Normalization of Joseon-Japan Relations After the Imjin War

Looking at East Asia's Past, Feeling Its Present, and Gazing at Its Future: The Youth of Sarangbang Embrace Kyushu

PARK Ji-won Konkuk University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: February 10, 2020

Museum of Korea-Japan Exchange · Nagoya Castle Site · PARK Ji-won · Konkuk University

Introduction

Reflecting on the sincere advice given by our professor the previous night, the 13th cohort of Sarangbang began the second day of our journey with vigor. Through a presentation in Sasebo, we confirmed the current military strength of the US and China. While we once envied Japan's military growth in the past, we visited the Tozan Shrine and the Kyushu Ceramic Museum to trace the footsteps of Yi Sam-pyeong. Perhaps due to fatigue or staying up late for the previous day's presentation, the one-and-a-half-hour drive to the Nagoya Castle Museum (Museum of Korea-Japan Exchange), our final activity for the second day, felt incredibly long. The Nagoya Castle Museum is located near the site of Nagoya Castle, which Toyotomi Hideyoshi used as a staging ground for the Imjin War. This initiative by Saga Prefecture, stemming from the recognition that the Imjin War and the Jeongyu War had severed the long-standing relations between Korea and Japan, aimed to reflect on these past conflicts and serve as a hub for promoting Korea-Japan exchange and friendship. As indicated by the professor's designation of the Nagoya Castle Museum as the 'Museum of Korea-Japan Exchange,' the overarching theme of the museum's exhibition is 'Korea-Japan Exchange,' showcasing traces of this exchange across different periods.

87 In light of the perception that the Imjin War and the Jeongyu War had severed the long-standing relations between Korea and Japan, this initiative by Saga Prefecture embodies its intention to reflect on these past conflicts and serve as a hub for promoting Korea-Japan exchange and friendship. As the professor's designation of the Nagoya Castle Museum as the 'Museum of Korea-Japan Exchange' suggests, the entire exhibition is centered around the theme of 'Korea-Japan Exchange,' displaying evidence of this exchange throughout various historical periods.

Figure 1. Exterior of the Museum of Korea-Japan Exchange

During times of strained Korea-Japan relations, such as the present, the phrase 'worst ever' often comes to mind. When I chose the 'Museum of Korea-Japan Exchange' as the subject for this report, I began to ponder when exactly Korea-Japan relations had been at their absolute worst in history. The Imjin War and the Japanese colonial period immediately came to mind. I became curious about how relations were normalized after these periods, which must have been unimaginably bleak. Therefore, while I was considering two key events—the 1607 'Reply Mission' (Hoedapgyeomswaehwan-sa), the first official diplomatic mission after the Imjin War, and the 1965 'Treaty on Basic Relations,' which marked the resumption of relations after the colonial period—I was particularly intrigued by the normalization of Joseon-Japan relations after the Imjin War, following the professor's advice that this period might have been the worst.

88 After the Imjin War, Joseon suffered thousands of casualties and tens of thousands of its people were taken captive to Japan. Even by 1607, when the first official mission was sent to Japan, the nation's defense and public sentiment remained unstable. Considering these damages, it is natural that Joseon-Japan relations were severed after the Imjin War. What then were the catalysts and processes behind the normalization of these relations, arguably at their worst, in 1607? Did the normalization of diplomatic ties lead to a positive shift in the perception of each nation towards the other? Can the experience of this historical normalization offer insights into contemporary Korea-Japan relations? With these questions in mind, I began to examine the Veritable Records of King Seonjo (Seonjo Sillok) and the Ha Haeng Chongjae.

Intense Debates in Joseon Regarding Peace with Japan

On May 12, 1606, Joseon officials engaged in fervent discussions regarding peace with Japan. The majority opinion favored peace, with the reasons largely falling into four categories (Seonjo Sillok, Vol. 40, 1989, pp. 15-37).

First, there was the issue of national defense. The turning point after which Joseon no longer felt the threat of the Imjin War was November 22, 1598, when the Japanese forces retreated following the death of Hideyoshi at the Battle of Noryang (Seonjo Sillok, Vol. 25, 1988, p. 180). However, even after the war's conclusion in 1598, Joseon continued to feel insecure about its national defense (Seonjo Sillok, Vol. 40, 1989, p. 25). With the abrupt end of the seven-year war, rumors of a renewed Japanese invasion were rampant, and the threat from the southern regions was immediate. Furthermore, 'barbarians' were active in the north, and the Training Command (Hullyeondogam), Joseon's defense system at the time, was insufficient to cope with the unstable East Asian geopolitical situation in both the south and the north (Seonjo Sillok, Vol. 41, 1989, p. 47). Therefore, many officials believed that by stabilizing national defense in the south through peace with Japan, they could concentrate their efforts on defending the northwest (Seonjo Sillok, Vol. 40, 1989, p. 32).

Additionally, the need for intelligence gathering on Japan, which had been raised since immediately after the Imjin War, supported the argument for peace with Japan to strengthen Joseon's defenses (Seonjo Sillok, Vol. 25, 1988, p. 245). Regarding internal affairs in Japan's southern regions, it appeared that Tokugawa Ieyasu, who had held opposing views during the war, had come to power after Hideyoshi, who initiated the Imjin War (Seonjo Sillok, Vol. 40, 1989, p. 28). The detailed internal situation in Japan became known later when Gyeom-seong visited Japan as part of the Reply Mission. It seems that after Ieyasu came to power, Hidenaga, who had been entrusted with the succession by Hideyoshi along with Ieyasu, did not gain power, leading Hidenaga to rebel, and Ieyasu eventually suppressed this rebellion.

