The Beginning of Russo-Japanese Discord: The Otsu Incident, Jeong Ha-min

Glover Garden · Saint Petersburg State University

Introduction

The international order, which had persisted as a world order within East Asia for thousands of years, began to lose its significance in the modern era of the 16th century with the advent of a new civilizational standard represented by the West. In the 17th century, Japan, pursuing a policy of seclusion, initiated exchanges with the West through exclusive trade with Dutch merchants. Nagasaki, its first point of contact, emerged as a new stage for Western powers. After navigating the opening of its ports in the 1850s and the period of enlightenment in the 1860s, modern Japan, having established itself as a new entity in East Asia, sought to expand its influence. Consequently, Japan at the time likely needed attractive models from the West, and various Western powers vied to project their allure onto Asia.

In the context of the turbulent modern transformation of the East Asian international order, Japan keenly recognized the importance of partners on the chaotic 'modern stage.' Thus, Britain and Russia, two newly emerged powers on the European continent, engaged in persistent courtship, vying for the new eastern stage that was Japan. Japan's domestic situation at the time was equally tumultuous. One of the reasons for the intensified conflict between the central shogunate and regional domains in the late Edo period was the lack of consensus on whether to accept the overtures of Western powers, who were forcing open the country with their powerful warships, or to resist them.

The initial encounters and processes involving Britain and Japan through Glover, and Russia and Japan through Putyatin, led to divergent outcomes: the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. As a result, Russia, once the dominant power in Asia, began its decline, while Japan, having chosen the British model, solidified its position as an Asian empire by acquiring Korea and Manchuria. This paper aims to explore the reasons why Japan allied with Britain and rejected Russia, and to examine the significance and impact of the 'Otsu Incident,' an assassination attempt on Crown Prince Nicholas (Nikolai Alexandrovich Romanov).

The Anglo-Russian-Japanese Triangle in the 19th Century International Order

1. Britain and Japan: A Beginning with Glover

The symbolic encounter between Britain and Japan began with Thomas Blake Glover, the proprietor of Glover Garden. He landed in Nagasaki as a merchant and established a weapons trading business based in Dejima. Glover's particular affability fostered deep bonds with Japanese samurai, providing a driving force for Japan's external openness and internal reforms. Leveraging his position as the operator of the largest foreign trading company in Nagasaki at the time, Glover was an exceptionally attractive partner, capable of supplying warships and rifles necessary to overthrow the shogunate.

The dispatch of the Chōshū Five paved the way for the Meiji Restoration, marking a significant event in Anglo-Japanese relations at the time.

2. Russia and Japan: A Beginning with Putyatin

Meanwhile, in the mid-19th century, Russia began its southward advance into the Primorye region. At this time, the United States sent Commodore Perry to Japan, demanding the opening of its ports. Russia could not be left behind. Envoy Yevfimy Vasilyevich Putyatin was dispatched. Following negotiations with Putyatin, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Russia and Japan was finally concluded in 1855. Russia became the third country, after the United States and Britain, to establish diplomatic relations with Japan, and at this time, it also achieved partial success in border demarcation negotiations with Japan (Wada Haruki 2009, 108). In 1873, Bishop Nicholas (Ivan Dmitrovich Kasatkin), engaged in religious activities, began teaching Russian in Tokyo. However, compared to Russia, a Japanese language school had been established in Irkutsk by order of Peter the Great in the 18th century. Within Russia, there was considerable interest not only in Japan but also in the East; during the same period, an Oriental Institute was established in Vladivostok to educate and research the languages and affairs of Eastern countries (Wada Haruki 2009, 149). Thus, Russia had been contemplating plans for Japan and the East, as well as its Eastern policy, from an earlier time. In March 1889, Sergei Witte was appointed Director of the Railway Department of the Russian Ministry of Finance, after which he began to implement more proactive policies towards the Far East. He initiated the project of constructing railways in the Far East. Russia succeeded in securing funding from France to commence the Siberian Railway project, focusing on building a single line connecting Vladivostok on the Pacific coast through Moscow to Europe. This meant that Russia, possessing the world's largest army, could potentially reach Japan directly from Moscow via Central Asia, without being hindered by Britain's naval supremacy.

