A Defense of Injo: Injo's Diplomacy Toward China During the Ming-Qing Transition

Forbidden City · Lee Ho-jun · National Defense University

Introduction

The weather in Beijing in July, when we arrived for the Sarangbang field trip, was extremely hot. The forecast of 37-38 degrees Celsius made us feel exhausted from the moment we arrived at the airport. Furthermore, the enhanced security checks at the airport and the traffic congestion in Beijing seemed to foreshadow that the two-day, three-night trip to Beijing would not be easy.

Before starting the main field trip, we visited a hot pot restaurant to taste Beijing-style hot pot and then moved to Tiananmen Square. Let's briefly introduce hot pot here. The origin of hot pot is not clear, but it is said that a similar method of eating began during the Yuan Dynasty, and it developed particularly in the Sichuan region of China. Therefore, it is classified as one of Sichuan's representative dishes, and today it is one of the most popular dishes in China, regardless of region.

After finishing our meal, we began the main field trip. As the Forbidden City is adjacent to Zhongnanhai, the political center of China, the security checks on the way to the Forbidden City were strict. Due to the threat of vehicle terrorism, parking was prohibited around Tiananmen Square, so we had to get off at a distant location and walk. Even while walking, we had to go through several security checks. Only then did we finally arrive at Tiananmen, the entrance to the Forbidden City. Tiananmen is the main gate of the Imperial City during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Construction began in the 15th year of the Yongle reign (1417) and was completed in the 18th year of the Yongle reign (1420). During the Ming Dynasty, it was called Chengtianmen. Since the Ming Dynasty, this gate was only used when the emperor entered or for state ceremonies. General access was through the East and West Chang'an Gates, which have now been demolished. Among these, the East Chang'an Gate was only accessible to the imperial family, while officials primarily entered and exited the Forbidden City through the West Chang'an Gate. Therefore, today's story will begin from this West Chang'an Gate.

On August 3, 1623, it was drizzling in Beijing from the morning. On this day, the Joseon envoy, led by Yi Gyeong-jeon, waited in front of the West Chang'an Gate from dawn for Ming officials to enter the palace. As Ming officials began to enter the palace, the envoy knelt and presented a petition requesting the prompt investiture of Injo. After a long while, the envoy's eyes caught sight of Ye Xianggao, the equivalent of today's Prime Minister, entering the palace. The envoy knelt again and requested Injo's investiture. Ye Xianggao pointed out that Injo's enthronement was not through a normal process and firmly rejected the envoy's request, stating that he would seek approval from the Emperor after careful investigation. This marked the beginning of a nail-biting process for Injo's investiture, which took over two years to complete the investiture procedures with the Ming Emperor.

Generally, our history describes this period as the Ming Dynasty, which was in conflict with the Later Jin, deliberately delaying the investiture to further subjugate Joseon politically and militarily. Consequently, Joseon was caught in Ming's intentions, leading to the collapse of the neutral diplomacy maintained during the Gwanghaegun era (Lee Young-chun 2011, 135-138). Therefore, in our history, Injo is indeed perceived as an incompetent monarch who, despite changing international circumstances, faithfully served the declining Ming Dynasty while maintaining a hardline stance against the rising Later Jin, ultimately leading to the humiliation of the Jeongmyo and Byeongja Horan (Han Myung-gi 2013, 357-364).

At first glance, these arguments seem plausible. We also agree with these claims, recalling the sorrow of a weak nation unable to escape the logic of power in international politics, and feeling ashamed of having an incompetent national leader. Perhaps Injo stands as the prime example of this perception throughout our history.

But was Injo truly an incompetent king? He, who was considered quite intelligent from a young age and possessed a meticulous personality capable of organizing and successfully carrying out a coup, why did he pursue diplomatic policies during his reign that were characterized by incompetence and a lack of realism? With these questions in mind, I examined Injo's diplomacy toward China during the Ming-Qing transition. And I came to think that the history of this era might be different from what we commonly know. Based on the facts I have uncovered so far, I feel compelled to defend Injo. Although I am not a lawyer by profession, I will now use historical records as my legal texts to uncover the truth of that time and attempt to defend him. What do the records of that time truly say?

