Diamonds Do Not Break

Kyushu National Museum · Kim Min-jeong · Ewha Womans University

Introduction

In the late 19th century, most East Asian countries fell under the colonial or semi-colonial rule of Western powers. However, in the 20th century, Western powers' interest in Joseon, Qing China, and Japan, which had not become colonies, increased.

The theory of East Asian Tripartite Solidarity, which emerged among intellectuals in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, was a perception of the times and a political theory that arose from the awareness of a nationwide crisis in East Asia, advocating for the prevention of Western powers' encroachment through the solidarity of the three East Asian nations: Joseon, China, and Japan. The tripartite solidarity was influenced by the Pan-Asianism and the theory of Asian solidarity advocated by Japan. Although Japan's theory of Asian solidarity differed superficially from the earlier theory of conquering Korea (Jeonghanron), it was essentially a softer, repackaged version of it.

Japan's proposed 'theory of Asian solidarity' aimed to form a political and economic community among the three nations of Korea, China, and Japan, based on their cultural and geographical commonalities, to counter the invasion of Western imperialism in East Asia. The Korean delegates on the inspection tour did not recognize the danger of the theory of Asian solidarity, allowing some intellectuals to share the perception of the three East Asian nations as a community of shared destiny, encompassing shared culture, language, history, unique sentiments, and geographical space.

However, considering the theory of conquering Korea (Jeonghanron), which strongly emerged in Japanese political circles around the 1870s, and the domestic atmosphere and historical events in Japan leading up to the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, it is necessary to examine the true intentions behind the theory of Asian solidarity. This study aims to analyze the implications of the modern Japanese government's policies toward Asia, established through these historical experiences. The research intends to analyze the "Japanese Dream" through official documents and statements from the Abe administration and to confirm that the Abe administration's diamond security alliance concept will not be broken.

Compared to the "China Dream" of the Xi Jinping government in the 21st century, Japan has not actively declared its "Japanese Dream." While China has presented concrete plans such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to build a unified order in the Indo-Pacific, Japan has not revealed its ambitions. Although Japan's dream is relatively less apparent compared to those of the United States and China, this does not mean that Japan's dream is smaller or that Japan is simply following the American dream. 6. Diamonds Do Not Break_Kyushu National Museum

Looking at the Japanese government that advocated Pan-Asianism and the theory of Asian solidarity in the late 19th century, it is evident that the Japanese Dream existed in their minds. At that time, Japan most boldly pursued its ambitions among the three East Asian nations of Joseon, China, and Japan. However, in the mid-21st century, Japan is proceeding with caution. Considering Japan's honne (true feelings) and tatemae (public facade), it is difficult to conclude that the Japanese Dream does not exist behind Japan's less overt stance.

This paper aims to analyze Japan's dream by examining the statements and defense white papers of the Abe administration, as well as official Japanese documents. The objective of this study is to analyze what Japanese Dream resides in the honne of Japan and how it influences the direction of the Japanese government's domestic and foreign policies. Furthermore, it seeks to predict how the Japanese Dream might affect the potential for change in the architecture of the East Asian order.

Some interpret the Japanese Dream as smaller than the China Dream or the American Dream. Scholars argue that Japan, adept at utilizing alliances, is achieving its goals through its alliance with the United States, essentially hitching a ride on the American agenda. However, this study will closely examine the dreams harbored within the honne of the Abe administration by comparing and analyzing the report of the "21st Century Vision Council" (2015) with the Indo-Pacific strategies of the United States and Japan. This research concludes that Japan harbors a more intense dream in its aspirations, urging greater attention to Japan's future actions on the international stage with the emergence of new leadership following the change in prime ministers.

The Abe Administration's Dream: The "21st Century Vision Council" Report (2015)

Centered On

On August 14, 2015, the Abe administration issued a statement commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Based on the report prepared by the "Intellectuals' Council on Reflecting on the 20th Century and Envisioning the World Order and Japan's Role in the 21st Century" (hereinafter referred to as the 21st Century Vision Council), Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered his 70th anniversary statement. Under the guise of a statement marking the 70th anniversary of the "post-war" period, the report focused on lessons from the 20th century, Japan's post-war trajectory, and reconciliation and cooperation with the East Asian region. In his statement, Prime Minister Abe emphasized Japan's "leading" role in establishing post-war global prosperity and peace. He also pledged that Japan had led and would continue to lead reconciliation and cooperation in the East Asian region.

