Empress Dowager Cixi's Love for the Summer Palace and Responsibility for the Sino-Japanese War Defeat

Summer Palace · Lee Jieun · University of Seoul

The Empress Dowager's Summer Palace

On July 4, 2018, the 10th cohort of Sarangbang began their second day of the Beijing field trip. In the morning, we visited the National Museum and the Military Museum, respectively, to hear the stories of the Song Dynasty and Kim San. As we were all getting tired under the scorching sun, we stopped at a restaurant called 'People's Commune' to taste Northeastern Chinese cuisine. We had a pleasant meal while looking at illustrations depicting Mao Zedong and the people during the Cultural Revolution. The next place we visited was the Summer Palace, famous as the summer palace of the Qing Dynasty. Although the weather was still oppressively hot, the colorful and beautiful entrance to the palace seemed to show why the Summer Palace was so beloved by Empress Dowager Cixi. However, contrary to the widely known narrative, we will re-examine the Summer Palace today as a space representing her splendid yet lonely life.

The Summer Palace is located about 14 km from the Forbidden City, which we visited yesterday. Originally built as the imperial garden of the Qing Dynasty under the name 'Qingyi Garden' during the reign of Emperor Qianlong, it was burned down in 1860 during the Anglo-French allied attack. It was then rebuilt starting in 1886 under its current name to be used as Empress Dowager Cixi's residence upon her retirement. Empress Dowager Cixi is always criticized for the scale and funding methods of this reconstruction. It is known that she diverted a large portion of the Beiyang Navy's budget to build the Summer Palace, contributing to the Beiyang Navy's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War due to insufficient military funds. Today, from this Summer Palace, we will discuss how much responsibility Empress Dowager Cixi bears for the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War through an examination of the power she wielded and the story of the Qing navy.

Empress Dowager Cixi, the Power Holder

Empress Dowager Cixi, later known as Cixi (慈禧), was born on November 29, 1835, into a Manchu family in Beijing. In 1852, she was selected as a concubine of Emperor Xianfeng, entering the palace in the sixth rank, a lower position among the eight ranks of the inner court. Then, in 1856, she gave birth to the future Emperor Tongzhi, and as the birth mother of the imperial prince, she received the title of Empress, the highest rank. This was the same rank as Empress Dowager Zian, the Emperor's principal wife.

From this point on, Empress Dowager Cixi, distinguished from Empress Dowager Zian in the east as the Empress Dowager in the west, became the second most powerful figure in the inner court. In 1861, her husband, Emperor Xianfeng, died, leaving a will appointing eight regents to jointly govern for Emperor Tongzhi. However, Empress Dowager Cixi, along with Prince Gong and Empress Dowager Zian, successfully carried out the Xinyou Coup and began ruling as regents. Although the imperial edicts at the time required the seals of both empress dowagers, decisions increasingly tended to be made according to Empress Dowager Cixi's will (Kim Hyong-jong 2010, 44). Empress Dowager Cixi thus seized political power of the Qing Dynasty through indirect rule as a regent from the Xinyou Coup until Emperor Guangxu began his personal rule in 1889.

Emperor Guangxu and Empress Dowager Cixi began to politically confront each other, marked by Emperor Guangxu's marriage. Emperor Guangxu, who had begun to manage state affairs personally, now sought to check Empress Dowager Cixi. Empress Dowager Cixi, who had left the Forbidden City upon her retirement, moved into the Summer Palace in 1891, as construction was not yet fully completed. At this time, the Summer Palace can be seen as a space where Empress Dowager Cixi was excluded and isolated from the overall state affairs occurring in the Forbidden City by Emperor Guangxu. The reason why Empress Dowager Cixi's political influence was relatively weak compared to Emperor Guangxu after moving to the Summer Palace is that after her retirement, her political activities had to follow a set of rules established by the ministers. These rules included that Emperor Guangxu had no obligation to discuss state affairs with Empress Dowager Cixi, nor could she comment on the decisions. She was only allowed to review the titles of the reports submitted to the imperial court, not their content. Emperor Guangxu also visited Empress Dowager Cixi for courtesy calls but did not discuss state affairs with her. These matters demonstrate how much Emperor Guangxu sought to exclude Empress Dowager Cixi's political influence (Chung 2013, 252-253).