East Asian International Politics and Power

To accurately understand Joseon's diplomacy toward China during this period, it is necessary to first examine the principles governing the international order that permeated East Asia at the time. The most important and core concept in contemporary international politics is power, but this is not a concept that emerged only in the modern era. Hans J. Morgenthau, a prominent Western international relations scholar, defined power as "the ability to control the minds and actions of others (Morgenthau 2013, 132)." According to him, to control the minds and actions of others, both political elements (權) and military elements (力) are necessary. As Morgenthau mentioned regarding power, it is necessary to examine the political and military elements of power separately when analyzing international politics. Power is a concept that emerged simultaneously with human political activity and has universal characteristics that transcend time. However, its mode of operation can vary depending on the era, place, and situation. In particular, the power that dominated East Asia before the modern era differs significantly from that of the modern era.

As we learned in our Sarangbang class, the East Asian world, centered around China, has long operated within a unique international political order expressed as rule by ritual (禮治). While the Western international order since the modern era has focused on the distribution of interests among states centered on military power, the East Asian international order before the modern era can be seen as having operated around political power represented by ritual (禮). Unlike military power, which can be quantified, the international order based on ritual is inherently complex in its operation, as political power cannot be numerically calculated. The complex nature of pre-modern East Asian international politics, differing from the West, is deeply related to these characteristics of power manifested in East Asia.

These unique characteristics of East Asian international politics operated without exception during the Ming-Qing transition. Particularly at this time, the international order based on ritual had reached its zenith, and this naturally exerted a strong influence on the relationship between Joseon, Ming, and Later Jin. Amidst the shifting power of the international order, would Joseon choose loyalty to Ming, with whom it had maintained relations for over 200 years based on subservience and deference, or would it follow the Later Jin, which showed potential for creating a new international order based on its formidable military power? Upon Injo's accession, Joseon stood at this crossroads of choice.

Injo's Diplomacy Toward China

Did Injo truly lack international sensibility at this time? To understand the truth of that time, we must first examine the historical records containing the accounts of that period. Here, we will focus on the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty, which form the basis of historical research on the Joseon Dynasty. First, looking at the Annals, it seems that from the beginning of his reign, Injo believed that the power of the Later Jin was on the rise and that a confrontation with the Later Jin would be inevitable at some point. "Given the movements of the rebels (Later Jin), they will surely invade at any moment. How can we neglect the methods of defense? However, our country is not adept at reconnaissance. If we cannot detect the enemy's strength in advance, how can we defend against them?"

method? But our country is not skilled in reconnaissance. If we cannot detect the enemy's strength in advance, how can we defend against them?

How can we defend against them?

" - Annals of Injo, Year 1, March 18 - The above passage indicates that Injo emphasized the need to prepare for the impending invasion by the Later Jin and to address Joseon's weakness in reconnaissance. Examining the Annals of Injo, it is evident that from the beginning of his reign, Injo discussed the defense of the northwestern region with his ministers approximately every two to three days. In fact, immediately after his enthronement, Injo appointed Jang Man as commander-in-chief and Yi Gwal as deputy commander for the defense of the northwestern region, and made considerable efforts to mobilize troops and replenish military supplies.

However, Joseon had not yet fully recovered from the devastation of the Imjin War. Let's first examine the military strength. Joseon's military strength had completely collapsed during the Imjin War. Although the military system was gradually restored to its former level after the war, Joseon suffered a significant loss of military power when its elite troops, numbering about 10,000, were decisively defeated by the Later Jin army at the Battle of Sarhū (1619) at the request of the Ming Dynasty. At that time, about 4,000 Joseon soldiers were taken prisoner, and they remained detained by the Later Jin army, unable to return to Joseon even after Injo's enthronement. As seen above, although Injo meticulously prepared for the defense of the northwestern region from the beginning of his reign, it was difficult to expect a significant increase in military strength in the short term.

