An Evaluation of the Sino-Japanese War and Mao Zedong's Anti-Japanese Activities

Mao Zedong Memorial Hall · Yoon Jiwon · Seoul National University

Introduction

In 1937, Japan initiated the Sino-Japanese War following the Mukden Incident. As Japan's ambitions intensified with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, China, which had been divided into the Nationalist and Communist parties and was engaged in civil war, began to unite under the banner of "anti-Japanese resistance" to confront Japan. At this time, the Chinese Communist Party, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, who argued for the need to effectively utilize the anti-Japanese sentiment that arose throughout China (Philip Short 2019, 484), experienced explosive growth (Twitchett and Fairbank (eds.) 1986, 620). Japan's invasion became a "godsend" opportunity for the Chinese Communist Party (Van de Ven 2018, 146). Mao succeeded in expanding the influence of the Communist Party through the Sino-Japanese War, ultimately leading to victory over the Nationalist Party and the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

However, regarding Mao's anti-Japanese record, there are conflicting evaluations, unlike the clear outcomes associated with the Sino-Japanese War and Mao Zedong's anti-Japanese activities at the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall. His actions have become immutable history, so why are the evaluations of his conduct divided into two opposing views? This question is closely related to whether Mao's stance in resisting Japan was sincere or merely rhetorical to counter the Nationalist Party. Therefore, the question can be rephrased as: "Why have there been dualistic evaluations regarding the sincerity of Mao's anti-Japanese endeavors?" This study aims to answer this research question by first examining the conflicting evaluations of Mao's anti-Japanese activities and then tracing the anti-Japanese strategies Mao employed at the time. This study will be conducted through literature research, primarily referencing books and articles detailing Mao Zedong's anti-Japanese struggle. Primary sources will include Mao Zedong's speeches, writings, and interviews, while secondary sources will consist of related monographs and academic papers.

Contrasting Evaluations of Mao Zedong and the Sino-Japanese War

During Mao Zedong's lifetime, the Sino-Japanese War was remembered in China solely as an event showcasing the brilliant leadership of Mao and the Communist Party (Coble 2007, 397-395). However, in the 2000s, after Mao's death and with the passage of time, the actions of his rival, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Nationalist Party during that period began to receive more positive re-evaluations (Coble 2007, 397-402). While this does not diminish the significance of the Communist Party's anti-Japanese efforts, and Mao's leadership during this period is still considered important (Coble 2007, 401), it is no longer accurate to claim that only Mao and the Communist Party were the main actors in the War of Resistance. In fact, highly contrasting evaluations of Mao's anti-Japanese record coexist during this period.

The debate between Jung Chang and Haliday, and their opponents Benton and Chun, serves as an excellent example that starkly illustrates these dualistic evaluations. Jung Chang and Haliday's "Mao: The Unknown Story" is a representative work that views Mao's anti-Japanese activities negatively. They argue that Mao saw the Sino-Japanese War as an "opportunity to allow the Nationalist Party to be destroyed by Japanese hands," asserting that he did not sincerely intend to fight Japan (Jung Chang, John Haliday 2006, 271). However, Benton and Chun countered Jung Chang's claims by editing a book titled "Was Mao Really a Monster?" This book argues that Jung Chang's criticisms of Mao's anti-Japanese record are unfounded (Gregor and Lin (eds) 2010, 61) and posits that Mao was merely a tactician who strategically resisted Japan while avoiding the annihilation of the Red Army (Gregor and Lin (eds) 2010, 143-144). This perspective views Mao's anti-Japanese activities positively, and Edgar Snow, who directly interviewed Mao, held a similar view. In his book "Red Star Over China," Snow recalls his time with the Chinese Communist Party, evaluating the Red Army as having a "resolute will to resist Japan and a firm intention to actively engage in it" (Edgar Snow 2013, 143). S. Schram, while maintaining a more neutral stance than Snow, also writes in his book "Mao Tse-tung" that Mao's sincere anti-Japanese spirit moved the Chinese people (S. Schram 1977, 205).

