Mao Zedong's 1960s and Sino-US Détente

Mao Zedong Memorial Hall · Kang Ae-ri · Sungkyunkwan University

Introduction

“Seven parts merit, three parts fault”

This is how Deng Xiaoping, one of the biggest victims of the madness unleashed by Mao Zedong under the name of the Cultural Revolution (hereinafter referred to as the CR), described Mao. It is also the official assessment of the Chinese Communist Party regarding Mao. It implies that although Mao made mistakes (three parts fault) for a certain period, he remains a major founder (seven parts merit) of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China.

On the second day of the 12th Sarangbang program, we headed to the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall (hereinafter referred to as the Memorial Hall). Knowing that it would be crowded from the morning, we followed the bus driver's advice to go early, before the ticket office opened. After passing through security checks and entering Tiananmen Square, we saw many people. Even before we got close to the Memorial Hall, we could feel the emotions of the Chinese people.

Their orderly movement towards the Memorial Hall conveyed a strong sense of reverence. For them, Chairman Mao would forever be remembered as the founder of the Party and the nation. This was a scene that was difficult for us, who have trauma from military dictatorships, to comprehend.

At the same time, a sense of déjà vu struck me. I was reminded of my recent visit to Mao Zedong's former residence in Shaoshan, Hunan Province. I recalled the scene of Chinese people offering flowers and bowing three times before a 10.1-meter statue of Mao, the experience of being involuntarily rushed through Mao's former residence amidst a noisy crowd on a pilgrimage, and observing the Mao Zedong badges worn by everyone on their clothing. Even then, despite being physically present, it felt alien. As I stood in line to enter the Mao Memorial Hall, I felt as if I were back in Shaoshan.

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The point where the photo was taken is at the front of the line, with a long queue stretching behind.

Mao still exists for China. His body, injected with formaldehyde and lying in the heart of Beijing, contrary to his dying wish to be buried in his hometown, is on one hand regrettable, but on the other hand, it made me realize once again that Mao serves as a crucial key to understanding China.

Let us set aside the discussion of the place and return to the topic we wish to share in this field report. Let us go back to 1972, a time of transition in the Cold War.

In 1972, the Cold War era underwent a turning point. Furthermore, the subsequent series of international political changes were so significant that they can be retrospectively evaluated as a process of constructing a new world order that replaced the existing Cold War.

32 This was because, when looking solely at China among the various actors at the time, this Sino-US détente and the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States became a crucial foundation for the subsequent reform and opening-up in China in 1978, China's rise in the 2000s, and ultimately for the reshaping of the international order up to the present day.

This field report focuses on the changes in China's perception of the Soviet Union in the 1960s as a background to the Sino-US détente. In particular, the perception in the 1960s can be understood as Mao's perception. Specifically, until the early 1960s, Mao Zedong was thoroughly armed with socialist ideology in his foreign relations. He advocated for world communist revolution and proletarian internationalism for this purpose, and formulated China's foreign policy. At the time, the threat to China was perceived as the United States, thus maintaining a pro-Soviet policy. Although China had begun to express discomfort with the Soviet Union since the late 1950s under Khrushchev's leadership, this discomfort ultimately expanded due to a series of events in the 1960s. From the late 1960s onwards, China, under the banner of world revolution and anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism, designated both the United States and the Soviet Union as hegemonic powers and chose an independent path for each nation.

However, the 1960s were, in a way, a decade even more defined by Mao and the Cultural Revolution than the present. The current Chinese Communist Party defines the Cultural Revolution as Mao's mistake, a 'decade of turmoil,' and explains that the situation in the 1960s led China to extreme leftism and isolation from the world, and that it only began to communicate with the world during the reform and opening-up period. The 'leftism' mentioned here stems from Mao's belief during the Cultural Revolution that the socialist regime, achieved through the sacrifices of Chinese martyrs, would collapse due to capitalism.

While the Cultural Revolution is often characterized as internal 'turmoil,' considering the context of the era, it seems more accurate to evaluate it as an internal 'rebellion' stemming from ideological and political divisions within the socialist camp. "If you don't understand the Cultural Revolution (hereinafter referred to as 'CR'), you can never understand China, and if you don't understand the CR, you can never understand the Chinese people. And in fact, if you haven't personally experienced it, there is fundamentally no way to understand the CR. This is a treasure gained by our people, who have endured immense hardships and paid a heavy price."