The "21st Century Vision Council" report (2015) emphasizes the Abe administration's internationalist perspective, but we can cautiously analyze their dream from this document. Firstly, it claims that Japan led the independence of Asia. Chapter 5 of the Vision Council report argues that Japan's defeat in World War II led to the independence of Asian and African countries. It states that their independence subsequently led to self-reliance, portraying World War II as a battle for the liberation of Asia. It asserts that Japan's participation in the war was not driven by imperial expansionism but by the goal of 'Asian independence.' Furthermore, they claim that Japan is responsible for the failure of colonial rule by countries like Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Ultimately, their logic is that Asian colonial nations achieved independence thanks to Japan.

“Whether or not Japan intended to liberate Asia, it did wind up

promoting the independence of the colonies in Asia.”

This is the honne that seeks to enhance Japan's role in Asia by linking its defeat in World War II with the independence of Asian countries, establishing a causal or sequential relationship.

The second point to note is the third section of Chapter 5 of the report. Here, Japan reveals its aspirations more explicitly. When asked about Japan's role in the prosperity of Asia and the world, the intellectuals' council panel's first answer is to "turn our eyes to Asia." The panel predicts that as American power relatively declines, it will be difficult for the United States to maintain its role in ensuring stability in the Asian region. In this situation, Japan is urged to take on greater responsibility for the prosperity and peace of the Asian region. In other words, it explains the necessity for Japan to play the role of maintaining the balance of power in the Asian region. This indicates that the dream of 'Japan acquiring hegemony in the Asian region' is not merely a figment of imagination. Furthermore, it clarifies that Japan's role is not limited to the Asian region. They assert that Japan has fulfilled its responsibilities in stabilizing the international order. Moreover, the international community has recognized Japan's leading role in peace since the late 1990s, and they discuss Japan's potential to play a greater role in global security in the future.

The third section of Chapter 5 of the 21st Century Vision Council report reveals Japan's aspiration to secure leadership in Asia by turning its attention to the Asian continent, while cooperating with the United States and other countries.

“First, we would like to turn our eyes to Asia.” 6. Diamonds Do Not Break_Kyushu National Museum

This is the first answer to the question about Japan's role in Chapter 5 of the 21st Century Vision Council report. 'Turn eyes to Asia' might initially bring to mind Hillary Clinton's 'Pivot to Asia.' In the 2015 Abe statement commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which was based on the Vision Council report, there are no explicit expressions of expanding influence in the Asian region. However, reflecting the final report of the Security Legislation Council submitted in May 2014, the Abe administration made a cabinet decision on July 1, 2014, to reinterpret the constitution regarding collective self-defense. Furthermore, the Abe administration enacted an amendment in March 2016 to expand the overseas activities of the Self-Defense Forces, enabling the exercise of collective self-defense. The reinterpretation of the constitution regarding collective self-defense is significantly different from the promises of the peace constitution and the officially announced statements made by Japan in the international community. The revision of laws that directly contradicted the content of the 2015 report and statement, just a year later in 2016, highlights the contradictions faced by the Abe administration. By reinterpreting collective self-defense, Japan sought to expand its domestic and international military and security influence, driven by a desire to check the economic influence of neighboring countries in the Asian region. The Abe administration launched the "Council on the Reconstruction of the Legal Foundations for Security" (hereinafter referred to as the Security Legislation Council) in February 2013. Reflecting the final report submitted by the Security Legislation Council in May 2014, the Abe administration made a cabinet decision on July 1, 2014, to reinterpret the constitution regarding collective self-defense. This decision, made before the 2015 report and statement, reflects considerations of the economic growth situation in the Asian region, particularly China, in the early 2010s. 6. Diamonds Do Not Break_Kyushu National Museum The military trends in Japan prior to the "21st Century Vision Council" report and the rhetorical expressions in the report indicate that Japan dreams of becoming a protagonist acting on the international stage, expanding its influence in the Asian region and ultimately playing a leading role.

