Capturing Episodes of 21st Century Hegemonic Competition

Sasebo JMSDF Museum · Lee Kwang-min · Sogang University

Introduction - Drawing the End from the Beginning

On the second day of the Sarangbang 13th cohort's trip, the first place we visited was the Sasebo JMSDF base. Leaving behind the healing hot springs and pleasant breakfast at the Huis Ten Bosch Hotel, we headed towards the naval base in a light drizzle. Before long, following our visits to Dejima, symbolizing Dutch hegemony, and Glover Garden, symbolizing British hegemony, we arrived at the Sasebo Naval Base, which embodies the history, present, and future of American hegemony. Perhaps due to the high sky, or perhaps due to the faint rays of light filtering through the clouds, our first impression of Sasebo, filled with docked warships, was one of 'grandeur.' Although we could not enter the base itself, through the Sasebo Museum, we gained sufficient insight into the significance of the place we visited and could contemplate the future of the 21st century.

71 the meaning of the place we visited, and contemplate the future of the 21st century.

Photo 1. The splendid Huis Ten Bosch accommodation

Along with the Yokosuka Naval Base, the Sasebo Naval Base has been used as a space where the U.S. Navy shares facilities with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force on mainland Japan. In the 1980s, U.S. Seventh Fleet vessels were stationed there,

72 primarily serving auxiliary functions such as logistics, supply, and refueling. Currently, U.S. Navy units primarily consist of amphibious and mine countermeasures forces, indicating their roles in 'Anti-Submarine Warfare' and 'Amphibious Operations.' It is known that approximately eight amphibious and mine warfare vessels are stationed there, including the USS Green Bay, which was deployed in 2015.

The Sasebo Naval Base is one of the locations where a portion of the U.S. naval power deployed in Asia is stationed, and it can be seen as encapsulating the military competition aspect of the hegemonic rivalry between the U.S. and China. It is adjacent to the East China Sea and located within China's 'First and Second Island Chains,' making it a point of penetration for the U.S. against China's 'Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)' strategy, while simultaneously being a target of containment for China. Therefore, considering the military competition, the ultimate episode in the confrontation between these two great powers, the naval power dynamics in East Asia cannot be overlooked. To understand this, it is necessary to examine the past and present of both countries' naval forces and project a certain vision for the future.

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Photo 2. 7th floor of the Sasebo JMSDF Museum. Cloudy weather

What Was Their Past?

China's rise to bipolarity shares many similarities with the Soviet Union, but also many differences. Unlike the Soviet Union, which prioritized guns, China prioritized butter and, under state regulation, selectively embraced the market, leading to rapid growth. Currently, it has rivaled the U.S.

74 in economic power. However, it conceded an advantage to the U.S. due to relatively low investment in national defense, a fact keenly felt during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis (Ross 2000). Not only was the U.S. Navy allowed free passage through the Taiwan Strait, but China had no means to counter it.

Since then, China has chosen a path of pursuing both guns and butter. In particular, to counter U.S. access to the East Asian region, it has continuously increased its defense budget to acquire the necessary military capabilities for its 'Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy,' allocating the largest portion to naval power. China's 'Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy' aims to increase the cost of warfare for the U.S. by leveraging its geographical advantages and deterrence capabilities, along with relatively indirect defense strategies, to counter the U.S.'s technological and numerical superiority, thus effectively targeting the U.S.'s preference for all-out combat (RAND, 2007).

Today's 21st Century: Peeking at the Short-Term Landscape

Therefore, it is important to examine the current military dynamics between the U.S. and China.

75 In short, the situation has changed significantly from the past, and the gap in overall scale has narrowed considerably. This means that the U.S. Navy can no longer freely enter China's A2/AD systems. This is because China is continuously augmenting its strategic weapons, including aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and destroyers, and is striving to elevate its technological capabilities to 'match' those of the U.S., while also moving towards a more robust Command and Control and Communication system for flexible and effective response (DIA, 2019). However, the game will not end with China taking a decisive lead. The military dynamics in East Asia in the 21st century do not end here; they extend to the U.S. seeking countermeasures.

In response to A2/AD, the U.S. Department of Defense proposed the 'Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)' in 2012, along with the 'Air-Sea Battle' approach utilizing joint Army, Navy, and Air Force operations (DOD, 2012). This can be seen as presenting a sophisticated yet powerful direct approach against China's relatively indirect defense strategy. Although China possesses more warships in total, the U.S. currently holds a commanding advantage in terms of major vessels and technological capabilities. Therefore, even with the narrowed gap, the U.S. Navy is merely facing 'obstacles' set by China, and it is not impossible to remove or overcome them through strong power and sophistication.