When Hideyoshi died in the year Gihae (1599), Hidenaga and Ieyasu received a pledge together regarding the succession. However, when Ieyasu assumed power, Hidenaga harbored resentment towards him. On one occasion, Hidenaga demanded credit for the conquest of Joseon from Ieyasu. Ieyasu responded, 'Joseon is a land of etiquette, only valuing culture and not boasting of military might or parading troops. Without reason, they initiated a war, so even if they had won, it would not have been a military achievement. What merit is there?' Consequently, Hideyoshi's resentment and animosity grew daily.

90 In the year Gyeongja, Hidenaga secretly instructed the governor of Nungdong Province, Gyeongseung, to deliberately incite a rebellion... The army of Seo Byeong (Hidenaga's forces) was severely defeated and retreated to Bukgyeong Castle. Ieyasu pursued them to Bukgyeong Castle and made an agreement with Hidenaga: if he returned his family safely, he would not be killed. Hidenaga, adhering to the agreement, released his troops and returned to his fief... Hidenaga's fief of 11 provinces was confiscated...

When Hideyoshi died in the year Gihae (1599), Hidenaga and Ieyasu received a pledge together regarding the succession. However, when Ieyasu assumed power, Hidenaga harbored resentment towards him.

On one occasion, Hidenaga demanded credit for the conquest of Joseon from Ieyasu.

Ieyasu responded, 'Joseon is a land of etiquette, only valuing culture and not boasting of military might or parading troops.

Without reason, they initiated a war, so even if they had won, it would not have been a military achievement. What merit is there?'

Consequently, Hideyoshi's resentment and animosity grew daily.

In the year Gyeongja, Hidenaga secretly instructed the governor of Nungdong Province, Gyeongseung, to deliberately incite a rebellion...

The army of Seo Byeong (Hidenaga's forces) was severely defeated and retreated to Bukgyeong Castle.

Ieyasu pursued them to Bukgyeong Castle and made an agreement with Hidenaga: if he returned his family safely, he would not be killed.

Hidenaga, adhering to the agreement, released his troops and returned to his fief...

Hidenaga's fief of 11 provinces was confiscated...

(National Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, pp. 282-283)

Seo Byeong (the army of the ruler) was greatly defeated and retreated to Bokgyeon Castle.

Second, there was the issue of the repatriation of captives. Discussions regarding the repatriation of captives began immediately after the conclusion of the Imjin War on December 8, 1598. By 1606, it was estimated that tens of thousands of Joseon people had been taken captive to Japan during the Imjin War. Therefore, the repatriation of captives further intensified the need for peace with Japan. The following record from November 9, 1606, indicates that King Seonjo placed significant importance on the repatriation of captives.

The King stated, 'We do not know how many thousands or tens of thousands of our people are held captive in Japan. As a parent to the people, how can we overlook this? Let the envoy negotiate this matter thoroughly, or let the Ministry of Rites send a letter to the Japanese regent, or devise other measures to ensure their complete repatriation...' The King's earnest desire and commitment to ensure their complete repatriation demonstrate his parental affection for the people.

(Seonjo Sillok, Vol. 41, 1989, pp. 99-100)

Furthermore, on January 4, 1607, King Seonjo discussed the importance of the people, specifically the repatriation of captives, and changed the name of the 1607 envoy from 'Reply Envoy' to 'Reply and Repatriation Envoy.' (However, later, upon the recommendation of the Council of State, the 1607 envoy was named 'Reply and Captive Repatriation Envoy'). Concurrently, King Seonjo designated the repatriation of captives and the acquisition of firearms as the two core missions for the first official envoy after the Imjin War, to be undertaken by Gyeom-seong and his delegation.

91 The King stated, 'A monarch has the duty of a parent towards the people. It is heartbreaking that our people, who are from a land of etiquette, are captured by barbarians and are about to become subjects of a barbarian nation. Previously, I instructed the Reply Envoy to personally handle the matter of repatriation upon arrival, but this seems insufficient, and I cannot guarantee his success. ... Now, it is appropriate to send someone from above or perhaps send a letter to the Ministry of Rites to act in accordance with righteousness and ensure the repatriation of all our country's captives, thereby solidifying the friendship between the two nations. ... If the title of the envoy is to be based on the repatriation of captives, then calling them 'Reply and Captive Repatriation Envoy' is a viable option. ... If they themselves intend to rectify all the mistakes of the previous era...

92 The King stated, 'A monarch has the duty of a parent towards the people. It is heartbreaking that our people, who are from a land of etiquette, are captured by barbarians and are about to become subjects of a barbarian nation. Previously, I instructed the Reply Envoy to personally handle the matter of repatriation upon arrival, but this seems insufficient, and I cannot guarantee his success. ... Now, it is appropriate to send someone from above or perhaps send a letter to the Ministry of Rites to act in accordance with righteousness and ensure the repatriation of all our country's captives, thereby solidifying the friendship between the two nations. ... If the title of the envoy is to be based on the repatriation of captives, then calling them 'Reply and Captive Repatriation Envoy' is a viable option. ... If they themselves intend to rectify all the mistakes of the previous era...'

The King's earnest desire and commitment to ensure their complete repatriation demonstrate his parental affection for the people.

