Mao's Dilemma: Chiang Kai-shek's Approach, the United Front, and Prestige vs. Pragmatism

Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression · Kim Dae-young · Korea University

I. Chiang Kai-shek's Suppression of the Communist Party

Mao was born into an era when China was becoming a semi-colony of foreign powers. He witnessed the fall of the monarchy under the Qing Dynasty and the chaos that followed the establishment of a republic in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. The central government was weak, and warlords sought to expand their influence. Among the intellectual class, some turned to communism as an alternative to escape the ills of feudalism and the subjugation of capitalist imperialist powers. With support from the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist movement held its First National Congress in Shanghai, a concessionary area, on July 23, 1921. At the Second National Congress held in Shanghai in May 1922, a resolution was adopted to accept the Comintern's line and establish a united front to support the bourgeois democratic revolution. Sun Yat-sen's government in Guangzhou needed an army to eliminate warlords and unify the country, as well as a strong and efficient party organization. By allying with the Soviet Union, it also allied with the Chinese Communist Party. Joffe (A. Joffe), sent by the Soviet Union as a Comintern representative, promoted the First United Front between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party (CCP), which was established on January 26, 1923, with the 'Sun-Joffe Joint Declaration.' At the Third National Congress of the CCP in June, the policy of KMT-CCP cooperation was decided. The First National Congress of the Kuomintang, held in Guangzhou in January 1924, formally established the KMT-CCP alliance. However, following Sun Yat-sen's death in March 1925, conflicts between the KMT and the CCP surfaced. Chiang Kai-shek, who emerged victorious in the power struggle, became the Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army and declared a nationwide mobilization on July 9, 1926, initiating the Northern Expedition. When Chiang Kai-shek advocated for Nanchang as the government seat for the efficient execution of the Northern Expedition, the KMT left-wing and the CCP opposed him. In February 1927, they forcibly moved the government to Wuhan, attempting to seize revolutionary leadership. Chiang Kai-shek then sought to expel the CCP. On April 12, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek's forces entered Shanghai, attacked, seized control of the city, and carried out a large-scale purge of the CCP, leading to the complete collapse of the First United Front. Subsequently, Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing government absorbed the Wuhan government. In 1928, warlord Zhang Zuolin of the Northeast was assassinated by the Japanese army, and his son Zhang Xueliang pledged allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek, bringing the Northern Expedition to an end. In October 1928, Chiang Kai-shek established Nanjing as the capital, solidifying the KMT government as the central government representing China. However, regional warlords still maintained independent power, and the challenge from the CCP posed a significant threat.

After failing in the Autumn Harvest Uprising in September 1927 and being expelled from the Politburo, Mao gathered troops in Jinggangshan, formed the Red Army, and established Soviet districts. In November 1931, representatives from various revolutionary bases, including central party cadres, convened the First National Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies (工農兵代表大會) and established the 'Central Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic' (中央工農民主政府), with Mao Zedong as Chairman and Zhu De as Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. In response, Chiang Kai-shek launched five encirclement campaigns against the Communists from December 1930 to October 1934. The first three campaigns failed. Chiang Kai-shek, under the policy of 'first eliminate internal enemies, then resist foreign invasion,' avoided full-scale war with Japan and mobilized 500,000 troops for the fourth encirclement campaign. Mao's guerrilla tactics barely managed to repel it, and the operation was halted by the Japanese advance into Rehe. However, Chiang Kai-shek bought time by signing an agreement with Japan in May 1934 and then mobilized nearly a million troops for the fifth military operation. Using blockhouse tactics and simultaneously isolating the peasants from the Red Army through economic blockade and regional control, the CCP could no longer hold out. In October 1934, the CCP began a strategic retreat known as the Long March.