"If you don't understand the Cultural Revolution (hereinafter referred to as 'CR'), you can never

understand China, and if you don't understand the CR, you can never

understand the Chinese people. And in fact, if you haven't personally experienced it, there is fundamentally

no way to understand the CR. This is a treasure gained by our people, who have endured immense hardships and paid a heavy price."

paid a heavy price."

(Statement by Wang Jianyi, Editor-in-Chief of 'Jiaodian' Magazine)

Therefore, it is difficult to discuss China, especially the 1960s, without considering Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. While the present is built upon the past, from the Cultural Revolution to Sino-US détente, the CR undeniably served as a turning point, having a comprehensive impact on the Chinese socialist system established after the founding of New China in 1949 and leading to the proposal of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

At this point, the question arises as to how the Cultural Revolution should be evaluated. Research on modern Chinese history is generally divided into three main areas: 1) the background of the Cultural Revolution,

34 2) the process of the Cultural Revolution, and 3) the results of the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent process leading to reform and opening-up. When analyzing the background of the Cultural Revolution, three approaches are taken: 1) the interaction between ideologically left-leaning theories and reality, 2) the interaction between individual arbitrariness and personality cult in the political sphere, and 3) the interaction between international anti-revisionism and domestic anti-revisionism. This field report aims to understand the changes in perception during the 1960s from a perspective close to the first and third of these causes. That is, in the context of the time, with revisionism emerging outside China and the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union failing to properly lead the international communist movement, China feared that such revisionism could also emerge domestically, leading to the expansion of left-leaning theories and practices. Within this ideological background, the anti-Soviet perception grew due to somewhat competitive interactions with the Soviet Union.

'China and the Soviet Union are unequal.'

Mao fundamentally perceived China and the Soviet Union as unequal. Although he directly criticized the Soviet Union in the 1960s, the origins of this perception can be traced back to the 1950s.

35 On February 14, 1950, China and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (中蘇友好同盟互助條約, Zhōng-Sū Yǒuhǎo Tóngméng Hùzhù Tiáoyuè, hereinafter referred to as the Sino-Soviet Treaty) in Moscow. This treaty was a new agreement with the Chinese Communist Party, following the alliance between the Soviet Union and the Kuomintang in 1945, after the Chinese Communist Party's victory in the civil war. From Mao's perspective, this was an act of following Stalin, but it is understood to have been greatly influenced by Stalin's diplomatic perceptions at the time. Stalin's top priority at the time was his own security, specifically by creating buffer zones around the Soviet Union, meaning areas not aligned with the United States. From Mao's perspective, the newly established People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, needed to secure reliable allies, which aligned with Stalin's need for a buffer zone. Although there were ideological similarities between the two countries, considering the previous alliance between the Soviet Union and the Kuomintang, it can be seen that the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, rather than emphasizing ideology/thought, was a complex entanglement of the interests of both nations.

These mutual interests can be confirmed in the meeting records from Mao Zedong's visit to Moscow on December 16, 1949, and subsequent meetings held until the end of January 1950. Consequently, the resulting treaty contained provisions that were relatively favorable to the Soviet Union. This was because China was a relatively weaker nation compared to the Soviet Union at the time. Although named the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (友好同盟互助條約), in reality,

36 China received only about $300 million in military aid over five years. In contrast, Stalin secured influence in the buffer zones he desired, such as the Chinese Changchun Railway, Lushun, and Dalian, and obtained agreements for loan approvals to China, thereby securing privileges in Chinese territory.

Mao was not pleased with these terms. It can be inferred from records that Mao did not raise his hand during the affirmative vote at the meeting of the Central People's Government Committee of China in April 1950 to ratify this treaty, indicating his dissatisfaction with the unequal terms. Later, in 1960, before the Sino-Soviet conflict intensified, China indirectly but more formally revealed its dissatisfaction with the unequal relationship with the Soviet Union by urging adherence to the Moscow Declaration. This was because it was premised that the Soviet Union was not adhering to the 'Moscow Declaration,' which stipulated that relations between socialist countries should be based on principles of fraternity, equality, comradeliness, and internationalism. Subsequently, on June 14, 1963, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in its 'Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement' (關于國際主義共産黨運動 總路線的建議), presented the necessity of equal relations between the two countries to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, indicating its dissatisfaction with the unequal relationship up to that point.