(Seonjo Sillok, Vol. 41, 1989, pp. 99-100)

The King stated, 'A monarch has the duty of a parent towards the people. It is heartbreaking that our people, who are from a land of etiquette, are captured by barbarians and are about to become subjects of a barbarian nation. Previously, I instructed the Reply Envoy to personally handle the matter of repatriation upon arrival, but this seems insufficient, and I cannot guarantee his success. ... Now, it is appropriate to send someone from above or perhaps send a letter to the Ministry of Rites to act in accordance with righteousness and ensure the repatriation of all our country's captives, thereby solidifying the friendship between the two nations. ... If the title of the envoy is to be based on the repatriation of captives, then calling them 'Reply and Captive Repatriation Envoy' is a viable option. ... If they themselves intend to rectify all the mistakes of the previous era...'

(National Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, pp. 282-283)

This is truly the heart of a parent for the people.

(Annals of King Seonjo v. 41, 1989, 99-100)

Furthermore, on January 4, 1607, Seonjo discussed the importance of the people and the following,

92 That is, he changed the name of the 1607 envoy from 'Reply Envoy' to 'Reply and Release Envoy' while discussing the importance of prisoner repatriation. (However, later, at the suggestion of the Council of State, the 1607 envoy was named 'Envoy for Reply and Release'.) At the same time, Seonjo assigned the two core missions for the first official envoy since the Imjin War to the Envoy for Reply and Release Gyeong Seom and his party: the repatriation of prisoners and the import of arquebuses.

“A monarch has the duty of a parent to the people. The people have been captured by barbarians

and are about to become subjects of the barbarian country, are they not to be pitied? Previously, I had instructed the Reply Envoy

to personally arrange matters concerning repatriation upon arrival, but this seems inadequate, and I am not certain he can achieve the repatriation.

… Now, by sending from above or perhaps

sending a letter to the Ministry of Rites, it is appropriate to test their intentions once by directly ordering, based on righteousness, the repatriation of all our country's prisoners and the strengthening of friendship between the two nations.

If the title of the envoy is based on the repatriation of captured persons,

calling it the Envoy for Reply and Release would be a strategy. …

It is fitting to once gauge their intentions by ordering, based on righteousness, the repatriation of all our country's prisoners and the strengthening of friendship between the two nations.

It is appropriate to once test their intentions by ordering, based on righteousness, the repatriation of all our country's prisoners and the strengthening of friendship between the two nations.

If the title of the envoy is based on the repatriation of captured persons,

calling it the Envoy for Reply and Release would be a strategy. …

If they themselves correct all the mistakes of the previous era

He said that if one had already corrected past mistakes, then in the previous era

all the people captured as prisoners should be repatriated, their mistakes corrected, and a new friendship established.

This is where the so-called trustworthiness lies. It seems appropriate to discuss and resolve this matter.

It would be appropriate to discuss and resolve this matter.

93 Furthermore, for weapons to defend against the enemy, there is nothing as effective as the Japanese matchlock. ... If

this time, the envoy for the reply mission were to be instructed to assess the prices of goods from Joseon,

and purchase a large quantity of matchlocks as convenient, then even if we returned with ships full of enemy weapons,

there would be no particular hindrance. This is also a beneficial matter, so please discuss it and implement it.

This is also a beneficial matter, so please discuss it and implement it.

Inform the State Council (Bieopansa) to discuss and implement it."

(Annals of King Seonjo v.41, 1989, 173)

Third is the issue concerning the national dignity (Gukche) of Joseon, specifically regarding the Japanese invaders who desecrated royal tombs during the Imjin War. From the perspective of Joseon's State Council (Bieopansa), Japan, during the Imjin War, "unjustifiably raised an army, conquered our (Joseon's) three provinces, massacred our (Joseon's) people, destroyed our (Joseon's) ancestral shrines, and desecrated our royal tombs" (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 40, 1976, p. 14). King Seonjo and the Joseon officials were particularly indignant about the desecration of the tombs by the Japanese invaders, considering it an offense for which they sought retribution for all eternity. Therefore, when Tsushima actively sought to pursue peace talks with Joseon, Joseon set two core preconditions for responding: first, to apprehend the invaders who desecrated the tombs, and second, to send them along with a letter of state (Seogye) (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 40, 1989, pp. 145-146). Later, in response to Joseon's demands, Japan sent two Japanese individuals, referring to them as "robbers who desecrated the tombs." However, Joseon, having harbored a persistent perception of the Japanese as "crafty and cunning" since before the Imjin War, initiated a debate regarding whether these individuals were the actual culprits. During this debate, the following royal decree from King Seonjo illustrates Joseon's profound indignation over the desecration of the tombs by the Japanese invaders:

94 It clearly shows how indignant Joseon was about the Japanese invaders who desecrated the tombs.

"If they were truly robbers who desecrated the tombs, the king and his subjects should have reported it to the ancestral shrine

and executed them personally. How could this not be a matter of grave concern?

There should be no doubt. ..."

(Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 41, 1989, p. 61)

"Regarding the crime of desecrating royal tombs, is there a distinction between the ringleader and followers?

... For example, if someone's parents' tombs were desecrated by others,

all thousands of robbers should be executed personally by the son.

However, if it were impossible to capture all thousands of them and only one or two were captured, would the son

go mad and run to his parents' tomb, wailing, and execute them personally to avenge his parents,

or would he stand by indifferently and sneer, saying, 'These are not the ringleaders who desecrated the tombs, but merely followers.

There is no need to be angry with them.'? If he did so

and took no action, would that not be considered unjust and unfilial?

If he took no action, would that not be considered unjust and unfilial?

This would be unrighteous and unfilial.

(Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 41, 1989, p. 113)

Subsequently, the two Japanese individuals sent by the Japanese domain of Tsushima as alleged desecrators of the tombs, Magosagu and Madahwaji, were subjected to torture but maintained that they had not desecrated Joseon's royal tombs and were entirely uninvolved in the incident (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 41, 1989, p. 115). Consequently, the debate over whether to execute Magosagu and Madahwaji intensified, and King Seonjo ultimately decreed their execution, considering their continued presence as a blow to national dignity, stating, 'There is no other recourse but to behead them' (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 41, 1989, p. 153). This passage reveals King Seonjo's profound indignation and fury towards the Japanese invaders who desecrated the tombs.