While the expansion of military strength was urgent, the most significant problem was provisions. Before the Imjin War, the arable land in Joseon was approximately 1.13 million gyul (結). During the war, it decreased by about 25%, to less than 290,000 gyul. According to an entry in the Annals of Injo, Year 1 (1623), April 25, the Ministry of Revenue reported to Injo that the court's annual expenditure was 110,000 sok (石), but only 100,000 sok had been collected. In response, Injo expressed concern about securing provisions, stating, "Procuring grain is far more difficult than raising troops." In addition, discussions about food shortages appear throughout the Annals of Injo, and the lack of provisions was the biggest headache for the Joseon court until the eve of the Jeongmyo and Byeongja Horan. Thus, at the time of Injo's enthronement, Joseon was not in a state to assist Ming in conquering the Later Jin, either politically or militarily. Although one of the main justifications for the coup was that Gwanghaegun had violated the "grace of re-establishment" from Ming and colluded with the Later Jin, from Injo's perspective, he could not sacrifice the nation's security to uphold loyalty to Ming. What options did Injo have in the face of this dilemma? Perhaps he could have defended against the Later Jin invasion with Ming's military support, or acknowledged the strength of the Later Jin, severed ties with Ming, and maintained friendly relations with the Later Jin, or surrendered to the military might of the Later Jin. Considering the international situation at the time, expecting military support from Ming was virtually impossible, and it was even more impossible to withdraw subservience to Ming and establish friendly relations with the Later Jin or surrender to their power. In this dilemma, Injo sought a way to maintain continuous subservience to Ming while maximally avoiding military conflict with the Later Jin.

While strengthening military power was an urgent task, the most significant problem was provisions. Immediately before the Imjin War, the arable land in Joseon was approximately 1.13 million gyul, but this decreased by about 25%, to less than 290,000 gyul, due to the war. According to a record from April 25th of the first year of King Injo's reign (1623), the Ministry of Revenue (Hojo) reported to King Injo that the court's annual expenses were 110,000 seok, but only 100,000 seok had been collected. In response, King Injo expressed concern about securing military provisions, stating, "Securing grain is far more difficult than raising soldiers." Furthermore, discussions about the shortage of military provisions appear throughout the Annals of King Injo, indicating that the lack of provisions was the greatest headache for the Joseon court leading up to the Jungmyong and Byeongja wars. Thus, at the time of King Injo's enthronement, Joseon was not in a state, politically or militarily, to assist the Ming and conquer the Later Jin. Although one of the primary justifications for the coup was that King Gwanghaegun had violated the Ming's grace of "re-creation" and colluded with the Later Jin, from King Injo's perspective, he could not neglect the nation's security to uphold righteousness towards the Ming. What options did King Injo face in this dilemma? Perhaps the choices were to defend against the Later Jin invasion through military support from the Ming, to acknowledge the strength of the Later Jin, sever ties with the Ming while maintaining friendly relations with the Later Jin, or to submit to the military power of the Later Jin. Considering the international situation at the time, expecting military support from the Ming was practically impossible. Moreover, it was even more impossible to withdraw the subservience to the Ming and establish friendly relations with the Later Jin, or to submit to the Later Jin's military might. Within this dilemma, King Injo sought a strategy to maintain continuous subservience to the Ming while maximally avoiding military conflict with the Later Jin.

"The Ministry of Military Affairs reported... [omitted]... If those rebels (Later Jin) happen to cross our border and attempt to communicate, we should say, 'The two countries have had no past grievances. It is proper for both you and us not to cross the border and cause disturbances, but to each guard our respective territories... [omitted]... The stationing of Chinese generals within our borders or the crossing of Liaodong residents to surrender to Chinese generals is not something we have instructed, so you should not use this as a pretext.' ... [omitted]... The King agreed."

If those rebels (Later Jin) happen to cross our border and attempt to communicate, we should say, 'The two countries have had no past grievances. It is proper for both you and us not to cross the border and cause disturbances, but to each guard our respective territories...'