<Figure 1> The arrival of Czarevitch Nicholas at Shimbashi Station

Courtesy the Kanagawa Museum (Source: Donald Keene. 2002)

On March 31, 1891, Crown Prince Nicholas of Russia visited Japan as the final leg of his world tour before attending the groundbreaking ceremony of the Siberian Railway in Vladivostok. However, at this juncture, a major event occurred that would have significant repercussions on Russo-Japanese relations. An assassination attempt on Nicholas, the Crown Prince of the Russian Empire, was carried out by a single Japanese policeman in Otsu. Subsequently, relations between Russia and Japan underwent rapid changes.

3. Japan's Foreign Policy and Containment of Russia

From the early 18th century, Russia had been preparing a southward expansion policy along the Kuril Islands. In the mid-18th century, Russia intensified its southward expansion policy by establishing a Japanese language school in Irkutsk, Siberia. It was at this time that Japan first came to have the concept of the 'Northern Problem.' In the 1780s, Hayashi Shihei, citing the Russian threat, argued that Japan, as a maritime nation, needed defense measures to counter Western powers. (Lee Samsung 2009, 202)

Around 1890, Japan laid the foundation for militarism. While wary of Russia's expansion into East Asia, it consolidated its military strength and political system. The Constitution of the Empire of Japan, promulgated in February 1889, was, as its drafter Ito Hirobumi stated, created 'for the purpose of strengthening national sovereignty and giving it the utmost importance' (Lee Sam-seong 2009, 406). In this manner, Japan rapidly expanded its military capabilities internally and reorganized its army along German lines.

At that time, a prominent newspaper called 'Nihon' was being published. The chief editor of this newspaper

focused on Eastern policy. In 1892, the Japanese Diet approved a seven-year naval expansion plan based on an imperial rescript. It was around this time that a broad consensus of hardliners in foreign policy emerged across Japan's political, media, and academic circles (Lee Sam-seong 2009, 406). Until 1890, Japan's national development strategy centered on reform. However, many Japanese scholars argue that from the early 1890s onwards, outward expansion, employing all means including military force, became Japan's national strategy. It is believed that by the summer of 1894, Japan had finally resolved the unequal treaties it had concluded with Western imperialist powers in the past, thus officially becoming a member of the 'imperialist club' and standing shoulder to shoulder with imperialist nations in the international order. The revision of treaties with Britain at that time served as a crucial starting point.

The primary reason for Japan's serious concern about Russia began with the groundbreaking of the Siberian Railway. This plan was already known in Japan. The first mention of this project in Japan appeared in the London 'Times' on June 24, 1887. The newspaper 'Choya Shimbun' promptly translated this article and published it on August 2 under the headline 'Construction of the Siberian Railway.' On August 12 and 13, it published editorials titled 'The Siberian Railway and its Relationship with the Three East Asian Nations' (Wada Haruki 2009, 155). The author of the editorial asserted that the commencement of the Siberian Railway construction would have a significant military impact on Japan, China, and Korea, and therefore, measures to counter Russia must be sought. Concerns in Japan began to emerge long before the construction of the Siberian Railway became concrete.

One of the factors for change hypothesized by Kuga Katsunan could be the commencement of the Siberian Railway construction in 1891, after Russia secured funding from France. In other words, once the Siberian Railway was completed, it would form a single line connecting Vladivostok on the Pacific coast through Moscow to Europe.

This global transformation in transportation brought about a significant shift in the perception of the Earth's space. Simultaneously, it raised the question of how to position island nation Japan within the map of international politics, prompting the establishment of research organizations and political associations such as the Eastern Society within Japan at the time.

