How the Prepared Seize Opportunity! East Asian International Politics in the 17th-18th Centuries Through Japanese Ceramics

Kyushu Ceramic Museum · Kim Do-hyun · Yonsei University

Introduction

Unlike the first day, when it rained steadily, the morning of the second day, as we headed to Tozan Shrine, was exceptionally sunny and warm. Some of you may be wondering what connection ceramics, shrines, and international politics might have. Today will be an opportunity to delve into that connection. The Tozan Shrine, to which we headed this morning, is dedicated to Yi Sam-pyeong, a potter who was (forcibly) relocated from Joseon to Japan during the Imjin War. The term (forcibly) relocated is used here because, while there are differing opinions among Korean and Japanese scholars as to whether the potters' migration at the time was a forced abduction or a voluntary relocation, from a Korean perspective, it can clearly be seen as forced relocation. According to records, after the Imjin War, numerous Joseon potters were brought in by Nabeshima Naoshige, the lord of the former Hizen Province. In 1616, the Joseon potter Yi Sam-pyeong discovered kaolin, a crucial raw material for porcelain production, in Izumiyama, and developed advanced ceramic technology.

producing porcelain that required high-temperature firing above 1,300℃. At the time, this was the highest level of technology. Like semiconductors today, the ceramics industry was a highly technology-intensive industry and a source of significant profit from foreign trade. Thanks to Yi Sam-pyeong, Japan acquired ceramic production technology that generated substantial profits from trade with Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. The Tozan Shrine, which we visited this morning, is dedicated to Yi Sam-pyeong, the ancestor of ceramics. At the shrine,

we found a shrine dedicated to him.

A ten-minute walk uphill from Tozan Shrine leads to the Tozō Yi Sam-pyeong Monument, which honors him. This illustrates the high status Yi Sam-pyeong holds in Japan, where he is revered as the 'God of Ceramics'.

However, was possessing advanced technology a sufficient condition for the prosperity of Japan's ceramics industry? Among the East Asian countries—China, Joseon, and Japan—that possessed advanced ceramic production technology at the time, why was Japanese ceramics particularly favored by European countries in the 17th and 18th centuries? We sought to examine the dynamic rise and fall of Japan's ceramic trade over two centuries through its relationship with the Dutch East India Company (VOC). The Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), established in 1602 and dissolved in 1799, was the world's largest trading company throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. While Britain and France also established their own East India Companies and attempted trade with Asia, the VOC played the most crucial role, at least through the 17th century and the early 18th century. A peculiar aspect of the VOC's ceramic trade during this period is that a significant portion of the ceramic trade from China to Europe began to shift rapidly to Japan from the mid-17th century onwards. Furthermore, the trade volume with the VOC, which had been rising dramatically, significantly decreased in the 18th century. Observing this anomaly, I developed several questions, which I hoped to resolve through this field trip. Why did the VOC fall in love with Japanese ceramics rather than Joseon ceramics? And why did the VOC's affection for Japanese ceramics, which lasted for 50 years, gradually wane? Did it find another object of affection? Or were both destined to accept a tragic fate?

Parting with Chinese Ceramics: The VOC Turns Its Gaze

The reason the VOC could not help but fall in love with Japanese ceramics was due to China's political background. In fact, before trading with Japan, the VOC was already enamored with Chinese ceramics. However, trade that began in the late Ming Dynasty could not last due to the turmoil of the Ming-Qing transition. The political transformation in East Asia, symbolized by the Ming-Qing transition in the 17th century, led to the destruction of Jingdezhen, a major ceramic production center, and the closure of various imperial kilns, causing disruptions in the supply of high-quality Chinese ceramics. This resulted in a temporary crack in China's monopolistic ceramic industry structure. At that time, the VOC was compelled to find new alternatives to meet the growing demand for high-quality ceramics in Europe. Ultimately, due to China's political circumstances, the VOC chose Japanese ceramics as a substitute for Chinese ceramics.

