The Role of Tsushima in Joseon-Japan Relations

The 21st Century Sarangbang Prepares for a Turbulent East Asia: The Youth of Sarangbang Embrace Kyushu

Kim Yu-jin Korea University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: February 10, 2020

Museum of Korean-Japanese Exchange · Kim Yu-jin · Korea University

Introduction

In the grand currents of change in East Asia during the 16th and 17th centuries, Joseon and Japan made choices that led to vastly different outcomes. The divergence began around the time of the Imjin War in 1592. Japan gradually began to attempt to break away from the existing world order based on its own perceptions of self-rule, and subsequently, through the Meiji Restoration, it actively embraced Western civilization and emerged as a new regional power. In contrast, Joseon, failing to accurately perceive the changed power dynamics after the Imjin War, instead pursued a 'Lesser China' (Sojunghwa) and sought to inherit the existing world order. As the goals pursued by the two nations were entirely different, they could not help but misunderstand and look down upon each other as they walked separate paths. The numerous conflicts, large and small, that persisted between the two countries after the Imjin War may have been foreshadowed from this period. Tsushima Island played a mediating role in the relationship between Joseon and Japan, which began to diverge in this manner. From the perspective of modern nation-states, Tsushima, merely an island belonging to Japan, receiving official positions from both Joseon and Japan and exclusively dominating bilateral exchange, feels remarkably novel within the communication system of the time. This illustrates that pre-modern territorial concepts possess a duality or dual attribution of being both inside and outside the boundary (Ha Woo-bong 2013, 216). The presence of a mediator connecting the inside and outside is crucial, and Tsushima served this role between Joseon and Japan. Japan's national integration was weak until the end of the Sengoku period by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and the establishment of the Edo Shogunate centered around Tokyo by Tokugawa Ieyasu. Consequently, Tsushima, located in the border region between Joseon and Japan, was able to act as a mediator for both countries, not being subordinate to Joseon and maintaining a semi-independent character in relation to Japan. Therefore, the role of Tsushima in the study of Joseon-Japan relations cannot be overlooked.

This field report aims to explore the mediating role of Tsushima in Joseon-Japan relations. First, we will examine the fundamental reasons why Tsushima was needed as a mediating entity by Joseon and Japan. Furthermore, focusing on the incident of forging official documents that greatly contributed to the conclusion of the Giyu Treaty immediately after the Imjin War, we will analyze the vested interests that led Joseon and Japan to tacitly approve it despite knowing about it. 5. The Role of Tsushima in Joseon-Japan Relations

Review of Existing Research and Necessity of the Study

Existing research on the relationship between Joseon and Japan has been named 'Joseon-Japan Relations History' and studied through a bilateral framework at the level of modern nation-states. Consequently, despite Tsushima's significant role in the early modern diplomatic system, research on Tsushima has been limited to studies of Joseon-Japan relations focused on the Joseon Tongsinsa (official envoy) or the Waegwan (Japanese trading post). (Jang Soon-soon 2013, 16)

Studies that have Tsushima as a primary subject of analysis in Joseon-Japan relations include the papers by Ha Woo-bong, Min Deok-gi, and Hong Seong-deok published in the Journal of Northeast Asian History, Vol. 41. Ha Woo-bong (2013) explored the changes in Joseon's and Japan's perceptions of Tsushima from the early medieval period to the late Joseon Dynasty. Here, Joseon's perception of Tsushima is divided into the 'Tsushima-gotō consciousness' (belief that Tsushima was historically our land), the 'Tsushima-byeongbyeong consciousness' (viewing Tsushima as Joseon's eastern border), and the 'Tsushima-gubun consciousness' (seeing Tsushima as distinct from mainland Japan). While the tributary relationship with Tsushima during the Goryeo Dynasty and the subjugation of Tsushima during King Sejong's reign of Joseon reinforced the Tsushima-gotō consciousness, it later shifted to the Tsushima-byeongbyeong consciousness and Tsushima-gubun consciousness as Tsushima was considered territorially part of Japan but politically part of Joseon. However, with Japan's diplomatic unification measures based on strengthened national integration, the distinction between mainland Japan and Tsushima became meaningless. Min Deok-gi (2013) explored Tsushima's diplomatic efforts with Joseon, dividing the period into before, during, and after the Imjin War. He argued that Tsushima's efforts were for Tsushima itself, not for mainland Japan, aiming to maintain exclusive trade rights with Joseon and avoid military conscription. He also suggested that Tokugawa Ieyasu, anticipating Tsushima's forgery of official documents, utilized it to maintain his domestic prestige while requesting peace with Joseon.

Toby (1991) and Lewis (2003) provide detailed accounts of the development of the Tsushima document forgery incident. However, Toby (1991) posited that the perpetrators of the forgery were Tsushima lord Sō Yoshitori and his diplomatic advisor Kenzo, while Lewis (2003) assumed that the perpetrators were Yanagawa Shigeyoki, a retainer of the Sō clan of Tsushima.

Furthermore, there is a divergence of opinion between Korean and Japanese scholars regarding whether Joseon-Japan relations in the late Joseon period were relations between states or between a state and a region. Japanese researchers view Joseon diplomacy up to the 'Yanagawa Ikken' (Tsushima document forgery incident) as Tsushima's independent action, while Korean researchers believe it reflected the intentions of Tokugawa Ieyasu, the de facto ruler of the Edo Shogunate. (Hong Seong-deok 2013, 138)

However, there is a lack of research fundamentally explaining why Tsushima came to play such a mediating role and the vested interests through which Joseon and Japan tacitly accepted Tsushima's moral laxity based on that role. This field report seeks to identify the origins of Tsushima's mediating role in its geographical advantages and the issue of Wako (Japanese pirates) and to supplement this by examining the Tsushima document forgery incident in detail. 5. The Role of Tsushima in Joseon-Japan Relations

Research Methods and Materials

This report analyzes the perceptions and responses of Tsushima, Joseon, and Japan revealed in the Tsushima document forgery incident, focusing on key Joseon sources such as the 'Annals of the Joseon Dynasty' and key Japanese sources such as the 'Yanagawa Shigeyoshi Kuji Kiroku' (Record of Yanagawa Shigeyoshi's Official Business). The analysis will reference Yi Yong-hee's third period of Joseon-Japan perceptions. Additionally, secondary sources written from a third-party perspective, including G. McCune, R. Toby, and J. B. Lewis, will be consulted to incorporate diverse viewpoints.

Formation of Tsushima's Mediating Role

The communication system in which Tsushima mediated exchanges between Joseon and Japan appears to have been formed due to ① geographical advantages considering transportation and ② the issue of Wako. Tsushima is located approximately 49.5 km from the Korean Peninsula and about 82 km from mainland Japan (Kyushu) (however, the closest Japanese island is about 47.5 km away). Considering Tsushima's geographical advantages, it is natural and efficient for Japan, which sought to interact with Joseon through Tsushima due to its position in the changing world order and its efforts to communicate with China via Joseon, to establish Tsushima as a mediator for Joseon-Japan exchanges.

