Why Did the Tripartite Intervention Not Occur in the Korean Peninsula?

Sino-Japanese Peace Museum · Cha Ji-yoon · Peking University

I. Introduction

Let us turn back time 136 years. What conversations took place between China and Japan in the Japanese port city of Shimonoseki? What were Li Hongzhang's feelings as he gazed at the rising sun from the ship? What was his state of mind when the China-Japan Peace Treaty, a treaty of humiliation, was signed after China, with its 5,000-year history, was defeated by Japan? What dreams did Ito Hirobumi harbor as he watched him, and when he thought he had finally gained the Liaodong Peninsula, what calculations did he make between the Liaodong Peninsula and the Korean Peninsula amidst the Tripartite Intervention?

In the late 19th century, Japan was meticulously crafting its foreign policy to minimize foreign intervention in Joseon. For instance, in the early stages of the Donghak Peasant Revolution, Japan adopted a very passive stance, considering a joint intervention in Joseon's internal affairs with China. Following its victory in the Sino-Japanese War, Japan's international standing improved, leading it to shift from a passive to a more active approach in interfering with Joseon's internal affairs. Japan acquired the Liaodong Peninsula from China through the Sino-Japanese War and received a promise of Joseon's 'independent sovereignty.' Just as the Sino-Japanese War seemed to be concluding in the Far East, Japan immediately faced a significant obstacle: the Tripartite Intervention by France, Russia, and Germany (hereinafter referred to as "Fradoch").

This paper views the Tripartite Intervention as a means for Western powers to maintain their national interests and influence in the Far East. Simultaneously, it considers the intervention as Russia's clever stratagem to internationalize the issue of the Liaodong Peninsula's cession from China to Japan. If the Tripartite Intervention had occurred on the Korean Peninsula, Western powers would have had to assess whether they had interests there and, second, whether intervention was necessary. If intervention did not occur despite all conditions being met, there must be a reason. This paper hypothesizes that in the late 19th century, Japan, as a key player in the Far East, accepted the internationalization of the Liaodong Peninsula cession issue before and after the Shimonoseki Treaty, while simultaneously minimizing the number of actors on the Korean Peninsula. From Japan's perspective, this was a delicate balancing act, avoiding direct conflict with Western powers under the disadvantageous conditions of a somewhat weakened national strength after the Sino-Japanese War.

To elaborate further, Japan skillfully allowed the intervention of the Fradoch powers in the Liaodong Peninsula, thereby directing the attention of European and American nations to the peninsula. Ultimately, the synergy between the shift in Western perceptions of Japan following its victory and Japan's adjustment of its policy towards Joseon minimized the number of actors on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it is argued that Japan made some concessions in the Liaodong Peninsula, where European and American nations had direct interests, thus preventing the Tripartite Intervention in Joseon. The shift in Japan's attitude, from a hardline stance to one of accommodation, is particularly intriguing and appears to have been a shrewd move within the "adverse circumstances" of the Tripartite Intervention. Lastly, although Russia actively intervened in Joseon after the Sino-Japanese War, this paper considers it a diplomatic misstep by Russia, igniting anti-Russian sentiment in Japan and serving as the catalyst for the Russo-Japanese War.

II. A Brief History Before and After the Sino-Japanese War

Following Commodore Perry's Black Ship incident, Japan underwent rapid modernization through the Meiji Restoration. During this period, Japan actively sent students to Western countries to learn advanced knowledge and witnessed the flourishing of capitalism domestically. Japan was making thorough preparations domestically to emerge as a major power. It also made proactive diplomatic moves, such as hosting parties and conferences for Western powers.

In the late 19th century, before the Sino-Japanese War, China's territory was being divided by foreign powers. China frequently clashed with Russia over territories in Xinjiang and the Northeast. Britain sought to incorporate Tibet into its empire, and France had significantly weakened its national strength through the Sino-French War. While China, with its Self-Strengthening Movement based on the principle of "Chinese learning for substance, Western learning for application," harbored dreams of national prosperity and strength, these remained mere dreams. Disappointment with the incompetent and corrupt Qing government grew daily. Li Hongzhang, rather than being wary of Japan, chose to trust it, even contemplating the idea of "allying with Japan to counter Russia" (联日防俄) in the 1880s.

