America's EDGE Initiative vs. China's Belt and Road Initiative: The Future of New Energy Alliances

Kyushu National Museum · Lee Soo-ji · Yonsei University

Introduction

On January 9, 2020, the third day of Sarangbang's 13th cohort's trip to Japan, our final itinerary was a visit to the Kyushu National Museum. The Kyushu National Museum offered a glimpse into Japan's history, prompting reflection on what international politics is and what political science means to Koreans. The rain continued, but it was warmer than in Korea, which was pleasant. The Kyushu National Museum was quite expansive. Upon entering the exhibition hall, it felt like traveling through time, with artifacts and tools from ancient periods arranged chronologically.

141 There were many artifacts. The lighting was dim to preserve the exhibits. Perhaps because of this, I felt myself leaning closer to the artifacts to examine them more carefully. As I explored Japan's history, I was struck by the intimate and interdependent past relationship with Korea. We had learned that since the 19th century, Korea was considered a "backward country" compared to Japan, and in the 20th century, Japan had become more advanced. However, seeing evidence that prior to the 19th century, Japan was overwhelmingly dependent on and followed Korea's lead made me contemplate the fluidity of international hegemony. Furthermore, the Kyushu Museum provided areas where photography was permitted and interactive zones that allowed touching the exhibits, making it a multisensory experience. It was a time that stimulated both my thoughts and my senses.

Examining history, this very Kyushu region was where Japan's first trade occurred. Being the westernmost region, maritime trade began here, which perhaps contributed to Japan becoming the first East Asian nation to actively engage in diplomacy with the West and become a developed country. How has the diplomatic landscape of East Asia changed today? Korea and Japan still have unresolved disputes over Dokdo and comfort women, while China is at a stage of declaring a hegemonic war with the United States, extending beyond regional dominance. For these reasons, Japan's relationship with the United States has become closer, and while Korea has a security alliance with the United States, it is not demonstrating influence beyond that of a middle power, both in issues concerning North Korea and in its relations with Japan. The term "Korea Passing," which is an absurd and regrettable term, has emerged, signifying a phenomenon where the United States and Japan exclude Korea from key decision-making processes related to the Korean Peninsula and discuss matters only among themselves.

142 Amidst South Korea's limited diplomatic power, it seems crucial for us, as political science students, to consider how the hegemonic competition between the United States and China in various fields (IT, economy, energy, etc.) will shape Korea's role in the future.

Photo 1. Entering the Kyushu National Museum

143

Ancient Kyushu and Korean History

The Kyushu Museum is dedicated to the history of Kyushu, particularly its diplomatic history and cultural exchanges with China and Korea. As Japan's southernmost region, Kyushu was the first point of contact for global trade. It initiated "Nanban trade" with Portugal in the 1540s, and trade with the Dutch occurred in the 1600s. Korea served as a crucial bridge between China and Japan. The first exchanges between Korea and Japan, and Kyushu, are recorded between the 1st and 3rd centuries. Southwestern Japan consistently sent envoys to Korea, demonstrating dependence. During the Three Kingdoms period, Gaya had a particularly close relationship with Japan due to its export of iron and steel. Baekje exported Chinese culture through its painters and scholars. Through Gaya and Baekje, pottery, Confucianism, legal systems, rice cultivation, the Chinese language, Buddhism, and construction techniques were shared. Exchanges between Kyushu and Korea became more active after the unification of Silla. In 846, Jang Bogo established a trading post in Kyushu and stationed interpreters. Korean traders and officials engaged in trade through the Daizifu trading post in Kyushu, which functioned as a type of administrative office. Jang Bogo's sailors were actively engaged in activities centered around this location in Kyushu.

144

Photo 2. Japanese swords at the Kyushu National Museum

Post-20th Century Context

The purpose of this report is to examine the goals of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, first unveiled by U.S. President Donald Trump in 2017, and its implications for Korea. Historically, among East Asian nations, the United States has had the most extensive exchanges with Japan. Through the 1983 Reagan-Nakasone Joint Statement and the 1987 US Nuclear Cooperation agreement, U.S.-Japan energy cooperation has been ongoing for nearly 40 years.

145 More recently, energy aid was provided following the 2011 earthquake, and initiatives such as the establishment of the US-China Clean Energy Research Center and the promotion of the Energy Action Plan have been pursued with China. However, beyond these instances, energy has not been a prominent topic in diplomatic discussions. The first systematic inclusion of energy as part of a comprehensive, macro-level policy can be seen in Obama's Pivot to Asia. The Pivot to Asia policy, which shifted the focus of foreign policy from the Middle East and Europe to Asia, began during the Obama administration. As part of this Pivot to Asia, the Asia Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership (ACEP) was announced, finally elevating energy discussions. President Trump recognized the necessity of Obama's Asia-centric foreign policy but introduced his own new approach, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, which led to the creation of the EDGE Initiative for energy policy, evolving from ACEP.

146

Photo 3. A model at the Kyushu National Museum

Analysis of the U.S. EDGE Initiative and Understanding - Formation of Alliances among the U.S.,

Japan, and South Korea

In 2017, President Trump first used the term "Free and Open Indo Pacific" at the APEC CEO Summit in Vietnam, signaling his interest in Asia, and particularly demonstrated his commitment to energy cooperation through the EDGE Initiative. However, EDGE showed significant differences from Obama's ACEP. While ACEP focused on renewable energy, cooperative energy markets, natural gas utilization, and environmental issues like sustainability, Trump's EDGE emphasized diplomatic and trade aspects such as energy security, energy alliances, open energy markets, improved energy trade relations, and energy access.

147 In 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo elaborated on the meaning of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. He stated that a "Free Indo-Pacific" means that all nations possess the capacity to protect their sovereignty from the coercion of other states. He added that freedom at the national level means ensuring good governance and the ability of all citizens to enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms. "Open" Indo-Pacific, he explained, means that sea and air routes are open to all nations. He emphasized that this is the key for all countries to achieve their goals and attain international peace, expressing a desire for peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes.

Furthermore, openness from an economic perspective implies fair and reciprocal trade, an open investment environment, transparent agreements between nations, and enhanced connectivity driving regional ties. Secretary Pompeo concluded his speech by announcing an investment of $113 million in areas such as the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure. The energy component of this initiative would be realized through EDGE. EDGE, an acronym for Enhancing Development and Growth Through Energy, aims to invest in Indo-Pacific partner countries to help them export, produce, transfer, store, and implement their own energy resources.

148 America's abundant energy capabilities include vast natural resources, world-leading private companies, sophisticated development finance tools, and unparalleled technological expertise. EDGE is about mobilizing these capabilities to seek sustainable growth and secure energy markets throughout the Indo-Pacific. The reason President Trump is focusing on Asian diplomacy and energy in Asia is ultimately China. It is with China in mind that he refers to the broader region of the Indo-Pacific, encompassing Japan, India, and Australia. An additional variable accompanying this is America's shale gas production. Through shale gas, the U.S. has adopted a more proactive stance on energy, and energy has emerged as a significant diplomatic tool. This is clarifying the contours of international energy alliances. The prospect is for energy alliances to be structured with the U.S., Japan, and South Korea on one side, and China and Russia on the other—akin to a Cold War-like structure. In Asia, America's strongest energy ally is Japan. This is because Japan, like South Korea, is energy-poor. Japan has no domestic oil production and must rely on the U.S. Moreover, the U.S. is urging South Korea's participation. However, South Korea has not yet actively joined the U.S. energy alliance; its position remains ambiguous.

It announced plans to invest in 148 partner countries to help them export, produce, transfer, store, and implement their own energy resources. The United States' abundant energy capabilities include vast natural resources, world-leading private companies, sophisticated development finance tools, and unparalleled technological expertise. The EDGE initiative is precisely about mobilizing these capabilities to seek sustainable growth across the Indo-Pacific and secure energy markets.