Conversely, the arguments of Japanese scholar Endo Homare align with those of Jung Chang. In his book, he claims that during the Sino-Japanese War, Mao secretly colluded with Japan to weaken the Nationalist Party (Endo Homare 2019). Peter Vladimirov, a Soviet advisor dispatched to China, also wrote in his diary on August 28, 1943, "At the present stage, the Chinese revolution must prioritize targeting Japanese imperialism, but for Mao, it is mere words" (Vladimirov 1975, 145).

As previously mentioned, these dualistic evaluations stem from differing views on the sincerity of Mao's intentions. Therefore, to examine these evaluations, it is necessary to attempt to directly explore Mao's true intentions during that period. This study seeks to gain insight into Mao's mindset during the Sino-Japanese War by examining the anti-Japanese strategies he formulated at the time. The significance of this study lies in its attempt to discern his thoughts on his anti-Japanese activities and his view of Japan from his anti-Japanese strategies, and it is expected to contribute, albeit modestly, to the analysis of China's policy toward Japan from the founding of the PRC to Mao's later years.

Mao Zedong's Anti-Japanese Strategies

Professor Rana Mitter, a scholar who has studied the Sino-Japanese War, points out that while the Communist Party and Mao receive attention for China's resistance, other actors like Chiang Kai-shek, despite their significant contributions, have been largely forgotten by history (Mitter 2014, 380). He re-evaluates Chiang Kai-shek, describing him as someone who "won the war but lost the country" (Mitter 2013, 6). This concise statement implies that although Chiang Kai-shek played a much larger role in the victory of the Sino-Japanese War, he ultimately lost the civil war to Mao. In fact, at the outset of the Sino-Japanese War, the Nationalist Party possessed a significantly stronger force than the Communist Party, making it logically inevitable that the Nationalist Party would take the lead over the Communist Party. However, when evaluating Mao Zedong's anti-Japanese record, these realistic conditions are not taken as the basis for judgment. The crucial issue is what Mao Zedong was thinking when he engaged in anti-Japanese activities, and this study aims to discern his mindset through his anti-Japanese strategies.

The anti-Japanese strategies of Mao that this paper focuses on can be broadly categorized into three main points. The first is the formation of a national united front. Mao's most fundamental strategy for resisting Japan was the argument that class struggle should be temporarily suspended for the sake of the nation and anti-Japanese resistance, and that a "national united front" should be formed through unity (Schram eds 1999, 94-97). He argued that, unlike the large landlord and merchant classes, the national bourgeoisie was a fluid class that could be absorbed into the Communist Party and join the resistance (Schram eds 1999, 86-102). Mao directly appealed for the support of these classes, stating that if China fell to Japan, the bourgeoisie and landlords would also become "slaves without a country" (Schram eds. 1999, 614). Although this tactic was criticized by communists who believed cooperation with the Nationalist Party was impossible, Mao strongly opposed them, labeling them "isolationists" and arguing that communism could not be realized without a country (Ross Terrill 2008, 331-339). Considering that this strategy, which stimulated the patriotism of the Chinese masses and fostered cooperation with the Nationalist Party, later became a key factor in Mao's victory (S. Schram 1977, 202), his anti-Japanese strategy can be considered rational.

However, at the same time, this strategy carried the risk of being absorbed ideologically and in terms of influence, given the Communist Party's significantly weaker position compared to the Nationalist Party at the time. Mao was well aware of this risk and was cautious, as evidenced in his writings: "The bourgeoisie is contending with us for leadership. To overcome the vacillation and inconsistency of the bourgeoisie, we must rely on mass power and correct policies. Otherwise, the bourgeoisie will defeat the proletariat." (Mao Zedong 2001, 336; Schram eds 1999, 656).

