Xi Jinping's Foreign Policy Thought: Seemingly New, Yet Unchanged

EAI Sarangbang 11th Cohort Kyushu Excursion: Dreaming of Asia's Future in Kyushu

Kang Ae-ri Sungkyunkwan University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: January 24, 2019

Kang Ae-ri · Sungkyunkwan University

Introduction

Although we visited Japan, I felt as though I was encountering China throughout the entire field trip. Perhaps it was because I was preparing a presentation on China's 21st-century vision, but China kept appearing in the Japanese narratives. At the Atomic Bomb Memorial Museum, China came to mind amidst the tragedy of Asian nations caught between Japan's perpetration and victimhood. In Sasebo, Japan's past naval power reminded me of the current military power gap between the United States and China. As we all empathized in Sarangbang 11 when recreating the intense diplomatic scene of the Sino-Japanese War Peace Memorial, I felt the need to understand each other's intentions within the dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula and pursue our national interests accordingly. Perhaps because of this, as someone studying China, I was preoccupied with how to better grasp China's present and future throughout the entire field trip.

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Sasebo Archives

After having lunch at Karato Market next to the Sino-Japanese War Peace Memorial, we proceeded with the presentation on China's present and future on the bus heading to Fukuoka. The title was set as "Xi Jinping's Foreign Policy Thought: Seemingly New, Yet Unchanged." The reason for mentioning 'Xi Jinping's Foreign Policy Thought' is that Xi Jinping Thought has recently become a major guiding ideology in China. In studying China, a state-party system, the activities and internal documents of the Chinese Communist Party are inevitably important.

In this sense, the National Congress of the Communist Party of China

Listening to the teacher's explanation before the site visit, which is important for understanding China as a whole.

plays a crucial role. The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter referred to as the '19th Congress'), held in October 2017, summarized Xi Jinping's first term and set the guidelines for national affairs and policy directions for his second term. Furthermore, it held significant meaning as 'Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era' (hereinafter referred to as 'Xi Jinping Thought') was added to the Party Constitution, which can be seen as the foundation of the Communist Party. Xi Jinping Thought has become the most important ruling philosophy for China's present and future, to the extent that it is included as a mandatory subject in admission and promotion exams for all Party members. Notably, China has consistently presented phased goals for national development, aiming to achieve socialist modernization based on a moderately prosperous society by 2020-2035, and then to become a strong socialist modernized country by 2035-2050. This will be pursued based on Xi Jinping Thought going forward.

Xi Jinping's Foreign Policy Thought?

So, what exactly is the foreign policy thought from the 19th Congress? The content of Xi Jinping's foreign policy thought can be summarized as 'a new type of international relations' (新型国际关系) and 'a community of shared future for mankind' (人类命运共同体). China has been continuously presenting diplomatic discourse recently, and these two concepts revealed at the 19th Congress can be understood as an expanded form of existing concepts. A new type of international relations is an evolution of the 'new model of great power relations' concept mentioned at the 18th Party Congress, encompassing great power diplomacy, neighborhood diplomacy, developing country diplomacy, and multilateral diplomacy that have been mentioned so far. A community of shared future for mankind also expands the concept of a community of shared destiny, which was primarily mentioned in relation to neighborhood diplomacy, to encompass all of humanity. The reason these discourses are continuously presented is that China's rise has become a double-edged sword, returning as a diplomatic burden. In a way, there was no need for sophisticated diplomacy before, but since China's rise became visible, it has had to continuously prove itself against external concerns. It has had to conduct more high-level and sophisticated diplomacy, such as continuously creating diplomatic discourse.

Given the significance of the 19th Congress, examining its specific content revealed a slight difference in tone compared to China's previous discussions. The diplomatic discourse and concepts that served as major grounds for the 'China threat' theory were weakened. For instance, the emphasis on core interests, which the 18th Congress insisted would not be compromised under any circumstances, was reduced. Furthermore, the discourse on maritime power, which had created the biggest issues with neighboring countries, was also reduced in volume and briefly described compared to previous discussions.