While South Korea has a security alliance with the U.S., its geographical proximity to China complicates matters. Furthermore, South Korea's investment and research in energy remain underdeveloped. According to Dr. Oh Mi-yeon at the Atlantic Council think tank, South Korea is expected to engage in a "balancing act" going forward. While fully supporting the U.S. is difficult, the current Moon Jae-in administration has pursued infrastructure cooperation (ports, railways, natural gas) with Russia. On the surface, participation in U.S. initiatives like the EDGE Initiative and the Energy Security Dialogue is likely to increase. However, if Japan emerges as a too-active U.S. energy ally, South Korea is expected to prioritize bilateral cooperation over multilateral engagement.

149

Analysis of China's Belt and Road Initiative and Understanding

– Formation of Alliances between China and Russia

If the U.S., Japan, and South Korea form one energy alliance, then China and Russia stand on the opposing side. China and Russia have become increasingly close over the past decade, with energy playing a crucial role as a platform for their cooperation. In 2012, the China-Russia Energy Cooperation Committee was established, and in March 2019, the Russian Chinese Energy Forum was held in Beijing. This forum can be interpreted as symbolic for their energy alliance. Putin publicly supported China and expressed his intention to strengthen cooperation with China. Although China and Russia have different objectives for their cooperation, they align well. Russia seeks to strengthen cooperation for economic and business interests, while China pursues it for its Belt and Road Initiative. Since 2016, Russia has become the largest supplier of crude oil to China. Previously, China imported oil from Saudi Arabia, but recently, Russia has taken over this role, indicating that energy cooperation is already underway.

150 Russia has granted China access to the Power of Siberia pipeline, increasing their economic and energy interdependence. With the completion of the first phase of the "Power of Siberia" natural gas pipeline, which supplies natural gas from eastern Siberia to China, it was announced that natural gas produced in Russia's Far East would be supplied through this pipeline starting in December 2019. This project was officially launched when Russian Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) reached an agreement on gas supply in 2014. The pipeline extends from Eastern Siberia through Khabarovsk to Vladivostok, with a total length of 4,000 km.

The two countries completed the first phase of the project in five years after commencing construction in September 2014 and plan to complete all phases by 2023. Upon completion of the natural gas pipeline construction, China is expected to become Russia's largest importer of natural gas. The two countries are also pursuing a western gas pipeline project. With the aim of supplying natural gas produced in Siberia to western China, they are proceeding with pipeline construction in the west as well as the east, which will strengthen China's energy alliance with Russia. China has named this project the "Polar Silk Road," and this also signifies the strengthening of their energy alliance.

151 At this forum, the two countries formalized cooperation projects in various fields, including energy, food, Arctic shipping routes, and e-commerce.

Conclusion - Outlook and Final Thoughts

Currently, the China-Russia energy alliance appears to be materializing more rapidly. The gas pipeline project has practically commenced, and it is expected to continue moving forward. In this regard, China's Belt and Road Initiative seems to be ahead of Trump's EDGE Initiative. However, the U.S. is also expected to counter China's rise by forming an alliance architecture. The first Asian country to join this alliance is Japan. As Japan is an energy-poor nation that can only rely on the U.S. and has signed a large-scale shale gas import agreement with the U.S., South Korea is likely to face pressure from the U.S. soon. However, South Korea's position is more complex than Japan's. Not only is it geographically close to China, but it also requires energy cooperation with Russia. This is because pursuing a joint South-North-Russia gas pipeline project as a means to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue could yield significant economic and security benefits. Russia, in particular, through its "Energy Strategy 2035," demonstrates that it is a market South Korea cannot afford to abandon. It is difficult for South Korea to fully support the U.S. alone, especially since the Moon Jae-in administration has pursued infrastructure cooperation (ports, railways, natural gas) with Russia.

152 On the surface, participation in U.S. initiatives like the EDGE Initiative and the Energy Security Dialogue is likely to increase. However, if Japan emerges as a too-active U.S. energy ally, South Korea is expected to prioritize bilateral cooperation over multilateral engagement.

Photo

Japan is an energy-poor nation that cannot rely outside of the United States, and because it has signed a large-scale shale gas import contract with the United States, I believe South Korea will soon face pressure from the United States. However, South Korea's position is more complex than Japan's. It is not only geographically close to China but also requires energy cooperation with Russia. This is because the economic and security benefits would be significant if the South Korea-North Korea-Russia gas pipeline connection project could be pursued as a means to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Russia, in particular, has demonstrated through its "Energy Strategy 2035" that it is a market South Korea cannot abandon. Given that it is difficult to fully support only the United States, the Moon Jae-in administration has

152 Following this, there was infrastructure cooperation (ports, railways, natural gas) with Russia. Superficially, participation with the United States seems likely to increase through initiatives such as the EDGE Initiative and the Energy Security Dialogue. However, if Japan emerges as too active an energy ally of the United States, South Korea is expected to participate primarily through bilateral cooperation rather than multilateral cooperation.

Photo 4. In front of the exit of the Kyushu National Museum

153 References 1. Internet Resources

‖Asia EDGE – Enhancing Development and Growth Through Energy.‖

U.S. Department of State. (Accessed November 11, 2019)

―Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy.‖ U.S. Agency for

International Development. (Accessed November 1, 2019)

―President Donald J. Trump‘s Administration is Advancing a Free and

Open Indo-Pacific.‖ White House Factsheets. (Accessed November 10, 2019) ―Indo-Pacific Strategy Report.‖ United States Department of Defense.

(Accessed December 1, 2019)

―The United States, India, and Future of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.‖

National Bureau of Asian Research. (Accessed December 1, 2019)

Armitage, Richard L., Joseph S. Nye. 2012. ―The U.S. Japan Alliance.‖

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Accessed December 20, 2019) CNBC. Shao, Grace. (December 3, 2019). ―Russia opens Siberian pipeline to

China as Beijing expands its influence in the Arctic.

(Accessed December 20, 2019)

CNBC. Ellyatt, Holly. (November 29, 2018). "Business leaders hail Russia's

booming energy ties with China." (Accessed December 20, 2019)

The Diplomat. 2019. "The 2019 US Indo-Pacific Strategy: Who's It

For?" (Accessed December 20, 2019)

154 Harding, Brian. 2019. "The Trump Administration's Free and Open

Indo-Pacific Approach." Southeast Asian Affairs. (Accessed December 20, 2019) Japan Times. 2019. "What does the 'Indo-Pacific strategy' mean?"

(Accessed December 20, 2019)

Kashin, Vasily, Ma Bin, Yuki Tatsumi, and Zhang Jian. 2019. "Sino-

Russian Relations Perspectives from Russia, China, and Japan."

National Bureau of Asian Research. (Accessed December 20, 2019)

Martin, William F. 2014. "Japan Energy Security Post-Fukushima."

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Accessed December 20, 2019) The New York Times. (July 10, 2013) "China and Russia, in a Display of

Unity, Hold Naval Exercises". (Accessed December 20, 2019)

Oh, Miyeon. 2018. "How Energy Infrastructure is shaping geopolitics in

East Asia." World Economic Forum. (Accessed December 20, 2019)

South China Morning Post. 2019. "A US Indo-Pacific strategy that

isolates China is small-minded and dangerous." (Accessed December 20, 2019) Sutter, Robert. 2018. "China-Russia Relations Strategic Implications

and U.S Policy Options.". National Bureau of Asian Research.

(Accessed December 20, 2019)

World Energy Council. 2019. "World Energy Trilemma Index."

(Accessed December 20, 2019)

2. Periodicals

155 Hughes, Christopher W. 2007. "Not quite the 'Great Britain of the Far

East': Japan's security, the US-Japan alliance and the 'war on terror'

in East Asia". Warwick Research Archive Portal(WRAP). 325–338. Iriye, Akira. 1993. "Pearl Harbor: A Fifty-Year

Perspective." Amerikastudien. Vol. 38 No. 1. 13-24.