95 The issue of the letter of state (Seogye) also—although not a basis for supporting the Joseon-Japan peace talks, it was a central topic concerning national dignity in the 1606 discussions, so let us examine it. Joseon envoys reached a consensus in favor of peace talks with Japan, but they hesitated to send envoys to Japan due to Japan's failure to send a letter of state.

The State Council (Bieopansa) reported, "However, the relationship between the two countries is of utmost importance, yet within the court, not a single document has ever been sent, and only Tsushima islanders have been coming and going, relaying messages. What is the reason for this?"

The royal secretary stated, "The enemy's request for peace is all due to the actions of Tsushima in the interim, and their pretext of 'Gagong' is all falsehood. If Gagong truly wished for a swift peace,

why did he not send a single letter when Yujeong returned, but instead used lengthy rhetoric and vicious threats to intimidate?"

96 why did he not send a single letter when Yujeong returned, but instead used lengthy rhetoric and vicious threats to intimidate?"

(Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 40, 1989, pp. 14-15)

In addition, many officials emphasized the issue of the letter of state, and after the 1606 discussions, Joseon requested a letter of state from Japan through Tsushima. Thus, Joseon's conditions for responding to the peace talks with Japan became: 1) Japan's letter of state and 2) the extradition of the two Japanese individuals who desecrated Joseon's tombs. Accordingly, Japan sent a letter of state on July 4, 1606. However, one point worth noting is the content of this letter. When the envoy Gyeongseom, who visited Tsushima on August 17, 1606, to gather intelligence on Japan's situation, saw the document presented by Tsushima as a letter from Japan, he reported that "upon opening the document, it contained occasional disrespectful remarks, and there was no mention of apprehending and sending the robbers" (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 41, 1989, p. 24), indicating that Joseon did not entirely welcome this letter.

Although Tsushima presented a document it claimed was a letter from Japan, King Seonjo, even before receiving the letter of state, harbored doubts about its authenticity, stating, "Gagong's letter and the robbers who desecrated the tombs will never come. Even if they do, it will be a falsehood, and we will ultimately be deceived" (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 40, 1989, p. 143).

As mentioned earlier, Joseon's perception of the Japanese, even before the Imjin War, was one of "craftiness and cunning," and therefore, Joseon did not easily trust Japan even when sending the Reply Envoy for Repatriation (Hoedapgyeomswaehwansa) in 1607.

97 Consequently, the authenticity of the letter of state remained a crucial topic of discussion regarding the dispatch of the Reply Envoy for Repatriation (Hoedapgyeomswaehwansa) thereafter (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 41, 1989, p. 163).

Indeed, during his visit to Japan in 1607, the envoy Gyeongseom was almost certain that the document presented by Tsushima as a letter from Japan was a forgery. The document shown by Tsushima bore the seal of "King of Japan," whereas Won Su-chung, the son of the new Kanpaku, had his seal, containing four characters including his name "Won Suchungin," on the reply state letter. Furthermore, when Gyeongseom asked if there was an official seal used for Gagong, Gagong's attendant replied, "There was one before, but someone attempted to forge it, and when discovered... it was melted down, and there is none now." Upon hearing this, Gyeongseom became convinced that the letter of state from Japan presented by Tsushima was a forgery (National Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, pp. 302-305). However, regardless of the authenticity of the letter of state, the fact that one of the two conditions set by Joseon for peace talks with Japan, namely the letter of state from Japan, arrived first played a significant role in facilitating the visit of the Reply Envoy for Repatriation (Hoedapgyeomswaehwansa) in 1607. Similarly, the extradition of the two Japanese individuals who desecrated the tombs, regardless of its authenticity, prompted the visit of the Reply Envoy for Repatriation.

Fourth, Tsushima's persistent pleas for peace talks between Joseon and Japan, which had continued for seven to eight years since 1598, were also a significant reason for agreeing to peace talks. Tsushima's pleas for peace talks began around the end of the Imjin War, on June 3, 1598. Yoshira, a native of Tsushima, requested peace talks with Joseon and attempted to negotiate with the Ming Chinese general, who was stationed in Joseon at the time.

98 Although the sincerity of the peace request was doubted due to Yoshira's statement that "the Kanpaku is unaware of this matter, and I was sent because the commander wishes to make peace" (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 24, 1988, pp. 166-167), Tsushima's pleas for peace, which began in 1598, greatly contributed to the dispatch of the first official mission after the Imjin War, the Reply Envoy for Repatriation (Hoedapgyeomswaehwansa), in 1607. In particular, starting with the repatriation of 250 Joseon people from Tsushima in June 1601, the periodic repatriation of Joseon prisoners of war appears to have served as an incentive to lure Joseon into making peace with Japan (Kim Mun-ja, 2019, pp. 48-49).

In the 1606 discussions, Joseon officials expressed concern about the repercussions from Tsushima if the decision regarding Tsushima's persistent pleas for peace talks, which had been postponed for six to seven years, were further delayed. Notably, Joseon's weak national defense capabilities made them fearful of repercussions from Tsushima. This fear, combined with the fact that Tsushima had repatriated Joseon prisoners of war on several occasions, as mentioned in the second point, made the fourth reason for agreeing to peace talks—'Tsushima's persistent pleas'—a compelling argument for peace. Thus, each reason for agreeing to peace talks not only held its own significance but also influenced the others, strengthening the necessity for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Joseon and Japan.

