미국의 EDGE Initiative VS. 중국의 Belt and Road Initiative: 새로운 에너지 동맹의 미래

규슈국립박물관 · 이 수 지 · 연세대학교

들어가며

사랑방 13 기의 일본 답사 셋째 날인 2020 년 1 월 9 일, 마지막 일정으로 규슈국립박물관을 갔습니다. 규슈국립박물관에서 일본의 역사를 엿볼 수 있었고, 이를 통해 국제정치가 무엇인지, 한국인에게 국제정치학은 무엇인지 고민하게 됐습니다. 비는 계속 왔는데 한국 보다는 따뜻해서 좋았습니다. 규슈국립박물관은 꽤나 넓었습니다. 본격적으로 전시장으로 입장했을 때는 시간 여행을 하는 것 마냥 모든 곳이 시간, 역사 순으로 고대 시기의 도구나 유물들이

141 많았습니다. 유물을 보존 하기 위해 조명은 어두웠습니다. 그래서 그런지 더 자세히 살피러 유물과 더 가까이 기대지는 제 몸을 느꼈습니다. 일본의 역사를 살피며 한국과의 친밀하고 의존했던 과거를 보니 신기했습니다. 사실 19 세기 이후부터는 한국이 일본 보다 소위 “후진국”이고, 20 세기 들어서는 본격 일본이 더 선진화 된 곳이라고 배웠던 저희. 사실 19 세기 이전에는 일본이 압도적으로 한국에 더 의존하고 뒤따라 온 흔적을 보니 역시 국제 패권의 유동성에 대해 생각하게 됐습니다. 더불어 규슈박물관은 사진을 찍을 수 있는 구간도 마련해주고, 손으로 만질 수 있는 체험형 구간도 있어서 오감이 즐거웠습니다. 나의 생각과 몸이 모두 자극 받는 시간이었습니다.

역사를 살피면 바로 이 규슈 지역이 예전에 일본에서 첫 무역이 일어났던 곳이죠. 가장 서쪽 지역이라 해양 무역은 여기서 시작했고 이를 통해 어쩌면 일본이 동아시아에서 가장 먼저 서양과 외교가 활성화 되고 선진국이 되는 것에 기여하지 않았나 싶습니다. 오늘날, 동아시아의 외교 상황은 어떻게 달라졌을까요? 한국과 일본은 아직 독도와 위안부 관련 분쟁이 미해결의 상태고, 중국은 지역적 패권을 너머 미국과의 패권전쟁을 선포하는 단계라고 볼 수 있습니다. 이러한 이유 때문인지 일본은 미국과의 관계가 더욱 친밀해지고, 한국은 미국과의 안보 동맹이긴 하지만 북한문제에도 그렇고, 일본과의 문제에서도 그렇고, 미들 파워 이상의 영향력을 보이고 있진 않습니다. “코리아 패싱”(Korea Passing)이라는

142 얼토당토하고 안타까운 용어가 사용될 정도로, 미국과 일본이 한반도와 관련한 핵심 의사결정 과정에서 한국을 배제하고 주변국끼리만 논의하는 현상이 나타나고 있습니다. 대한민국의 외교 파워가 그다지 크지 않은 이와중에, 다수의 분야에서 미국과 중국의 패권전쟁 (IT 업계, 경제, 에너지 등)은 한국의 역할을 앞으로 어떻게 바꿀 것인가 정치학도로 고민하는 것은 중요한 숙제인 것 같습니다.

사진 1. 규슈국립박물관에 입장

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고대 규슈와 한국의 역사

규슈박물관은 규슈의 역사, 특히 중국, 한국을 비롯한 외교 역사와 문화 교류 등을 다루는 박물관입니다. 규슈는 일본의 가장 남쪽 지역임으로 세계와 첫 무역을 했습니다. 가장 처음으로 포르투갈과 1540 년대에 “난반무역”을 시작하였고, 1600 년대에는 더치와 교류가 이뤄졌던 곳이 규슈 지역입니다. 한국은 중국과 일본 사이 다리 역할을 하는 핵심이었습니다. 한국과 일본, 규슈와 첫 교류는 100-300 년도로 기록되어 있습니다. 남서일본은 사절을 한국으로 꾸준히 보내오며 의존했습니다. 삼국시대에는 가야가 특히 일본이랑 가까웠는데요, 바로 쇠, 철을 수출하기 때문이었습니다. 백제는 화가와 학자들을 통해 중국 문화를 수출했습니다. 가야와 백제를 통해 도자기, 유교, 법정, 논 농사, 중국어, 불교, 건축 공법 등을 공유했습니다. 규슈와 한국은 신라 통합 이후 더 활발해졌습니다. 846 년에는 장보고가 규슈에 무역소를 설치하였고, 통역사들도 배치했습니다. 규슈 대제부 무역소를 통해 신라 무역사와 관리들이 무역을 했습니다. 일종의 행정관청 같은 곳이었죠. 바로 규슈의 이 곳을 중심으로 장보고 선원들은 활동을 활발히 했습니다.

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사진 2. 규슈국립박물관에 있는 일본도

20 세기 이후 배경

미국의 도널드 트럼프 대통령이 2017 년 처음으로 Free and Open Indo- Pacific Strategy 라는 정책을 공개했고, 그 이후 그 정책은 어떤 목표를 갖고 있는지, 한국에게는 어떤 의미를 갖고 있는지 살피는 것이 이 보고서의 목적입니다. 동아시아 국가중에서는 역사적으로 미국은 일본과 가장 많은 교류를 해왔습니다. 1983 년도 레이건 대통령의 Nakasone Joint Statement, 1987 년 US Nuclear Cooperation 등을 통해 미국과 일본은 에너지 합의가 40 년 가까지 전부터 이어지고

145 있습니다. 최근에는 2011 년 지진 후 에너지 원조를 제공했고, 중국과는 US China Clean Energy Research 설립, Energy Action Plan 의 추진이 있었습니다. 하지만 이 외에는 에너지가 외교 논의에서 많이 다뤄지진 않았습니다. 처음으로 체계적으로 거시적 정책의 일부로 다뤄진 것은 오바마의 Pivot to Asia 이라고 볼 수 있습니다. 오바마때부터 외교 정책의 포커스를 중동, 유럽에서 아시아로 변경한 정책이 Pivot to Asia 였습니다. 이 Pivot to Asia 의 일부분으로 Asia Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership(ACEP) 를 발표했고 비로서 에너지 논의가 커졌습니다. 트럼프 대통령은 오바마 대통령의 아시아 중심 외교 정책의 필요성을 인지하나 자신만의 새로운 접근, Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy 라는 정책을 발표했고, ACEP 또한 EDGE Initiative 라는 에너지 정책을 탄생시켰습니다.

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사진 3. 규슈국립박물관에 있는 모형

미국 EDGE Initiative 의 현황분석 및 이해 – 미국,

일본, 한국의 동맹 형성

2017 년 트럼프 대통령이 처음으로 Free and Open Indo Pacific 이라는 용어를 베트남 APEC CEO 서밋에서 사용함으로 아시아에 대한

147 관심을 선포 했고, 특히 EDGE Initiative 를 통해 에너지 협력에 대한 의지를 보였습니다. 하지만 EDGE 는 오바마의 ACEP 와의 큰 차이를 보였습니다. ACEP 는 재생에너지, 협력 에너지 시장, 자연가스 활용, 그리고 지속가능성과 같은 환경적 문제들에 집중을 했다면 트럼프의 EDGE 는 에너지 안보, 에너지 동맹, 개방된 에너지 시장, 에너지 무역 관계 개선, 에너지 접근성 과 같은 외교적, 무역적 성격을 띕니다.

2018 년 폼페이오 국무장관은 이 Free and Open Indo Pacific 의 의미를 풀이해줬습니다. Free Indo Pacific 이란 모든 국가가 타국의 강압으로부터 자국의 주권을 보호할 수 있는 능력을 갖추는 것이라고 했습니다. 국가 차원에서의 자유라 함은 굿 거버넌스 그리고 모든 시민의 기본적인 권리와 자유를 구가할 수 있도록 보장하는 것을 의미한다고 말했습니다. Open, 혹은 개방적인 인도 태평양이란, 모든 국가에 해로와 항공로가 개방되는 것을 의미한다고 했습니다. 영토와 해상 분쟁을 평화적으로 해결하기 원한다고 밝히고 각국이 자국의 목표를 달성하고 국제 평화를 달성할 수 있는 열쇠라고 강조했습니다.