In the late 19th century, a tragic situation of a temporary power vacuum occurred on the Korean Peninsula. During this period, peasant uprisings erupted as people sought to improve their lives, their lives were arduous, and the royal court was unable to effectively handle domestic incidents. As Mutsu Munemitsu would later state, this provided the Japanese government with a convenient pretext to control Joseon.

The Joseon government eventually reached out to China for help, and as China dispatched troops, Japan also sent forces based on the provisions of the Tianjin Convention between China and Japan. Even after the Donghak Peasant Revolution was suppressed, Japan refused to withdraw its troops, and several months later, Japan launched a surprise attack on China, triggering the Sino-Japanese War. The Sino-Japanese War involved numerous clashes on both land and sea. Ultimately, with the decisive defeat of the Qing navy in the Battle of the Yellow Sea, China lost its will to fight, and the Sino-Japanese War concluded on March 9th with Japan's victory in land battles.

Extensive discussions and research have already been conducted on the nature of the Sino-Japanese War. This paper, building upon those arguments, posits that the essence of the Sino-Japanese War was a conflict between China's attempt to organize its institutions by projecting abstract, customary, and historical interstate relations onto modern international politics, and Japan's attempt to establish institutions that reflected the actual power disparity. In other words, it was the prelude to a war for hegemony in East Asia, not primarily aimed at regulating the tributary relationship of Joseon. The main objective of the Sino-Japanese War can be briefly defined as laying the groundwork for realizing the dream of continental expansion and establishing the Great Japanese Empire.

Certainly, existing research on the Sino-Japanese War has emphasized the importance of Joseon by focusing on Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Furthermore, Li Hongzhang was aware that Japan had coveted Joseon's territory long before the actual negotiations.1 Li Hongzhang and for China, Joseon held significant meaning. Having witnessed numerous kingdoms break away from China's tributary system, China could not abandon its attachment to Joseon, which adhered to the tradition of tributary relations. After suffering two consecutive defeats against France in 1883, China, prompted by the British occupation of Geomun Island in March 1885, saw Britain publicly acknowledge the tributary relationship between China and Joseon, a stance it had previously maintained with indifference. This attachment likely stemmed from China's last vestiges of face (面子, dignity).

However, the focus of this paper is not on the Sino-Japanese War, which has been extensively researched, but on the events that followed. While the conflicting interests of various powers in China's Liaodong Peninsula led to the Tripartite Intervention, a similar conflict or a significant shift in the attitude of Western powers did not occur on the Korean Peninsula. This discrepancy sparked my interest, leading me to formulate the hypothesis that "Japan's shift in its foreign policy towards Joseon minimized the intervention of China and other Western powers on the Korean Peninsula, allowing Japan to increase its control over the peninsula."

The hypothesis presented in this paper requires the validation of three points to be convincing. First, whether Japan's foreign policy towards Joseon actually changed and, if so, how. Second, how Japan managed to prevent China, as well as the Western powers that intervened in the Liaodong Peninsula, from focusing their attention on the Korean Peninsula. Third, how Japan dealt with Russia, which attempted to intervene in Joseon despite these efforts, and what the consequences were.

III. The Tripartite Intervention in the Liaodong Peninsula and Perceptions of Japan

Change

3.1. The Strategic Significance of the Tripartite Intervention and the Liaodong Peninsula

The Tripartite Intervention refers to the joint intervention by Russia, France, and Germany in 1895, opposing Japan's possession of the Liaodong Peninsula as stipulated in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the peace treaty concluding the Sino-Japanese War.

The Liaodong Peninsula features excellent ice-free ports such as Lushun and Dalian. Western countries, for trade with China and other nations, would have to pass through these ports. To maximize their influence in the Far East, occupying the Liaodong Peninsula was the most effective strategy, a fact well understood by France, Russia, and Germany. The Tripartite Intervention ultimately opened the door for Western powers to partition China, leading to the landing of German troops in Jiaozhou Bay in March 1898, and Russia obtaining railway concessions in Manchuria and leasing the Liaodong Peninsula. This indicates the high number of powers vying for control of the Liaodong Peninsula, and Japan, despite being the first to act, lost it due to the Tripartite Intervention.