However, given that Joseon had already been directly exchanging envoys with distant China for a long time, it is difficult to argue that geographical advantages alone helped Joseon accept Tsushima's mediating role. To understand Joseon's interests, it is necessary to consider the difference between land and sea transportation. For the Joseon Tongsinsa missions, the distance between Hanyang (Seoul) and Nikko (where Tokugawa Ieyasu's shrine is located) is approximately 2,000 km, taking about 10-12 months one way. (The Dong-a Ilbo 2014) In contrast, the distance between Hanyang and Beijing, China, where envoys from Joseon and the Ming Dynasty traveled, is about 1,500 km, taking about 3 months one way. Interestingly, despite the distance between Seoul-Nikko and Seoul-Beijing differing by only about 1.3 times, the travel time differs by 3-4 times. This is due to the difference between sea and land routes. After the Ming Dynasty moved its capital from Nanjing to Beijing, until the Liaodong region was blocked by the Later Jin in the 17th century, envoys from the Ming and Joseon traveled by land. However, for the Joseon Tongsinsa to travel to Japan, they had to use sea, river, and land routes. The sea route was longer than the land route and carried a greater risk of shipwreck and drowning. (Heo Kyung-jin 2009, 72) This is well illustrated in 'Haesaro' by Kim Se-ryeom, one of the 'Haengchongjae' (officials in charge of sea voyages) of the Tongsinsa missions.

After traveling over a hundred li, the north wind turned into an east wind, and upon reaching the crest of the waves (Sujong),

the wind grew fiercer. The waves rose like mountains, causing severe rocking; when rising, it felt like ascending to heaven, and

when falling, it felt like plunging into the earth. Looking at other boats,

their undersides were exposed when they rose, and their mast tips were visible when they sank. Everyone on board was dizzy, falling, and vomiting,

and even the rowers collapsed between the oars, losing consciousness. 5. The Role of Tsushima in Joseon-Japan Relations

The oarsmen also collapsed between the oars, losing consciousness. (Omitted) When Pyeongseongchun and others drifted away, the Japanese sailors worried. The main ship's hull was broken by the waves,

and the sake and honey bottles inside the ship collided and all broke. It was the first time crossing the sea, and suddenly encountering a strong, unfavorable wind, the ship nearly capsized, but upon reaching the shore, everyone celebrated their survival.

The sailors worried when Pyeongseongchun and others drifted away. The hull of the main ship was broken by the waves,

The sake and honey bottles inside the ship collided and all broke. It was the first time crossing the sea, and suddenly encountering a strong, unfavorable wind, the ship nearly capsized, but upon reaching the shore, everyone celebrated their survival.

It was the first time crossing the sea, and suddenly encountering a strong, unfavorable wind, the ship nearly capsized, but upon reaching the shore, everyone celebrated their survival.

Upon reaching the shore, everyone celebrated their survival.

Everyone celebrated their survival.

As sea travel was significantly affected by weather and waves, and if the weather was unfavorable, one had to wait at the anchorage until it improved. Considering this, even for Joseon, which did not use mediators in its diplomacy with other countries, it would have been a less burdensome route to interact with Japan through Tsushima.

Furthermore, the issue of Wako played a significant role in Tsushima's identity as a 'mediator' in Joseon-Japan relations. Tsushima began to actively engage in exchanges with the Korean Peninsula in the late 12th century, during the Goryeo Dynasty. After Silla destroyed Baekje, which had close ties with Japan, trade between the Korean Peninsula and Japan completely ceased, and this impact continued into the Goryeo period. Nevertheless, Tsushima initiated exchanges with the Korean Peninsula, starting with the exchange of castaways, and began to arrange trade between the Korean Peninsula and western Japan. The trade during this period is called 'Jinbongseon Trade' (Tribute Ship Trade), an official trade system with the format of diplomatic rituals as a tributary trade. The Jinbongseon Trade, through which Tsushima maintained trade with Goryeo despite the absence of official diplomatic relations between Goryeo and Japan, and the fact that the Tsushima lord received a Goryeo official position, are evaluated as symbols of Tsushima's semi-independence. (Ha Woo-bong 2013, 221)

However, when the Yuan Dynasty invaded Goryeo, and a peace treaty was concluded between Goryeo and Yuan, and the combined Goryeo-Yuan forces invaded Japan, the Jinbongseon Trade system was interrupted. Having lost its trade routes, the people of Tsushima turned into Wako. This was because Tsushima's economic structure, with its small population and terrain unsuitable for agriculture, could only survive through trade. (Toby

The Wako, who invaded and plundered the southern regions of the Korean Peninsula seasonally, threatening the existence of Goryeo, turned into Wako. There are records of Goryeo sending envoys to Japan to demand a resolution to the Wako problem, even though there were no diplomatic relations between Goryeo and Japan, and it is known that the Japanese shogunate at the time also suffered immense damage due to its inability to control the Wako.

1991, 26) The Wako, who invaded and plundered the southern regions of the Korean Peninsula seasonally, threatening the existence of Goryeo, turned into Wako. There are records of Goryeo sending envoys to Japan to demand a resolution to the Wako problem, even though there were no diplomatic relations between Goryeo and Japan, and it is known that the Japanese shogunate at the time also suffered immense damage due to its inability to control the Wako.

Therefore, Joseon, which succeeded Goryeo, made continuous efforts from its early days to manage the Wako problem and stabilize the southern regions. A notable example is King Sejong's dispatch of Yi Jong-mu in 1419 to conquer Tsushima to eradicate the Wako strongholds. Joseon's proactive Wako management policy led to the brutal pirates engaging in trade. Tsushima lord Sō Sadashige actively cooperated with Joseon's Wako policy, enabling communication with Joseon 82 times, and based on this, strengthened his control over Tsushima. (Ha Woo-bong 2013, 225) In other words, Joseon and Japan, by assigning the role of 'diplomatic mediator' to Tsushima, which had a dependent economic structure and difficulty in self-sufficiency, sought to jointly manage it and resolve the troublesome Wako issue.

The Tsushima Document Forgery Incident

Before the Imjin War, Tsushima was concerned about how to dilute Toyotomi Hideyoshi's intention to invade Joseon and China and prevent war. In fact, in 1587, Tsushima lord Sō Yoshishige sent Yanagawa Shigenobu to present tribute to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Yanagawa Shigenobu proposed to Hideyoshi a plan to receive tribute from Joseon instead of invading it. These attempts bought time for Hideyoshi to postpone his decision to invade, but as Joseon did not offer tribute and subsequent negotiations failed, Hideyoshi ordered the Kyushu daimyo to construct Nagoya Castle, where the Museum of Korean-Japanese Exchange is currently located. In 1592, 160,000 Japanese troops departed from Nagoya Castle for Joseon, and the Imjin War, which Tsushima had tried to prevent, broke out.

After the Imjin War, Tsushima sought ways to resume the severed relations through the dispatch of the Tongsinsa. Japan's official efforts for peace negotiations began in 1598 when Tokugawa Ieyasu ordered the Tsushima lord to resume exchanges with Joseon. Tsushima requested peace by returning prisoners of war, but Joseon refused, citing Ming's opposition.

