Why Can't North Korea Give Up Nuclear Weapons?

Preparing for a Turbulent East Asia in the 21st Century: The Youth of Sarangbang Embrace Kyushu

Jeon Seon-mi Fudan University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: February 10, 2020

Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum · Jeon Seon-mi · Fudan University

Introduction

In the summer of 1945, atomic bombs were dropped on Japan. The day nuclear weapons were first used in human history left an indelible scar on humanity, even more than half a century later. Has the fear of nuclear weapons completely disappeared? Unfortunately, on the land where I live, despite desperate struggles for denuclearization, it continues. If the North Korean nuclear issue is not resolved, it may not only result in a tragedy of fratricidal strife in the 21st century but could also lead to a tragedy on a global scale. This is the urgent reason why nuclear weapons, first used more than half a century ago, must be the final historical record of their use on Earth. This field trip report began with the elementary question, 'Why can't North Korea give up nuclear weapons?' In September 2022, North Korea announced a new law on nuclear force policy. In fact, North Korea had already announced a law related to nuclear possession, which can be seen as a previous version of the current law, ten years ago in 2013. Therefore, this report attempts to analyze the continuity and discontinuity between the "Law on Solidifying the Status of a Nuclear-Weapon State" (hereinafter referred to as the "Law on Nuclear Possession"), announced in April 2013, and the "Law on the DPRK's Nuclear Force Policy," announced in September 2022. First, it aims to understand the continuity and discontinuity of the two laws. Second, it seeks to comprehend the core message of North Korea's new nuclear doctrine presented in the recently released law. Based on this, the report endeavors to understand the background behind North Korea's decision to enact a new nuclear force law after a decade.

Comparison of North Korea's Nuclear Force Legislation: 2013 vs. 2022

On September 8, 2022, North Korea adopted the Law on Nuclear Force Policy at the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly. Having enacted the Law on Nuclear Possession in 2013, North Korea explicitly stated in Article 11: "The effect of the Supreme People's Assembly Decree of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, adopted on April 1, 2013, 'On Solidifying the Status of a Nuclear-Weapon State,' shall be nullified," thereby signifying the enactment of a new nuclear-related law. The Law on Nuclear Force Policy, consisting of 11 articles and 17 clauses, differs in both structure and content from the previous Law on Nuclear Possession, which had 10 articles. While North Korea focused on solidifying its 'status as a nuclear-weapon state' both domestically and internationally by promulgating the law ten years ago, in 2022, North Korea is expressing a more assertive voice by identifying itself as a de facto nuclear-weapon state and advocating for the construction of a peaceful world where international justice is realized.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a dignified nuclear-weapon state capable of repelling any invading force in a single blow,

firmly defending the socialist system and reliably guaranteeing the happy lives of its people. (2013, Law on Nuclear Possession).

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as a responsible nuclear-weapon state, opposes all forms of war, including nuclear war,

and aims for the construction of a peaceful world where international justice is realized. (2022, Law on Nuclear Force Policy).

North Korea asserts the legitimacy of its nuclear weapon possession as a defensive choice against external aggression. The external forces North Korea refers to are the United States. In other words, North Korea argues that its possession of nuclear weapons is an unavoidable defensive choice due to the U.S.'s hostile policy towards North Korea and its nuclear threats. For North Korea, nuclear weapons are the most effective and reliable means to protect its sovereignty, territory, and fundamental interests, and to guarantee peace by preventing war on the Korean Peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region.

The nuclear weapons of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are a legitimate means of defense, acquired due to the persistent hostile policy and nuclear threats from the United States against our Republic. (Article 1, 2013 Law on Nuclear Possession).

North Korea argues that its possession of nuclear weapons is a defensive choice against the aggression of external forces, and by external forces, North Korea means the United States. In other words, North Korea claims that its nuclear weapons are an unavoidable defensive choice due to the U.S.'s hostile policy towards North Korea and its nuclear threats. For North Korea, nuclear weapons are the most effective and reliable means to protect its sovereignty, territory, and fundamental interests, and to prevent war in the Korean Peninsula and, by extension, Northeast Asia, thereby guaranteeing peace. The nuclear weapons of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are a response to the U.S.'s

continuously escalating hostile policy and nuclear threats against our Republic, and are an unavoidable

The nuclear force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a powerful means to protect the country's sovereignty, territorial integrity,

The nuclear forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are for the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity,

fundamental interests, prevent war on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia,

and ensure strategic stability in the world.

The nuclear posture of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a reliable, effective, and mature nuclear deterrence and defensive capability that can actively respond to all existing and evolving future nuclear threats.

(2022, Preamble to the Law on Nuclear Force Policy).

Through the Law on Nuclear Force Policy, North Korea demonstrates the absolute power of Chairman Kim Jong Un as the sole supreme commander with ultimate decision-making authority over nuclear weapons, specifying the conditions under which nuclear forces may be used. It stipulates that if the Kim Jong Un regime faces danger due to an attack by hostile forces, a nuclear strike to annihilate hostile forces, including the points of provocation and command centers, will be automatically and immediately carried out according to pre-determined operational plans. This confirms the significant emphasis placed on the function and role of North Korean nuclear weapons in deterring attacks and war against North Korea. 1. Why Can't North Korea Give Up Nuclear Weapons? Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

Specifically, regarding the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, unlike the Law on Nuclear Possession, which outlined the conditions for use in a single article, the Law on Nuclear Force Policy elaborates in detail across Article 5 (Principles of Nuclear Weapon Use) and Article 6 (Conditions for Nuclear Weapon Use). From this, we can infer the background and purpose behind North Korea's promulgation of the Law on Nuclear Force Policy.