Furthermore, while changes in transportation alter the flow of economies and people, they also facilitate the movement of soldiers and weapons, leading to shifts in the military balance. In other words, with the completion of the Siberian Railway, Russia, possessing the world's largest army, gained the potential to launch military operations directly from Moscow to Japan without being hindered by Britain's naval supremacy. The emergence of this transcontinental transportation system not only shook Japan but also brought about significant changes and impacts on East Asia and, by extension, world politics. It is evident that this posed a tangible threat not only to the Japanese government but also to the Japanese populace. According to Kuga Katsunan, these series of events in 1891 'could not but inspire a sense of outward-looking consciousness among the people' (Shinichi Yamamuro 2005, 55).

As a result, anti-Russian sentiment gradually began to emerge even among the general Japanese public. One year before the 'Otsu Incident,' in 1890, the Emperor's carriage passed by the Russian legation after visiting the Diet. The Emperor, passing by a pond, recognized the wife of the Russian minister and removed his hat in a gesture of respect. However, as the Emperor passed, someone in the crowd threw a stone at the Russian ladies, and a Korean accompanying the minister responded in kind, leading to a barrage of stones thrown from both sides. Simultaneously, the crowd attempted to push through the iron gate of the legation, but order was restored by the police.

Upon hearing of this incident before the Crown Prince's visit to Japan, Emperor Alexander III wrote, 'Such anti-foreign and malicious acts make me somewhat uneasy regarding the Crown Prince's visit to Japan' (Wada Haruki 2009, 158). And as he feared, an incident occurred that left an indelible scar on his successor, Crown Prince Nicholas.

The Otsu Incident: The Spark of Discord

1. The Course of the Otsu Incident 2. The Beginning of Russo-Japanese Discord: The Otsu Incident

<Figure 2> Crown Prince Nicholas in a Rickshaw, 1891

<Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture>

(Source: A. N. Meshcheryakov. 2018)

<Figure 3> The Otsu Incident

(Source: Dmitry Mityurin. 2015)

Crown Prince Nicholas of the Russian Empire visited Japan en route to Vladivostok with a fleet to attend the groundbreaking ceremony of the Far East section of the Siberian Railway. After visiting Nagasaki and Kagoshima, the entourage of Crown Prince Nicholas planned to land in Kobe and proceed to Kyoto.

In the afternoon of May 11, 1891, on their way back from a day trip to Lake Biwa from Kyoto, Crown Prince Nicholas, Prince George of Greece, and Prince Arisugawa Takehito were riding in rickshaws in that order through Otsu city when Tsuda Sanzō, a policeman from the Shiga Prefectural Police Station, suddenly drew his saber and inflicted injuries on Crown Prince Nicholas. Nicholas jumped out of his rickshaw and fled into a nearby alley, but Tsuda pursued him, attempting to inflict further injury. However, Tsuda was struck on the back with a bamboo staff by Prince George and fell after his leg was tripped by a rickshaw puller accompanying Crown Prince Nicholas. Furthermore, a rickshaw puller accompanying Prince George struck Tsuda on the neck with the saber Tsuda had dropped, and Tsuda Sanzō was eventually apprehended by other patrolling policemen. Crown Prince Nicholas sustained wounds approximately 7 cm and 9 cm long on the right side of his head, but his life was not in danger. Prince Takehito was present at the scene but was blocked by onlookers and could not get close; by the time he assessed the situation, Tsuda had already been apprehended.

Prince Takehito, who was knowledgeable about international relations through his studies and overseas military inspections, immediately recognized this incident as a grave diplomatic issue beyond his capacity to resolve. He ordered his retinue to promptly compile the details and report them via telegram to Emperor Meiji in Tokyo, and simultaneously requested the Emperor's urgent visit to Kyoto to demonstrate sincerity to the Russian Empire. Upon receiving the telegram, Emperor Meiji immediately confirmed the situation, ordered Prince Takehito to ensure the security of Crown Prince Nicholas, and dispatched Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa to Kyoto as an envoy.