The events at Shimonoseki reveal a fascinating detail. In the meeting between Li Hongzhang and Ito Hirobumi, the Japanese side expressed a desire to possess the Liaodong Peninsula. Ito Hirobumi presented Li Hongzhang with a total of 10 articles for the peace treaty. Among these, Article 1 concerned Joseon's independent sovereignty, and 4 articles were directly or indirectly related to the Liaodong Peninsula. Li Hongzhang relayed these demands to the Qing court, summarizing them as Japan's desire for "Joseon's independence, cession of the Liaodong Peninsula and Taiwan, reparations, and the opening of port cities." Four days later, Li Hongzhang proposed that the cession of the Liaodong Peninsula would be difficult. As the Japanese side insisted on not yielding, they seemed to compromise, stating that while the entire Liaodong Peninsula was difficult, partial cession might be possible. During their fifth and final meeting, Ito Hirobumi, demonstrating the Japanese side's firm stance, stated that personnel would be dispatched immediately upon the treaty's signing to proceed with the cession, despite Li Hongzhang's earnest pleas.3 China feared losing the Liaodong Peninsula until the very end, as its proximity to the capital, Beijing, made it a critical strategic location.

For France, Russia, and Germany, the return of the Liaodong Peninsula was a matter directly linked to their national interests, compelling them to intervene more actively. France and Germany likely judged that ceding the peninsula to Japan would be detrimental to their economies and trade. Evidence for this can be found in a letter from Kurino Shinichiro, Japan's Minister to the United States, to Kato Takaaki, Japan's Minister to Great Britain. The letter contained a summary of the protest notes from the three powers received by Japan and Japan's proposed response. The first point was Russia's concern that "the independence of Joseon will become nominal." The second was that it would "harm European trade and commerce." The third was that it could "threaten the capital of China," and finally, that "the peace of the Far East is endangered."

For France, while trade was important, the existence of the Franco-Russian Alliance meant they had to support Russia. Furthermore, by assisting China, France sought to pursue its interests in Vietnam. Germany, like Russia, saw this as a golden opportunity to secure its own base in the Far East and also believed that by diverting Russia's attention to the Far East, it would help reduce threats in Europe.

As the Tripartite Intervention was led by Russia, it is evident that most of the points in the protest note, except for the second item, were related to Russia's interests. Russia desperately needed ports, especially ice-free ones, for its expansion into the Far East and aimed to increase its influence in Manchuria. This can be seen in newspaper reports from Austria-Hungary at the time. Vienna received word from St. Petersburg that Russia hoped Japan would either abandon its rights in Joseon or grant Russia one ice-free port (《马关议和中之伊李问答》pp.152). At that time, Russian imperial newspapers vehemently criticized Japan, demanding that it relinquish its rights not only to the Liaodong Peninsula but also to the Korean Peninsula. It is imaginable how great the sense of betrayal must have been for Japan, considering that three years later, when Russia leased the Liaodong Peninsula, anti-Russian sentiment in Japan reached its peak.

3.2. Changes in International Perceptions of Japan After the War

The outcome of the Sino-Japanese War was a shift in Western powers' perception of Japan. Some referred to it as 'Old China, New Japan,' and Benjamin Elman summarized it as 'Rise of Japan, Fall of China,' viewing the Sino-Japanese War as 'the clash of two orders'.

Extensive research has been conducted on the difference in naval combat capabilities between China and Japan. Studies indicate that Japan's defeat was inevitable not only due to differences in operational capabilities at the time but also in tactical aspects and the quality and quantity of actual warships possessed (Liu Zhi 2014, 628-676; Li Yusheng 2014, 677-714). While some Chinese researchers have also discussed the role of luck in Japan's victory (Fei Zhijie 2014, 779-789), this is not the mainstream view.

While current research can identify the causes of victory and defeat based on abundant information and accurate data, the late 19th century lacked such extensive information, and predictions of war outcomes were highly subjective. Therefore, the shock experienced by Western countries upon hearing of China's defeat was immense, comparable to a drawing of a small samurai defeating a giant dressed in Chinese attire. 5. Why did the Triple Intervention not occur in Korea?_Sino-Japanese War Museum.