156

Photographs and References

DAY 1. Arrival at Fukuoka Airport

157 DAY 1. Glover Garden, Nagasaki 1

DAY 1. Glover Garden, Nagasaki 2

158

DAY 1. Glover Garden, Nagasaki 3

DAY 2. Arita Pottery Village

159

DAY 2. Kyushu Ceramic Museum

160 DAY 3. At a cafe before returning home

Reference Material 1: Lee Kwang Min Report (English)

US-China Hegemonic Competition Short-Term

Episode, Regional Naval Confrontation in Indo

Pacific

: Balance or Escalation?

Lee Kwang Min

1. Introduction

1.1 Background of Analysis and Methodology

The rise of China and declination of US, along with various expected outcomes of, and also the process of power transition has long been asserted and debated. From John J. Mearsheimer‘s "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" and to "Destined for War" by Graham Allison, the long-term understanding of US-China dynamic of power transition has been the most interested topic recently and relatively well-known, dealing with the dynamic with the keywords of "preventive war or power transition", "Thucydides Trap and Kindleberger Trap". However, merely depending on theoretical and long-term understanding of the

161 dynamic cannot explain the flip side of the coin, could result in prediction error. Thus, in order to focus on short-term and more dynamic analysis of the logic, it would be necessary to view military power, dynamic and geopolitical situation between US and China in East Asia.

"New Type of Great Power Relations", noted by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, clearly shows the need of different bipolar relationship from the Cold War bipolarity, emphasizing less competitiveness but more interactions and cooperation between US-China 1. In fact, in the aspect of intensity of bipolarity, Cold War exhibited more competitiveness and less direct interaction, while US-China in present world exhibits comparatively less competition and more direct interaction, reaching the first phase deal in economic sector through negotiation in December of 2019 2 . Likewise, relatively loose and more interactive bipolarity can be found than the past, along with improbability to expect the 'destined war' in present world between two great powers in twenty-first century with mere outcome of past analysis, as economy and technology became critical factor in the aspect of intensity.

1 The Asan Forum. (October 4, 2013). "Modeling a 'New Type of Great Power Relations': A Chinese Viewpoint" (http://www.theasanforum.org/modeling-a-new-type-of-great- power-relations-a-chinese-viewpoint/) (Accessed: December 27, 2019)

2 The Diplomat. (December 14, 2019). "The U.S. and Chinese announcements on the 'phase one' deal are optimistic in tone, but their differences hint at lingering frictions." (https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/the-us-china-trade-deal-is-finally-here/) (Accessed: December 27, 2019)

162 On the other hand, at the same time, technological development enabled accurate counterforce attacks and perfect preemptive attacks upon adversary, generating the world with no MAD 3. Transparency Revolution, moreover, brought about the effect of 'lifting the fog of war' in battlefield for accurate attacks and damage limitation, and simultaneously, created effective but vulnerable assets regarding C4ISR, becoming effective first attack target for 'blinding the enemy's eyes' and a factor for escalating crisis4. Thus, US-China relationship, from the long-term viewpoint of Thucydides Trap, may form a balance, however, from the short-term perspective of military dynamics and regional confrontation state in East Asia, the expected outcome cannot be optimistic.

Since the Taiwan Crisis in 1996, when the US could freely enter the Taiwan Strait and China lacked the capability to respond5, investment in the military has continuously increased. Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities were developed to effectively respond and keep the US out of the first and second island chains. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press. (2017). "." <International Security> Vol. 41. No. 4. pp. 9-49.

4 James M. Acton. (2018). "." <International Security> Vol. 43. No. 1. pp. 56-99.

5 Robert S. Ross. (2000). "." <International Security> Vol. 25. No. 2. pp. 87-123.

163 island chains and secure a space for its influence in East Asia6. Also, as can be seen from the graph below, since then, the GDP gap between the US and China has shrunk dramatically, with China rising to G2 status, which is quite different from the situation in 1996.

<US-China GDP Change 1960-2019>

Source: World Bank, "GDP data", https://www.worldbank.org/ (Accessed: 2019.12.27)

However, the situation is more complicated than during the Cold War era in that China's static military objective of reunifying Taiwan, along with territorial disputes with other neighboring states, including the Philippines (Spratly Islands), Japan (Senkaku), and Vietnam, persists. Though it may be regarded as a limited 6 Si-Fu Ou. (2014). "." 亞太研究論壇第 60 期.

164 nationalistic political aim, from an external perspective, these postures are perceived as revisionist and expansionist. Hence, the regional confrontation in East Asia takes place: China with offensive political aims and defensive military balance7, and the US with defensive political aims to protect allies but with offensive military balance to penetrate through the chain.

In 2012, as a counter-response to A2/AD, the US introduced the notion of "JOAC (Joint Operational Access Concept)", along with the notion of "Air-Sea Battle", to penetrate A2/AD8. As a result, two counter-strategies form the regional confrontation in East Asia with a mismatch of different political aims and military balances. Therefore, to analyze the dynamic, it is first necessary to understand the scale of US-China naval power in the current confrontation state, as a fundamental power for operations if a battle takes place in the area. Secondly, a dynamic analysis of the two strategies is required for predicting the outcome of the confrontation: crisis escalation or de-escalation, and balance or imbalance.

In short, focusing on the military dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, the second part will provide a numerical and overall comparison between the two naval powers (mainly on fleet power) for the current situation using a mathematical approach, in order to achieve a significant comparison. By using 'weighted average', technological factors will be indirectly included in the comparison, and a relatively accurate 7 Defense Intelligence Agency. (2019). "China Military Power."

8 Department of Defense. (2012). "Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)."

165 outcome. It would be significant to examine naval power, since the two great powers are allocating most of their budgets to the navy. In the third part, the dynamics of the two strategic approaches will be analyzed mainly on naval power, focusing on the roles of the navy in overall strategy and other supporting powers of fleet power. And lastly, an expected outcome of the short-term dynamics in East Asia regarding the navy and in total will be presented.

2. Comparing Naval Power

In this section, based on the total number data set for both the US and China, by applying different weights to the types of fleets, depending on their importance in operations. Although there is no previous analysis on the 'importance' of each type of fleet, the budget for build-up and the versatility of the fleet will serve as criteria for deciding the weights. However, the weights, though not precise, could still offer significant intuition into the navy power difference, reflecting factors beyond mere numbers, if multiplied by the same weight for both the US and China.

According to the US Navy budget in 2019, the navy's total budget was $194.1 billion, an increase of seven percent from the previous year. Of this budget, almost $22 billion were spent on ship building, and aircraft carriers overwhelmed all other ships with expenditures exceeding $2 billion for design and continuous construction. Secondly, three DDG51 destroyers cost a total of $5.6 billion, averaging approximately $1.7 billion each for total build-up. Thirdly, with continuous funding for the Columbia-class submarine, the navy

166 increased the fund to almost $10 billion, with an average of $3-4 billion for each submarine. Lastly, amphibious ships and littoral combat ships each accounted for under one billion dollars.9

By following cost and versatility as criteria, aircraft carriers should receive the most weight, followed by submarines, cruisers, destroyers, combat ships, and amphibious ships in that order. From section 2.1, using the weighted average method, a numerical index representing US navy ship power will be derived, and by applying the same weights to the PLAN in section 2.2, a representative index will also be derived.

2.1 US Navy

The 2018 US National Defense Strategy White Paper emphasizes the situation in the Indo-Pacific and East Asia, and the need for Joint Operations, identifying China, Russia, and North Korea as states requiring attention10. The importance of the navy for Joint Operations is essential, and the US not only focuses on numbers but also invests more in weapon systems and fleet quality to make them suitable for Joint Operations and more flexible responses11. At the same time, the US Navy, with the largest budget, continuously increased the number of ships until 2018 and plans 9 Department of the Navy. (2019). "The Department of the Navy FY2019 Budget." 10 Department of Defense. (2018). "National Defense Strategy of The United States of America."