Yoo Yeong-gyeong's opinion is as follows.

"Recently, the court's discussions have all been about 'Since Pyeongsu-gil has already died and Gagong has

taken charge, he is acting contrary to Su-gil's wishes,' and the Japanese from Tsushima are using this to demand peace talks with urgent pressure. If we were to steadfastly refuse at this point, it is difficult to guarantee that the dangerous poison will not spread. It is better to plan well in advance than to concede after being threatened. This is also a strategy for the people... Therefore, when I previously met with the senior officials of the State Council (Bieopansa), the Ministry of Rites (Yejo) proposed drafting a letter of state and dispatching someone to Japan to deliver it, thereby appeasing Tsushima's anger on one hand and investigating Japan's situation on the other, to lay the groundwork for future actions."

99 and investigating Japan's situation on the other, to lay the groundwork for future actions."

(Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 40, 1989, p. 24) Shim Hui-su's opinion is as follows.

"It has already been eight to nine years since we recovered our territory, yet looking around, no preparations for conquest have been made, and time is being wasted more than before the Sinmyo year. Our nation grows weaker day by day. Therefore, it is only natural that the Tsushima bandits, recognizing our lack of defenses, would become more audacious in their schemes. The situation has reached a point where the power to control it lies with them, not with us... Generally, since Gyeoljijeong has long wished for death due to his inability to achieve his goals, if we further delay and cause him to return in disappointment,

100 it is likely that he will become enraged and willingly go to Gagong to receive a letter of state and return.

(Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 40, 1989, pp. 25-26) Seong Yeong's opinion is as follows.

"This matter has been delayed for many years, and now that it has reached this point, it can no longer be postponed.

there is no way... However, 'Recently, Tsushima, following your country's wishes

requested a peace treaty and sent people, repeatedly petitioning two or three times a year.

and has continuously repatriated our prisoners of war before and after.

Therefore, their sincerity is commendable. However, is this solely Tsushima's

initiative, or is it acting upon your country's instructions to be so

earnest? The sea route is long, so we cannot know for sure. Thus, we dare

to dispatch an envoy to investigate.' you should say."

(Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 40, 1989, p. 30)

Subsequently, on August 17, 1606, Joseon dispatched Vice-Envoy Gye Seon, Interpreter Yi Eonseo, and Vice-Commander Park Dae-geun to Tsushima to gather intelligence on Japan. Upon their arrival, Gye Su-jeong became enraged, accusing them of delaying the process and stating that this investigation would surely anger Japan, and that 'Joseon does not trust Japan.' He also made wild accusations. Furthermore, Gye Su-jeong offered the repatriation of Joseon prisoners as an incentive for resuming Joseon-Japan relations, saying, 'If these individuals, who were repatriated to Tsushima by Japan, are not returned to Joseon, Tsushima will be doomed. Therefore, we must send a large number at once to achieve a significant outcome.' (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 41, 1989, pp. 21-28) Later, Tsushima reported the visit of these three individuals to Japan, which angered the Japanese. As Tsushima showed desperation and impatience, and Japan became enraged, Joseon, concerned about the impending difficulties, accelerated preparations to receive Tsushima's envoy.

101 After deliberation, Joseon decided to send a return envoy and repatriating mission to Japan. When Interpreter Yi Eonseo suggested, 'Since they have already permitted us to send an envoy, is there really a need to go before the Lunar New Year?' Gye Wae (Gye Su-jeong) became angry and said, 'If I hear that the trip will be postponed until after the Lunar New Year, the elders will surely seize this opportunity to condemn the island lord.' He urged Joseon to hasten the envoy's departure (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 41, 1989, p. 140). Moreover, Gye Su-jeong later played a crucial bridging role between Joseon and Japan throughout the entire process of the return and repatriating mission led by Gye Seom in 1607, which will be examined in the <Haesalok>.

Meanwhile, some officials showed hesitation regarding the resumption of Joseon-Japan relations. This was because, as mentioned earlier, only Tsushima's intentions were clear, but there was no official communication from Japan's Kampaku (or equivalent). However, these officials also argued that since they lacked accurate knowledge of Japan's intentions and internal affairs, it was appropriate to send an envoy to gather intelligence (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 40, 1989, pp. 15, 17-19).

Meanwhile, some officials showed hesitation regarding the Joseon-Japan Treaty of Amity. The reason for this, as mentioned earlier, was that only the intentions of Tsushima were clearly evident, and there was no letter from Kang I, who was presumed to be the Kampaku of Japan. However, these officials also argued that since they did not know Japan's intentions and internal situation accurately, it was appropriate to send envoys to investigate (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 40, 1989, pp. 15, 17-19).

Thus, around mid-May 1606, discussions in Joseon regarding the resumption of Joseon-Japan relations were fervent. However, the official historian recording these events criticized, 'The various high officials of the court

102 were solely focused on temporary remedies, earnestly advocating for sending an envoy under the guise of protecting the state and its people. Is this not a rather flimsy argument? The true strategy for protecting the state and its people lies in self-strengthening, and regrettably, there was not a single minister who proposed this.' The historian criticized Joseon's reality, which, while neglecting national defense—the fundamental basis for protecting Joseon and its people—was solely focused on the issue of sending an envoy (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 40, 1989, p. 36).

Photo 2. Nagoya Castle ruins, with Professor Ha Young-seon and the 13th cohort of Sarangbang in the background.

