Prospects for the Indo-Pacific Order in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Kyushu National Museum of History and Culture · Lee Yerim · Seoul National University

Introduction

The world is currently in turmoil due to the competition between the United States and China and the repercussions of the aggressive policies enacted by the U.S. to contain China. The current reality, which demands swift and sharp analysis of how this competition will unfold and what its outcome will be, is reminiscent of the late Joseon Dynasty when the world order was in flux, and people were in disarray. However, the U.S. containment of China is not a new development but rather a continuation of the pivot to Asia policy initiated during the Obama administration. The recent, almost radical, mutual aggression signals that the U.S. has now drawn its sword against China. 7. Prospects for the Indo-Pacific Order in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence Competition

The conflict between the U.S. and China, which began in trade, has now escalated to a contest for leadership in cutting-edge technologies and technical standards. Competition and confrontation are also becoming evident in the field of artificial intelligence. However, the label of 'competition' in the field of AI may require reconsideration. The current U.S.-China competition is often compared to the previous U.S.-Soviet Cold War, but the AI field is fundamentally different in nature and dynamics from any previous competition. While technologies during the Cold War were largely state secrets, leading to national monopolies, AI is a 'general-purpose technology' that is widely usable and applicable, and a 'driver technology' that fuels the growth of all industries. Furthermore, its role as a foundational technology for other technologies makes it difficult to categorize distinctly. Consequently, even though AI is bringing about revolutionary changes comparable to the nuclear arms race or the space race during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, it cannot be placed on the same level. The field of AI has no finish line, the path forward is unclear, and the way is generally ambiguous and overlapping (Christine Fox, 2020).

Nevertheless, countries are investing heavily in technology and are not shying away from confrontation. China, at the central government level, consistently emphasizes and provides full support for technology in general, and AI in particular. This stems from the belief that in the current era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, preempting key technologies is the way to achieve global hegemony. Revolutionary technological changes not only differ but also generate revolutionary government policy ideas (Allen and Chan, 2017). China's interest, research, investment, and business in AI are collectively referred to as China's 'Sputnik moment' (Lee Kai Fu, 2018). The U.S. also recognizes that the current period is a turning point for AI and technology overall. 1 However, observing China's formidable progress, the U.S. is now belatedly seeking strong and comprehensive national-level support and guidance. The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) believes that the U.S. is not currently giving serious consideration to the profound impact the AI revolution will have on society, the economy, and national security, but urges that the AI revolution be viewed from the perspective of protecting security, prosperity, and democratic values (NSCAI, 2021). As the AI and technology competition between the U.S. and China is expected to intensify, it is important to examine how each country is entering this competition and how they envision the post-competition world. Understanding how the international political landscape will transform in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, spearheaded by AI, will be useful in identifying the options available in future international politics. 1 Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense reported at the Reagan Defense forum. 7. Prospects for the Indo-Pacific Order in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Responding to the Competition

The U.S. Attempt at Decoupling

The U.S. clearly states that the post-Cold War era has definitively ended and that competition among great powers is underway to shape what comes next (NSS, 2022). It also assesses that we are approaching a critical juncture in history regarding how to address the nascent impact of AI. This stems from the realization that without reflecting on and renewing the efforts made to maintain the U.S. as it has been, its technological leadership cannot be assured, and it risks losing it. While acknowledging that the U.S. cannot confidently claim to be leading or superior, it asserts that America's destiny will be determined by how it prepares for the new era ushered in by AI.

Since 2018, the U.S. has been implementing measures to systematically exclude China from key supply chains, including semiconductors. When these aggressive U.S. actions are termed a "tech war," they bear a strong resemblance to a trade war but differ in that a broader range of actors are involved. While similar competitive tools are used, such as policy interventions and control over the flow of goods, services, capital, and information, trade wars are driven by well-organized entities with significant political influence. In contrast, the tech sector involves comprehensive participation from both the public and private sectors. This means it encompasses not only organized entities with political agendas but also industry, academia, and even the general public, along with their level of awareness.

