5. On the Sino-Soviet Split and Mao Zedong's "Intermediate Zone" Theory: The Ideals and Limitations of "Intermediate Zone Theory" in New China's Diplomacy

Mao Zedong Memorial Hall · Son Seung-po · Korea University

Introduction

Less than a year after the end of World War II, around February 1962, Churchill announced the advent of a new international order, the Cold War, through his famous "Iron Curtain" speech. The deepening conflict between the US and the Soviet Union had a profound impact on China, leading to the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in June of that year. It was during this period that Mao Zedong conceived the concept of the "intermediate zone," reflecting his independent judgment of the global situation. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Mao further systematized the concept of the intermediate zone, eventually advocating the theory of "three worlds" in the 1970s.

Mao Zedong era (1949-1976) Chinese foreign policy can be understood in three stages, divided roughly by decade (Kawashima Shin, Mori Kazuko 2012). From the establishment of the People's Republic of China until the mid-1950s, it was a policy of leaning solely towards the Soviet Union (Soviet one-sided diplomacy), adopting Zhdanov's theory of two camps and pursuing an anti-American, pro-Soviet stance. The 1960s saw an isolated diplomacy characterized by anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism, coupled with a Third World diplomacy based on the theory of the intermediate zone. The 1970s can be summarized by the formation of an anti-Soviet international united front based on the theory of three worlds and the pursuit of Sino-American détente. This paper aims to explain these three periods by focusing on Mao's unique theory of the intermediate zone. Specifically, it is noteworthy that Chinese foreign policy from the 1950s to the 1960s, by simultaneously antagonizing the United States and the Soviet Union, the superpowers under the Cold War system, and thus inviting isolation, displayed aspects that are difficult to explain through the logic of international security strategy (Kim Jae-cheol, 2007). The fact that academic attention has been relatively insufficient regarding the theory of the intermediate zone and its legacy, which formed the ideological basis for China's most insecure period, also underscores the necessity of this paper.

Some may question whether it is appropriate to understand New China's foreign policy through Mao Zedong's personal foreign policy perceptions. However, at that time, Mao Zedong was not merely a political leader but a revolutionary leader who ended a century of national turmoil. His political influence was comparable to that of past emperors (Teiwes, 2001). Moreover, in the early Cold War, when the dual tasks of revolution and nation-building intersected, the lack of information and experience among CPC leaders regarding foreign policy led to an almost complete reliance on Mao Zedong for foreign policy strategy (Niu Jun 2015, 5-63). In other words, Mao Zedong's foreign policy perceptions were realized through New China's foreign policy, and given that Mao Zedong's ideological legacy continues as a fundamental principle of contemporary Chinese diplomacy, research on Mao personally is, in essence, research on the early foreign policy of New China.

The Conception of the Intermediate Zone and the Declaration of Leaning to One Side

Mao's independent perception of the "intermediate zone" was first confirmed in August 1946, during the Cold War order's establishment and while the civil war was ongoing domestically, in a conversation with American journalist Anna Louise Strong.

“The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a very vast zone, and in this zone are

many capitalist countries and colonial, semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The American reactionaries cannot possibly attack the Soviet Union before they have subjugated these countries...

(omitted)... The United States is deploying large-scale military forces and establishing military bases in many countries under various pretexts. The American reactionaries claim that all the military bases they have already established or intend to establish around the world are aimed against the Soviet Union.

Certainly, these military bases are aimed at the Soviet Union. However, it is not the Soviet Union that is first subjected to American aggression, but the countries where military bases are established.” (Mao Zedong 1946)

Mao acknowledged the bipolarization of the world around the US and the Soviet Union following the Cold War order, but he also sought to point out the existence of a vast intermediate zone between the two superpowers. He refused to passively accept the Cold War dichotomy of international affairs. The intermediate zone was largely composed of newly established nation-states after World War II, but capitalist countries in the West under American influence were also understood to be included in the concept of the intermediate zone. In other words, the world was not divided into the US and the Soviet Union, but tripartite, consisting of the US, the Soviet Union, and the vast zone in between, and seizing the numerous capitalist, colonial, and semi-colonial countries located in the intermediate zone was the primary objective of American imperialism.