“We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan attempted to break

its deadlock with force.”

This implies that the renunciation of the right to wage war and the possession of any military force should be stipulated in Japan's peace constitution, enacted in 1947. According to the 'three principles' stipulated in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the renunciation of military power should be upheld. However, the Japanese government has continuously expanded the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces since the 1950s, in a manner that contradicts the spirit of the peace constitution, which prescribes pacifism. Since the 1990s, under the pretext of overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces and the exercise of collective self-defense, Japan has considered measures to develop it into a full-fledged military force, even to the extent of amending the constitution.

Through this, the Self-Defense Forces can exercise military force and, in situations affecting Japan's security, can exercise self-defense rights without geographical limitations. The fact that a bill directly contradicting the content of the Abe statement (2015), based on the "21st Century Vision Council" report, was immediately revised the following year in 2016 is a contradiction faced by the Abe administration. By reinterpreting collective self-defense, Japan sought to expand its military and security influence both domestically and internationally, driven by a desire to check the economic influence of neighboring countries in the Asian region. The Abe administration launched the "Council on the Reconstruction of the Legal Foundations for Security" (hereinafter referred to as the Security Legislation Council) in February 2013. Reflecting the final report submitted by the Security Legislation Council in May 2014, the Abe administration made a cabinet decision on July 1, 2014, to reinterpret the constitution regarding collective self-defense. This decision, made before the 2015 report and statement, reflects considerations of the economic growth situation in the Asian region, particularly China, in the early 2010s. 6. Diamonds Do Not Break_Kyushu National Museum The military trends in Japan prior to the "21st Century Vision Council" report and the rhetorical expressions in the report indicate that Japan dreams of becoming a protagonist acting on the international stage, expanding its influence in the Asian region and ultimately playing a leading role (proactive role).

Japan and the United States' Indo-Pacific Strategy

The official announcement of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" (hereinafter referred to as FOIP) by the Japanese government in 2017, as stated in its diplomatic blue paper, signifies a shift in Japan's regional vision from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific from a geostrategic perspective. This section will examine the implications of Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy for its regional vision by comparing it with the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy.

In August 2016, at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) held in Kenya, Prime Minister Abe announced the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy. Prime Minister Abe emphasized the importance of the maritime space where the two oceans, the Pacific and the Indian, and the two continents, Asia and Africa, intersect, characterizing it as a "space that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy." The significance of Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy lies in the shift of its regional vision's focal point. While the previous focal point of Japan's regional vision was the 'continent' of East Asia, by announcing the Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan signaled to both domestic and international audiences that its regional vision would expand beyond land-based spaces to include 'maritime' spaces. The background to Japan setting a new direction for its foreign and security strategy towards the 'maritime' domain is the competition for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region between the United States and China. However, Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy is not solely aimed at countering China's influence in the Indo-Pacific order. While cooperation with the United States through a new security alliance and strengthened security system has become increasingly important, the Japanese government's actions prompt an analysis of the underlying intentions of their new regional vision.

In 2019, Japan's Ministry of Defense released its defense white paper, including the contents of the "New National Defense Program Guidelines." According to the overview of Japan's defense policy by the Ministry of Defense, the National Defense Program Guidelines outline the fundamental principles for the development, maintenance, and operation of Japan's defense capabilities in light of the surrounding security environment. The "New" National Defense Program Guidelines, published in the 2019 defense white paper, state that the security environment surrounding Japan is rapidly changing, the balance of power in the international community is accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainties surrounding the existing order are increasing. Japan justifies the primary goal of strengthening its defense capabilities by citing the instability of its security environment. In particular, Japan argues that acquiring "superiority" in new domains such as space, cyber, and electromagnetic waves is "existentially" important, linking defense capability increases to survival. However, this is assessed as a measure to counter China's strengthening capabilities in existing domains (land, sea, and air), its expansion of military activities in new domains, and the military power of the United States and China. This represents Japan's response to the military buildup of China and the United States within a bipolar system. Specifically, the 2020 defense guidelines mention expanding the activities of the Maritime Self-Defense Force under the pretext of "ensuring maritime security," which aligns with the Indo-Pacific strategy. Since 2017, the Maritime Self-Defense Force has conducted long-term deployments in the Indo-Pacific region annually, including with large escort vessels such as the Izumo and Kaga. The strengthening of MSDF training and joint exercises with friendly nations are interpreted as means to realize Japan's Indo-Pacific vision. 6. Diamonds Do Not Break_Kyushu National Museum

