The Meeting of Mao and Stalin, and the Beginning of Their Schemes

Mao Zedong Memorial Hall · Kim Ho-in · Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Introduction

The start of the final day of Sarangbang's 10th expedition was the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall. As a testament to the authority that still absolutely remains in the Chinese constitution, the sight of Chinese people lining up from dawn was a spectacle rarely seen in Korea. After a long wait, we were able to see the famous revolutionary in person in the center of the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall. Mao Zedong's embalmed body, preserved and enshrined, felt somewhat unreal, but the prestige he still holds in the hearts of the Chinese people was more tangible than anything read in books. The Mao Zedong Memorial Hall is located directly in front of Tiananmen Square. And Mao Zedong's portrait hangs on Tiananmen. Currently, only his portrait is displayed, but during the Cultural Revolution, portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin were also displayed. Among these, Stalin was a figure who actually met Mao Zedong. Their meeting was a significant event in the construction of the East Asian order during the Cold War, so understanding the schemes that formed in their minds became my goal for this expedition.

Why Did Mao Not Become Asia's Tito in 1950?

Shortly after the proclamation of the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, in December, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the largest communist state in East Asia, visited Moscow to celebrate Stalin's 70th birthday. The result of that meeting was the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. This marked the official beginning of China's 'one-sided policy' towards the Soviet Union, which lasted for the next ten years. However, such an outcome was completely unpredictable until recently. A US Department of State analysis report from late 1948, as the Chinese Civil War was drawing to a close, concluded as follows:

Given that Mao has held power for nearly ten times longer than Tito,

Moscow faces the enormous task of trying to bring the Chinese Communist

Party under complete Soviet domination. In other words, the US government was making a tremendous mistake in believing that China would become Asia's Tito (J. B. Tito). In June 1948, Tito, the communist ruler of Yugoslavia, broke ties with Stalin but soon received economic aid from the United States. The defection of Yugoslavia, a loyal ally of the Soviet Union, dealt a significant blow to the communist bloc countries while also serving as a buffer zone in the Cold War order. Like Mao, Tito, who seized power based on his own strength, did not rely on Stalin's support to maintain his rule. Therefore, Stalin's attempt to subordinate Yugoslavia to the legitimacy of the Cominform enraged him. The United States believed that Mao would follow in Tito's footsteps. However, at a time when the Cold War was being structured in Europe, shortly after the end of World War II, the Chinese Communist Party advocated a one-sided policy towards the Soviet Union, joined the communist bloc, and clearly declared that there was no middle ground. In July 1949, Stalin also proposed a 'second front' in Asia to the Chinese delegation from Beijing, which the United States had been concerned about (Gaddis 2010, 55-63).

Therefore, it is necessary to shed light on why Mao returned with a different conclusion from Stalin's meeting compared to Tito. This is because the formation of the 'second front' indirectly led to the Korean War, which was the first hot war of the Cold War and one of the greatest tragedies of Korean international politics. We will focus on the context of the early period after the end of World War II, which has been overlooked, particularly Mao's mindset. Specifically, we will trace the causes based on primary sources such as Mao Zedong's writings and speeches after World War II and the 'Making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance' Collection at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

The Issue of China's Representation Before and After the Anti-Japanese War

Mao was not initially Stalin's negotiating partner. Since taking office as President of the Executive Yuan in 1935, Chiang Kai-shek had controlled the diplomatic authority of the Chinese Nationalist Government. At a time when China's international status as one of the 'Four Great Powers' was being institutionalized, the increase in the Communist Party's strength raised the issue of China's representation. (Kawashima Shin, Mori Kazuko 2011, 117-137) Mao's Communist Party, having already fought one civil war, sought to reject the representation of China held by Chiang Kai-shek. The claim for independent command of the Red Army was made in the same context. In 1945, Chiang ordered the Communist army to halt all actions and obey his command. Naturally, Mao refused, viewing it as a prelude to civil war. What is noteworthy is that the logic he employed was based on contemporary international norms. For example, a Xinhua News Agency commentary on August 13, 1945, argued that Commander-in-Chief Zhu De's order was a strict implementation of Article 2 of the Potsdam Declaration, which stated, 'Continue the war against Japan until Japan ceases its resistance,' and that Chiang had violated it. Furthermore, it declared:

We declare to the people of the whole country and the peoples of the world that the Chongqing high command

cannot represent the Chinese people and the true anti-Japanese forces of China. The Chinese people

demand that the anti-Japanese forces in the Chinese liberated areas, under the command of Commander-in-Chief Zhu De,

directly dispatch their representatives to participate in the acceptance of Japan's surrender by the Four Allied Powers

and in the military administration of Japan, and also to participate in the future peace conference.

If this is not implemented,

the Chinese people will consider it extremely unjust.

(Mao Zedong 2008, 31-32). In a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek on August 16, 1945, Mao also emphasized that his views were completely aligned with those of the Allied powers such as Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union (Mao Zedong 2008, 39). Through this series of discursive actions, he appears to have sought to secure international 'legitimacy' for the Chinese Communist Party.

Mao's Pro-Soviet Stance from the Early Stages of the Chinese Civil War

As examined above, when Japan's surrender signaled the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945, the possibility of another civil war emerged. From this period onward, Mao appears to have already considered the Soviet Union as a potential partner. He frequently expressed the view that the revolutionary forces for victory in China's civil war were determined by both domestic and international factors, often pointing to great power politics along with the peoples of various countries. The driving forces of this great power politics are composed of the distribution of power (polarity) among leading states, the types of amity and enmity between great powers, the degree of participation and intervention by great powers, and the specific social tendencies of great powers regarding security levels (Buzan, Barry; Hansen, Lene 2010, 103). Mao was precisely aware of the bipolar division of global power balance in the early Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. He also evaluated the Soviet Union's military contribution to the end of the Anti-Japanese War and sought to politically leverage its influence in the upcoming domestic struggle. In a speech to cadres in Yan'an on August 13, 1945, Mao stated the following:

The Soviet Union has sent troops, and the Red Army has come to help the Chinese people who are driving out the

aggressors, which is unprecedented in Chinese history. The influence stemming from this is immeasurable. The propaganda organs of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek are trying to nullify the political influence of the Red Army with two atomic bombs.

However, they cannot nullify it. It is not an easy task. Can the atomic bomb

solve the war? It cannot. Could the atomic bomb make Japan surrender? It could not. Without the people's struggle, the atomic bomb alone would be of no help whatsoever. If the atomic bomb could solve the war, why

would it be necessary to ask the Soviet Union to send troops? Why did Japan, which did not surrender even after two atomic bombs were dropped, surrender as soon as the Soviet Union sent troops?

Some of our comrades consider the atomic bomb to be a great thing,

but this is a very mistaken idea.

(Mao Zedong 2008, 26)

The enmity between the US and the Soviet Union in the early Cold War stemmed significantly from ideological differences, in addition to the power distribution. More precisely, the ideological differences amplified the threat perceived by each side regarding the other's power resources. For Mao, who claimed to be a Marxist-Leninist, international politics was not just a struggle of physical violence but also a battle of ideologies. He sought Soviet support, which he expected to be ideologically friendly. In the speech above, Mao presented self-reliance and worldwide anti-imperialist solidarity as the policy to respond to the given situation. By using the term 'imperialism,' the Chinese Communist Party clearly distinguished between friendly, non-aggressive democratic-capitalist powers and those that were not (Snow, Edgar 1985, 124). Under this classification, Mao defined the United States as an imperialist power. He argued that US imperialism sought to subjugate China by supporting Chiang Kai-shek. This aligns with Novikov's (N. Novikov) 1946 report, which viewed the opposing side as an expansionist state. Therefore, Mao actively pursued friendly relations with the Soviet Union, with which he shared a common identity. Furthermore, Mao believed that the degree of US and Soviet involvement in the East Asian region would be limited, making a pro-Soviet stance a natural conclusion. This was because excessive Soviet military intervention would be fundamentally blocked, thus mitigating the security threat arising from geographical proximity. In this context, pursuing an alliance with the Soviet Union based on ideological amity would increase its utility. Mao anticipated that the Chinese Civil War would remain a localized conflict on a global scale at the end of World War II. The great powers would not have the capacity to immediately engage in a Third World War. On October 17, 1945, in his report to the Yan'an cadre meeting regarding the Chongqing negotiations, Mao expressed this view.