The following morning, May 12, 1891, Emperor Meiji boarded a train at Shimbashi Station and arrived in Kyoto that same night. Emperor Meiji was scheduled to visit Crown Prince Nicholas that night, but at the request of Crown Prince Nicholas's party, it was postponed to the next day. Prince Arisugawa Taruhito, the elder brother of Prince Arisugawa Takehito, also arrived in Kyoto following Emperor Meiji. On May 13, Emperor Meiji visited Crown Prince Nicholas at the Kyoto Hotel, where he was staying, and escorted him to Kobe along with Princes Takehito, Yoshihisa, and Taruhito.

Later, when Emperor Meiji himself visited the Russian warship anchored at Kobe port, despite his retainers' objections that he might be 'kidnapped,' he disregarded their concerns and visited the recuperating Crown Prince Nicholas again (Seo Hyun-seop 2004, 142).

Rumors spread that 'Russia might attack Japan in retaliation' because a small nation like Japan had injured the Crown Prince of the great power, Russia. Schools closed as a sign of respect, and prayers for the Crown Prince's recovery were offered at shrines, temples, and churches. Over 10,000 messages of condolence were sent to Crown Prince Nicholas, and the town of Kanayama in Yamagata Prefecture passed a resolution prohibiting the use of the surname 'Tsuda' and the given name 'Sanzō.' Furthermore, on May 20, 1891, a woman named Yuko Hatakeyama committed suicide in front of the Kyoto Prefectural Office with a razor, stating, 'I offer my life in apology' to Crown Prince Nicholas (Seo Hyun-seop 2004, 142). Keio University students, fluent in foreign languages, wrote letters of apology in French, and a Russian Orthodox missionary visited Crown Prince Nicholas to mediate diplomatic friction between Japan and Russia.

2. After the Otsu Incident

Emperor Alexander III of Russia, deeply moved by the sincere attitude of the Japanese Emperor and the entire nation, expressed a magnanimous stance, stating that the Crown Prince's injury had led him to see Japan in a new light. The excessive apologies from the Japanese people had touched Russia. Russia concluded the incident with great magnanimity.

Relieved by Russia's magnanimity, Japan intended to execute Tsuda Sanzō under Article 116 of the Penal Code. However, Chief Justice Kojima Iken argued that applying this article to an assailant of a foreign prince was unreasonable and ruled that Tsuda be treated as a general attempted murderer and sentenced to life imprisonment. Tsuda later died of pneumonia four months later.

Following Emperor Alexander III's magnanimous response, Japanese public opinion, relieved by the avoidance of a crisis with Russia, became emboldened by the fact that they had averted a conflict. This led to a surge in demands for a fair trial for the perpetrator, Tsuda.

An atmosphere prevailed where Tsuda was seen as a patriot who sacrificed himself for the nation. As the saying goes, 'the more the merrier,' voices quickly spread from various regions proclaiming Tsuda not as a mere attempted murderer but as a martyr. This truly exemplified a facet of the Japanese national character.

Chief Justice Kojima sentenced him to life imprisonment for attempted murder. On May 29, as the verdict was announced, those filling the courtroom shouted 'Long live the Empire!' and 'Long live the nation!', and the crowds outside joined in shouting 'Long live Japan!'. Chief Justice Kojima became a triumphant hero. He is still highly praised today as a 'god of law' who defended the independence of the judiciary (Seo Hyun-seop 2004, 144).

The Otsu Incident and the Russo-Japanese War

1. Motives for the Otsu Incident

Various speculations and opinions remain regarding the 'Otsu Incident.' This is understandable, as there is limited documentation to prove the circumstances of the time, and Nicholas's diary recollections are not particularly helpful. Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to assert that the 'Otsu Incident' was the direct cause of the Russo-Japanese War. First, it is necessary to examine Tsuda Sanzō's stated motive for the crime.