However, the most striking aspect of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy is the strengthening of its "soft power." This is where it differs from the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy. In its Regional Strategy section, the United States' National Security Strategy Report (NSSR, 2017) addresses the Indo-Pacific region first. The United States first discusses maintaining military capabilities to deter and defeat adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region in times of contingency. Furthermore, it emphasizes strengthening military cooperation and defense networks with allies in the Indo-Pacific region. This demonstrates that hard power is central to the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, the "Strategic Framework for the 2018 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPSR)," released in January 2021 by Robert O'Brien, Senior Advisor to the White House National Security Council, defines "preserving peace through strength" as a key national security objective for implementing the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The four national security objectives outlined in this document show that the primary goals of their Indo-Pacific strategy are to counter China's military expansion and economic pressure and to protect their hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, in the National Security Strategy Report (2017),

“States throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership.” It affirmed and justified its leadership in the Indo-Pacific region. In the Indo-Pacific region, the United States is the wolf, and strength is at the center of its performance. While it is difficult to say that the aspect of strength is entirely excluded from Japan's performance in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan also emphasizes the aspect of normative diplomacy. In the Indo-Pacific region, Japan's non-military stage operates significantly. In its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (2017), Japan advocates for enhancing "connectivity" between continents by extending values such as democracy, the rule of law, and market economy to the Middle East and Africa. The 2018 Diplomatic Blue Paper promises the implementation of the "Quality Infrastructure Development Programme" to enhance connectivity. Japan's efforts for a free and open Indo-Pacific encompass Japan's endeavors to secure intercontinental connectivity by building infrastructure such as highways and ports in Africa and Southeast Asia. Through this, Japan's regional strategy for its Indo-Pacific vision can be said to differ in its stage, as it emphasizes soft power. 6. Diamonds Do Not Break_Kyushu National Museum

Japan's strategy emphasizing soft power is evident not only in its Indo-Pacific strategy but also in the "Research Report on International Economy and Foreign Affairs" (2019) by the Japanese House of Councillors. The report explicitly emphasizes Japan's role as a "leading country" and declares its intention to make a "Proactive Contribution to Peace" by cooperating with other countries while firmly upholding fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights, thereby leading global peace and prosperity. Furthermore, the House of Councillors report calls for Japan to act on the international stage in a manner different from the modern international order, which is based on power struggles. The House of Councillors report emphasizes "Japanese culture." It raises the necessity of disseminating Japanese culture more widely throughout the world and promoting the Japanese language. This cultural strategy reflects Japan's aspiration to emphasize the aspect of values-based diplomacy. The objective of achieving peace by enhancing global connectivity through Japanese culture, by further disseminating Japanese culture, is clearly contrasted with the United States' approach of maintaining security through force. The Japanese cultural initiative advocated through the House of Councillors report signifies a genuine intention to play a leading role by accumulating soft power through culture, rather than merely increasing language usage.

Japan's Dream for 2050: The Mitsubishi Research Institute Report

(2019) Centered On

In 2019, Japan's Mitsubishi Research Institute published a report titled "Future Society 2050." The Mitsubishi Research Institute report describes "two worlds and six trends" toward 2050, envisioning a "rich and sustainable world" as the state of the world in 2050. To achieve this, it argues for the necessity of "consensus" that shares "common interests" among multiple parties. The Mitsubishi Research Institute predicts further multipolarization by 2050, mentioning the possibility of intense power struggles between emerging economic powers like India and existing great powers, in addition to the US and China.

