The End and Beginning of 19th Century East Asian Earthquakes

The Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall · Gong Do-young · Ewha Womans University

Introduction

On the morning of the last day of our field trip, we traveled by car for about an hour and a half from Fukuoka city to Shimonoseki. It was here, 125 years ago, that Japan's Itō Hirobumi and China's Li Hongzhang negotiated the end of the First Sino-Japanese War and finally signed the "Treaty of Shimonoseki." The Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall faced a vast, open sea. Despite being a pivotal site of history where the 19th-century East Asian order was overturned, the memorial hall was a modest structure situated in a corner of Shimonoseki. Yet, in this small space, China, the long-standing hegemon of East Asia, finally acknowledged its defeat, relinquished its suzerainty over Korea, Taiwan, and other territories, and modern Japan emerged.

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Figure 1. The sea in front of the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall

The First Sino-Japanese War triggered earthquake-like changes in the traditional balance of power in East Asia at the end of the 19th century, shattering centuries of international harmony within the Confucian world and marking the first instance of an Asian nation being recognized as a great power by Europe (Paine 2003, 3). Furthermore, the war continues to ignite territorial and political disputes in East Asia even over a century later (Greve and Levy 2018, 149). Considering the legacy of the First Sino-Japanese War and the current East Asian regional order shaped by China's rapid rise, and given that the armed conflict between China and Japan occurred on the Korean Peninsula,

119 it is essential to revisit the First Sino-Japanese War for the study of Korean international politics.

The First Sino-Japanese War originated from the conflict over the dispatch of troops by China and Japan to Korea, the land where the Donghak Peasant Revolution occurred. In 1894, the first Donghak peasant army revolted, and on April 27th, they captured Jeonju Fortress. Consequently, the Korean government decided to request troops from China on April 29th. On May 1st, Li Hongzhang, the Northern Superintendent, dispatched warships and elite troops to Korea and informed Japan of this action in accordance with the Treaty of Tientsin. However, Japan, under the pretext of protecting its consuls and merchants in the "urgent situation in Korea," dispatched its troops to Korea without notifying China. Li Hongzhang consistently advocated for the withdrawal of troops from both countries, seeking to avoid armed conflict as much as possible, but armed conflict between the two nations ultimately erupted on Korean soil. This ended in the overwhelming victory of Japan, which had adopted a modern military system.

Most previous studies explain the causes of the First Sino-Japanese War as the rise of Japan within the East Asian regional order and its economic and status-related objectives. In addition to these structural changes, given that the war was officially declared by both China and Japan on August 1, 1894, it is necessary to examine how China perceived the shifting balance of power in the region towards Japan and why it decided to go to war despite its military inferiority. Therefore, this paper will trace the debates between the war faction (主戰論) and the peace faction (主和論) within China just before the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War,

120 and how they perceived the Korean issue and international relations, through the voices of Wen Ting-shi and Li Hongzhang, respectively.

Figure 2. Sarangbang Class 13 attentively listening to the professor's lecture on the First Sino-Japanese War

The Confrontation Between Pro-War and Pro-Peace Factions Within China Before the Outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War

121 In January 1894, due to the corrupt governance of Jo Byeong-gap, the magistrate of Gobu in Jeolla Province, Donghak followers and peasants in Gobu revolted. In late March, they defeated the government troops dispatched to suppress them at Hwangto-hyeon near Gobu on April 8th, and on April 27th, they occupied Jeonju. Upon receiving news of the peasant army's occupation of Jeonju on April 27th, the Korean government officially requested a dispatch of troops from China. Yuan Shikai, the Chinese Minister Plenipotentiary and Superintendent of Trade in Korea, who received the request, asked Li Hongzhang to send troops. Li Hongzhang ordered Xie Zhichao and Xie Shicheng to lead seven elite battalions of the Beiyang Army to Korea, and also ordered the Beiyang Navy Admiral Ding Ruchang to dispatch the cruisers 'Zhiyuan' and 'Jingyuan' to Incheon to protect residents and escort transport ships (Fukimura Michio 1997, 75-81). Simultaneously, in accordance with the Treaty of Tientsin, Li Hongzhang informed the Japanese side that "having been requested by Korea, troops will be dispatched but will withdraw once the rebellion is suppressed." However, Japan, under the pretext of protecting its merchants, dispatched 300 soldiers on May 3rd, and by May 8th-9th, it had sent 14 ships and an additional 2,000 troops. Li Hongzhang demanded Japan's withdrawal, but Japan repeatedly delayed its withdrawal, demanding that both China and Japan undertake reforms in Korean internal affairs, thereby escalating tensions on Korean soil.