The turning point in this fundamental perception was the death of Stalin. On March 5, 1953, Stalin suddenly

37 died. According to Mao's personal records, while he respected Stalin, he also felt humiliated by willingly following Moscow's directives based on China's strategic calculations and needs. In particular, his resentment grew into antipathy through the Korean War, as mentioned earlier, and by the 1960s, he increasingly desired that China and the Soviet Union be treated as equals. Although he was reluctant to participate in the Korean War, his status within the socialist camp significantly increased after the war. After Stalin's death, Mao seized this momentum and believed he had an opportunity to claim leadership within the world socialist camp.

While Stalin's death was seen by Mao as an opportunity to expand his influence in the socialist camp, it also led to changes in subsequent Sino-Soviet relations. At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev delivered a secret speech denouncing Stalin, the party's leader. Mao viewed the denigration of Stalin and de-Stalinization not only as causing confusion within the socialist camp regarding the international communist movement but also as a challenge to his own authority. This was because Mao's opponents used it as a means to attack and check him. The principle of collective leadership was increasingly emphasized, and personality cult was condemned. In response, Mao also contributed to measures emphasizing collective leadership, aligning with Khrushchev's speech.

38 Records indicate that Mao felt insulted and was privately furious, suggesting that he reluctantly supported collective leadership at the time. The situation was indeed becoming unfavorable for Mao. Domestically, Mao's popularity was declining due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune movement, which he had ambitiously pursued from 1958 to 1961.

Mao's Perception of Anti-Revisionism

Following Khrushchev's rise to power and his secret speech, Mao gradually began to lay the ideological groundwork for anti-Soviet sentiment and China's own path, and the Cultural Revolution largely reflected this.

Mao explains the concepts of 'commonality' and 'individuality' in his theory of contradiction as follows:

"The relationship between the universality of contradiction and the particularity of contradiction is the relationship between the commonality (共性, common characteristics) of contradiction and the individuality (個性, individual characteristics) of contradiction. Commonality exists in all processes

of contradiction, and it runs through the beginning and end of all processes. Contradiction is precisely

motion, things, processes, and ideas. To negate the contradictions of things is to negate everything.

This is a common principle, and there are no exceptions, whether in the East or West, ancient or modern. Therefore, commonality is absolute. However, this commonality

is contained within all individualities, and without individuality, there is no commonality."

is contained within all individualities, and without individuality, there is no commonality."

39 is contained within all individualities, and without individuality, there is no commonality."

Here, the commonality of contradiction refers to Marx's dialectical materialism, and the individuality of contradiction refers to the specific circumstances in which China found itself. Specifically, the series of revolutions undertaken by China, including the Cultural Revolution, can be interpreted as finding and implementing methods to overcome the contradictions China faced. The fact that China and the Soviet Union, despite being socialist countries, could take different paths can be explained by the individuality of contradiction. The search for new paths and methods for socialist construction by the socialist camp and the Soviet Union itself after Stalin's death can also be seen as the individuality of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, the Sino-Soviet disputes at the time reveal that the fundamental issue that China and the Soviet Union had to resolve was 'What is socialism and how should socialism be constructed?' Combined with the aforementioned perception of inequality between China and the Soviet Union, and the confrontation between Khrushchev and Mao within the socialist camp after Stalin's death, both China and the Soviet Union aspired to different individualities under the same commonality. At that time, the Soviet Union leaned towards the right in handling domestic and foreign affairs, while China leaned towards the left and repeatedly criticized the changes within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The nine commentaries published in People's Daily and Red Flag magazine from September 6, 1963, to July 14, 1964, directly stated that Khrushchev had divided the international communist movement by leading the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union could no longer be considered a socialist country in the true sense. The content can be understood even from the titles of the nine commentaries.

40 The content can be understood even from the titles of the nine commentaries.

Nine Commentaries

1. The origin and development of the divergence between the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and ours (苏共领导

On the Origin and Development of Our Differences)

2. On the Stalin Issue (Regarding the Stalin Issue)

3. Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country? (Is Yugoslavia a Socialist

Country?)

4. Apologists for Neo-colonialism (Defenders of Neo-colonialism)

5. Two Lines on the Issue of War and Peace (Two Lines on the Issue of War and Peace)

6. Two Fundamentally Opposed Policies of Peaceful Coexistence (Two Fundamentally Opposed Policies of Peaceful Coexistence)

7. The Leadership of the CPSU is the Greatest Splitter of the Present Day (The CPSU Leadership is the Greatest Splitter of the Present Day)

8. The Proletarian Class Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism (The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism)

9. On Khrushchev's Fake Communism and Its Lessons in World History (Regarding Khrushchev's Fake Communism and Its Lessons in World History)