Mao's conception of the world as tripartite, including the intermediate zone, rather than divided into the capitalist-liberal forces led by the US and the socialist-communist forces led by the Soviet Union, was influenced by his theory of contradiction. "On Contradiction" is a dialectical logic used in Marxism-Leninism, adapted and developed to fit China's reality. Mao argued that the basis of social development stems from the continuous emergence of contradictions. Therefore, the most accurate judgment of reality must begin with identifying the principal contradictions of the time (Kim Ok-jun 2011, 35-41). This dialectical thinking of Mao not only guided the Chinese Revolution but also had a profound impact on understanding the post-war international order, with the intermediate zone theory being a prime example. Mao argued that the principal contradictions in the world at that time lay not between the ideological and systemic conflicts surrounding the US and the Soviet Union, but between imperialist forces and the forces of people's revolution, and he urged the numerous countries in the intermediate zone to unite and resist imperialist forces. To concretize the threat of American imperialism to the intermediate zone countries and to form a united front against it, Mao proposed the "smokescreen theory" (Mao Zedong 1946, 43-45). The American "anti-Soviet war slogan" was merely a "smokescreen" to conceal aggression against intermediate zone countries, including China, and countries located in the intermediate zone should never be deceived by American tactics (Mao Zedong 1954, 121-122; Mao Zedong 1954, 123-126).

Mao's thinking, which identified the principal global contradiction not between the US and the Soviet Union but between the reactionary forces of US imperialism and the forces of people's revolution, was further elaborated. He emphasized the importance of revolutionary struggle, stating, "Oppose the frenzied aggression of US imperialism against China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" and "Oppose the traitorous and dictatorial Kuomintang reactionary government that massacres the Chinese people through civil war" (Kim Seung-il 2008, 270-274). Later, in his essay "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," he referred to the United States as the main enemy of the socialist camp (Kim Seung-il 2008, 390-405). If the main enemy of the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War was the Kuomintang government led by Chiang Kai-shek, which was supported by the United States, then by the time the revolution concluded, the main enemy had shifted to the United States.

Less than a year after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, in February 1950, Mao Zedong signed the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance" with Stalin's Soviet Union and adopted a policy of leaning entirely towards the Soviet Union. However, to perceive this as a major shift in China's foreign policy—from the intermediate zone theory to leaning to one side—is to see only half the truth. While it may appear inconsistent on the surface, according to Mao Zedong's thinking, both the intermediate zone theory and the policy of leaning to one side were strategies that shared the contradiction between imperialist forces and the forces of people's revolution. For Mao, the opposing pole to the "socialist" camp was not the "capitalist" camp but the "imperialist" camp, and it was a consistent foreign policy with coherent internal logic in opposing the United States, the imperialist power posing the greatest security threat to China (Lee Won-jun 2019).

After the Korean War, China actually began to strengthen its diplomacy with third world countries in the intermediate zone. The intermediate zone was perceived by Chinese leaders as a strategic space with immense potential to influence world politics. Asia, in particular, was seen as a space that possessed the inherent power to change the global political landscape, where China could exert strong influence and even play a leading role (Niu Jun 2015, 401-434). China sought to mitigate its previously belligerent and radical image by using relatively moderate language and discourse, differentiating itself from Western industrial nations that had repeatedly engaged in aggression and exploitation. In particular, the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, advocated by China at the time, received a strong response among third world countries that shared the common experience of colonialism. These principles were later expanded into the ten principles of peace at the Bandung Conference. The intermediate zone thus became a stage for China's new strategic competition outside the two major blocs and a discovery of new diplomatic space not sought within the Cold War system. In particular, the five principles of peace proposed in this process came to function as normative principles defining China's diplomatic rhetoric in the future.