As Japan dispatched troops to Korea without a clear justification and, instead of withdrawing, increased its troop numbers, voices advocating for further troop deployment and war against Japan became dominant within China. To understand the pro-war and pro-peace factions, it is necessary to first examine the political structure within late 19th-century China and the Donghak movement. In the late 19th century, China was largely divided into the Westernization faction (洋務派) and the reformist faction (淸流派). The Westernizers hoped to establish friendly relations with Western powers to achieve national strength and prosperity through the introduction of Western science and technology, while the reformists viewed Western encroachment as a grave challenge to the Chinese imperial system and advocated for a hardline foreign policy to defend China against Western aggression (Ahn Cheol-soo 2011, 368-386).

122 Although Emperor Guangxu of China (光緖帝, 1871-1908) began his personal rule in 1887, Empress Dowager Cixi was involved in important state affairs, and the Grand Council (the emperor's highest advisory body), led by Prince Gong, and the Zongli Yamen (foreign affairs), led by Prince Qing, handled state and foreign affairs. In other words, actual control over military and foreign affairs was held by Li Hongzhang, who enjoyed the trust of Empress Dowager Cixi, and the Zongli Yamen also acted under Li Hongzhang's direction. The Emperor's faction, dissatisfied with this, opposed Li Hongzhang's foreign policy with the goal of establishing Emperor Guangxu's personal rule (Fukimura Michio 1997, 123). In accordance with this political confrontation between Empress Dowager Cixi and Emperor Guangxu, the Westernizers and the reformists were divided into the "Empress's Faction" (后黨), which supported Empress Dowager Cixi, and the "Emperor's Faction" (帝黨), which supported Emperor Guangxu. At this time, the leading figure of the Westernizers was Li Hongzhang, while the reformists included the Minister of Revenue Weng Tonghe (翁同龢), who was Emperor Guangxu's tutor, the Hanlin Academy Reader Wen Ting-shi (文廷式), the Vice Minister of Rites Zhang Zhi Rui (張志銳), and the scholar Zhang Jian (张謇) from Nantong (Ahn Cheol-soo 2011, 368-386). This paper will examine the debates between the pro-peace and pro-war factions based on the collected writings of Li Hongzhang, who effectively led the First Sino-Japanese War, and the writings of Wen Ting-shi, a Hanlin Academy Reader who directly confronted Li Hongzhang by submitting numerous memorials impeaching him among the reformist figures.

123 The central figures were (Ahn Cheol-soo 2011, 368-386). This paper will examine the debates between the pro-peace and pro-war factions based on the collected writings of Li Hongzhang, who effectively led the First Sino-Japanese War, and the writings of Wen Ting-shi, a Hanlin Academy Reader who directly confronted Li Hongzhang by submitting numerous memorials impeaching him among the reformist figures.

As Japan increased its troop numbers, pro-war advocates, including Wen Ting-shi, argued for actively confronting Japan. The difference in opinion between Wen Ting-shi and Li Hongzhang regarding the commencement of war just before its outbreak appears to stem from differing perceptions of the Chinese military's strength. Wen Ting-shi continuously submitted memorials criticizing Li Hongzhang and other pro-peace advocates for "advocating for reconciliation and only seeking immediate stability." He also expressed confidence in China's naval power, believing that China could still win a war against Japan.

China has been building its navy for nearly ten years, and has spent over ten million [taels of silver]. Can the Beiyang Navy truly contend with Japan? Ding Ruchang was originally a mediocre talent; during the Sino-French War, he was so afraid of the enemy that he wept tears. Entrusting him with the heavy responsibility of admiral was truly a careless choice of personnel.

China has been building its navy for nearly ten years,

and has spent over ten million [taels of silver]. Can the Beiyang Navy

truly contend with Japan? Ding Ruchang was originally

a mediocre talent; during the Sino-French War, he was so afraid of the enemy

that he wept tears. Entrusting him with the heavy responsibility of

admiral (Beiyang Fleet) was truly a careless

choice of personnel.