The reasons for the U.S. engaging in this all-encompassing technological competition and decoupling from China can be broadly summarized as follows: the premise of maintaining existing U.S. hegemony, the U.S.'s relative weakness in many technological fields compared to China's rapid ascent, and domestic political reasons stemming from the U.S. trade deficit with China. Firstly, the prominent weakness of the U.S. and strength of China in various technology-related indicators can be a major cause. While there are several indicators for evaluating technological capabilities, such as AI, prominent examples include patents, data, talent, and R&D levels. Regarding AI patents, China is at a comparable or even leading level to the U.S. In particular, in deep learning, a key subfield of AI, China holds approximately six times more patent publications. It is noteworthy that China's patent publications are increasing at a very rapid pace. In terms of data, a crucial asset for AI, China possesses vast amounts of high-quality data. China's society is already largely digitized, and the quantity and quality of data generated by individuals in their daily lives are highly valued. The sheer volume of consistent, high-quality data generated daily by an overwhelming number of domestic users is like oil continuously supplying China's AI capabilities. In terms of talent, China has four times more bachelor's degree holders in STEM fields than the U.S. and approximately twice as many doctoral graduates. Furthermore, Chinese teams consistently dominate top positions, including first place, in international AI competitions (Belfer, 2021). Additionally, China is increasingly showing strength in R&D levels, while U.S. levels have steadily declined. Moreover, China exhibits remarkable strength in other technological fields such as quantum science, biotechnology, and green energy technology. In quantum information science (including quantum computing, quantum communication, and quantum sensing), China's quantum communication surpasses that of the U.S., and in green energy technology, it has solidified its monopoly, surpassing the U.S., which has been a leading inventor for the past two decades. In biotechnology, it is narrowing the gap with the U.S. Given China's rapid advancement in various technological fields, opinions are converging that the U.S. is no longer the global science and technology hegemon.

Secondly, domestic political reasons can also be identified. There is a general consensus among the public that the U.S. economy has suffered significant damage from the trade shock originating from China, often referred to as the 'China Shock' (Autor et al., 2016). The Rust Belt region, in particular, has experienced noticeable job losses and economic damage due to imports from China, contributing to the polarization of economic issues into political and ideological ones. While the U.S. faces the challenge of healing severe divisions, China has grown significantly to rival the U.S. while American manufacturing has declined. Starting from the perception that the asymmetry in trade relations with China has become severe, benefiting only China, the issue has expanded to a consensus that the entire U.S. has suffered immense losses from espionage activities by China in areas such as economics and technology, and these damages can no longer be tolerated.

In summary, considering the trajectory thus far, the next decade will see the U.S. acknowledge China as a 'full-fledged competitor' in economics and security (Eric Schmidt, 2021) and reach the conclusion that it must maintain its superiority and slow China's progress. Notably, there are clear voices of self-reflection suggesting that many Americans still hold outdated views of China and must recognize its potential to surpass the U.S. in the future (NSCAI, 2021). Given that emerging technologies like AI can transform society across the board, including economics, military affairs, and security, failing to lead in this competition could result in formidable competition in economic and military terms. With this calculus, the U.S. aims to reduce its dependence and vulnerabilities in key technologies through reshoring and renewed efforts in domestic technological development, even if it incurs short-term damage to its own economy, thereby restructuring the current order. This includes attempts at short-term decoupling from China, even if not permanent.

For example, in areas like biotechnology utilizing AI, the U.S. is pointing out its significant reliance on China's manufacturing and workforce and is considering decoupling from China in such fields (Rob Carlson, Rik Wehbring, 2020). Similar movements can be observed in the area of human resources. Many agree that it is essential for national security to recognize and prevent threats posed by China's infiltration into U.S. academia through programs like the Thousand Talents Plan, which involves deception, theft, coercion, and compensation (Rory Truex, 2020).