The Intermediate Zone Theory and the Three Worlds Theory

Mao Zedong's intermediate zone theory emerged as a concrete strategy in Chinese foreign policy after the declaration of leaning to one side, in 1954. Mao sought to counter imperialism by exploiting the fissures in the "intermediate zone" and the contradictions within the capitalist bloc. Mao argued as follows in a conversation with a delegation from the British Labour Party:

“The United States of America, under the guise of anti-communism, is concealing its ulterior motive of seeking to control the intermediate zone from Japan to Britain...(omitted)... The aim of the United States is to occupy, bully, and control the economies of the countries located in the vast intermediate zone, establish military bases, and watch their decline. Japan and Germany are included in the intermediate zone.” (Mao Zedong, 1954)

This logic seems to echo the "smokescreen theory" proposed in August 1946, but it differs significantly from the initial concept of the intermediate zone. While the primary actors in the intermediate zone concept presented in August 1946 were revolutionary popular forces, the first intermediate zone theory that emerged in 1954 referred to the numerous newly independent nations born in the post-war order, as well as wealthy capitalist countries in Europe and Asia, excluding the US and the Soviet Union (Niu Jun 2015, 407-409). Mao's developed understanding of intermediate zone countries is further clarified in the following passage:

Mao's thinking, which judged the world's principal contradictions to be between reactionary forces led by the United States and revolutionary forces of the people, rather than between the US and the Soviet Union, would later become more concrete. He emphasized the importance of revolutionary struggle, stating that China would "oppose the fanatical invasion of China by US imperialism under the leadership of the Communist Party of China" and "oppose the traitorous and dictatorial Kuomintang reactionary government that is slaughtering the Chinese people through civil war" (Kim Seung-il 2008, 270-274). Later, in his essay "On the Dictatorship of People's Democracy," he mentioned the United States as the main enemy of the socialist camp (Kim Seung-il 2008, 390-405). If the main enemy of the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War was the Kuomintang government led by Chiang Kai-shek, which was supported by the United States, then at the time the revolution was concluding, that enemy shifted to the United States.

In February 1950, less than a year after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Mao Zedong signed the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance" with Stalin's Soviet Union, embarking on a path of leaning solely towards the Soviet Union. However, to perceive this as a major shift in China's foreign policy—a change from the theory of the intermediate zone to a Soviet-leaning stance—is to see only half the truth. While it may appear inconsistent on the surface, in Mao Zedong's thinking, both the theory of the intermediate zone and the Soviet-leaning line were strategies that shared the contradiction between imperialist forces and people's revolutionary forces. For Mao, the opposing pole to the 'socialist' camp was not the 'capitalist' camp but the 'imperialist' camp, and it was a consistent foreign policy with coherent internal logic in its opposition to the United States, the imperialist power posing the greatest security threat to China (Lee Won-jun 2019).

China indeed began to strengthen its diplomacy with Third World countries in the intermediate zone after the Korean War. The intermediate zone was perceived by Chinese leaders as a strategic space with immense potential to influence world politics. Asia, in particular, was understood as a space where the dynamics of world politics could be transformed, and where China could exert strong influence, even play a leading role (New Jun 2015, 401-434). China sought to mitigate its previously belligerent and radical image by using relatively moderate language and discourse instead of revolution and struggle, while simultaneously aiming to create a distinct impression from Western industrial nations that had repeatedly engaged in aggression and exploitation. Notably, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that China advocated at the time—mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence—received a strong response from Third World countries that shared the common experience of colonialism, and were later expanded into the Ten Principles of Bandung. The intermediate zone thus became a stage for China's new strategic competition outside the two camps and a discovery of new diplomatic space not explored during the Cold War. In particular, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence presented in this process would function as normative principles defining China's foreign policy rhetoric henceforth.

Theory of the Intermediate Zone and Theory of Three Worlds

Mao Zedong's theory of the intermediate zone emerged as a concrete strategy in Chinese foreign policy in 1954, after the declaration of leaning towards the Soviet Union. Mao sought to counter imperialism by exploiting the fissures in the 'intermediate zone' between the US and the capitalist forces, and the contradictions within capitalist forces. In a conversation with a delegation of the British Labour Party, Mao argued as follows:

“The United States of America is concealing its ulterior motives of controlling the intermediate zone from Japan to Britain, and is creating a pretext of anti-communism...