76 Concurrently with the joint access strategy, the U.S. Navy is investing in building a ghost fleet using unmanned technology (RAND, 2019). Currently, the U.S. Navy can perform '3D (Dull-Dirty-Dangerous)' operations such as mine clearance and anti-submarine warfare, which are particularly noteworthy in China's indirect strategy. In the near future, super-large unmanned surface vessels and large unmanned submarines are also anticipated. Approximately 190 unmanned surface vessels and submarines are expected by 2024, and there are arguments for employing a 'Swarming' strategy to penetrate the 'Dragon's Lair' using a large number of unmanned vessels, which are relatively safe and inexpensive as they do not carry personnel (Gorrell, Macphail, Rice, 2016). Unlike JOAC, which aims for relatively direct penetration through sophisticated coordination led by major vessels, this can be seen as an indirect response to China's indirect strategy.

Ultimately, the race between the U.S. and China has returned to the starting point. Both sides will continue to invest in naval power: the U.S. to maintain its advantage, and China to narrow the gap. The U.S. will seek more effective penetration methods, and China will devise countermeasures against the ghost fleet it will soon face. In other words, the repetition of such 'action' and 'counter-action' will continue in East Asia today, and at this point, both sides will choose options that escalate crises.

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Photo 3. 3rd floor of the Sasebo JMSDF Museum. World Nuclear Weapon Map

Today's Bipolarity: Is It Stable?

Can the bipolarity we face today in the 21st century be called a 'stable bipolarity' as Waltz argued? In East Asia, China seeks to secure its own space to exert its influence amidst countries adjacent to China, including Taiwan, especially those that are U.S. allies and also seek to contain China's influence, while the U.S. seeks to protect the countries within that space. Therefore, China needs defense capabilities for offensive political objectives, emphasizing this in its defense white papers, whereas the U.S. needs penetration into the space established by China for its defensive political objective, namely maintaining the status quo, thus requiring offensive defense capabilities. These conflicting and irreconcilable political objectives have led to different forms of military balance, and by choosing the 'Crisis Escalation' option in military episodes to achieve their respective goals, they are progressively narrowing the scope for 'Crisis Management.' In other words, irreconcilable political objectives act as an obstacle to crisis management and situational stability.

78 Furthermore, while technological advancements may have simultaneously improved effectiveness and efficiency in the military domain, they have also made states' actions more aggressive and led them to perceive each other as such. Increased technological capabilities, through precision and transparency, have rendered a perfect preemptive strike impossible, while these same capabilities have created integrated systems and networks that are effective but vulnerable to attack. In essence, they have provided targets for a perfect preemptive strike. Both the U.S. and China perceive the other's C4ISR as the primary target for a first strike, planning attacks to blind the adversary. Consequently, in addition to conflicting political objectives, external factors such as technological advancement have further narrowed the possibilities for 'crisis management' between the two states, and if either state 'falls,' the escalation of crisis is expected to occur at an uncontrollable speed.

79 In conclusion, regarding the short-term military dynamics in the 21st century, it appears difficult to find a stable bipolarity as described by Waltz in today's world. As long as the possibility of falling within a narrowing scope of crisis management exists, the U.S.-China bipolarity will be closer to 'instability' in the short term.

In conclusion, regarding the short-term military dynamics in the 21st century, it appears difficult to find a stable bipolarity as described by Waltz in today's world. As long as the possibility of falling within a narrowing scope of crisis management exists, the U.S.-China bipolarity will be closer to 'instability' in the short term.

In conclusion, regarding the short-term military dynamics in the 21st century, it appears difficult to find a stable bipolarity as described by Waltz in today's world. As long as the possibility of falling within a narrowing scope of crisis management exists, the U.S.-China bipolarity will be closer to 'instability' in the short term.

Tomorrow's 21st Century: Peeking at the Long-Term Landscape

Can the bipolarity of the 21st century be definitively characterized as a 'crisis'? Just as short-term and long-term equilibrium have different meanings in economics, concluding the instability of U.S.-China bipolarity based solely on the current 21st century would be problematic. Therefore, we will attempt to predict what tomorrow's 21st century will look like.

Consider the process of analyzing a regression line using past data: amidst numerous fluctuations, the regression line is represented by a 'smooth' line passing through these variations.

80 Similarly, the 21st century we are observing from above is the situation we face now and in the very near future. Furthermore, the 21st century we are observing today is merely a part of those numerous fluctuations, and while it allows us to predict the immediate future, it does not provide a view of the overall situation. For example, just as we learn today that the U.S.-Soviet bipolarity was relatively stable in the past, it would have been difficult to perceive it as such at the time.