Chinese blue-and-white porcelain was first imported in large quantities to the European market in 1602, coinciding with the VOC's full entry into the East Asian trade market. However, with the establishment of the Qing Dynasty in 1636 and the complete fall of the Ming Dynasty in 1644, all imperial kilns in China, including the Jingdezhen kilns, were closed by 1654. Furthermore, the rebellion of Wu Sangui in 1673 led to the destruction of most of the Jingdezhen kilns. Consequently, after the Qing Dynasty achieved domestic unification in 1683, there was an unstable period of about 40 years until exports became possible again in earnest after the lifting of the maritime ban in 1668 and the resumption of porcelain production in Jingdezhen in 1684. This instability in Chinese porcelain production directly led importing countries like the Netherlands to seek new alternatives. According to T. Volker (1971), "When the VOC approached the Ming Dynasty, it was already nearing its end, having been supplanted by the Qing Dynasty. In 1644, the Manchus replaced the Ming Dynasty and established the Qing Dynasty with Beijing as its capital. The Manchus sought to reach agreements with the Dutch on trade and Formosa on several occasions. The Manchu government even promised to restore Formosa to the VOC on the condition that they expel Koxinga from Formosa and the South China Sea." During the chaotic period of the Ming-Qing transition, the VOC was in a position where it had to navigate the conflicting relationship between the Ming successor, Koxinga, and the Qing Dynasty to succeed in trade. This was an unfavorable situation for the VOC. The Qing Dynasty promised the VOC advantages in future trade with China if they captured Taiwan, then held by Koxinga. At that time, political relations were more important than economic relations, such as trade, with China. Taking advantage of this export vacuum in Chinese ceramics, Japan, a latecomer in the East Asian ceramics industry, rapidly grew as a new supplier of high-quality ceramics through the VOC's intermediary trade. The Chinese vacuum provided a crucial opportunity for Japanese ceramics to emerge in the global market as a substitute for Chinese ceramics.

Japanese Ceramics Flourish in Arita and Imari

Japan's ceramics industry, which grew by exploiting China's structural vacuum, did not miss the opportunity. Instead, it attracted European consumers by highlighting its technical distinctiveness from Chinese ceramics. According to T. Volker (1971), the VOC actively placed orders with Japan, going beyond simply purchasing finished products, to guide the production of ceramics desired in the European market.

to produce ceramics desired in the European market

ornate ceramic bowls

At that time,

a wide variety of ceramics, including not only blue-and-white porcelain, which was the most basic demand in the ceramic market, but also polychrome ceramics, were exported in large quantities for various uses and shapes. The distinctiveness of Japanese products, tailored to European demand, led to the 'Japonisme' trend in Europe in the 19th century. The acquisition of technology by Japan to produce blue-and-white porcelain that met the VOC's requests was greatly facilitated by the Joseon potters who were (forcibly) relocated to Japan. Ceramic technology from Joseon was transmitted to Japan, forming the foundational basis for Japan's ceramic trade.

According to Kim Yu-jeong's (2017) network analysis, various forms of ceramics were initiated by Joseon potters. After Yi Sam-pyeong, a Joseon potter, discovered kaolin in Izumiyama in 1616 and began producing porcelain requiring advanced ceramic technology, Japanese export ceramics gained immense popularity in Europe, not as blue-and-white porcelain, but as polychrome ceramics in the distinct red Kakiemon or Ko-Imari styles. Furthermore, in the 18th century, ceramics called Chinese Imari, which imitated the Japanese Arita-Imari style, became popular in the European market, marking the peak of Japanese ceramic technology. Arita and Imari were the primary settlements where potters migrated within Japan. Consequently, Arita and Imari became the leading ceramic production centers for Japanese export ceramics in the 17th century. Through the transmission of technology by numerous Joseon potters, Japan received significant assistance in establishing a new foundation for its ceramics industry.

