The Secret of the Treaty of Shimonoseki: Analyzing the Treaty Negotiation Process through a Frame Narrative

Il-Cheong Peace Memorial Hall · Son Sang-yong · Seoul National University

Introduction

The journey of Sarangbang 11's field trip concluded at the Il-Cheong Peace Memorial Hall. At the Il-Cheong Peace Memorial Hall, a presentation was prepared to reconstruct the process of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in a more dynamic manner. Specifically, it aimed to reconstruct the treaty negotiation process using a frame narrative. A frame narrative refers to the work of restoring the hidden perceptions and negotiation strategies of the actors by focusing on the diplomatic documents written by the actors who negotiated the treaty, in addition to the treaty negotiation process within the frame. Of course, due to limitations in personal ability and language barriers, not all diplomatic documents could be consulted, but I would like to offer a humble excuse that this is a modest starting point for tracing the hidden perceptions of Li Hongzhang of Qing China and Itō Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu of Japan. The temporal scope of this study was set from 1894, when negotiations for the Treaty of Shimonoseki began, to December 1895, shortly after the treaty was concluded. The primary sources used were mainly contemporary primary diplomatic documents. To reconstruct Li Hongzhang's perceptions, Qing diplomatic documents and diplomatic telegrams exchanged between Li Hongzhang and the Zongli Yamen were consulted. To reconstruct the perceptions of Itō Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu of Japan, the diplomatic memorandum 'Kenkenshi' and contemporary Japanese documents were consulted. In addition, to supplement the primary sources with secondary sources, 'The Sino-Japanese War,' compiled by President Syngman Rhee using contemporary historical materials, and historical works published in China and Japan were referenced. Now, let us return to the past when the Treaty of Shimonoseki was concluded and begin with the first meeting between Li Hongzhang and Itō Hirobumi.

Scene #1: The First Meeting Between Itō and Li Hongzhang

On March 20, 1895, Li Hongzhang, appointed as the plenipotentiary ambassador of Qing China, arrived in Shimonoseki with 11 advisors, including his adopted son Li Jingfang. Japan welcomed them with Itō Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu, accompanied by six secretaries. Although the first meeting between Li Hongzhang and Itō dates back to Tianjin in 1885, the conversation between the two giants of diplomacy, reunited after 10 years, was as follows: Itō: "I believe that the position of 'Zhongtang' (Li Hongzhang) in carrying out the Emperor's decree this time is of great importance. It is crucial to stop the war between the two countries and restore righteousness. If we achieve eternal peace in the future, it will bring great benefits to both countries.

I believe it is important to stop the war between the two countries and restore righteousness. If we achieve eternal peace in the future, it will bring great benefits to both countries.

If we achieve eternal peace in the future, it will bring great benefits to both countries.

It will bring great benefits to both countries.

Li Hongzhang: "Our two countries in Asia are the closest, and our writings are the same. We have had a brief dispute recently, which I believe was for our mutual benefit. If we continue to be enemies, it will be a great harm to us, and Japan will also not benefit. Looking at the situation in the West, even with strong military power, they maintain friendly relations with neighboring countries. Let us learn from the Western situation and achieve peace in Asia. If the relationship between our two countries deteriorates, the yellow race of Asia will be devoured by the white race of Europe."

We have had a brief dispute recently, which I believe was for our mutual benefit. If we continue to be enemies, it will be a great harm to us, and Japan will also not benefit. Looking at the situation in the West, even with strong military power, they maintain friendly relations with neighboring countries. Let us learn from the Western situation and achieve peace in Asia. If the relationship between our two countries deteriorates, the yellow race of Asia will be devoured by the white race of Europe."

If we continue to be enemies, it will be a great harm to us, and Japan will also not benefit. Looking at the situation in the West, even with strong military power, they maintain friendly relations with neighboring countries. Let us learn from the Western situation and achieve peace in Asia. If the relationship between our two countries deteriorates, the yellow race of Asia will be devoured by the white race of Europe."

Looking at the situation in the West, even with strong military power, they maintain friendly relations with neighboring countries. Let us learn from the Western situation and achieve peace in Asia. If the relationship between our two countries deteriorates, the yellow race of Asia will be devoured by the white race of Europe."

Let us learn from the Western situation and achieve peace in Asia. If the relationship between our two countries deteriorates, the yellow race of Asia will be devoured by the white race of Europe."