11 Department of the Navy. (2015). "The National Fleet Plan."

167 to maintain this increase until 202312. Although the chart provided by the Congress Research Service shows a numerical inferiority in the number of fleets currently13, the research also points out the insignificance of comparing numbers, as technology, size, capability, weapon systems, and others, including proficiency, differ, and in most aspects, Chinese fleets are inferior14. The article "Why China isn't ahead of the US Navy, even with more ships" also points out the meaninglessness of numerical comparison15. Thus, to obtain significant data for comparison, assigning more weight depending on the importance of the fleet is required.

<Chart A> shows the US's current fleet power possession. The US manages a total of 11 aircraft carriers, including the recent Gerald R. Ford, with one under construction. With a current total of 108 surface combatants, 79 submarines, and 33 amphibious ships, more destroyers, combat ships, submarines, and amphibious ships are under construction, with a total of 289 expected.

12 Department of the Navy. (2019). "The Department of the Navy FY2019 Budget." 13 Congress Research Service. (2019). "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress."

14 Defense Intelligence Agency. (2019). "China Military Power."

15 Brookings. (2019.09.10). "Why China isn't ahead of the US Navy, even with more ships." (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/09/10/why-china-isnt- ahead-of-the-us-navy-even-with-more-ships/) (Accessed: 2019.12.29)

168 AIRCRAFT CARRIER (TOTAL 40%) 11 (1 under construction)

SURFACE COMBATANT (20%) Current Total: 108

CRUISER (8.5%) 22

DESTROYER (8.5%) 67

(9 under construction, 12 under contract) LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (3%) 19

(14 under construction and pre-

production, 1 under trial)

SUBMARINE (TOTAL 30%) Current Total: 79 BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE 14

(15%)

ATTACK SUBMARINE (5%) 57 (christened included)

(9 under construction) GUIDED MISSILE SUBMARINE 18

(10%)

AMPHIBIOUS SHIP (TOTAL 10%) Current Total: 33

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP 8

AMPHIBIOUS COMMAND SHIP 2 AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT DOCK 11

(2 under construction)

DOCK LANDING SHIP 12

CURRENT TOTAL 241

169 EXPECTED TOTAL 289

<Chart A: US Navy Fleet Power>

(Other support and auxiliary ships not included. Data from https://www.navy.mil/.)

With a total weight of 100%, different weights are allocated to each type of ship, referring to the budget and versatility. To calculate the index number for the current US navy with the allocated weights,

The US navy ship power index shows a total result of 22.585, with 4.4 for aircraft carriers, 8.135 for surface combatants, 6.75 for submarines, and 3.3 for amphibious ships. Although the index omits technological factors, including weapon systems and capabilities, it does not generate errors in comparison, as the US, according to the China Military Report and China Naval Modernization Report, prevails in technology in most aspects. For example, comparing the major fleets, aircraft carriers and submarines, US aircraft carriers overwhelm in overall capacity for aircraft and technology, using the catapult method for flexible operation16, while the Chinese navy is undergoing technological upgrades with inferior technology currently. Also, the PLAN with 4 SSBNs, to reach the range for attack targets, requires supporting ships for operation due to noise issues and faces flexible response problems regarding China's command and control system, executing no deterrence patrols at sea17, which indicates the structural challenges China is confronting. Conversely, the US, by "protecting through loss," maintains credible and flexible deterrence with SLBMs. Omitting the technological factor, therefore, does not downgrade the measurement of PLAN capability, but rather enhances the US capability, giving more incentive to the index for PLAN. 16 Congress Research Service. (2019). "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress."

170 with inferior technology currently. Also, the PLAN with 4 SSBNs, to reach the range for attack targets, needs supporting ships accompanied for operation due to the noise problem, and faces flexible response problems regarding the command and control system of China, executing no deterrence patrol in the sea17, which indicates the structural challenge China is confronting. On the contrary, the US, "protecting by losing" the submarines, maintains the credible and flexible deterrence with SLBM. Omitting the technological factor, therefore, does not downgrade the measurement of PLAN capability, but rather the US capability, giving more incentive to index for PLAN.

2.2 People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)

The People's Liberation Army has persistently increased investment in the navy since the Taiwan Crisis, deploying its first domestically constructed aircraft carrier for trials and increasing the total number of surface combatants, submarines, and amphibious ships. Not only in numbers, but also in technological and structural aspects, it is attempting to catch up in capability and flexibility. Especially, China's third aircraft carrier, expected to be Type 002 weighing 80,000-85,000 tons with a catapult launch system, is reportedly under construction18.

17 David C. Logan (2017). "China's Future SSBN Command and Control Structure." Institute for National Security Studies.

18 China Power. (2019). "Tracking China's Third Aircraft Carrier." (https://chinapower.csis.org/china-carrier-type-002/) (Accessed: 2019.12.29)

171 AIRCRAFT -

CARRIER

CURRENT 1 Liaoning (Type 001) under operation

1 Liaoning (Type 001A) under trial

1 Liaoning (Type 002) under construction

EXPECTED 4~6 more expected

CURRENT TOTAL 1

SURFACE -

COMBATANT

CRUISER (LARGE 4 of RENHAI-class (Type 055)

DESTROYER)

(CG) Expected: more under construction

DESTROYER 3 of LUYANG III-class (Type 052D)

(DDG)

TOTAL DESTROYER 42

FRIGATE 27 JIANGKAI II-class (Type 054A)

(FFG) Expected: more under construction

Total: 54

CORVETTE Over 40 JIANGDO-class (Type 056) with ASW

(FFL) Total: 42

GUIDED-MISSILE 60 HOUBEI-class (Type 022)

172 PATORL BOAT Total: 60 CURRENT TOTAL 198

SUBMARINE -

NUCLEAR- Total: 4 (JIN-class Type 094

POWERED with JL-2 SLBM)

BALLISTIC

MISSILE Expected: next generation

SUBMARINE Type 096 with JL-3 SLBM

(SSBN)

NUCLEAR- Total: 6 with JL-2 SLBM

POWERED SHANG I-class (Type 093): 2

ATTACK SHANG II-class (Type

SUBMARINE 093A): 4

(SSN) Expected: SHANG-class

(Type 093B) with guided-

missile nuclear arm

CONVENTIONAL- Total: 50 with ASCM

POWERED Russian-Built KILO-class: 12

ATTACK (8 capable of ASCM)

SUBMARINE SONG-class (Type 039): 13

(SS) YUAN-class (Type 039A): 17

173 Expected: 3 YUAN-class

(total: 20)

CURRENT TOTAL 60

EXPECTED 65~70

TOTAL

AMPHIBIOUS SHIP - YUZHAO-CLASS Total: 5

(TYPE 071)

TYPE 075 New type launched in 2019 CURRENT TOTAL 59

<Chart B: PLAN Fleet Power19>

(Other support, auxiliary ships not included.)

Above charts show overall current data of PLAN fleet power, total number of 318 and expected number of approximate 330. The recognizable feature of PLAN is the overall build-up of fleets in every aspect, and the massive number of littoral combat ships and support ships. To calculate the index of PLAN fleet power,

19 Office of Secretary of Defense. (2019). ―Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People‘s Republic of China 2019.‖ / Congress Research Service. (2019). ―China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.‖ / Defense Intelligence Agency. (2019). ―China Military Power.‖

174

The PLAN index of fleet power from current data shows result of 18.25, explicitly lower than the US (22.585), even though with higher total number of fleets. The calculation assumes other conditions to be homogeneous, which indicates the difference between the two indexes to be bigger than the actual outcomes, as China is still under process of technological improvement and structural reform to perform effective, credible deterrence against US.

Although China‘s condition to catch up US in naval power relies on technology, which is under its process, at the same time, US navy is also consistently upgrading and increasing the number of aircraft carrier, destroyer and submarine, focusing on the main fleets with higher weight. PLAN, however, also maintains its budget for small fleets and amphibious fleets, which presumes to be for its area denial strategy, but for other possible operations for Marine Corps 20 . Further, drills and experiences, structural problems still stand as obstacles after overcoming technological barriers in dynamic analysis.