Would Japan, which did not surrender even when attacked, have surrendered soon after the Soviet Union's intervention?

Some of our comrades consider the atomic bomb to be a great thing,

this is a very mistaken idea.

(Mao Zedong 2008, 26)

Will a Third World War break out just because the London foreign ministers' meeting failed? That will not happen. World War II has just ended,

how can a Third World War break out? Capitalist countries and

socialist countries will still compromise on many international issues. This is

because compromise is advantageous. The proletariat of the whole world and

the people are resolutely opposed to anti-Soviet and anti-communist wars. In the last 30 years, two world wars have occurred; there was an interval of more than 20 years between World War I and World War II. In the 500,000-year history of humanity, world wars have only occurred in these

30 years.

(Mao Zedong 2008, 59) Prior to the end of World War II, the relationship between Mao and Stalin could hardly be described as friendly. Firstly, the tactic proposed by Wang Ming on behalf of the Comintern, 'Everything proceeds through the united front,' conflicted with Mao's tactic demanding an 'independent and autonomous position within the anti-Japanese national united front.' Mao's line of independence and autonomy, based on the actual situation in China during the previous Anti-Japanese War, was aimed not only at the Nationalist government but also at the Comintern and the Soviet leadership. From the Rectification Movement in Yan'an in February 1942, opposing formal directives from the Party and dogmatism, to the proposal of Mao Zedong Thought at the 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in April 1945, one of the goals was to eliminate the influence of Soviet forces within the Party and to expand the strength of the Chinese Communist Party autonomously (Shen Zhihua 2010, 81-82). However, after World War II, as the threat from the Soviet Union weakened, Mao actively pursued a pro-Soviet line internationally. This was because the expansion of US influence in East Asia made it difficult for the Soviet Union to restrain the independent line of the Chinese Communist Party. By April 1946, Mao pointed out in a secret document of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that the issue of relations between the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union was a matter of timing, not of compromise or rupture (Mao Zedong 2008, 83). In this situation, where the possibility of a full-scale war involving direct intervention by the United States and the Soviet Union was blocked, the only remaining scenario for him was likely a proxy war between the two countries. The question was, in what space would such conflict and competition unfold? While China's independent foreign policy of the 'intermediate zone' theory surfaced after 1958, the concept of the intermediate zone as a geopolitical space existed from the 1940s. Mao was a communist as well as a nationalist. As Edgar Snow described, he was a person with profound knowledge of Chinese classics (Snow, Edgar 1985, 112). Therefore, Mao's concept of space was likely significantly influenced by the traditional Sinocentric order. The concept of the intermediate zone can be inferred to originate from the concentric structure of the traditional tributary system. Just as in the Five Blessings tributary system established to deal with the 'barbarians' of the periphery, the states in the intermediate zone would have been regions that had to be traversed to head towards the Soviet Union in the center. On August 6, 1946, in a conversation with Anna Louise Strong, he argued that the United States would first subjugate the intermediate zone to wage a war against the Soviet Union.

there was an interval. In the 500,000-year history of humankind, World Wars have occurred only during this

30-year period.