If the relationship between our two countries deteriorates, the yellow race of Asia will be devoured by the white race of Europe."

If the relationship between our two countries deteriorates, the yellow race of Asia will be devoured by the white race of Europe."

The yellow race of Asia will be devoured by the white race of Europe.

Itō: "Zhongtang, your words are the same as mine. However, 10 years ago, I advised you, but why have you not reformed even one aspect of your governance until today?"

However, 10 years ago, I advised you, but why have you not reformed even one aspect of your governance until today?"

Li Hongzhang: "Your Excellency has reformed all of your country's outdated systems since meeting me, and has developed to this day, which I truly envy. Our Qing dynasty has remained steeped in its old ways for over 10 years, with no change, which is truly shameful."

Your Excellency has reformed all of your country's outdated systems since meeting me, and has developed to this day, which I truly envy. Our Qing dynasty has remained steeped in its old ways for over 10 years, with no change, which is truly shameful."

Our Qing dynasty has remained steeped in its old ways for over 10 years, with no change, which is truly shameful."

Itō: "The Japanese people are more difficult to govern than the Qing people, and with the parliament in between, it is even more difficult to act."

Ito: “The Japanese people are more difficult to govern than the Qing people, and the parliament

and with the parliament in between, it is even more difficult to act."

In their first meeting, Itō and Li Hongzhang resolved the issue of the 'full powers' that had been a point of contention between the two countries and began the formal negotiations for the peace treaty. However, prior to the negotiations, we aim to reconstruct how Li Hongzhang perceived the Sino-Japanese War and what strategies he intended to employ in the negotiations that would determine the fate of Qing China.

Li Hongzhang evaluated the Sino-Japanese War in three ways. First, Japan's victory using European-style army and navy organizations proved that the yellow race of the East could do anything, just like the white race of the West. Second, the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War allowed Qing China to awaken from its long, deep slumber and served as a valuable experience for national development. Third, the cooperation between Japan and Qing China provided an opportunity for the East to counter the European powers.

Then, what strategy did Li Hongzhang devise to enhance Qing China's diplomatic negotiation capabilities after its defeat in the war? This is where his outstanding sense of international politics is evident. Regarding relations with Japan, Li Hongzhang recognized that a truce and peace treaty with Japan were essential for Qing China. In fact, in a letter to his daughter, Li Gyeongsuk, Li Hongzhang expressed criticism of the passive attitudes of the court and the Zongli Yamen, stating, "Consulting on the treaty with Japan requires careful deliberation, but there is still no sign of progress, the court is not thinking deeply about it, and the Grand Secretariat has not inquired about recent events" (Kim Ki-hyo, 2017).

Above all, Li Hongzhang sought to enhance Qing China's negotiation power with Japan by utilizing Western powers. In other words, anticipating that Japan would demand excessive reparations in the negotiations, he contemplated how to analyze the positions and trends of various Western countries and steer the negotiations with Japan in a favorable direction. 'Statement to the Grand Secretariat Regarding Amity and Truce' is a document sent by Li Hongzhang to the Qing Grand Secretariat detailing his meetings with envoys from Britain and Russia. In this document, Li Hongzhang inquired about the positions of various Western countries on the Sino-Japanese War and sought advice. During his meeting with the Russian envoy, he asked what would happen if Japan invaded Russian territory and what Russia's position would be if Japan occupied Korean territory. In other words, Li Hongzhang's strategy was to use Western countries to mitigate Japan's excessive negotiation terms.

What perceptions and strategies did the Japanese side have in anticipation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki? Japan was on the verge of marching into Beijing, capitalizing on its victory in the Sino-Japanese War. Therefore, Japan intended to actively leverage its status as a victorious nation to present favorable peace terms to Qing China. However, at the same time, Japan was seriously concerned about the interference of Western powers stationed in East Asia. In fact, there was a major conflict between Army General Yamagata Aritomo, representing the military, and Itō Hirobumi, representing the political sphere, regarding the decision to march into Beijing. Itō argued, "If such a situation arises, Japan will be negotiating a peace treaty not with Qing China, but with the Western powers," and the Japanese government adopted Itō's proposal.