...The aim of the United States is to occupy, harass, control the economies of, establish military bases in, and watch the decline of the countries located in the vast intermediate zone. Here, Japan and Germany are included in the intermediate zone.” (Mao Zedong, 1954)

The United States of America is concealing its ulterior motives of controlling the intermediate zone from Japan to Britain, and is creating a pretext of anti-communism... The aim of the United States is to occupy, harass, control the economies of, establish military bases in, and watch the decline of the countries located in the vast intermediate zone. Here, Japan and Germany are included in the intermediate zone.

Japan and Germany are included in the intermediate zone.” (Mao Zedong, 1954)

(Mao Zedong, 1954)

This logic appears to be a partial repetition of the "smokescreen theory" of imperialism proposed in 1946, but it differs significantly from the initial concept of the intermediate zone. While the primary actors in the intermediate zone concept presented in August 1946 were revolutionary people's forces, the first theory of the intermediate zone that emerged in 1954 referred to the numerous newly independent nations born in the post-war order, as well as wealthy capitalist countries in Europe and Asia, excluding the United States and the Soviet Union (New Jun 2015, 407-409). Mao's developed understanding of intermediate zone countries is further clarified in the following passage.

“Monopoly capitalist countries like West Germany are cooperating with the United States while also resisting it, and Japan is the same. We call this region the intermediate zone.

resisting it, and Japan is the same. We call this region the intermediate zone.

The socialist camp is calculated on one side, and the United States on the other.

Everything in between constitutes the intermediate zone.

However, the countries located in the intermediate zone are all essentially different...

...However, the United States wants to swallow them all.”

(Mao Zedong 1962) 6. Mao Zedong's New China Diplomacy: On the Ideals and Limitations of the Theory of the Intermediate Zone_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

In other words, Mao aimed to enable a more flexible execution of Chinese foreign policy by suggesting that, on the basis of the two-camp theory, contradictions were intensifying even among advanced capitalist countries long considered eternal allies of the United States, and that solidarity was possible if they agreed to the banner of anti-imperialism. Mao's expanded understanding of the intermediate zone was further solidified with the emergence of an independent foreign policy led by France's de Gaulle. Witnessing France's refusal to participate in the US-led order and its independent pursuit of nuclear development, Mao came to believe that a rejection of the bipolar Cold War structure of the US and the Soviet Union was also shared among Western capitalist countries (Michael Yahuda 1983, 104-114).

Mao subsequently argued that the world was composed of "two intermediate zones." The first zone comprised the newly independent nations of "Asia, Africa, and Latin America," holding the status of developing countries, and was termed the First Intermediate Zone. The second zone consisted of advanced capitalist countries represented by "Europe, Japan, and Canada," whose contradictions with the United States were progressively widening, and these were termed the Second Intermediate Zone. In essence, the world was divided into three parts, with the intermediate zone further divided into the First and Second Intermediate Zones. The First Intermediate Zone was to form an international united front, including the industrial nations of the Second Intermediate Zone, to counter imperialist forces. "All peoples across Asia, Africa, and Latin America oppose the United States.

oppose the United States. Many people in Europe, North America, and Oceania also oppose US imperialism. Some imperialists also oppose US imperialism. De Gaulle's opposition to the United States is proof of this.

Many people in Europe, North America, and Oceania also oppose US imperialism. Some imperialists also oppose US imperialism. De Gaulle's opposition to the United States is proof of this.

De Gaulle's opposition to the United States is proof of this.

Through this, we can now propose the viewpoint that there are two intermediate zones: Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute the first,

Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute the first,

and Europe, North America, and Oceania constitute the second.

Japan also belongs to the second intermediate zone. Japan's monopoly capitalists also express dissatisfaction with the United States and openly oppose it at times.

Japan also belongs to the second intermediate zone. Japan's monopoly capitalists also express dissatisfaction with the United States and openly oppose it at times.