또한 경제 관점에서의 개방은 공정하고 상호적인 무역, 개방적인 투자 환경, 국까간의 투명한 협정, 지역 내 유대를 견인하는 연결성의 강화 등을 뜻합니다. 폼페이오 장관은 연설 끝 앞으로 디지털 경제, 에너지, 인프라 등에 1 억 1300 만 달러를 투입할 것을 선언했습니다. 여기에 에너지 구상은 EDGE 를 통해 발현될 것이라고 했습니다. EDGE 는 에너지를 통한 개발 및 성장 제고의 약자로 인도 태평양

148 파트너국에 투자하여 자국의 에너지 자원을 수출, 생산, 이전, 저장, 구현할 수 있도록 도울 계획임을 밝혔습니다. 미국의 풍부한 에너지 역량에는 방대한 천연 자원, 세계를 선도하는 민간 기업, 정교한 개발금융 수단, 타의 추종을 불허하는 기술 전문성이 포함됩니다. 미국은 이러한 역량을 총동원해 인도 태평양 전역에서 지속가능한 성장을 모색하고 에너지 시장을 확보하는 것이 바로 EDGE 입니다.

트럼프 대통령이 아시아 외교와 아시아의 에너지에 집중하는 이유는 결국 중국입니다. 중국을 의식하기 때문에 Indo Pacific 라는 더 방대한 지역을 칭하며 일본, 인도, 호주까지 포함시키는 속셈이라고 볼 수 있습니다. 여기에 동반되는 한가지 변수 추가는 미국의 shale gas 입니다. 미국에서는 shale gas 를 통해 에너지에 대한 태도가 더 적극적이게 됐고, 에너지가 중요한 외교 도구로 부상하고 있습니다. 이로써 국제 에너지 동맹의 윤곽은 더 뚜렷해집니다. 미국, 일본, 한국이 한편, 중국, 러시아 한편 – 마치 냉전과 비슷한 구도로 에너지 동맹은 꾸려질 전망입니다. 아시아에서 미국의 가장 강한 에너지 동맹은 일본입니다. 왜냐면 일본은 한국과 더불어 에너지 빈민국입니다. 일본은 석유 한방울이 안 나기 때문에 무조건 미국에 의존해야 합니다. 더불어 미국은 한국의 참여 또한 촉구하고 있습니다. 하지만 아직 한국은 적극적으로 미국의 에너지 동맹으로 참여를 하지 않고 있습니다. 한국의 입장은 아직 두루뭉실합니다.

한국은 미국과는 안보동맹이지만 중국과 지리적으로 너무 가까워서 문제가 복잡합니다. 게다가 아직 한국은 에너지에 대한

149 투자나 연구가 덜 된 상태입니다. 미국 Atlantic Council 싱크탱크의 오미연 박사에 의하면 한국은 앞으로 “balancing act”을 하지 않을까 전망합니다. 전적으로 미국만을 지지한다고 하기엔 문재인 정부 들어선 후 러시아와도 인프라 협력(항만, 철도, 자연가스)이 있었습니다. 표면적으로 미국과는 EDGE Initiative 와 Energy Security Dialogue 등을 통해 참여가 높아질 것 같습니다. 다만 일본이 너무 적극적인 미국의 에너지 동맹으로 부상한다면 다자 협력 보다는 양자 협력 위주로 참여할 것으로 예상됩니다.

중국 Belt and Road Initiative 의 현황분석 및 이해

– 중국, 러시아 동맹 형성

미국, 일본, 한국이 하나의 에너지 동맹이라면 그 반대편에는 중국과 러시아가 있습니다. 중국과 러시아는 최근 10 년간 굉장히 돈독해진 가운데, 에너지가 중요한 플랫폼 역할을 했습니다. 2012 년도에는 China-Russia Energy Cooperation Committee 가 개설 되었고 2019 년 3 월에는 Russian Chinese Energy Forum 이 베이징에서 열렸습니다. 이 청문회는 에너지 동맹에 있어 상징적이었다고 해석할 수 있습니다. 푸틴은 중국을 공개적으로 지지했고, 중국과의 협력 강화 의사를 밝혔습니다. 중국과 러시아는 각기 협력의 목적이 다르면서도 서로

150 잘 맞습니다. 러시아는 경제와 business interest 때문에, 중국은 Belt and Road Initiative 때문에, 서로 협력을 강화할 예정입니다. 심지어 2016 년 이후 러시아는 중국의 원유 최대 공급자로 부상했습니다. 이전에는 사우디에게서 원유를 수입했지만 최근엔 이 역할을 러시아에게 줄 만큼 서로 에너지 협력은 이미 이루어지고 있습니다.

러시아는 시베리아 파이프를 중국에게 허용하며 둘의 경제적, 에너지 의존도는 높아졌습니다. 러시아 동부 시베리아의 천연가스를 중국으로 공급하는 “시베리아의 힘” 천연가스관 1 단계 공사가 마무리 되며 2019 년 12 월부터 이 가스관을 통해 러시아 극동 지역에서 생산한 천연가스를 들여올 계획이라고 밝혔습니다. 이 사업은 러시아 가즈프롬과 중국 석유천연가스집단(CNPC)이 지난 2014 년 가스 공급에 합의를 이루며 본격 추진 됐습니다. 가스관은 동부 시베리아에서 극동 하비롭스크를 거쳐 블라디보스토크로 이어지며 총길이는 4000km 에 달합니다.

양국은 2014 년 9 월 착공해 5 년만에 1 단계 사업을 마치게 됐으며 2023 년까지 모든 사업을 완료할 계획입니다. 천연가스관 건설이 마무리되면 중국은 러시아의 최대 가스 수입국으로 부상할 것으로 보입니다. 양국은 서부 가스관 사업 또한 추진하고 있습니다. 시베리아에서 생산한 천연가스를 중국 서부 지역에 공급하려는 목적으로 동부에 이어 서부에도 가스관 사업을 진행하며 중국은 러시아와 에너지 동맹을 강활 할 것입니다. 중국은 이 프로젝트를 “Polar Silk Road”라고 칭했고 이 또한 둘의 에너지 동맹의 강화

151 트렌드를 보여주고 있습니다. 이 청문회에서 양국은 에너지, 식량, 북극 항로, 전자상거래 등 다양한 분야에서의 협력 프로젝트를 구체화했습니다.

나가며 - 전망 및 결론

현재 에너지 동맹이란 중국과 러시아가 더 빨리 실현하고 있다고 볼 수 있습니다. 가스 파이프 프로젝트를 실질적으로 시작한 단계이며, 시작한 이상 앞으로 더 이어질 것으로 예상됩니다. 이런 면에서 중국의 Belt Road Initiative 가 트럼프의 EDGE Initiative 를 앞서가고 있다고 생각합니다. 하지만 미국 또한 동맹 아키텍쳐를 꾸려 앞으로 중국의 부상에 대응할 것으로 보입니다. 일단 가장 먼저 이 동맹에 합류한 아시아 국가는 일본입니다.

일본은 미국 밖에 의존할 수 없는 에너지 빈민국이며 미국과 대규모 shale gas 도입계약을 체결했기 때문에 한국은 조만간 미국으로부터 압박을 받을 거라고 생각합니다. 하지만 한국의 입장은 일본 보다 더 복잡합니다. 중국과 지리적으로 가까울뿐만 아니라 러시아와의 에너지 협력 또한 필요합니다. 북핵문제를 해결하는 수단으로 남 · 북 · 러 가스관 연결 사업이 추진될 수 있다면 경제적 이익과 안보적 이득도 커지기 때문입니다. 러시아는 특히 “에너지 전략 2035”를 통해 한국이 포기할 수 없는 시장임을 보여주고 있습니다. 전적으로 미국만을 지지한다고 하기엔 문재인 정부 들어선

152 후 러시아와도 인프라 협력(항만, 철도, 자연 가스)이 있었습니다. 표면적으로 미국과는 EDGE Initiative 와 Energy Security Dialogue 등을 통해 참여가 높아질 것 같습니다. 다만 일본이 너무 적극적인 미국의 에너지 동맹으로 부상한다면 다자 협력 보다는 양자 협력 위주로 참여할 것으로 예상됩니다.

사진 4. 규슈국립박물관 출구 앞에서

153 참고문헌 1. 인터넷 자료

‖Asia EDGE – Enhancing Development and Growth Through Energy.‖

US Department of State. (검색일 2019.11.11)

―Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy.‖ US Agency for

International Development. (검색일 2019.11.01)

―President Donald J. Trump‘s Administration is Advancing a Free and

Open Indo-Pacific.‖ White House Factsheets. (검색일 2019.11.10) ―Indo-Pacific Strategy Report.‖ United States Department of Defense.

