Between the Memory of Victimhood and Perpetration

Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum · Jeong Yun-ju · Seoul National University

Introduction

The first site visited during the Sarangbang 11 Kyushu field trip was the Atomic Bomb Museum located in Nagasaki. We traveled for two hours from Fukuoka Airport to our first destination, the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. On the way to the museum, we felt a mixture of excitement and a somewhat heavy heart as we anticipated learning about the history of that fateful day in 1945 through presentations and our visit. The most significant lesson learned throughout the semester from Professor Ha Young-sun, while studying the history and lineage of international politics, was that international politics is ultimately about the relationships between people and nations aimed at peace. In that sense, it is crucial for fostering peace in human society to understand and reflect on the atomic bomb, a central element of 20th-century imperialism and the subsequent Cold War world order, from an international political perspective. Therefore, my feelings were a mix of excitement and solemnity as I prepared for the first presentation and field trip focused on the Atomic Bomb Museum. My studies had primarily focused on the United States as the main actor in the atomic bombing, and I pondered how we, the 21st-century Sarangbang participants with memories of colonial rule over Korea by Japan, should approach and study Japan's perspective as the 'world's only atomic-bombed nation' during our field trip. With these thoughts, we headed to the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. The field trip was planned to include visits to the Atomic Bomb Museum, Nagasaki Peace Park, and the memorial for Korean victims of the atomic bombing.

The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, sent shockwaves of horror across Japan and the world. The bombing of Hiroshima resulted in the deaths of 66,000 Japanese from the explosion and subsequent fires, while the bomb dropped on Nagasaki three days later instantly killed 40,000 people. Simultaneously, the atomic bombs shaped a new order between the United States and Japan, serving as a catalyst that ended World War II and ushered in the Cold War era. Korea also experienced significant changes due to Japan's atomic bombings. As a colony of the Japanese Empire at the time, Korea achieved liberation involuntarily with Japan's unconditional surrender, and the Korean Peninsula subsequently became a battleground of the Cold War.

The first exhibit at the Atomic Bomb Museum

was an old clock stopped at 11:02 AM on August 9, 1945, the exact time the atomic bomb was dropped. While touring the Atomic Bomb Museum, which presents the tragedy from a Japanese perspective, I found myself contemplating whether the U.S. atomic bombing was truly necessary. This question remains a subject of debate in academia, with three main perspectives.

The academic community holds three perspectives

on this issue, which is still debated. The first perspective is the traditionalist view, which posits that the U.S. atomic bombing was an unavoidable measure to end the war. The second is the revisionist view, which argues that the bombing was strategically employed to establish U.S. geopolitical dominance. The third is the moderate view (Middle ground view), which seeks to reconcile the first two. While no single perspective can be definitively declared as correct, this paper aims to explain the background of the atomic bombing, drawing upon the arguments of revisionism, which offers insights into the hidden dynamics of international politics surrounding the event that traditional history textbooks have not revealed. Specifically, I will attempt to discern the intentions of the U.S. government through the personal letters of then-U.S. President Truman and the Potsdam diary discovered in 1979.

The perspectives can be summarized as the traditionalist view, which posits that the U.S. atomic bombings were an inevitable measure to end the war; the revisionist view, which argues in contrast that the atomic bombings were strategically used to secure American international political dominance; and a third view, the middle ground view, which reconciles the two. While none of these perspectives can be definitively declared as the sole truth, this paper aims to explain the hidden background of international politics surrounding the atomic bombings based on the revisionist argument, delving into aspects not previously covered in history textbooks. Specifically, this explanation will seek to understand the intentions of the U.S. government through the handwritten letters of then-U.S. President Truman and the Potsdam diary, discovered in 1979.

The United States' Ambition to Reshape the Post-War Order

Following the sudden death of President Roosevelt, his successor, Truman, established the Interim Committee. This committee, comprising 28 key figures involved in the Manhattan Project, was tasked with deciding whether to use the atomic bomb. The Interim Committee functioned as the de facto body responsible for deciding on and justifying the atomic bombing. In a meeting on May 31, the committee concluded that the United States should maintain a monopoly on nuclear weapons. Subsequently, on June 1, 1945, the committee decided to drop the atomic bomb on Japan without prior warning. The rationale presented was that an unannounced bombing would maximize its impact, and that the U.S. held a three-to-ten-year lead over the Soviet Union in nuclear manufacturing capabilities, thus persuading the committee to approve the bombing. Later, on June 21, the Interim Committee began identifying two target areas within Japan, focusing on regions with significant military industrial activity.