Mao stated, 'In the thirty-odd years of the Chinese revolution, the limited achievements are not due to a flawed objective, but entirely to strategic errors. The so-called strategic errors are the failure to unite true friends and attack true enemies. This is because we failed to distinguish between friend and foe.' At this time, the criterion for distinguishing between friend and foe was class analysis. Mao believed that the petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie could sometimes be enemies and sometimes friends, depending on their consciousness. Students and intellectuals were considered revolutionary if they were willing to unite with the workers and peasants, and otherwise, they were considered non-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. Ultimately, based on their political and ideological consciousness, they could be classified as revolutionary classes alongside the proletariat. This criterion left room for engagement with the 'nation.' (Shin Bong-soo 2009, 75-76)

II. Mao Zedong's Anti-Japanese Political Propaganda

Following the collapse of the First United Front, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) identified the Kuomintang (KMT) as its primary enemy, developing Soviet movements and sharply confronting the KMT's Nanjing National Government. The CCP's anti-Japanese policy was not consistent from the outset; initially, it lacked substantive meaning beyond a slogan, and the will to resist Japan was not particularly proactive. However, as Japan's invasion accelerated and its influence expanded to North China, the CCP gradually presented concrete and proactive policies. Initially, it advocated an anti-imperialist policy at the propaganda level, but after Japan's invasion of China intensified, it proposed an anti-Japanese policy opposing Japanese imperialism. Subsequently, as the invasion expanded beyond Manchuria into China proper, it presented and specified an anti-Japanese policy resisting the Japanese invasion. Originally, it proposed an anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese line of establishing an anti-Japanese front in alliance with forces excluding Chiang Kai-shek, but later pursued policies to actively draw them into a united front. In contrast, the KMT focused on suppressing the Communists and responded passively to Japan. Only when Japan invaded North China and threatened the KMT's ruling base did it seek an alliance with the CCP under the banner of resisting Japan. This process became possible as the interests of the CCP, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Comintern converged on the common goal of 'resisting Japan.' Originally, Mao Zedong intended to pursue an anti-Japanese strategy by 'allying with Zhang Xueliang and opposing Chiang Kai-shek' (the 'ally with Zhang, oppose Chiang, resist Japan' strategy), rather than seeking to resist Japan with Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek also pursued a policy of 'first pacifying the interior, then resisting the exterior' (Park Jeong-hyeon 2002, 283-284).

The CCP accepted the growing popular demand for resistance against Japan following the Mukden Incident. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army stationed in Manchuria instigated the incident, occupying Fengtian (Shenyang), the largest city in Manchuria, and Changchun, the capital of Jilin Province. Chiang Kai-shek, preoccupied with military operations against the Soviet districts, offered no resistance. However, a widespread anti-Japanese movement erupted nationwide. As patriotism surged, Mao Zedong concluded in January 1932 that the CCP should 'utilize' this opportunity. The calculation was that the popular anti-Japanese sentiment could be directed towards Chiang Kai-shek, who had made no defensive preparations against Japan's invasion of Manchuria. In mid-December, the KMT's 26th Route Army rebelled against Chiang Kai-shek's policy of 'compromise' with Japan. At a Central Bureau meeting in mid-January 1932, Mao Zedong stated: 'The large-scale invasion by Japanese imperialists to destroy China has intensified the people's anti-Japanese sentiment nationwide and will bring about changes in domestic class relations.' In April 1932, the Chinese Soviet Republic formally declared war on Japan and advocated for the formation of 'Anti-Japanese Volunteer Armies.' Mao and Zhu De proposed a truce agreement if the KMT agreed to stop fighting the CCP and fight Japan instead. In August 1934, some units of the Red Army launched military operations outside their base areas to confuse the enemy in Zhejiang Province. At that time, the CCP propagandized that these Red Army units were 'vanguard anti-Japanese forces' advancing north to fight the invaders. The CCP's actions resonated with intellectuals, who felt immense shame at the lack of resistance against Japanese aggression. Chiang Kai-shek continued to argue that the CCP was a greater threat than Japan, but he was perceived as someone who did not defend the nation's honor. (Philip Short 2019, 533-534)