(검색일 2019.12.01)

―The United States, India, and Future of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.‖

National Bureau of Asian Research. (검색일 2019.12.01)

Armitage, Richard L., Joseph S. Nye. 2012. ―The U.S Japan Alliance.‖

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (검색일 2019.12.20) CNBC. Shao, Grace. (Dec 3 2019). ―Russia opens Siberian pipeline to

China as Beijing expands its influence in the Arctic.‖

(검색일 2019.12.20)

CNBC. Ellyatt, Holly. (Nov 29, 2018). ―Business leaders hail Russia‘s

booming energy ties with China.‖ (검색일 2019.12.20)

The Diplomat. 2019. ―The 2019 US Indo-Pacific Strategy: Who‘s It

For?‖ (검색일 2019.12.20)

154 Harding, Brian. 2019. ―The Trump Administration‘s Free and Open

Indo-Pacific Approach.‖ Southeast Asian Affairs. (검색일 2019.12.20) Japan Times. 2019. ―What does the 'Indo-Pacific strategy' mean?‖

(검색일 2019.12.20)

Kashin, Vasily, Ma Bin, Yuki Tatsumi, and Zhang Jian. 2019. ―Sino-

Russian Relations Perspectives from Russia, China, and Japan.‖

National Bureau of Asian Research. (검색일 2019.12.20)

Martin, William F. 2014. ―Japan Energy Security Post-Fukushima.‖.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (검색일 2019.12.20) The New York Times. (2013.07.10) "China and Russia, in a Display of

Unity, Hold Naval Exercises". (검색일 2019.12.20)

Oh, Miyeon. 2018. ―How Energy Infrastructure is shaping geopolitics in

East Asia.‖ World Economic Forum. (검색일 2019.12.20)

South China Morning Post. 2019. ―A US Indo-Pacific strategy that

isolates China is small-minded and dangerous.‖ (검색일 2019.12.20) Sutter, Robert. 2018. ―China-Russia Relations Strategic Implications

and U.S Policy Options.‖. National Bureau of Asian Research.

(검색일 2019.12.20)

World Energy Council. 2019. ―World Energy Trilemma Index.‖

(검색일 2019.12.20)

2. 정기 간행물

155 Hughes, Christopher W. 2007. "Not quite the 'Great Britain of the Far

East': Japan's security, the US-Japan alliance and the 'war on terror'

in East Asia". Warwick Research Archive Portal(WRAP). 325–338. Iriye, Akira. 1993. "Pearl Harbor: A Fifty-Year

Perspective." Amerikastudien. Vol. 38 No. 1. 13-24.

156

사진 및 참고자료

DAY 1. 후쿠오카 공항 도착

157 DAY 1. 나가사키 구라바엔 1

DAY 1. 나가사키 구라바엔 2

158

DAY 1. 나가사키 구라바엔 3

DAY 2. 아리타 도자기 마을

159

DAY 2. 규슈 도자기박물관

160 DAY 3. 귀국 전 카페에서

참고자료 1: 이광민 보고서(영문)

US-China Hegemonic Competition Short-Term

Episode, Regional Naval Confrontation in Indo

Pacific

: Balance or Escalation?

Lee Kwang Min

1. Introduction

1.1 Background of Analysis and Methodology

The rise of China and declination of US, along with various expected outcomes of, and also the process of power transition has long been asserted and debated. From John J. Mearsheimer‘s ―The Tragedy of Great Power Politics‖ and to ―Destined for War‖ by Graham Allison, the long-term understanding of US-China dynamic of power transition has been the most interested topic recently and relatively well-known, dealing with the dynamic with the keywords of ―preventive war or power transition‖, ―Thucydides Trap and Kindleberger Trap‖. However, merely depending on theoretical and long-term understanding of the

161 dynamic cannot explain the flip side of the coin, could result in prediction error. Thus, in order to focus on short-term and more dynamic analysis of the logic, it would be necessary to view military power, dynamic and geopolitical situation between US and China in East Asia.

―New Type of Great Power Relations‖, noted by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, clearly shows the need of different bipolar relationship from the Cold War bipolarity, emphasizing less competitiveness but more interactions and cooperation between US-China 1. In fact, in the aspect of intensity of bipolarity, Cold War exhibited more competitiveness and less direct interaction, while US-China in present world exhibits comparatively less competition and more direct interaction, reaching the first phase deal in economic sector through negotiation in December of 2019 2 . Likewise, relatively loose and more interactive bipolarity can be found than the past, along with improbability to expect the ‗destined war‘ in present world between two great powers in twenty-first century with mere outcome of past analysis, as economy and technology became critical factor in the aspect of intensity.

1 The Asan Forum. (2013.10.04). ―Modeling a ―New Type of Great Power Relations‖: A Chinese Viewpoint‖ (http://www.theasanforum.org/modeling-a-new-type-of-great- power-relations-a-chinese-viewpoint/) (검색일: 2019.12.27)

2 The Diplomat. (2019.12.14). ―The U.S. and Chinese announcements on the ―phase one‖ deal are optimistic in tone, but their differences hint at lingering frictions.‖ (https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/the-us-china-trade-deal-is-finally-here/) (검색일: 2019.12.27)

162 On the other hand, at the same time, technological development enabled accurate counterforce attacks and perfect preemptive attacks upon adversary, generating the world with no MAD 3. Transparency Revolution, moreover, brought about the effect of ‗lifting the fog of war‘ in battlefield for accurate attacks and damage limitation, and simultaneously, created effective but vulnerable assets regarding C4ISR, becoming effective first attack target for ‗blinding the enemy‘s eyes‘ and a factor for escalating crisis4. Thus, US-China relationship, from the long-term viewpoint of Thucydides Trap, may form a balance, however, from the short-term perspective of military dynamics and regional confrontation state in East Asia, the expected outcome cannot be optimistic.

Since the Taiwan Crisis in 1996 when US could access free entrance in Taiwan Strait and China had no capability to respond5, investment on military continuously increased. A2/AD (Anti-Access and Area Denial) capability were developed in order to effectively respond, keep US out of the first-second 3 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press. (2017). ―The New Era of Counterforce.‖ <International Security> Vol. 41. No.4. pp. 9-49.

4 James M. Acton. (2018). ―Escalation Through Entanglement.‖ <International Security> Vol. 43. No. 1. pp. 56-99.

5 Robert S. Ross. (2000). ―The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation.‖ <International Security> Vol. 25. No. 2. pp. 87-123.

163 island chains and secure a space for its influence in East Asia6. Also, to see from the graph below, since then, the GDP gap between US-China shrunk dramatically, rising as G2, which is quite different from the situation in 1996.

<US-China GDP change 1960-2019>

Source: World Bank, ―GDP data‖, https://www.worldbank.org/ (검색일: 2019.12.27)

However, the situation is more complicated than the Cold War era in that China‘s military aim for reunification of Taiwan remains static, along with territorial disputes with other neighboring states, including Philippines (Spratly Islands), Japan (Senkaku), Vietnam etc. Though may regard as limited 6 Si-Fu Ou. (2014). ―China‘s A2AD and Its Geographic Perspective.‖ 亞太研究論壇第 60 期.

164 nationalistic political aim, from the viewpoint of outside, postures are perceived as revisionist and expansionist. Hence, the regional confrontation in East Asia takes places: China with offensive political aim and defensive military balance 7 , and US with defensive political aim to protect allies but with offensive military balance to penetrate through the chain.

US, in 2012, as a counter-response against A2/AD, introduced the notion of ―JOAC (Joint Operational Access Concept)‖, along with the notion of ―Air-Sea Battle‖, to penetrate A2/AD8. As a result, two counter-strategies form regional confrontation in East Asia with mismatch of different political aims and military balances. Ergo, to analyze the dynamic, firstly require understanding the scale of US-China naval power in current confrontation state, as a fundamental power for operation if battle takes place in the area. Secondly, dynamic analysis of two strategies is required for predicting the outcome of confrontation: crisis escalation or de-escalation, and balance or imbalance.