The nuclear weapons of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea may only be used by the final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army to repel and retaliate against any invading or attacking hostile nuclear-weapon state. (Article 6, Law on Nuclear Possession).

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's fundamental principle is to use nuclear weapons as a last resort in response to external invasion and attack that gravely threaten the security of the state and its people. (Article 5(1), Law on Nuclear Force Policy).

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states as long as they do not collude with other nuclear-weapon states to engage in acts of aggression or attack against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (Article 5(2), Law on Nuclear Force Policy). If a nuclear or non-nuclear attack against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is imminent or has been launched (Article 6(1), Law on Nuclear Force Policy),

If a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces against the state leadership and the national nuclear force command organization is imminent or has been launched (Article 6(2), Law on Nuclear Force Policy),

If a critical military attack by hostile forces against the state's key strategic targets is imminent or has been launched (Article 6(3), Law on Nuclear Force Policy),

If it becomes operationally necessary to prevent the escalation and protraction of war and to seize the initiative in war (Article 6(4), Law on Nuclear Force Policy),

If a situation arises that poses an unavoidable crisis to the existence of the state and the lives and safety of the people, making it unavoidable to respond with nuclear weapons (Article 6(5), Law on Nuclear Force Policy).

Unlike the 2013 Law on Nuclear Possession, which stated that nuclear weapons could be used if North Korea was attacked or invaded, the Law on Nuclear Force Policy allows for more ambiguous and subjective judgments. Articles 6(1) through 6(3) use phrases such as 'if it is judged that an attack by hostile forces against North Korea is imminent' and 'if it is judged operationally unavoidable,' suggesting the possibility of using nuclear weapons even if North Korea's leadership (command structure) and key strategic assets feel threatened by hostile forces. The inclusion of subjective judgment and the broad definition of targets, including the leadership (command structure) and strategic assets, further clarify North Korea's intentions in possessing nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, while Article 5(1) states that the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort is the fundamental principle, the possibility of a preemptive nuclear strike by North Korea, stemming from its own misjudgment or subjective perception of threat, cannot be ruled out. The law also specifies the possibility of use against non-nuclear states, clearly drawing a line that contradicts the previous assumption that South Korea would not be a target.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, as long as they do not collude with other nuclear-weapon states to engage in acts of aggression or attack against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (Article 5, Law on Nuclear Possession).

...a nuclear strike to annihilate hostile forces, including the points of provocation and command centers, will be automatically and immediately carried out. (Article 2(3), Law on Nuclear Force Policy). The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states as long as they do not collude with other nuclear-weapon states to engage in acts of aggression or attack against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (Article 5(2), Law on Nuclear Force Policy).

If a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is imminent or has been launched (Article 6(1), Law on Nuclear Force Policy),

If a critical military attack by hostile forces against the state's key strategic targets is imminent or has been launched (Article 6(3), Law on Nuclear Force Policy),

If it becomes operationally necessary to prevent the escalation and protraction of war and to seize the initiative in war (Article 6(4), Law on Nuclear Force Policy),

If it becomes operationally necessary to prevent the escalation and protraction of war and to seize the initiative in war (Article 6(4), Law on Nuclear Force Policy).

Compared to the 2013 law, which had a defensive character, this decree shows a distinctly offensive shift, which can be seen as based on confidence in nuclear weapons. However, it is also evidence of North Korea's insecurity. A close examination of the nuclear decree reveals the ambiguous phrase 'if it is judged to be imminent,' leaving open almost all possibilities for nuclear use. This phrase can be determined by subjective judgment and can be seen as an attempt to maximize the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons based on confidence in them. In the era of nuclear weapons, due to the revolutionary increase in destructive power, deterrence that prevents the use of nuclear weapons itself is very important, rather than defense after their use, because of the unbearable human and material damage the adversary will suffer after use (Ha Young-sun, 2017). From North Korea's perspective, it may be aiming to achieve a balance of terror using nuclear weapons against internal and external threats. In other words, it is necessary to examine whether such an open interpretation indicates that North Korea has initiated a political war using nuclear weapons. In the future, North Korea will intensify a political war as heated as a hot war, using nuclear weapons, and will make the difficulty of solving problems in diplomatic negotiations for denuclearization and regime guarantees even greater. 1. Why North Korea Cannot Give Up Nuclear Weapons_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Data <Table 1> Comparison of North Korea's Nuclear Doctrines (2013 vs. 2022)

Category Nuclear-Weapon State Law (2013) Nuclear Force Policy Law (2022)

Preamble · Declaration of nuclear-weapon state status · Declaration of nuclear weapon use strategy and policy

Mission · Legitimate means of defense · Basic mission: War deterrence

(Purpose of Use) · Operational mission: Decisive victory in war

Principles of Use · No First Use (NFU*) Doctrine · Usable at any time (NFU* not adopted)

Adoption · Usable against non-nuclear states

Command and Control · Final order of the supreme commander · Sole command of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission (NC2**) · Assistance from the National Nuclear Force Command

· Limited delegation in case of NC2 incapacitation

Conditions for Use · To deter and repel aggression and attack · When attacked by nuclear or WMD, or imminent threat

of nuclear or WMD attack · Nuclear or non-nuclear

annihilation strike on enemy strongholds

· Operationally necessary to prevent escalation or prolonging of war, or to seize initiative