During the trial, the perpetrator Tsuda rambled that he felt humiliated because Nicholas, upon arriving in Japan, did not pay his respects to the Emperor first but instead spent his time sightseeing. He also argued that he decided to kill Nicholas because he believed Nicholas was using his sightseeing as a pretext to spy on Japan (Seo Hyun-seop 2004, 145).

<Figure 3> <Rumors about Saigō Takamori>

(Source: Shin, Peter Yong-Shik. 1989)

Scholars have proposed three main possible motives for Tsuda's actions. The first is that he believed the rumors that Nicholas's visit to Japan was a reconnaissance mission for an invasion of Japan. Furthermore, there were widespread rumors that Saigō Takamori, the hero of the Seinan War, had not died but had returned with Nicholas. Tsuda, who had received a medal in the Seinan War, did not take kindly to these rumors. These series of events illustrate how sensitive Japan was to Russia's expansion into the Far East at the time. The second motive stems from fanatical loyalty, as stated in his testimony. The fact that Nicholas went to Nagasaki instead of Tokyo to visit the Emperor was seen as an insult to the Emperor, and he did not show respect to a war memorial erected within the temple grounds during his sightseeing. The third, though a minority view, speculates that the assassination was planned by elements within the Japanese government who sought to check Russia. However, this view lacks sufficient evidence for substantiation.

What is certain is that at the time, Japan was experiencing not only political turmoil but also a coexistence of strong anti-Russian sentiment and fear. This fear materialized into international conflict, affecting even individual lives. Although it appeared to be well-managed externally due to Russia's magnanimous attitude, this incident ultimately led to the conclusion that Japan and Russia, viewing the international stage differently, could not coexist.

2. Omniscient Russian Perspective

Regarding the 'Otsu Incident,' several historians and popular biographers have noted that it provoked Nicholas's animosity towards Japan, with some considering it the 'starting point of the Russo-Japanese War.' Count Sergei Witte, who served as Nicholas's Minister of Finance and chief advisor for ten years, expressed a similar view in his memoirs, suggesting that the last Tsar's involvement in the 'Far Eastern adventure' was partly because he perceived it as a place where he had 'natural animosity towards Japan and was being scorned.' More explicitly, after the war with Japan, Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky believed that 'the attempt on his life... provoked antipathy and even hatred towards Japan on the part of Nicholas II,' and assessed that it might have influenced his Far Eastern policy, which served as the epilogue to the Russo-Japanese War. While these inferences seem to offer a complete explanation, little has actually shed light on the incident itself. What is clear is that it left a visible scar on the Tsarevich's face, and he suffered from headaches until his death, which he attributed to that injury. (Rotem Kowner 1998)

Donald Keene (2002) also views the 'Otsu Incident' as a significant step toward the Russo-Japanese War, citing Witte's memoirs. His argument stems from the conviction that Witte would not have been biased in describing Nicholas's use of the words 'animosity and contempt.' Although the 'Otsu Incident' did not lead to war as many in the government feared at the time, it raises the possibility that Nicholas's formation of anti-Japanese prejudice due to the assassination attempt led to the Russo-Japanese War thirteen years later.

Rotem Kowner (1998) notes that Nicholas's diary does not reveal any condemnation or resentment towards Japan stemming from this incident. Nicholas did not pursue war with Japan, nor did he contemplate revenge. His true attitude towards the Japanese was a mixture of favor towards Orientalists and racial hatred, which gradually developed into an overestimation of their capabilities. The image Nicholas held of the Japanese was that they were feminine, weak, and inferior due to stereotypes he was exposed to before and during his visit. This perception, rather than vague revenge, likely acted as a hindrance in Russia's assessment of Japanese national character and military strength.