It is proper for both you and us not to cross the border and cause disturbances, but to each guard our respective territories...

The stationing of Chinese generals within our borders or the crossing of Liaodong residents to surrender to Chinese generals is not something we have instructed, so you should not use this as a pretext.

The stationing of Chinese generals within our borders or the crossing of Liaodong residents to surrender to Chinese generals is not something we have instructed, so you should not use this as a pretext.

so you should not use this as a pretext.

The King agreed.

- Annals of Injo, Year 1, March 27 - Injo decided to adopt a conciliatory policy toward the Later Jin. In other words, Joseon returned to the policy of 'gimi' (羈靡), which it had employed since the founding of the dynasty in dealing with the Jurchens. From its inception, Joseon had established its foreign policy based on a tributary relationship with Ming and a relationship of exchange with the Jurchens and Japan. Among these, Joseon secured stability on its northern border by appropriately utilizing both conquest and 'gimi' in its dealings with the Jurchens. Strictly speaking, whether the policy Injo adopted towards the Later Jin can be called 'gimi' requires further discussion. The term 'gimi' originally combined 'bridle' (羈) and 'reins' (靡), and was used to mean controlling the 'Yi Di' (夷狄, barbarians) as if holding their reins (Kim Han-gyu, 2005, 118). Therefore, to use 'gimi', one must possess superior strength to the object of 'gimi'. Before the Imjin War, Joseon possessed greater military and political strength than the Jurchens, allowing it to effectively control the Jurchens through 'gimi'. However, by the time of Injo, as the power of the Later Jin rapidly grew, this relationship began to reverse.

While Joseon could effectively control the Jurchens through 'gimi' in the early and middle periods because their strength was weaker than Joseon's, it was difficult to expect this 'gimi' policy toward the Later Jin to be effective at this time when the balance of power had shifted. In this regard, one might question whether the policy adopted by Injo toward the Later Jin can be called 'gimi'. However, given that the Joseon court at the time referred to this policy as 'gimi' and that there is still no unified academic discussion on this foreign policy, we will use the term 'gimi' for now. Before examining Injo's diplomacy toward the Later Jin, let's briefly revisit Gwanghaegun's foreign policy. Perhaps Gwanghaegun was the first to notice these subtle changes in the international situation. He attempted a cautious balancing act between Ming and the Later Jin by pursuing an equidistant diplomacy, similar to current neutral diplomacy.

From a modern perspective, Gwanghaegun's neutral diplomacy appears very pragmatic. However, when restoring historical truth, we must enter the context of the time and view the era from that perspective. The East Asian international order at the time was a Confucian order based on Neo-Confucianism. It was a system with a clear distinction between the 'Zhonghua' (中華, China) and the 'Yi Di' (夷狄, barbarians), and a relatively clear hierarchy among states. From this perspective, Gwanghaegun's foreign policy of trying to satisfy both Ming (Zhonghua) and Later Jin (Yi Di) was likely perceived by contemporaries as a heretical act that denied both the legitimacy of the dynasty and the righteousness of the Zhonghua order. In fact, according to an entry in the Annals of Gwanghaegun, Year 10 (1681), June 20, when Gwanghaegun refused Ming's repeated demands for troop dispatch, the officials of the Ministry of Military Affairs criticized Gwanghaegun's neutral diplomacy and strongly argued for maintaining loyalty to Ming, stating, "It is better to sin against His Majesty (Gwanghaegun) than to sin against the Ming court." As time passed, an entry from the Annals of Injo, Year 14 (1636), September 22, clearly illustrates the founding ideology of the Joseon Dynasty.

The official Jo Bin submitted a memorial stating,

"A nation arises with a fundamental reason... [omitted]... Ah, our dynasty also has a fundamental reason for its rise. In the late Goryeo period, influenced by the schemes of treacherous officials, the Hongwu calendar was abandoned, the Northern Yuan calendar was used, weapons were raised in rebellion, and troops marched to Wihwado. The suffering of the common people at that time was immeasurable. Our sacred founder, raising righteousness, turned back his troops and greatly comforted the wishes of the Eastern people, so the heavenly will and the hearts of the people turned together... [omitted]... Therefore, I believe that turning back with righteousness and upholding the principle of honoring the Zhou dynasty is the foundation upon which our nation rose. If descendants betray this principle, they will surely go against the heavenly will and the hearts of the people, and the nation cannot be preserved.