Following the collapse of the KMT-CCP cooperation due to Chiang Kai-shek's coup, a debate arose among socialists in China, including the CCP, from the late 1920s to the early 1930s regarding the nature of Chinese society. The core issue of this debate was whether the primary contradiction in China was capitalist or still mired in feudal contradictions. Ultimately, the theory of semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism (半殖民地半封建論), advocated by the 'New Thought Faction' centered around the CCP, gained widespread acceptance. In January 1935, during the early stages of the Long March, Mao Zedong seized party leadership. Shortly after the Red Army arrived in Yan'an, the Sino-Japanese War broke out, shifting the contradiction between the KMT and the CCP to one between the Chinese nation and foreign powers, specifically Japanese militarism. This, combined with the context of war, further strengthened the national liberation movement in China. The Chinese people felt a renewed sense of national crisis, demanding an end to the civil war and a unified resistance against Japan. (Cho Bong-rae 2011, 529-530)

From 1934 to 1935, Japan's invasion of China entered a new phase. In June 1935, Japanese commander-in-chief Umezu Yoshijirō signed an agreement with KMT government representative He Yingqin, promising the dissolution of KMT branches in Hebei Province and Beijing and Tianjin, and the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Hebei. In response, on August 1, 1935, the CCP issued 'An Open Letter to All Our Compatriots for the Sake of Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation' from Mao'er Gai, Sichuan Province. Unlike previous declarations, this one did not demand immediate democracy or mass armament but only a cessation of hostilities between the KMT and the CCP. While previous calls for an anti-Japanese united front had advocated for a united front against the KMT, this declaration identified resistance against Japan as the most crucial task determining the survival of the Chinese nation and appealed for the broad mobilization of all compatriots, including not only workers and peasants but also the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. This 'August 1 Declaration' was a united front that did not aim to overthrow the KMT, unlike previous declarations that called for the overthrow of both the Japanese and the KMT. (Lee Geon-il 2014, 298-299)

At the conference of party activists held in Wayaobao on December 27, 1935, a report titled 'On the Opposition to Japanese Imperialist Strategy' emphasized the necessity of establishing a national united front to resist Japanese imperialist aggression. During the Xi'an Incident, the CCP adopted a lenient stance towards Chiang Kai-shek, opting for a peaceful resolution. This was driven by concerns that if Chiang Kai-shek were removed, power in the Nanjing government might fall to He Yingqin, who was pro-Japanese. At this time, some, including Mao Zedong, argued for a more assertive response, stating, 'The Nanjing government is already making active military preparations to attack Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, so there is a risk that a peaceful resolution may be impossible.' (Oh Soo-yeol 2012, 205) Subsequently, the CCP responded nimbly to the changing situation by proposing a joint anti-Japanese effort with the KMT, gaining significant popular support. Furthermore, the Xi'an Incident led the Nationalist government to cease its attacks on Yan'an, allowing the Red Army to be incorporated and reorganized into the National Revolutionary Army, thereby gaining legitimacy. The CCP escaped crisis, pursued expansion, and Mao Zedong's leadership was solidified within the party, freeing him from internal challenges to his guiding ideology. (Oh Soo-yeol 2012, 208-209)

As negotiations progressed, Mao's perspective on Chiang Kai-shek and the meaning of Japanese aggression gradually shifted. In April 1936, Mao concluded that the slogan 'Resist Japan and Oppose Chiang (抗日反蔣)' was counterproductive. Mao told Zhang Wentian, 'Our position is to fight Japan and stop the civil war. Fighting Chiang Kai-shek comes later.' A month later, Mao questioned the validity of treating all imperialist powers equally as a single bloc, beginning to recognize the escalating tensions between Japan, Britain, and the United States. (Philip Short 2019, 576)