As technological changes occur more rapidly and radically than anticipated, U.S. national security is also evolving. The challenges facing the U.S. today are by no means simple or light. The U.S. is confronted with the challenge of deterring both modern, nuclear-capable China and Russia simultaneously. Preventing the rise of China and solidifying its position as the world's number one is a complex task in itself, but the heightened geopolitical competition triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine adds further security threats, creating a complex security dilemma (Department of Defense, 2022). Considering that both countries are actively pursuing the military application of new technologies, rapid technological changes can significantly alter the security landscape. In this context, a shift is observed in the U.S. towards a declaration of actively utilizing AI technology in defense (NSCAI, 2021). The primary security issue for the U.S. has shifted from counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East following 9/11 to discussions concerning China and Russia. With the core of security shifting to what is known as great power competition (GPC), the importance of geopolitics and grand strategy is being newly emphasized. It goes without saying that the Indo-Pacific region is a priority in the Biden administration's Global Posture Review.

More importantly, the U.S. is mobilizing various resources, led by its commitment to liberal democratic values. It is strengthening partnerships and advanced technology cooperation through initiatives like AUKUS and the Quad, and in the military domain, it is seeking expanded partnerships and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region (DOD News, 2021). The Biden administration, emphasizing the role of alliances, is expected to further accelerate efforts to rally nations that share democratic values (DOD, 2022). This is part of America's 'reglobalization,' which demands a break from authoritarian states and alignment with the U.S. As is well known, South Korea has experienced difficulties caught between the U.S. demand to join the Quad alliance and China's overt hostility towards it. Furthermore, the global community has experienced significant turmoil due to U.S. demands for a ban on Chinese 5G equipment, as seen in the Huawei incident. Recent demands to ban Chinese semiconductor and battery use and relocate key technology factories, which are drawing increasing attention, are all part of the U.S. attempt to reshape global supply chains and its version of reglobalization.

The continuous interest rate hikes by the U.S. since 2022 can also be considered part of reglobalization. This is a powerful weapon wielded by the current global hegemon and issuer of the world's reserve currency, and it can be interpreted as targeting China, which has an extreme level of national debt. Furthermore, the fact that these hikes are not merely short-term but will continue until inflation stabilizes superficially suggests a long-term struggle. The U.S. is attempting to reshape the global value chain (GVC) and rebuild the order in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution through reshoring, relocating key technology factories from China, and accepting domestic losses in the process. Meanwhile, referring to the U.S.'s National Security Strategy (NDS) of October 2022, it mentions that conflict with China is neither desirable nor inevitable, indicating a moderation of pace. However, this is interpreted not as an intention to avoid conflict with China or lower the level of offensive pressure, but rather as an effort to manage strategic competition, pursue cooperation, and adjust the pace to avoid overly radical changes. Given that the U.S. is operating with a long-term plan, as evidenced by its interest rate hike plans, rather than a short-term plan of one to two years, the overall strategy of confronting China will likely continue unchanged.

China's Response

To understand China's current technological rise, it is essential first to grasp the concepts of the 'Chinese Dream' and the 'Two Centenaries.' Since becoming General Secretary in 2012, Xi Jinping has repeatedly articulated the 'Chinese Dream' (Zhongguo Meng), the core of which is the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.' The discussion of the 'Chinese Dream' within China did not originate with Xi Jinping; it existed during Hu Jintao's era as well, though researchers may have varied interpretations. What is clear is that while the 'Chinese Dream' was previously confined to an internal agenda to erase doubts about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and strengthen its legitimacy and continuity, it has now expanded and is being utilized in diverse ways, including improving the living standards of the Chinese people (Hong Geon-sik, 2018). It aims not only for the well-being of its citizens but also to showcase China's influence and confidence on a global scale, encompassing soft power such as institutions, culture, and technology, based on the ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In essence, the current 'Chinese Dream' is a concept at the level of grand strategy with both domestic and international political implications. 7. Prospects for the Indo-Pacific Order in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

In essence, the 'Chinese Dream' emphasized by the current Xi Jinping leadership encompasses the development of Chinese-style socialism, the construction of a moderately prosperous society (Xiaokang), and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The resolve to fulfill the 'Chinese Dream' of becoming the world's strongest nation by 2050 can be seen as a declaration to overcome the setbacks and adversities experienced by the Chinese nation and achieve great rejuvenation by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. The roadmap presented for this is the 'Two Centenaries': the first centenary refers to 2021, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, and the second centenary refers to 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. By 2049, when the Two Centenaries are completed, China aims to achieve the goal of a modernized socialist country centered on national prosperity, national rejuvenation, and people's happiness, thereby restoring its status as a great power. Historically, the CCP has undergone major changes approximately every 30 years. 2 The 30-year period leading up to 2049, as pursued by Xi Jinping, can be considered a testing period for implementing various initiatives by dedicating all national resources towards the grand strategy encapsulated in the 'Chinese Dream.'