Tsushima's document forgery occurred twice in this context of stalled Joseon-Japan peace negotiations. Joseon, which had been refusing negotiation requests, finally presented two preconditions in 1606 for resuming diplomatic relations with Japan. First, Japan was to send an official government document addressing Tokugawa Ieyasu as 'King of Japan' and request the dispatch of the Tongsinsa. Second, the Japanese soldiers who had desecrated the tombs of King Seongjong and King Jungjong were to be handed over. However, this could imply that Japan was admitting defeat in the war, and the expression 'King of Japan' referred to a king enfeoffed by China, making it unlikely for Japan to accept these conditions. Consequently, Tsushima lord Sō Yoshitoshi and his diplomatic advisor Kenzo forged a letter stating 'King of Japan' and sent a substitute for the grave robbers to Joseon. (Toby 1991, 31) However, there is also a claim that Yanagawa Shigeyoki, a retainer of the Sō clan, led this forgery. (Lewis 2003)

As a result, when Joseon's envoy for reply and repatriation visited Japan, the forgery was on the verge of being exposed, so they forged the letter one more time. The original content of the letter Joseon brought was to the effect that 'Japan initiated the Imjin War, which insulted even the late king's tomb, making it impossible to live under the same sky, but since your country sent a letter of inquiry and corrected its mistakes, we respond with such goodwill.' However, the Tsushima lord altered the expression 'Bongbok' (meaning replying to a letter) to 'Bongseo' (meaning sending a letter first), implying that Joseon requested the diplomatic exchange first, and changed it to state that 'Joseon requests the diplomatic exchange first.' (The Dong-a Ilbo 2015)

Tsushima's desperate efforts to resume diplomatic relations between Joseon and Japan were influenced not only by Tsushima's aforementioned trade-dependent economic structure but also by the internal political situation in Japan. Konishi Yukinaga, the father-in-law of Tsushima lord Sō Yoshitoshi, was defeated by Tokugawa Ieyasu in the Battle of Sekigahara, which occurred during the power struggle among the daimyo after Toyotomi Hideyoshi's death. Yoshitoshi, who had sided with his father-in-law, feared purge after Ieyasu seized power and even went so far as to divorce his wife, Maria Konishi. This suggests that Yoshitoshi likely predicted Ieyasu's desire to resume diplomatic relations with Joseon and strove to achieve this to gain favor with Ieyasu. The Annals of King Seonjo also record the statements of officials who observed that the Tsushima lord was desperately trying to establish diplomatic relations with Joseon because Yukinaga had been defeated by Tokugawa Ieyasu in the Battle of Sekigahara.

Ping Jo-shin (平調信) and Ping Ui-ji (平義智) are both vassals under Ieyasu's influence

and are eager to establish peace with our country, which is

intended to curry favor with Ieyasu. Since the Shin-chuk year (1601), they have repeatedly traveled back and forth, pleading and threatening, employing every possible tactic. After Ping Jo-shin's death, they have become even more persistent in revealing their malicious intent, resorting to threats and coercion.

They have employed every possible tactic, pleading and threatening. After Ping Jo-shin's death, they have become even more persistent in revealing their malicious intent, resorting to threats and coercion.

After Ping Jo-shin's death, they have become even more persistent in revealing their malicious intent, resorting to threats and coercion.

Therefore, it is clear that they have been manipulating the situation from the middle, and it is unlikely that Japan is involved and aware of this.

It is clear that they have been manipulating the situation from the middle, and it is unlikely that Japan is involved and aware of this.

It is unlikely that Japan is involved and aware of this.

Shim Hui-su, the Second State Councilor of Joseon, also surmised that Tsushima's attempt to resume diplomatic relations between Joseon and Japan by combining requests and threats, and even by fabricating official letters, was to win favor with Tokugawa Ieyasu and not the will of the Edo Shogunate. 5. The Role of Tsushima in Joseon-Japan Relations

The prohibition of trade between Joseon and Tsushima, as long as diplomatic relations were not resumed, also had an impact. In response to Tsushima's efforts towards Joseon, Joseon declared in 1604 that 'Tsushima's efforts towards Joseon are commendable, and therefore, Tsushima will not be differentiated from Japan and its trade will not be cut off.' At this time, they promised to allow trade in Busan for Tsushima, but this was meaningless for Tsushima as Ieyasu did not permit Tsushima to pursue trade unless the Joseon Tongsinsa was dispatched to mainland Japan.

Reasons Why Joseon Had to Tacitly Approve Tsushima's Document Forgery

Reasons

Due to Tsushima's document forgery, Joseon and Japan engaged in peace negotiations without their intentions being properly reflected. This was a very serious issue that could be considered 'deception' under the current international law, a cause for treaty invalidation. Especially from Joseon's perspective, it would have been difficult to trust Tsushima any further, given that the Tsushima lord, whom they considered a vassal, had led the vanguard in the Imjin War following his father-in-law Konishi Yukinaga, and had sent false perpetrators of the desecration of the former king's tomb. This sentiment of Joseon is also evident in the punishments imposed in the Giyu Treaty, concluded through the forged documents, which included reducing Tsushima's annual tribute ships and prohibiting their entry into Seoul. Joseon suspected the forgery because the letter sent by Tsushima used the Ming calendar (明曆), contained a tone that did not reject Sinocentrism, and the substitutes sent as desecrators were too young. (Toby 1991, 31) It is presumed that Joseon was able to quickly grasp these clues because it was important for Japan to conform to the world order. However, Joseon lacked the capacity to deal with another invasion following the Imjin and Jeongyu Wars, and based on its perception of looking down on Tsushima, it accepted Tsushima's efforts to forge documents as a justifiable reason for tacit approval. This can be confirmed by the discussions between King Seonjo and his officials regarding the handling of this issue in the Annals of King Seonjo.

It has already been eight to nine years since the enemy retreated and the territory was recovered.

Even after years have passed, looking around, there is no preparation for conquest.

We are wasting time idly, and it has become worse than the previous year of the Shinmyo (2012), growing weaker with each passing day.

It has become worse than the previous year of the Shinmyo (2012), growing weaker with each passing day.

Therefore, it is only natural that the pirates of Tsushima, knowing our country's lack of defenses, would become even more presumptuous and insulting.

Seeing that the situation has reached this point, the authority to control matters lies with them, not with us. Thus, even if the one who controls Japan is not Kang (Tokugawa Ieyasu),

it is unavoidable to first seek relations with them as a policy for the people. (Omitted) Shedding tears, I cannot but implement the plan to marry my daughter off to the state of Wu today. Ah,

it is unavoidable to first seek relations with them as a policy for the people. (Omitted) Shedding tears, I cannot but implement the plan to marry my daughter off to the state of Wu today. Ah, Role of Tsushima in Joseon-Japan Relations

my heart aches.