· In other situations deemed necessary

Maintenance Policy · Qualitative and quantitative enhancement of nuclear capabilities · Constant evaluation of nuclear force posture

· Qualitative and quantitative renewal and enhancement of nuclear forces

Source: Assessment of North Korea's Nuclear Force Operational Capability: Changes in Nuclear Force Policy and Recent Missile Provocations

Implications (Yang Uk)

Note: (1) NFU: No First Use

(2) NC2: Nuclear Command & Control

North Korea's Material and Mental Landscape Viewed Through Its Nuclear Program

North Korea announced and pursued the "Byungjin line" of parallel development of nuclear weapons and the economy in 2013. Examining the relationship between these two tracks, it appears that North Korea initially expected a mutually reinforcing cycle between its nuclear program and economy. However, as it faced persistent difficulties on the economic front, North Korea seems to have sought ways to leverage its nuclear capabilities to drive economic progress. A prime example of this is the lifting of international sanctions against the country. Beyond economic considerations, other objectives include the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations, the realization of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and the establishment of a peace regime. North Korea possesses a profound understanding of the political, in addition to the military, dimensions of its nuclear arsenal. Ultimately, facing limited options, North Korea appears to be pursuing strategies to make its own calculations prevail through political maneuvering centered on its nuclear program.

We have reached the level of strength we demand, and on the basis of reliably guaranteeing the safety of our state and people,

in line with humanity's common aspirations and goals, we will actively contribute to the building of a world free of nuclear weapons.

common aspirations and goals, we will actively contribute to the building of a world free of nuclear weapons.

This is the peace-loving stance of our Party, which has put forth the strategic line of parallel development of economic construction and the building of nuclear power. The historic tasks set forth by this strategic line have been brilliantly fulfilled.

parallel development of economic construction and the building of nuclear power have been brilliantly fulfilled.

Today, with the brilliant fulfillment of the historic tasks set forth by the strategic line of parallel development of economic construction and nuclear armament, our Party faces the crucial revolutionary task of accelerating the advance of the revolution with heightened confidence in victory and hastening the ultimate triumph of the socialist cause.

hastening the ultimate triumph of the socialist cause.

The Party faces the crucial revolutionary task of accelerating the advance of the revolution with heightened confidence in victory and hastening the ultimate triumph of the socialist cause. (Rodong Sinmun, 7th Party Congress, 3rd Plenary Session)

3rd Plenary Session)

As stated above, North Korea, through its Nuclear Weapons State Law and Nuclear Force Policy Law, asserts that the U.S. policy of hostility toward North Korea is the reason it cannot help but possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is necessary to examine more closely the thoughts that the North Korean leadership intends to convey to the United States through its words and writings. 1. Why North Korea Cannot Give Up Its Nuclear Weapons: Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Data

North Korea has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons unless a peace treaty is signed with the United States.

(December 16, 2013, Foreign Ministry Statement)

“As long as the U.S. heinous hostile policy toward North Korea is not eradicated,

our halting of nuclear development or our abandonment of nuclear weapons will never happen, even if the sky falls. Our military and people will continuously enhance the qualitative and quantitative strength of our righteous nuclear deterrent, which guarantees the future of the Juche revolutionary cause for ten thousand years.

Our military and people will continuously enhance the qualitative and quantitative strength of our righteous nuclear deterrent, which guarantees the future of the Juche revolutionary cause for ten thousand years.

We will continuously enhance the qualitative and quantitative strength of our righteous nuclear deterrent, which guarantees the future of the Juche revolutionary cause for ten thousand years. Strengthening national defense is the most important of all state affairs, and the dignity of the country, the happiness of the people, and peace itself rest upon a powerful gun barrel.” (2016 New Year's Address)

peace itself rest upon a powerful gun barrel.” (2016 New Year's Address)

While the Obama administration's policy of "strategic patience" toward North Korea continued, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in February 2013, its fourth in February 2016, and its fifth just six months later in September 2016. In response, President Trump strongly criticized the Obama administration's North Korea policy and proposed "maximum pressure and engagement." Trump characterized North Korea as a corrupt nation and declared that if North Korea "threaten[s] the United States or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea," expressing a very strong resolve. However, Chairman Kim Jong Un responded by stating that this confirmed "the path chosen by North Korea was the right one and the path that must be followed to the end," indicating that North Korea would not back down easily, regardless of the U.S. actively signaling military options. (Ha Young-sun, 2017) The following year, in 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test in September and launched the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in November. Following this, Chairman Kim Jong Un declared the "completion of the state nuclear force." Consequently, North Korea faced unprecedented international sanctions. UN Security Council Resolutions 2375 and 2397, adopted after the sixth nuclear test and the Hwasong-15 launch, included stringent sanctions, such as restrictions on oil supplies to North Korea and further limitations. Nevertheless, disregarding international condemnation and responses, Chairman Kim stated in his 2018 New Year's address that North Korea would use the victory in building its nuclear force as a springboard to "achieve new victories on all fronts of socialist construction through a revolutionary general offensive" and further strengthen its self-defense capabilities. In particular, he emphasized the acceleration of "mass production and practical deployment of nuclear warheads and ballistic rockets whose power and reliability are guaranteed" in the nuclear weapons and rocket sectors. (Ha Young-sun, 2018)