Perceptions of a nation played a crucial role in predicting the outcome of the war. At that time, Japan actively engaged in diplomacy and achieved modernization over 30 years, significantly developing its industrial production capacity. Nevertheless, until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Western powers uniformly predicted China's victory. However, following the near-upsetting outcome, perceptions and images of Japan began to change very positively. Western powers started to recognize Japan as an undisputed major power, at least in the Far East, exemplified by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance formed in 1902.

IV. Japan's Active Diplomacy Towards Korea After the Sino-Japanese War

Revision of Policy Line

To substantiate the hypothesis discussed earlier, a book offering insight into the changes in Japan's diplomatic policy toward Korea was needed, and 'Kenkkenroku' was selected. Kenkkenroku is a book about the Sino-Japanese War later written by Mutsu Munemitsu. He is known as a diplomat who directly participated in the negotiation process of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Of course, the collection of Japanese diplomatic documents compiled by Itō Hirobumi was also chosen as a reference. Furthermore, the detailed discussions between Li Hongzhang and Itō Hirobumi, which shed light on China's changing stance in response to Japan's policy changes and actual actions, were closely examined. By referencing the aforementioned books, it was possible to gain insight into the diplomatic significance of Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War, as well as the process of weighing options in the Liaodong Peninsula and Korea resulting from Japan's victory.

4.1. Diplomatic Policy Towards Korea Before the Sino-Japanese War

Existing research refutes the claim that Japan was inadvertently drawn into the Sino-Japanese War, arguing instead that Japan approached the issue of Korea and hegemony in East Asia very systematically (Qi Junjie 2014, 493-515; Wang Xianzong 2014: 516-532). Although not accidental, Japan maintained a very cautious yet anxious stance, as can be seen from the treaties concluded with China before 1895.

Japan clearly concluded the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and Joseon in 1876 as a treaty between two independent states. However, China's persistent efforts to impress upon the international community the subordinate relationship between China and Joseon and to legally solidify it must have been a significant burden for Japan, which was just beginning to establish its position in the international community. In particular, even in diplomatic relations with Japan, China insisted on its 'tributary system' logic, calling Japan a 'brother' and stating, 'Europe for Europeans, Asia for Asians.' As Japan had concluded the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and Joseon as a treaty between two independent states, it is likely that Japan felt a greater urgency to resolve the ambiguous suzerain-vassal relationship between China and Joseon, knowing that future international legal issues would arise if it were not addressed.

Furthermore, since the Treaty of Tianjin lacked provisions clearly defining the relationship between China and Joseon, Japan needed a decisive 'blow' to make China accept its terms smoothly. If the provisions of the Treaty of Tianjin, which required notification to Japan before dispatching troops to Joseon, served as a balance of power between China and Japan in Joseon, then China's dispatch of troops in 1894 would have been the first event from Japan's perspective to judge whether China would faithfully abide by the Treaty of Tianjin. That is, while both sides claimed equal rights, Japan recognized Joseon as an independent state, while China recognized Joseon as a tributary state. Japan strongly protested China's assertion that 'protecting a tributary is an old Chinese custom' among the notification points, which could be considered the true trigger of the Sino-Japanese War. In fact, this logic is easier to understand if slightly rephrased: if a tributary-vassal relationship existed between China and Joseon while Joseon had concluded the Treaty of Amity and Commerce as an independent state dealing with another independent state, this would inevitably work to Japan's disadvantage in the future.

However, contrary to Japan's concerns, a look at the negotiation process reveals that by 1895, China was largely indifferent to Joseon's fate and was instead calculating its own interests. This is a perfectly normal reaction, stemming from the fact that China was on the verge of ceding its own territory and could hardly consider Joseon's fate. Itō Hirobumi and Li Hongzhang held six official meetings to negotiate the treaty terms. Even before these meetings, Li Hongzhang had received the terms Japan intended to include in the treaty from the Japanese side. However, as mentioned earlier, publicly acknowledging Joseon's independent sovereignty was tantamount to trampling on China's last vestige of dignity, Mianzi. Therefore, even though Li Hongzhang was the plenipotentiary minister, his response on April 5, before receiving instructions from the court, to finally acknowledge Japan's first demand concerning Joseon's independent sovereignty, marked the point from which Li Hongzhang could foresee China's decline and Japan's rise. It is unimaginable how humiliating and tragic it must have been. 4.2. Diplomatic Policy Towards Korea After the War