(Shi Quan 1997, 68)

124 中国练海军已近十年，糜费至千余万，责以一战，亦

复何辞? 然臣不能谅创始之难也。顾臣所不解者： 倭

人之练海军，亦不过二十年，何以此次出兵，北洋即

不敢与之较？ 臣闻丁汝昌本一庸才，法越之役，避敌

畏惧，至于流涕。畀以提督重任，实属轻于择人。

In response to domestic and international crises such as the Opium Wars, the Arrow Incident, and the Taiping Rebellion, China implemented the Self-Strengthening Movement (洋務運動), a modernization drive centered on military affairs in the latter half of the 19th century. Key arsenals included the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fuzhou Shipyard, and naval forces such as the Beiyang, Nanyang, Fujian, and Guangdong fleets were established. However, by the time of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, only the Beiyang Fleet, led by Li Hongzhang, possessed combat capability (Kim Ji-hoon 2012, 212).

Furthermore, examining the total naval strength deployed in the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan's Combined Fleet consisted of 27 ships, while China's Beiyang Fleet had 21 ships. However, 12 of China's naval vessels were between 1,000 and 7,000 tons, with the remaining 9 being small ships of several hundred tons. In contrast, Japan's four largest warships exceeded 4,000 tons, and below that, there was a mix of medium and large warships ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 tons. Moreover, the speed of the Beiyang Fleet's 7,000-ton behemoths was 14 knots, and its two fastest ships, capable of 18 knots, were 2,300-ton vessels, whereas Japan's 4,000-ton Yoshino could reach 23 knots. Most of Japan's warships were both large and fast. Additionally, only the Beiyang Fleet's largest ship, the 'Tingyuan,' was equipped with four 30 cm caliber main guns, with a total of only about 30 guns of 10-26 cm caliber or larger, the rest being machine guns. Japan, on the other hand, had over 200 guns of 10-26 cm caliber, including four 32 cm caliber guns (Park Young-jae 2002, 52-53).

125 Most of the warships were both large and fast. Additionally, only the Beiyang Fleet's largest ship, the 'Tingyuan,' was equipped with four 30 cm caliber main guns, with a total of only about 30 guns of 10-26 cm caliber or larger, the rest being machine guns. Japan, on the other hand, had over 200 guns of 10-26 cm caliber, including four 32 cm caliber guns (Park Young-jae 2002, 52-53).

Li Hongzhang, who was in overall command of the Beiyang Fleet, appears to have had a more accurate understanding of China's relative military inferiority. For instance, in a memorial from 1875 advocating for the installation of coastal defense facilities, Li Hongzhang's anxiety and perception of China's military strength can be discerned.

The speed of Westerners' steamships and telegraphs is so fast that it reaches a thousand li in an instant,

and their new weapons are 100 times stronger than ours... Despite the rapid changes brought about by barbarian invasions,

China still responds with outdated methods... Such responses will absolutely not be effective.

China still responds with outdated methods... Such responses will absolutely not be effective.

Such responses will absolutely not be effective.

be effective.

(Liang Qichao 2013, 162)

For these reasons, Li Hongzhang showed apprehension about a direct military conflict between China and Japan. On May 14th, Wang Xing (汪星), the Chinese envoy in Japan, argued that "since Japan appears to be preparing for a major confrontation, we should gather substantial forces and secretly thwart their schemes" (Donghak Revolution Memorial Foundation 2017, 163). However, Li Hongzhang adopted a passive stance regarding troop reinforcements, citing reasons such as the insufficient number of warships (Qi Qizhang, Vol. 2, 1989, 583). He delayed China's additional troop dispatch and ordered Yuan Shikai to negotiate secretly with Japan. He perceived China's dispatch of troops and armed conflict with Japan as a Japanese ploy and informed the Zongli Yamen that such a fight was not the best strategy.

126 gather substantial forces and secretly thwart their schemes" (Donghak Revolution Memorial Foundation 2017, 163). However, Li Hongzhang adopted a passive stance regarding troop reinforcements, citing reasons such as the insufficient number of warships (Qi Qizhang, Vol. 2, 1989, 583). He delayed China's additional troop dispatch and ordered Yuan Shikai to negotiate secretly with Japan. He perceived China's dispatch of troops and armed conflict with Japan as a Japanese ploy and informed the Zongli Yamen that such a fight was not the best strategy.

Sent to the Zongli Yamen, May 15, 1894:

The nature of the Japanese is fickle and unstable. If we

add more troops and gather them in large numbers, it will only

reveal the Japanese's cunning schemes. Suspicion leading to

inevitable conflict is not the best strategy for thwarting schemes.

schemes.