While the Obama administration maintained its strategic patience toward North Korea, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in February 2013, its fourth nuclear test in March 2016, and its fifth nuclear test six months later in September 2016. In response, President Trump strongly criticized the Obama administration's North Korea policy and proposed 'maximum pressure and engagement.' President Trump characterized North Korea as a corrupt nation and expressed a strong resolve, stating that if North Korea were to 'attack the United States or its allies, the United States would have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.' However, Chairman Kim Jong-un responded by stating that this confirmed the path chosen by North Korea was correct and must be followed to the end, thereby signaling that North Korea would not easily back down, regardless of how actively the United States hinted at military options. (Ha Young-sun, 2017) In September of the following year, 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test and, in November of the same year, launched the ICBM Hwasong-15. Chairman Kim Jong-un then declared the 'completion of state nuclear force.' Consequently, North Korea faced unprecedented international sanctions. UN Security Council Resolutions 2375 and 2397, implemented after the sixth nuclear test and the launch of the ICBM Hwasong-15, included strong sanctions such as restrictions on oil supply to North Korea and further limitations. However, despite international condemnation and responses, Chairman Kim, in his 2018 New Year's address, declared that North Korea would use the victory in building its nuclear force as a stepping stone to 'achieve new victories on all fronts of building a socialist strong nation through a revolutionary general offensive' and vowed to further solidify its self-defense capabilities. He specifically emphasized accelerating the 'mass production and practical deployment of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles that guarantee power and reliability' in the nuclear weapons and rocket sectors. (Ha Young-sun, 2018)

Building on the achievements in its nuclear program, Chairman Kim Jong Un defined 2018 as "a historic year in which great changes took place in domestic and foreign affairs and socialist construction entered a new stage due to our Party's line of independence and strategic decisions" (Ha Young-sun, 2019). On April 20 of the same year, at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Party, he declared the victory of the Byungjin line of economic construction and nuclear armament development pursued thus far, and announced a new strategic line, the "New Strategic Line," focusing all efforts on socialist economic construction.

Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea...

The strategic line of our Party for parallel development of economic construction and nuclear armament, proposed at the March 2013 plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee...

The historic tasks put forth by the strategic line for parallel development of economic construction and nuclear armament, proposed at the March 2013 plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee, have been brilliantly fulfilled.

Our Republic has proudly declared that the historic tasks set forth by the strategic line for parallel development of economic construction and nuclear armament, proposed at the March 2013 plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee, have been brilliantly fulfilled.

At this stage, where our Republic has firmly ascended to the position of a global political and ideological power and a military power,

the strategic line of our Party is to concentrate all efforts on socialist economic construction across the entire Party and the nation.

This is the strategic line of our Party. (Korean Central News Agency)

North Korea, based on its military confidence in nuclear weapons, proclaimed a new line and simultaneously formalized its willingness to denuclearize to both domestic and international audiences. As a result, inter-Korean summits, North Korea-China summits, and North Korea-U.S. summits took place in 2018. In his 2019 New Year's address, Chairman Kim Jong Un highly praised the North Korea-U.S. summit as having "greatly contributed to dramatically transforming the most hostile North Korea-U.S. relations and ensuring peace and security in the Korean Peninsula region." However, alongside this positive assessment, he also sent a warning message to the United States. He argued that if the U.S. misjudges North Korea and continues sanctions and pressure, North Korea will have no choice but to seek a new path to defend its sovereignty and national interests and achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. (Ha Young-sun, 2019) Contrary to expectations, due to the inability to overcome differences in opinions regarding the lifting of economic sanctions, denuclearization, improvement of North Korea-U.S. relations, and security guarantees, the second North Korea-U.S. summit concluded without significant achievements. Following the collapse of the North Korea-U.S. summit, attention is drawn to the position stated by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho at an emergency press conference held without prior notice. North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho stated that North Korea had demanded the lifting of only five of the eleven UN Security Council resolutions adopted between 2016 and 2017, specifically those that impede civilian economy and people's livelihoods, as a condition for dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear facility, rather than a comprehensive lifting of sanctions. However, as the United States rejected this partial lifting, the summit ultimately concluded without substantial outcomes, and North Korea placed the responsibility for the Hanoi "No Deal" on the United States. Nevertheless, the level of criticism directed at the U.S. was low, and North Korea also expressed its willingness to continue dialogue. North Korea identifies international sanctions against it as an indicator of the U.S. policy of hostility and insists on sanctions relief that can materially guarantee improved relations and trust-building. However, the subsequent remarks by Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, stating that "Chairman Kim Jong Un does not seem to fully understand the American way of calculation" and that "I get the impression that he has lost enthusiasm for such North Korea-U.S. dealings," indicated that both sides had reaffirmed their differing calculations. Beyond sanctions relief, North Korea and the U.S. also proposed different processes for implementation. The structural contradictions in the sequence and scope of denuclearization, as well as the implementation process for various issues arising from or as a consequence of denuclearization, could not be overcome. Consequently, North Korea-U.S. relations and inter-Korean relations entered another period of regression. The potential for a change in the "New Strategic Line" declared by North Korea in April 2018 was already cautiously anticipated as an external and internal crisis at this point. In October 2019, Kim Kye Gwan, advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued a statement urging the U.S. to present a new calculation by the end of the year. A few days later, Kim Yong Chol, vice chairman of the Workers' Party, who had been absent from U.S. affairs for some time, reiterated the call for a U.S. decision. North Korea's use of senior officials to present specific timelines and demand changes from the U.S. reveals its impatience and desperation. If this is the case, why did North Korea, in its impatient and desperate state, propose a specific deadline for negotiations within the year? It can be surmised that the North Korean leadership harbored confidence derived from its nuclear capabilities.