In the late Goryeo period, influenced by the schemes of treacherous officials, the Hongwu calendar was abandoned, the Northern Yuan calendar was used, weapons were raised in rebellion, and troops marched to Wihwado. The suffering of the common people at that time was immeasurable.

the Hongwu calendar was abandoned, the Northern Yuan calendar was used, weapons were raised in rebellion, and troops marched to Wihwado. The suffering of the common people at that time was immeasurable.

Our sacred founder, raising righteousness, turned back his troops and greatly comforted the wishes of the Eastern people, so the heavenly will and the hearts of the people turned together...

so the heavenly will and the hearts of the people turned together...

Therefore, I believe that turning back with righteousness and upholding the principle of honoring the Zhou dynasty is the foundation upon which our nation rose.

is the foundation upon which our nation rose. If descendants betray this principle, they will surely go against the heavenly will and the hearts of the people, and the nation cannot be preserved.

If descendants betray this principle, they will surely go against the heavenly will and the hearts of the people, and the nation cannot be preserved.

the nation cannot be preserved.

- Annals of Injo, Year 14, September 22 - From this perspective, it is difficult to readily answer whether Joseon could have guaranteed its independence between Ming and Later Jin even if Gwanghaegun had continued his neutral diplomacy. Abandoning loyalty to Ming was akin to negating the founding ideology of the dynasty, and this could have provided the justification for the coup. And indeed, that is what happened.

Furthermore, there was the practical issue of whether Ming could truly be overthrown by the Later Jin. Although Ming suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Later Jin army at Sarhū in 1619, Ming did not collapse easily from such a defeat. Instead, in 1626, the Later Jin suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Ming army led by Yuan Chonghuan at the Battle of Ningyuan. To make matters worse, Nurhaci died in the same year. Although the areas outside Shanhaiguan Pass were all captured by Hong Taiji in 1641, the Later Jin could never have crossed Shanhaiguan Pass on its own until Ming collapsed due to Li Zicheng's rebellion in 1644 and Wu Sangui opened the gates of Shanhaiguan Pass to Hong Taiji. What would have happened if Ming had won the confrontation with the Later Jin in this situation? Would Ming have understood the reality of Joseon, which it could not help? Probably no one would have understood Joseon, which betrayed them despite receiving the grace of re-establishment. And a terrible retribution, surpassing that of the Byeongja Horan, might have followed (Jo Il-su 2017, 364).

Injo also appears to have accurately recognized this reality. In this context, Injo's continuous subservience to Ming while practicing 'gimi' toward the Later Jin needs to be understood. Nevertheless, within the power dynamics of the time, it was difficult to avoid conflict with the growing Later Jin while maintaining subservience to Ming. In a state of war between Ming and Later Jin, Joseon, bordering the Later Jin, could not remain uninvolved in the conflict. Injo's stance was naturally enough to incur the wrath of the Later Jin. The following passage clearly illustrates this.

When the Beile of Ula, Pōzhāntài, invaded Joseon (1612), the Emperor (Nurhaci) and Pōzhāntài were relatives, and although they issued a command to stop their advance, Joseon did not express its gratitude. Furthermore, when the Emperor (Nurhaci) passed away, no envoy was sent to offer condolences (1626).

When the Beile of Ula, Pōzhāntài, invaded Joseon (1612), the Emperor (Nurhaci) and Pōzhāntài were relatives, and although they issued a command to stop their advance, Joseon did not express its gratitude.

Furthermore, when the Emperor (Nurhaci) passed away, no envoy was sent to offer condolences (1626).

(1626).