Kowner also draws attention to Witte's memoirs. According to Sergei Witte, the incident demonstrated the Tsarevich's sharply negative attitude towards the Japanese, particularly due to the headaches that plagued him until the end of his life as a result of his injuries. (Rotem Kowner 1998) The dragon tattoo in Japan kept the incident alive. And according to his aide Witte, after this incident, he referred to the Emperor of Japan as a 'monkey.' These dismissive remarks and attitudes towards Japan can be cited as examples of Russia underestimating Japan. Furthermore, throughout his trip, he spent nights carousing with Japanese geishas and even requested to see 'Tokyo prostitutes' in Tokyo. (Donald Keene 2002)

Indeed, Aleksey Kuropatkin's memoirs on the Russo-Japanese War cite a lack of prior knowledge and underestimation of Japan as the primary reasons for the war. In his memoirs, Kuropatkin writes, 'The behavior observed in the Japanese soldiers who fought alongside our troops at the Battle of Paektu Mountain in 1900 greatly impressed me, and I was able to appreciate their value... I was amazed to see how much the Japanese had grown in all fields over 25 years. I could see immense movement across all sectors, and it was immediately apparent that these industrious people felt happiness, possessed great patriotism for their country, and had hope for the future.' (Kuropatkin 2007)

In summary, Russia, including the Tsar, did not desire war and was willing to negotiate. However, due to ignorance of Japan's resolve and preparedness for war, they failed to exhibit flexibility in negotiations. Consequently, they ruined the negotiations, making war unavoidable, according to this reflection.

3. Omniscient Japanese Perspective

Both of the aforementioned arguments are plausible conjectures when considering the Russian mindset. However, one point that must be addressed is that Witte's memoirs were written amidst the debate in Russia over 'who is responsible for the outbreak of war?' with the sole aim of asserting his own lack of responsibility. Therefore, we must consider that Witte may have wished to avoid leaving any blemishes on himself and also intended to shift the responsibility to the highest authority, the Tsar. Furthermore, contrary to Witte's claims, Nicholas's own diary, as read by the author, does not reveal such extreme animosity towards Japan. Therefore, the author intends to focus on interpretations from the Japanese perspective, drawing upon Russian sentiments.

Shin, Peter Yong-Shik (1989) argues that the 'Otsu Incident,' from an international political perspective, was not merely an unexpected event caused by a single fanatic but a political incident in which the Japanese government was deeply involved. Firstly, as an external factor, it appears to have been rooted in the Japanese government's foreign policy, specifically Yamagata Aritomo's new foreign policy announced in 1890, which redefined Japan's relationship with Russia. (Shin, Peter Yong-Shik, 1989) To put it bluntly, had a new direction not been established, the incident would not have occurred. Re-examining the incident from this perspective, the 'Otsu Incident' becomes an manifestation of diplomacy reliant on Japan's military expansionism.

This incident holds significant diplomatic and political meaning in modern Japanese history. It was particularly the first instance of expansionism attempted against European powers. The successful outcome instilled great confidence and pride in the Japanese leadership. As the first of three major events (Otsu Incident, Triple Intervention, Russo-Japanese War) that illuminate modern Japanese history, it marked the confrontation between Japan and Russia. Meanwhile, this event served as the first national movement for national consolidation within Japan, successfully mobilizing the populace, including the Emperor, and forming a united front according to the government's direction.

Secondly, the Tsarevich's visit provoked antipathy within the Japanese government. Upon arriving in Nagasaki, Nicholas and his entourage remained in port for a week without disembarking immediately. The reason was to observe the Easter holidays. However, the Japanese public was already preparing for Nicholas's visit, causing disruptions and generating negative rumors. He then proceeded directly to Kagoshima, a city that had produced many prominent leaders of the Meiji Restoration and the establishment of the Meiji government. However, the Satsuma leaders had already lost political power to the Choshu leaders who had effectively controlled the government during Nicholas's reign. Subsequently, the visit to Hokkaido was a sensitive issue for the Japanese government due to its potential to cause territorial disputes. Finally, his decision to spend another week in Aomori agitated the Japanese from a strategic standpoint, as the narrow strait between Aomori and Hakodate was a crucial point in case of war. At this time, there were suspicions that the true purpose of the Japanese tour was to investigate conditions for future invasion.