In his report titled "On Our Party's Current Fighting Tasks Amidst the Prevailing Domestic and International Situation," delivered at the 5th Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea held at the end of 2019, Chairman Kim Jong Un of North Korea highlighted the challenges of sanctions and pressure externally, and the difficulties in building a socialist power internally. Ha Young-sun (2020) points out that North Korea is emphasizing a "second Byungjin line," which seeks to overcome the difficulties faced by North Korea through nuclear deterrence and self-reliance, following the transition from the Byungjin line of nuclear and economic parallel development in March 2013 to a line focused on nuclear-based economic construction in 2018.

The challenges we have faced in the past few months were harsh and perilous ordeals that others could not have endured for even a single day.

endured for even a single day and would have retreated.

“Our external environment has not changed at all, whether we were pursuing the path of parallel development or are now concentrating all efforts on economic construction.

and hostile acts and nuclear threats continue to increase, we cannot sacrifice future security for visible economic achievements and prosperity.

and visible economic achievements and prosperity alone.

“The world will soon witness the new strategic weapons that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will possess.

(Rodong Sinmun, Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea)

5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee).

On August 19, 2020, Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, officially declared the failure of the 'National Economic Development Improvement Strategy' established at the 7th Party Congress in 2016 during the plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and in his opening address and the report on the work of the 8th Party Congress and the Central Committee.

The period for the five-year economic development strategy concluded last year, but the goals set forth

fell far short in almost all sectors... The struggle for new victories in socialist construction

is hindered by various challenges, both external and internal,

and these challenges still exist.

(KCNA)

According to estimates by the Bank of Korea, North Korea's economic growth rate has been on a downward trend since 2017, when international sanctions against North Korea began to take full effect. In particular, due to the triple hardship caused by natural disasters such as COVID-19 and floods, the growth rate was -4.5% in 2020 and -0.1% in 2021, shifting back to a decline after turning to growth in 2019, which was the first increase in three years since 2016. Furthermore, among the industrial sectors emphasized by North Korea for self-reliance, mining and agriculture, forestry, and fisheries showed the largest decreases, at -9.6% and -7.6% respectively. The deterioration of the North Korean economy can be attributed to international sanctions and the decrease in trade volume due to preemptive lockdown policies caused by COVID-19. Although North Korea adheres to self-reliance, its various economic indicators show a significant dependence on trade with China. However, after the outbreak of COVID-19, North Korea's early self-imposed lockdown policy and the resulting decrease in foreign trade likely acted as a limit to strengthening its domestic capabilities. Chairman Kim Jong Un's official acknowledgment of the 'failure of economic strategy' and the formulation of a new strategy were indicative of the difficult economic situation. Nevertheless, the reason North Korea emphasizes a 'second dual-track approach' is paradoxically due to the limitations of the structural contradictions between nuclear development and economic development. North Korea, which advocates for economic development through nuclear weapons, finds itself without many options due to continuous economic deterioration and is solely promoting self-reliance. However, in reality, economic development through self-reliance is impossible. Other approaches advocated by North Korea, like its economic strategy, have clear limitations in their potential for success. The situation will likely worsen as the strategy North Korea has chosen today—economic development through nuclear weapons and the pursuit of development through other avenues—operates without any virtuous cycle due to the structural limitations and contradictions inherent in all its objectives. In December 2020, North Korea promulgated the 'Law on Rejecting Anti-Socialist Ideological Culture' to prevent ideological laxity caused by the influx of foreign ideas, and in January 2021, it established the Discipline Investigation Department and the Ministry of Justice to strengthen internal controls and enforce discipline throughout society, indicating that there are cascading difficulties within North Korea's internal society.

In fact, North Korea likely has no other effective means than to continuously emphasize economic development alongside internal control through nuclear weapons, thereby instilling hope and ideological resolve in its citizens. On August 19, 2020, Chairman Kim Jong Un expressed strong determination at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, stating, 'The 8th Party Congress must be a congress of struggle, a congress of work, and a congress that comprehensively reviews the Party's work.' Through the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party, Chairman Kim established a new economic development strategy and presented a five-year plan for national economic development. 1. Why North Korea Cannot Give Up Nuclear Weapons_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Data North Korea issued a warning at the 8th Party Congress that its response would depend on the actions of South Korea and the United States. Regarding South Korea, it stated that if South Korea continues to pressure North Korea from a dualistic and unfair perspective, North Korea will have no choice but to deal with South Korea differently, and depending on South Korea's attitude, the inter-Korean relations could return to a new starting point of peace and prosperity like the spring three years ago in the near future. Regarding the United States, it described the U.S. as the primary obstacle to the development of the North Korean revolution and the greatest enemy, emphasizing the principles of self-reliance and the North Korean-style denuclearization that North Korea has consistently advocated. Similar to inter-Korean relations, the key to establishing new North Korea-U.S. relations lies in the U.S. abandoning its hostile policy toward North Korea, and North Korea will continue to deal with the U.S. on the principle of strength against strength and goodwill for goodwill (Ha Young-sun, 2021). This can be interpreted as North Korea's response method changing depending on the attitudes of South Korea and the United States. North Korea has repeatedly emphasized that the future of inter-Korean relations depends on the actions of South Korea and the United States, thereby creating a pretext that the choices of the other party could serve as a cause for North Korea's future actions. It is noteworthy that Chairman Kim Jong Un's unprecedented direct criticism of the U.S. administration at the Supreme People's Assembly, while offering the restoration of inter-Korean communication lines to South Korea, implies an intention to attempt to shake the alliance by imposing conditions unacceptable to South Korea and the U.S. Furthermore, it can be interpreted as an attempt by North Korea to build external justification for possessing nuclear weapons by explicitly revealing its distrust of U.S. foreign policy, such as 'diplomatic engagement' and 'unconditional dialogue,' while emphasizing the strengthening of national defense capabilities. This can be seen as North Korea's full-fledged commencement of nuclear weapon political warfare.