Of course, there are dissenting opinions. According to a recent argument, Mao Zedong opposed the Red Army soldiers and CCP leaders who advocated fighting the Japanese army. It is claimed that he did not view the Sino-Japanese War as a war for all Chinese to unite and fight Japan, nor did he ever consider himself aligned with Chiang Kai-shek. Instead, he saw the Sino-Japanese War as a three-way conflict between Chiang Kai-shek, Japan, and the CCP, viewing the Japanese invasion as an opportunity to destroy Chiang Kai-shek. (Jon Halliday 1968)

Against this backdrop, Edgar Snow was granted permission to visit the Communist base areas to introduce the Communist cause to the Western world. In June, the Red Army moved its headquarters from Wayaobao to Bao'an, a more remote and impoverished location in the heart of the vast Loess Plateau. The Communist leaders resided in caves within the red sandstone cliffs formed by erosion. The hills overlooked a muddy river. It was there that Mao made a prophetic statement to Edgar Snow. The following is a conversation they had on July 16. 4. Mao's Dilemma: Chiang Kai-shek's Approach, the United Front, and Prestige vs. Pragmatism_Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression

Those who believe that by sacrificing more of China's sovereignty... they can prevent Japan's advance are indulging in utopian fantasies... The Japanese navy is blockading the Chinese seas and intends to seize the Philippines, Siam (Thailand), Indochina, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. Once war breaks out, Japan will use these regions as strategic bases... (However) China is a very large country. Unless every inch of the country is under the enemy's sword, it cannot be said to be conquered. Even if Japan occupies a large part of Chinese territory and rules over 100 million or even 200 million Chinese living there, we are not yet defeated... The waves of Japanese imperialism will break upon the reefs of Chinese resistance and lose their strength, and countless people will pour out from the vast reservoir of human resources that is the revolutionary Chinese people to fight for freedom.

On July 16, 1936, in an interview with Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong stated that China's most urgent task was to recover all territories lost to Japanese imperialist invasion, including not only areas south of the Great Wall but also Manchuria. While not including Korea, a 'former Chinese colony,' he promised enthusiastic support for the Korean independence struggle if Koreans sought liberation from Japanese chains after China regained its lost territories. This also applied to Taiwan. In the case of Inner Mongolia, inhabited by both Chinese and Mongolians, he proposed expelling the Japanese and establishing an autonomous region. Furthermore, he pledged not to use force in areas occupied by anti-Japanese forces, stating that this had never happened before and that opportunistic actions would not be taken during wartime. He asserted that the people should be granted the right to organize and arm themselves to participate in the war, a right that had not been realized due to Chiang Kai-shek's oppression. (Edgar Snow 1968, 110-112)

Throughout the summer and fall of 1936, the CCP repeatedly appealed, both privately and to the KMT and its leaders, for a truce and a united front against Japan. In August, Stalin, belatedly recognizing the extreme importance of a Sino-Soviet anti-Japanese alliance for Soviet interests, pressured Mao Zedong. Consequently, Mao proposed reviving the KMT-CCP united front that existed in the 1920s, establishing a 'Great Chinese United Democratic Republic (大中華統一民主公和國),' and guaranteeing parliamentary systems in the Red Army base areas, as in other regions. Mao told Snow, 'For a people whose national freedom is deprived, the revolutionary task is not immediate socialism but the achievement of independence. If there is no nation, there is no need to discuss socialism. There must be a nation within which socialism can be implemented.' Mao even stated that he would change the name of the Red Army if it nominally entered the command structure of the KMT army and officially became part of the KMT forces. He adopted a stance of making any concessions as long as the CCP's control over its army and territory was recognized. However, Mao also expressed suspicion towards Chiang Kai-shek, doubting whether Chiang had truly changed his strategy and predicting that he would continue to shift his position. (Philip Short 2019, 577)

III. The Xi'an Incident and the KMT-CCP United Front

In Mao Zedong's report 'On the Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism' (December 27, 1935), delivered at the conference of party activists in Wayaobao, northern Shaanxi Province, Chiang Kai-shek was described as having 'betrayed the revolution in 1927,' being a 'traitorous renegade,' and pursuing policies 'selling out China,' placing him on the same level as 'Japanese imperialists seeking to destroy China.'