From the words of Left State Councilor Shim Hee-su, it can be known that Joseon viewed Tsushima's forgery of the state letter as an act of 'mocking' Joseon. Despite this, Joseon recognized the inevitability of resuming diplomatic relations with Japan due to its insufficient military power and the 'authority to mediate' that had been transferred to Japan. Shim Hee-su's reasoning was also based on the fact that even after Tsushima sent a letter regretting the war and presented Joseon prisoners, claiming it was the will of mainland Japan, there was not a single letter of credence. Therefore, while suspecting Tsushima's forgery of the state letter, Shim Hee-su argued for stalling by telling the Tsushima side that Joseon would report the matter to China and observe their reaction.

Indeed, barbarians are like beasts, and when a sovereign deals with them, he must never disappoint them. Is this something they do willingly?

Is this something they do willingly?

If friendly relations are lost once, they will fiercely take up arms and advance, and it is not only a concern that our millions of people will suffer unspeakable damage, but it will also greatly affect the security of the ancestral shrines and the state, and on a smaller scale, it will lead to decades of continuous warfare. How can the events in between be fully described in words?

(Omitted) If we now send him back in custody and reprimand him, saying he is not the real culprit, and immediately show our anger, will Gyuljijeong truly confess, or will he calmly bring another captured enemy and offer him without a word?

If we now send him back in custody and reprimand him, saying he is not the real culprit, and immediately show our anger, will Gyuljijeong truly confess, or will he calmly bring another captured enemy and offer him without a word?

He will surely make a fuss and shout loudly. Furthermore, if we do not accept him and question him, we will not be able to deal with Gyuljijeong afterwards, and the envoy will not be able to cross over, leading to many difficulties.

Since the Japanese pirates have already used the pretext of capturing and presenting a fake culprit, it is not possible to scheme with beasts by feigning sincerity or insincerity.

If we do not punish them but only kill them, and do not perform the ceremony of presenting captives, we will naturally be free from suspicion even if we are deceived, and it will be a hostile act. However, we must proceed with careful consideration.

We must proceed with careful consideration.

Looking at King Seonjo's words regarding the treatment of royal tomb robbers, he spoke in a tone that dismissed Tsushima and Japan as barbarians and beasts, implying that Joseon, as the 'emperor,' should understand their actions. This period corresponds to the third phase in Lee Yong-hee's periodization of Korean-Japanese relations, and it clearly reveals Joseon's cultural contempt for Japan and Tsushima, as well as the humiliation of being invaded. Furthermore, while anticipating that pressing Tsushima about the forged state letter would lead to military pressure from Tsushima and Japan, 5. The Role of Tsushima in Joseon-Japan Relations: Joseon perceived Tsushima's forgery of the state letter and the escort of fake tomb robbers as a kind of justification for maintaining peace in Joseon. Joseon learned of the Battle of Sekigahara from Tsushima and believed that the Japanese shogunate would prioritize internal stability over external expansion. Joseon thought that if it responded to the resumption of diplomatic relations, armed conflict could be avoided. (Toby 1991. 27)

Reasons why Japan could not help but condone Tsushima's forgery of diplomatic correspondence

From the perspective of the Japanese shogunate, it must have been difficult to forgive Tsushima, as Joseon had accepted conditions that were absolutely unacceptable to the shogunate. Nevertheless, Japan also made a seemingly irrational choice by condoning Tsushima's forgery of the state letter and entrusting Tsushima with diplomatic responsibilities once more.

From Japan's perspective, the reasons for needing to resume diplomatic relations with Joseon were largely political. For Tokugawa Ieyasu, who established the Edo shogunate, restoring relations with Joseon was a process of concluding Hideyoshi's failed war and a way to demonstrate his legitimacy to the remaining opposition forces within Japan. However, at the same time, Ieyasu found it difficult to formally request a peace treaty with Joseon due to concerns about his domestic prestige. For this reason, Ieyasu ordered Tsushima to mediate the peace negotiations as before. Tsushima also emphasized to Joseon that Tokugawa Ieyasu was different from Toyotomi Hideyoshi when requesting a peace treaty.

Furthermore, I hear that Kang (Tokugawa Ieyasu) has never sent a single soldier across the sea, and that he does everything contrary to the so-called policies of Sukiyil (Toyotomi Hideyoshi).

Unlike Joseon, which quickly detected Tsushima's forgery of the state letter, Japan only became aware of it later when Yanagawa Buzen Shigeoki sued the shogunate, claiming that Sadō (Sado Island) was involved in communication between Japan and Joseon. This lawsuit, which occurred in 1631, 22 years after the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Kiyu Treaty in 1609, is known as the 'Yanagawa Ikken' and was a lawsuit between Sō Yoshinori, who succeeded Sō Yoshitoshi (the instigator of the state letter forgery) as the lord of Tsushima, and Yanagawa Buzen Shigeoki. The details of the lawsuit are thoroughly recorded in the 'Yanagawa Shigeoki Kujiroku' (Record of Yanagawa Shigeoki's Lawsuit).

On the 30th, Oinokami (大炊頭) summoned Furukawa Umanosuke and ordered him,

saying, "If travel between Japan and Joseon is suspended during this lawsuit, Joseon will become suspicious. Therefore, it is the shogun's will that one envoy from each side be sent to prevent Joseon from becoming suspicious."

The Japanese Edo shogunate was unaware that Joseon had detected Tsushima's forgery of the state letter. Therefore, the Japanese ruling power's suspension of travel between Japan and Joseon, considering the Yanagawa Ikken, can be interpreted as hesitation to inform Joseon about the forgery of the state letter. Furthermore, sending a letter of understanding to Joseon shows that they did not want to damage relations with Joseon, regardless of the forgery of the state letter.

During the lawsuit, Sō Yoshinori claimed that the alteration of the state letter occurred during the time of his predecessor, Sō Yoshitoshi, and that he was too young at the time to have known about it. He further argued that his retainers, the Yanagawa family, were responsible for the practical affairs of communication with Joseon and had therefore unilaterally led the forgery of the state letter. Conversely, Yanagawa Shigeoki argued that the Sō clan, the lords of Tsushima, had been forging state letters for a long time and that he had merely followed orders. Since Toby (1991) and Lewis (2003) also have differing assessments regarding who was responsible for the forgery of the state letter, it will be difficult to ascertain who the true culprit was. However, Yoshinori won the lawsuit, and Shigeoki was punished. This is clearly demonstrated in the letter Yoshinori sent to Joseon after the lawsuit concluded.

In recent years, Buzen has plotted unjust acts, violated the principles of lord and vassal, and

and has also submitted various proposals regarding communication with Joseon. (Omitted)

The trial in Edo Castle revealed all the facts clearly.

Therefore, I was found innocent and my authority over the island (Tsushima) was recognized. In particular, I was ordered to continue managing communication with Joseon as before.