Expansion of Foreign Trade Through the Opening of Nagasaki

However, these two political and technological backgrounds also apply to Joseon. The Ming-Qing transition was an opportunity for both Joseon and Japan, and Joseon's technological capabilities were by no means inferior to Japan's. So, what was the decisive factor that differentiated the ceramics industries of Japan and Joseon?

The difference can be found in Japan's economic background. Dejima in Nagasaki, which served as the export port for Japanese ceramics, acted as a crucial channel for continuous communication with the Netherlands. This is where we visited on the first day. Dejima is an artificial island constructed over two years starting in 1634 by 25 influential merchants from the Nagasaki region. Through this unique channel, Dejima, Japan maintained continuous exchange and interaction with the Netherlands, unlike other East Asian countries, even under a general policy of seclusion. While Japan maintained its traditional trade relations with Joseon and Ryukyu, it decreed that only Chinese and Dutch ships would be allowed to dock. In 1616, European ship ports were limited to Hirado and Nagasaki, and from 1635, only Nagasaki was permitted, and even then, only within the confined space of 'Dejima,' not the entire Nagasaki area. The situation in Joseon appears to have been very different. The story of Hamel, who arrived in Joseon when the Dutch ship Sperwer ran aground in 1648, is recorded in the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty as a significant event, suggesting that Joseon had no substantial interaction with European countries, including the Netherlands, at that time. The presence or absence of economic exchange made a significant difference for Joseon and Japan during the great geopolitical transition of the 17th and 18th centuries.

According to T. Volker (1971), Japan in the 17th century, when the Dutch first arrived, was in the period when the Tokugawa Shogunate government was formed in 1603.

The VOC established its first factory on the artificial island of Dejima in Nagasaki Port, first in Hirado from 1609 to 1641, and then in Dejima from 1641 to 1862. After 1641, the Netherlands was the only European country permitted to trade in Japan. Therefore, he assessed that these conditions for the Netherlands played a significant role in the special outcomes of Japanese ceramic production and trade.

The Anglo-Dutch Wars (1st-4th): The Decline of the VOC

Then, why did the VOC's vibrant ceramic trade with Japan suddenly decline? The first reason for the decrease in Japanese ceramic trade was the stagnation of the VOC, which lost its maritime supremacy to Britain through the 1st to 4th Anglo-Dutch Wars. According to C.J.A. Jörg (1984), "The only competitor of the Dutch East India Company in selling Chinese goods in Europe in the 17th century was the English London Company. Despite the Dutch advantageous position in Macao and Manila, the Portuguese and Spanish still transported Chinese porcelain virtually exclusively within their territories. The French and Danes, on the other hand, could profit from intermittent shipments. Like the Dutch East India Company, the English also attempted regular and direct trade with China but had to rely on Tongking, Bantam, Formosa, and other ports along the Malay Archipelago and the Indian coast to maintain their supply. They succeeded in trading with Siam but low-quality silk, goods in demand, and trade restrictions led them to abandon trade in 1689." Against this backdrop, Britain could not help but covet Dutch maritime dominance, and Britain and the Netherlands engaged in a power struggle over trade with China.

(Arita Town History Compilation Committee, 1988: cited from Watanabe Yoshiro, 2013)

The First Anglo-Dutch War, which began in 1652 with Britain's announcement of the Navigation Act restricting the activities of Dutch intermediary traders; the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667), triggered by the renewal of the Navigation Act in 1660 by the restored British monarchy and the occupation of Dutch colonies in the New World; and the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-1674), which broke out when Britain, allied with France through the Treaty of Dover, participated in the war between France and the Netherlands—these two nations fiercely competed for maritime dominance. Ultimately, the Third War marked the beginning of the decline of Dutch maritime power, and Britain began to actively engage in East Asian trade. As shown in the graph in Figure 1, the periods when the Anglo-Dutch Wars occurred were conditions under which Japanese ceramic trade could not be conducted at all. Therefore, the geopolitical relationship between Britain and the Netherlands over maritime power can be seen as having had a significant impact on the ceramic trade with Japan.