He further points out that the Japanese government had already adopted an anti-Russian policy regarding international politics in the Far East at that time. Negotiations for treaty revision were underway with Britain, and during this period, large military expenditures were demanded from the Diet. (2. The Beginning of Discord in Russo-Japanese Relations: The Otsu Incident) In early February 1891, with the establishment of the Imperial Reception Committee, the government's cautious stance became apparent. General Kawakami Soroku, then Chief of the General Staff, was elected; Kawakami, known as a tactician, was already preparing for war. He was extremely interested in intelligence gathering and stated that preparations for war with China should be made by 1892. He believed that war with Russia would be unavoidable before the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway within ten years. (Shin, Peter Yong-Shik 1989)

Thirdly, he points to the encouragement of anti-foreign sentiment among the public through the media. The then semi-official newspaper 'Tokyo Nichi Nichi' published an article on March 7th regarding Nicholas's suspicious visit. 'Rumors were heard that it was for the purpose of investigating geographical conditions and observing military preparations for future invasion plans, but this is not true.' (Shin, Peter Yong-Shik, 1989) While this was stated to prevent public misunderstanding and negative impact, it is highly likely the opposite was true. The reasons are: the newspaper 'Tokyo Nichi Nichi' was a media outlet controlled by the government, as well as the police. Secondly, this newspaper article was published not by any other newspaper but by 'Tokyo Nichi Nichi' after the Diet session concluded. Thirdly, the article was presented as a relatively major topic with the headline 'Suspicious Eyes.' (Shin, Peter Yong-Shik, 1989) Fourthly, there is evidence that the Japanese government was already suspicious of Nicholas's itinerary. The article in 'Tokyo Nichi Nichi' had an immense impact on the general public. Immediately after the article's publication, it greatly influenced the public, and discussions about Nicholas's visit were published in both provincial and metropolitan newspapers, continuing until Nicholas's arrival in Japan. On April 4th, 'The Nation's Friends' published a cynical commentary in issue No. 114, stating that Nicholas's visit to Japan helped to awaken the lazy eyes of the Japanese people. (Shin, Peter Yong-Shik, 1989) Additionally, the placement of the police chief of Otsu Prefecture and the police officer Tsuda Sanzo, who harbored resentment towards Nicholas's visit, and the judge Kojima, who presided over Tsuda Sanzo's trial, are also cited as evidence.

He further raises questions about Tsuda Sanzo's death, stating that none of the Japanese politicians, intellectuals, or overseas activists of the time remember the 'Otsu Incident.' The only record of Tsuda Sanzo is by the Portuguese consul Wenceslao de Moraes, who, reminiscing about Tsuda, expressed condolences for the unfortunate patriot. Furthermore, on May 20th, Hatakeyama Yuko committed suicide as an apology. There were memorial services and gatherings for her, and biographies were written. However, there is no mention of Tsuda Sanzo, leading to speculation that Tsuda Sanzo may not have died of pneumonia. The drawback is the lack of definitive documentary evidence from the Japanese government.

Synthesizing these arguments, it is true that the Japanese government and media at the time stimulated fear of Russia among the public, instilling fear and vigilance. Furthermore, Russia's clear intention to seize hegemony in East Asia by completing the Trans-Siberian Railway undeniably fueled the power struggle in the Asia-Pacific region. The 'Otsu Incident' is considered to be the event where these domestic sentiments and international circumstances converged. It was a trigger point that could have led to the first clash between Western and Asian empires, and the first instance in modern times where global order conflicts between Asian and Western empires manifested in individual actions.

Conclusion

The Otsu Incident clearly illustrates the extremely volatile situation in international relations at the time. It starkly reveals that Russia underestimated Japan. This can be seen as the primary reason for Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. For Japan, it was an unavoidable destiny, marked by both the fear of extreme warfare and the opportunity to emerge as an empire. While it is difficult to consider this the starting point for the Russo-Japanese War, it is interpreted as an event that demonstrated Japan's willingness to engage in war with the West if necessary, as the sole empire in East Asia, while cautiously observing Western powers militarily.