Buzen committed many wrongs arbitrarily concerning Joseon,

and was punished with exile to a distant place. (Omitted) The investigation was thorough and concluded consistently, and matters related to Joseon remain unchanged, which I find satisfactory. Therefore,

(Omitted) The investigation was thorough and concluded consistently, and matters related to Joseon remain unchanged, which I find satisfactory. Therefore,

I have been ordered to send a dispatch ship according to precedent to promote communication between Japan and Joseon as before. In the future, Joseon should also uphold the way of sincerity and trust.

I believe it is important. I wish you all the best in everything.

Consequently, the Sō clan of Tsushima was officially recognized for its special role in mediating diplomacy between Joseon and the Edo shogunate. The Yanagawa Shigeoki Kuji Kioku (Record of the Interrogation of Yanagawa Shigeoki) contains detailed records of the interrogations of the involved parties, but it did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the Sō clan was not involved in the forgery of the state letter. Considering this, it is reasonable to conclude that the outcome of Yanagawa Ikken's trial was the result of a political decision by the Japanese ruling powers. However, to prevent similar incidents from recurring, the Edo shogunate sent monks from Kyoto to Tsushima to supervise and ensure that diplomacy between Joseon and the Edo shogunate was conducted properly. (Lewis 2003. 22) By this time, about twenty years had passed since the state letter forgery incident, and relations with Joseon had stabilized; the shogunate did not wish to jeopardize this and likely valued the expertise of the Sō clan, which had been responsible for diplomatic relations with Joseon for a long time. Despite Shigeoki being a major offender, the fact that he received a sentence of exile rather than being forced to commit ritual suicide further supports the notion that Ikken's decision was politically motivated.

However, the Edo shogunate's desire for stable communication with Joseon was not necessarily to conform to the world order as Joseon intended. According to the preparatory documents written to respond to the questions and answers with the Shogun by envoys who visited Joseon after Ikken, there are several passages that demonstrate Japan's assertion of its own sovereignty.

Joseon asked, “Regarding the Joseon envoy’s letter referring to the Japanese Shogun as ‘Taegun (大君)’,

does this refer to the name (御名) or the title (御位)? It seems I have not heard of this before.”

Regarding ‘Taegun (大君)’, I have not heard of it, and I do not know what it was before. Joseon does not have detailed knowledge of Japan's situation. If Tsushima no Kami writes the Japanese Shogun as Taegun, it should be accepted as is.

I have not heard of it, and I do not know what it was before. Joseon does not have detailed knowledge of Japan's situation. If Tsushima no Kami writes the Japanese Shogun as Taegun, it should be accepted as is.

Joseon does not have detailed knowledge of Japan's situation. If Tsushima no Kami writes the Japanese Shogun as Taegun, it should be accepted as is.

If Tsushima no Kami writes the Japanese Shogun as Taegun, it should be accepted as is.

Although Tsushima no Kami is ignorant, the monks who drafted the state letter would not have made such an error. Furthermore, as you are aware, there were many instances where Yanagawa Buzen privately handled matters without Tsushima no Kami's knowledge in our communications with your country. This time, Tsushima no Kami has paid special attention to the matter with the drafters and subordinates, so there is no room for doubt.

As you are aware, there were many instances where Yanagawa Buzen privately handled matters without Tsushima no Kami's knowledge in our communications with your country. This time, Tsushima no Kami has paid special attention to the matter with the drafters and subordinates, so there is no room for doubt.

This time, Tsushima no Kami has paid special attention to the matter with the drafters and subordinates, so there is no room for doubt.

Regarding the question, “Nowadays, unlike in the past, the era name (年號) is not included in the state letter. What is the reason for this?”

The inclusion of the era name in the past was a mistake according to Tsushima no Kami's judgment. Originally, Japan is not a vassal of China. Japan also has its own Son of Heaven, and its official titles, names, and era names are used independently, so the era names of foreign countries are not recorded. Even if Joseon and Tsushima no Kami did not communicate, there would be no violation of the Japanese Way.

Originally, Japan is not a vassal of China. Japan also has its own Son of Heaven, and its official titles, names, and era names are used independently, so the era names of foreign countries are not recorded. Even if Joseon and Tsushima no Kami did not communicate, there would be no violation of the Japanese Way.

Even if Joseon and Tsushima no Kami did not communicate, there would be no violation of the Japanese Way.

There would be no violation of the Japanese Way.

This exchange of questions and answers shows that despite the Tsushima Letter forgery incident, Japan insisted on the title 'Great Country' (大君, Daegun) that it had originally desired, and sought to use its own era name instead of the Ming era name. Japan, which had been at the center of the world order, was gradually moving towards the outside of the world order.

Joseon's reaction to this is also interesting. Joseon responded to the Japanese side that they were already aware of the Tsushima Letter forgery and were willing to accept any revisions to the bilateral relationship that might result from it. Furthermore, they reacted as if the outcome of the Ken-ken (一見, Itken) was a natural result, favorable to the Tsushima lord's family, and agreed with the Shogunate's position.

Without knowing what was happening in Joseon, Buzen mentioned it privately.

It is said that this happened several times. Regarding such matters, Joseon 5. The Role of Tsushima in Joseon-Japan Relations

Buzen had been handling matters privately for several years without informing Tsushima no Kami.

It was known that he had handled matters privately.

Therefore, even if the current Tsushima no Kami judged the previous actions to be wrong and corrected them,

Joseon would not say otherwise.

(Omitted) He said, "There is no good fortune for those who make their lord an enemy and are unfilial to their parents. Everyone knows that Yanagawa, a subordinate of Tsushima no Kami, is such a person. He lied to kill his lord. It is natural that Buzen became like this."

There is no good fortune for those who make their lord an enemy and are unfilial to their parents. Tsushima no Kami's subordinate

Yanagawa is known even in foreign countries. He intended to kill his lord.

He lied. It is natural that Buzen became like this."

Regarding Bocho-ro (the letter from Buzen to Joseon), he said, "Since Buzen agreed to it, this

was also contrary to principle."

From this, it can be inferred that although Joseon and Japan recognized that each had different objectives—adherence to and departure from the world order, respectively—they chose to maintain diplomatic relations for practical benefits. In this context, under the favorable atmosphere between the two countries regarding the handling of the Tsushima Letter forgery incident, preparations for the regular visits of the Joseon Tongsinsa (Communication Envoys) to Japan began rapidly.

Last year, the Roju sent a letter, and the reply to Joseon

was handled by Tsushima no Kami this time, in accordance with the Shogunate's intentions.

This reply has no issues, so it would be appropriate to report this and request the Tongsinsa, but

if I deliver it, the Tongsinsa will be delayed, so I request it urgently.

If asked about the envoy requesting the Tongsinsa, "We will cross the sea waiting for a favorable wind."

We will cross the sea waiting for a favorable wind.

Thanks to this, the Joseon Tongsinsa visited in 1636. Prior to this, envoys with the title 'Hoe-dap-gyeom-swae-hwan-sa' (Return and Repatriation Envoy), mainly for the repatriation of captives, had visited. However, from this period onwards, the visits became regularized under the title 'Tongsinsa', with a total of 9 missions dispatched until the reign of King Sunjo in 1811. This also marked the conclusion of the protracted post-war settlement process following the Imjin War.