Although many depend on the United States, with the passage of time, they will drive the United States from its position of power.

of time, they will drive the United States from its position of power.”

(Mao Zedong 1964)

The world is composed of three parts: the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, the imperialist aggressive forces led by the United States, and the intermediate zone in between. The status of countries located in the intermediate zone has changed from being the front line of revolution that the Communist Party of China supported and carried out anti-imperialist struggles to becoming subjects that must unite to carry out anti-imperialist struggles. At that time, China's diplomatic efforts were concentrated on the national liberation movements of the First Intermediate Zone countries, which were often driven by the highly ideological motive of China's world revolution strategy (Kim Ok-jun 2009). However, through the theory of the intermediate zone, Mao expressed the intention for China to pursue solidarity with advanced capitalist countries in Western Europe, which were traditionally perceived as lackeys of imperialism.

Theory of Three Worlds

Mao's understanding of the intermediate zone underwent a decisive change as the 1970s approached. This stemmed from the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, which had been ongoing since the 1960s, leading him to advocate the theory of three worlds, a more realistic development of the logic beyond the second theory of the intermediate zone.

“Mao Zedong: Who belongs to the First World?

Kounda: I believe it is the exploiters and imperialists.”

Mao Zedong: Then, what about the Second World?

Kaundha: I believe it refers to those who have become revisionists.

Mao Zedong: I consider the United States and the Soviet Union to belong to the First World.

In between are the Second World countries, including Japan, Europe, Australia, and Canada.

The rest belong to the Third World.” (Mao Zedong 1974)

From the mid-1960s onwards, Mao began to depart from the conventional perception of dividing the world into three parts based on the theory of two camps, and started to view the United States and the Soviet Union as belonging to the same First World bloc. Meanwhile, China's self-perception shifted from that of an intermediate zone country to a Third World country, signifying that the Soviet Union was no longer an ally sharing strategic interests with China but an adversary to be contended with. The Soviet Union came to be regarded as an imperialist country in the First World, exploiting the Third World, just like the United States.

The relationship between China and the Soviet Union is, in fact, a long history of love and hate that began with the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Stalin harbored constant suspicions towards Mao Zedong, and the arrogant attitude displayed by the Soviet Union during and after the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance left deep scars on Mao Zedong's pride. Therefore, an assessment exists that China's one-sided diplomacy was merely a policy pursued out of practical necessity to achieve economic development by receiving economic and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and imitating the Soviet model of industrialization, while simultaneously countering the overwhelming security threat posed by the United States (Michael Yahuda 1983; Lee Dong-ryul 2015). In the 1950s, after Stalin's death, the 'de-Stalinization campaign' led by Khrushchev (N. Khrushchev), who came to power, fueled ideological disputes over revisionism between China and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's military passivity, revealed during the Korean War (1950) and the Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958), served as a crucial moment that clearly demonstrated the limitations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (Nakajima Mineo 1977). Furthermore, Khrushchev's advocacy of 'peaceful coexistence' was regarded as a revisionist ideology to be overthrown, and a betrayal of China in terms of ideology and security. Crucially, the 'Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963)' between the US and the USSR in the 1960s intensified China's suspicion that the Soviet Union was colluding with the United States to attack China (Michael Yahuda 1968). The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) led China to perceive Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to China's security. The tension between the two countries eventually materialized through border clashes between China and the Soviet Union (1969), which exacerbated Mao's security anxieties and prompted him to actively form an anti-Soviet united front (Yang Kuisong 2000). At the time, Mao Zedong believed that there was a real possibility of a Soviet military attack on China, and based on this, the heightened security concerns became the backdrop for promoting Sino-US détente (Radchenko, Sergey 2017). Ultimately, China, in response to the changing international landscape and security perceptions, adopted an anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist line, opposing both US imperialism and Soviet social imperialism. To implement this, it pursued the establishment of a unified revolutionary front through the alliance of the First and Second Intermediate Zones (Kim Ok-jun, 2009).