(Mao Zedong 2008, 59) Prior to the end of World War II, the relationship between Mao and Stalin was difficult to characterize as friendly. Firstly, the tactic proposed by Wang Ming, representing the Comintern, of 'everything proceeds through the united front,' and Mao's tactic of demanding a 'self-reliant and independent stance within the anti-Japanese national united front' were in opposition. The self-reliant and independent line that Mao proposed based on the actual situation in China during the preceding Anti-Japanese War period can be said to have been aimed not only at the Nationalist government but also at the Comintern and the Soviet leadership. One of the goals from the Rectification Movement in Yan'an in February 1942, opposing formal directives from the Party and dogmatism, to the proposal of Mao Zedong Thought at the 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in April 1945, was to eliminate the influence of Soviet forces within the Party and to expand the power of the Communist Party of China independently (Shen Zhihua 2010, 81-82). However, after World War II, as the threat from the Soviet Union weakened, Mao actively pursued an internationally pro-Soviet line. This was because, to prevent the expansion of American influence in the East Asian region, a situation arose where it was difficult for the Soviet Union to restrain the independent line of the Chinese Communist Party's forces. By April 1946, Mao pointed out in a secret document of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that the relationship with the United States, Britain, and France on one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, was not a matter of compromise or rupture, but a matter of timing (Mao Zedong 2008, 83). In this context, with the possibility of direct full-scale war involving the United States and the Soviet Union blocked, the only scenario remaining for him would have been a proxy war between the two countries. The question then became the arena in which such conflicts and competition would unfold. The theory of the intermediate zone as an independent diplomatic policy line for China surfaced after 1958, but as a geopolitical space, the theory of the intermediate zone already existed from the 1940s. Mao was a communist as well as a nationalist. As Edgar Snow described, he was a person with profound knowledge of Chinese classics (Edgar Snow 1985, 112). Therefore, Mao's concept of space would have been significantly influenced by the traditional Sinocentric order. The concept of the intermediate zone can be inferred to have originated from the concentric structure of the traditional Tianxia (all-under-heaven) order. Just as in the Five Rites of the Tianxia order established to deal with the 'barbarians' of the periphery, the states in the intermediate zone would have been regions that had to be traversed to head towards the Soviet center. In a conversation with Anna Louise Strong on August 6, 1946, he argued that the United States would first subjugate the intermediate zone to wage a war against the Soviet Union.

The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a very vast territory, which includes Europe,

Asia, and Africa, with many capitalist countries and semi-colonial and colonial countries.

The reactionary faction of the United States cannot possibly attack the Soviet Union

before subjugating these countries. Currently, the United States controls a larger area in the Pacific than Britain previously controlled, and it dominates Japan,

the China ruled by the Kuomintang, half of Korea, and the South Pacific.

Furthermore, the United States has long dominated Central and South America,

and is attempting to dominate the entire British Empire and Western Europe.

Under various pretexts, the United States has deployed large-scale military forces in many countries.

Under various pretexts, large-scale military deployments were made in many countries

They are establishing military bases. The American revisionists say that the military bases they have already established or intend to establish around the world

are all aimed against the Soviet Union. It is true that these military bases are

aimed at the Soviet Union. However, the countries where these military bases are being established are the ones being invaded by the United States first and foremost.

are the ones being invaded by the United States first and foremost.

are the ones being invaded by the United States first and foremost.

(Mao Zedong 2008, 93-94) Within the international system where a communist world order centered around the Soviet Union was being constructed, China also found itself in a middle position. This was because the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek, as a friendly force of the United States, was considered to hold a status equivalent to American military bases opposing the Soviet Union. Within this external perspective, the presence of the United States would have posed a significant security threat to Mao, who was engaged in a war with the Kuomintang. Mao appears to have believed that the Soviet Union shared the same security perceptions.

Mao's persistent adherence to a pro-Soviet line was ultimately a matter of survival for the China he sought to establish. Security at this time had to encompass both internal struggles within the nation and external conflicts. The banner of 'revolution' served to strengthen the internal cohesion of the Chinese Communist Party's liberated areas. Simultaneously, it represented an identity that was subject to American containment and a source of legitimacy for seeking Soviet support.

In other words, for the Chinese Communist Party, which was still in an unstable state in 1946, 'revolution' was a parallel concept for pursuing security. Therefore, to guarantee survival, an entity that could politically and militarily support the success of 'revolution' was desperately needed. Mao, consequently, had no choice but to consider the spheres of international politics being shaped by ideology. In a situation where 'self-help' through internal balancing was difficult, an alliance with the Soviet Union within the same sphere, as an external balancing mechanism, was not an option but a necessity.