- Qing Shi Gao, Biographies of Joseon - In fact, from the early days of his reign, Nurhaci had long hoped to establish friendly relations with Joseon. If he could win over Joseon, he could secure political legitimacy by claiming the Mandate of Heaven, and at the same time, ensure the security of his rear. He continuously sent letters to the Joseon court to win them over, while simultaneously attempting to sow discord between Ming and Joseon by insulting Ming and saying that Ming considered Joseon a mere subordinate. However, Joseon remained unmoved. The deep animosity that Nurhaci and Hong Taiji harbored towards Joseon stemmed from these reasons (Chun Jieshen 2015, 314-315).

There were other problems as well. From 1621 onwards, Mao Wenlong, a Ming general stationed on Jodo Island, was a nuisance to both Joseon and the Later Jin. While stationed on Jodo, he pretended to check the Later Jin, and under this pretext, he made unreasonable demands, such as for provisions, from the Joseon court. He also repeatedly crossed the Yalu River to raid the Later Jin's territory, displeasing Nurhaci. In response, Nurhaci sent a letter to Joseon, promising to release Kang Hong-rip and all the Joseon officers and soldiers captured at the Battle of Sarhū if Joseon would stop supplying provisions to Mao Wenlong and hand him over. Although these terms were tempting to Joseon, Injo remained unresponsive to the Later Jin's offer.

There was also the issue of Han Chinese who fled to Joseon's borders. As the Later Jin's power expanded, it encroached upon Han Chinese territories, leading to a continuous stream of captured Han Chinese fleeing across the Later Jin's borders into Joseon. By 1621, the number of fugitives reached as many as 100,000. The Jurchens tended to regard captives as property, and the flight of residents was equivalent to losing property, so they made every effort to retrieve the fugitives. Nurhaci also took this matter seriously and repeatedly sent letters to Injo attempting to retrieve the Han Chinese who had fled to Joseon. However, Injo had no intention of handing over Ming subjects at will.

All of this was enough to enrage the Later Jin. If Joseon's cooperation could not be secured through diplomacy and legitimacy, the only remaining option was to subjugate Joseon by force. In 1626, Nurhaci died, and his successor, Hong Taiji, who ascended to the position of Khan, decided to punish Joseon before resuming the war with the Ming Dynasty.

The Jeongmyo and Byeongja Wars and the New Peace

In January 1627, the Later Jin army crossed the Yalu River and advanced directly toward Hanyang. Although the Joseon court had somewhat anticipated the Later Jin's invasion and prepared countermeasures, they were insufficient to repel it. King Injo harbored a will to resist from Ganghwa Island, but will alone could not resolve the issue. After a protracted negotiation, a peace treaty was eventually concluded, establishing a 'brotherly relationship' with the Later Jin.

The fact that the Later Jin did not occupy other military strongholds but instead advanced rapidly toward Hanyang immediately after crossing the Yalu River, and that they first proposed peace, suggests that they understood that military force alone could not subjugate Joseon before deciding on the punitive expedition. It is likely that Hong Taiji, seeing Joseon's unwavering adherence to serving the Ming Dynasty, thought that they were different from the other tribes of Manchuria that they had conquered so far. In other words, he probably believed that even if Joseon were conquered by military force, they would not obediently submit to Later Jin rule. Hong Taiji's inner thoughts are well reflected in the words spoken by Gang Hong-rip, who accompanied the Later Jin army at the time, when he met with King Injo.

Gang Hong-rip said:

“Those enemies (Later Jin) have always considered it unacceptable to serve the Imperial Court as subjects.

After reading the state letter, they said, ‘Joseon has served the Imperial Court as a subject for 200 years, which shows extreme sincerity. If we form a friendship with them, it can last for a long time.’

My uncle is currently a hostage, so they sent me to finalize the peace and return.

My uncle is currently a hostage, so they sent me to finalize the peace and return.

I was sent to finalize the peace and return.