Japan's concern about the interference of Western powers was also evident in the debate within the cabinet on whether to pre-notify the Western powers of the draft peace treaty. Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu argued for hinting at the terms of the peace treaty in advance to gain the tacit approval of Western countries, while Itō Hirobumi argued for limiting the terms of the treaty solely between China and Japan to eliminate any possibility of third-party interference. Ultimately, Itō's proposal was adopted. As these two examples show, Japan exhibited a dual perception: a desire to impose harsh peace terms on Qing China and a need to prevent the intervention of Western powers based on geopolitical calculations.

In the process of negotiating the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which began after these preparations, Mutsu evaluated his first meeting with Li Hongzhang as follows. Mutsu recorded that despite starting the negotiations from a disadvantageous position, Li Hongzhang was a man without shame as the foremost figure of Qing China. He also highly praised Li Hongzhang's strategy of trying to lessen the humiliating status of the defeated Qing China by interspersing praise, criticism, and even harsh words with the aim of eliciting sympathy from Japan (Mutsu Munemitsu, 1994).

Scene #2: The Assassination Attempt on Li Hongzhang and the Turning Point in Negotiations

On March 24, 1895, the third meeting between Japan and Qing China was held. The previous two meetings failed to reach an agreement on 'truce discussions,' and the discussion shifted to 'concluding a peace treaty.' However, on the way back after the third meeting, a dramatic incident occurred when Li Hongzhang was shot and fell by a Japanese ronin. The English-language newspapers published at the time described the urgent situation as follows:

As Li Hongzhang was returning from the meeting hall to his lodging, a Japanese man suddenly rushed out from the crowd and fired a pistol, shooting Li Hongzhang, and then fled but was apprehended by a police officer. The bullet penetrated deeply below Li Hongzhang's left eye, causing serious injury. When the sedan bearers, startled by the assailant, froze, the police drew their swords, dispersed the onlookers, and escorted the sedan to the inn. Li Hongzhang was carried into his bedroom, where he fainted and lost consciousness.

As Li Hongzhang was returning from the meeting hall to his lodging, a Japanese man suddenly rushed out from the crowd and fired a pistol, shooting Li Hongzhang, and then fled but was apprehended by a police officer. The bullet penetrated deeply below Li Hongzhang's left eye, causing serious injury. When the sedan bearers, startled by the assailant, froze, the police drew their swords, dispersed the onlookers, and escorted the sedan to the inn. Li Hongzhang was carried into his bedroom, where he fainted and lost consciousness.

The bullet penetrated deeply below Li Hongzhang's left eye, causing serious injury. When the sedan bearers, startled by the assailant, froze, the police drew their swords, dispersed the onlookers, and escorted the sedan to the inn. Li Hongzhang was carried into his bedroom, where he fainted and lost consciousness.

When the sedan bearers, startled by the assailant, froze, the police drew their swords, dispersed the onlookers, and escorted the sedan to the inn. Li Hongzhang was carried into his bedroom, where he fainted and lost consciousness.

the police drew their swords, dispersed the onlookers, and escorted the sedan to the inn. Li Hongzhang was carried into his bedroom, where he fainted and lost consciousness.

escorted the sedan to the inn. Li Hongzhang was carried into his bedroom, where he fainted and lost consciousness.

Li Hongzhang was carried into his bedroom, where he fainted and lost consciousness.

The incident marked a turning point in the negotiations for the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In fact, the Japanese Emperor himself issued an imperial edict expressing the apology of the Japanese Imperial family. How did Qing China and Japan perceive this incident and formulate their response strategies? First, we will attempt to reconstruct Li Hongzhang's perceptions. Li Hongzhang expected that the assassination attempt would shift the negotiation dynamics and slightly ease the excessive conditions set by Japan. He is reported to have said immediately after being shot, "Even if I lose my life, I will not spare it if it benefits the nation." When a Japanese doctor recommended surgery, he retorted, "There are many important matters facing the nation now, and we cannot delay the peace talks for even a moment. How can I jeopardize national affairs for personal reasons?" As Li Hongzhang predicted, the incident led Japan to reduce the indemnity to 200 million taels and conclude the long-delayed truce agreement.

How did Japan perceive and respond to the same incident? In summary, Japan shifted to a slightly more moderate stance towards Qing China based on concerns about the domestic and international political repercussions of the incident.

based on concerns about the domestic and international political repercussions of the incident.