(Donghak Revolution Memorial Foundation 2017, 166)

In telegrams to Yuan Shikai and Wang Xing, Li Hongzhang indicated his intention to ultimately mobilize troops in the worst-case scenario where Japan did not withdraw, but Li Hongzhang expressed concern that such additional troop deployment would arouse Japan's suspicion and "endanger the great nation" (Donghak Revolution Memorial Foundation 2017, 167-170). He also urged Wang Xing to "negotiate earnestly" with Mutsu Munemitsu and Itō Hirobumi (Donghak Revolution Memorial Foundation 2017, 175).

127 Despite the difference in perceptions regarding military strength, Wen Ting-shi and Li Hongzhang shared a fundamental understanding of Korea's status as a tributary state. Wen Ting-shi stated that "among China's tributary states, there is no nation more important than Korea" (Wen Ting-shi 1993, 7), and that the tribute over the past twenty years had been sufficient, thus maintaining its status as a vassal. He further argued that if a rebellion occurred in Korea, it was only natural for China to dispatch troops and quell the rebellion, just as a father protects his son (Wen Ting-shi 1967, 29-31). Within the traditional order of tributary states, the relationship between Korea and China was akin to that of a father and son. Particularly, as Korea was the most central nation within China's tributary system, the collapse of its suzerainty over Korea also signified the collapse of the old order that China had established in East Asia. Furthermore, Wen Ting-shi recorded that "Korea is a nation that serves our court as a vassal, and it surrounds the three eastern provinces like a screen" (Wen Ting-shi 1967, 29-31), and that "if Japan were to take advantage of our unpreparedness and infiltrate troops to launch a surprise attack, it would result in significant losses" (Wen Ting-shi 1993, 5-6). He interpreted Korea, bordering China, falling under the influence of Japan and other powers as the collapse of China's defense line. Therefore, Wen Ting-shi argued for increasing troops and patrolling the northern and southern coasts, as Japan was occupying strategic points in Korea and targeting China's frontiers (Wen Ting-shi 1967, 29-31).

Li Hongzhang also shows a similar perception regarding suzerainty over Joseon. As the Northern Yang Governor-General, Li Hongzhang oversaw the Northern Yang Army and Navy,

and held command over diplomatic missions in 128 overseas posts. Since 1881, he had been in charge of Joseon affairs and, from 1885 onwards, interfered in Joseon's internal and foreign affairs through Yuan Shikai, who was stationed in Hanseong. Therefore, he can be considered a symbol of Qing's suzerainty over Joseon. Consequently, when Japan repeatedly delayed its troop withdrawal by the end of May, Li Hongzhang sternly stated that if Joseon, unable to withstand Japan's pressure, were to acknowledge it was not a tributary state of China, China would inevitably mobilize its troops to punish the offense (Donghak Revolution Memorial Foundation 2017, 226).

However, Japan's dispatch of troops to Joseon already aimed to weaken Qing's influence over Joseon. Although Article 1 of the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity, signed in 1876, declared Joseon a sovereign state, Qing continued to exercise its suzerainty as before. In a diplomatic communication sent to Japan in 1894 regarding Qing's dispatch of troops to Joseon, the term 'tributary state (屬邦)' was used. Japan requested its revision, but Li Hongzhang responded that it was inappropriate to disrupt the established practice of protecting tributary states and that it was not right to revise it based on Japan's acknowledgment, thus setting himself against Japan (Donghak Revolution Memorial Foundation 2017, 121).

By mid-May, Mutsu Munemitsu proposed that Japan would delay its troop withdrawal if both countries dispatched officials to manage and reform the Joseon government and its tax system, and to train the Joseon military to suppress the rebellion independently. However, Li Hongzhang argued that the Joseon rebellion had already been quelled and that Japan

129 had no further need to intervene, thus dismissing Munemitsu's demands (Donghak Revolution Memorial Foundation 2017, 164). Furthermore, on July 19, just before the outbreak of war, when tensions with Japan were at their peak, Li Hongzhang also definitively stated that equal treatment for Qing and Japan in Joseon's national affairs, such as the dispatch of troops, negotiations on concessions, and internal reforms, was impossible.

Although they had different understandings of Qing's military strength, Wen Shixun and Li Hongzhang, who shared fundamentally the same view on Joseon as a tributary state, sought diplomatic solutions and proposed different alternatives. Wen Shixun predicted that because Britain and Germany were checking Russia, if China were to show it was checking Japan and Russia, Britain and Germany would naturally assist China. He particularly argued that just as Japan had colluded with Russia, China should also ally with Britain to suppress Japan and Russia (Fujimura Michio 1997, 124). Britain and Germany were always focused on preventing Russia's southward expansion, so they expected Britain and Germany to actively support China if China deterred Japan and Russia.