41 Mao's Cultural Revolution was intended to create a more ideal communist state than the Soviet Union. Of course, in the course of the Cultural Revolution, there are questionable aspects to Mao's claims from the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, namely the aspect of power struggles. However, in the broad sense that the interaction between domestic and international politics drives history, the Cultural Revolution can be interpreted as a critique of other lines of the international communist movement, namely the Soviet Union which took a different path, and an attempt to prevent the infiltration of revisionism into the Communist Party of China (anti-revisionism). The revisionism within the socialist camp ultimately originated from the changes in Sino-Soviet relations mentioned earlier, and considering the course of the Cultural Revolution and the socialist revolutions that occurred worldwide thereafter, domestic anti-revisionism and international anti-revisionism were inevitably intertwined.

The movement against revisionism began in earnest after Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union mentioned earlier. Although Mao made speeches expressing support for the system of collective leadership, he later officially set the goal of the Cultural Revolution as 'opposing and preventing revisionism, and overthrowing imperialism, revisionism, and counter-revolution.' Domestically, Mao advocated 'anti-revisionism and prevention of revisionism' (反修防修), and internationally, he advocated anti-revisionism.

At that time, Mao would have claimed to be doing what a leader of a proletarian ruling party should do. It is said that the leader of the Communist Party should always be vigilant and pay attention to exposing and

42 overcoming the dark aspects that exist within the party and the state. In that context, Mao was vigilant against revisionism at home and abroad, and played a role in pressuring and guiding the people away from the wrong path. Externally, he advocated anti-hegemony and anti-imperialism, which are wrong paths pursued by hegemons, and prevented the socialist camp from going down the wrong path of revisionism. Accordingly, Mao's anti-revisionism and prevention of revisionism was accepted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and gained broad support within and outside the party. It was worthy of welcome for reminding leaders of their true role and pointing it out at the ideological crossroads of the time.

However, as this trend of anti-revisionism and prevention of revisionism intensified, Mao's 'mistakes' began. While Mao's theoretical framework was sound, in the process of pursuing anti-revisionism at home and abroad, Mao failed to resolve the gap between theory and reality. When translated into practical policies, it lost its original purpose and character. Not only did he fail to grasp reality, but looking at the latter part of the Cultural Revolution, the side effects of the Cultural Revolution were already beyond Mao's control and in the hands of the Red Guards. He failed to interpret the political situation of the party and the state or the social class relations, and his definition of revisionism based on these flawed interpretations was bound to fail. Anyone who deviated from Mao's claims became a target of struggle as a revisionist, but in fact, this might not have been the 'revisionism' that Mao himself criticized in the first place.

43 To summarize, the interaction between domestic and international revisionism played a significant role as an ideological basis for external anti-Soviet diplomacy. Mao's claims at the time, which recognized the reality of the problems more seriously, had a profound impact on the ideology and political life of the members of the Communist Party of China and the majority of the masses. First, it made all party members and cadres feel that they were realistically exposed to the revival and danger of revisionism, and this sense of crisis became an ideological driving force for many people to participate in the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, in the Sino-Soviet debate, this interaction systematically advanced the already left-leaning Communist Party of China's leftism, and on the other hand, propaganda materials targeted at the masses also became strongly 'anti-revisionist.' These changes ultimately made it inevitable for the masses to sympathize with the confrontation with Soviet revisionism.

Mao's words, "Whatever the enemy opposes, we must support; whatever the enemy supports, we must oppose," became absolute. As the anti-revisionist trend reached extremes, any viewpoint that differed slightly from Mao's words was labeled an enemy, a heretic, and suffered under the stigma of revisionism.

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(https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19807561

"Rare Chinese Revolution photos on display")

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Sino-Soviet Border Conflict at Zhenbao Island during the Mao Era

"China initiated the Zhenbao Island battle."

Materials Introducing the Zhenbao Island Self-Defense Counterattack Operation (珍寶島自衛反擊作戰介紹材料)

By the end of the 1960s, nearing the peak of the madness of the Cultural Revolution, China seemed to have transformed into a more realistic nation. While in the early 1960s, the US was defined as 'the most vicious enemy of the world's people and the target of struggle,' by the late 1960s, China perceived a greater threat from the Soviet Union, its immediate neighbor. This was likely influenced by the accumulated perceptions of inequality and anti-Soviet sentiment since the 1950s. However, the event that solidified China's anti-Soviet stance, which had been threatened by Soviet expansion, was the Sino-Soviet border conflict surrounding Zhenbao Island.