Therefore, the key for the Communist Party in forming the united front was essentially how to embrace and unite different classes while preserving its identity and avoiding absorption by the Nationalist Party. To this end, Mao established a form of safeguard by advocating the principle that "all forces included in the united front, including the Communist Party, must maintain an independent status" (Mao Zedong 2002, 224; Schram eds 2004, 527; Schram eds 2004, 243), thereby preventing the Communist Party from being absorbed by the Nationalist Party. Mao's determination to clearly differentiate himself from the Nationalist Party is also evident in his statements that "there is no need, and indeed there should not be, to pre-discuss all matters with the Nationalist Party" (see Schram eds. 2004, 316; Mao Zedong 2002, 240-241; Schram eds. 2004, 546-547).

Having thus secured the conditions for external independence by firmly establishing his stance towards the Nationalist Party, Mao sought to maintain the Communist Party's identity internally by integrating "nation" and "class." He argued for adjusting the level of class struggle to a degree that would align with the goals of the united front, thereby capturing a point where national and class struggles could aim for the same objective and attempting to unify these two concepts. (Mao Zedong 2002, 240; Schram eds. 2004, 546).

As previously mentioned, Mao emphasized to the national bourgeoisie that they too could become slaves under Japanese invasion (Schram, eds. 1999, 614), implying that they too could become an oppressed class if the nation were lost. This can be seen as a subtle instance of the aforementioned "unification of nation and class." Mao's unification strategy was not limited to the national bourgeoisie. The following quote, illustrating Mao's attitude towards the Ge La Hui, a secret organization that opposed the Qing Dynasty (Edgar Snow 1985, 97), confirms his effort to link the ideologies of the Communist Party and the Ge La Hui to persuade them to resist Japan.

"The oppression of the ruling class on the Ge La Hui is almost identical to the oppression on us! ... You support attacking the rich and helping the poor, and we support attacking local tyrants and distributing land. Therefore, our views and positions are very close, especially in the path of serving our country and our enemies." (Ross Terrill 2008, 333-334)

Therefore, Mao's anti-Japanese strategy of "building a national united front" can be understood as an effort to gather people from various strata under the common goal of resisting Japan, to oppose Japan, and to appropriately harmonize the ideologies of nation and class within this process, ultimately preserving the identity of the Communist Party. As Mao himself stated, this strategy was largely aimed at making the Communist Party "a great mass party" (Mao Zedong 2002, 223; Schram eds. 2004, 526).

Mao's second strategy involved "propaganda" and "education." This served to heighten the will to resist Japan, but also acted as a means to cultivate individuals and forces favorable to the Communist Party, thereby realizing the Party's leadership. Mao believed that the Communist Party should "patiently educate" the people and help them to "remold themselves" (Mao Zedong 1992, 1074-1075; Mao Zedong 1983b, 113-114). Early on, he presented a Ten-Point Program for National Salvation, explicitly including education as one of its points (Mao Zedong 2002, 31; Schram eds. 2004, 31-32), and indeed devoted considerable effort to educating people about "anti-Japanese resistance" and "communism." This is clearly evident in Snow's work, "Red Star Over China."

"If there is any achievement in this 'communism,' it is that thousands of educated young people... have been led to seek ways to contribute to the creation of a 'more abundant life'... Through propaganda and practical action, they have instilled new perceptions of the nation, society, and the individual in millions of people." (Edgar Snow 2013, 154). Sino-Japanese War and Mao Zedong's Anti-Japanese Activities Evaluation_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

A closer examination of Snow's description of the plays he witnessed with the Red Army at that time clearly reveals the intentions of the Communist Party. The Communist Party was simultaneously inciting animosity towards Japan and promoting the spirit of anti-Japanese resistance, while also denouncing Chiang Kai-shek of the Nationalist Party as a traitor who collaborated with Japan (Edgar Snow 2013, 144-155). Of course, Snow's experience occurred just before the Sino-Japanese War, prior to the agreement on the United Front between the Nationalists and Communists, and thus differs from the situation after the United Front was established. After the Communist Party formally joined forces with the Nationalist Party, the level of criticism directed at the Nationalist Party somewhat softened. However, as mentioned above, propaganda and education for the Communist Party were essential for the relatively weaker Communist Party to avoid being absorbed.