The U.S. attempt to create an asymmetric imbalance on the Korean Peninsula and surrounding areas

to exert pressure on us is a grave miscalculation that further exacerbates the acute and unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula, which is in an armistice state.

Our target is not the South Korean military, but the United States across the ocean.

(KCNA)

(Korean Central News Agency)

We have no intention or reason to provoke South Korea, nor do we intend to harm it.

As long as the factors causing distrust and confrontation remain, hostile acts will continue even if an end-of-war declaration is made.

The past eight months since the advent of the new U.S. administration have clearly shown that the U.S. military threat and hostile policy toward us have not changed in the least.

Rather, the forms and methods of expression have become more insidious.

Although the U.S. advocates for diplomatic engagement and unconditional dialogue, it is merely a facade to deceive the international community and cover up their hostile actions, and it is merely an extension of the hostile policies pursued by successive U.S. administrations.

The fundamental danger facing the world is the high-handedness and high-handedness of the United States and its followers.

(Speech at the Supreme People's Assembly, September 2021) 1. Why North Korea Cannot Give Up Nuclear Weapons_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Data

In a speech at the National Defense Development Exhibition in October 2021, North Korea strongly criticized the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and South Korea's military modernization. It emphasized that the high level of military tension, different from the past, creates an unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula, and therefore, North Korea's development of corresponding military power is a generational imperative for our revolution and a sacred duty for our revolution and future. This trend of military buildup was expected to continue into 2022. At the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in 2021, North Korea stated, 'The increasingly unstable military environment on the Korean Peninsula and the flow of international affairs demand that the strengthening of national defense capabilities be pursued even more vigorously without a moment's delay.' Under the guise of North Korean-style justification, North Korea announced that it would accelerate the qualitative and quantitative strengthening of its war deterrence and the development and production of essential strategic and tactical means for national security in accordance with the second five-year plan for the defense industry revolution (2021-2025) presented at the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The blind following of Japan and South Korea by the United States is accelerating the U.S.-Japan-ROK

trilateral military alliance manipulation, which is clearly a dangerous prelude to the creation of an 'Asian NATO.' The era of a 'new Cold War' has arrived in the Asia-Pacific region due to U.S. machinations, and a sharp confrontation structure where power clashes with power is being formed... As the U.S. formulated its Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at deterring China, it unreasonably designated our country as a 'major threat to regional instability,' and therefore, the joint military exercises conducted by the U.S., Japan, and South Korea in the Asia-Pacific region can be said to be primarily targeting us. (KCNA)

In addition to military and security cooperation such as ROK-U.S. military exercises, the ROK and the U.S. are strengthening close cooperation in non-military fields such as economy and intelligence. Although this is to counter the North Korean threat, North Korea likely perceives it as a threat because it views ROK-U.S. military exercises as a hostile policy toward North Korea. Furthermore, Japan, which North Korea criticizes as an imperialist aggressor, advocates for becoming a military power, and the U.S. has reiterated its acceptance of Japan's military role in U.S.-Japan summit meetings. Efforts to bridge the gaps in security cooperation have also been made among the ROK, the U.S., and Japan. Regional multilateral cooperation is also actively underway, and this consultative body began discussing formal institutionalization in an online meeting in August 2020, with the possibility of expansion into 'Quad Plus' involving neighboring countries such as South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand cannot be ruled out. In response, North Korea vehemently criticized this as the creation of an Asian NATO.

North Korea reported through the Rodong Sinmun on the military training of tactical nuclear operation units of the Korean People's Army from September 25 to October 9, and the firepower strike training of front-line long-range artillery units and air force flight units. Although North Korea had previously announced plans for the forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, this was the first time it conducted military training involving 'tactical nuclear weapon operation units.' In its report, North Korea stated at the outset that the purpose of this military training was to verify the country's war deterrence and nuclear counterattack capabilities, and it strongly condemned the ROK-U.S. military exercises and joint exercises with Japan, emphasizing that this external situation made it an unavoidable choice for North Korea's survival, thereby revealing North Korea's justification.

The military exercises of our armed forces were conducted at a time when large-scale naval forces of the combined forces, including U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, Aegis destroyers, and nuclear-powered submarines, were conducting dangerous military exercises in the waters of the Korean Peninsula.