20 Congress Research Service. (2019). ―China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.‖

175 Therefore, according to the analysis and also most of the recent views, do not expect PLAN to be a match against US Navy. An article by Michael Beckley, though lacking appropriate analysis of situation, even emphasizes that US allies inside the island chains have enough capability to outweigh Chinese military power without direct intervention of US, advocating the ‗active denial strategy‘21. From the aspect of military power, ergo, it is likely to expect to form a balance between US and China with US dominance over the situation.

3. Strategic Dynamic of US-China: Entering and Solidifying

the Dragon‘s Lair

the Dragon‘s Lair Despite the military analysis of naval power indicates US dominance in fire power over China even in the near future, and expects a balance in long-term, there always exists possibility for crisis to be extremely escalated when analyzing the regional confrontation in East Asia: China aiming offensive political goal with defensive balance and US aiming defensive political goal with offensive balance. As a background, in order to secure a space for such actions and ‗keep the US out‘, China built the ‗dragon‘s lair‘ in East Asia, known to be A2/AD (Anti-Access and Area Denial), while US tries to penetrate into the lair through various routes. The crisis comes from the short-term 21 Michael Beckley. (2017). ―The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia.‖ <International Security> Vol. 42. No.2. pp. 78-119.

176 military strategic dynamic with geopolitical issue of Taiwan and other neighboring states around China, especially the US allies.

With the revision of PLA manuals of ―New Generation Operations Regulations‖, China emphasized the ―local war under modern, high-technology conditions‖, and in this sense, A2/AD capability aims the integrated denial of adversaries and overcoming the confinements of island chains22, changing from ‗continental defense‘ to ‗periphery defense with maritime power projection‘. US counteraction to function as ―off-shore balancer‖ according to the active denial strategy23, however, US also tries to enter and has to enter the A2/AD of China for protection of allies if cross the redline.

Thus, the third section aims to view strategical posture and dynamic of US-China to penetrate and defend, focusing on the navy‘s role in operation. In 3.1, will firstly analyze PLAN posture under A2/AD, and in 3.2, will view US navy posture against A2/AD, focusing on the technological and strategical ways to access the area.

22 The Heritage Foundation. (2014. 7. 9). ―The U.S. Needs an Integrated Approach to Counter China‘s Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy.‖(https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-us-needs-integrated-approach- counter-chinas-anti-accessarea-denial-strategy). (Accessed: 2019.12.29)

23 RAND Corporation. (2015. 6. 8).

"Why the United States Needs an Active Denial Strategy for Asia." (https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/06/why-the-united-states-needs-an-active-denial-strategy.html). (Accessed: 2019.12.29)

177 3.1 Solidifying the Lair: Aggressive Protection from Penetration China, as the defender from US penetration, aims to solidify the A2/AD strategy under position of overall inferiority, with no experience of the

"local war,"

especially the

"high-technology local war,"

while US under position of overall superiority with abundant experience of local wars. Therefore, PLA faces question of how to defeat the relative superior enemy.

According to the RAND analysis of China‘s approach toward relatively imbalanced warfare, PLA suggests some indirect defense methods to response against US. Importantly, with

"no direct confrontation,"



"aims to seize the initiative early with preemptive surprise concentrated attack with information superiority, against key points counterforce targets for distraction and shock,"

which includes

"command, information, weapon, logistic, link systems."

By doing this, China also aims to

"raise the cost of battle"

and

"backdown the wills of adversary to fight"

by

"damaging valuable assets and generating casualties."

Ultimately, China intends to gain only

"limited military victory and large political dominance"

through the warfare24.

To achieve the goal, PLA firstly targets US C4ISR, computer network, satellite to blind the eyes of US by

"killing the guy on the elephant."

Secondly, China targets logistics and the long support line of US, regarding the long distance and time length of forming the logistics as a vulnerable point for 24 RAND Air Force Project. (2007).

"Entering the Dragon‘s Lair."

178 US. Thirdly, air bases, ports sea lanes are another target for attacks. Lastly, China, perceiving aircraft carrier as the biggest target due to its range and air power, aims to put anti-access effort on aircraft carriers to hinder its effective operation25.

In total, though China as a defending state, takes relatively aggressive approach against US, viewing first effective preemptive attack as a necessary first step. To focus on the roles of People‘s Liberation Army Navy in such operations, in current situation, PLAN functions as a main actor to Anti-Access US naval powers. Due to its difficulty of directly confronting the US naval power, Chinese aircraft carriers and surface combatants cannot be expected to function as direct defense assets, but rather, indirect defense assets to deter US navy from accessing the area. Therefore, taking asymmetric posture to gain superiority over assets to support indirect defense strategy, such as submarines, littoral combat ships and destroyers, suits the ultimate goals to gain initiative for China.

To undermine the role of US navy, PLAN will take critical role to attack the support and transportation line to intercept the ships, and destroy sea lanes and ports, taking advantage over the short support line. Also, submarines will play a crucial role in forming a blockade with mines to block the access of aircraft carriers and surface combatants, which would eventually be the target. 25 RAND Air Force Project. (2007).

"Entering the Dragon‘s Lair."

179 US navy with lacking anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills26, which China also considers as the weakness along with its size, plans to deter the access with submarines and aims to operate combined strikes along with air force and destroyers to destroy 27 . Plus, with recently developing supersonic ASCM, China believes its capability to effectively deter against US naval power. In sum, PLAN, with combination of air force and rocket forces, will function as a vital actor to indirectly deter the access of US naval power and destroy valuable assets to raise the cost of fighting for US with small combatant fleets and submarines. Though improbable to expect indirect approach of China after its balance of aircraft carriers and destroyers, with current imbalance in direct confrontation, China will take indirect approach to

"push US away"

from the area.

China, from 2019 Defense White Paper, still argues its goal of naval power for reunification of Taiwan and its dominance over neighboring states in South, East China Sea, securing the interest for China. However, at the same time, emphasizes the

"peaceful rising"

and

"defensiveness"

of its navy‘s build- up of aircraft carrier and submarines. Moreover, China aims to match US 26 The Strategist. (2017. 9. 24).

"Towards China‘s A2AD 2.0."

(https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/towards-chinas-a2ad-2-0/). (Accessed: 2019.12.30) 27 RAND Air Force Project. (2007).

"Entering the Dragon‘s Lair‖

180 military power by 205028, expecting 10 aircraft carriers total. Therefore, it would be improbable to expect direct confrontation between US-China, however, in short-term, it would be not be improbable to expect a regional confrontation with a third state in between inside the island chains, as two political aims collide.

3.2 Entering the Lair: Delicate Penetration for Protection

To best express the posture of US against current China‘s aggressive defense system, US is currently

"knocking on the doors into the lair"

and

"looking for the leaks surrounding the lair,"

figuring out how to enter the area with both technologically and strategically. Though as a penetrator accompanying massive offense power with 6 aircraft carriers to be deployed in Pacific, along with overall increase of the size of Indo-Pacific Command, US navy also requires defense posture to counteract against A2/AD posture, demanding more delicacy in operation.

Hence, the capabilities to counteract against Chinese A2/AD should meet before penetration. For US navy, RAND suggests

"anti-submarine warfare capability"

and

"mine sweeping capability"

without reliance upon the allies29. 28 The Economist. (2019. 06. 27).

"Xi Jinping wants China‘s armed forces to be

"world-class"

by 2050."

(https://www.economist.com/china/2019/06/27/xi-jinping-wants-chinas-armed-forces-to-be-world-class-by-2050). (Accessed: 2019.12.30)

29 RAND Air Force Project. (2007).

"Entering the Dragon‘s Lair."

181 To response against what opponent regard as the

"game-changer,"

US suggests both technological and strategical answers: JOAC & ASB, Active Denial and Swarming.

JOAC (Joint Operational Access Concept) was introduced as a counter-response against A2/AD strategy US is facing in 2012, along with the notion of ASB (Air-Sea Battle)30. To preserve US power projection in East Asia against China, integrated and more networked system of US military is seen necessary31. ASB, with

"networked cross-domain operation"

and

"integrated air, sea, land capabilities"

targets enemies with A2/AD by

"attacking in depth."