However, Japan's change in stance was based on thorough calculation. Mutsu recognized the need to prepare a definite response strategy to prevent the negotiations from encountering difficulties, based on the surge of sympathy for Li Hongzhang domestically, which could escalate into global public opinion. This concern was shared not only by Mutsu but also by key officials within Japan, who judged the incident to be detrimental to Japan's national interests, as stated below:

Itō Hirobumi angrily stated, "If that criminal thought that peace should not be made, it would have been right to shoot me, not to attempt to assassinate the Qing envoy. I proposed the peace treaty, and the Qing envoy is not at fault. Although this incident was committed by a madman, it has dealt a great blow to our nation's honor. If he had killed me, the problem would have been less severe." Army Minister Yamagata Aritomo stated, "This criminal committed this act without considering the nation's important affairs," and slammed the desk and wept (Syngman Rhee, 2015).

If that criminal thought that peace should not be made, it would have been right to shoot me, not to attempt to assassinate the Qing envoy. I proposed the peace treaty, and the Qing envoy is not at fault. Although this incident was committed by a madman, it has dealt a great blow to our nation's honor. If he had killed me, the problem would have been less severe."

I proposed the peace treaty, and the Qing envoy is not at fault. Although this incident was committed by a madman, it has dealt a great blow to our nation's honor. If he had killed me, the problem would have been less severe."

Although this incident was committed by a madman, it has dealt a great blow to our nation's honor. If he had killed me, the problem would have been less severe."

If he had killed me, the problem would have been less severe."

Army Minister Yamagata Aritomo stated, "This criminal committed this act without considering the nation's important affairs," and slammed the desk and wept (Syngman Rhee, 2015).

"This criminal committed this act without considering the nation's important affairs," and slammed the desk and wept (Syngman Rhee, 2015).

and slammed the desk and wept (Syngman Rhee, 2015)..

From an international political perspective, Japan recognized the Li Hongzhang shooting incident as a potential trigger for intervention by Western powers and prepared countermeasures. Mutsu believed that a mere ceremonial response would negatively impact negotiations, thus necessitating unconventional measures. He formally requested Japan's concession on the 'armistice issue.' Mutsu's proposal was approved by Ito, and the focus of the talks naturally shifted to the 'conditions' and 'duration' for concluding a convention. The following text accurately reflects Mutsu's perception. If Li Hongzhang were to return to his country midway, merely using his physical injuries as a pretext,

and vehemently condemn Japan's actions, while artfully inducing the Western powers,

to once again request their mediation, it would not be difficult to gain the sympathy of at least two or three European powers.

In such a situation, if European powers were to intervene,

our demands on Qing China would also require significant concessions.

In the current conflict between the two nations, it is customary under international law for the victor, especially us, to accord the envoy of the enemy nation considerable protection and respect.

However, if public sentiment were to be stirred, even slightly, by such an incident,

it would not be easy to quell such sentiments with mere theoretical arguments (Mutsu Munemitsu 1994).

Based on this understanding, Mutsu sent telegrams on March 24, 1895, to the overseas embassies of countries including Britain, Germany, the United States, France, Russia, and the Netherlands, explaining the situation to prevent Western intervention. This demonstrates how much Japan was concerned about the formation of pro-Qing public opinion internationally and foreign interference in the negotiations between the two countries. Consequently, the Li Hongzhang shooting incident led to a significant reduction in the reparations Qing China had to pay and resolved the unresolved armistice issue. In essence, a single bullet exerted a profound influence on the national interests of both Japan and Qing China.

Scene #3 Negotiation Difficulties and Hidden Strategies

The 4th round of talks was held later than scheduled to allow for Li Hongzhang's recovery. In the 4th round, Japan demanded reparations, territorial concessions, and Japanese occupation of certain regions from Qing China. Qing China rejected these demands, citing the excessive reparations proposed by Japan and the negative views of Western powers on territorial concessions. However, Ito strongly conveyed that Japan could not yield on its proposed terms, pressuring Li Hongzhang, which ultimately led to the 5th round of talks as follows:

<Scene #4 5th Round of Talks> Li Hongzhang: I have received an imperial edict from the Emperor instructing me to handle this matter with consideration. However, it is too difficult to handle, so I ask that you, my counterpart, consider it on my behalf. I truly find it difficult to gauge. Ito: My position is similar to that of the Grand Secretary. The Grand Secretary holds a high position in China, and no one can challenge his authority. In my country, the authority of the Diet is significant, and if I mismanage affairs, I will be immediately criticized.