Additionally, the inclusion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Party Constitution is significant. At the 19th Congress, the BRI, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund, and the first BRI Forum were mentioned as major achievements of Xi Jinping's first term. Beyond these points, the BRI itself was incorporated into the Party Constitution. Considering the importance of the Party Constitution, we can infer that the BRI will be a priority during Xi Jinping's second term and will be pursued even more long-term by including it in the Party Constitution. In a way, the BRI will serve as a framework for realizing Xi Jinping Thought, as it handles the economic dimension of a community of shared future for mankind and has been more concretely translated into policy compared to other aspects.

Along with the aforementioned points, the document from the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (中央外事工作會議, hereinafter referred to as the 'Foreign Affairs Conference') in June 2018 is noteworthy. While the Foreign Affairs Conference documents are generally not public, they are important because they outline foreign policy. This particular conference was even more significant because it officially designated Xi Jinping's foreign policy thought from the 19th Congress as 'Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era' (新時代中國特色社會主義外交思想, hereinafter referred to as 'Xi Jinping's Diplomatic Thought'), thereby granting it the status of a guiding ideology for Chinese diplomacy. It has become a primary benchmark for all diplomatic work, and the document allows for a more detailed understanding of Xi Jinping's Diplomatic Thought.

When considering the 19th Congress report and the June Foreign Affairs Conference document together, it becomes clear that the content of Xi Jinping's foreign policy thought is not that new. Although there are differences between the 19th Congress report and the June Foreign Affairs Conference, overall, the scope of existing diplomatic discourse has expanded, but the core content remains unchanged. Compared to the 19th Congress report, the June Foreign Affairs Conference places greater emphasis on 'conducting diplomacy centered on the Party, with Xi Jinping Thought at its core.' However, what is more noteworthy is that, on an equal footing, item 9 states, 'Defend and uphold national sovereignty, security, and development interests with national core interests as the bottom line.' This re-emphasizes core interests, which were weakened in the 19th Congress, with a stronger emphasis than in the 19th Congress report, aligning with previous discussions. In other words, considering Xi Jinping's Diplomatic Thought, including the June Foreign Affairs Conference, as important documents, despite the premise that China is entering a new ideological phase due to new socialist contradictions, Chinese diplomacy will remain unchanged.

The Core of Xi Jinping's Foreign Policy Thought?

Consequently, the following questions arose, and confronting these questions led me to contemplate the background of Xi Jinping's foreign policy thought and the methods for its realization.

1. Since there is no new content, why were 'a new type of international relations' and 'a community of shared future for mankind'

presented as if they were new diplomatic discourses?

2. Regarding concepts that hindered the narrative of China's peaceful rise, such as 'core interests' and 'maritime power discourse,'

why was the extent of their mention relatively weak in the public document (19th Congress)

and then re-emphasized in the non-public document (Foreign Affairs Conference)?

3. In a similar vein, China presented diplomatic discourse linking China and its neighbors, which cannot be realized unless the 'China threat' theory is resolved. Recognizing this, why is China continuously presenting the narrative of peaceful rise while simultaneously emphasizing core interests, sovereignty, and security, and conducting diplomacy in a dual manner?

4. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that China's rise is peaceful. The rise of power naturally leads to an expansion of influence, and from this perspective,

the dual content mentioned in relation to China's rise (content on peaceful rise and emphasis on sovereignty) may be natural. However, how will this be concretized and realized? How will the contradictions between these two aspects be resolved?

The dual content mentioned in relation to China's rise (content on peaceful rise and emphasis on sovereignty) may be natural. However, how will this be concretized and realized? How will the contradictions between these two aspects be resolved?

4. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that China's rise is peaceful. The rise of power naturally leads to an expansion of influence, and from this perspective,

So, what is China actually thinking? Common to the diplomatic discourse presented by China is the concept of 'democratization of international relations.' According to China's previous statements, China ultimately defines the current international order as unfair and unjust. From this old type of international relations, China advocates for a transition to a new, fair, and just type of relations, which is the democratization of international relations. It underlies all diplomatic discourse, aiming for an international relationship where all countries are on an equal footing and pursue common values rather than universal ones. Both the 19th Congress and the June Foreign Affairs Conference mention this democratization of international relations, stating that it is essential to accurately grasp and define the current state of domestic and international affairs and to comprehensively plan external affairs based on this, using Xi Jinping's Diplomatic Thought as a guiding principle. China continues to point out problems with the current order and aims to create a stable and balanced great power relationship with other countries through concepts like a community of shared future for mankind, building a global governance system, and concretizing the BRI.