Similar to China‘s approach, ASB also aims C4ISR for its first target, and enemy capabilities in sequence, jointly approaching the A2/AD system by supplementing each other‘s weaknesses32. Also, as China is relying heavily on its SSBNs, US continuously secures its second-strike capability (deterrence capability) through 14 SSBNs under water, and aims sea control and power projection through overwhelming scale of aircraft carrier and surface combatants along with air strike forces, displaying rather a direct confrontation against China with more accuracy and delicacy in operation through joint 30 Department of Defense. (2012).

"Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) 1.0."

32 Air-Sea Battle Office. (2013).

"Air-Sea Battle."

182 operation33. Additionally,

'active denial strategy'

gives critical insight of allies inside the island chains, US acting as an

"offshore balancer"

and supporting the capabilities of allies functioning as frontline states 34 . Not as a deterrence strategy, but also forming a network among the allies with similar geopolitical issues suggests evidence for US accessing the area.

Secondly, PLAN suggests technological answer toward the question of how to enter the dragon‘s lair:

"Swarming through Ghost Fleet."

Richard A. Bitzinger, emphasizing

"unmanned system, automation, undersea warfare, complex integrated system"

as a

"Third Offset Strategy"

to effectively counteract against A2/AD, suggests technological answer for US navy35. To integrate with the strategy,

"swarming,"

suggests different answer from current idea of JOAC in that it aims to directly counter A2/AD by using large, unmanned but simple weapon system. By

"coordinating simple unmanned units (for example, unmanned drones, vessels or robot),"

navy aims to disperse power projection, reduce cost for conflicts and effectively breakdown enemy‘s defense system. Despite its budget challenges, the expected cost-exchange 33 Department of Defense. (2015).

"A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower."

35 Richard A. Bitzinger. (2017).

"Chinese A2/AD Capabilities and the US Third Offset Strategy."

183 efficiency against A2/AD is found to be effective36. With total budget of $628.8 million for 2020, US navy, along with the budget, plans to continuously increase the number of USV (Unmanned Surface Vehicle) and UUV (Unmanned Undersea Vehicle) until 2024, expecting 191 vessels in total. The UV vessels are more capable of dirty and dangerous missions with less cost than manned vessels, especially underwater operations, including mine sweeping and ASW, being a possible answer for two weaknesses of US navy without worrying about human capital37.

Below chart shows main actions of UV vehicles in operation.

USV (UNMANNED SURFACE MAIN ACTS

VEHICLE)

LUSV (LARGE UNMANNED SUW+ASUW, ISR

SURFACE VEHICLE)

MDUSV (MEDIUM UNMANNED ASW, Mining, Armed Escort

SURFACE VEHICLE)

SUSV (SMALL UNMANNED Mine Sweep, Mine Neutralization

SURFACE VEHICLE)

36 Richard Gorrell, Alexander MacPhail, Joseph Rice. (2016).

"Countering A2/AD with Swarming."

Air Command and Staff College Air University.

37 Congressional Research Service. (2019).

"Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress."

184 VERY SMALL UNMMANED ISR, Armed Escort

SURFACE VEHICLE

UUV (UNMANNED UNDERSEA MAIN ACTS

VEHICLE)

XLUUV (EXTRA LARGE Under Preparation (SUW+ASUW, ASW, UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE) ISR, etc.)

LUUV (LARGE UNMANNED Under Preparation

UNDERSEA VEHICLE)

MDUUV (MEDIUM UNMANNED Buried-Volume Mine Hunting

UNDERSEA VEHICLE)

SUUV (SMALL UNMANNED ISR

UNDERSEA VEHICLE)

<Chart C: US Navy UV>

(Source:

https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMariti

meSys-Small.pdf?ver=2019-01-15-165105-297)

Though not sufficient in number for current and yet some not available currently, in near future, US navy is expected to own enough capability to swarm through ghost fleet, which signifies the continuous dynamic in naval build-up in US during China‘s sea power modernization plan. In short,

185 "Swarming" strategy could suggest an evidence to overcoming weakness of JOAC and ASB.

4. Conclusion: Outcome of Dynamics, Crisis Managed or

Escalated?

To mention again, despite the interdependency and cultural affinity, development of technology has brought a world with no MAD, and made states to act aggressively, enabling first perfect preemptive attack with lower cost than before if scale and accuracy holds. Additionally, Transparency Revolution created effective but vulnerable assets regarding C4ISR, becoming the first attack target for both US and China. Though it would be improbable to expect a preventive war between US-China in long term, as long as two different political aims collide in short-term, especially in specific region with a 3rd state in between, crisis management should be the main issue, since crisis could be escalated as fast as it could if there is a

"slip."

The chance for the slip is increasing between US and China, as bargaining range in between is decreasing due to aggressive military dynamics in East Asia.

According to the short-term dynamic analysis from above, PLAN is following the path of US navy in a fast speed with current overall inferiority except the number of vehicles. To overcome the inferiority and taking advantage of a mainland defender, takes indirect posture to secure a free space for influence, focusing on submarine and destroyer attacks targeting sea ports,

186 sea lanes, support lines, logistic lines and valuable US navy assets (especially aircraft carrier) to raise the cost for conflict. And in long-term, aims to secure enough amount of naval power with modernized technologies to match US naval power, however, at the same time, US navy is also looking for strategies and technologies to enter the denied area, which puts two back to zero but with more crisis escalated. US-China, in short-term, though different in intensity, is showing a dynamic similar to India-Pakistan in South Asia.

Different from past bipolarity with Soviet when crisis was well- managed despite the competitiveness, US-China faces imbalance in military power with high technology and sustainable economy, creating a crisis escalation when two perceives each other as dangerous, which could evoke a first attack if cross the redline. Therefore, US, if China crosses the redline and intrude allies, will surely penetrate A2/AD in order to protect the allies, and both will target

"the eyes"

of each other, escalating the crisis. However, China with inferiority in conventional and nuclear power, and US with superiority, first counterforce attack with conventional force against China‘s mainland (especially targeting inflexible command-control system, shallow communication system and inflexible weapon system) could be another option for US, which, if China perceives as dangerous, first attack would be the only option for both 38. Thus, despite the fact that crisis management is necessary, if 38 RAND. (2019).

"Mainland Strikes and US Military Strategy Towards China."

187 China crosses the redline, crisis escalation would be inevitable.

After a period of time, PLAN could match current US naval power, however, at the same time, US will not only figure out a way to enter the lair, but also pursue overall superiority continuously, stepping few steps ahead. It is probable to expect PLAN‘s counteraction against US UV technology combined with ASB in long-term, but in short-term, expecting a balance in naval strategy would be a probable prediction. Balance in this sense holds different meaning in that balance signifies US keeping its superiority over China in military power, preventing China crossing the redline. Since two states have the opposite political aims (US with defensive and China with offensive aim) and military balance (US with offensive balance and China with defensive balance), China aims to avoid direct confrontation with US by taking advantage of mainland defense, which, eventually results in indirect confrontation. On the other hand, US, aims to use overall superiority for relatively direct confrontation with more delicate methods, along with indirect approach at the same time by using unmanned technologies and making China fight ghost fleets. This further implies, it would be essential to view US-China military confrontation as asymmetric warfare between the great powers inside the strategic aspect, rather than viewing as mere great power warfare by looking at the outer surface.

Ergo, to maintain the balance, firstly, crisis management is necessary. However, if different political aims collide and no common interest exists to

188

'hold'

the situation, crisis management would be difficult to hold. Then, as a second option, US maintaining its overall superiority in military dynamic is important for keeping the balance in Indo-Pacific. Maintaining the

'gap'

and

'asymmetrical balance'

with China (which also indicates decreasing the possible management range and forming an 'instable balance') could be the short-term solution for stability. Also in long term, the mechanism for keeping a balance would remain same in that total imbalance and asymmetry of military power creating relatively stable balance for US and China in East Asia. The term

"asymmetric balance,"

to speak specifically, would be

'balance under instability and asymmetric balance of military power (imbalance of military power)'

, expecting a balance of total power under the condition of military power imbalance, though crisis escalates and instability increases.