Li Hongzhang: It is said that I have a good relationship with Japan's Ito, yet last year I was impeached multiple times. Is the current negotiation for peace not proof of our friendship? Ito: They impeached the Grand Secretary because they did not understand the circumstances of the times.

Li Hongzhang: If I sign this harsh treaty, I will surely be reviled. What should I do?

Ito: That is absurd. In matters of such importance, in China, only the Grand Secretary can handle them.

Li Hongzhang: They will surely criticize me after the treaty is signed. I ask that you, my counterpart, think carefully on my behalf and make concessions on both reparations and territorial concessions.

Ito: As I said before, it is difficult to make any concessions.

Li Hongzhang: When we parted previously, I requested a reduction of 50 million. Did you not show any inclination to do so then? If a concession is possible, the entire treaty can be concluded.

Ito: I have already made a concession.

(Omitted) Li Hongzhang: If the Japanese troops withdraw, the medical supplies will certainly be ratified. Ito: What will you do if they are not ratified?

Li Hongzhang: If ratified, I will notify you immediately by telegram.

Ito: The telegram should be in English, but there is no need for a secret code. However, you must specify the timing and location for the exchange of medical supplies. I request it within 15 days of the treaty's conclusion.

Li Hongzhang: 15 days is insufficient; let it be one month.

Ito: Our troops are too numerous, and staying for a month is too long. Li Hongzhang: It is difficult if it is not one month.

Ito: Let it be three weeks.

The above is a transcript of the 5th round of talks. At this point, as the negotiations were heading towards their climax, what was Li Hongzhang thinking? I will analyze his perceptions by dividing them into domestic and international politics. From a domestic political standpoint, Li Hongzhang anticipated criticism regardless of the treaty's outcome. Indeed, Zhang Zhidong, Li Hongzhang's greatest political rival within Qing China, was preparing impeachment proceedings. The public's critical sentiment, accustomed to the traditional world order, erupted, even transforming into anti-imperialist and anti-Christian struggles, with the people of Liaonan and Taiwan setting fire to Christian and Catholic churches (Wang Shaofang 2018).

So, what measures did Li Hongzhang take to mitigate the domestic political criticism? After the 5th round of talks, Li Hongzhang sent multiple telegrams to the Grand Council of State (Zongli Yamen) regarding the four-day deadline set by Ito, continuously inquiring whether he could sign Ito's revised proposal or if the court would issue different instructions (Lee Seung-man 2015). The telegrams exchanged between Li Hongzhang and the Grand Council of State, presented below, reveal Li Hongzhang's attempt to delegate the final treaty approval authority to the court and convey the urgency of his situation. In other words, aware of the domestic political opposition, Li Hongzhang sought to minimally escape the situation where all criticism would be directed at him, despite being dispatched as a plenipotentiary envoy.

<Reconstruction of Telegrams between Li Hongzhang and the Grand Council of State> April 11 (Li Hongzhang → Grand Council of State)

"I met with Ito yesterday, but his tone suggested that the decision was final and unchangeable. The dispatch received today also seems to indicate a final resolution. Therefore, please instruct me quickly on how much further I can concede."

(Grand Council of State → Li Hongzhang)

"Ito seems to be pressing hard. If there is no room for further negotiation, you should transmit his intentions by telegram on one hand, and on the other hand, proceed to sign the treaty. However, ensure that even if you argue after receiving instructions, it never reaches the point of rupture."

April 14 (Li Hongzhang → Grand Council of State)

"We will meet tomorrow at 4 PM to discuss the agreement. If this deadline passes, the negotiations will not proceed smoothly, and the situation will become very serious. If we accept Japan's demands, we can maintain the imperial court's prestige, but if not, the situation could escalate unexpectedly. Therefore, there is no time to wait for further instructions, and the treaty must be signed."

(Grand Council of State → Li Hongzhang)

"The previous instruction (on April 12, the Grand Council of State sent a telegram to Li Hongzhang)

was to...

Ito: Telegrams shall be in English, but there is no need to use code. However,

the time and place for the exchange of the treaty must be specified. Within 15 days of the signing of the treaty,

I request it. Li Hongzhang: 15 days is insufficient; let it be one month.

Ito: Our soldiers are too numerous to stay for a month. Li Hongzhang: It is difficult if not one month.