"Intellectuals who are relatively loyal and can endure hardship, desiring only to resist Japan, should be accepted and educated in various ways... At the same time, some intellectuals who meet the conditions for party membership should be admitted according to specific circumstances... All intellectuals who are somewhat useful and relatively loyal should be assigned appropriate tasks, educated and guided well to gradually overcome their weaknesses in the long-term struggle, to be revolutionized and popularized, and to associate with veteran party members and cadres, and with party members from worker and peasant backgrounds."

(Mao Zedong 2002, 329; Mao Zedong 1983a, 88-89). As revealed in the passage above, Mao attempted to absorb intellectuals into the Communist Party through propaganda and education. Considering that a significant number of those who came to Yan'an, the Communist Party's base at the time, were middle-class intellectuals (Mitter 2013, 190-191), this strategy clearly indicates Mao's intention to expand the Communist Party's influence at the time. The Communist Party at the time boasted about battles won through cooperation with the Nationalist Party as their great successes (Van de Ven 2018, 144), and even after the cooperation, Mao openly stated in his speeches that the Nationalist Party was oppressing the Communist Party (Mitter 2013, 224), emphasizing the moral superiority of the Communist Party, and propaganda for the Communist Party continued.

The third anti-Japanese strategy of Mao that this paper will focus on is guerrilla warfare and rear-area operations. Mao argued that China should resist Japan through guerrilla warfare, or mobile warfare. In addition to this, another point he emphasized was "rear-area operations." Mao stressed the great importance of operating in the enemy's rear, and indeed, the Communist Party's Eighth Route Army conducted operations in the flanks and rear of the Japanese army (Mao Zedong 2002, 56; Schram eds 2004, 107). He viewed China's vast territory as effectively surrounding Japan (Mao Zedong 2002, 131; Schram eds 2004, 527; Schram eds 2004, 325), and therefore, disrupting Japan's supply lines from the rear played a particularly significant role (Mao Zedong 2002, 56; Schram eds 2004, 117). Mao added the following:

"If large numbers of troops engage in mobile warfare and the Eighth Route Army supports them with guerrilla warfare, victory will surely be ours." (Mao Zedong 2002, 57; Schram eds 2004, 117).

Here, "large numbers of troops" and "Eighth Route Army" are contrasted, and "large numbers of troops" comparable to the Eighth Route Army at the time is interpreted as referring to the Nationalist army. Therefore, this statement implies that the Eighth Route Army would support the Nationalist army by conducting guerrilla warfare in the rear. It is not difficult to infer that units engaged in rear-area operations would have suffered relatively fewer casualties, and since Mao never engaged in combat under unfavorable conditions (Schram eds. 1966, 56-57), these remarks indicate that he was deeply concerned with minimizing the casualties of the Communist Party. The purpose of this strategy was not only to reduce casualties but also to establish bases in the Japanese army's rear to realize the leadership of the Communist Party (Twitchett and Fairbank (eds.) 1986, 614). The Communist Party "rapidly infiltrated the areas behind the Japanese army" (Ray Huang 2009, 221) and began to bring those areas under its effective control. Mao considered one more factor in this context.