Although she deeply loved her life in the Summer Palace, enjoying boat rides surrounded by flora and fauna, it may also have been a space where she felt loneliness. It was only during the Sino-Japanese War, which demanded strong leadership, that she re-entered politics. Thus, the extent and limits of Empress Dowager Cixi's power varied by period. This is quite different from the portrayal of her as an absolute ruler who consistently wielded power over the Qing Dynasty for up to 48 years.

Reconstruction of the Summer Palace

Let us return to the Summer Palace. Earlier, we mentioned that the Qing Dynasty rebuilt the Summer Palace to serve as Empress Dowager Cixi's residence after her retirement. However, the Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan) was actually considered as a residence for this purpose before the Summer Palace. In 1873, the 12th year of Emperor Tongzhi's reign, an imperial edict was issued to partially reconstruct the Old Summer Palace, but it was frustrated by strong opposition from officials. In 1886, Empress Dowager Cixi, who particularly favored the Summer Palace, stated before her retirement, 'Instead of undertaking expensive journeys like the summer resort in Chengde, frequently visited by past emperors, or visiting the recently modernized navy, I wish to build a residence for my retirement, which I have long desired (Chung 2013, 247).' As there was no strong opposition as before, the reconstruction of the Summer Palace was carried out.

This can be seen as reflecting both Empress Dowager Cixi's personal desire to hold a grand birthday celebration for herself, as she would turn sixty in 1894, and the Qing court's political consideration to restore its prestige, which had been tarnished by Western attacks (Heo Myung-gil 1984, 30-32).

The problem was that the cost of this project was enormous, and Empress Dowager Cixi diverted funds from the Beiyang Navy, then led by Li Hongzhang, to finance it. While scholars offer varying figures for the exact restoration costs and the amount of diverted funds, some Chinese historians suggest that the total restoration cost did not exceed 6 million taels of silver. This is because the budget office at the time estimated the initial costs for 56 construction sites, approximately half of the total project scale, at 3,166,700 taels (Chung 2013, 247-248). If the restoration of the Summer Palace cost 6 million taels, this figure slightly exceeds the cost of Emperor Guangxu's wedding, which was 5.5 million taels. Furthermore, Empress Dowager Cixi contributed nearly half of the construction costs, 3 million taels, from her own savings.

The controversy lies in how the remaining costs were covered. Empress Dowager Cixi, who was determined to proceed with the reconstruction of the Summer Palace, promised not to touch the Ministry of Revenue's budget before commencing the project. Thus, she found a way by leveraging her political closeness with Prince Chun, who was in charge of naval reconstruction at the time. The Qing navy had an annual budget of nearly 4 million taels, and Prince Chun cooperated by allowing Empress Dowager Cixi to collect annual interest of 300,000 taels from naval funds deposited in foreign banks. Zhang Yong argues that it is difficult to say Empress Dowager Cixi directly interfered with state finances, and citing her subsequent donation of approximately 3 million taels to the navy, he presents an argument that rationalizes Empress Dowager Cixi's diversion of funds. Even if such a donation were true, considering the Qing's national finances and the living conditions of its citizens at the time, the construction of a summer palace for the imperial family was a luxury rather than a necessity, and it is certain that the construction costs incurred caused losses to the state.

However, it is noteworthy that unlike in 1873, when such extravagance was curbed, there were no strong voices of opposition to the reconstruction in 1886. This indicates that over time, the Qing court's governance became less effectively checked.