In the words of Mutsu Munemitsu, Japan believed at the time that 'a tilted power balance between China and Japan in Joseon' already existed, and consequently, by failing to suppress the Donghak Peasant Revolution, Japan could justify its active intervention, citing Joseon's lack of capacity as a central government, and thus exclude other Western powers from Joseon. After the Sino-Japanese War, Japan's policy towards Joseon can be described as meticulous and swift. They demanded Joseon's independent sovereignty in Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, making the expansion of influence in the Korean Peninsula one of the various objectives of the Sino-Japanese War.

Furthermore, Japan was aware that various factions existed within the Joseon court, and that elites were increasing the influence of Western countries through negotiations with them. Itō Hirobumi, concerned about this, formulated a policy to revise Japan's approach to Joseon over approximately two years (1894-1895). Notably, as indicated in a report by Inoue Kaoru, Japan proposed policies that would lead to the loss of the Joseon dynasty's actual ruling power on the pretext of 'protecting Joseon.' He knew that Japan lacked a legitimate basis for interfering in Joseon's internal affairs but decided to proceed nonetheless. At that time, Itō Hirobumi was narrowing down the differences with China's Li Hongzhang regarding the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and immediately after receiving the acknowledgment of Joseon's independent sovereignty on April 5, policy discussions aimed at interfering in Joseon's internal affairs were held on the 8th. The summarized proposals included: 1. Stationing of Japanese troops, 2. Plans for railway and communication construction in Joseon, and 3. Internal reforms through Japan.6

5 <日淸平和後ニ於ケル對韓方針ヲ定ムル義ニ付井上伯具申>p. 630 “I profess the independence of Korea on the surface, but in reality, there is suspicion that we harbor ambitions to make it a subordinate state, which contradicts our declarations and actions, and we cannot escape criticism.” (Translation: We profess Korea's independence on the surface, but in reality, there is suspicion that we harbor ambitions to make it a subordinate state, which contradicts our declarations and actions, and we cannot escape criticism.)

6 <日淸平和後ニ於ケル對韓方針ヲ定ムル義ニ付井上伯具申> pp. 631-632 In particular, Japan needed a reason why it alone could take the initiative in Korea and possessed the resolve to implement it. Japan cited the Joseon government's financial problems and its inability to resolve domestic issues as grounds, and devised a policy whereby Joseon's communication with foreign countries would be blocked and channeled through Japan for internal reforms.7

Japan strengthened its 'internal foundation' by expanding its influence within the Joseon royal court, while simultaneously conducting active diplomatic correspondence to minimize external conflicts with its interests.

For example, 'Kenkkenroku' records Mutsu Munemitsu persuading Itō Hirobumi to focus Western powers' attention solely on the Liaodong Peninsula, and although he spoke indirectly, his intention was clear. He argued, 'If the Triple Intervention is to be resolved through an international conference, other countries will inevitably participate, and it is obvious that the conference will raise other agendas besides the return of the Liaodong Peninsula (e.g., how to guarantee Joseon's independent sovereignty), which will lead to the failure of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and invite new interference from European powers.'8 He immediately sent a letter to the Russian Minister to Japan, promising to fully satisfy Russia's demands regarding the issue of Korean independence.

Japan's meticulous efforts to minimize the number of actors in the Korean Peninsula had its own logic. Chinese officials who interacted with Japan increasingly perceived Japan's ambitions. For instance, in June 1879, Chinese official Ding Richang reported to the Emperor, 'Japan harbors ambitions to annex Joseon, and Western countries (European and American nations) wish to trade with Joseon, so it might be acceptable to encourage Joseon to actively engage in exchanges with Western countries.'