103

The First Official Mission in Ten Years: Gye Seom's <Haesalok>

After these twists and turns, Joseon finally dispatched its first official mission in ten years since the end of the Imjin War in 1598. The record of this mission is Gye Seom's <Haesalok>. On January 12, 1607, Gye Seom, the chief envoy, Yeo U-gil, the principal envoy, and Jeong Ho-gwan, the subordinate envoy, received their mission as return and repatriating envoys and took their leave from the palace (National Translation Series of Maritime Affairs, Vol. II, 1974, p. 237). As examined in the Annals of King Seonjo, the repatriation of prisoners was one of the two core missions of the return and repatriating envoy, and it resulted in the successful repatriation of 1,418 individuals (National Translation Series of Maritime Affairs, Vol. II, 1974, p. 325). Furthermore, as the 1607 return and repatriating mission served as the starting point for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Japan after the Imjin War, the letters from King Seonjo and Vice Minister of Rites Oh Eok-ryeong to the Gye Seom mission summarize Joseon's concerns during the process of resuming diplomatic relations.

King Seonjo of Joseon sends a reply to His Majesty the King of Japan. Relations between neighboring

countries have been as they are since ancient times. For 200 years,

there have been no wars, and the seas have been calm, all thanks to the virtue of the Chinese court. However, would our country have truly

abandoned your country?

The Imjin War was a calamity caused by your country raising an army without cause, resulting in extreme devastation, and even desecrating the tomb of the former king.

Therefore, the hearts of our country's officials and people were pained and our bones chilled, and by righteousness, we could not coexist under the same sky as your country. For six to seven years, although Tsushima repeatedly requested peace negotiations,

it was truly a matter of shame for our country. Now, your country has reformed its past mistakes and sent a letter of goodwill first, stating that it has 'corrected its past errors.' If this is truly the case, would it not be a blessing for the people of both countries?

It was a matter of shame for our country. For six to seven years, although Tsushima repeatedly requested peace negotiations,

104 it was truly a matter of shame for our country. For six to seven years, although Tsushima repeatedly requested peace negotiations,

(National Translation Series of Maritime Affairs, Vol. II, 1974, p. 237) Oh Eok-ryeong, Vice Minister of Rites of Joseon, respectfully conveys the message of our King to the Regent of Japan. The Imjin War was truly an unforgettable pain for our country, and also an indelible shame for your country. The principle of intercourse between neighboring countries is based on trust, so what was the reason for the unprovoked invasion? This is something that the spirits of heaven and earth would be indignant about. Now, your country has first sent a brief letter stating that it has 'corrected its past errors.' If this is truly the case, would it not be a blessing for the people of both countries? However, we consider that since you have already stated that you have 'corrected your past errors,' ... how many years have the tens of thousands of our captured people been held captive? For six to seven years, Tsushima seemed to be making efforts to repatriate them, but only a single hair from nine oxen was sent back before and after. Furthermore, have you considered this matter? A country exists because of its people, and moreover, are not our people truly subjects of the Chinese court?

105 people? Now that the two countries are seeking to establish new friendly relations,

if all the captured men and women are not returned, then your country

will have 'corrected its past errors,' but who would acknowledge it?

This is a matter that you should personally oversee and strive for.

If you promptly issue an order for their immediate repatriation, without leaving a single man or woman behind,

so that the people of both countries can live in peace and stability,

then the relations between the two countries will be strengthened for eternity.

Therefore, we urge you to strive for this.

(National Translation Series of Maritime Affairs, Vol. II, 1974, p. 238)

Now, we will organize 1) Joseon's perception of Japan, Japan's perception of Joseon, and Gye Seom's perception of Japan, as seen in the <Annals of King Seonjo> and <Haesalok>, and 2) the difference in attitudes towards China between Joseon and Japan, and 3) records concerning the repatriation of prisoners and the import of firearms.

While the <Annals of King Seonjo> offered a glimpse into Joseon's perception of Japan, Gye Seom's <Haesalok> provided insight into Japan's perception of Joseon. For instance, Gye Su-jeong states, 'Joseon people are suspicious; I have often observed that in all matters, whether trivial or important, large or small, there is much debate, and sometimes decisions already made are reversed' (National Translation Series of Maritime Affairs, Vol. II, 1974, p. 255). The <Annals of King Seonjo> also records that when Gye Seon's delegation visited Tsushima for intelligence gathering on August 17, 1606, Gye Su-jeong became enraged, accusing Joseon of not trusting Japan. This suggests that Japan's, and particularly Gye Su-jeong's, perception of Joseon was one of 'suspicion and caution' (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 41, 1989, p. 26).

106 enraged, accusing Joseon of not trusting Japan. This suggests that Japan's, and particularly Gye Su-jeong's, perception of Joseon was one of 'suspicion and caution' (Annals of King Seonjo, Vol. 41, 1989, p. 26).

Meanwhile, during his visit to Japan, Gye Seom learned of a custom where people were killed as part of a game on the Dano festival. Gye Seom recorded in <Haesalok>, 'On this day, those who kill many people, even if they are lowly individuals from the marketplace, are immediately promoted to high positions by boat, while those who fear and avoid it, even if they are the children of nobles, are ostracized by the entire nation and not accepted by the people.' He commented, 'Their custom of valuing life lightly and enjoying killing is thus' (National Translation Series of Maritime Affairs, Vol. II, 1974, pp. 298-299). Furthermore, after Japan treated the return and repatriating mission generously, they requested Joseon's assistance regarding Japan's proposed invasion of China, a topic that had not been mentioned at all before the mission's departure. Gye Seom expressed his displeasure, calling it 'deceitful words intended to cause trouble in the future, which is detestable' (National Translation Series of Maritime Affairs, Vol. II, 1974, p. 319). Thus, Joseon held the perception that 'Japanese are cunning and treacherous,' while Japan perceived Joseon as 'suspicious and cautious.'