In other words, as a driving force for the approximately 25 years leading up to 2049, China emphasizes 'innovation-driven growth,' spearheaded by technology. 'Innovation-driven growth' signifies a transition from traditional manufacturing to high-value-added industries, aiming to boost growth rates by focusing on the Fourth Industrial Revolution as a central pillar, especially as the era of high-speed growth comes to an end and growth slows. China defines the current era, distinct from the previous period of hyper-growth, as the 'New Normal.' While the Xi Jinping leadership explains this as a shift from prioritizing quantitative growth to qualitative growth, they aim to change the paradigm of China's economic structure and growth drivers, which still require high-speed growth, even while defining the present as a new normal. The authorities, who have tied the legitimacy of their rule to high-speed growth, are seeking new logic to sustain this through the concept of the 'New Normal' and are exploring growth drivers that can support their regime. In essence, by betting heavily on advanced technologies such as AI, China aims to avoid the middle-income trap, sustain existing growth, ensure regime stability, and ultimately achieve the status of the world's strongest power by 2049.

China recognizes manufacturing as a core element supporting this objective and has presented strategies such as 'Made in China 2025.' However, China, already at a relative disadvantage compared to manufacturing powerhouses like the U.S., Germany, and Japan in traditional manufacturing sectors, perceives the new technological fields arising from the Fourth Industrial Revolution as an opportunity for a comeback, aiming to compensate for the time lost in previous industrial revolutions. In other words, 'Made in China 2025' is a development strategy for the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plan periods (2016-2025) aimed at fostering advanced manufacturing by integrating manufacturing with information and communication technology. All these goals signify a 'systemic transformation' different from previous industrial development policies. 'Made in China 2025' reflects the will to build a China-centric GVC and network by increasing the localization rate in key technologies such as next-generation information technology, robotics, and automated machine tools. Numerous subsequent measures for various industries, proposed after 'Made in China 2025,' are also aimed at identifying technological development drivers and creating an environment for emerging as a unicorn powerhouse. The government presents clear phased goals and implementation programs and demands the coordinated execution of lower-level components. Specifically, in response to COVID-19, the state actively supported companies in integrating AI technology into epidemic prevention efforts. Policies such as the 'Notice on Services for Epidemic Prevention and Return to Work Utilizing Next-Generation Information Technology Support' have formalized the application of new technologies like AI, big data, and cloud computing to manage the spread of infectious diseases. AI is used for virus gene analysis, disease diagnosis, and vaccine development, as well as for detecting individuals not wearing masks in public places and automatically detecting fevers through thermal imaging and facial recognition, leading to the widespread adoption of digital surveillance systems. Furthermore, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly developing and integrating capabilities in space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and information warfare, in addition to expanding conventional forces. This enhances their overall approach to warfare. Efforts to build robust overseas and infrastructure capabilities are accelerating, along with attempts to modernize and expand nuclear capabilities. AI is perceived as a pathway for China to overcome the U.S.'s traditional military advantage. Consequently, the PLA is funding a wide range of AI-related projects, pursuing R&D in military research institutions, and seeking partnerships with civilian companies (Horowitz, 2018).

Crucially, China is pursuing these initiatives in conjunction with the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI). The BRI, encompassing the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, represents China's westward strategy in response to the U.S. eastward push. China's modern Silk Road, the BRI, has expanded its scope to connect land, sea, space, and digital domains. It promotes cooperation frameworks, including infrastructure connectivity, in regions such as South Asia, ASEAN, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, attempting to expand railway and road networks, internationally connected railways and pipelines, communication infrastructure, and logistics facilities between countries. In this context, China is disseminating AI and communication technologies to BRI-participating countries through the 'Digital Silk Road (DSR)' 4 . For example, in African countries with insufficient capabilities, such as Angola, Zimbabwe, and Uganda, China supports the establishment of facial recognition systems, including the installation of facial recognition cameras nationwide, thereby enhancing governmental political control. Coupled with the rapid growth of the digital economy post-COVID-19, the dissemination of China's technological infrastructure and standards is expected to accelerate.