The big landlords, big corrupt officials, big warlords, big bureaucrats, and big compradors had long ago made up their minds. They have always said, and continue to say, that revolution (regardless of its nature) is unconditionally worse than what imperialists do. Forming a camp of traitorous renegades, they are unconcerned about becoming slaves of a dying nation. They have already erased national boundaries. They have an inseparable relationship with imperialism in terms of their interests. The foremost among them is Chiang Kai-shek. This camp of traitorous renegades is the sworn enemy of the Chinese people. If it were not for these traitorous renegades, Japanese imperialism would not have been able to rampage so wantonly as it does now. They are precisely the running dogs of imperialism.

Furthermore, upon hearing the news of the Xi'an Incident, all Communist Party members, regardless of their rank, were overjoyed to the point of losing their senses. In the evening, a mass rally was held where Mao, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai argued that Chiang Kai-shek should be brought before the masses for trial. Zhang Guotao later recalled, 'It was an event that should have been met with standing ovations. It seemed like all problems could be easily resolved.'

At a Politburo meeting held on Sunday morning, party leaders, including Zhang Guotao, advocated for the overthrow of the KMT government and the execution of Chiang Kai-shek. They cited his initiation of a brutal civil war, his collaboration with Japan through a humiliating appeasement policy, and his recent final rejection of the CCP's peace proposal, prioritizing the 'suppression of bandits' over China's defense. Mao's position was more cautious. Mao stated that objectively, Chiang Kai-shek had been pro-Japanese. He also asserted that Chiang's detention had 'revolutionary significance' and that the CCP should naturally support it. However, he argued that the CCP should not take the lead in overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek, but rather that it would be more appropriate to bring him before the 'people's tribunal' to publicly expose his crimes. According to Zhang Guotao's later interpretation, Mao's remarks were intended to instigate Zhang Xueliang to deal with Chiang Kai-shek—Mao referred to Chiang as the 'chief culprit'—without the CCP directly getting its hands dirty. Mao also stated that efforts should be made to build a nationwide anti-Japanese united front by garnering support from the left-wing and moderate factions of the Nanjing government, while also preventing the right-wing KMT leaders from attempting to suppress the Xi'an Incident by force. (Philip Short 2019, 580)

However, in the 'Statement on Chiang Kai-shek's Statement' dated December 28, 1936, after the Xi'an Incident, it was evaluated that Chiang's statement 'changes the erroneous policies of the past ten years' and contained commendable phrases such as 'words must be trustworthy and actions must have results.' However, regret was expressed for referring to the revolutionary faction as the 'reactionary faction,' and it was noted that 'the peaceful settlement of Xi'an was greatly facilitated by the CCP's mediation' and that this 'proceeded entirely from the perspective of national survival.' (Mao Zedong 2001) In the telegram dated December 29, 'The Situation and Our Policy After the Peaceful Settlement of the Xi'an Incident,' it was stated that although the pro-resistance factions within the Nanjing government had gained some advantage, efforts must be made to prevent the pro-Japanese faction from regaining dominance. The plan was to expand the CCP's influence within and outside the government, drawing in left-wing and moderate factions, while simultaneously strengthening the Red Army. (Chou 1981, 91-92)

In the 'Statement on Opposing Japan's Attack: Policy, Measures, and Prospects' dated July 23, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek's title was changed to 'Mr.'

We urge Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and all patriotic Kuomintang members to adhere to your principles, fulfill your promises, oppose compromise and concession, and resist to the end, thereby responding to the insults inflicted by the enemy. All armies nationwide, including the Red Army, support Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's declaration, oppose compromise and concession, and resist to the end!