The U.S., under the pretext of responding to North Korea's Nuclear Force Policy Law, has agreed to further strengthen extended deterrence for South Korea, and as a first demonstration, it brought the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier 'Ronald Reagan' strike group into the waters of the Korean Peninsula on September 23. From the 26th to the 29th, for four consecutive days, it conducted joint maritime exercises with South Korea in the East Sea of Korea, and on the 30th, it forcibly conducted joint anti-submarine exercises with Japan and South Korea. On October 6, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier strike group, which had left the East Sea of Korea, re-entered to conduct joint missile defense exercises, followed by joint maritime maneuver exercises on the 7th and 8th, thereby openly threatening us militarily and exacerbating the tension in the region. (Rodong Sinmun) On September 9, the day after the promulgation of the nuclear force policy, the Party Central Military Commission organized military exercises, and accordingly, from the end of September to the beginning of October, the large-scale reporting of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un's on-site guidance of military exercises by tactical nuclear weapon operation units was carried out. It is noteworthy that North Korea unhesitatingly disclosed the details of each exercise, including the time, content, and purpose.

On the morning of September 25, a ballistic missile launch exercise simulating the loading of a tactical nuclear warhead was conducted at a reservoir underwater launch site in the northwestern part of our country... The purpose of the exercise was to confirm the rapid and safe handling procedures for the transport and deployment of tactical nuclear warheads, to verify and master the reliability of the overall operational system, and to train in the ballistic missile launch capabilities from reservoir underwater launch sites and inspect the rapid response posture... The launched tactical ballistic missile flew along the predetermined trajectory over the target in the East Sea of Korea, and the reliable detonation of the warhead at the set altitude was verified... Furthermore, the planned direction for the construction of reservoir underwater launch sites was confirmed through the live-fire exercise.

On September 28, in a ballistic missile launch exercise simulating the loading of a tactical nuclear warhead, conducted with the aim of neutralizing airfields within the South Korean operational area, issues related to the operation of nuclear warheads

were addressed.

The U.S. strategy for the Indo-Pacific, aimed at deterring China, unreasonably designates our country as a 'major threat to regional instability.'

Therefore, the joint military exercises conducted by the U.S., Japan, and South Korea in the Asia-Pacific region can be said to be primarily targeting us.

(KCNA)

The ROK and the U.S. are strengthening close cooperation not only in military and security fields such as ROK-U.S. military exercises but also in non-military fields such as economy and intelligence. While this is intended to counter the North Korean threat, North Korea likely perceives it as a threat because it views ROK-U.S. military exercises as a hostile policy toward North Korea. Furthermore, Japan, which North Korea criticizes as an imperialist aggressor, advocates for becoming a military power, and the U.S. has reiterated its acceptance of Japan's military role in U.S.-Japan summit meetings. Efforts to bridge the gaps in security cooperation have also been made among the ROK, the U.S., and Japan. Regional multilateral cooperation is also actively underway, and this consultative body began discussing formal institutionalization in an online meeting in August 2020, with the possibility of expansion into 'Quad Plus' involving neighboring countries such as South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand cannot be ruled out. In response, North Korea vehemently criticized this as the creation of an 'Asian NATO.'

The relevant military exercises of our armed forces were conducted at a time when large-scale naval forces of the combined forces, including U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, Aegis destroyers, and nuclear-powered submarines, were conducting dangerous military exercises in the waters of the Korean Peninsula.

From the 26th to the 29th, for four consecutive days, it conducted joint maritime exercises with South Korea in the East Sea of Korea, and on the 30th, it forcibly conducted joint anti-submarine exercises with Japan and South Korea.

On October 6, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier strike group, which had left the East Sea of Korea, re-entered to conduct joint missile defense exercises, followed by joint maritime maneuver exercises on the 7th and 8th, thereby openly threatening us militarily and exacerbating the tension in the region.

(Rodong Sinmun) On September 9, the day after the promulgation of the nuclear force policy, the Party Central Military Commission organized military exercises, and accordingly, from the end of September to the beginning of October, the large-scale reporting of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un's on-site guidance of military exercises by tactical nuclear weapon operation units was carried out.

It is noteworthy that North Korea unhesitatingly disclosed the details of each exercise, including the time, content, and purpose.

The purpose of the exercise was to confirm the rapid and safe handling procedures for the transport and deployment of tactical nuclear warheads, to verify and master the reliability of the overall operational system, and to train in the ballistic missile launch capabilities from reservoir underwater launch sites and inspect the rapid response posture...

The launched tactical ballistic missile flew along the predetermined trajectory over the target in the East Sea of Korea, and the reliable detonation of the warhead at the set altitude was verified... Furthermore, the planned direction for the construction of reservoir underwater launch sites was confirmed through the live-fire exercise.

were addressed.

The U.S. strategy for the Indo-Pacific, aimed at deterring China, unreasonably designates our country as a 'major threat to regional instability.'

Therefore, the joint military exercises conducted by the U.S., Japan, and South Korea in the Asia-Pacific region can be said to be primarily targeting us. (KCNA)

On September 25, a ballistic missile launch exercise simulating the loading of a tactical nuclear warhead was conducted at a reservoir underwater launch site in the northwestern part of our country...

were addressed.

The U.S. strategy for the Indo-Pacific, aimed at deterring China, unreasonably designates our country as a 'major threat to regional instability.'

Therefore, the joint military exercises conducted by the U.S., Japan, and South Korea in the Asia-Pacific region can be said to be primarily targeting us. (KCNA)

The U.S. strategy for the Indo-Pacific, aimed at deterring China, unreasonably designates our country as a 'major threat to regional instability.'

Therefore, the joint military exercises conducted by the U.S., Japan, and South Korea in the Asia-Pacific region can be said to be primarily targeting us. (KCNA)

were addressed.