In short, focusing on military dynamic in Indo-Pacific, in second part, numerical and overall comparison between two naval power (mainly on fleet power) for current situation will be made through mathematical way, in order to gain significant comparison. By using ‗weighted average‘, will indirectly include technological factors in comparison, and show relatively accurate 7 Defense Intelligence Agency. (2019). ―China Military Power.‖

8 Department of Defense. (2012). ―Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC).‖

165 outcome. It would be significant to take a look at naval power, since two great powers are allocating most budget on navy. In third part, dynamic of two strategical approaches will be analyzed mainly on naval power, focusing on the roles of navy in overall strategy and other supporting powers of fleet power. And lastly, will bring out an expected outcome of the short-term dynamic in East Asia regarding the navy and in total.

2. Comparing the Naval Power

In this section, based on the total number data set of both US-China, by applying different weight upon the types of fleet, depending on the importance in operation. Although no previous analysis upon the ‗importance‘ of each type of fleet, the budget for build-up and versatility of the fleet would function as criteria for deciding the weight. However, the weight, though not precise, could still offer significant intuition of navy power difference reflecting other factors than mere number if multiplied by same weight for both US and China.

According to the US Navy budget in 2019, the navy‘s budget was $194.1 billion in total, increased by seven percent from last year. Among the budget, almost $22 billion were spent for ship building and aircraft carrier overwhelmed all other ships with expenditure of more than $2 billion for design and continuous construction. Secondly, three DDG51 destroyers costed total of $5.6 billion with average of approximately $1.7 billion each for total build-up. Thirdly, continuously funding for Columbia class submarine, navy

166 increased the fund to almost $10 billion, with average of $3~4 billion for each submarine. Lastly, amphibious ships and littoral combat ships each took up under one billion dollars.9

By following the cost and versatility as criteria, aircraft carrier should take the most weight, followed by submarine, cruiser, destroyer, combat ships and amphibious ships in order. From 2.1, by using weight average method, will draw out a numerical index, representing US navy ship power, and by applying the same weight on PLAN in 2.2, will also draw out a representative index.

2.1 US Navy

2018 US National Defense Strategy White Paper emphasizes the situation in Indo-Pacific and East Asia, and need of Joint Operation, setting China, Russia and North Korea as states to be attentive of10. The importance of navy for Joint Operation is essential, which, US, not only the number, but also invests more on the weapon system and quality of fleets, to make suitable for Joint Operations and more flexible responses11. At the same time, US Navy, with the most budget, continuously increased the number of ships until 2018, and plans 9 Department of the Navy. (2019). ―The Department of the Navy FY2019 Budget.‖ 10 Department of Defense. (2018). ―National Defense Strategy of The United States of America.‖

11 Department of the Navy. (2015). ―The National Fleet Plan.‖

167 to maintain the increase until 202312. Though the chart suggested by Congress Research Service shows numerical inferior in the number of fleets currently13, the research also points out the insignificance of comparing in numbers, as technology, size, capability, weapon system and others, including proficiency, are different, and in most of the aspects, Chinese fleets are rather inferior14. The article ―Why China isn‘t ahead of the US Navy, even with more ships‖ also points out the meaninglessness of numerical comparison 15 . Thus, to get significant data for comparison, rendering more weight depending on the importance of fleet is required.

<Chart A> shows the US current possession of fleet power. US manages total 11 aircraft carriers, including the recent Gerald R. Ford and with one under construction. With current total of 108 surface combatant, 79 submarines and 33 amphibious ships, more destroyer, combat ship, submarines and amphibious ships are under construction, expecting 289 in total.

12 Department of the Navy. (2019). ―The Department of the Navy FY2019 Budget.‖ 13 Congress Research Service. (2019). ―China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.‖

14 Defense Intelligence Agency. (2019). ―China Military Power.‖

15 Brookings. (2019.09.10). ―Why China isn‘t ahead of the US Navy, even with more ships.‖ (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/09/10/why-china-isnt- ahead-of-the-us-navy-even-with-more-ships/) (검색일: 2019.12.29)

168 AIRCRAFT CARRIER (TOTAL 40%) 11 (1 under construction)

SURFACE COMBATANT (20%) Current Total: 108

CRUISER (8.5%) 22

DESTROYER (8.5%) 67

(9 under construction, 12 under contract) LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (3%) 19

(14 under construction and pre-

production, 1 under trial)

SUBMARINE (TOTAL 30%) Current Total: 79 BALLISTIC MISSLE SUBMARINE 14

(15%)

ATTACK SUBMARINE (5%) 57 (christened included)

(9 under construction) GUIDED MISSILE SUBMARINE 18

(10%)

AMPHBIOUS SHIP (TOTAL 10%) Current Total: 33

AMPHBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP 8

AMPHIBIOUS COMMAND SHIP 2 AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT DOCK 11

(2 under construction)

DOCK LANDING SHIP 12

CURRENT TOTAL 241

169 EXPECTED TOTAL 289

<Chart A: US Navy Fleet Power>

(Other support, auxiliary ships not included. Data from https://www.navy.mil/.)

With total weight of 100%, allocated each type of ship a different weight, referring to the budget and versatility. To calculate the index number for current US navy with the weight allocated above,

The US navy ship power index shows result of 22.585 in total, with 4.4 for aircraft carrier, 8.135 for surface combatant, 6.75 for submarine, 3.3 for amphibious ship. Though the index leaves out technological factors, including weapon system and capability, it does not generate error in comparing, as US, according to the China Military Report and China Naval Modernization Report, prevails in technology in most aspect. For example, comparing the major fleets, aircraft carrier and submarine, US aircraft carrier overwhelms in overall capacity for aircraft, and technology, using catapult method for flexible operation16, while Chinese navy is undergoing the upgrade in the technology 16 Congress Research Service. (2019). ―China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.‖

170 with inferior technology currently. Also, PLAN with 4 SSBN, to reach the range for attack target, needs supporting ships accompanied for operation due to the noise problem, and faces flexible response problem regarding the command control system of China, executing no deterrence patrol in the sea17, which indicates the structural challenge China is confronting. On the contrary, US, ―protecting by losing‖ the submarines, maintains the credible and flexible deterrence with SLBM. Omitting the technological factor, therefore, does not downgrade the measurement of PLAN capability, but rather the US capability, giving more incentive to index for PLAN.

2.2 People‘s Liberal Army Navy (PLAN)

People‘s Liberal Army persistently increased the investment on navy since Taiwan Crisis, deploying its first domestically constructed aircraft carrier in trial and increasing the number of surface combatant, submarine, amphibious ships in total. Not only in numbers, but also in technological and structural aspect, tries to catch up the capability and flexibility. Especially, China‘s third aircraft carrier expected to be Type 002 weighing 80,000~85,000 tons with catapult launch system, is found to be under construction18.

17 David C. Logan (2017). ―China´s Future SSBN Command and Control Structure.‖ Institute for National Security Studies.

18 China Power. (2019). ―Tracking China‘s Third Aircraft Carrier.‖ (https://chinapower.csis.org/china-carrier-type-002/) (검색일: 2019.12.29)

171 AIRCRAFT -

CARRIER

CURRENT 1 Liaoning (Type 001) under operation

1 Liaoning (Type 001A) under trial

1 Liaoning (Type 002) under construction

EXPECTED 4~6 more expected

CURRENT TOTAL 1

SURFACE -

COMBATANT

CRUISER (LARGE 4 of RENHAI-class (Type 055)

DESTROYER)

(CG) Expected: more under construction

DESTROYER 3 of LUYANG III-class (Type 052D)

(DDG)

TOTAL DESTROYER 42

FRIGATE 27 JIANGKAI II-class (Type 054A)

(FFG) Expected: more under construction

Total: 54

CORVETTE Over 40 JIANGDO-class (Type 056) with ASW

(FFL) Total: 42

GUIDED-MISSILE 60 HOUBEI-class (Type 022)

172 PATORL BOAT Total: 60 CURRENT TOTAL 198

SUBMARINE -

NUCLEAR- Total: 4 (JIN-class Type 094

POWERED with JL-2 SLBM)

BALLISTIC

MISSILE Expected: next generation

SUBMARINE Type 096 with JL-3 SLBM

(SSBN)

NUCLEAR- Total: 6 with JL-2 SLBM

POWERED SHANG I-class (Type 093): 2

ATTACK SHANG II-class (Type

SUBMARINE 093A): 4

(SSN) Expected: SHANG-class

(Type 093B) with guided-

missile nuclear arm

CONVENTIONAL- Total: 50 with ASCM

POWERED Russian-Built KILO-class: 12

ATTACK (8 capable of ASCM)

SUBMARINE SONG-class (Type 039): 13

(SS) YUAN-class (Type 039A): 17

173 Expected: 3 YUAN-class

(total: 20)

CURRENT TOTAL 60

EXPECTED 65~70

TOTAL

AMPHIBIOUS SHIP - YUZHAO-CLASS Total: 5

(TYPE 071)

TYPE 075 New type launched in 2019 CURRENT TOTAL 59

<Chart B: PLAN Fleet Power19>

(Other support, auxiliary ships not included.)