Conclusion: The Tsushima Letter forgery played a pivotal role in the improvement of Joseon-Japan relations after the Imjin War. In a situation where the interests of Joseon and Japan were precariously aligned, the Tsushima Letter forgery served as an excellent justification and breakthrough.

This mediating role of Tsushima was facilitated by its geographical advantage, which could compensate for the disadvantages of maritime transport, and by the agreement between Joseon and Japan to resolve the issue of Japanese pirates. Tsushima, with its economy dependent on external relations, also actively sought to play the role of a mediator.

From Joseon's perspective, the Tsushima Letter forgery provided a justification to avoid armed conflict with Japan and also served as a moral victory, embodying the spirit of a "junzi" (君子, noble person) nation embracing the "barbarians."

From Japan's perspective, the Tsushima Letter forgery was an excellent means to strengthen the legitimacy of the Edo Shogunate, established through internal competition, while simultaneously avoiding damage to its domestic prestige.

In other words, the tacit acceptance of the Tsushima Letter forgery incident was the result of the convergence of interests among Tsushima, Joseon, and Japan. Notably, even though Joseon and Japan recognized that they had diametrically opposed objectives—adherence to and departure from the world order, respectively—Joseon chose to maintain diplomatic relations for external stability, while Japan chose to do so for internal stability, thus prioritizing practical benefits.

References: The Dong-A Ilbo. 2014. "Joseon Tongsinsa: Charting the Course of Korea-Japan Relations."

https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/020/00026475

20 (Accessed: 2023.1.24)

The Dong-A Ilbo. 2015. "Tsushima's Forged Letter of State... Joseon and Japan Knew but Ignored It."

https://www.donga.com/news/Culture/article/all/20151

027/74421185/1 (Accessed: 2023.1.24).

Min, Deok-gi. 2013. "Tsushima's Negotiations with Joseon during the Imjin War Period." *Northeast Asian History Review*

No. 41, pp. 97-135.

*Yanagawa Shigeoki's Official Record*. Translated by Kim Sang-jun. Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation. Lee, Yong-hee. 1970. "The Spiritual Problem in Korea-Japan Relations: On the Conflict of Border Culture Consciousness." *Shin Dong-A*, August issue.

Conflict of Border Culture Consciousness." *Shin Dong-A*, August issue.

Jang, Soon-soon. 2013. "Current Status and Tasks of Research on Tsushima during the Joseon Dynasty."

*Northeast Asian History Review* No. 41, pp. 15-60.

Annals of the Joseon Dynasty. https://sillok.history.go.kr/main/main.do (accessed January 23, 2023).

Ha, Boubong. 2013. “Perceptions of Tsushima Island in Korea and Japan during the Pre-modern Period”

Northeast Asian History Review 41, 215-250.

Heo, Gyeongjin. 2009. “A Comparative Study of Sea Experiences in Su-ro Cheonrok and Tongshinsa Haengrok”

Journal of Korean Classical Literature 43, 49-79.

Hong, Seongdeok. 2013. “The Role of Tsushima Island in the Diplomatic System between Joseon and Japan in the Late Joseon Period”

Northeast Asian History Review 41, 137-180.

Lewis, James B. 2003. Frontier contact between Choson Korea and

Tokugawa Japan. RoutledgeCurzon. 5. The Role of Tsushima Island in Joseon-Japan Relations McCune, George M. 1946. “The Exchange of Envoys between Korea

and Japan during the Tokugawa Period.” The Far Eastern

Quarterly Vol. 5, No. 3.

Tan, Isaac C.K. 2021. “Beyond Frontiers and Borderlands: A

Reexamination of Tsushima’s/Taema-Do’s Geopolitical

Position in Fifteenth Century East Asia” International

Journal of Korean History Vol. 26, No. 1.

Toby, Ronald P. 1991. State and diplomacy in early modern Japan:

Asia in the development of the Tokugawa Bakufu. Stanford:

Stanford University Press.

Chapter 6 Li Hongzhang’s Psyche

Throughout the Sino-Japanese War

Sino-Japanese Treaty Memorial Hall

Jongeun Seong

The University of Sydney

1. Introduction

2. The Great Qing Empire’s Perspectives on Li Hongzhang’s Psyche

2.1: Qing China’s Official Diplomatic Documents Issued

Throughout the Sino-Japanese War in Li Hongzhang quan ji (李鸿章全集)

2.2: Liang Qichao’s Assessment of Li Hongzhang’s Lifetime in

Li Hongzhang chuan (李鸿章传)

3. Li Hongzhang’s Psyche from the Eyes of Japan: the Innermost Ambitions

of the Japanese Empire

3.1: Bilateral Peace Summit Between Ito Hirobumi and Li Hongzhang

in Shimonoseki, Japan

3.2: Mutsu Munemitsu’s memoir of Li Hongzhang in Kenkenroku (蹇蹇錄) 4. Conclusion 6. Li Hongzhang’s Psyche Throughout the Sino-Japanese War

I. Introduction

Although the Great Qing Empire’s hegemony in East Asia started to diminish due to the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, Qing China maintained its traditional tribute affiliation (朝贡关系) with its periphery states such as Joseon. However, from the 1870s, as an imperative step of the Self-Strengthening Movement (洋务运动), Qing China started to modernize its naval powers under the leadership of the then Grand Secretary Li Hongzhang. Li Hongzhang sent several Chinese officers abroad to Europe and North America to adopt a more advanced military system in Qing China. In addition, Li Hongzhang formed the Beiyang Fleet, the Nanyang Fleet, and the Fujian Fleet in an effort to strengthen the naval powers of Qing China. Notwithstanding Li Hongzhang’s execution of the self-strengthening movement for several decades, Qing China was devastated by Japan’s meticulously modernized naval powers during the Meiji Restoration. As a matter of fact, Japan was fully prepared to utilize its westernized military capabilities under the leadership of Emperor Meiji, unlike the Qing imperial court’s outmoded national defence strategy.

Until the early 2000s, Chinese academics did not progress a significant amount of research on the Sino-Japanese War because many Chinese people shamefully perceived the Great Qing Empire’s defeat by a mere “barbarian,” non-western state like Japan based on the traditional concept of the Sino-barbarian dichotomy (华夷之辨). Hence, scrutinizing the “psyche” of Li Hongzhang, a protagonist of the Sino-Japanese War, will be a meaningful attempt to figure out how the Sino-Japanese War changed the course of East Asia’s regional order in the late 1800s and its implications for contemporary international relations in the East Asian region. Furthermore, successful analyses of a statesman’s “psyche” makes it possible to prospect the innermost intentions of states; for instance, by analyzing Chairman Kim Jong-un’s “psyche,” International Relations scholars are able to anticipate North Korea’s actual intentions in the U.S.-DPRK peace summits in Singapore and Hanoi.