The overall system stability was verified, and in tactical ballistic missile launch drills conducted on September 29 and October 1,

various types of tactical ballistic missile launch drills, the corresponding set targets were hit with a combination of airburst and direct precision and scattered strike, confirming the accuracy and power of our weapon systems.

airburst and direct precision and scattered strike, confirming the accuracy and power of our weapon systems.

weapon systems' accuracy and power.

On October 4, the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea adopted a decision to send a stronger and clearer warning to the enemy in response to the ongoing unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula,

unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula, to send a stronger and clearer warning to the enemy,

and to strike a set target in the Pacific Ocean, 4,500 km across the Japanese archipelago, with a new long-range ground-to-ground ballistic missile.

across the Japanese archipelago, 4,500 km across the Japanese archipelago, to strike a set target in the Pacific Ocean,

and to strike a set target in the Pacific Ocean.

On October 6, in the early morning, an ultra-large multiple rocket launcher and tactical ballistic missile strike drill was conducted to verify the power of the functional combat warhead, simulating a strike on the enemy's main military command facilities.

On the morning of September 9, an ultra-large multiple rocket launcher firing drill was conducted, simulating a strike on the enemy's main ports.

On the morning of September 9, an ultra-large multiple rocket launcher firing drill was conducted, simulating a strike on the enemy's main ports. (Rodong Sinmun)

On October 6, a joint strike drill was conducted by long-range artillery sub-units of the Korean People's Army's Western Front and air force units of the Western District... The joint strike drill involved air force units striking an island target simulating an enemy military base with medium-range air-to-ground guided bombs and cruise missiles, and performing close-attack and bombing missions, followed by sequential firepower strikes by long-range artillery sub-units of the front.

On October 6, a joint strike drill was conducted by long-range artillery sub-units of the Korean People's Army's Western Front and air force units of the Western District...

The joint strike drill involved air force units striking an island target simulating an enemy military base with medium-range air-to-ground guided bombs and cruise missiles, and performing close-attack and bombing missions, followed by sequential firepower strikes by long-range artillery sub-units of the front.

medium-range air-to-ground guided bombs and cruise missiles, and performing close-attack and bombing missions, followed by sequential firepower strikes by long-range artillery sub-units of the front.

sequential firepower strikes by long-range artillery sub-units of the front.

On October 8, against the backdrop of joint naval exercises by the US Navy, including an aircraft carrier that had re-entered the East Sea of Korea, the Korean People's Army Air Force conducted a large-scale integrated air attack drill, launching about 150 various combat aircraft simultaneously for the first time in history... The drill aimed to assess the ground target strike and air combat capabilities of air force divisions and regiments, reaffirm the scale, procedures, and methods of air strikes according to operational targets, master flight command, and enhance the cooperative operational capabilities of units. The reliability of new air weapon systems was verified through test launches... Subsequently, on the night of the same day, a concentrated firepower strike drill by long-range artillery sub-units of the Eastern Front was conducted, simulating a strike on enemy operational airfields...

the Korean People's Army Air Force conducted a large-scale integrated air attack drill, launching about 150 various combat aircraft simultaneously for the first time in history...

The drill aimed to assess the ground target strike and air combat capabilities of air force divisions and regiments, reaffirm the scale, procedures, and methods of air strikes according to operational targets, master flight command, and enhance the cooperative operational capabilities of units.

master flight command, and enhance the cooperative operational capabilities of units.

and enhance the cooperative operational capabilities of units.

The reliability of new air weapon systems was verified through test launches...

Subsequently, on the night of the same day, a concentrated firepower strike drill by long-range artillery sub-units of the Eastern Front was conducted, simulating a strike on enemy operational airfields...

a concentrated firepower strike drill by long-range artillery sub-units of the Eastern Front was conducted, simulating a strike on enemy operational airfields...

and confirmed once again the rapid response capability and military power in the given combat situations, and the combat performance of the weapon systems.

and confirmed once again the rapid response capability and military power in the given combat situations, and the combat performance of the weapon systems. (Rodong Sinmun)

Furthermore, what does the world look like from North Korea's perspective today? And to what extent does North Korea perceive the crisis? The subjective threats arising from the limitations of North Korea's vision, intertwined with objective internal and external difficulties, would have painted a picture of the world that was unfavorable to them. Ultimately, this means that North Korea has not possessed even a few pebbles that could change objective reality or overcome subjective judgment over the past decades. The only pebble North Korea has is nuclear, which it can hide in its pocket and take out to touch. Consequently, North Korea began a political war using nuclear weapons by enacting a new law on nuclear force policy in September 2022. The pebble that North Korea has taken out—can it survive in the world today? This is a clearly wrong choice in the flow of reality. We understand the military and political dangers of nuclear weapons better than anyone. We must put an end to the human tragedy caused by nuclear weapons with a sense of arduous mission to reside on this land.

Bibliography Yang Wook. 2022. “Assessment of North Korea's Nuclear Force Operational Capability: Changes in Nuclear Force Policy and

Implications of Recent Missile Provocations”

Ha Young-sun. 2017. “Finding a New Path to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis”

______. 2018. “The Three Faces of Kim Jong-un's New Year's Address and the Pyeongchang Olympics”

______. 2019. “Kim Jong-un's 2019 New Year's Address and the Task of Complete Denuclearization” ______. 2020. “North Korea's 2020 'Frontal Breakthrough' Amidst Two Major Difficulties”

______. 2021. “The 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea: North Korea's Stagnant

Next Five Years)”

Rodong Sinmun

Korean Central News Agency

Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea. 2022. “Defense White Paper 2022”

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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