Furthermore, Gye Seom's <Haesalok> reveals differences between Joseon and Japan in their attitudes towards China. The <Annals of King Seonjo> consistently show evidence that Joseon considered itself a vassal state of China. In contrast, as shown below, <Haesalok> suggests that Japan considered itself equal to China.

107 The current ruler wished to use the Wanli (Emperor Shenzong of Ming) era name, while Seungtae wished to use the Japanese era name. When he asked the Kampaku, the Kampaku replied, 'Our

country has not served the Great Ming (honorific title for Ming Dynasty), so we cannot use its era name. If we were to use the Japanese era name, the envoy would surely have unfavorable intentions, so it is better not to use either.'

(National Translation Series of Maritime Affairs, Vol. II, 1974, pp. 302-303) The general opinion was to include a clause about paying tribute to the Chinese court in the reply letter, and the Kampaku also intended to do so. However,

The general opinion was to include a clause about paying tribute to the Chinese court in the reply letter, and the Kampaku also intended to do so. However,

Seungtae said to the Kampaku, 'Japan has its own Emperor, and the Great Ming has its Son of Heaven. These are equal countries. It was highly inappropriate for the previous Kampakus to call themselves subjects and pay tribute. How can there be a reason for a country equal to another to lower itself and call itself a subject?' The Kampaku agreed with his words

and did not include it.

(National Translation Series of Maritime Affairs, Vol. II, 1974, p. 312)

Finally, I would like to conclude the discussion of <Haesalok> by discussing the two core missions that King Seonjo gave to the return and repatriating mission led by Gye Seom in 1607. The two core missions given to the return and repatriating envoy were the repatriation of prisoners and the import of firearms. Regarding the repatriation of prisoners in particular, King Seonjo

Even before sending the envoy for reply and prisoner exchange, its importance was emphasized, and the importance is also evident in the official letter sent to Japan by Vice Minister of Rites Oh Eok-ryeong. Therefore, the envoy Gyeongseom also conveyed a special message to the Japanese side regarding the exchange of prisoners: 'We sincerely hope that you will wholeheartedly accomplish this task and achieve amity between our two nations.' Subsequently, the Japanese Governor of the Right sent the following reply to Vice Minister of Rites Oh Eok-ryeong regarding the exchange of prisoners.

It has been 20 years since your country's men and women were captured and scattered across various provinces and domains.

Through the affection and compassion of the scholars within the country,

some have married or been married, and some have young children.

If they have no intention of returning to your country, let them do as they please, and

if they wish to return to their hometown, prepare for their swift departure.

This is the King's strict order. Our King's affection for those far away

is even deeper. Even if they are scholars raised in our court, if they earnestly desire to return, we have granted permission.

Whether in the past or present, a nation cannot be governed without humaneness.

Humaneness is essential for governing a nation, both in the past and present.

(Korean Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, 311)

Wonpung followed from Juhada and said, 'If Gyeokang is to return all the prisoners who wish to return, and if any owner detains those who wish to return, they shall be punished...

all prisoners who wish to return are to be exchanged, and if any owner detains those who wish to return, they shall be punished...

If the owner detains those who wish to return, they shall be punished...

He ordered.

109 (Korean Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, 313)

Thus, the exchange of prisoners, one of the most important missions of the envoy for reply and prisoner exchange, seemed to be proceeding smoothly. However, the envoy Gyeongseom soon realized the underlying motive behind Japan's active pursuit of the Japan-Joseon treaty and its agreement to the prisoner exchange.

Gyeongjik then said, '...Previously, Son Mun-uk said, 'If the matter of establishing peace is concluded, the matter of tribute will also be permitted in due course.' What do you think?'

If the matter of establishing peace is concluded, the matter of tribute will also be permitted in due course.

What do you think?'

(Korean Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, 312)

'You must also make every effort to show tangible proof of amity through the prisoner exchange,'

said Wonpung, 'How could I not do my utmost? Even after the envoy departs, I will continue the exchange. Furthermore, the matter of communication is solely for the purpose of presenting tribute to the Celestial Court.'

I will continue the exchange. Furthermore, the matter of communication is solely for the purpose of presenting tribute to the Celestial Court.

The purpose of presenting tribute to the Celestial Court is solely for the purpose of presenting tribute to the Celestial Court.

What concern is it of ours that Japan presents tribute to the Celestial Court? If you are determined to pay tribute, there is an old path; Japan should petition on its own. It is not for us to know.

Why should Japan's tribute to the Celestial Court concern Joseon? If Japan wishes to pay tribute, it should do so through the established route. It is not our affair.

If Japan wishes to pay tribute, it should do so through the established route. It is not our affair.

So I said,

Wonpung replied, 'Joseon is a nation as one with China. It is intended that through Joseon, we will inform them of our intention to pay tribute. The General intended to raise the matter when receiving the envoy, or perhaps to send a written message within the official correspondence, but he thought, 'I cannot trouble the King with such matters, nor can I casually speak to the envoy, so I must have Mado convey it to the Joseon official in charge.'