Above charts show overall current data of PLAN fleet power, total number of 318 and expected number of approximate 330. The recognizable feature of PLAN is the overall build-up of fleets in every aspect, and the massive number of littoral combat ships and support ships. To calculate the index of PLAN fleet power,

19 Office of Secretary of Defense. (2019). ―Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People‘s Republic of China 2019.‖ / Congress Research Service. (2019). ―China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.‖ / Defense Intelligence Agency. (2019). ―China Military Power.‖

174

The PLAN index of fleet power from current data shows result of 18.25, explicitly lower than the US (22.585), even though with higher total number of fleets. The calculation assumes other conditions to be homogeneous, which indicates the difference between the two indexes to be bigger than the actual outcomes, as China is still under process of technological improvement and structural reform to perform effective, credible deterrence against US.

Although China‘s condition to catch up US in naval power relies on technology, which is under its process, at the same time, US navy is also consistently upgrading and increasing the number of aircraft carrier, destroyer and submarine, focusing on the main fleets with higher weight. PLAN, however, also maintains its budget for small fleets and amphibious fleets, which presumes to be for its area denial strategy, but for other possible operations for Marine Corps 20 . Further, drills and experiences, structural problems still stand as obstacles after overcoming technological barriers in dynamic analysis.

20 Congress Research Service. (2019). ―China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.‖

175 Therefore, according to the analysis and also most of the recent views, do not expect PLAN to be a match against US Navy. An article by Michael Beckley, though lacking appropriate analysis of situation, even emphasizes that US allies inside the island chains have enough capability to outweigh Chinese military power without direct intervention of US, advocating the ‗active denial strategy‘21. From the aspect of military power, ergo, it is likely to expect to form a balance between US and China with US dominance over the situation.

3. Strategic Dynamic of US-China: Entering and Solidifying

the Dragon‘s Lair

Despite the military analysis of naval power indicates US dominance in fire power over China even in the near future, and expects a balance in long-term, there always exists possibility for crisis to be extremely escalated when analyzing the regional confrontation in East Asia: China aiming offensive political goal with defensive balance and US aiming defensive political goal with offensive balance. As a background, in order to secure a space for such actions and ‗keep the US out‘, China built the ‗dragon‘s lair‘ in East Asia, known to be A2/AD (Anti-Access and Area Denial), while US tries to penetrate into the lair through various routes. The crisis comes from the short-term 21 Michael Beckley. (2017). ―The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia.‖ <International Security> Vol. 42. No.2. pp. 78-119.

176 military strategic dynamic with geopolitical issue of Taiwan and other neighboring states around China, especially the US allies.

With the revision of PLA manuals of ―New Generation Operations Regulations‖, China emphasized the ―local war under modern, high-technology conditions‖, and in this sense, A2/AD capability aims the integrated denial of adversaries and overcoming the confinements of island chains22, changing from ‗continental defense‘ to ‗periphery defense with maritime power projection‘. US counteraction to function as ―off-shore balancer‖ according to the active denial strategy23, however, US also tries to enter and has to enter the A2/AD of China for protection of allies if cross the redline.

Thus, the third section aims to view strategical posture and dynamic of US-China to penetrate and defend, focusing on the navy‘s role in operation. In 3.1, will firstly analyze PLAN posture under A2/AD, and in 3.2, will view US navy posture against A2/AD, focusing on the technological and strategical ways to access the area.

22 The Heritage Foundation. (2014. 7. 9). ―The U.S. Needs an Integrated Approach to Counter China‘s Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy.‖(https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-us-needs-integrated-approach- counter-chinas-anti-accessarea-denial-strategy). (검색일: 2019.12.29)

23 RAND Corporation. (2015. 6. 8). ―Why the United States Needs an Active Denial Strategy for Asia.‖ (https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/06/why-the-united-states-needs-an- active-denial-strategy.html). (검색일: 2019.12.29)

177 3.1 Solidifying the Lair: Aggressive Protection from Penetration China, as the defender from US penetration, aims to solidify the A2/AD strategy under position of overall inferiority, with no experience of the ―local war‖, especially the ―high-technology local war‖, while US under position of overall superiority with abundant experience of local wars. Therefore, PLA faces question of how to defeat the relative superior enemy.

According to the RAND analysis of China‘s approach toward relatively imbalanced warfare, PLA suggests some indirect defense methods to response against US. Importantly, with ―no direct confrontation‖, ―aims to seize the initiative early with preemptive surprise concentrated attack with information superiority, against key points counterforce targets for distraction and shock‖, which includes ―command, information, weapon, logistic, link systems‖. By doing this, China also aims to ―raise the cost of battle‖ and ―backdown the wills of adversary to fight‖ by ―damaging valuable assets and generating casualties‖. Ultimately, China intends to gain only ―limited military victory and large political dominance‖ through the warfare24.

To achieve the goal, PLA firstly targets US C4ISR, computer network, satellite to blind the eyes of US by ―killing the guy on the elephant‖. Secondly, China targets logistics and the long support line of US, regarding the long distance and time length of forming the logistics as a vulnerable point for 24 RAND Air Force Project. (2007). ―Entering the Dragon‘s Lair.‖

178 US. Thirdly, air bases, ports sea lanes are another target for attacks. Lastly, China, perceiving aircraft carrier as the biggest target due to its range and air power, aims to put anti-access effort on aircraft carriers to hinder its effective operation25.

In total, though China as a defending state, takes relatively aggressive approach against US, viewing first effective preemptive attack as a necessary first step. To focus on the roles of People‘s Liberation Army Navy in such operations, in current situation, PLAN functions as a main actor to Anti-Access US naval powers. Due to its difficulty of directly confronting the US naval power, Chinese aircraft carriers and surface combatants cannot be expected to function as direct defense assets, but rather, indirect defense assets to deter US navy from accessing the area. Therefore, taking asymmetric posture to gain superiority over assets to support indirect defense strategy, such as submarines, littoral combat ships and destroyers, suits the ultimate goals to gain initiative for China.

To undermine the role of US navy, PLAN will take critical role to attack the support and transportation line to intercept the ships, and destroy sea lanes and ports, taking advantage over the short support line. Also, submarines will play a crucial role in forming a blockade with mines to block the access of aircraft carriers and surface combatants, which would eventually be the target. 25 RAND Air Force Project. (2007). ―Entering the Dragon‘s Lair.‖

179 US navy with lacking anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills26, which China also considers as the weakness along with its size, plans to deter the access with submarines and aims to operate combined strikes along with air force and destroyers to destroy 27 . Plus, with recently developing supersonic ASCM, China believes its capability to effectively deter against US naval power. In sum, PLAN, with combination of air force and rocket forces, will function as a vital actor to indirectly deter the access of US naval power and destroy valuable assets to raise the cost of fighting for US with small combatant fleets and submarines. Though improbable to expect indirect approach of China after its balance of aircraft carriers and destroyers, with current imbalance in direct confrontation, China will take indirect approach to ―push US away‖ from the area.

China, from 2019 Defense White Paper, still argues its goal of naval power for reunification of Taiwan and its dominance over neighboring states in South, East China Sea, securing the interest for China. However, at the same time, emphasizes the ―peaceful rising‖ and ―defensiveness‖ of its navy‘s build- up of aircraft carrier and submarines. Moreover, China aims to match US 26 The Strategist. (2017. 9. 24). ―Towards China‘s A2AD 2.0.‖

(https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/towards-chinas-a2ad-2-0/). (검색일: 2019.12.30) 27 RAND Air Force Project. (2007). ―Entering the Dragon‘s Lair‖

180 military power by 205028, expecting 10 aircraft carriers total. Therefore, it would be improbable to expect direct confrontation between US-China, however, in short-term, it would be not be improbable to expect a regional confrontation with a third state in between inside the island chains, as two political aims collide.

3.2 Entering the Lair: Delicate Penetration for Protection

To best express the posture of US against current China‘s aggressive defense system, US is currently ―knocking on the doors into the lair‖ and ―looking for the leaks surrounding the lair‖, figuring out how to enter the area with both technologically and strategically. Though as a penetrator accompanying massive offense power with 6 aircraft carriers to be deployed in Pacific, along with overall increase of the size of Indo-Pacific Command, US navy also requires defense posture to counteract against A2/AD posture, demanding more delicacy in operation.