Truman's actions reveal the United States' objectives in concretizing post-war solutions among the great powers who were planning and anticipating the post-World War II landscape. The Grand Alliance against Japan was not bound by strong ties, leading to differing perspectives among nations in shaping the post-war geopolitical map. Notably, the United States' primary future adversary in leading the post-war order was its current ally, the Soviet Union. Against this international political backdrop, scholar Gar Alperovitz argues that the U.S. dropped the atomic bomb to demonstrate its military superiority over the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States is a continental power, geographically separated from the war-torn regions of Europe. Consequently, while not facing significant military disadvantages such as becoming a direct battlefield, the U.S. desired to exert influence beyond its continent in the post-war era. The United States, aiming to influence global intellectual currents, likely envisioned a grand strategy for the post-Cold War world order. This ambition, contrary to the traditionalist argument, is suggested by some scholars as leading to the tragic decision to drop the atomic bomb unnecessarily.

Japan's Impending Surrender

During the Pacific War, Emperor Hirohito's imperial rescript on September 7, 1944, urged the nation to "renew our resolve and strengthen our unity to rise up" and continue the war, indicating a strong will to fight. However, as the war situation evolved, Japan's stance began to shift. The most significant change was Germany's unconditional surrender. While the war in Europe concluded with Germany's surrender on May 9, 1945, the Japanese Empire persisted in its commitment to war. Concurrently, the international landscape was nearing its end, with various alliances and pacts in play, including the Potsdam Conference held in Potsdam, Germany. This conference brought together the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain—Stalin, Truman, and Churchill—to discuss and establish the post-World War II world order. One of Truman's primary objectives at Potsdam was to secure Stalin's commitment, as promised at Yalta, for the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan. Hasegawa's diversified research, which includes the Soviet Union and Japan and analyzes this critical summer of 1945, is significant for its focus on actors beyond the United States and indirectly strengthens the revisionist position. Hasegawa's analysis suggests that the Soviet Union's entry into the war was more crucial than the bombing of Hiroshima in compelling Japan's surrender. While the bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet Union's declaration of war on August 8, two days later, combined to lead to Japan's surrender, Hasegawa argues that the Soviet entry had a greater impact. This is because the Soviet Union's entry and the abrogation of the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan eliminated Japan's options for seeking peace through diplomatic cooperation with the Soviet Union. In essence, this supports the revisionist view that President Truman could have avoided using the horrific weapon of the atomic bomb had he simply waited for the Soviet Union's intervention.

Above all, Japan was well aware of its disadvantageous position in the ongoing war. Truman's diary entry on July 18 reveals that he received a telegram from the Japanese Emperor seeking peace. Truman's diary entry of July 18 mentions a "telegram from Jap emperor asking for peace," indicating that Truman was aware of Japan's situation, which involved considering surrender under the condition that the Japanese Emperor would not abdicate.

Absence of Military Disadvantage

When the United States first developed the atomic bomb and decided to use it, the intention was to employ it against Germany. Believing Germany to be ahead in atomic bomb research, the U.S. hastily began conceptualizing and researching nuclear weapons. According to the atomic bomb scientist Szilard, they initially developed the bomb as a means to counter Germany, but confessed that their objective became obsolete with Germany's surrender. However, despite the fact that many U.S. policymakers and scientists anticipated Germany posing an atomic bomb threat, Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945. Even after losing their primary justification for developing the atomic bomb—to counter Germany—the acceleration of atomic bomb research continued.

Then why did Truman believe that "half a million" American lives were at stake? In his 1955 memoir, Truman testified that the atomic bombing was necessary to "save American lives," stating, "it might cost half a million American lives to force the enemy’s surrender on his homegrounds." This aligns with the traditionalist perspective, which views the atomic bombing as an unavoidable choice to save American lives and a justifiable means to secure Japan's surrender. However, during a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House on June 18, military officials predicted that the number of American casualties from continued warfare would be "relatively inexpensive." In contrast, Truman's diary entry on June 17 reveals his contemplation of how to approach Japan. General Curtis LeMay argued for the justification of bombing Japan by stating that Japanese civilians were aiding in the production of military supplies, and that if Japanese industry was not destroyed, an invasion of Japan would be necessary, leading to the loss of many American lives. He estimated that at least 5 million American lives would be lost. Thus, torn between the lives of Japanese and Americans, he decided to drop the bomb, stating, "there are no civilians in Japan."

