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The Diplomacy of Joseon Tongsinsa for the Repatriation of Korean Captives of the Imjin War: Centered on Haesaro

Finding a Center in the Turbulent East Asia: The Young Men of Sarangbang Embrace Kyushu

Category
EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published
May 14, 2026

Museum of Korean-Japanese Exchange · Moon Yechan · KDI School of Public Policy and Management

Introduction

Korean-Japanese relations are a subject of discussion for improvement. Generally, the relationship can be described as unfavorable. Korean-Japanese relations have unfolded through continuous conflict and confrontation, and during the Joseon Dynasty, there were also numerous military clashes, large and small. In particular, after the Imjin War, diplomatic relations were temporarily severed. The Imjin War created various diplomatic issues, and the issue of prisoners of war (Joseon captives) was a major agenda item discussed by both Joseon and Japan. After the war, Joseon dispatched Tongsinsa (envoys) to bring back the Joseon captives.

Then, through what methods was the repatriation of captives after the Imjin War discussed, and how many Koreans were brought back? This study aims to focus on the constraints that arose during the repatriation process of the captives. Specifically, it will discuss the voluntary and involuntary refusal of repatriation to Joseon from the individual perspective of the Joseon captives, and provide a new perspective on the constraints of repatriation.

This study sets Haesaro (海槎錄) as its scope of research, focusing on the repatriation process of captives as described within it. Haesaro is a travelogue included in HaHaengchongjae (海行摠載) and records the first official mission after the Imjin War, conducted at Japan's request. Gyeongseom, a civil official of the Joseon Dynasty, participated in the mission as Tongsinsa Bu-sa (deputy envoy) and recorded the eight-month journey in diary form. Haesaro comprehensively covers official documents, including letters from Seonjo and the Ministry of Rites, as well as personal correspondence. In particular, it records various discussions regarding repatriation. This study aims to analyze the repatriation process and its constraints as presented in Haesaro through documentary research.

Repatriation has been a major research topic in the discussion of Korean-Japanese relations after the Imjin War. In particular, research has focused on the dispatch of missions for reply and repatriation. Son Seung-cheol (2006) examined Joseon-Japan relations by focusing on the dispatch of these missions, and Lee Hoon (2014) analyzed Joseon's diplomatic strategy towards Japan centered on these missions. Kim Jeong-ho (2016) conducted a comparative analysis of repatriation negotiations during the Imjin War and the Byeongja War to derive their political and diplomatic characteristics. Beyond this, Tongsinsa diplomacy has been continuously studied to analyze Joseon-Japan relations during the Joseon Dynasty. Research has analyzed changes in Tongsinsa records by period, focusing on the rituals of Joseon Tongsinsa (Song Ji-won, 2011), and studies have also been conducted on the correlation between Tongsinsa rituals and Joseon-Japan diplomatic relations (Ha Woo-bong, 2011). Furthermore, Lee Jae-hoon (2012) examined Joseon's perception of Japan, focusing on Joseon's perspective towards Japan based on Tongsinsa records, observing negative perceptions of Japan. These previous studies are significant in explaining Joseon-Japan relations during the Joseon Dynasty and the impact of Joseon's envoy dispatch on bilateral diplomatic relations. However, existing research has not actively discussed the constraints during the repatriation process, focusing instead on repatriation itself or conducting comparative analyses through period-specific discussions. This study aims to address these limitations by examining the constraints of the repatriation process during the Seonjo period through Haesaro. In particular, by discussing the repatriation process from an individual perspective, rather than the national level as in previous studies, it will contribute to establishing a new research foundation. This study is differentiated by presenting a different approach to the study of the repatriation process compared to previous research.

The Issue of Korean Captives from the Imjin War

Haesaro is a document that not only contains information about the repatriation process of Joseon captives but also reveals perceptions of Japan or Japanese people. For instance, it expresses negative perceptions of Japanese people by referring to them as cunning 'Waein' (倭人, Japanese people) and describes their characteristics through terms like greed and ferocity. In particular, scenes recalling the Imjin War are also continuously depicted, expressing the tragedy of the Imjin War through references to 'ear mounds' and the 'calamity of the Imjin year.' Haesaro also shows the difference in perceptions between Joseon and Japan regarding repatriation. Joseon presented the repatriation of Joseon captives as a condition for restoring diplomatic relations and aimed for the complete repatriation of all captives. Japan also sought to build friendly relations with Joseon through repatriation, particularly focusing on Tsushima to increase diplomatic and trade benefits. Additionally, Japan established principles regarding the repatriation of captives.