Ito: Let it be three weeks.

The above is a transcript of the fifth meeting. What, then, was Li Hongzhang thinking at the point when the negotiations were reaching their climax? We will analyze his perceptions by dividing them into domestic and international politics. From a domestic political perspective, Li Hongzhang anticipated domestic political criticism regardless of the success of the treaty signing. In fact, Zhang Zhidong, the most powerful political rival of Li Hongzhang within Qing China, was preparing impeachment proceedings. The critical public opinion of the Qing populace, who had lived within the former world order, exploded, even transforming into anti-imperialist and anti-Christian struggles, with the people of Liaonan and Taiwan setting fire to Christian and Catholic churches (Wang Shaofang 2018).

What measures, then, did Li Hongzhang take to mitigate the criticism from domestic public opinion, even slightly? After the fifth meeting, Li Hongzhang sent numerous telegrams to the Zongli Yamen regarding Ito's four-day deadline proposal, continuously asking whether it would be acceptable to sign Ito's revised proposal or if the court would issue different instructions (Lee Seung-man 2015). Examining the telegrams exchanged between Li Hongzhang and the Zongli Yamen below, we can glimpse Li Hongzhang's attempt to defer the final treaty signing authority to the court and convey the urgency of his situation. That is, from Li Hongzhang's perspective, aware of the opposition from domestic political opinion, he sought to escape, even slightly, the situation where all criticism would be directed at him, despite being dispatched as a plenipotentiary envoy.

<Reconstruction of Telegrams between Li Hongzhang and the Zongli Yamen> April 11 (Li Hongzhang → Zongli Yamen)

“I met with Ito yesterday, but his tone suggests that the decision is already made and cannot be changed.

Today, another dispatch was received, which seems to indicate a final resolution.

Therefore, please instruct me quickly on how much further I should concede.

”

(Zongli Yamen → Li Hongzhang)

“Ito seems to be pressing hard. If there is no room for further negotiation, you should,

on the one hand, convey his intentions via telegram, and on the other hand, proceed to sign the treaty.

However, after receiving my instructions, even if you engage in debate with confidence, under no circumstances

should you reach a point of rupture.” April 14 (Li Hongzhang → Zongli Yamen)

“We will meet tomorrow afternoon at 4 p.m. to discuss the terms. If this deadline passes,

the negotiation will not proceed smoothly, and the situation will become very serious.

If we accept Japan's demands, we can maintain the imperial court, but

if not, the matter could escalate unexpectedly. Therefore, there is no time to wait for further instructions, and we must proceed to sign the treaty.”

”

(Zongli Yamen → Li Hongzhang)

“The previous instruction (on the 12th, the Zongli Yamen sent a telegram to Li Hongzhang)

Among the Japanese demands, there was a request for further reduction that

implied that if even a minute part was disputed, the investment made for that minute would yield profit.

However, if the negotiations could not be altered further,

sign the treaty according to the instructions previously given.

In relation to international politics, Li Hongzhang recognized that if the ratification period of the Treaty of Shimonoseki could be extended as much as possible, it would create an opportunity for surrounding Western powers to intervene and thus check Japan to a certain extent. In other words, the answer as to why Li Hongzhang sought to extend the treaty's ratification period as much as possible in the aforementioned 5th meeting transcript lies here. In fact, even before being dispatched as the plenipotentiary for the Treaty of Shimonoseki, he actively contacted Western powers such as Britain, Russia, France, and the United States within China, seeking diplomatic measures to check Japan. Referring to the 'Summary of Q&A with Russian Envoy K' dated September 14, 1894 (Guangxu 20th Year), it can be understood that Li Hongzhang was actively relying on Russia to check Japan (Kim Ki-hyo, 2017). In his meeting with Arthur Pavlovich Cassini, the Russian envoy in China, Li Hongzhang stated regarding the armistice with Japan, "If Minister K could request your government to order the Russian Minister in Tokyo to consult with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it would be even more direct," indicating his intention to use Russia to push for an armistice agreement with Japan as favorably as possible. In this document, Li Hongzhang described the Japanese as "extremely cunning and deceitful people" and also stated that Japan would invade Korea, disregarding the opinions of Western countries. Furthermore, Li Hongzhang showed a diplomatic strategy of checking Japan through Western powers by stimulating the Russian envoy's anxiety, stating that if Japan occupied Korea, it would greatly hinder China and Russia from exercising their rights in Korea in the future, similar to France's occupation of Vietnam.