The attitudes of the US and the Soviet Union towards the Chinese Civil War

International politics unfolds through interaction, so the external perspective of Mao alone cannot explain the dynamics of foreign relations surrounding China at that time. The attitudes of the United States and the Soviet Union towards the Chinese Civil War also influenced subsequent international politics, so we will briefly examine both countries.

Although the United States supported the Kuomintang, it did not want China to become a one-party dictatorship under the Kuomintang. The original plan was for the Republic of China government to take over the areas previously occupied and ruled by Japan, establish a 'coalition government of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party' led by the Kuomintang, and enact a new constitution to make it a democratic country and a cooperative partner of the United States in East Asia. Indeed, in 1946, the Chinese Civil War briefly entered a lull under US mediation. However, as Soviet troops withdrew from Manchuria, the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communists over Manchuria intensified, and it is reported that the United States also abandoned its role as mediator in 1947 (Kawashima Shin and Mori Kazuko 2011, 148). Mao Zedong's conversation with American journalist Stilwell on September 29, 1946, suggests that the sincerity of US policy was doubted, as American mediation was carried out in parallel with aid to the Kuomintang (Mao Zedong 2008, 103-105).

The Soviet Union did not have high expectations for the Chinese Communist Party. Reviewing documents from the Woodrow Wilson Center, Soviet official foreign policy documents until 1947 primarily engaged with the Kuomintang government as the main negotiating partner. Stalin's ultimate goal was to ensure the full implementation of the Yalta Agreement in the Far East, thereby restoring all rights in China that Russia had lost in the Russo-Japanese War; ideological issues were at best a political tool for Stalin in handling diplomatic matters with the Kuomintang government (Shen Zhihua 2010, 88). While the presence of Soviet troops in Northeast China helped the Communist Party establish its base, it was not Stalin's strategic objective. Until the tide of the Chinese Civil War turned, the Chinese Communist Party was merely leverage for negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. In other words, for the Soviet Union, 'revolution' was merely a supplementary concept for security. This attitude of the Soviet Union appears to have caused considerable displeasure among Chinese Communist Party cadres subsequently.

A Period of Transition: 1947-1948

However, the Soviet Union's laissez-faire attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party changed in 1947. The cause can be found in the shifts within China's internal situation. A directive within the Chinese Communist Party dated September 16, 1946, indicates a move to transition from guerrilla warfare tactics, which were prevalent during the anti-Japanese period, to mobile warfare, which involves concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemy piecemeal (Mao Zedong 2008, 97-100). The policy was set to focus on troop strength rather than territory. And judging by the content of the internal directive dated October 1, 1946, this policy appears to have achieved its intended results, despite considerable casualties on the Communist Party's side. The situation further progressed, and on February 1, 1947, it was declared that the situation in China was developing from a nationwide anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle into a new people's democratic revolution. Furthermore, a Xinhua News Agency commentary on May 20 of the same year asserted that the Chiang Kai-shek government was already surrounded by the entire populace (Mao Zedong 2008, 106-132). Although there was a crisis where Yan'an, the capital, was captured due to Chiang Kai-shek's advance into the northwestern region during this process, the expansion of the front line ultimately resulted in an increased military burden for the Kuomintang. However, these developments appear to have been misrepresented to Moscow by Western foreign news agencies. On June 15, 1947, Stalin conveyed his intention to arrange a secret meeting in Moscow through Terebin, a doctor who was staying in China, to Mao Zedong (Woodrow Wilson Center 1947). According to the recollections of Shi Zhe, Mao Zedong's interpreter and secretary, the actual situation was that after Stalin heard reports from Western news agencies claiming that the Chinese Communist Party had suffered a major defeat with immense losses, and that high-ranking officials like He Long and even Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, had been captured and transferred to Xi'an, the Soviet Union proactively dispatched a special aircraft to offer to take Mao and other high-ranking officials to the Soviet Union (Shen Zhihua 2010, 88). However, after confirming that the actual situation differed from the reports, Stalin requested to postpone the trip to Moscow (Woodrow Wilson Center 1947).