The revisionist perspective refutes the traditionalist argument that the atomic bomb was dropped as an unavoidable measure to end the war, citing that the total number of American casualties in the wars against Japan and Germany did not exceed 300,000. Geographically, the United States, located far from the main theaters of war in Europe and East Asia, experienced no significant attacks beyond the initial assault on Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, the United States benefited economically from the war; its Gross Domestic Product doubled within four years of the war's commencement. The U.S. economy, fueled by wartime production, was in a strategically advantageous position. While occasional Japanese air raids occurred, there is little historical record to suggest they significantly impacted American military or economic capabilities. This wartime context suggests that the decision to hastily drop the atomic bomb on Japan was not militarily inevitable, contrary to the traditionalist claims.

Commemorating Other Victims

After visiting the main building of the Atomic Bomb Museum and Nagasaki Peace Park, we proceeded to the memorial for Korean victims of the atomic bombing, which was discreetly located within the park. Erected on August 9, 1979, by the Nagasaki Association for the Protection of the Rights of Koreans in Japan, this memorial was situated in a secluded area of the park. Without any signage, we found the information board to be heavily worn, with faded inscriptions. The memorial commemorates approximately 10,000 Koreans who died in the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and 20,000 who were exposed to radiation. The inscription reads, "We, nameless Japanese people, have erected this memorial for the approximately 10,000 Koreans who lived tragic lives in Nagasaki."

As we followed the contrasting perspectives on the atomic bombing, one of the most tragic events in human history, we naturally began to reflect on the importance of remembering and learning from history. When I first encountered and studied this history, modern and contemporary history felt overwhelmingly oppressive. This was because, despite the tangled knots of the past ensnaring the present, the current older generation seemed reluctant to untangle them.

The victimhood of the atomic bomb

visiting the memorial for Korean victims of the atomic bombing

a scene of commemoration

country, but also remembered as a perpetrator of imperialism,

Japan possesses a dual historical narrative. Consequently, victimized nations that experienced colonial rule and invasion by Japan hold different memories of Japan. The Yasukuni Shrine, frequently mentioned in the media, is a prime example. Japan's rhetoric, which suggests that its colonial rule and imperial expansion were possible simply due to its power, without reflecting on its imperialistic past, poses a significant obstacle to maintaining positive relations with victimized nations. The Atomic Bomb Museum, despite Japan's role as an imperial perpetrator, focused on its experience as a victim of the atomic bombing. Being bombed does not justify 36 years of colonial rule over Korea. However, we live in a rational human society that must strive to prevent the recurrence of tragic events, and it is imperative to remember that historical reflection is the starting point. Past wrongdoings must be rectified through national or international solidarity. From the perspective of victimized nations, the reflection is often perceived as insufficient relative to the harm suffered. Therefore, we must examine the atomic bombing from various angles. Traditionalism, revisionism, and a third perspective can all hold elements of truth, much like Japan's history as both perpetrator and victim.

Visiting the memorial for Korean victims of the atomic bombing particularly highlighted the importance of the narrative constructed by Korea in the context of the atomic bombing's history. As scholar John Dower emphasizes the importance of conveying "the feelings that Japan must have felt 'from the inside'" when narrating Japan's atomic bombing experience, we too need to offer a new historical narrative by viewing the atomic bombing through the eyes of Koreans at the time of liberation in 1945. From Korea's perspective, the atomic bombing led to Japan's defeat, and thus history has largely been interpreted as the atomic bomb of liberation, a gift of freedom. However, we must further consider whether this tragic event, which brought liberation, should be welcomed, given that Koreans directly suffered physical and psychological damage from the bomb and subsequently endured the tragedies of the Cold War. Furthermore, Korea, which has often focused on victimhood in international politics, must also reflect on its experiences as both victim and perpetrator. The crimes committed by Korean troops against Vietnamese civilians during the Vietnam War serve as a pertinent example. In the international arena, an actor is not always a force for good. At different times, an actor can be perceived as either good or evil. Therefore, just as we should not be confined to a single perspective like traditionalism or revisionism, we must constantly examine both victim and perpetrator experiences to strive towards becoming a just actor in the international community. With this resolve, I concluded my day in Nagasaki. References: Na Jong-nam, Park Il-song. 2007. "Discussion on the Truman Administration's Plans for Ending the Pacific War: The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb from June to August 1945." *Western History Review* 36: 85-123.

Discussion on the Truman Administration's Plans for Ending the Pacific War: The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb from June to August 1945.

Lee Wan-beom. 2005. "Truman and the Northeast Asian Cold War." *Journal of American History* 21: 69-103.

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