"In the course of the war, China will be able to capture many Japanese soldiers and seize many weapons and ammunition to arm itself... and gradually strengthen the equipment of the Chinese army." (Mao Zedong 2002, 132; Schram eds 2004, 325; Schram eds 1999, 266)

The issue of military equipment was a problem that existed from the time of the Red Army, even before the United Front between the Nationalists and Communists. The Communist Party had a limited capacity for self-produced weaponry and often resolved this issue by capturing it from the enemy (Edgar Snow 2013, 345). After the United Front, Chiang Kai-shek promised to support the Eighth Route Army, but this was not properly implemented. Ironically, the Communist Party was once again forced to rely on the equipment of the enemy, the Japanese army (Ross Terrill 2008, 342; Schram eds 2004, 136). Therefore, attacking the rear and supply lines of the Japanese army also presented an opportunity to capture various equipment and supplies used by the Japanese military. In fact, when explaining the surprise tactics of guerrilla warfare and their objectives, Mao wrote, "Weapons acquired through guerrilla warfare will gradually strengthen guerrilla units and supplement regular forces" (Schram eds 2004, 180), which clearly indicates that one of the objectives of guerrilla warfare was the acquisition of materiel. He listed targets for ambushes, including enemy trucks, trains, and ships, and issued directives to find and seize weapons and resources from them (Schram eds 2004, 189-191). The following passage from Mao's basic tactics manual clearly illustrates his thinking.

"The fact that the enemy has weapons? We can find ways to capture those weapons... We must act as if the enemy is the bread that will satisfy our hunger and devour him immediately." (Schram 1966, 53)

Synthesizing Mao's first and second anti-Japanese strategies discussed above, it can be confirmed that they ultimately led to the expansion of the Communist Party in terms of personnel through the education and propaganda of those mobilized under the banner of anti-Japanese resistance. The third strategy can be seen as a method to expand the Party's controlled territory while simultaneously strengthening its military capabilities. Therefore, this study posits that the anti-Japanese strategies formulated by Mao were, in effect, strategies to strengthen the Communist Party. This does not mean that he did not engage in anti-Japanese activities at all or had no intention of doing so, but rather that the objective of preserving and expanding the Communist Party was clearly reflected in his anti-Japanese activities. Paradoxically, this may have been possible precisely because the Communist Party was weak and at a disadvantage.

Results of the Strategy

As discussed, Mao's strategy demonstrates the Chinese Communist Party's response to the dual enemies of Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. The establishment of the national united front was a means to engage in anti-Japanese resistance with limited forces, and it also served as a mechanism to publicly demonstrate Mao and the Communist Party's serious commitment to the national crisis. By joining forces with the Nationalist Party, their former main adversary, they had the opportunity to officially halt their attacks. However, the cooperation between the Nationalists and Communists was maintained to some extent only in the early stages of the war, and it weakened again in the latter half (Rana Mitter 2020, 364). Nevertheless, the mere cessation of the civil war was a significant benefit for the Communist Party, which was extremely weak at the time. Amidst this, the Communist Party's propaganda activities continued steadily (see FRUS 1945, 1948).

Furthermore, Mao engaged the Japanese army through "guerrilla warfare," which he had consistently advocated, thus conducting the war at a much lower cost compared to the Nationalist Party. This can be interpreted as Mao being able to utilize resources more efficiently than Chiang Kai-shek. The following passage clearly illustrates this fact.

"By advocating guerrilla warfare, he did not need to maintain the large standing army that the Nationalist Party required to be deeply involved in the wartime alliance... Mao had a relatively low military expenditure, allowing him to allocate financial resources in a way that the Nationalist Party could not possibly match. While life in the areas ruled by the Nationalist Party became increasingly harsh and unequal, the Communist Party increasingly became a symbol of hope and was clearly contrasted with the Nationalist Party." (Rana Mitter 2020, 343) Sino-Japanese War and Mao Zedong's Anti-Japanese Activities Evaluation_Mao Zedong Memorial Hall

Mao largely avoided direct confrontation with the Japanese army, thus bearing a relatively light burden in the anti-Japanese resistance. He utilized various resources, including communication lines, in the Japanese army's rear areas (FRUS 1944), creating better conditions than those in areas occupied by the Nationalist Party. These actions indicate that Mao's anti-Japanese activities were aimed at preserving and, furthermore, expanding the Communist Party. In other words, he was able to achieve two goals with a single strategy. Considering that the Communist Party, which was insignificant before the war, emerged as a force comparable to the Nationalist Party after the war, and even gained higher popular support, this strategy can be evaluated as truly successful.