Communist Party members, with one heart and one mind, faithfully implement their declaration while continuing to support Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's declaration. Together with Kuomintang members and all compatriots nationwide, let us fight to the last drop of our blood for the defense of our homeland, oppose the enemy's hesitation, wavering, compromise, and concessions, and resist to the end.

At the expanded meeting of the CCP Central Committee's Politburo on August 22, 1937, Mao Zedong emphasized that even after the KMT-CCP cooperation, the CCP must adhere to the principle of independence and autonomy in its relations with the KMT. On August 25, in 'Let Us Mobilize All Forces to Fight for the Victory of the War of Resistance,' he stated that regarding the KMT's policies, if they did not change, political reforms were necessary to realize 'all-out national resistance.' In the report 'Urgent Tasks After the Establishment of the KMT-CCP United Front' on September 29, he reiterated that resistance against Japan could not be achieved by the government and military alone; all parties, factions, groups, armies, and individuals must be tightly controlled like being tied by ropes, and the approach towards the masses must change to replace the KMT's autocratic policies. Subsequently, in the report 'The Situation and Tasks of the War of Resistance' on November 12, he issued a stern warning against 'right-wing capitulationism,' which involved losing independence and leaning towards the KMT, and re-emphasized the CCP's principles of independent autonomy and its leadership in the united front. (Lee Byung-joo, Kim Ki-hoon 2002, 147-148)

Through the theory of New Democracy, Mao Zedong presented that the goal the Chinese Communist Party should pursue in the Chinese context at that time was not a pure bourgeois democratic revolution led by the KMT, but a New Democratic Revolution achieved through a united front led by the proletariat and the CCP, absorbing the middle factions. He naturally emphasized that since the New Democratic Revolution forms the basic conditions for the transition to socialism, it is absolutely necessary for the proletariat and the CCP to secure leadership in the united front. (Lee Byung-joo, Kim Ki-hoon 2002, 150)

The narrative of resistance consistently mentions specific leading forces that led the anti-Japanese struggle, such as the Chinese Communist Party. Instead of emphasizing the role of the CCP in leading the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), another subject of the anti-Japanese struggle, is excluded. This clearly shows that the collective memory conveyed by the narrative of resistance is a history of the anti-Japanese struggle centered around the CCP. (Cho Eun-kyung 2014, 211)

On July 15, 1939, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declared the KMT-CCP cooperation, proclaiming that resistance against Japan would be achieved through the efforts of the people, descendants of the Yellow Emperor. The struggle would aim to: first, achieve independence, freedom, and liberation, thereby recovering territory and sovereignty; second, realize democracy in practice, establish a parliament, and achieve the liberation of the people through a constitution; and third, ensure the Chinese people could enjoy happy and prosperous lives. To prevent sabotage and obstruction by Japanese imperialists, it was solemnly declared: first, that Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People are what China currently needs, and the party is prepared to fight for them; second, that the policy of inciting rebellion to overthrow the KMT regime is abandoned, the Sovietization movement is canceled, and the policy of forcibly confiscating landlords' land is ceased; third, that the current Soviet governments are abolished, and the practice of democracy is advocated for the integration of state power domestically; and fourth, that the Red Army will abandon its current name and be incorporated under the command of the National Revolutionary Army of the National Government's Military Affairs Commission, preparing to march towards the anti-Japanese front.