<Table 1> Perceptions of Joseon and Japan Regarding the Repatriation of Joseon Captives

Category Joseon Japan

Condition for Restoration of Diplomatic Relations

Main Points 1. Securing trade benefits through exclusive diplomacy with Tsushima 2. Principle of respecting the captives' own will

1. Aiming for the complete repatriation of captives 2. Maintaining friendly relations with Joseon

The main itinerary of Haesaro is as follows. Gyeongseom's delegation departed Hanyang on January 12, 1607, set sail from Busan on February 29, and arrived in Tsushima on March 3. They subsequently arrived in Osaka on April 7 and entered Kyoto on the 12th. They reached Edo (Tokyo), where the Shogun was located at the time, on May 24, and delivered the letter of state on June 6, seeking to resolve the issue of Joseon captives. The 'Reply and Repatriation Mission' mentioned in the travelogue was more of a temporary nature than an official delegation. It also served the purpose of verifying the true intentions and situation of the Shogunate government due to a lack of accurate understanding of Japan's internal affairs.

Haesaro intermittently mentions captives. Notably, there was no mention of captives during the journey to Edo. On the return journey to Joseon, the topic of Joseon captives was addressed for the first time, and through the tears of a Korean woman watching the Tongsinsa procession, her longing for her homeland was conveyed.

The Joseon captives in Japan sometimes wished to return, but were hindered by various factors. Some captives were living under surveillance, and others had married Japanese individuals, requiring their spouses' permission. Nevertheless, Haesaro also confirms the presence of captives joining the repatriation procession, overcoming various obstacles, which suggests that most captives resided in Japan in a state of servitude. Furthermore, difficulties were encountered in locating the captives. Japanese local officials often concealed them, continuously obstructing their return. However, some Daimyo did assist in the repatriation of Joseon captives, helping dozens return to Joseon.

The issue of captives from the Imjin War, as depicted in the travelogue, was generally described with a focus on the constraints of repatriation. To facilitate the return of Joseon captives, it was necessary to first address the issues of surveillance and detention, and the activities of the Tongsinsa alone had limitations in resolving these various factors.

The Reply and Repatriation Mission of 1607, dispatched to address the issue of Joseon captives for the first time and to facilitate their repatriation, successfully repatriated a total of 1,418 individuals amidst various constraints. Haesaro comments on these figures, stating, 'The number being repatriated now is less than a single hair plucked from nine oxen,' highlighting the various limitations concerning the issue of Joseon captives.

Meanwhile, the constraints that emerged during the repatriation process manifested in the actual course of events due to the difference in positions between Joseon and Japan. In particular, repatriation to Joseon was difficult on an individual level, rather than at a national level. Some Joseon captives held positions in the Japanese imperial court or had established livelihoods in Japan, refusing repatriation requests. In other cases, individuals wished to return to Joseon but were prevented from doing so due to marriage with a Japanese husband and the spouse's opposition.

<Table 2> Reasons for Refusal of Repatriation

Category Main Content

1. Establishing a livelihood in Japan

Voluntary Refusal

2. Lack of will to be repatriated to Joseon

Involuntary Refusal 1. Marriage with a Japanese national, spouse's refusal of repatriation

Limitations of Repatriation Diplomacy

The repatriation diplomacy depicted in Haesaro faced various limitations. Firstly, the whereabouts of the captives could not be accurately ascertained. It was difficult to identify the specific locations of captives scattered throughout Japan, and assessing their willingness to return individually was time-consuming. Moreover, despite the Japanese Kanpaku's order to allow return based on the captives' wishes and the principle of repatriation, these were not effectively upheld. Joseon captives, who appeared to be in a state of servitude, were hidden by their owners who refused repatriation, and some captives, finding comfort in their lives in Japan, were unwilling to return. The limitations of repatriation diplomacy can be attributed to a complex interplay of internal factors related to the captives and external factors arising from the diplomatic relations between Joseon and Japan.

Regarding internal factors, they can be discussed in direct relation to the lives of the Joseon captives. Captives generally had the status of prisoners of war. In most cases, they lived as slaves, and their return to Joseon required the permission of their Japanese owners. Although the Japanese Kanpaku established the principle of deciding repatriation based on the captives' wishes, it can be assessed that he did not directly intervene in the master-slave relationship between individual Japanese and Koreans.

The repatriation diplomacy between Joseon and Japan is imbued with various political characteristics stemming from the Imjin War. Firstly, Joseon harbored distrust regarding Japan's repatriation process and intentions. The will of King Seonjo and the Joseon court to repatriate war captives back to Joseon was very strong. They made the repatriation of captives a prerequisite for restoring diplomatic relations, prioritizing it above all other conditions.

However, the distrust between the two countries resulting from the Imjin War was consistently evident in the repatriation negotiations. In particular, Haesaro, while describing the first repatriation diplomacy after the Imjin War, also conveys the limitations shown by the diplomacy of both Joseon and Japan. Firstly, Haesaro continuously reveals negative perceptions of Japan, thereby expressing negative perceptions regarding Japan's willingness to repatriate. Nevertheless, Joseon Tongsinsa envoys met with relatively cooperative officials in Tsushima and Edo, leading to high expectations for repatriation.