From this point on, the Chinese Communist Party began to gain the initiative in the civil war. They transitioned from merely engaging in mobile warfare within the liberated areas to a full-scale offensive. This shift is clearly evident in the strategic directives for the second year of the Liberation War, announced on September 1, 1947.

The main task of our army's second year of operation is to launch a nationwide counteroffensive, that is,

to mobilize the main forces to advance externally, drawing the war into the Kuomintang's territory,

to annihilate large numbers of enemy forces externally, and to continue drawing the war into the liberated areas

to further destroy and deplete the manpower and resources of the liberated areas, thereby preventing us from

enduring for long, and to thoroughly crush the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary strategic policy of

crushing the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary strategic policy of preventing us from enduring for long. A partial task of our army's second year of operation is to mobilize some of the main forces and many regional units to continue fighting within our territory, annihilate the enemy within our territory,

to annihilate the enemy within our territory and recover lost territory.

to annihilate the enemy within our territory and recover lost territory.

(Mao Zedong 2008, 135) Shortly thereafter, on October 10, 1947, the Chinese People's Liberation Army Declaration was issued, proclaiming the eight basic policies of the Chinese Communist Party and beginning to form a proper state structure. Furthermore, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1946, the Soviet Union needed to cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its influence in Manchuria. Consequently, on December 16, 1947, Stalin sent a telegram to Mao, who had requested a visit to the Soviet Union, officially extending a welcome. The timing was specified as the following year, 1948. According to Terebin's report the next day, Mao expressed great satisfaction, emphasizing his long-held desire to visit the Soviet Union (Woodrow Wilson Center 1947). This report reaffirms the psychological standing the Soviet Union held among communists at that time.

Coordination of the Mao-Stalin Meeting

The meeting between Mao and Stalin did not occur immediately. 1948 was a period of adjustment for this historic encounter. Subsequently, through a series of dialogues in 1949, the policy of 'leaning to one side' became solidified as China's first foreign policy. The result was the 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship' published on June 30, commemorating the 28th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. In this document, Mao declared a foreign policy of forming an international united front by allying with the Soviet Union, allying with each people's democratic country, and allying with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people of other countries.

'You are leaning to one side.' That is right. We have learned from the 40 years of experience of Sun Yat-sen and the 28 years of experience of the Communist Party that in order to attain victory, it is imperative to lean to one side.

We have learned from the 40 years of experience of Sun Yat-sen and the 28 years of experience of the Communist Party that in order to attain victory, it is imperative to lean to one side.

We have learned from the 40 years of experience of Sun Yat-sen and the 28 years of experience of the Communist Party that in order to attain victory, it is imperative to lean to one side.

Based on the experience accumulated over 40 and 28 years, the Chinese people will either lean to the imperialist side or the socialist side, and there is absolutely no exception.

Based on the experience accumulated over 40 and 28 years, the Chinese people will either lean to the imperialist side or the socialist side, and there is absolutely no exception.

Based on the experience accumulated over 40 and 28 years, the Chinese people will either lean to the imperialist side or the socialist side, and there is absolutely no exception.

Remaining neutral or wavering between the two sides is not acceptable; there is no third way.

We are opposed to the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who lean to the imperialist side, and

We are opposed to the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who lean to the imperialist side, and

We are opposed to the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who lean to the imperialist side, and

Conclusion: A Tripartite Perspective on Early Cold War Communist International Politics

The perspective on international politics held by communist leaders, including Mao and Stalin, was fundamentally tripartite: a power-political view of anarchy, a world-system view of international communist revolution, and a view of domestic revolutionary capabilities. The power-political view of anarchy refers to the structural pressures exerted by the bipolar system of the United States and the Soviet Union. International communist revolution, within that sphere, subsequently unfolded as Soviet leadership and Chinese challenges. As communist revolution, according to Marxism, aims to unify the world, this element must also be approached systematically. Domestic revolutionary capabilities, as Lenin mentioned, realistically require the establishment of proletarian power at the state level as an intermediate stage for global communist revolution, making it an indispensable element.