Among the six trends for a rich and sustainable world, the second and fourth trends are particularly noteworthy. The second trend is an "international order without a hegemonic state," signifying the advent of a world without an absolute hegemonic power in the international community. While the Mitsubishi Research Institute predicts that China's economic scale will be similar to that of the United States by around 2030, it forecasts a decline in the economic influence of both the US and China by 2050, with the rise and expansion of India's economic power. Through the Mitsubishi Research Institute report, new strategies will be added to the plans of Japanese government ministries, particularly Japan's and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, to counter not only the US and China but also India.

The Mitsubishi Research Institute explains that while digital technology can lead to inequality, it can also bring high returns if managed well. This implies "we cannot afford to fall behind." They argue that these trends should not be passively observed but viewed as opportunities, and Japan should leverage its unique advantages and strengths. Furthermore, they emphasize the necessity of active challenges by governments, corporations, and individuals, thereby inspiring the spirit of challenge among the Japanese people. Through "Future Society Vision 2050," Japan will enhance its technological capabilities in the digital space and strive not to fall behind in digital technology within the international community. The Mitsubishi Research Institute report suggests that Japan envisions itself as a protagonist on a more complex stage composed of military, economic, cultural, and digital spaces, by proposing the necessity of building networks in the digital space and forming alliances in cyberspace, in addition to the military, economic, social, and cultural alliances examined in the previous chapters.

The Mitsubishi Research Institute also acknowledges the role of Japan's soft power and proposes three ways Japan can contribute to the world through soft power. In the chapter "Japan's Role in the World," the Mitsubishi Research Institute predicts that the fragmentation of the world and the expansion of the digital economy will lead to the formation of a new international order. It explains that Japan's soft power plays a crucial role in ensuring Japan's contribution to the international community and suggests that Japan can further advance in terms of soft power by: 1. Creating frameworks for international cooperation, 2. Presenting social models that satisfy both growth and stability, and 3. Solving social problems through technology. Through the Mitsubishi Research Institute's "Future Society Vision 2050" report, which emphasizes the importance of soft power and advocates for international cooperation and the formation of an international order based on it, it is evident that the Japanese Dream differs significantly from the China Dream and the American Dream, which focus on political and military aspects. 6. Diamonds Do Not Break_Kyushu National Museum

Conclusion

Some argue that Japan's ambitions are driven by path dependence stemming from its experiences in World War II. Others may question whether Japan is truly dreaming, given that its vision is not as grand as China's "great power rise." However, as this paper has demonstrated, the Japanese Dream clearly exists. The 21st-century Japanese Dream is not about boldly pursuing its ambitions on the world stage as it did before and after World War II. Instead, it is a dream of acting as the protagonist on a new stage, composed of a triad of culture, digital technology, and soft power, without completely disregarding the political and military aspects.

The Japanese government is demonstrating centrifugal force, seeking to expand further onto the international stage by redefining its regional strategy from continental to maritime. In the early 2010s, the Abe administration announced the "Diamond Security Concept." Although Japan's dream may seem to have receded due to China's growing influence and intensifying power competition, "the diamond has not been broken." Japan has revealed its aspirations through official documents and statements. The 21st Century Vision Council report, the defense white paper and diplomatic blue paper's Indo-Pacific strategy, the House of Councillors report, and the Mitsubishi Research Institute report all clearly confirm the existence of the Japanese Dream.

Japan's actions, such as amending the interpretation of the Self-Defense Forces' constitution, increasing the activities of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, and undertaking quality infrastructure projects in Africa and Southeast Asia, reveal an aspiration to expand its influence not only in the Asian region but also globally. The Mitsubishi Research Institute's report suggests contributing to global peace and prosperity through cooperation and technology, proposing action on a complex stage rather than solely a political-military one. This indicates that the Japanese Dream aims for superiority in fields such as culture, science and technology, and information, rather than in military and economic domains. The emphasis on values-based diplomacy and normative diplomacy shows that Japan views the stage of international politics in a complex manner. Japan, dreaming of a leading role on this complex stage, will continue to envision new diamonds with its neighboring countries and many other nations. 6. Diamonds Do Not Break_Kyushu National Museum References Hwangbo, Ga-ram, and Park, Chang-geon. 2020. "Japan's Regional Vision as Geostrategy: Focusing on the Indo-

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