Significance and Limitations of the Intermediate Zone Theory

Mao Zedong's Intermediate Zone Theory reflects the high ideals of Chinese diplomacy. Mao's determination to end the prolonged political turmoil since the fall of the Qing Dynasty and restore China's international standing is highly commendable, yet its limitations have also become evident over time. This section will examine the merits and demerits, achievements and failures of the Intermediate Zone Theory. Significance

In 1948, amidst the ongoing Chinese Civil War, Mao Zedong understood the emerging international order not within the context of Cold War ideological confrontation, but within the historical framework of national liberation struggles that had been ongoing since the era of Western encroachment. Therefore, in his concept of the intermediate zone, the dividing line was not between the US and the USSR, but between the imperialist reactionary forces and the broad 'intermediate zone' of peoples resisting them (Lee Won-jun 2016). This was an innovative logic (Okabe Tatsumi 1977) that rejected the Cold War paradigm positing a horizontal conflict between East and West, and instead posited a vertical conflict between North and South—the contradiction between advanced capitalist powers and newly independent nations still struggling to escape the status of developing countries. Based on this, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Bandung diplomacy are evaluated as the starting point of China's multilateral diplomacy, which aimed to secure a leadership position among Asian nations by advancing into the intermediate zone within the bipolar international order dominated by the US and the USSR (New Jun 2015, 434-435).

Mao Zedong's Intermediate Zone Theory also served a domestic political purpose. Through his independent judgment of global contradictions, Mao sought to elevate the importance and status of the Chinese revolutionary movement. To this end, Mao intentionally downplayed the significance of US-Soviet conflict and highlighted the struggle between the world's peoples and imperialist reactionary forces, thereby positioning China's socialist revolution at the very center of this global historical current. In other words, through the Intermediate Zone Theory, the socialist revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party was elevated from a movement confined to resolving internal Chinese contradictions to one of world-historical significance.

Specifically, by positing that the core contradiction in the international arena existed between the United States and the 'intermediate zone,' the front between the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist government, which received material support from the United States, and the Chinese Communist Party was equated with the forefront of the world revolution. Through this, Mao was able to solidify the political legitimacy and justification for the socialist revolution, as well as his own political standing. Subsequently, he was able to secure aid by overcoming internal conflicts with the Soviet Union (Okabe Tatsumi 1977, 231-233).

Furthermore, the outbreak of the Vietnam War was perceived as an event that proved the major global contradictions pointed out by Mao in the Intermediate Zone Theory, and as an event that starkly revealed the ambitions of US imperialism to advance into the intermediate zone (Michael Yahuda 1983, 110). Subsequently, the logic of the Intermediate Zone Theory, which emphasized China's leading role and position in the international revolutionary front, significantly influenced the way Chinese leaders understood the external world and redefined China's international status (New Jun 2015, 18-23).

Limitations

However, the Intermediate Zone Theory also had clear limitations. Within the context of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) led by Mao Zedong, China's increasingly radicalized diplomacy became isolated from the realities of the international environment, and China's diplomacy towards the intermediate zone failed to achieve significant results after its initial successes. Particularly by the 1960s, when the revolutionary fervor dominated China's diplomatic rhetoric, China could no longer maintain relations with the governments of Southeast Asian countries. Moderate diplomatic policies were replaced by revolutionary rhetoric, and in Africa, socialist revolutionary forces were found only in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali (Kim Ok-jun 2011, 72-76).

Moreover, the idea of resisting global hegemonic powers through solidarity with Third World countries located in the intermediate zone was largely derived from socialist ideology, such as proletarian internationalism, and thus strongly reflected a failure to objectively assess material conditions. In particular, China's foreign policy, which became excessively ideological with its anti-US stance in the 1950s and its anti-Soviet stance in the 1960s, pushed the nation into an unprecedented security crisis. Following the armed clashes at Zhenbao Island in 1969, the Soviet Union stationed 1.2 million troops along the border with China, forming a northern front. While the Vietnam War continued, China faced the dual dilemma of an indirect war with the United States in the south. Experiencing a period of extreme diplomatic and security vulnerability, having to confront both US imperialism and Soviet imperialism, China's security anxieties reached their peak. In this process, Mao's pursuit of détente with the United States was tantamount to abandoning the hollowed-out Intermediate Zone Theory and declaring a return to realistic foreign policy. Confronting both the United States and the Soviet Union, the world superpowers during the Cold War, was an unrealistic choice from the outset, given China's military and economic capabilities.