In other words, the CCP declared its intention to unite with the KMT for the sake of resisting Japan, while simultaneously ceasing its Sovietization efforts. (Chou 1981, 94)

In the 'Policy, Measures, and Prospects for Opposing Japan's Attack' dated July 23, 1937, it is stated that on July 17, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement firmly establishing his policy of resistance. This is described as 'the first correct declaration made by the Kuomintang among the declarations issued over the years regarding foreign policy, and it has been welcomed by us and all compatriots nationwide.' In 'Let Us Mobilize All Forces to Fight for the Victory of the War of Resistance' dated August 25, 1937, it is stated that 'the progress of the Kuomintang on the issue of resistance is commendable, and this is what the Chinese Communist Party and the entire nation have hoped for over many years.' While welcoming this progress, it is pointed out that 'freedom for the people's anti-Japanese movement is not granted, no fundamental changes are being made to government structures, there is no policy to improve the lives of the people, and true cooperation has not been achieved in relations with the Communist Party.' In 'Urgent Tasks After the Establishment of the KMT-CCP United Front' dated September 29, 1937, it is noted that Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's statement recognized the legal status of the Communist Party nationwide and that the necessity of uniting to save the nation was excellently presented, but the lack of necessary self-criticism was unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, it is stated that the united front between the two parties has been declared established. In Mao Zedong's lecture 'On Protracted War' at the Yan'an Anti-Japanese War Research Association in May 1938, it is mentioned that the KMT relies on Britain and the United States and will not surrender unless Britain and the US tell them to. In 'Actively Develop Anti-Japanese Strength and Resist the Attacks of the Anti-Communist Die-hards' dated May 4, 1940, it is emphasized that in the KMT-controlled areas, struggle and accumulation of strength should be carried out moderately and precisely within the scope permitted by KMT laws, orders, and social customs. (Mao Zedong 2002)

In a lecture given by Zhang Hao at the Anti-Japanese University, Mao Zedong revealed his inner thoughts: 'Under the current circumstances, we must compromise with the Kuomintang. This temporary compromise with the Kuomintang is by no means a surrender or a betrayal of the interests of the proletariat; it should be seen as being in the interest of the broad masses who are suffering. We are not surrendering to the Kuomintang; we are only moving towards resisting Japan. The cooperation with the Kuomintang is for the stage of resisting Japan, so comrades of our party should not have doubts.'

Concurrently, the Eighth Route Army's Political Department published a booklet titled <Answers to Several Questions>, which selected ten issues and explained them in a question-and-answer format. This aimed to alleviate the unease and misunderstandings within the Red Army caused by the CCP's promise of 'Four Guarantees' to the KMT. Regarding the issue of defending Chiang Kai-shek's leadership in resisting Japan, it explained: 'The current Chairman Chiang has already turned towards resisting Japan. He has accepted the anti-Japanese national united front advocated by our Communist Party, has moved the troops that were originally intended to attack us to the front lines for resistance, and is implementing the anti-Japanese platform proposed by the Communist Party. Therefore, we must defend him. We are not defending Chairman Chiang personally, but rather his implementation of the anti-Japanese stance, and we are encouraging him to firmly follow the path of the anti-Japanese national united front.' (Lee Geon-il 2014)

IV. The Second KMT-CCP Civil War

After the collapse of the Second KMT-CCP United Front, in 'On the United Front' dated April 30, 1945, it is stated that Chiang Kai-shek never abandoned his dream of pursuing civil war. Before the Xi'an Incident, he continuously suppressed the CCP while also restraining KMT forces that sought to continue the anti-Japanese struggle. At one point, he told General Zhang Xueliang that his mission was to eliminate the Communists and that he would be dismissed from his post if he went to fight the Japanese army. Despite his statement after the Xi'an Incident that he would no longer engage in civil war and would fight the Japanese army, he imprisoned Zhang Xueliang and sent Yang Hucheng abroad, angering the Northeast Army and the Eighth Route Army. Later, Song Ziwen stated that Chiang Kai-shek would reorganize the Nanjing government after his release, but this promise was not kept for eight years. (Chou 1981, 216-217)

After Japan's defeat, on August 16, 1945, direct criticism was leveled against Chiang Kai-shek. In 'Actively Propagate Opposition to Civil War and Dictatorship and Expose Chiang Kai-shek’s Deceitful Plot,' it states:

Chiang Kai-shek has intensified his propaganda for civil war and intends to continue his dictatorship by plunging the people into fear and waging civil war, blaming the Communist Party. For the past 5-6 years, Chiang Kai-shek has not recognized the armies in the liberated areas or sent them relief supplies, but now he suddenly orders them to wait for orders and not move. This is to receive the surrender of the Japanese army and incorporate the puppet troops into his own army. (Chou 1981, 247)

Previously, Mao had said the following to the Eighth Route Army participating in the anti-Japanese front:

'The Sino-Japanese War is an excellent opportunity for our party to develop. The policy we have decided is to use 70 percent of our strength for our own development, 20 percent for compromise with the Kuomintang, and 10 percent for resisting the Japanese army.'

Thus, the Chinese Communist Party worked to build its party organization in the rear areas while keeping the Kuomintang in check, and strengthened its mass line.

V. Mao's Ideological System

In 'On the Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism' (December 27, 1935), Mao already referred to Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the camp of traitorous renegades, the sworn enemy of the Chinese people. Furthermore, although he emphasized it in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek never abandoned his dream of pursuing civil war, and before the Xi'an Incident, he continuously suppressed the CCP while restraining KMT forces seeking to engage in anti-Japanese struggles. Moreover, after experiencing the 'February 7 Massacre' in Zhengzhou in 1923, Mao argued that it was impossible for the bourgeoisie to lead the national revolution. Even when considering a united front in the 1920s, he hesitated even when considering cooperation with the pro-Communist left-wing of the KMT. Mao concisely expressed the problem with this approach using the idiom '疊床架屋' (die-sang-ga-ok), meaning 'placing a bed on top of a bed, and a house on top of a house,' a metaphor for unnecessary repetition. In other words, Mao's point was that if the united front was a tactic for the CCP to ally with the pro-Communist left-wing of the KMT—those who shared thoughts and goals with the CCP—then either the CCP or the KMT left-wing would become redundant. The question was, which side should disappear? (Philip Short 2019) If he had such an approach towards the KMT left-wing, what was his mindset towards Chiang Kai-shek?

This can be answered through the 'theory of contradictions.' As explained by Zhou Enlai in 'On the United Front' (April 30, 1945), Section I. On the Anti-Japanese National United Front, this theory of contradictions means using contradictions to gain the support of the majority, oppose the minority, and defeat enemies one by one. Originally defined as 'all things contain contradictions, and without contradictions, there would be no world. The world progresses through imperfect contradictions,' Mao Zedong sought to resolve external obstacles such as imperialism and anti-feudalism. Through cool self-analysis and diagnosis, Mao Zedong argued that in the case of China, a semi-colonial country, the primary contradiction was between the Chinese nation and imperialist powers, and therefore, the KMT-CCP cooperation was justified. In other words, the Japanese imperialist invasion caused a qualitative change in China's class contradictions, and with this change, class contradictions became secondary to national contradictions.

Based on this understanding of the situation, Mao was able to forge a united front with Chiang Kai-shek, who had caused the shedding of blood of countless comrades, justifying his actions while simultaneously employing deceptive tactics behind the scenes. Observing the tone used when referring to the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek, if one finds similarities to the rhetoric used by North Korea towards South Korea, the following content may be helpful in understanding the North's true intentions. References: Park Jeong-hyun. 2002. “A Study on the Process of Change in the Chinese Communist Party's Anti-Japanese Policy.” Sajong, 55(0),

Institute of Historical Studies, Korea University

Shin Bong-soo. 2009. “Dialectics of Class and Nation.” Korean Political Science Review, 43(1),

Korean Political Science Association

Oh Soo-yeol. 2012. “The Development of the Xi'an Incident and Its Impact on Chinese Politics.”

Korean Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, (64), p205.

Lee Byung-joo, Kim Ki-hoon. 2002. [Special Research] “A Study on the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Policy as a Strategy for Seizing National Power (1937-1949).” Strategic Studies

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