According to T. Volker (1971), after the end of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, prices in the Netherlands plummeted to the point where generating profit was impossible, and these losses continued. Although it seemed that trade with China, which had decreased, would increase prices and profits again in 1789, ships departing from Hong Kong in 1792 failed to reach the Netherlands due to the outbreak of war in Europe, leading the Netherlands down a path of decline. Ultimately, the Dutch defeat in the Fourth War directly contributed to the dissolution of the VOC in 1799, and Japan, the primary beneficiary of Dutch intermediary trade, also suffered.

The Resurgence of Jingdezhen and the Replacement of Japanese Ceramics

Another background for the VOC abandoning Japan in the 18th century was the resurgence of Jingdezhen. After the Qing Dynasty achieved domestic unification in 1683, porcelain production resumed in Jingdezhen in 1684, and Chinese goods, which had previously supplied the European market, began to flood back. According to Alessandro Giraudo (2016), in the 17th and 18th centuries, Jingdezhen had thousands of kilns, employing 50,000 to 60,000 potters. This suggests that even if Japan's production increased rapidly during China's production vacuum, the resurgence of China, which had already secured sufficient production bases and technology, likely threatened Japan's ceramic trade.

According to C.J.A. Jörg (1984), "After the stabilization of the Manchu regime in 1683 and the annexation of Formosa by the Chinese Empire, Malacca, Manila, Japan, and the Malay Archipelago were completely freed. Although limited to a permit system, trade with China by foreigners was then permitted. The Dutch government had the opportunity to obtain Chinese goods at prices not much higher than domestic Chinese prices, without causing shipping problems or needing to procure Dutch vessels. They encouraged Chinese merchants to increase trade with Batavia, and trade could cease when the flow of goods was sufficient to meet their demand for Chinese products." This indicates that trade with the VOC was highly favorable to the Netherlands after the unification of the Qing Dynasty. Consequently, the VOC no longer needed to limit its trade to Japanese merchants, and this became an opportunity for the VOC to gain a superior position in trade with both Japan and China.

Decreased Demand for Ceramics Due to the Transmission of Ceramic Technology to Europe

A third background factor is the transmission of ceramic technology to Europe. While Delft in the Netherlands enjoyed prosperity from the 1640s to the 1740s by imitating Chinese blue-and-white porcelain, the secret of Chinese porcelain manufacturing was finally revealed in Meissen, Germany, in 1709, with the creation of Europe's first hard-paste porcelain. The European ceramic technology, finally secured through the efforts of Frederick Augustus II, could have become a reason why Europe no longer needed to rely on China and Japan for porcelain production. Subsequently, European ceramics, through Sèvres in France and Jasperware in England, developed the capacity to produce ceramics with designs tailored to European tastes. Notably, after the Industrial Revolution, Britain achieved mass production of ceramics. This transmission of technology to Europe served as a background for the decline in the VOC's imports of Japanese ceramics.

According to Robert Finlay (2010), "As it became difficult to meet Europe's explosive demand for porcelain and the supply of silver became insufficient, various kings and regional rulers competed to develop and invest in white porcelain production themselves. Amidst active efforts to create high-purity white porcelain, the first white porcelain of the same quality as that imported from China's Ming Dynasty was produced in Meissen, Saxony, Germany, in 1710. With the discovery of high-quality kaolin mines in Selitz and Kemmlitz, northwest of Meissen along the Elbe River, Meissen's white porcelain production entered its golden age. Shortly after Meissen became the first in Europe to produce hard-paste porcelain, it expanded its production facilities to meet the growing demand. From Sèvres in France in 1740, and Royal Copenhagen in Denmark (1727), porcelain production technology spread. The ceramic technology revolution that began in Meissen subsequently spread throughout Europe, and as Europe gained the ability to produce ceramics that suited its own cultural styles, the demand for Japanese ceramics naturally decreased. Comparing this with Figure 1, Japanese ceramic exports sharply declined from the 1720s, when European ceramic technology began to spread in earnest. Ultimately, Japanese ceramic technology was transmitted to Europe, creating new cultural styles, and this can be seen as creating another culture where ceramics exported through VOC intermediary trade were produced and consumed within Europe.