Meanwhile, China is also securing permission to use ports for military purposes as a condition for providing such infrastructure. Examples include the Hambantota Port and Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Chittagong Port in Bangladesh, Bagamoyo Port in Tanzania, and the port of Aden in Yemen. Simultaneously, it is noteworthy that the locations of the BRI and Chinese arms exports significantly overlap. The number of countries purchasing Chinese weapons has doubled compared to the 1980s, and China became the world's third-largest arms exporter between 2013 and 2017 ('Defense and Technology', 2018). This is an effort to secure energy and build overseas military bases to achieve maritime dominance in the South China Sea and become a maritime power.

4 The Digital Silk Road (DSR) aims to establish communication infrastructure in Phase 1, collaborate on the BeiDou navigation system and quantum computing in Phase 2, and build digital free trade zones and e-commerce systems in Phase 3. In essence, all these endeavors are efforts to secure resource import routes beyond the reach of U.S. maritime control and to consolidate political influence. China is expanding its operational scope, particularly focusing on countries in Asia and Africa that share its authoritarian system and are hesitant to integrate into the U.S.-led order. There is also an opinion that the balance of power in Southeast Asia is gradually tilting towards China, given the recent developments in China's relations in the region (Graham Allison, 2020).

Likely International Order Scenarios in the Age of AI

Decoupling or Cooperation

Attempts to sever the decades-long relationship between the U.S. and China, starting from trade, are evident across various domains, including technology, supply chains, and markets. It is important to note that once initiated, such policies are extremely difficult to reverse due to the accumulation of bilateral political distrust. If the U.S. and China achieve complete decoupling and divide the market, the world will face intense competition over national standards, leading to a loss of interoperability and compatibility across various technologies. Furthermore, the benefits of innovation and cost reduction enjoyed by countries participating in established networks are likely to cease. Ultimately, the competition between the two nations will have far-reaching ripple effects, creating numerous conflicts across all technological domains (Paul Triolo, 2020).

On the other hand, there are signs of recognizing China as an equal partner with capabilities and potential for contribution. This perspective stems from the judgment that China can make significant contributions to the AI ecosystem, given that AI is a technology that transcends borders and is a nascent field with many unknowns (Christine Fox, 2020). It is argued that completely withdrawing from or ignoring collaboration and exchange with China is tantamount to withdrawing from a significant part of the world, including existing U.S. trade and security partners. Simultaneously, it is emphasized that maintaining openness within close networks, reaping the benefits offered by China, and strengthening the U.S. through collaboration in emerging fields are also important (Remco Zwetsloot, 2020). Preventing Chinese students from studying abroad, for instance, is equivalent to forfeiting immense intellectual benefits derived from international collaboration in emerging fields like AI.

Outcome of U.S.-China Competition

The era of AI and the Fourth Industrial Revolution is already an age of abundant, even overwhelming, knowledge. This means the era when the sheer volume of knowledge was a measure of national power has passed. Of course, if we consider only the development of AI itself, China's characteristics may appear advantageous. While various factors contribute to AI development, the most crucial material elements include data and the chips required for AI, while intangible elements include basic research, application capabilities, and reliability. Data, likened to the oil needed to run the car of AI, gives China an undeniable advantage given the vast amount of data generated by its enormous market and population (Lee Kai Fu, 2018). China also excels in application areas, possessing a significant strength in commercialization. Leveraging data from its vast population and domestic market, China is aggressively pursuing commercialization. It is not merely copying existing technologies or services but optimizing them for Chinese users, achieving success. One reason for China's aggressive commercialization efforts is the presence of numerous profit-hungry startups whose ultimate goal is to make money. While the U.S. develops technology based on a pure spirit of innovation, China is relatively uninhibited by cultural norms regarding imitation and responds solely to market demands. This is described as a transition from the 'age of discovery' to the 'age of execution,' where discovered innovations are applied in practice. For these reasons, China itself assesses that it will surpass the U.S. in basic research and innovation (Lee Kai Fu, 2018). 7. Prospects for the Indo-Pacific Order in the Age of Artificial Intelligence However, looking at the coming era of AI utilization, as exemplified by the recently released ChatGPT, it is an age where most knowledge can be easily obtained with just a few keystrokes. Therefore, the previous formula of competing based on quantity may not be effective.