On the other hand, Li Hongzhang sought negotiations with Japan through Yuan Shikai while simultaneously requesting mediation from Russia. Li Hongzhang intended to prevent Japan and other countries from intervening in Joseon, but he soon judged that Russia and Britain were checking Japan without harboring ambitions towards Joseon. According to a document Li Hongzhang sent to the Zongli Yamen on May 17, he expressed his firm belief that if Russia intervened, Japan, fearing Russia,

130 would be immediately controlled (Donghak Revolution Memorial Foundation 2017, 181).

However, despite Russia's mediation, Munemitsu remained unyielding, arguing that Japan could only withdraw its troops after the Qing government guaranteed that both countries would wait for Joseon's internal reforms to be completed, or that the Japanese government would independently carry out Joseon's internal reforms without interference from the Qing government (Mutsu Munemitsu 2013, 83-84). Furthermore, the Russian government, judging that Japan had already dispatched a large number of troops and had no particular ambitions in Joseon beyond its independence, and that Russian assistance to Qing might provoke hostile actions from Britain, lost its willingness to intervene actively (Wu Xiangxiang 1959, 194).

In June 1894, Otori demanded that the Joseon government promptly request the withdrawal of Qing troops and the abrogation of three trade agreements between China and Joseon. As Joseon consistently maintained a negative stance, on June 21, Japan dispatched troops, surrounded and occupied Gyeongbokgung Palace, and on July 25, under Japanese threat, the Daewongun declared Joseon's independence and delegated the authority to withdraw Qing troops to Japan. In the early hours of the same day, Japanese forces launched a surprise attack on the Chinese navy in Asan Bay, ultimately leading to the outbreak of war.

Ultimately, the confrontation between Qing, the former suzerain state, and Japan, which sought to weaken Qing's influence, over the irreconcilable issue of Joseon was

131 an inevitable outcome. Li Hongzhang, having recognized the might of the Japanese army early on, sought to avoid physical conflict as much as possible, but he could not abandon his claim to suzerainty over Joseon, leading to the breakdown of negotiations with Japan. On July 24, Japan sent a second notice of severance, signifying the severance of relations with Qing, and Li Hongzhang was compelled to prepare for military response (Li Hongzhang 1985, 775). Through this, Li Hongzhang was ultimately drawn into the war he had so desperately tried to avoid.

The Confrontation Between Wen Shixun and Li Hongzhang After the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War

Even after the war began on July 25, Li Hongzhang still placed his hopes on diplomatic mediation. On July 27, in his declaration of war, Li Hongzhang asserted that Japan's preemptive provocation and the tributary relationship between Qing and Joseon should be specified to prepare for diplomatic negotiations regarding Joseon's issues after the war. The Zongli Yamen, accordingly, emphasized to the various foreign legations in China that the war was provoked by Japan and that the tributary relationship between Joseon and Qing had been acknowledged by the various countries when they concluded treaties with Joseon (Li Hongzhang 1985, 817). This can be seen as stemming from Li Hongzhang's existing belief in 'international law'.

It is imperative to act in accordance with international law. It would be difficult for Japan to invade China while violating international law, so China should

respond with peace. According to the provisions of international law, the party that initiates war first is in the wrong.

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(Li Hongzhang 1965, 26)

Despite the outbreak of war, Li Hongzhang believed that if other countries recognized that Japan had initiated the attack, China could gain a diplomatic advantage in post-war negotiations. By September 9, Wen Shixun gathered 37 proponents of war and submitted a memorial, reiterating the argument for resisting Japan through an alliance with Britain and Germany.

A secret memorial on the enemy situation and the need for a surprise strategy to end the conflict, September 9, 1894:

At this time, if the Japanese gain the upper hand, it will be disadvantageous to Britain; French military strategies are also deeply feared by Germany.

Therefore, I have heard that the British are quite willing to provoke a conflict with Japan, and over 50 warships

have already gathered in the South China Sea. The Germans are also particularly favorable to us,

and all their officers and soldiers will strive for China. In my humble opinion,

it is advisable to take advantage of the current situation and send trusted high officials to discuss it, and to spend money to punish the Japanese. The British and German envoys have already subtly indicated their intentions,

and the Governor-General of Huguang, Zhang Zhidong, has secretly consulted and can handle the matter with approximately 20 million taels. If the Japanese secretly collude with France and Russia,

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how can they prohibit us from secretly allying with Britain and Germany?