However, as time passed and the Sino-Japanese War became intertwined with World War II, Mao's strategy appears to have leaned more towards fostering the growth of the Communist Party internally. In the 1940s, his focus "extended further from the military sphere to the civilian sphere" (Van de Ven 2018, 152), and by the end of the war, he avoided engagements with the Japanese army due to the Communist Party's lack of weaponry ('Diary of Fu Bingchang', entry of 7 April 1945. cited in: Van de Ven 2003, 59). Nevertheless, the growth achieved by the Communist Party throughout the war was truly remarkable, leading even the United States, an ally of the Nationalist Party, to gradually show interest in the Chinese Communist Party (Rana Mitter 2020, 408-409; Alexander Pantsov, Steven Levine 2017, 492). Conversely, the Nationalist Party lost credibility both domestically and internationally due to resource depletion during the war against Japan and internal corruption (Rana Mitter 2020, 398-405). The situation had completely changed from the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. The Nationalist Party declined, and the Communist Party gained power. In this context, the war ended with Japan's surrender. Although the two parties attempted cooperation after the common enemy disappeared, they ultimately failed to reach a compromise, and in the ensuing civil war, Mao and the Communist Party ultimately emerged victorious (Rana Mitter 2020, 462-469).

Conclusion

Mao Zedong, the founding father of China, expanded his power through anti-Japanese resistance and became the victor on the mainland. However, his anti-Japanese activities are subject to conflicting evaluations. The criteria for these starkly divided evaluations can be summarized as the question of "whether Mao engaged in anti-Japanese resistance for the sake of resistance itself, or for the purpose of winning the civil war." This study, by examining the three main anti-Japanese strategies proposed by Mao, concludes that his strategies were ultimately linked to the expansion of the Communist Party. The anti-Japanese strategies examined in this paper can be broadly categorized into three: first, promoting unity with the national bourgeoisie and organizing a united front. This strategy was intended for the expansion and popularization of the Communist Party and indeed met those expectations. Soviet advisor Peter Vladimirov wrote in his diary on October 22, 1942, that "Mao considers the transformation of the Communist Party from a party of 'workers and peasants' to a party of 'the People' as an advantage of the anti-Japanese struggle" (Vladimirov 1975, 69). Such evidence corroborates the fact that Mao had the expansion of the Communist Party in mind when engaging in the anti-Japanese war. However, this strategy also carried the risk of the Communist Party being absorbed, given its weaker position compared to the Nationalist Party at the time. Mao clearly distinguished the Communist Party as a separate entity from the Nationalist Party, only cooperating, and solidified its ideology internally. The second strategy, propaganda and education, is connected to this aspect. Through propaganda and education, Mao disseminated the Communist Party's ideology, thereby maintaining the Party's identity and rallying its members. Ross Terrill, the author of Mao Zedong's biography, writes that even while cooperating with the Nationalist Party, "somewhere in the spirit lay the promise of revolution" (Ross Terrill 2008, 341), indicating that the Communist Party's ideology and principles were maintained independently of cooperation with the Nationalist Party. Mao's third strategy involved fighting battles relatively safely from the rear, establishing bases, and securing materiel. This was aimed at acquiring resources while minimizing military losses and simultaneously expanding the reach of the Communist Party's control. This explanation does not imply that he did not fight Japan at all or had no intention of fighting, but rather that he engaged in anti-Japanese activities with the expansion of the Communist Party fully in mind. Therefore, he was able to achieve both anti-Japanese resistance and the expansion of the Communist Party's influence with a single strategy. The anti-Japanese strategy itself ultimately contributed to the growth of the Communist Party's power and became the driving force behind its later victory in the civil war. This may also explain why there are divided opinions among scholars regarding Mao's anti-Japanese activities.

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