Qing Navy's Military Strength and Strategy

Looking out at the vast lake before us, we cannot help but discuss the Qing navy. Even if Empress Dowager Cixi diverted naval funds to build the Summer Palace, can this be considered the most direct cause of the Beiyang Navy's crushing defeat in the Sino-Japanese War? Conversely, if the Beiyang Navy had secured sufficient annual funding, would the victor of the Sino-Japanese War have been different?

To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the military strength and strategy of the Chinese navy at the time more closely. In modern warfare, naval power often determines the course of a war because the side that controls the seas can rapidly supply troops to the land. During the Sino-Japanese War, both Japan and China could only supply troops to Korea via sea (Paine 2003, 152; Kim Yong-wook 2008, 31). Japan, about two months after the war began, on September 17, 1894, won the Battle of the Yellow Sea, defeating 30% of the Qing fleet, indicating that the war's tide would turn in Japan's favor.

In fact, Japan, recognizing the importance of naval power early on, invested significantly more in strengthening its navy than its army in preparation for the Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese government allocated 47 million yen to the army and 169 million yen to the navy, with naval expenditure increasing by 200% from 1881 to 1891. In 1895, Japan's military budget accounted for 30% of the total national budget (Paine 2003, 327). Japan's military strength participating in the Sino-Japanese War consisted of a total of 100,000 soldiers, and in terms of the navy, 32 battleships and 23 torpedo boats (Rawlinson 1967, 168).

What about China's situation? The Qing Dynasty, since the 1860s, had been making efforts to strengthen and modernize its military, led by Empress Dowager Cixi and Li Hongzhang. Empress Dowager Cixi consistently advocated for the expansion of the Qing navy's armaments, and during her regency, this intention was put into practice through Beiyang Minister Li Hongzhang. Li Hongzhang was responsible for all military-related tasks, including the purchase and construction of ships and the manufacturing of weapons, and in 1871, he established the Beiyang Fleet. Until the Sino-Japanese War, the Beiyang Fleet was considered the eighth most powerful fleet in the world and the strongest in East Asia.

As a result of these efforts, it appears that Japan did not hold an overwhelming advantage in terms of naval power. During the war, the Chinese navy possessed 65 battleships and 43 torpedo boats. In particular, the 7,000-ton ironclad battleships Dingyuan (定遠) and Zhenyuan (鎭遠) owned by the Beiyang Navy were perceived as a threat to Japan. At the time, the Vice Admiral of the British Navy, G. A. Ballard, described these ironclads as being 'equivalent to the six best battleships of Japan combined.' One scholar has argued that China could have won naval battles, given that the Beiyang Navy alone was comparable in size to the entire Japanese navy (Rawlinson 1967, 168).

In fact, when comparing the number of battleships alone, China appears to have a numerical advantage over Japan. The annual naval budget of 4 million taels allocated by the Qing court was by no means a small amount for maintaining a large fleet of battleships. However, the inefficient use of resources mobilized for military modernization is pointed out (Lee Jong-ho 2015, 30). Furthermore, inadequate military training, the absence of a modern command system, which resulted in low combat effectiveness (Upton 1878, 20), and an inappropriate defensive-oriented military strategy are also cited as specific reasons for the defeat.