While China continuously presents the aforementioned diplomatic discourse as a response to the 'China threat' theory, the problem is that neighboring countries' suspicions remain unresolved. Although China presents diplomatic discourse linking itself with its neighbors, it cannot abandon its core interests, sovereignty, and security because it lacks the power to fundamentally reshape the international order. At the same time, it cannot openly pursue only its own interests, leading to a dual approach in both discourse and policy. In the case of the 19th Congress report, the diplomatic discourse itself aimed for peaceful rise and was directed at both domestic and international audiences, necessitating a weakening of the emphasis on core interests, sovereignty, and security. However, this limits China's own freedom of choice in pursuing its interests. In this regard, the re-emphasis on core interests, sovereignty, and security at the June Foreign Affairs Conference was entirely directed at an internal audience, and the pursuit of interests was deemed necessary in the diplomatic context before and after the conference. In other words, the conference can be interpreted as having been held with the US-China trade war, which became apparent in July 2018, in mind. By the end of June, when the Foreign Affairs Conference was held, the US-China trade war was virtually certain, and given that most participants in the conference were high-ranking officials in charge of external affairs, there was a need for a meeting to set guidelines or strengthen resolve in this regard. For example, items 1 and 9 of the ten items mentioned at the Foreign Affairs Conference—item 1: 'Uphold the Party's centralized and unified leadership over external affairs, taking the authority of the Party Central Committee as the basis for command,' and item 9: 'Defend and uphold national sovereignty, security, and development interests with national core interests as the bottom line'—are both considered to be in response to the impending trade war with the United States.

Like the Mid-Levels Escalator in Hong Kong

It is presumed to be the result. Although only a small portion is officially known, considering the surrounding circumstances, significant resolve must have been forged in the internal meeting. Finally, why was it presented as if it were new, when in fact there was no new content? And why was it named Xi Jinping Thought, and even added to the Party Constitution? While this remains to be seen, at this point,

frankly, we joked that it seemed more like Xi Jinping's rhetoric. I believe it was an attempt to preemptively declare authority through rhetoric to secure legitimacy. The second term of the Xi Jinping administration is crucial in the history of the Communist Party of China. Over the next five years, China will celebrate significant anniversaries each year: 2018 marked the 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening Up, 2019 the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, 2020 the year the first of the two centenary goals, the construction of a moderately prosperous society, will be completed, and 2021 the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. On each occasion, the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China must be secured not only through historical legitimacy but also through achievements. Especially since the current period is critical for achieving the future goals set for 2050, 2018 was an opportune time to introduce a new guiding ideology for China.

In contrast, while Xi Jinping secured some legitimacy in his first term through his anti-corruption drive, he lacked a distinct brand compared to other leaders. Following the addition of 'Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era' to the Party Constitution at the 19th Congress, the most significant actions have been the June Foreign Affairs Conference and the trade war with the United States. This suggests that China has used diplomacy to fill in the substance of this ideology, which has been elevated to the status of a guiding ideology. In the context of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and its rise to power, the unprecedentedly strong response to the US's containment efforts and the officialization of Xi Jinping's foreign policy thought at the June Foreign Affairs Conference were ultimately aimed at securing Xi Jinping's authority and legitimacy domestically. Facing an unavoidable trade war, such a response was sufficient to secure domestic authority. Although China is currently at a disadvantage in the US-China trade war, it is significant as the first move reflecting the officialized Xi Jinping's foreign policy thought, and it can be anticipated that its broad scope will be further elaborated through future diplomatic actions.

Conclusion: The Realization of Xi Jinping's Foreign Policy Thought?

China's perception of being in a state of new socialist contradictions is partially valid, as its own foreign policy thought and guidelines, which link it with neighboring countries, will become increasingly difficult to realize as they are made more concrete. To achieve the democratization of international relations envisioned in 'a new type of international relations' and 'a community of shared future for mankind,' the resolution of the 'China threat' theory and the support of neighboring countries are essential. There are two ways to achieve this.