Li Hongzhang sent a similar letter to Yi Yu-won, who was then the Minister of War in Joseon. From that time on, China actively drew in Western powers to internationalize the Korean Peninsula, devising an 'using barbarians to control barbarians' policy that anticipated conflicts of interest between Japan and Western countries should Japan harbor ambitions toward the peninsula. Later, they even attempted to make Joseon a neutral country like Belgium or Switzerland.

Japan adopted a very cautious stance regarding the Triple Intervention. While appearing to comply with the demands of Germany, Russia, and France to prevent the repercussions of the Triple Intervention in the Liaodong Peninsula from extending to Joseon, it simultaneously declared its intention to deter other countries from interfering in the Korean Peninsula by stating, 'Other treaties concluded with China (excluding the issue of returning the Liaodong Peninsula) will only be returned after China has fully implemented them.'

4.3. China Completely Relents, While Russia Remains Active. China completely relented. The Sino-Japanese War was, in a sense, a test of the success of China's Self-Strengthening Movement. China's nearly 30-year plan for national prosperity and strength came to a bitter end with the defeat of the Beiyang Fleet, led by Ding Ruchang, in the Battle of the Yellow Sea. Ultimately, Joseon achieved 'autonomy' (自主) and 'independence' (独立), but it was weaker and more isolated than ever before.

In fact, the tributary-vassal subordinate relationship between China and Joseon began to show signs of weakening as early as the conclusion of the Japan-Joseon Treaty of Amity in 1876. The balance of power in Joseon, which had been precarious between the two nations, definitively tilted in favor of Japan with the conclusion of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1885, and even more so after the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This is evident from the correspondence exchanged between Li Hongzhang, as plenipotentiary minister, and the 'neighboring states' (邦国), as he communicated not only with ministers stationed in Joseon but also with the Joseon royal court before the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1895.

Documents referring to Joseon as a Chinese tributary state only existed up to the 21st year of Guangxu (1895). In 1899, the Treaty of Commerce between the Great Korean Empire and the Great Qing Empire (大韓國大淸國通商條約) was signed. Incidentally, in a letter sent in 1899 from Li Hongzhang to Xu Shoupeng, the Qing envoy to the Great Korean Empire, he expressed pity for the future of the Great Korean Empire, stating, 'A small country surrounded by great powers.' Regardless, this treaty holds great historical significance as the first modern equal treaty concluded between Korea and China on an equal footing in their unified dynastic history.

However, unlike China, which had completely given up, and Western countries, which had lost interest, Russia had not given up. Instead, a situation arose where it became even more actively involved.

In the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia, judging that Japan would guarantee Joseon's independence and not infringe upon its own interests, adopted a passive policy of observing the situation without direct intervention. However, contrary to its initial expectation of a Chinese victory, Japan won and occupied Lushun in the Liaodong Peninsula, prompting Russia to decide to intervene and shift to an active policy. Russia closely monitored the negotiation process of the peace talks between China and Japan and eventually led the Triple Intervention, thereby diminishing the significance of Japan's war victory. Consequently, the confrontation between Japan, which was pursuing the colonization of the Korean Peninsula and aiming for continental expansion, and Russia became inevitable.

Russia's policy toward Joseon during the Sino-Japanese War period shifted from passive to active, and from a stance of waiting and observing to a leading role, with the Triple Intervention as a turning point. However, within the broader framework, it maintained a continuous and consistent policy line, based on maintaining the status quo with the premise of Joseon's autonomy and independence.

As mentioned earlier, Russia, despite having vast land, lacked good harbors, making it difficult to advance into the Pacific in the Far East. Therefore, Russia has historically had a strong desire for land and ports in the Far East. 9 The ongoing disputes between Russia and other countries over the sea, including the path to the Pacific, have their origins in similar logic. 9 In 1860, Russia signed the 'Treaty of Peking' with China and acquired Sakhalin Island in the Far East.

The Korean Peninsula occupies a strategically crucial position. Not only does it possess important sea routes for Russia's advance into the Pacific, but it also served as a significant 'geopolitical buffer zone' for Russia, as strongly argued by one researcher (Zhang Zhi, From a Geopolitical Perspective, Japan Launched the First Sino-Japanese War). Russia removed the foothold for Japan to threaten Russia through the Liaodong Peninsula after the Sino-Japanese peace treaty and the success of the Triple Intervention. However, Russia remained wary of the stationing of Japanese troops in major Korean cities. Since the mid-19th century, Russia had been continuously expanding into Eastern Siberia. Therefore, Japan's expansion of influence in the Korean Peninsula posed a risk of Russia losing the territory in Northeast China acquired from China.