Therefore, following this context, if we predict tomorrow's 21st century, i.e., the long-term U.S.-China relationship, based on the short-term U.S.-China military dynamics, we anticipate a 'balance accompanied by crisis.' Unlike the Cold War, we are observing a military confrontation between 'poles with military power imbalances.' Even without common goals to freeze different political objectives and situations, we can anticipate a state of balance with power imbalances, i.e., an 'unstable balance' or an 'asymmetric balance.' Breaking down the term 'Asymmetric Balance,' it can be understood as 'Balance of Power under Asymmetric Balance of Military Power.' Accordingly, the term 'Asymmetric Balance' is used instead of 'Asymmetric Stability' because, in the absence of maintaining a military power gap and under continuous technological advancement, one cannot carelessly use the word 'stability.' Rather, in terms of military dynamics, it is closer to 'instability.'

81 Therefore, even if the military dynamics are deemed unstable, if the U.S. maintains its military superiority at a point far in the future, such as the end of the 21st century, we can anticipate that a balance of power will be maintained amidst instability. This can be specifically expressed as 'Balance under Instability and Asymmetric Balance of Military Power.'

However, this limited state of balance will require certain conditions. Explaining this in conjunction with U.S.-China military dynamics, artificial crisis management will be essential. If this fails, it will be important for the U.S. to maintain its military superiority over China, which has aggressive political objectives. Although the accumulation of 'action' and 'counter-action,' and the preference of both sides for preemptive strikes to blind each other, especially if the U.S. considers a 'Preemptive Counterforce Attack' on mainland China (RAND, 2019), will reduce the scope for crisis management, if the U.S., with its defensive political objectives, holds military superiority, it can remain in a state of unstable balance. However, it must be considered that, unlike in the past, the probability of 'falling down' in the 21st-century military confrontation is high, and it will increase further with continuous 'action-to-counteraction.' If they fall, the escalation of crisis will occur at an immense speed.

This limited equilibrium state would require certain conditions. Explaining this in conjunction with US-China military dynamics, artificial crisis management would be a prerequisite. However, in case of failure, it would be important for the United States to maintain its military superiority over China, which has aggressive political objectives. Although the period for crisis management would shorten as 'action' and 'counter-action' accumulate, and especially if both sides prefer preemptive strikes that blind each other, particularly if the US is considering a 'Preemptive Counterforce Attack' on mainland China (RAND, 2019), a state of unstable equilibrium could persist if the US, with defensive political objectives, holds the military advantage. However, what must be considered is that, unlike in the past, military confrontations in the 21st century have a high 'Chance to Fall Down,' which will increase further if 'action-to-counteraction' continues, and the expansion of crisis upon falling would occur at tremendous speed.

82 Furthermore, unlike in the past, communication is not absent.

Consequently, the present and future of the 21st century, as examined thus far, may not be as detailed or precise as the entirety of the 21st-century military hegemonic competition viewed from its end, but it can be stated that the imbalance of military power, which continuously entails risks and involves disparities in military strength, paradoxically forms a balance that maintains the overall phenomenon.

Conclusion - Opening a Door to a Door

As we passed through the process of the Maritime Self-Defense Force reaching its current form throughout the 19th and 20th centuries and left the museum, the rain had stopped and the clouds had cleared. The unknown sense of refreshment that came from having sketched out a general outline of today's and tomorrow's 21st century was welcome. It felt as if we had passed through the door to today, tomorrow, and the distant future.

Although many questions seemed to be answered, as we opened the third door and stepped out, we could not avoid facing even greater challenges. What are the implications of this continuous arms race and expansion for the 21st century, and what significance does the global expansion of naval power between the two countries hold? Furthermore, what will be China's 'counter-counteraction' in response to the U.S.'s 'counteraction,' how will multi-domain operations, including space, be conducted, and what role will the navy play within them? Leaving behind such endless questions, and yet, in a sense, completing a task, we closed the door of the museum.

83 global expansion of naval power between the two countries hold? Furthermore, what will be China's 'counter-counteraction' in response to the U.S.'s 'counteraction,' how will multi-domain operations, including space, be conducted, and what role will the navy play within them? Leaving behind such endless questions, and yet, in a sense, completing a task, we closed the door of the museum.

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Photo 4. Sasebo

JMSDF Museum Doorway to Exit

85 References 1. Periodicals

Defense Intelligence Agency. 2019. ―China Military Power.‖ Department of Defense. 2012. ―Joint Operational Access Concept

(JOAC) 1.0.‖

RAND. 2007. ―Entering the Dragon‘s Lair.‖

. 2019. ―Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress.‖

. 2019. ―Mainland Strikes and US Military Strategy Towards China.‖

Richard Gorrell, Alexander MacPhail, Joseph Rice. 2016. “Countering

A2/AD with Swarming.” Air Command and Staff College Air

University.

Robert S. Ross. 2000. “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation.”

International Security. Vol. 25. No. 2. 87-123.

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