In the upcoming era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and AI, where knowledge is not just abundant but saturated, creativity will be the key differentiator. This seems to diverge significantly from the 'Chinese characteristics' that China consistently emphasizes. The development of AI in China is largely driven by profit-hungry startups engaged in superficial applications, endlessly churning out simple applications and executions (Christine Fox, 2020). This is because fundamental innovations related to AI are based on basic research and development. Image generation, strategy games, and language understanding and generation, for example, stem from basic research rather than superficial applications or instrumental execution. Furthermore, considering the nature of AI, it is inherently a technology that cannot be confined within national borders. Its structure inherently favors creativity and openness. This is why China's ultimate alignment with the era dominated by AI and the Fourth Industrial Revolution is difficult. While China's emphasis on Chinese-style development paths, Chinese characteristics, and unique Chinese values may be effective in some authoritarian countries or those influenced by Confucian cultural discourse, it is likely to be less persuasive in many countries that share liberal democratic cultures, considering that intangible assets such as social systems, ideologies, social atmosphere, political democratization, intellectual capacity, and culture are the driving forces of society in the future.

Furthermore, a key factor will be the willingness and ability of participating countries in the networks being formed by each nation to provide public goods and bear the costs of management. China is continuously attempting to build networks that counter the U.S., such as the BRI. However, the restrictive aid provided by China, with high interest rates in exchange for infrastructure construction, is likely to exacerbate the crisis situations of participating countries. Given that many countries participating in the BRI are already economically or politically unstable, problems are arising, such as liquidity shortages as loan repayment deadlines approach, especially when their finances were already precarious. As seen with Pakistan's emergency bailout request, the departure of many financially weak countries, such as Malaysia and Sri Lanka, may accelerate. At this juncture, the willingness and ability to bear management costs, such as providing liquidity to participating countries, will be crucial for maintaining China-centric networks. However, if the U.S.'s long-term interest rate hikes, as the issuer of the key currency, continue, China's capacity will inevitably weaken. If China is struggling to resolve its own national debt, managing countries within its BRI-constructed network will be an insurmountable challenge. The U.S. hub-and-spoke system was not formed overnight. It was solidified over a long period, from the two World Wars and the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, during which it provided public goods to countries incorporated into its network and bore the costs associated with crisis management, resolution, and satisfaction adjustment. In an era where the movement and speed of information, driven by AI and the Fourth Industrial Revolution, are accelerating, the willingness and ability to bear these management costs are clearly essential for any country to rival or surpass the U.S.

Conclusion

Competition in cutting-edge technology fields, led by artificial intelligence, is likely to manifest differently from traditional international political competition. Given its nature as a driver technology and a general-purpose technology, its impact is not linear and is interconnected across various fields, requiring a comprehensive perspective. Furthermore, as the U.S. containment of China has now fully begun, examining the evolving international political reality in the age of AI and the outcome of the U.S.-style reglobalization that the U.S. is attempting to construct is essential for Indo-Pacific nations, which are experiencing the severe repercussions of this conflict, to prepare their strategic postures. Given the inherently open nature of AI technology, a crucial question will be whether the characteristics of the countries utilizing this technology align with it. For China, which adheres to digital totalitarianism represented by the Great Firewall, this presents a difficult challenge. As the age of AI emphasizes creativity, China's previous formula of competing based on quantity is unlikely to be effective. Moreover, with the U.S. interest rate hikes expected to continue for an extended period, it is difficult to foresee positively China's ability and willingness to avoid the middle-income trap and bear the management costs for BRI participating countries. Therefore, the future of the Indo-Pacific order will depend on how these dynamics unfold.

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