To conclude, "What was Joseon doing?"

The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed by two diplomatic officials representing Japan and China, Ito and Li Hongzhang. Consequently, the Treaty of Shimonoseki can be evaluated as an event that brought about a significant turning point in the East Asian order. First, Joseon became an independent nation. Second, the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan Island, and the Penghu Islands, which were under Qing China's rule, were ceded to Japan. Third, Qing China paid 200 million taels to Japan, and a new modern treaty regulating trade between the two countries was concluded.

However, instead of a conclusion, in the final paragraph, I would like to briefly introduce Joseon's perspective, which could not be discussed in depth due to the lack of primary sources. How did Joseon perceive the Treaty of Shimonoseki between Japan and Qing China? To answer this, let's refer to two primary sources.

First, the Dongguk Yeonpyeonsa (Chronicle of Joseon) well records King Gojong's perspective. Dongguk Yeonpyeonsa, Volume 2, Year of Eulmi (1895), King Gojong's 32nd Year, in the entry 'Directing the decree to set the National Celebration Day of Independence,' contains King Gojong's perception that Joseon had achieved complete independence through the Treaty of Shimonoseki and no longer needed to rely on Qing China (Jeong Gyo, 2004). Furthermore, Dongguk Yeonpyeonsa offers its own interpretation of the reasons for Qing China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and the key provisions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as follows. <March 1895: Reasons for Qing China's War Defeat>

The reasons for the successive defeats of the Qing people are as follows.

One, the officials guarding the territories of the 18 provinces, claiming that territories must be protected by themselves, stood by and watched as the Beiyang Navy was annihilated.

One, the handling of affairs by officials. Qing China's coastal and naval forts were like sandcastles built by children, collapsing immediately when kicked. Qing China's navy and army did not know how to fight battles. Military provisions rapidly depleted, and weapons became rusted. Entering the battlefield, they only thought of plundering the people's wealth due to hunger. Facing the enemy, they trembled with fear and only sought to escape and preserve their lives.

One, the magnificent appearance of the elite army and the advanced weaponry, which were meticulously prepared over decades using the best resources from 20 provinces, were completely handed over to the enemy overnight. <March 1895: Assessment of the Significance of the Treaty of Shimonoseki>

At this time, Li Hongzhang, the minister dispatched by Qing China, crossed the sea to the east and pleaded for peace. Japan ordered Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu to meet in Shimonoseki on March 23 (Gregorian calendar April 17) and conclude a treaty. The important provisions are as follows.

Article 1: Joseon is confirmed as a complete and perfect independent and sovereign state. <On October 25, 1894, Qing China had already issued a statement confirming Joseon as a complete and perfect independent and sovereign state.>.

Article 2: Qing China shall cede the southern region of Fengtian Province, the entire island of Taiwan and its affiliated islands, and the Penghu Archipelago to Japan.

Article 4: Qing China shall pay Japan an indemnity of 200 million taels for war expenses.

Article 6: Japan shall engage in trade in Shashi, Hubei Province; Chongqing Prefecture, Sichuan Province; Suzhou Prefecture, Jiangsu Province; and Hangzhou Prefecture, Zhejiang Province.

On April 8, the peace treaty was ratified. Shortly thereafter, Russia, France, and Germany informed Japan, stating, "If Japan occupies Liaodong (the southern part of Fengtian Province), East Asia will never be peaceful, so it is better to return it to Qing China." Japan complied with this request, and Qing China repaid them with 30 million taels of silver. Second, the '14 Articles of the Hongbeom' proclaimed on January 7, 1895, is a document that stipulates Joseon's status as an independent nation and declared Joseon's independent sovereignty at the Jongmyo Shrine. The introduction to the 14 Articles of the Hongbeom states, "From now on, without relying on any other country, we will promote the prosperity of the nation and the well-being and prosperity of the people, thereby perfecting the foundation of independent sovereignty," indicating the intention to establish a basis for independent sovereignty without relying on Qing China.