- Annals of King Injo, Year 5, February 10 - The actions of the Later Jin during the Jeongmyo War must be understood in context. If Joseon could not be subjugated by military force alone, it would have been more rational to first establish a brotherly relationship and then gradually win them over to their side. If they had demanded a lord-vassal relationship from the outset, or taken measures such as annexing part of Joseon's territory, they would likely have faced strong resistance from Joseon.

Even if Joseon decided to accept the Later Jin's demands, not all problems were resolved. Joseon had to express that while they were accepting the demands under duress of the Later Jin's military might, they did not wholeheartedly agree. When the issue of using the Ming era name arose during the peace negotiations, King Injo stated, 'In matters of great righteousness, even if the country perishes, we can never comply, but we should not now invite disaster by stubbornly provoking a conflict' (Annals of King Injo, Year 5, February 22), and instructed that the Ming era name not be used in the state letter to the Later Jin. At the same time, he stipulated, 'We have served the Imperial Court (Ming) as subjects for over 200 years, and the grace we have received is deep and profound, making it impossible to abandon our righteousness. We ask for your understanding' (Annals of King Injo, Year 5, February 23), thus striving to convey Joseon's intentions until the very end. These efforts by King Injo were accepted by the Later Jin, and peace was maintained between Joseon and the Later Jin without major conflict until the outbreak of the Byeongja War.

Nevertheless, the fundamental issues between the two countries were not resolved. As long as the decline of the Ming Dynasty and the rise of the Later Jin existed, the relationship between the two countries harbored the risk of breaking at any moment. And that expectation soon became a reality.

In 1634, Hong Taiji effectively pacified all of Mongolia by destroying Ligdan Khan of the Chahar Mongols. Subsequently, the remnants of Ligdan Khan's forces surrendered with the Yuan Dynasty's imperial seal. By obtaining the Yuan Dynasty's imperial seal, Hong Taiji must have become convinced that the mandate of heaven was with him. His ministers, confirming Hong Taiji's intentions, urged him to ascend to the throne of Emperor. At this time, Hong Taiji said the following:

In the 9th year of Tiancong (1635), after pacifying Ligdan Khan of the Chahar, and obtaining the imperial seal of the Yuan Dynasty. The princes of the Eight Khoshuuds and the 49 princes of the Outer Mongols submitted a petition requesting the bestowal of an honorific title.

The Emperor (Hong Taiji) said,

“Joseon is a brotherly state, so it is proper to discuss this together.”

requested the bestowal of an honorific title.

The Emperor (Hong Taiji) said,

“Joseon is a brotherly state, so it is proper to discuss this together.”

- History of Qing, Annals of Joseon, Year 9 of Tiancong - Although Hong Taiji had conquered surrounding states by military force and obtained the Yuan Dynasty's imperial seal, he could not be certain whether they would recognize his authority when he ascended to the throne of Emperor. As Morgenthau's remarks on power suggest, something more than military force is needed to control the minds and actions of others. Hong Taiji, born the eighth son of Nurhaci and possessing the political acumen to ascend to the throne of Emperor, would have known this.

On February 24, 1636, Yonggol'dae and his delegation finally visited King Injo. However, Yonggol'dae's delegation presented King Injo with an unusual document, unlike their usual practice: it was a letter from the princes of the Eight Khoshuuds and the Mongolian princes requesting Hong Taiji's enthronement as Emperor. The Joseon court refused to accept the document brought by Yonggol'dae, stating, 'There is no precedent for a subordinate state to send a letter to the ruler of another country.' Enraged, Yonggol'dae returned to his home country.

Since King Injo refused to recognize Hong Taiji's enthronement, rumors spread widely that war with the Later Jin would soon break out. To make matters worse, an official document from the envoy, ordering preparations for a confrontation with the Later Jin, was even stolen by Yonggol'dae's delegation. The relationship with the Later Jin had now deteriorated beyond repair. Soon after, another incident further angered Hong Taiji.