189

Reference Material 2: Lee Su-ji Report (English)

U.S EDGE Initiative Vs. China

Belt and Road Initiative: Future of

New Energy Alliance

Lee Su-ji

Yonsei University

Table of Content I. Introduction

190 II. History and Background III. Current Situation Analysis

a. EDGE Initiative Interests – US, Japan, Korea Alliance

b. Belt and Road Initiative Interests – China, Russia Alliance

c. Korea‘s Stance and Role

Ⅳ. Prospects: US Pressure, Strong US – Japan Alliance, and Korea‘s Complex Participation

V. Conclusion Introduction

The use of energy is increasing alongside the rise of technology, modernization, and globalization. After the World Financial Crisis in 2008, there seemed to be increasing cooperation in the energy sector, but ten years later, today, not much progress or study regarding this has been made. There is no doubt that American administrations and policies have a critical impact on the East Asian region. With Trump‘s rise to POTUS, Asian states have been curious and anxious as to what kind of changes his nationalistic administration will bring. The major policies that Trump has addressed have been the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Asian EDGE Initiative. In 2017, the Trump administration began using the term Indo-Pacific as a replacement of the previous administration‘s "pivot to Asia"

191 to describe an expanded Asia-Pacific region, seeking to articulate U.S. strategy towards an expanded Indo-Asia-Pacific region at a time when China‘s presence across the region is growing. With an objective of a "free and open" region, it may also encompass the so-called Quad, an informal four-party grouping of regional democracies involving Australia, India, Japan, and the US. The strategy accepts and endorses "ASEAN centrality." Defense Secretary Mattis identified four main themes of Trump‘s Indo-Pacific Strategy: expanding attention on the maritime space by helping our partners build naval and law enforcement capabilities and capacities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime orders and interests; interoperability, to ensure that our military is able to more easily integrate with others; strengthening the rule of law, civil society, and transparent governance; and private sector-led economic development with no empty promises or surrender of economic sovereignty. It implies further US engagement amidst a new context of overt strategic competition with China. US‘ interest in the region seems obvious – economic and military. Nine of the world‘s 10 busiest seaports are in the region, and 60 percent of global maritime trade transits through Asia, with roughly one-third of global shipping passing through the South China Sea alone. America‘s annual two-way trade with the region is $2.3 trillion, with U.S. foreign direct investment of $1.3 trillion in the region – more than China‘s, Japan‘s, and South Korea‘s combined. A quarter of U.S. exports go to the Indo-Pacific, and exports to China and India have more than doubled over the past decade. This

192 is made possible by free and open trade routes through the air, sea, land, space, and cyber commons that form the current global system. This paper will delve into whether Trump‘s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Asian EDGE Initiative will be successful or not? More specifically, what is the future of the possible "energy alliance" between US, Japan and China, Russia? Where and how do other East Asian states such as Korea fit in this equation? How will the different states react or respond differently in the energy field?

History and Background

The United States has long had active foreign policies with East Asian states such as Korea, Japan, and China. With Japan, it has been especially dynamic since Japan‘s active participation in World War 1,2 and the Cold War. During World War 1, both the US and Japan fought on the Allied side, but Japan‘s later aggressive role in dealing with China became a continual source of tension. American public opinion strongly opposed Japan‘s invasion of China in 1937. At the same time, Japan depended on the US, British, and Dutch for 90% of its oil. Japanese diplomats were sent to Washington in the summer of 1941 to engage in high-level talks, but both sides realized that no compromise was possible between Japan‘s commitment to conquer China and America‘s commitment to defend China. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, triggering the American declaration of war on Japan. Japan‘s Axis allies, including Nazi Germany, also declared war on the US following Pearl Harbor, officially starting World War 2. The crisis lasted until September 1, 1945, when

193 Japan surrendered in response to the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Historian Akira Iriye argues that World War II and the Occupation decisively shaped bilateral relations after 1945. He presents the oil crisis of 1941 as the confrontation of two diametrically opposed concepts of the Asian Pacific order. Japan was militaristic and sought to create and control a self-sufficient economic region in Southeast Asia. Franklin D. Roosevelt and his successors were internationalists seeking an open international economic order. The war reflected the interplay of military, economic, political, and ideological factors. The postwar era led to a radical change in bilateral relations from stark hostility to close friendship and political alliance. With the rise of Soviet power in the 1980s and the onset of the Cold War, Japan reassured United States leaders of Japan's determination against the Soviet threat, closely coordinated policies with the United States toward Asian trouble spots such as the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia, and worked cooperatively with the United States in developing China policy. The Japanese government welcomed the increase of American forces in Japan and the western Pacific and positioned Japan firmly on the side of the United States against the threat of Soviet international expansion. By the late 1990s and beyond, the US-Japan relationship had been improved and strengthened. The major causes of friction in the relationship, e.g., trade disputes, became less problematic as China displaced Japan as the greatest perceived economic threat to the U.S. Meanwhile, though in the immediate post–Cold War period the security alliance suffered from a lack of a

194 defined threat, the emergence of North Korea as a belligerent rogue state and China‘s economic and military expansion provided a purpose to strengthen the relationship. In 2013, China and Russia held joint naval drills in what Chinese state media called an attempt to challenge the American-Japanese alliance. Previous to Trump‘s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Obama administration had adhered to a Pivot to Asia strategy, which represented a significant shift in the foreign policy of the US, taking the country‘s focus from the Middle Eastern and European spheres and began to invest heavily in East Asian countries. Also known as the 'Pivot to Asia,' the American military and diplomatic 'pivot,' or 'rebalance' toward Asia became a popular buzzword after Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, coined it. Clinton‘s article emphasizes the importance of the Asia-Pacific, noting that nearly half of the world‘s population resides there, making its development vital to American economic and strategic interests. She states that "open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the nuclear proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military

195 activities of the region's key players." The 'pivot' strategy, according to Clinton, will proceed along six courses of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening America‘s relationships with rising powers, including China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.

Current Situation Analysis

EDGE Initiative Interests – U.S, Japan, Korea Alliance

According to the World Energy Council, three primary policy areas—energy security, energy equity, and energy sustainability—are evaluated to form a score that shows which countries have the most sustainable energy policies. The United States is ranked 15th, Japan 31st, South Korea 37th, Russia 42nd, and China 72nd. This ranking shows us that the current energy power is more concentrated in the US alliance among the US, Japan, and Korea rather than the challenging group of China and Russia. This may indicate a bigger incentive but also a bigger game-changer.

Japan has been openly supportive of Trump‘s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. The two are major allies in the energy field. With China‘s rise, the alliance has become only stronger with a bigger incentive for the Japanese to thwart growing Chinese power. That is why Trump is determined with this

196 policy. The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy revolves around the simultaneous enhancement of America‘s economic engagement, security cooperation, and rule-making potential, objectives that align with key partners like Japan and Australia. Donald Trump announced in 2018 that he will allocate a down payment of $113 million to fund new initiatives to bolster the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure of the Indo-Pacific region. The following month, Vice President Michael Pence announced efforts to coordinate with Japan on $10 billion in regional energy investment, establish a U.S.-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, and launch a five-country partnership for electrification in Papua New Guinea. The Vice President also announced the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative to help countries attract high-quality investment and counter corruption and coercive threats to their sovereignty by strengthening civil society and good governance. Furthermore, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, a major bipartisan legislation, was signed into law by President Trump on December 31, 2018. This legislation enshrines a generational whole-of-government policy framework that demonstrates the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and includes initiatives that promote sovereignty, rule of law, democracy, economic engagement, and regional security. Although we cannot be certain of the future prospects, we are sure that the energy competition will only elevate.