These three elements were not separate but were intricately intertwined. This was also the case for China. In the early Cold War, the bipolar superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were establishing their legitimacy based on ideology. Therefore, the enhancement of domestic revolutionary capabilities was linked to basic survival in power politics, and China showed deference to Soviet leadership in the international communist revolution. However, once China's standing was somewhat established, it began to link its domestic revolutionary capabilities to securing its position within the international communist revolution. By 1972, in seeking détente with the United States, China adopted a policy of separating ideology and power politics to some extent. However, the fact that the Chinese leadership insisted on including the phrase 'people's revolution' in the joint communiqué during the détente process indicates that the separation was not complete.

In this context, it is important to note that at the meeting with Stalin transitioning from 1949 to 1950, Mao placed the highest priority on economic aid and emulation of the Soviet Union. At a time when the communist international political order of the early Cold War had not yet fully solidified, China, in its nascent stage of statehood, faced the prerequisite task of fulfilling internal security needs. With the Kuomintang regime still remaining in Taiwan, China was in a vulnerable state where subversion by imperialists could occur if its internal revolutionary capabilities were not sufficiently developed. Therefore, rather than taking risks, it was crucial to establish an environment where the 'revolutionary capabilities' of the Soviet Union, the only successful model among the major powers, could be transplanted to China. However, as the Soviet Union itself admitted, the unique nature of China's revolution led to its adaptation. Instead, the 'leaning to one side' policy, which fully accepted and followed Soviet leadership within the communist bloc, was adopted. The American conclusion that Mao would become the 'Tito of Asia' was not entirely unfounded. Even Roshin, the Soviet ambassador to China, commented that 'the reason the Soviet Union is interested in mediating the Chinese Civil War is its fear that Mao Zedong will become the Tito of Asia' (Shen Zhihua 2010, 108). Even when dividing the elements of 'threat' into 'total power,' 'military strength,' 'geographic proximity,' and 'aggressive intent' as defined by S. Walt, it was sufficient to judge that the Soviet Union, which was directly projecting military power in the Northeast and Xinjiang regions, posed a greater threat than the United States. The US was providing aid to the Kuomintang but was not militarily intervening in mainland China. As Walt pointed out, Americans fundamentally believed that while ideology could solidify alliances, it was not the fundamental motivation for forming them. However, they overlooked the fact that the international politics of the communist bloc were not solely constituted by Western concepts of power politics. For early communist states, the variable of aggressive intent could be determined by ideology. Especially for a country as large as China, where doubts about domestic revolutionary capabilities were often high, enhancing cooperation with communist bloc countries could be crucial. In preparing for this field trip, I attempted to reconstruct the international political epistemology of Mao and other communist leaders to supplement the analysis of Western international political science. For Mao, the meeting with Stalin and the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance were attempts to enhance domestic revolutionary capabilities through international cooperation within the communist bloc, thereby securing survival in power politics. Furthermore, after securing the basic foundation of domestic communist revolution, 'revolution' evolved from a parallel concept of security to a supplementary one.

At a time when Xi Jinping is advocating for socialism with Chinese characteristics, examining how the foreign policy perspectives of contemporary Chinese leadership have been shaped was a task that absolutely needed to be undertaken. Whether the attempt to look beyond the propaganda of the era and delve into Mao Zedong's thoughts as preserved in his writings was successful is uncertain. However, at the very least, the urgency with which China, in the early Cold War, struggled fiercely for survival resonated with me in 2018. As long as Mao Zedong's portrait, watching over his own remains, remains on Tiananmen Square, his influence on China's foreign policy is bound to persist. I slowly walked away, contemplating this. References Kawashima Shin and Mori Kazuko. 2011. A 150-Year History of Chinese Diplomacy. Translated by Lee Yong-bin.

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2005), p. 378. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by

Sergey Radchenko.

http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110296 Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov], December 17, 1947, History

and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, F. 39,

Op. 1, D. 31, L. 26. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa

Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie

Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow:

Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 378. Translated for

CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko.

http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113617