(Wen Ting-shih, Wang Shuzi ed., Vol. 2, 1993, 26)

此時倭人得志，勢將不利於英； 法人與其兵謀，德國亦

所深忌。故聞英人頗有籍端與倭開釁之志，兵船五十餘

號已盡集南洋。 德人亦特厚於我， 凡將弁之效力於中國

者， 其主皆特賞寶星； 又任中國購買軍火， 籍資馭敵

。 此非偏有所厚也， 衛我即所以自衛也。 臣等愚見，

以為宜及此時， 特派親信重臣與之商議， 資其兵費，

使伐倭人。 聞英、 德使臣皆已微示其意， 湖廣督臣張

之洞亦經密與商謀， 大約不過二千萬金上下， 便可遵辦

。 倭人既暗約法、 俄， 何能禁我之密連英德？ 且與其

議和而用為賠費， 何如戰勝而出以犒師？ 得失甚明，

可無疑義。 雖他日或有恃功之意， 如回紇之需索於唐，

然兩禍相權， 其輕於受侮於倭則已多矣。

However, in the Battle of Pyongyang on September 15-16, Qing casualties were ten times higher than Japanese casualties, resulting in Qing's defeat. Notably, in the Battle of the Yellow Sea on the 17th, the Beiyang Fleet was defeated by Japan. Due to continuous defeats, on September 19, Li Hongzhang finally admitted that it was impossible for the Beiyang Navy's combat power to contend with Japan (Li Hongzhang 1985, 1008-1009). On October 10 and 12, Li Hongzhang and the Zongli Yamen requested the British Minister Macartney and the Russian Minister Cassini to mediate a peace negotiation with Japan, offering to abandon suzerainty and allow Joseon's independence (Joseph 1959, 52-54). Furthermore, in early November, as Japan advanced to the Liaodong Peninsula, and in 1895, when Japan occupied key strategic points on the Shandong Peninsula, threatening the capital Beijing, Li Hongzhang hastily entered into peace negotiations.

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Meanwhile, on December 26, Wen Shixun argued that China's strength or weakness was closely tied to the situation of various countries, and if all of China's interests were ceded to Japan through a treaty, other countries would watch and seek to divide what Japan gained, thus reiterating that reconciliation should absolutely not occur.

Wen Shixun was also opposed to the peace negotiations. In March 1895, he argued that if Taiwan were ceded, China would be dismantled from all sides and discussed plans to preserve Taiwan with the Governor of Taiwan. In particular, when the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki were delivered to Beijing on March 28, Wen Shixun drafted a memorial, submitting memorials from Jiangnan Province and Jiangxi Province, each composed of 54 and 120 individuals respectively. He advocated for relocating the capital to Xi'an and gathering forces to resist Japan again (Jeong Jae-gyeong 2000, 148). However, the peace treaty, negotiated between Li Hongzhang and Itō Hirobumi in Shimonoseki from March 19, 1895, was ultimately signed on April 17. Its main points included the confirmation of Joseon's independence, the cession of the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan Island, and the Penghu Islands to Japan, payment of reparations to Japan, and the opening of ports such as Chongqing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou to trade with Japan. Through this, Qing, which had dominated East Asia, faced a 'century of humiliation,' Japan's imperialist rise began, and Asia entered a tumultuous century.

135

Moving forward

This Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall can be considered the end of the East Asian earthquake of the 19th century, as it marks the end of China's long-standing dominance in Asia and the conclusion of the war. It can also be seen as the starting point of the East Asian earthquake of the 19th century, as the end of the war heralded a shift in power within Asia and the dawn of Japanese imperialism.

It is very easy to look back at historical events after they have concluded and their subsequent evaluations are complete, and to judge the decisions of our predecessors as right or wrong. We frequently make such judgments. However, by listening to the voices of Wen Shixun and Li Hongzhang, who represented the pro-war and pro-peace factions before and after the Sino-Japanese War, I realized that these confrontations and debates were not merely political factional struggles but the result of intense deliberation.

On the day of my visit to the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall, the weather was clear and fog-free, allowing me to see the cities and mountains far across the sea. 125 years have passed since the Treaty of Shimonoseki; what changes in the international landscape are we facing today? Pondering how we should resolve the issues that lie before us, I departed from Shimonoseki.

136

Photo 3. Li Hongzhang's calligraphy in Shimonoseki

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