Thus, Joseon perceived that, with the Treaty of Shimonoseki as a turning point, it could embark on a new journey as an independent sovereign nation, breaking away from Qing China's world order. However, in the end, Joseon's independent sovereignty was the result of Japan revealing its ambition to annex Korea. That is, Japan initiated the Sino-Japanese War by raising the issue of 'Joseon's status' and gradually realized its plan to annex Joseon by making it independent from Qing China. Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki states, "Qing confirms that Joseon is a completely independent and sovereign state and abolishes all actions that undermine Joseon's independent and sovereign system," which was the first step toward Japan's rule over Korea. The 14 Articles of the Hongbeom, while cautious, can also be considered reforms driven by Japan's agenda rather than Joseon's independent reforms. In fact, during the drafting process of the 14 Articles of the Hongbeom, the Japanese Minister to Korea, Inoue, and the Minister of the Interior, Park Young-hyo, had significant influence.

Consequently, Joseon completely misjudged the significance of the Treaty of Shimonoseki amidst the power struggle between Qing China and Japan. At the same time, Joseon's response was consistently slow amidst the historical transition of the East Asian order from Qing China's world order to Japan's modern international order. This led Joseon to become a Japanese colony and experience an indelible, painful history. Now, we must move beyond the dark past and prepare for the present and future. Currently, East Asia is transitioning to a new world order being constructed by China and the United States. Therefore, Korea must invest all its efforts in developing diplomatic measures that allow it to broaden its room for maneuver amidst the US-China power competition, moving beyond the misjudgment of the Treaty of Shimonoseki during the Sino-Japanese War and diplomatic failures.

The fierce diplomatic negotiations between Li Hongzhang of Qing China and Ito Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu of Japan for national interests will surely resonate deeply with us aspiring to become diplomats. Observing the actions of great power diplomats negotiating for their nations' survival, we contemplate the diplomatic capabilities of South Korea, a small and medium-sized country. In the 21st century, South Korea must not only accurately analyze the diplomatic strategies of the United States and China but also intensely consider what diplomacy will maximize Korea's national interests amidst their rivalry to prepare for the future. As someone aspiring to become a Korean diplomat, I feel a great sense of responsibility as I leave the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall. References Primary Sources

Kim Ki-hyo. 2017. *Modern East Asian Diplomatic Documents: An Annotated Bibliography Vol. 12*. Seoul:

Seonin Publishing Co.

Mutsu Munemitsu. 1994. *Kenkōroku*. Translated by Kim Seung-il. Seoul: BeomwooSa.

Rhee Syngman. 2015. *A Plainly Written History of the Sino-Japanese War*. Translated by Kim Yong-sam, Kim Hyo-seon, Ryu Seok-chun.

and others. Seoul: Book & People.

Jeong Gyo. 2004. *Dongguk Yeonpyeonsa Vol. 2*. Seoul: Somyeong Publishing Co.

Wang Xiaofang. 2018. *Secret History of Chinese Diplomacy Vol. 1*. Seoul: RH Korea. Geno Volpicelli. 2009. *Seen Through the Eyes of a Russian Diplomat in the Late Joseon Dynasty: The Sino-Japanese War: The Clash of Western and Eastern Civilizations on Korean Soil*.

Translated by Yu Young-bun. Seoul: Sallim Publishing Co.

Chun Sun-chun. 2006. *The Sino-Japanese War*. Translated by Jo Yang-wook. Seoul: Se-Kyung Publishing Co. Secondary Sources

Cheon Sun-cheon. 2006. *The Sino-Japanese War*. Translated by Jo Yang-wook. Seoul: Se-gyeong Publishing Company. Secondary Source.

Kim Kyung-rok. 2018. *The Sino-Japanese War and Japan's Military Occupation*. Seoul: Ministry of National Defense

Institute of Military History

Kim Seok-gu. 2014. *The Sino-Japanese War: Focusing on International Relations in the 19th Century, Major Battles, and Political Outcomes*. Gyeryong: Army Military Research Institute.

Wang Hyeon-jong. 2009. *Mutual Strategies of Joseon, China, and Japan during the Sino-Japanese War*. Seoul:

Wang Hyeon-jong. 2009. *The Mutual Strategies of China, Japan, and Korea during the Sino-Japanese War*. Seoul:

Northeast Asian History Foundation. Yu In-seon, Kim Byung-jun, et al. 2014. *Asia Seen Through Historical Records*. Seoul:

Withus Book.

Little Archibald. 1903. *Li Hung-chang: His Life and Times*. London:

Cassell.