On March 2, 1969, soldiers from both countries clashed on Zhenbao Island, an island in the middle reaches of the Ussuri River in China's Heilongjiang Province, a Sino-Soviet border area. The anecdote of Chinese soldiers using martial arts with spiked clubs to counter the Russian soldiers, who were specialized in boxing, suggests that the initial incident might have been a simple brawl between soldiers of the two countries. However, about ten days after the brawl, armored vehicles and anti-tank guns were mobilized, escalating the conflict into armed confrontation. According to materials from the People's Daily at the time, China was considering relocating its wartime capital to Chongqing, and the residents of Zhenbao Island actually evacuated.

46 As this news spread, the anti-Soviet sentiment that had been growing throughout the 1960s took root.

However, the reason the Zhenbao Island incident is named 'Mao's Zhenbao Island Border Conflict' in the title is because recent opinions suggest that this incident was orchestrated by Mao. In the late 1960s, due to Soviet expansionism, numerous minor border conflicts between China and the Soviet Union were occurring frequently. Due to the domestic situation in the 1960s, China was focusing on self-defense rather than active offense. A year before the Zhenbao Island incident, in 1968, an incident occurred where a Soviet armored vehicle illegally entered the Sino-Soviet border and killed four Chinese citizens (the Qiliquin Island incident). While border negotiations were ongoing, Mao stated, 'Let's show the Soviets a bitter lesson,' and insisted on a firm self-defensive counterattack if the Soviets attacked China's border areas again, and was poised to confront the Soviets.

In this context, a brawl occurred between forward units at Zhenbao Island, and the conflict escalated according to Mao's directives regarding Soviet border incursions. This was a result of the prevailing anti-Soviet sentiment and, furthermore, a decisive event that led to the normalization of relations with the United States, i.e., Sino-US détente. In fact, Mao was reportedly overjoyed upon hearing the news of China's final victory in the Zhenbao Island border conflict on March 15.

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Conclusion

"Complicated international affairs, talk to that person (pointing to Zhou Enlai), and

discuss philosophical issues with me."

(Mao Zedong's remarks during his meeting with President Nixon in February 1972)

Even today, at the moment the 1972 'Shanghai Communiqué' (Shanghai Joint Statement) was issued, Mao was with China. Although Mao was alive in 1972 and invited Nixon to his office for a personal meeting, his deteriorating health meant that concrete policy discussions were left to Zhou Enlai. However, both Nixon and Zhou Enlai must have felt Mao's spiritual presence. The 1960s were an era defined by Mao, whether through his mistakes or achievements. While the situation within China surrounding the Cultural Revolution is regrettable, it is clear that Mao was involved in fostering anti-Soviet sentiment externally and calculating the practical benefits with the United States at the policy level. In his last conversation with Nixon in 1974, shortly before his death, Mao stated, "We do not send our troops abroad," which can be seen as Mao's recognition that the Vietnam War was a burden for the United States at the time.

I learned that one must read the situation and the times well, and pursue our interests within them while formulating foreign policy. Looking at the end of the Cultural Revolution, it seems that Mao tried to achieve too much with just the Cultural Revolution, failing to read the situation and the times. He misjudged the broader framework of the international communist movement and the framework of domestic political struggles, made 'mistakes,' and many people were sacrificed. However, his actions in the 1960s at least benefited China's future.

48 Starting with Sino-US détente, China achieved economic growth through reform and opening up in 1978, and began to walk its own path. In this process, efforts are being made to avoid falling into the error of excessive leftism as a reflection on the Cultural Revolution. However, even though China's appearance has changed compared to the China of the 1960s, Mao will likely continue to exist.

Beginning with the Sino-Soviet détente, China achieved economic growth through its reform and opening-up policy in 1978, forging its own path. In this process, reflecting on the Cultural Revolution, China has also strived to avoid falling into the error of excessive leftward deviation. However, even though China's appearance has changed compared to the past in the 1960s, Mao will likely continue to exist.

"The task of the state is to achieve socialist modernization by concentrating strength in accordance with the direction of socialism with Chinese characteristics."

(Constitution of the People's Republic of China)

The 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' that China often speaks of is also theoretically based on the concepts of 'Gong' (公, public/common) and 'Ge' (个, individual/particular) found in Mao's theory of contradiction. Beyond this, Mao can be found everywhere in China. It evokes the sense of déjà vu I felt in Changsha and Beijing. Personally, as I prepared this travelogue, the experience of understanding China through the lens of Mao, the Cultural Revolution, and the foreign policy perceptions of that era has been invaluable for my future studies of China.

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