'great powers protect the security of weaker nations' (Yan, 2019, pp. 65-66). The provision of international public goods through military power enhances the strategic credibility and international influence of great powers, and this is pursued under the realist objective of building leadership in a hegemonic transition phase.

If Japan's diplomatic identity is understood as a 'merchant' or a 'monk,' this change would inevitably be discontinuous. However, if the 'moral high ground' as a victim has been Japan's long-standing identity, then this is not a change or transition, but a continuation.

Under the principle of "Proactive Contribution to Peace," we will join hands with the international community and play a greater role than ever before in addressing the various global challenges we face. We will overcome the current novel coronavirus infectious disease (COVID-19) and forge a future for our nation for the present and future generations.

In this way, by 2020, the Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead had begun to be used as a conference to articulate Japan's diplomatic identity. Considering that August is traditionally a time of mourning and remembrance in Japan,

this change is quite shocking. However, if we understand the competitive nature of victimhood nationalism within the framework of moral realism, it is not awkward for 'mourning' to be linked to 'international politics.' As mentioned earlier, Japan's victim identity has been consistently maintained from the pre-war, post-war, to the modern era, and in the 21st century, the dynamics of memory politics have been at play, manifesting this realistically.

208

Conclusion

This paper has defined the international political character of victimhood nationalism as moral realism and examined the consistency of Japan's diplomatic identity from the perspective of the continuity of nationalism. While existing international relations scholarship has largely followed Japan's periodization, defining its diplomatic identity as discontinuous and fragmented,

The framework of 'moral realism,' which seeks to understand Japan's true diplomatic identity by delving into the Japanese psyche, can be applied to various real-world cases. For instance, based on a consistent victim identity, Japan has always perceived other countries with strong moral conviction. Historian Jun Yunaha argues that Japan's diplomacy is becoming 'Confucianized,' citing the foreign perceptions of ordinary Japanese people. According to him, the thoughts of ordinary Japanese people are as follows: "(Regarding the recognition of past history) We are making such sincere efforts, why aren't they recognized?" "(Regarding the visit to Yasukuni Shrine) I am visiting with the sentiment (mind) that we must never wage war again, so what is wrong with that?" "(Regardless of whether aggressive war is acknowledged or not) Are the Chinese and Koreans, and the Japanese leftists who criticize actions done with good intentions, narrow-minded people?" (Yunaha, 2013, pp. 242-243). 6 In this way, defining oneself as a victim in any situation and asserting one's 'grievance' and 'morality (good intentions and heart)' can be said to be the basic nuance of the diplomatic language that contemporary Japan uses towards South Korea and China. This perception is particularly evident when dealing with South Korea. Towards South Korea, Japan has made strong judgments based on norms and morality, such as 'South Korea does not keep its promises (regarding the comfort women agreement)' and 'South Korea does not comply with international law (regarding the forced labor ruling),' and in the incident involving the patrol aircraft in 2018-2019, it appealed to its victim identity by stating that 'South Korea aimed its patrol aircraft at us.'

this article argues that Japan, as an Asian nation, has consistently pursued 'nationalist diplomacy' from the pre-war, wartime, post-war, to the modern era, possessing a kind of post-colonial identity (victim). Theoretically, it has broadened the scope of application of 'Chinese IR' by adopting Yan Xuetong's moral realism and reinterpreted victimhood nationalism in international politics, examining how 'emotions' should be handled in international relations scholarship.

209 4. Japan's Diplomatic 'Moral Realism': The Diplomatization of Atomic Bombing Experiences_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

Conclusion

The preceding analysis has defined the international political character of victimhood nationalism as moral realism and examined the consistency of Japan's diplomatic identity from the perspective of the persistence of nationalism. While existing international politics scholarship has largely followed Japan's periodization, defining its diplomatic identity as discontinuous and

Table 2. Analysis of Speeches at Memorial Ceremonies for the War Dead

209 4. Japan's 'Moral Realism' in Diplomacy: Discourse on Atomic Bomb Experiences_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

(Mourning for the war dead, post-war reconstruction and development, and efforts in the international community are mentioned annually. The sole nation in the world

as fragmented, this paper argues that Japan, as an Asian nation, has consistently pursued 'nationalist diplomacy' throughout the pre-war, wartime, post-war, and contemporary periods, possessing a form of post-colonial identity (as a victim). Theoretically, it broadens the scope of 'China IR' by adopting Yan Xuetong's moral realism and reinterprets victimhood nationalism in international politics, thereby examining how 'emotions' can be addressed in international politics scholarship.

As a means to identify Japan's true diplomatic identity by delving into the Japanese psyche, 'moral realism' can be applied in various real-world cases. For instance, based on a consistent victim identity, Japan has always perceived other countries with strong moral conviction. Historian Jun Yunaha (與那覇潤) argues that Japanese diplomacy is becoming 'Confucianized,' citing the foreign perceptions of ordinary Japanese people. According to him, the thoughts of ordinary Japanese people are as follows: "(Regarding the recognition of past history) Aren't they unaware of our sincere efforts?", "(Regarding paying respects at the Yasukuni Shrine) What is wrong with paying respects with the sentiment (mind) that we must never wage war again?", "(Regardless of acknowledging the war of aggression) The Chinese and Koreans who criticize actions done with good intentions, as well as the leftists within Japan, are narrow-minded individuals

210

Im Ji-hyun, the proponent of 'victimhood nationalism,' predicts that true peace will only be possible through the formation of a solidarity of memory by 'sacrificing victimhood nationalism' (Im Ji-hyun, 2021, pp. 522-523).

While it is important to directly confront the non-identifiable aspects of history obscured by national imagination and to narrate suppressed memories, in the current international political reality where nationalism is intensifying daily, merely vociferously advocating for the 'overcoming of nationalism' is indeed overly didactic. Therefore, how about focusing on the liberating aspects of victimhood nationalism, starting from shared experiences of suffering? Last year's joint visit by the South Korean and Japanese leaders to the memorial for Korean atomic bomb victims in Hiroshima was a profoundly meaningful 'event' in that regard. We hope that South Korea and Japan can achieve true reconciliation as the 80th anniversary of the end of the war approaches. 6 Yunaha uniquely diagnoses contemporary Japan as gradually becoming 'Sinicized' based on his distinct view of history. Following his analysis, considering the internalization of Confucian ethics, applying the theory Yan Xuetong used to explain China to Japan is quite persuasive. (Yunaha, 2013)

211 4. Japan's Diplomatic 'Moral Realism': The Diplomatization of Atomic Bombing Experiences_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

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Prime Minister's Speeches at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony (2005-2023) Prime Minister's Speeches at the Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremony (2005-2023) Prime Minister's Speeches at the Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead (2005-2023)

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Oh, Eun-jung. 2018. From 'War Sufferers' to 'Hibakusha': The Institutionalization of Support for Japanese Atomic Bomb Survivors and the Construction of 'Hibakusha' as a New Category of Qualification. Nihon Hihyo, 19, pp.308-341. Oh, Eun-jung. 2013. Japanese Hibakusha Status for Korean Atomic Bomb Victims: The Interaction of Science, Politics, and Bureaucracy in Defining and Controlling the Boundaries of the Hibakusha Category.

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Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University Graduate School.

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3) Web Resources

Hankyoreh. 2017. “UN General Assembly Resolution Abstention… Was the Park Geun-hye Administration Correct and the Moon Jae-in

Administration Incorrect?”. Hankyoreh. October 30, 2017.

218 <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/816633.ht

ml> (Accessed January 11, 2024)

219

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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