Nicholas referred to 1891 and 1892 as his dark years in his diary (Nicholas, 1923). The trauma likely stemmed not only from the 'Otsu Incident' but also from the deaths of those around him, and most significantly, the death of his father in 1892. The 'Otsu Incident,' marking the beginning of his decline, caused him persistent headaches throughout his life, and the dragon tattoo he received in Japan likely served as a constant reminder of that painful wound. Therefore, the speculation that he harbored a subconscious negative perception of Japan warrants attention.

As written in Witte's memoirs, Nicholas described the Emperor of Japan as a 'monkey.' This indicates that, contrary to his positive attitude during his trip to Japan, he did not yet recognize Japan as an empire. While the apology from the Japanese people following the 'Otsu Incident' might have seemed appropriate to the parties involved, it likely came across as a humiliating and barbaric apology to the Russians, exceeding what they expected. Thus, the magnanimity of Alexander III and the generosity of Crown Prince Nicholas were likely born from a consideration that stemmed from evaluating the Japanese as superior to their own level. This, in turn, likely served as a decisive factor in leading Russians on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War to misjudge and underestimate their opponent.

At that time, Japan, having just passed twenty years since the Meiji Restoration, held two starkly contrasting attitudes towards the international order in the minds of its people and government. One was a conservative tendency, inherited from before the Restoration, characterized by fear of Western powers and a desire to avoid war by adhering to etiquette. The other was an expansionist tendency, fueled by the confidence of being the first modern nation to achieve modernization in Asia and the ambition to rise as an empire among the great powers. 2. The Beginning of Discord in Russo-Japanese Relations: The Otsu Incident (大津事件)

This began with the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution ('大日本帝国憲法') in 1889 and the opening of the National Diet the following year. Internally, the turbulent political struggles since the nation's founding were consolidated within a fixed constitutional order. Externally, it marked the beginning of institutional mechanisms that allowed Japan to demand revisions to the 'unequal treaty' system from Western powers (Park Young-jae, 1994).

Furthermore, it is necessary to consider the reasonable suspicion that extremist elements within Japan may have been behind the 'Otsu Incident.' It is noteworthy that the scale of the incident, which could have escalated into war, suggests it was more than just the act of a single police officer driven by fanatical loyalty. Japan was on the verge of an alliance with Britain at the time, and Russia would have been a significant irritant. In fact, along with Nicholas, Espy

Crompton visited Japan.

The Russian diplomat's motive for the perpetrator's actions was described as 'strange.' In conclusion, the 'Otsu Incident' was resolved remarkably calmly, contrary to the serious situation at the time. Moreover, despite being a major incident involving an attempt on the life of an imperial crown prince, it did not gain significant international attention. While Japan's excessive response and Russia's subsequent magnanimity greatly contributed to its appeasement, this incident could have accelerated the first clash between Asia and the West. Furthermore, it could have escalated into a territorial dispute involving the expansionist ambitions of Japan and Britain, and Russia and China at the time. The author views this incident as Japan's initial attempt to ascend to the ranks of imperial powers and a warning to Western empires, and believes it could have been the starting point that led to a world war between East and West.

Russia and Japan's first clash between Eastern and Western empires, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, ended with an unexpected Russian defeat. The Anglo-Japanese relations we examined earlier began with a young man named Glover and led to a symbiotic relationship in 1901 with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Glover Garden, which I saw during my visit to Japan, was much larger and more expansive than I had imagined. Seeing the site, which remains under the name of an Englishman in a foreign land, I felt that the history of the victors is remembered by name, but the history of the vanquished leaves no trace. Thus, the symbiotic efforts between Russia and Japan, which began with the 'Otsu Incident,' escalated into the Russo-Japanese War and continue to this day as territorial disputes. 2. The Beginning of Discord in Russo-Japanese Relations The Otsu Incident (大津事件) persists. The reality is that a peace treaty has not yet been concluded between Russia and Japan.

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