(Korean Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, 316-317)

Photograph 3. View from Nagoya Castle ruins

111 As can be seen from the above historical records, the primary reason Japan actively pursued the Japan-Joseon treaty was its desire to pay tribute to China again through Joseon. However, the envoy Gyeongseom's party, aware of Japan's previous attempt to pay tribute to China, which resulted in a sudden change of attitude, 'not only refusing to receive the Ming envoys but also insulting and mistreating the strategists and expelling them,' strongly opposed Japan's request for assistance in paying tribute to China. Despite the envoy Gyeongseom's clear expression of opposition, Japan later insisted through Tsushima that it would request Joseon's assistance in the process of Japan's tribute to China (Korean Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, 317-319). In summary, it can be inferred that the reason Japan actively engaged in the two conditions for the Joseon envoy's visit, namely 1) the Japanese official letter and 2) sending the perpetrators who desecrated the royal tombs, as well as the two core missions of the envoy for reply and prisoner exchange, namely prisoner exchange and the import of firearms, was its desire to pay tribute to China again, which is noteworthy.

Looking again at the prisoner exchange process of the envoy for reply and prisoner exchange, initially, Joseon prisoners were not gathered in large numbers, but as Gyeongseom extended his stay beyond the schedule for the prisoner exchange, the prisoners gradually began to gather. However, despite Gyeokang's order that owners would be punished if they detained prisoners who wished to return to their homeland, many owners detained Joseon prisoners. Even when the envoy Gyeongseom's party visited each household to facilitate more prisoner exchanges, the owners hid the prisoners, and regrettably, many prisoners could not be

112 exchanged. Furthermore, in the case of married Joseon prisoners, their husbands often prevented them from leaving (Korean Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, 316, 320-326). For these reasons, despite the envoy Gyeongseom's party achieving the feat of exchanging 1,418 prisoners, Gyeongseom lamented, 'It is unknown how many tens of thousands of prisoners are scattered throughout Japan. ... The number being exchanged now is less than a single hair plucked from nine oxen; how can I contain my sorrow?' (Korean Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, 325-326).

Meanwhile, the import of firearms, the other important mission of the envoy for reply and prisoner exchange, proceeded very smoothly, unlike the prisoner exchange, in response to Gyeokang's statement: 'If we are to fight, we will fight; why should we compete with a nation without weapons? Moreover, if a neighboring country wishes to purchase them, how can we prohibit it?' Consequently, 500 firearms were successfully imported (Korean Translation of Ha Haeng Chongjae II, 1974, 319).

Conclusion

The resumption of diplomatic relations, which had been severed for ten years after the Imjin War, can ultimately be summarized as being due to both Joseon and Japan recognizing its necessity. Joseon decided to resume diplomatic relations with Japan due to the need for 1) national defense, 2) prisoner exchange, and 3) restoration of national dignity. After the Imjin War, national defense in the northern regions was unstable, and Joseon could not improve its national defense system.

113 Therefore, Joseon wished to stabilize national defense in the southern regions by resuming diplomatic relations with Japan. Furthermore, as a king or minister of a nation, it was considered a duty to exchange prisoners of their own people who had been taken captive by a neighboring country. Accordingly, 1) the import of firearms for national defense and 2) the exchange of prisoners were assigned as two core tasks to the envoy Gyeongseom's party in 1607. Additionally, as a condition for resuming diplomatic relations, Joseon was able to partially restore its national dignity, which had been tarnished by the Imjin War, by receiving two perpetrators who desecrated the royal tombs and an official letter from Japan. In Japan's case, it actively pursued the Japan-Joseon treaty because it felt the necessity of Joseon's assistance in the process of paying tribute to China. Accordingly, Japan sent 1) an official letter and 2) the perpetrators who desecrated the royal tombs, the two preconditions set by Joseon for the envoy's visit. - Although the official letter is presumed to be a forgery according to Gyeongseom, and the perpetrators who desecrated the royal tombs are also likely to be false according to their confessions - the fact that Japan superficially complied with Joseon's demands made Joseon more proactive in pursuing the Japan-Joseon treaty.

Meanwhile, Joseon's perception of Japan was 'cunning and deceitful,' and Japan's perception of Joseon is presumed to be 'suspicious and cautious.' Moreover, even though bilateral relations resumed ten years after the Imjin War, perceptions of each other do not seem to have changed positively. Rather, it seems that the negative perceptions of each other have continuously delayed the resumption of diplomatic relations. However, ultimately, because the perceived necessity of the Japan-Joseon treaty by each country surpassed the negative perceptions of each other, the visit of the envoy for reply and prisoner exchange to Japan in 1607 was possible.

114 It is thought that this is a point worth considering when Japan-Korea relations are as turbulent as they are today. With these thoughts in mind, we left the Nagoya Castle site.

Photograph 4. Descending from Nagoya Castle ruins with my dear Sarangbang family members. References 1. Primary Sources

Minjok Munhwa Chujinhoe. (1598-1607) "Annals of King Seonjo of Joseon." v.24-26, 30-

31, 41-42. (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Chujinhoe.)

Gyeongseom. (1974). "Haesaro." Gojeon Gukyeok Chongseo Ha Haeng Chongjae II. (Seoul:

Minjok Munhwa Chujinhoe.)

2. Monographs a. Korean

Kim Mun-ja. (2019). "Joseon-Japan Relations and the Dispatch of Envoys after the Imjin War." (Busan: Busan Metropolitan City History Compilation Committee.)

Han Myeong-gi. 2010. "The Imjin War in East Asian International Relations: The Imjin War and the Transformation of the East Asian World." (Seoul: Gyeongin Munhwasa.)

b. Translations

Fuma Susumu. (2008). "Yeonhyengsa and Tongshinsa." (Seoul: Seoshinwon.) 3. Other Materials

B. Translations

Lee Yong-hee. 1970. "The Spiritual Problem of Korea-Japan Relations - On the Conflict of Border Culture Consciousness." <Shin Dong-A>. August issue

116 117

Regarding the 'New Dong-a', August issue

116 117

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

← Back · ← Home · ← Back to list