Hence, the capabilities to counteract against Chinese A2/AD should meet before penetration. For US navy, RAND suggests ―anti-submarine warfare capability‖ and ―mine sweeping capability‖ without reliance upon the allies29. 28 The Economist. (2019. 06. 27). ―Xi Jinping wants China‘s armed forces to be ―world-class‖ by 2050.‖ (https://www.economist.com/china/2019/06/27/xi-jinping-wants-chinas-armed- forces-to-be-world-class-by-2050). (검색일: 2019.12.30)

29 RAND Air Force Project. (2007). ―Entering the Dragon‘s Lair.‖

181 To response against what opponent regard as the ―game-changer‖, US suggests both technological and strategical answers: JOAC & ASB, Active Denial and Swarming.

JOAC (Joint Operational Access Concept) was introduced as a counter-response against A2/AD strategy US is facing in 2012, along with the notion of ASB (Air-Sea Battle)30. To preserve US power projection in East Asia against China, integrated and more networked system of US military is seen necessary31. ASB, with ―networked cross-domain operation‖ and ―integrated air, sea, land capabilities‖ targets enemies with A2/AD by ―attacking in depth‖. Similar to China‘s approach, ASB also aims C4ISR for its first target, and enemy capabilities in sequence, jointly approaching the A2/AD system by supplementing each other‘s weaknesses32. Also, as China is relying heavily on its SSBNs, US continuously secures its second-strike capability (deterrence capability) through 14 SSBNs under water, and aims sea control and power projection through overwhelming scale of aircraft carrier and surface combatants along with air strike forces, displaying rather a direct confrontation against China with more accuracy and delicacy in operation through joint 30 Department of Defense. (2012). ―Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) 1.0.‖ 31 CSBA. (2010). ―Why Air-Sea Battle?‖

32 Air-Sea Battle Office. (2013). ―Air-Sea Battle.‖

182 operation33. Additionally, ‗active denial strategy‘ gives critical insight of allies inside the island chains, US acting as an ―offshore balancer‖ and supporting the capabilities of allies functioning as frontline states 34 . Not as a deterrence strategy, but also forming a network among the allies with similar geopolitical issues suggests evidence for US accessing the area.

Secondly, PLAN suggests technological answer toward the question of how to enter the dragon‘s lair: ―Swarming through Ghost Fleet‖. Richard A. Bitzinger, emphasizing ―unmanned system, automation, undersea warfare, complex integrated system‖ as a ―Third Offset Strategy‖ to effectively counteract against A2/AD, suggests technological answer for US navy35. To integrate with the strategy, ―swarming‖, suggests different answer from current idea of JOAC in that it aims to directly counter A2/AD by using large, unmanned but simple weapon system. By ―coordinating simple unmanned units (for example, unmanned drones, vessels or robot)‖, navy aims to disperse power projection, reduce cost for conflicts and effectively breakdown enemy‘s defense system. Despite its budget challenges, the expected cost-exchange 33 Department of Defense. (2015). ―A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.‖ 34 Eric Heginbotham and Jacob L. Heim. (2015). ―Deterring without Dominance: Discouraging Chinese Adventurism under Austerity.‖ <The Washington Quarterly>. Spring 2015. 38:1. pp. 185-199.

35 Richard A. Bitzinger. (2017). ―Chinese A2/AD Capabilities and the US Third Offset Strategy.‖

183 efficiency against A2/AD is found to be effective36. With total budget of $628.8 million for 2020, US navy, along with the budget, plans to continuously increase the number of USV (Unmanned Surface Vehicle) and UUV (Unmanned Undersea Vehicle) until 2024, expecting 191 vessels in total. The UV vessels are more capable of dirty and dangerous missions with less cost than manned vessels, especially underwater operations, including mine sweeping and ASW, being a possible answer for two weaknesses of US navy without worrying about human capital37.

Below chart shows main actions of UV vehicles in operation.

USV (UNMANNED SURFACE MAIN ACTS

VEHICLE)

LUSV (LARGE UNMANNED SUW+ASUW, ISR

SURFACE VEHICLE)

MDUSV (MEDIUM UNMANNED ASW, Mining, Armed Escort

SURFACE VEHICLE)

SUSV (SMALL UNMANNED Mine Sweep, Mine Neutralization

SURFACE VEHICLE)

36 Richard Gorrell, Alexander MacPhail, Joseph Rice. (2016). ―Countering A2/AD with Swarming.‖ Air Command and Staff College Air University.

37 Congressional Research Service. (2019). ―Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress.‖

184 VERY SMALL UNMMANED ISR, Armed Escort

SURFACE VEHICLE

UUV (UNMANNED UNDERSEA MAIN ACTS

VEHICLE)

XLUUV (EXTRA LARGE Under Preparation (SUW+ASUW, ASW, UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE) ISR, etc.)

LUUV (LARGE UNMANNED Under Preparation

UNDERSEA VEHICLE)

MDUUV (MEDIUM UNMANNED Buried-Volume Mine Hunting

UNDERSEA VEHICLE)

SUUV (SMALL UNMANNED ISR

UNDERSEA VEHICLE)

<Chart C: US Navy UV>

(Source:

https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMariti

meSys-Small.pdf?ver=2019-01-15-165105-297)

Though not sufficient in number for current and yet some not available currently, in near future, US navy is expected to own enough capability to swarm through ghost fleet, which signifies the continuous dynamic in naval build-up in US during China‘s sea power modernization plan. In short,

185 ―Swarming‖ strategy could suggest an evidence to overcoming weakness of JOAC and ASB.

4. Conclusion: Outcome of Dynamics, Crisis Managed or

Escalated?

To mention again, despite the interdependency and cultural affinity, development of technology has brought a world with no MAD, and made states to act aggressively, enabling first perfect preemptive attack with lower cost than before if scale and accuracy holds. Additionally, Transparency Revolution created effective but vulnerable assets regarding C4ISR, becoming the first attack target for both US and China. Though it would be improbable to expect a preventive war between US-China in long term, as long as two different political aims collide in short-term, especially in specific region with a 3rd state in between, crisis management should be the main issue, since crisis could be escalated as fast as it could if there is a ―slip‖. The chance for the slip is increasing between US and China, as bargaining range in between is decreasing due to aggressive military dynamics in East Asia.

According to the short-term dynamic analysis from above, PLAN is following the path of US navy in a fast speed with current overall inferiority except the number of vehicles. To overcome the inferiority and taking advantage of a mainland defender, takes indirect posture to secure a free space for influence, focusing on submarine and destroyer attacks targeting sea ports,

186 sea lanes, support lines, logistic lines and valuable US navy assets (especially aircraft carrier) to raise the cost for conflict. And in long-term, aims to secure enough amount of naval power with modernized technologies to match US naval power, however, at the same time, US navy is also looking for strategies and technologies to enter the denied area, which puts two back to zero but with more crisis escalated. US-China, in short-term, though different in intensity, is showing a dynamic similar to India-Pakistan in South Asia.

Different from past bipolarity with Soviet when crisis was well- managed despite the competitiveness, US-China faces imbalance in military power with high technology and sustainable economy, creating a crisis escalation when two perceives each other as dangerous, which could evoke a first attack if cross the redline. Therefore, US, if China crosses the redline and intrude allies, will surely penetrate A2/AD in order to protect the allies, and both will target ―the eyes‖ of each other, escalating the crisis. However, China with inferiority in conventional and nuclear power, and US with superiority, first counterforce attack with conventional force against China‘s mainland (especially targeting inflexible command-control system, shallow communication system and inflexible weapon system) could be another option for US, which, if China perceives as dangerous, first attack would be the only option for both 38. Thus, despite the fact that crisis management is necessary, if 38 RAND. (2019). ―Mainland Strikes and US Military Strategy Towards China.‖

187 China crosses the redline, crisis escalation would be inevitable.

After a period of time, PLAN could match current US naval power, however, at the same time, US will not only figure out a way to enter the lair, but also pursue overall superiority continuously, stepping few steps ahead. It is probable to expect PLAN‘s counteraction against US UV technology combined with ASB in long-term, but in short-term, expecting a balance in naval strategy would be a probable prediction. Balance in this sense holds different meaning in that balance signifies US keeping its superiority over China in military power, preventing China crossing the redline. Since two states have the opposite political aims (US with defensive and China with offensive aim) and military balance (US with offensive balance and China with defensive balance), China aims to avoid direct confrontation with US by taking advantage of mainland defense, which, eventually results in indirect confrontation. On the other hand, US, aims to use overall superiority for relatively direct confrontation with more delicate methods, along with indirect approach at the same time by using unmanned technologies and making China fight ghost fleets. This further implies, it would be essential to view US-China military confrontation as asymmetric warfare between the great powers inside the strategic aspect, rather than viewing as mere great power warfare by looking at the outer surface.