Recent positive developments in natural gas could rekindle bilateral energy trade in ways few thought possible just a few years ago. The discoveries of

197 large new shale gas reserves in the lower 48 states have made the United States the world‘s fastest growing natural gas producer. The International Energy Agency noted that the planned expansion of the Panama Canal in 2014 would enable 80 percent of the world‘s liquefied natural gas (LNG) fleet to use the canal, dramatically lowering shipping costs and making LNG exports from the U.S. Gulf Coast dramatically more competitive in Asia.

The shale gas revolution in the continental United States and the abundant gas reserves in Alaska present Japan and the United States with a complementary opportunity: the United States should begin to export LNG from the lower 48 states by 2015, and Japan continues to be the world‘s largest LNG importer. Since 1969, Japan has imported relatively small amounts of LNG from Alaska, and interest is picking up in expanding that trade link, given Japan‘s need to increase and diversify its sources of LNG imports.

Belt and Road Initiative Interests – China, Russia Alliance China is a growing challenger to the US global hegemony. The energy sector is one of the huge pillars which China is planning on using to realize this. China‘s main and open ally regarding energy is Russia. Sino-Russian relations have significantly deepened over the last decade. For one, arms sales have grown significantly in terms of both quantity and quality in recent years after recovering from a sizable decline in the first decade of the 21st century. They have also increased their level of military cooperation and the frequency of

198 joint exercises during this period as both countries oppose the US-dominated international system and seek to challenge US influence abroad with the aim of creating a more multipolar international order. Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on China economically and has tried to address this issue by implementing new multilateral initiatives in Asia. For example, China reiterated its political support of Russia on a number of occasions, denouncing Western sanctions but stopping short of recognizing the Russian possession of Crimea. However, China did provide important technological assistance for building the so-called energy bridge between Crimea and the main Russian territory, which was necessary to stabilize Russian control over the peninsula. Another example is the bilateral intergovernmental commission, the China-Russia Energy Cooperation Committee, which was established in 2012 on the basis of existing bilateral energy dialogues. China‘s Belt and Road Initiative is committed to the economic integration of the Eurasian continent. For this initiative to succeed, China needs Russia‘s support. As a result, the relationship between the two countries has once again grown closer in recent years. This shows that whatever political blemishes China and Russia have, they are being overcome by energy cooperation. At present, Chinese scholars emphasize the importance of energy security when discussing bilateral relations from the perspective of economic cooperation. Since 2016, Russia has replaced Saudi Arabia as China‘s largest supplier of crude oil. Sino-Russian energy cooperation is also crucial for China‘s deep integration into the global energy

199 system through infrastructure projects under BRI. Moreover, as neighboring countries, China and Russia can achieve mutual security and reliable protection to a large extent, depending on the degree of development of mutual economic relations.

Korea’s Stance and Role

Korea, being a middle power, with an overt security alliance with the United States but also being close in proximity to China, is in a more complex situation. Energy is a key sector where ROK, US, and Japan interests meet.

On the one hand, Korea is aligned with the US and Japan. An area where all three nations have deep interests in defining the future rules of the international system is nuclear energy. As China rises among the ranks of nuclear powers, it will become crucial for allies like Japan and the ROK—both important actors in the global market—to ensure proper safeguards, nonproliferation practices, and high standards of transparency in the production of nuclear energy. With the United States‘ footprint in the nuclear energy sector receding due to policy uncertainty, unfavorable economics (mainly due to low natural gas prices), and the absence of a renewed 123 agreement with the ROK, it is especially timely for Tokyo and Seoul to assume a greater role in defining the standards for global nuclear energy generation. Japan‘s recommitment to safe nuclear energy and the ROK‘s commitment to the highest standards of transparency and nonproliferation as a global nuclear energy supplier will be critical to ensuring the future of this regime.

200 On the other hand, Korea cannot defy its ties with its close regional neighbor, China. China‘s Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa through trade and infrastructure routes and covers more than 65 countries with a combined population of 4.4 billion. It serves as a blueprint for China‘s grand geoeconomic and geopolitical strategy of connecting itself to the global economy and strengthening its influence.

The Moon Jae-in administration has laid out a vision intended to be compatible with the goals and priorities of both China and the US, and with the current changing geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula. The US, in collaboration with Japan, is refining its "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy, which aims to advance free markets and freedom of navigation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Concurrently, the Moon administration is offering a strategic vision that aims to be independent of both the Indo-Pacific strategy and China‘s BRI, and also to overlap with converging interests. At the 2017 Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, President Moon Jae-in proposed expanding South Korea‘s cooperation with Russia on joint infrastructure, including ports, railways, natural gas pipelines, electric grids, and Arctic shipping lanes. Cooperation with Russia is a central component of South Korea‘s New Northern Policy, because new infrastructure projects that include North Korean participation can alleviate tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang over denuclearization of the Peninsula. At the same time, in 2017 the Moon administration‘s announcement of its New Southern Policy outlined a

201 set of core initiatives, including energy infrastructure, to strengthen its economic ties with ASEAN countries. In this way, South Korea has chosen to be a strategic balancer between powers by diversifying its energy partnerships. Prospects

"The relations between the Russian Federation and the People‘s Republic of China are on the rise," President Putin said in a welcome message at a Russian-Chinese Energy Forum in Beijing. "An important part of these relations is energy cooperation, which has lately received significant development." The relationship between China and Russia is "very unlikely to deteriorate in the foreseeable future," according to Alexander Gabuev, senior fellow and chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. The "two authoritarian regimes understand each other well." "The Kremlin doesn‘t fully trust China, but it knows that the national interests of both countries coincide in many areas and that China will be a predictable and pragmatic partner for years to come. By contrast, Moscow sees U.S. leaders as unpredictable and untrustworthy." The Russian-Chinese Energy Forum was a significant symbol of the future prospects of energy cooperation. On the other hand, Trump‘s Free and Open Indo-Pacific seems to grow sweltering and increasingly steadfast in the future as well. The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy revolves around the simultaneous enhancement of America‘s economic engagement, security cooperation, and rule-making potential, objectives that align with key partners like Japan and Australia. Donald Trump announced in

202 2018 that he will allocate a down payment of $113 million to fund new initiatives to bolster the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure of the Indo-Pacific region. The following month, Vice President Michael Pence announced efforts to coordinate with Japan on $10 billion in regional energy investment, establish a U.S.-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, and launch a five-country partnership for electrification in Papua New Guinea. The Vice President also announced the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative to help countries attract high-quality investment and counter corruption and coercive threats to their sovereignty by strengthening civil society and good governance. Furthermore, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, a major bipartisan legislation, was signed into law by President Trump on December 31, 2018. This legislation enshrines a generational whole-of-government policy framework that demonstrates the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and includes initiatives that promote sovereignty, rule of law, democracy, economic engagement, and regional security. Although we cannot be certain of the future prospects, we are sure that the energy competition will only elevate.

Conclusion

With Trump‘s rise to POTUS, Asian states have been curious and anxious as to what kind of changes his nationalistic administration will bring. The major policies that Trump has addressed have been the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Asian EDGE Initiative. In 2017, the Trump administration began using the term Indo-Pacific as a replacement of the previous administration‘s "pivot to Asia"

203 to describe an expanded Asia-Pacific region, seeking to articulate U.S. strategy towards an expanded Indo-Asia-Pacific region at a time when China‘s presence across the region is growing. With an objective of a "free and open" region, it may also encompass the so-called Quad, an informal four-party grouping of regional democracies involving Australia, India, Japan, and the US. The strategy accepts and endorses "ASEAN centrality." Defense Secretary Mattis identified four main themes of Trump‘s Indo-Pacific Strategy: expanding attention on the maritime space by helping our partners build naval and law enforcement capabilities and capacities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime orders and interests; interoperability, to ensure that our military is able to more easily integrate with others; strengthening the rule of law, civil society, and transparent governance; and private sector-led economic development with no empty promises or surrender of economic sovereignty. It implies further US engagement amidst a new context of overt strategic competition with China. US‘ interest in the region seems obvious – economic and military. This paper has delved into the future of the energy alliance by evaluating the current situation and prospect of Trump‘s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy on one hand, and the Chinese-Russian energy alliance on the other.

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