However, as mentioned earlier, the results of repatriation diplomacy were not significant compared to the total number of captives. While the repatriation of approximately 1,500 individuals was successful, this was a very small number relative to the total number of captives. The reasons for this outcome can be understood by examining the subsequent Tongsinsa missions. The repatriation diplomacy in 1607, as described in Haesaro, was unique in that it was the first bilateral diplomacy after the war.

In the repatriation negotiations recorded in Haengchongjae after Haesaro, Japan's active willingness to repatriate is difficult to find. The cooperative attitude of Japanese officials seen in 1607, as well as the active measures and principles regarding captive repatriation, had faded. Japan's willingness in repatriation negotiations weakened over time, leading to increased distrust among Joseon Tongsinsa envoys. The repatriation diplomacy negotiations described in Haesaro, due to being the first of their kind, achieved repatriation results; however, subsequent repatriation negotiations faced limitations due to Japan's passive diplomatic stance.

Furthermore, the measures taken by the Joseon government for the repatriated captives did not significantly contribute to establishing sustainable repatriation negotiations. Specific compensation and related measures for the repatriated captives by the Joseon government are difficult to ascertain, with only records of providing ten days' worth of food being found. It can be assessed that long-term policies and institutional frameworks for the captives, who had left behind their lives in Japan, were not established, and support for the captives to return to their hometowns, rebuild their lives, and settle down was not continuously provided. These characteristics represent the limitations of King Seonjo and the Joseon court at the time, and it can be said that Joseon itself could not establish an environment to fully accommodate the captives. Joseon, rather than prioritizing national reconstruction efforts due to the damages of the Imjin War, focused more on the repatriation of Joseon captives, continuously dispatching Tongsinsa envoys to conduct repatriation negotiations without concrete and long-term measures for the captives.

The limitations of repatriation diplomacy can be understood through the internal factors of Joseon captives, external factors related to Joseon-Japan diplomatic relations, and factors at the Joseon government level. Despite Joseon's continuous efforts and will for repatriation, tangible results were not achieved. These diplomatic characteristics have significant implications for future Korean-Japanese relations.

Conclusion

This study has examined the process and limitations of Joseon's repatriation negotiations in 1607, as depicted in Haesaro. Joseon experienced numerous captives during the Imjin War, who had gone to Japan and were living new lives. King Seonjo showed a strong will for the repatriation of captives after the war, making it a key condition for restoring diplomatic relations. To this end, Joseon Tongsinsa was dispatched in 1607, and active diplomatic efforts were made for repatriation.

However, various constraints were discovered during the repatriation process. Internal factors related to the individual will of Joseon captives also played a role, and the diplomatic relations between Joseon and Japan, as well as the political situation within Joseon, imposed various restrictions on the repatriation of captives. This repatriation process has significant implications for current Korean-Japanese relations, and both countries need to overcome past limitations and build a future-oriented relationship.

The greatest obstacles during the repatriation process were mutual distrust and ambivalence. After the Imjin War, Joseon demonstrated a strong will for repatriation while simultaneously harboring distrust towards Japan. Japan also showed a relatively cooperative attitude initially, but later adopted a passive stance in repatriation negotiations, exhibiting an ambivalent attitude. The distrust and ambivalence between the two countries served as limitations in achieving tangible results in repatriation negotiations and also affected the improvement of bilateral relations and the restoration of diplomatic ties. Haesaro and the repatriation negotiations between Joseon and Japan offer insights into the direction that both countries should pursue in their current relationship. Even now, both Korea and Japan often exhibit mutual distrust and ambivalence. Formal diplomatic relations have not led to tangible improvements, and Korean-Japanese relations remain mired in conflict.

To move beyond distrust and build a relationship of trust, a stance that is not bound by the past is necessary. Joseon and Japan failed to establish a sustainable improvement in their relationship due to the Imjin War. There is a need to create a future-oriented relationship that is not constrained by the past. First, issues that both countries can cooperate on should be discussed while examining past issues. If past issues are prioritized, Korean-Japanese relations are likely to reach an impasse.

With the advent of the Biden administration, Korean-Japanese relations have entered a new phase. Value-based diplomacy centered on democracy and human rights is emerging, and the United States seeks to resolve North Korean nuclear issues through trilateral cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan. Without structural improvements in Korean-Japanese relations, trilateral cooperation between Korea, the US, and Japan will have limitations in achieving tangible results.

Improving Korean-Japanese relations begins with securing mutual trust. Clinging to the past only intensifies distrust. It is necessary to secure the sustainability of dialogue between Korea and Japan, focusing on new agendas. From this perspective, the emergence of the Biden administration and value-based diplomacy is significant. This is because Korea and Japan are in a relationship that requires cooperation in various fields such as democracy, human rights, climate change, and security on the Korean Peninsula. It is hoped that Korean-Japanese relations will move beyond the distrust that has persisted since the Imjin War towards trust and cooperation.

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*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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