This research paper will therefore delve into Li Hongzhang’s psyche before, during, and after the Sino-Japanese War from the perspectives of both the Qing and the Japanese Empires for the aforementioned reasons. Since official government documents do not necessarily represent a statesman’s psyche, a diverse range of primary and secondary sources were used for this research paper. The first part of this research paper will examine the Great Qing Empire’s perspectives on Li Hongzhang’s psyche by observing two primary sources: 1) the official diplomatic documents that Qing China issued throughout the Sino-Japanese War in Li Hongzhang quan ji (李鸿章全集) and 2) a critical assessment of Li Hongzhang’s life, Li Hongzhang 6. Li Hongzhang’s Psyche Throughout the Sino-Japanese War chuan (李鸿章传), which was written by Liang Qichao. The second part of this research paper will analyze the Japanese Empire’s perspectives on Li Hongzhang’s psyche and determine what Japan genuinely wanted to achieve at the time period. In order to do so, the then-Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu’s Kenkenroku (蹇蹇錄) and the dialogue between Ito Hirobumi and Li Hongzhang during the Shimonoseki Treaty will be scrutinized in detail.

2. The Great Qing Empire’s Perspectives on Li Hongzhang’s

Psyche

2.1 Qing China’s Official Diplomatic Documents Issued

Throughout the Sino-Japanese War in Li Hongzhang quan ji

(李鸿章全集)

Li Hongzhang quan ji (李鸿章全集) is an invaluable primary source to analyze Li Hongzhang’s psyche since it consists of Qing China’s official diplomatic documents, confidential government documents, Li Hongzhang’s diaries, letters exchanged between Li Hongzhang and the Guangxu Emperor, and Li Hongzhang’s letters to Japanese government officials. After Qing China was defeated by the Japanese in the Battle of Weihaiwei, the Qing Court reluctantly decided to send envoys to Japan for a peace summit. Qing’s government document that was issued during the twenty-first year of the Guangxu Emperor’s reign shows Li Hongzhang’s feelings before he left Beijing for a bilateral summit with Japan. The document was called “恭谢天恩并陈交卸起程日期折,” meaning Li Hongzhang’s gratitude towards the Guangxu Emperor and his report about the departure date to Japan. Li Hongzhang described that Japan demanded the Qing imperial court send one of the highest-ranking government officials as a plenipotentiary (全权大使). Li Hongzhang added that the “behaviors of Japan are extremely rude, and it is likely that Japan is hiding something that they want.” Li Hongzhang also remarked that “it is entirely this servant (臣)’s fault to let his Imperial Majesty be concerned about this issue…However, I cannot hold back my tears for his Imperial Majesty’s decision to entrust me with such a heavy responsibility (重任).” Based on the letter to the Guangxu Emperor, it is apparent that Li Hongzhang held himself accountable for Qing China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, and he bluntly showed his anxiety regarding the treaty with Japan. What caused Li Hongzhang’s anxiety was that he was uncertain what the Japanese would demand Qing China to reimburse for the Sino-Japanese War and what it meant for the future of Qing China. 6. Li Hongzhang’s Psyche Throughout the Sino-Japanese War

The then-Grand Councilor (军机大臣)’s letter to the Guangxu Emperor in February 1895 also shows Li Hongzhang’s anxiety. The Grand Councilor wrote, “Since this servant (臣) cannot determine the current enemy’s situations (敌情), we are in a state of emergency…I am worried that the Japanese (倭人) might provoke our soldiers and threaten Beijing. This servant (臣) is pretty sure that the Japanese will demand the cession of certain territories. If we do not allow a cession of certain territories, the Japanese will, of course, threaten our capital. Since it is important for us Qing to determine what the Japanese actually want, please allow Li Hongzhang to deal with a cession of Qing’s territories as soon as possible.”

The overall tone of both documents in Li Hongzhang quan ji (李鸿章全集) clearly shows that Li Hongzhang was extremely anxious about the future of Qing China because he was burdened with heavy responsibilities to negotiate with Japan. For instance, whenever Li Hongzhang sent a letter to the Guangxu Emperor, he constantly self-criticized by stating that it was his “fault” for letting the Emperor be concerned about diplomatic affairs. Furthermore, the Grand Councilor (军机大臣)’s letter to the Guangxu Emperor shows that Li Hongzhang was the one who was qualified, which makes Li Hongzhang more anxious about the potential results of the Sino-Japanese summit even before he left Beijing.

2.2 Liang Qichao’s Assessment of Li Hongzhang’s Lifetime

in Li Hongzhang chuan (李鸿章传)

The author of Li Hongzhang chuan (李鸿章传), Liang Qichao, was the Republic of China’s former Minister of Justice and Minister of Finance. Moreover, Liang Qichao was also well-known as a political opponent of Li Hongzhang, which makes Li Hongzhang chuan (李鸿章传) a significant primary source to objectively assess Li Hongzhang’s psyche. Liang Qichao even stated in the beginning of Li Hongzhang chuan (李鸿章传) that he tried to write about Li Hongzhang’s life as objectively as possible because “historians must have an unbiased mindset” although Li Hongzhang was his political opponent.

In the eighth chapter of Li Hongzhang chuan (李鸿章传), “第八章：外交家之李鸿章上,” when Li Hongzhang was coming back from the third round of summit with Japan, he was shot by a far-right terrorist named Koyama Toyotaro. Li Hongzhang almost lost his life as the bullet deeply penetrated his left cheekbone. Astounded by the attempted assassination, Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi and the Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu paid Li Hongzhang a visit to the hospital to console him. Japanese Emperor Meiji himself even sent court physicians and medical officers to assist with Li Hongzhang’s treatment. The attempted assassination of Li Hongzhang bluntly showed the 6. Li Hongzhang’s Psyche Throughout the Sino-Japanese War sincerity of Li Hongzhang’s patriotism towards Qing China. When a Japanese physician told Li Hongzhang that he must take a rest for a while after they got rid of the bullet, Li Hongzhang furiously answered: “When our nation is in grave danger, we cannot postpone our plans to achieve peace. How can I delay such a critical issue? I will not get rid of the bullet and would rather die!” On the following day, when someone saw Li Hongzhang’s clothing stained with blood, he said, “this is blood shed for the country.” With tears in his eyes, Li Hongzhang answered, “I can gladly die if my death benefits my motherland.” Li Hongzhang’s remarks show that his loyalty towards Qing China was sincere even at the edge of death, and that he was ready to risk his life for Qing’s national interests.

3. Li Hongzhang’s Psyche from the Eyes of Japan: the

Innermost Ambitions of the Japanese Empire

3.2 Bilateral Peace Summit Between Ito Hirobumi and Li

Hongzhang in Shimonoseki, Japan

Before Japan and Qing China started their bilateral peace summit, Japan intentionally selected a sashimi restaurant to host the meeting. Inviting a high-ranking statesman like Li Hongzhang to a sashimi restaurant for a bilateral summit was unconventional; however, Japan intentionally chose the place to humiliate Li Hongzhang. When Ito Hirobumi first met Li Hongzhang, he remarked that “this small town does not contain any building worthy of one of Your Excellency’s high rank. We are quite ashamed that we have nothing better to offer you.” Although Ito Hirobumi outwardly apologized to Li Hongzhang, he knew that Japan’s choice of a sashimi restaurant for a bilateral summit was against diplomatic etiquette. As Japan intended, Li Hongzhang might have felt shameful as a plenipotentiary from the Great Qing Empire.