Ergo, to maintain the balance, firstly, crisis management is necessary. However, if different political aims collide and no common interest exists to

188 ‗hold‘ the situation, crisis management would be difficult to hold. Then, as a second option, US maintaining its overall superiority in military dynamic is important for keeping the balance in Indo-Pacific. Maintaining the ‗gap‘ and ‗asymmetrical balance‘ with China (which also indicates decreasing the possible management range and forming an 'instable balance') could be the short-term solution for stability. Also in long term, the mechanism for keeping a balance would remain same in that total imbalance and asymmetry of military power creating relatively stable balance for US and China in East Asia. The term ―asymmetric balance‖, to speak specifically, would be ‗balance under instability and asymmetric balance of military power (imbalance of military power)‘, expecting a balance of total power under the condition of military power imbalance, though crisis escalates and instability increases.

189

참고자료 2: 이수지 보고서(영문)

U.S EDGE Initiative Vs. China

Belt and Road Initiative: Future of

New Energy Alliance

이수지

연세대학교

Table of Content I. Introduction

190 II. History and Background III. Current Situation Analysis

a. EDGE Initiative Interests – US, Japan, Korea Alliance

b. Belt and Road Initiative Interests – China, Russia Alliance

c. Korea‘s Stance and Role

Ⅳ. Prospects: US Pressure, Strong US – Japan Alliance, and Korea‘s Complex Participation

V. Conclusion Introduction

The use of energy is increasing alongside rise of technology, modernization, and globalization. After the World Financial Crisis in 2008, there seemed to be increasing cooperation in energy sector, but ten years after, today, not much progress or study regarding has been made. There is no doubt that American administrations and policies have a critical impact on the East Asian region. With Trump‘s rise to POTUS, Asian states have been curious and anxious as to what kind of changes his nationalistic administration will bring. The major policies that Trump has addressed have been the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Asian EDGE Initiative. In 2017, the Trump administration began using the term Indo-Pacific as a replacement of the previous administration‘s ―pivot to Asia‖

191 to describe an expanded Asia-Pacific region, seeking to articulate U.S. strategy towards an expanded Indo-Asia-Pacific region at a time when China‘s presence across the region is growing. With an objective of ―free and open‖ region, it may also encompass the so-called Quad, an informal four-party grouping of regional democracies involving Australia, India, Japan, and the US. The strategy accepts and endorses ―ASEAN centrality.‖ Defense Secretary Mattis identified four main themes of Trump‘s Indo-Pacific Strategy: expanding attention on the maritime space by helping our partners build naval and law enforcement capabilities and capacities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime orders and interests; interoperability, to ensure that our military is able to more easily integrate with others; strengthening the rule of law, civil society, and transparent governance; and private sector-led economic development with no empty promises or surrender of economic sovereignty. It implies further US engagement amidst a new context of overt strategic competition with China. US‘ interest in the region seems obvious – economic and military. Nine of the world‘s 10 busiest seaports are in the region, and 60 percent of global maritime trade transits through Asia, with roughly one-third of global shipping passing through the South China Sea alone. America‘s annual two-way trade with the region is $2.3 trillion, with U.S. foreign direct investment of $1.3 trillion in the region – more than China‘s, Japan‘s, and South Korea‘s combined. A quarter of U.S. exports go to the Indo-Pacific, and exports to China and India have more than doubled over the past decade. This

192 is made possible by free and open trade routes through the air, sea, land, space, and cyber commons that form the current global system. This paper will delve into whether Trump‘s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Asian EDGE Initiative will be successful or not? More specifically, what is the future of the possible ―energy alliance‖ between US, Japan and China, Russia? Where and how do other East Asian states such as Korea fit in this equation? How will the different states react or respond differently in the energy field?

History and Background

The United States has long had active foreign policies with East Asian states such as Korea, Japan, and China. With Japan, it has been especially dynamic since Japan‘s active participation in World War 1,2 and Cold War. During World War 1, both the US and Japan fought on the Allied side but Japan‘s later aggressive role in dealing with China became a continual source of tension. American public opinion strongly opposed Japan‘s invasion of China in 1937. At the same time, Japan depended on US, British, and Netherland for 90% of the oil. Japanese diplomats were sent to Washington in the summer 1941 to engage in high level talks but both sides realized that no compromise was possible between Japan‘s commitment to conquer China and America‘s commitment to defend China. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, triggering the American declaration of war on Japan. Japan‘s Axis allies including Nazi Germany also declared war on the US following Pearl Harbor, officially starting World War 2. The crisis lasted until September 1, 1945 when

193 Japan surrendered in response to the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Historian Akira Iriye argues that World War II and the Occupation decisively shaped bilateral relations after 1945. He presents the oil crisis of 1941 as the confrontation of two diametrically opposed concepts of Asian Pacific order. Japan was militaristic, and sought to create and control a self-sufficient economic region in Southeast Asia. Franklin D Roosevelt and his successors were internationalists seeking an open international economic order. The war reflected the interplay of military, economic, political, and ideological factors. The postwar era led to a radical change in bilateral relations from stark hostility to close friendship and political alliance. With the rise of Soviet power in the 1980‘s and onset of Cold War, Japan reassured United States leaders of Japan's determination against the Soviet threat, closely coordinated policies with the United States toward Asian trouble spots such as the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia, and worked cooperatively with the United States in developing China policy. The Japanese government welcomed the increase of American forces in Japan and the western Pacific and positioned Japan firmly on the side of the United States against the threat of Soviet international expansion. By the late 1990s and beyond, the US-Japan relationship had been improved and strengthened. The major cause of friction in the relationship, e.g. trade disputes, became less problematic as China displaced Japan as the greatest perceived economic threat to the U.S. Meanwhile, though in the immediate post–Cold War period the security alliance suffered from a lack of a

194 defined threat, the emergence of North Korea as a belligerent rogue state and China's economic and military expansion provided a purpose to strengthen the relationship. In 2013 China and Russia held joint naval drills in what Chinese state media called an attempt to challenge the American-Japanese alliance. Previous to Trump‘s free and open Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Obama administration had cohered to a Pivot to Asia strategy, which represented a significant shift in the foreign policy of the US, taking the country‘s focus from the Middle Eastern and European sphere and began to invest heavily in East Asian countries. Also known as 'Pivot to Asia', the American military and diplomatic 'pivot,' or 'rebalance' toward Asia became a popular buzzword after Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State coined it. Clinton's article emphasizes the importance of the Asia-Pacific, noting that nearly half of the world's population resides there, making its development vital to American economic and strategic interests. She states that "open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the nuclear proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military

195 activities of the region's key players." The 'pivot' strategy, according to Clinton, will proceed along six courses of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening America's relationships with rising powers, including China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.

Current Situation Analysis

EDGE Initiative Interests – U.S, Japan, Korea Alliance

According to the World Energy Council, three primary policy areas, energy security, energy equity, and energy sustainability are evaluated to form a score which shows which countries have the most sustainable energy policies. United States is ranked at 15, Japan 31, South Korea 37, Russia 42, and China 72. This ranking shows us that the current energy power is more concentrated in the US alliance among US, Japan, and Korea rather than the challenging group, China and Russia. This may indicate a bigger incentive but also a bigger gamechanger.

Japan has been openly supportive of Trump‘s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. The two are major allies in the energy field. With China‘s rise, the alliance has become only stronger with bigger incentive for the Japanese to thwart growing Chinese power. That is why Trump is determined with this

196 policy. U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy revolves around the simultaneous enhancement of America‘s economic engagement, security cooperation, and rule-making potential, objectives that align with key partners like Japan and Australia. Donald Trump announced on 2018 that he will allocate a down payment of 113 million dollars to fund new initiatives to bolster the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure of the Indo Pacific region. The following month, Vice President Michael Pence announced efforts to coordinate with Japan on $10 billion in regional energy investment, establish a U.S.-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, and launch a five-country partnership for electrification in Papua New Guinea. The Vice President also announced the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative to help countries attract high-quality investment and counter corruption and coercive threats to their sovereignty, by strengthening civil society and good governance. Furthermore, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, a major bipartisan legislation, was signed into law by President Trump on December 31, 2018. This legislation enshrines a generational whole-of-government policy framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and includes initiatives that promote sovereignty, rule of law, democracy, economic engagement, and regional security. Although we cannot be certain of the future prospect, we are sure that the energy competition will only elevate.