In other words, the Liaodong Peninsula and the Korean Peninsula were like a double-edged sword for Russia. While both served as springboards for Russia to advance into other countries, they could also be used as springboards for other countries to enter Russia. 5. Why did the Triple Intervention not occur in Korea?_Sino-Japanese War Museum.

V. Conclusion

There is a saying, "Attack is the best defense." This phrase is from On War, written by Carl von Clausewitz. It means that offense is the best defense. Japan has always launched preemptive strikes whenever it engaged in reckless expansion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It then meticulously crafted strategies and tactics to protect the spoils of war it acquired.

Based on the above, it can be inferred that Japan was concerned about the overly complex entanglement of interests of other Western powers in the Korean Peninsula. This was because it could pose problems in the future colonization of Joseon. Therefore, it can be inferred that Japan strategically and systematically blocked the intervention of other Western countries from the outset.

To maximize its interests in the Korean Peninsula, Japan endeavored to minimize the number of actors involved in events occurring there. Indeed, after the First Sino-Japanese War, no other country besides Russia attempted to intervene. To achieve its objectives, Japan sought to sever communication within the Joseon court and with foreign powers. It also communicated its intentions to other countries, cloaking them under the pretext of 'protection.' Consequently, Japan succeeded and laid the groundwork for further expansion into Russia, which arguably contributed to its smoother victory in the war.

The sun sets slowly, then all at once. What was Li Hongzhang thinking as he gazed at the slowly setting sun in Shimonoseki? Perhaps Li Hongzhang, looking at Japan, recalled the past glory of the Qing Dynasty. I feel an urge to rush to the Museum of the Shimonoseki Treaty.

1. Compiled by Jukichi Inouye. 1895. "A Concise history of the war

between Japan and China".

2. S. C. M. Paine. 2005. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895:

Perceptions, Power, and Primacy. Cambridge University

Press.

3. Benjamin Elman. 2013. "The 'Rise' of Japan and the 'Fall of China'

after 1895." Chapt. 5 in The Chinese Chameleon Revisited:

From the Jesuits to Zhang Yimou.

4. Li Hongzhang. 2008. 《Li Hongzhang Quanji Vol. 36 (Letters VIII)》. Compiled by Gu Tinglong and Dai Yi. Anhui

Educational Publishing House.

5. Compiled by Guangxi Normal University Press. 2008. 《The Dialogue between Ito and Li during the Shimonoseki Peace Negotiations (Pain and Dreams Before the Wuxu Year)》. Guangxi Normal University Press.

6. Li Hongzhang. 1965. 《Li Wenzhong Gong Quanji》. Vol. 1, 《Yishuxian Gao》. Selected by Wu Rulun.

6. Li Hongzhang. 1965. *Complete Collection of Duke Wenzhong of Li*. Vol. 1, *Drafts of Diplomatic Correspondence*. Selected by Wu Rulun.

Wenhai Publishing House, reprinted from the 1905 edition. (31st year of Guangxu).

7. Chief Editor Guo Yang and Wang Jihua. 2018. 《Collection of Papers from the International Academic Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War and Modern East Asian History》. Social Sciences Literature Publishing House.

8. [Japan] Harada Keiichi. 2007. 《Nisshin, Nichiro Senso》. Iwanami Shoten. 5. Why did the Triple Intervention Not Occur in the Korean Peninsula?_Museum of the Shimonoseki Treaty 9. [Japan] Mutsu Munemitsu. 2018. 《Kenkennroku: Secret Diplomatic Records of the First Sino-Japanese War》. Translated by Zhao Gofei and Wang Zongyu. China Intercontinental Press.

8. [Japan] Harada Keiichi. 2007. *The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War*. Iwanami Shoten. 5. Why did the Triple Intervention not occur in the Korean Peninsula?_Sino-Japanese War Museum 9. [Japan] Mutsu Munemitsu. 2018. *Kenkennroku: A Secret Record of the Sino-Japanese War Diplomacy*. Translated by Zhao Ge.