Aside from Japan’s choice of a sashimi restaurant, Qing China and Japan had to have several rounds of summit discussions due to discordance in each other’s conditions for negotiation. Although Li Hongzhang constantly requested an armistice, Ito Hirobumi refused to withdraw the Japanese troops from Qing China’s provinces. Li Hongzhang pleaded, “As China and Japan are like brothers in the family of nations, the terms of the armistice are much too severe. Have you nothing better to offer?” Moreover, Li Hongzhang bluntly showed his embarrassed feelings during the peace negotiations. Li Hongzhang beseeched Ito Hirobumi, “I am Viceroy of the province of Chihli, and these places are my jurisdiction. My personal reputation is at stake. Let me ask, Count Ito, how you would feel under these embarrassing 6. Li Hongzhang’s Psyche Throughout the Sino-Japanese War circumstances?” Based on Li Hongzhang’s statements, it is clear that he felt extremely embarrassed by Japan’s occupation of Chinese provinces; Li Hongzhang continuously begged for Ito Hirobumi’s sympathy, which

even worsened Qing China’s position in bilateral summit discussions. Li Hongzhang’s submissive attitude towards Ito Hirobumi is also shown in several parts of the bilateral discussion. For instance, when Ito Hirobumi told Li Hongzhang that he was born in Shimonoseki, Li Hongzhang repeatedly flattered that Shimonoseki “is a birthplace of famous men.” Li Hongzhang’s attitude shows how desperate he was to achieve armistice with the Japanese; however, Ito Hirobumi did not give an inch and refused to withdraw Japanese troops for Japan’s imperialistic desires.

3.2 Mutsu Munemitsu’s Memoir of Li Hongzhang in

Kenkenroku (蹇蹇錄)

During the Shimonoseki Treaty, Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu was the one who accompanied Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi. Throughout the Sino-Japanese War, Mutsu Munemitsu wrote a memoir of his diplomatic experience, which is called Kenkenroku(蹇蹇錄). Although Kenkenroku(蹇蹇錄) might be relatively biased, it still remains a meaningful primary source to assess Li Hongzhang’s psyche from the eyes of the Japanese empire. Mutsu Munemitsu reminisced that Li Hongzhang was self-critical when he requested for an armistice with Japan. Li Hongzhang remarked that Qing China could not achieve reformation due to his incompetence, but he praised Ito Hirobumi’s successful reformation projects. Li Hongzhang added that many Chinese people were grateful for Japan’s advanced military capabilities because it proves that the “yellow people” can do as good as “white people.” However, Mutsu Munemitsu assessed that Li Hongzhang’s such comments sounded pathetic. Mutsu Munemitsu stated, “The old man’s effort to hide his embarrassment and to arouse Japan’s sympathy was adorable.” After the third round of summit discussions when Li Hongzhang was shot by Koyama Toyotaro, Japanese Emperor Meiji eventually allowed an armistice with Qing China. Mutsu Munemitsu reminisced that Li Hongzhang’s face was wrapped with bandage but he expressed his sincere gratitude with his eyes. Based on Mutsu Munemitsu’s memoir, Li Hongzhang seemed like a shameless, flattering person. However, it might have been Li Hongzhang’s strategy to achieve Qing’s armistice with the Japanese as soon as possible despite his embarrassment.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, explaining Li Hongzhang’s psyche before, during, and after the Sino-Japanese War in a single word is difficult. Nonetheless, based on Li Hongzhang quan ji(李鸿章全集) and Liang Qichao’s Li Hongzhang chuan(李鸿章传), Qing’s perspectives on Li Hongzhang’s psyche is that he was truly loyal to his motherland even at the edge of death. On the contrary, based on the bilateral peace summit record and Mutsu Munemitsu’s Kenkenroku(蹇蹇錄), Japan’s perspective on Li Hongzhang’s psyche was that he was a cunning person who tried to arouse sympathy from Japan. Further scrutiny is required to understand what Japan truly wanted to gain from the Shimonoseki Treaty. Hence, it can be speculated that Japan’s intention was to propagandize to the western world the fall of the Great Qing Empire and the rise of the new hegemon in East Asia.

Bibliography Chang, Sheue-Chih. 1989. “A Study of Li Hong-Chang’s Foreign Policy

During, Before and After the Sino-Japanese War” Busan:

Pusan National University

Lee, Seunghwan. 2020. “A Comparative Study on the Perception of the

Korean Peninsula by China and Japan During the First Sino-

Japanese War: Focus on the Geopolitical Perceptions of Li

Hong-Zhang and Yamagata Aritomo” Seoul: Korea University

Library

The Tientsin Press. 1895. “Verbal Discussion During Peace Negotiation

Between the Chinese Plenipotentiary Viceroy Li Hung-Chang

and the Japanese Plenipotentiaries Count Ito and Viscount

Mutsu at Shimonoseki, Japan.” The Peking and Tientsin

Times. 6. Li Hongzhang’s Psyche Throughout the Sino-Japanese War Kim Ki-hyo. 2017. An Annotation of Modern East Asian Diplomatic Documents XIV: China Volume. Seoul: Seonin. Mutsu Munemitsu. 1993. Kenkenroku. Translated by Kim Chang-soo. Beomusa. Yang Jisun. 2013. A Biography of Li Hongzhang. Translated by Park Hee-sung and Moon Se-na. Prism. Liang Qichao. 2011. A Brief Account of Li Wenzhong. China Classics Essence Library.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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Introduction

Review of Existing Research and Necessity of the Study

Research Methods and Materials

Formation of Tsushima's Mediating Role

The Tsushima Document Forgery Incident

Reasons Why Joseon Had to Tacitly Approve Tsushima's Document Forgery

Reasons

Reasons why Japan could not help but condone Tsushima's forgery of diplomatic correspondence

Reasons why Japan could not help but condone Tsushima's forgery of diplomatic correspondence

Chapter 6

Li Hongzhang’s Psyche

Throughout the Sino-Japanese War

Sino-Japanese Treaty Memorial Hall

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

2. The Great Qing Empire’s Perspectives on Li Hongzhang’s

Psyche

2.1 Qing China’s Official Diplomatic Documents Issued

Throughout the Sino-Japanese War in Li Hongzhang quan ji

(李鸿章全集)

2.2 Liang Qichao’s Assessment of Li Hongzhang’s Lifetime

in Li Hongzhang chuan (李鸿章传)

3. Li Hongzhang’s Psyche from the Eyes of Japan: the

Innermost Ambitions of the Japanese Empire

3.2 Bilateral Peace Summit Between Ito Hirobumi and Li

Hongzhang in Shimonoseki, Japan

3.2 Mutsu Munemitsu’s Memoir of Li Hongzhang in

Kenkenroku (蹇蹇錄)

4. Conclusion