Conclusion: The Necessity of Complex Diplomatic Strategies

The VOC's Japanese ceramic trade in the 17th and 18th centuries illustrates how the transmission of ceramic technology, then considered the highest form of cultural technology, and the structure of international politics influenced the ceramic trade between the Netherlands and Japan. The structural vacuum following the turmoil of the Ming-Qing transition in the early 17th century, until the Qing unification of China in 1683 and the resumption of ceramic production in Jingdezhen in 1684, was a significant factor enabling Japan, despite being a latecomer in ceramic technology, to expand its trade with Europe through the VOC. This allowed Japan to reach the pinnacle of its ceramic technology. However, the background that enabled Japan to leverage this international political structure was the prior transmission of Joseon ceramic technology to Japan through the (forced) relocation of Joseon potters during the Imjin War, and economically, Japan had the foundation of not delaying its opening to foreign trade centered around the unique trading post of Dejima. These political, economic, and technological factors served as conditions that allowed a nation, even from a disadvantaged position as a latecomer, to overcome its inferiority and achieve development during a period of international order disruption.

Furthermore, the intermittent interruptions in VOC-Japan ceramic trade in the mid-17th century, and its gradual decline in the late 17th century, can also be explained by political, economic, and technological factors. The Anglo-Dutch Wars, which first broke out in 1652, culminated in the 4th war from 1780-1784 and served as a major cause for the dissolution of the VOC in 1799. The ensuing power struggle between the Netherlands and Britain in the East Asian seas directly impacted Japan's ceramic exports, which had entered the European market through the VOC as a bridgehead. Moreover, after the Qing Dynasty's unification of China in 1683 and the resumption of ceramic production in Jingdezhen in 1684, the return of China, the established power in the ceramic market, resulted in a relative reduction of Japan's ceramic position. Lastly, just as the rapid growth of Japanese ceramic technology, spurred by the transmission of Joseon ceramic technology to Japan, contributed to Japan's prosperity, European ceramic technology, which began in Meissen in 1709, also advanced and reached a turning point through mass production as it spread to new cultural spheres, including the Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark, and eventually Britain.

The expansion and contraction of Japan's ceramics industry in the 17th-18th centuries, in relation to the VOC, can be explained by the same political, economic, and technological factors. This indicates that the economic exchanges of various countries, including contemporary South Korea, are not solely explained by the technological prowess of a single industry but have a high potential to change depending on the current international political and economic environment. Therefore, by fully recognizing how the transmission of technology and the political and economic conditions of the time will influence the future international political structure, and based on lessons from the past, we must establish complex diplomatic strategies for the 21st century.

Bibliography Kim Yu-jeong. 2017. "The Emergence of 17th Century Japanese Ceramics and the Dynamics of Market Fluctuations –

A Political Economy Study of Technology and Cultural Transmission" Master's thesis, Seoul National University.

Master's thesis.

Misugi Takatoshi. 2001. *History of East-West Ceramic Exchange: The Road to Meissen*,

translated by Kim In-gyu. Seoul: Nulwa.

Alessandro Giraudo. 2016. *When Iron Was More Expensive Than Gold: Stories of Economic History of Shock and Oblivion*,

translated by Song Gi-hyeong. Seoul: Ggachi.

Watanabe, Yoshiro. 2013. “Overseas Exports of Hizen Ceramics and

the Port of Nagasaki.” <Locality Humanities> vol. 10, 241-255. C.J.A. Jörg. 1982. Porcelain and the Dutch China trade. Dordrecht:

Springer.

Robert Finlay. 1998. “The Pilgrim Art: The Culture of Porcelain in

World History.” <Journal of World History> vol. 9, 141-187. T. Volker. 1954. Porcelain and the Dutch East India Company. Leiden:

E. J. Brill.