First, the actual power itself must grow. If China's national strength increases, it can provide economic and military norms and governance through its power, thereby drawing in neighboring countries. It can lead other countries to participate in a community of shared future, premised on the democratization of international relations, which has been discussed so far, and even provide practical assistance in return. This would allow China to gain support from neighboring countries due to its increased power. However, this seems difficult at present. Even assuming an increase in military power, before resolving the 'China threat' theory, military power must be operated to defend all neighboring countries facing China, resulting in relatively less surplus military power compared to the United States. Both domestically and internationally, China is entering a period of low economic growth, and the BRI strategy, the economic dimension of a community of shared future for mankind, also aims to address domestic issues related to this low growth.

Alternatively, there is a way for China's authority to increase even with limited growth in power. Indeed, China has been consistently highlighting its historical status as a civilized nation to realize this authority. It argues that China's development is the development of all its neighbors and that China itself is not a bad country. However, in practice, the fact that China is also a modern nation-state paradoxically solidifies the 'China threat' theory. While defining itself as a civilized nation advocating for the common interests of humanity, it simultaneously defends its own national interests in matters such as the US-China trade war and maritime disputes with neighboring countries. While this is naturally expected of any nation, a change in actions is necessary to resolve China's contradictions and engage its neighbors.

In essence, when comparing China's current diplomatic discourse and foreign policy, China is attempting to dispel the existing 'China threat' theory by presenting new diplomatic discourse. However, it is failing to resolve contradictions due to the discrepancy between this discourse and policy, and even if this discrepancy were overlooked, due to a lack of power to push it forward. While it is presumptuous to predict China's situation in 2050, the crucial point is that the process leading up to 2050 will likely resemble the present, with adjustments made between common interests (peaceful rise) and China's own interests (the 'China threat' theory). This is similar to how the emphasis in diplomatic discourse was adjusted domestically in anticipation of the US-China trade war. Until a significant shift in power occurs or an event that fundamentally changes the structure takes place, China will exploit the gaps in the existing governance system to fill them with its own approach while simultaneously defending its core interests. How Xi Jinping's foreign policy thought and its subsequent policies will be concretized will depend on how the focus of policy is adjusted between the two aforementioned points, but Xi Jinping himself will strive to be evaluated as having played a significant role in realizing the two centenary goals.

In conclusion, I question whether China can truly realize 'a new model of great power relations' and 'a community of shared future for mankind.' However, I am certain that China's future diplomatic discourse and policies will be adjusted between common interests and China's interests. Even if the mention of common interests is merely political rhetoric, the content of Xi Jinping's foreign policy thought, which is included in the Party Constitution and at the center of Chinese diplomacy, makes it impossible to ignore common interests. Therefore, whether the expanded scope of China's diplomatic discourse will be filled, and with what, remains an area that requires continuous attention. It is necessary to distinguish between China's long-term goals and its timely objectives and apply this to the interpretation of discourse. This will undoubtedly be difficult, and it daunts me as I continue to observe China. At such times, I will recall Dongju's question from Sarangbang, 'Why is our people so vulnerable?' and 'Joseon,' which, though small and fragile during the field trip, misjudged the power dynamics of international relations. As we learned throughout Sarangbang and as mentioned at the Foreign Affairs Conference, we must grasp our current position, interpret the situations created by the various variables we face from that position, and handle international affairs and diplomacy with an attitude of calculating our own interests.

On the last day of the field trip, near Karato Market, Sarangbang Class 11

References Primary Sources

18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, http://www.gov.cn/18da/

19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/19thcpc

/index.htm

State Council Executive Meeting of the People's Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/cwhy/2018

0613c14/index.htm

First Meeting of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2

018/0515/c64094-29992327.html

Secondary Sources

SKKU Institute of China Studies, 2018. The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Seoul: Jisik Gongjakso.

SKKU Institute of China Studies, 2018. Xi Jinping Thought and China's Future. Seoul: Jisik Gongjakso.

SKKU Institute of China Studies, 2018. Xi Jinping Thought and China's Future.

Edited by Cho Young-nam, Seoul: Jisik Gongjakso.

Swaine, Michael D. and Tellis, Ashley J. 2000. Interpreting China’s

Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future. Wahsington D.C:

Rand.

Swaine, Michael D. “Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery

Diplomacy”, China Leadership Monitor, Issue 44, July 2018. Swaine, Michael D. “Chinese Views on Foreign Policy in the 19th Party

Congress”, China Leadership Monitor, Issue 55, Jan 2018.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

← Back · ← Home · ← Back to list