Recent positive developments in natural gas could rekindle bilateral energy trade in ways few thought possible just a few years ago. The discoveries of

197 large new shale gas reserves in the lower 48 states have made the United States the world‘s fastest growing natural gas producer. The Inter- national Energy Agency noted that the planned expansion of the Panama Canal in 2014 would enable 80 percent of the world‘s liquefied natural gas (LNG) fleet to use the canal, dramatically lowering shipping costs and making LNG exports from the U.S. Gulf Coast dramatically more competitive in Asia.

The shale gas revolution in the continental United States and the abundant gas reserves in Alaska present Japan and the United States with a complementary opportunity: the United States should begin to export LNG from the lower 48 states by 2015, and Japan continues to be the world‘s largest LNG importer. Since 1969, Japan has imported relatively small amounts of LNG from Alaska, and interest is picking up in expanding that trade link, given Japan‘s need to increase and diversify its sources of LNG imports

Belt and Road Initiative Interests – China, Russia Alliance China is a growing challenger to the US global hegemony. The energy sector is one of the huge pillars which China is planning on using to realize this. China‘s main and open ally regarding energy is Russia. Sino-Russian relations have significantly deepened over the last decade. For one, arms sales have grown significantly in terms of both quantity and quality in recent years after recovering from a sizable decline in the first decade of the 21st century. They have also increased their level of military cooperation and the frequency of

198 joint exercises during this period as both countries oppose the US dominated international system and seek to challenge US influence abroad with the aim of creating a more multipolar international order. Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on China economically and has tried to address this issue by implementing new multilateral initiatives in Asia. For example, China reiterated its political support of Russia on a number of occasions, denouncing Western sanctions but stopping short of recognizing the Russian possession of Crimea. However, China did provide important technological assistance for building the so-called energy bridge between Crimea and the main Russian territory, which was necessary to stabilize Russian control over the peninsula. Another example is the bilateral intergovernmental commission, China-Russia Energy Cooperation Committee which was established in 2012 on the basis of existing bilateral energy dialogues. China‘s Belt and Road Initiative is committed to the economic integration of the Eurasian continent. For this initiative to succeed, China needs Russia‘s support. As a result, the relationship between the two countries has once again grown closer in recent years. This shows that whatever political blemish China and Russia have, it is being overcome by energy cooperation. At present, Chinese scholars emphasize the importance of energy security when discussing bilateral relations from the perspective of economic cooperation. Since 2016, Russia has replaced Saudi Arabia as China‘s largest supplier of crude oil. Sino-Russian energy cooperation is also crucial for China‘s deep integration into the global energy

199 system through infrastructure projects under BRI. Moreover, as neighboring countries, China and Russia can achieve mutual security and reliable protection to a large extent, depending on the degree of development of mutual economic relations.

Korea’s Stance and Role

Korea, being a middle state, with an overt security alliance with United States but also being close in proximity to China, is in a more complex situation. Energy is a key sector where ROK, US, and Japan interests meet.

On the one side, Korea is aligned with US and Japan. An area where all three nations have deep interests in defining the future rules of the international system is nuclear energy. As China rises among the ranks of nuclear powers, it will become crucial for allies like Japan and ROK—both important actors in the global market, to ensure proper safeguards, nonproliferation practices, and high standards of transparency in the production of nuclear energy. With the United States‘ footprint in the nuclear energy sector receding due to policy uncertainty, unfavorable economics (mainly due to low natural gas prices), and the absence of a renewed 123 agreement with ROK, it is especially timely for Tokyo and Seoul to assume a greater role in defining the standards for global nuclear energy generation. Japan‘s recommitment to safe nuclear energy and ROK‘s commitment to the highest standards of transparency and nonproliferation as a global nuclear energy supplier will be critical to ensuring the future of this regime.

200 On the other hand, Korea cannot defy ties with close regional neighbor, China. China‘s Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa through trade and infrastructure routes and covers more than 65 countries with a combined population of 4.4 billion. It serves as a blueprint for China‘s grand geoeconomic and geopolitical strategy of connecting itself to the global economy and strengthening its influence.

The Moon Jae-in administration has laid out a vision intended to be compatible with the goals and priorities of both China and the US, and with the current changing geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula. The US, in collaboration with Japan, is refining its ―Free and Open Indo-Pacific‖ strategy, which aims to advance free markets and freedom of navigation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Concurrently, the Moon administration is offering a strategic vision that aims to be independent of both the Indo-Pacific strategy and China‘s BRI, and also to overlap with converging interests. At the 2017 Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, President Moon Jae-in proposed expanding South Korea‘s cooperation with Russia on joint infrastructure, including ports, railways, natural gas pipelines, electric grids and Arctic shipping lanes. Cooperation with Russia is a central component of South Korea‘s New Northern Policy, because new infrastructure projects that include North Korean participation can alleviate tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang over denuclearization of the Peninsula. At the same time, in 2017 the Moon administration‘s announcement of its New Southern Policy outlined a

201 set of core initiatives, including energy infrastructure, to strengthen its economic ties with ASEAN countries. In this way, South Korea has chosen to be a strategic balancer between powers by diversifying its energy partnerships. Prospects

―The relations between the Russian Federation and People‘s Republic of China are on the rise,‖ President Putin said in a welcome message at a Russian- Chinese Energy Forum in Beijing. ―An important part of these relations is energy cooperation which has lately received significant development.‖ The relationship between China and Russia is ―very unlikely to deteriorate in the foreseeable future,‖ according to Alexander Gabuev, senior fellow and chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. The ―two authoritarian regimes understand each other well.‖ ―The Kremlin doesn‘t fully trust China, but it knows that the national interests of both countries coincide in many areas and that China will be a predictable and pragmatic partner for years to come. By contrast, Moscow sees U.S. leaders as unpredictable and untrustworthy.‖ The Russian Chinese Energy Forum was a significant symbol of the future prospect of energy cooperation in the future. On the other hand, Trump‘s Free and Open Indo-Pacific seems to grow sweltering and increasingly steadfast in the future as well. U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy revolves around the simultaneous enhancement of America‘s economic engagement, security cooperation, and rule-making potential, objectives that align with key partners like Japan and Australia. Donald Trump announced on

202 2018 that he will allocate a down payment of 113 million dollars to fund new initiatives to bolster the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure of the Indo Pacific region. The following month, Vice President Michael Pence announced efforts to coordinate with Japan on $10 billion in regional energy investment, establish a U.S.-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, and launch a five-country partnership for electrification in Papua New Guinea. The Vice President also announced the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative to help countries attract high-quality investment and counter corruption and coercive threats to their sovereignty, by strengthening civil society and good governance. Furthermore, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, a major bipartisan legislation, was signed into law by President Trump on December 31, 2018. This legislation enshrines a generational whole-of-government policy framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and includes initiatives that promote sovereignty, rule of law, democracy, economic engagement, and regional security. Although we cannot be certain of the future prospect, we are sure that the energy competition will only elevate.

Conclusion

With Trump‘s rise to POTUS, Asian states have been curious and anxious as to what kind of changes his nationalistic administration will bring. The major policies that Trump has addressed have been the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Asian EDGE Initiative. In 2017, the Trump administration began using the term Indo-Pacific as a replacement of the previous administration‘s ―pivot to Asia‖

203 to describe an expanded Asia-Pacific region, seeking to articulate U.S. strategy towards an expanded Indo-Asia-Pacific region at a time when China‘s presence across the region is growing. With an objective of ―free and open‖ region, it may also encompass the so-called Quad, an informal four-party grouping of regional democracies involving Australia, India, Japan, and the US. The strategy accepts and endorses ―ASEAN centrality.‖ Defense Secretary Mattis identified four main themes of Trump‘s Indo-Pacific Strategy: expanding attention on the maritime space by helping our partners build naval and law enforcement capabilities and capacities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime orders and interests; interoperability, to ensure that our military is able to more easily integrate with others; strengthening the rule of law, civil society, and transparent governance; and private sector-led economic development with no empty promises or surrender of economic sovereignty. It implies further US engagement amidst a new context of overt strategic competition with China. US‘ interest in the region seems obvious – economic and military. This paper has delved into the future of the energy alliance by evaluating the current situation and prospect of Trumps Free and Open Indo- Pacific Strategy on one hand, and the Chinese-Russian energy alliance on the other.

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