However, if the limitations were so clear, how could the isolationist policy based on the Intermediate Zone Theory persist for over a decade? While the ideological nature of diplomacy was one factor, domestic political reasons also existed. Mao utilized the radical foreign policy as a tool for mass mobilization to restore his weakened domestic political standing after the failure of the Great Leap Forward (Chen Jian 2012, 10-11). Due to the severe economic difficulties caused by the Great Leap Forward, Mao began to lose domestic political momentum, and the revolutionary fervor he had ignited seemed to be waning. Domestically, orthodox Leninists like Liu Shaoqi and pragmatists like Deng Xiaoping began to gain real power, leading to declining internal party support for the revolution led by Mao. As public distrust in the party also began to spread, Mao sought to restore his personal authority and legitimize continuous revolution through an extreme foreign policy (Chen Jian 2012, 49-84). In fact, he amplified the ideological disputes with the Soviet Union to serve as a pretext for eliminating domestic political rivals, expelling Liu Shaoqi under the banner of anti-revisionism. In other words, the revolutionary diplomacy of the 1960s was, to some extent, self-initiated by Mao Zedong for his own domestic political purposes. However, it is difficult to believe that Mao Zedong intentionally prolonged the anti-Soviet and anti-US line from a strategic security perspective. Instead, it is more reasonable to infer that the Intermediate Zone Theory was imposed by the revolutionary fervor and the Vietnam War amidst domestic and international circumstances. The policy of confronting both hegemonic powers eventually led to détente as security anxieties peaked due to the Soviet threat.

Conclusion

China's foreign policy during Mao Zedong's tenure can be understood as an extension of the national liberation struggle against imperialist aggressors. While China's foreign policy, which oscillated from pro-Soviet and anti-US to anti-Soviet and anti-US, and then to anti-Soviet and pro-US, may appear to lack predictability and logical consistency at times, it consistently sought to identify the world's major contradictions and balance power in accordance with changes in the primary security threat.

Through the concept of the intermediate zone, Mao Zedong viewed the world's major contradictions as existing not between the Cold War order of the US and the USSR, but between imperialist powers led by the United States and the revolutionary forces of the peoples in the colonies. Therefore, the greatest threat to the Chinese revolution was the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist government backed by the United States. In essence, the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong, through the first iteration of the Intermediate Zone Theory, interpreted the Chinese revolution within a historical current possessing its own momentum. This allowed the CCP to gain legitimacy and historical justification for initiating war against the Nationalist government and, furthermore, to elevate the status of the Chinese revolution to a world-historical level, thereby seeking to enhance China's international standing.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, China opted for an alliance with the Soviet Union, but soon came to perceive the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to China's security. The Soviet Union's characteristic arrogance had made Mao uncomfortable even before the founding of the PRC. Subsequently, despite the military alliance, the Soviet Union's military passivity, the ideological disputes over revisionism after Stalin's death, its violent interventions in Eastern Europe, and repeated border clashes with China ultimately led China to regard Soviet expansionism as a tangible security threat. In the second iteration of the Intermediate Zone Theory, Mao presented the perception of a world divided into three parts, acknowledging that not only the Third World of newly independent nations, previously considered partners, but also capitalist countries in Europe could be partners under the banner of anti-imperialism, thus establishing an anti-Soviet and anti-US line. However, nearly a decade of revolutionary diplomacy led to China's international isolation, and the Intermediate Zone Theory, based on extreme ideology, was abandoned in favor of Sino-US détente. It is also confirmed that during this process, Mao intentionally pursued revolutionary diplomacy based on the Intermediate Zone Theory to eliminate his domestic political rivals and mobilize the masses.

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