Non.

10. Compiled by Ito Hirobumi [et al.]. 1936. 《Secret Documents Series: Joseon Negotiation Materials (Vol. 1, 2, and

3)》. Secret Documents Publication Society.

11. Compiled by Ito Hirobumi [et al.]. 1933. 《Secret Documents Series, Vol. 1: The Sino-Japanese Incident》. Secret

Documents Publication Society.

Journal Articles

1. Kim Won-su. 2015. "The First Sino-Japanese War, the Triple Intervention, and Russia's Policy toward Korea."

〈Korean Journal of Political and Diplomatic History〉, 36, 2: 37-65.

2. Gu Seon-hee. 2006. "The Meaning of the First Sino-Japanese War: Focusing on the 'Vassal State' Relationship between Joseon and Qing."

〈Korean Studies of Modern and Contemporary History〉, 37: 92-125.

3. Kwon Moo-hyuk. 2006. "Russia's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula during the First Sino-Japanese War."

〈Journal of Sino-Soviet Studies〉, 30, 1: 151-184.

4. [Korea] Wang Xianzhong. 2018. "The Korean Government's Assistance in the War Effort and its Dependence on Japan during the 2014 Sino-Japanese War." In 《Collection of Papers from the International Academic Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War and Modern East Asian History》. Social Sciences Literature Publishing House,

516-532.

5. Kwon Hyuk-soo. 2014. "A Study on the Formation Process of the Clause Regarding the Korean Peninsula Issue in the Treaty of Shimonoseki." 《Journal of Anti-Japanese War Studies》, 2014, No. 4.

6. Qi Junjie. 2018. "The Causes and Consequences of Japan's Initiation of the First Sino-Japanese War." In 《Collection of Papers from the International Academic Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War and Modern East Asian History》. Social Sciences Literature Publishing House, 493-515.

7. Liu Zhi. 2018. "A Comparison of Torpedo Boat Units of Japan and China in the First Sino-Japanese War." In 《Collection of Papers from the International Academic Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War and Modern East Asian History》. Social Sciences Literature

Publishing House. 628-676.

8. Li Yusheng. 2018. "Naval Observation and Fire Control Technology during the First Sino-Japanese War and the Naval Battle Movements of the Chinese and Japanese Fleets." In 《Collection of Papers from the International Academic Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War and Modern East Asian History》. Social Sciences Literature Publishing House, 677-714.

9. Fei Zhijie. 2018. "Analysis of the Fortuitous Factors in Japan's Victory in the First Sino-Japanese War. Analysis of the Fortuitous Factors in Japan's Victory in the First Sino-Japanese War." In 《Collection of Papers from the International Academic Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War and Modern East Asian History》. Social Sciences Literature Publishing House,

771-779.

10. Zhang Shuangzhi. 2018. "Viewing Japan's Launch of the First Sino-Japanese War from a Geopolitical Perspective." In 《Collection of Papers from the International Academic Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War and Modern East Asian History》. Social Sciences Literature

Publishing House, 169-179.

8. Li Yusheng. 2018. "Naval Fire Control Technology During the Sino-Japanese War and the Naval Battle Between Chinese and Japanese Fleets."

Movement." *Proceedings of the International Academic Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the Sino-Japanese War and Modern East Asian History*.

Social Sciences Academic Press, pp. 677-714.

9. Fesjeter. 2018. "Analysis of the Fortuitous Factors in Japan's Victory in the Sino-Japanese War. Analysis of Fortuitous Factors in Japan's Victory in the Sino-Japanese War."

" *Proceedings of the International Academic Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the Sino-Japanese War and Modern East Asian History*."

Social Sciences Academic Press, pp. 771-779.

771-779.

10. Zhang Shuangzhi. 2018. "Viewing Japan's Launch of the Sino-Japanese War from a Geopolitical Perspective." *Proceedings of the International Academic Symposium on the 120th Anniversary of the Sino-Japanese War and Modern East Asian History*.

Social Sciences Academic Press, pp. 169-179.

Social Sciences Academic Press, 169-179.