Among these, let's examine the Qing navy's military strategy more closely in conjunction with the figure of Li Hongzhang. In the Sino-Japanese War, the Qing navy exhibited an excessively defensive posture. Such a defensive maritime strategy is also related to China's geopolitical characteristics. Traditionally, the threat perceived by Chinese dynasties came from nomadic peoples in Central Asia, making inland defense paramount for national security (Cho Han-seung, 119; Paine 2003, 218). It was not until the Ming Dynasty that China recognized the threat from the sea due to Japanese pirate raids. However, even then, the response was limited to defending and guarding against the pirates' disturbances in coastal areas. The existing defense concept, which prioritized land over sea, was maintained. The event that definitively impressed upon the Chinese the importance of maritime defense was Japan's invasion of Taiwan in 1874. Li Hongzhang was a prominent figure who recognized the importance of maritime defense and had argued to the imperial court that the Qing Dynasty should prioritize allocating its budget to maritime defense over inland defense (Paine 2003, 218). However, as the field commander, Li Hongzhang devoted considerable effort to building the fleet, but he adopted a passive stance, primarily using this fleet for coastal defense. In this regard, Li Hongzhang did not completely break away from the existing defense concept, and his diplomatic nature, which pursued compromise and peace, likely influenced this passive military strategy (Liu Zhongmin 2013, 233-243). In fact, Li Hongzhang's order issued on August 14 contained only provisions for defense and guarding, with no offensive plans included. Under Li Hongzhang's passive defensive strategy, the powerful Beiyang Fleet was confined to Weihai, used merely to intimidate the enemy, rather than actively seeking out and engaging the opponent.

In addition, the Qing navy at the time lacked a unified command system. There were as many as six commanders with the same rank and authority as Li Hongzhang, who led the Beiyang Navy. Although only a few fleets were mobilized in the actual war, even if all fleets had participated, it would have been difficult to conduct coordinated operations effectively due to the lack of established strict discipline (Rawlinson 1967, 169; Liang Qichao 2013, 179). Thus, when considering modern naval power, we must examine not only the quantity of weapons and equipment but also the existence of an effective command system and an active military strategy. Given that the Qing Dynasty had been striving to strengthen and modernize its military for about 20 years before the Sino-Japanese War, these strategic limitations are indeed regrettable.

Responsibility for the Sino-Japanese War Defeat: Leaving the Summer Palace

The initial question related to the Summer Palace was whether the argument that the Beiyang Navy was defeated due to the reconstruction of the Summer Palace could hold true. This is because we felt that to identify the reasons for the Beiyang Navy's complete collapse before Japan, other factors besides insufficient military funds needed to be considered. On the other hand, the purpose of examining the causes of defeat should not be solely to shift all responsibility onto a specific individual and criticize them. Therefore, based on the preceding discussions, the final question remains: If not Empress Dowager Cixi, then who is responsible for the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War?

Let's briefly examine them in order. First, Li Hongzhang, who led the Beiyang Fleet as the field commander, bears responsibility for setting military strategy and conducting combat operations. The Beiyang Fleet, as previously described, employed an overly passive defensive strategy. It can be argued that Li Hongzhang blocked opportunities for the newly purchased and constructed ships, acquired at great expense each year, to be used more effectively. At this point, the individuals who could have reset the direction of this military strategy were limited to Emperor Guangxu or Empress Dowager Cixi, who were in positions to issue orders to Li Hongzhang. However, immediately before the Sino-Japanese War, Empress Dowager Cixi was in a position where even Li Hongzhang could not easily meet her at the Summer Palace.

Meanwhile, Emperor Guangxu and his tutor Weng Tonghe, who held political power at the time, were individuals who prioritized domestic crisis management over national defense. Therefore, they seem not to have recognized the importance of military matters until just before the outbreak of the war. After Emperor Guangxu began his personal rule in 1889, no new naval vessels were added, and the fact that he ordered a halt to investment in all military branches, including the navy, in 1891 supports this argument.

However, Empress Dowager Cixi is not entirely without responsibility. Her extravagance with non-essential construction during a period of financial hardship for the nation for the sake of her comfortable retirement, and her illicit access to state funds, are difficult to excuse. On the other hand, one could argue positively that she extended the life of the nation into the early 20th century amidst crisis (Kim Hyong-jong 2010, 63). Rather than evaluating Empress Dowager Cixi as entirely positive or negative, we must evaluate her three-dimensionally based on the specific circumstances, considering the extent and limits of the power she wielded. Only then should the scope of blame and responsibility attributable to her be revised. Should we not, above all, be wary of the simplistic logic that attributes the causes and responsibility for a nation's defeat and downfall solely to specific individuals who lived through that era?

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