On April 11, Hong Taiji finally proclaimed the establishment of the Qing Dynasty in Shenyang and ascended to the throne of Emperor. At this time, Na Deok-heon and Yi Hwak from Joseon were attending Hong Taiji's enthronement ceremony as envoys of congratulation and reply, respectively. A surprising event occurred here. Throughout the enthronement ceremony, the two men did not bow to Hong Taiji. This was because they believed that even if Hong Taiji had ascended to the throne of Emperor, Joseon was still a brotherly state, not a suzerain state. Considering the atmosphere of the ceremony, where Manchus, Mongols, and even Ming officials bowed and paid homage, the actions of these two men were by no means easy (Han Myung-gi 2013, 48).

Of course, the two were severely beaten by Qing officials. Nevertheless, they persisted in refusing to bow to Hong Taiji until the end. According to Nam Ang-gap's 'Byeongja Rok,' it is said that some Han officials present at the ceremony shed tears of shame upon witnessing the two men's steadfast refusal (Han Myung-gi 2013, 54). What do you think Hong Taiji thought as he watched the Joseon envoys? Even if he dispatched troops to conquer Joseon, would he have believed that they would truly submit to him?

News of Hong Taiji's enthronement soon reached the Joseon court. With this, Joseon and the Qing Dynasty had crossed the point of no return. Just as there cannot be two suns in the sky, Joseon could not accept the Later Jin's establishment of an era name and enthronement. However, even amidst this, King Injo appears to have not given up on the possibility of compromise with the Qing Dynasty until the very end. Around June, when the news of Hong Taiji's enthronement arrived, King Injo proposed during a royal lecture discussing the state letter to be sent to the Qing Dynasty, to use the title 'Qing Khan' instead of 'Emperor of the Great Qing.' While acknowledging the reality of the Qing Dynasty, he could not fully accept it, thus seeking a way out within these constraints. However, it was no longer possible to prevent the imminent invasion of the Qing Dynasty at that level.

On December 9, 1637, the Qing Dynasty crossed the Yalu River to conquer Joseon. On December 13, they advanced directly to Hanyang via Anju. Facing the second invasion by the Qing Dynasty, Joseon was once again subjugated by the Qing military might and experienced the humiliation of Samjeondo. Nevertheless, Hong Taiji did not completely destroy Joseon. Unlike other countries they had conquered, Hong Taiji concluded the war by establishing a lord-vassal relationship with Joseon. This treatment of Joseon by the Qing Dynasty is particularly interesting, given that the Qing Dynasty directly ruled all the territories they had conquered and intended to continue doing so. It is likely that seeing Joseon, despite its inferior national strength, steadfastly refuse to submit and uphold its righteousness with the Ming Dynasty, fighting for its survival and independence, Hong Taiji concluded that he could not make this country permanently subservient through military force alone. The relationship between Joseon and the Qing Dynasty during this period seems to demonstrate that military force alone is insufficient to control people's minds and actions through power. This case also proves that King Injo's diplomatic policies at the time need to be examined from a complex perspective of the nature of power.

Conclusion

As the story has unfolded, our tour has reached the rear gate of the Forbidden City, Shenwu Gate. It is now time to conclude our narrative. As mentioned earlier, given the domestic situation and international dynamics at the time, King Injo had few options in his diplomacy between the Ming and Qing dynasties. Even the options available were precarious. Therefore, Injo's diplomacy toward China during the Ming-Qing transition needs to be interpreted within this context. Although he endured the humiliation of kneeling before the 'barbarians,' and the suffering of his people under the Qing's tyranny was immense, King Injo, through his utmost efforts, managed to uphold his righteousness with the declining Ming Dynasty while securing Joseon's survival and guarantee from the rising Qing Dynasty. Ultimately, unlike other conquered nations, the Qing Dynasty largely ceased its internal interference in Joseon after Emperor Kangxi (1661-1772), and the two countries maintained a peaceful relationship for over 250 years.

When the fierce waves of history surge, it is not always best to try to block them with one's entire body, only to be shattered. Especially for nations like ours, heavily influenced by the international politics of great powers, it is necessary to keenly grasp changes in the international landscape and continuously contemplate clever strategies that can ensure the nation's survival and independence amidst the great powers. The reason why it is not necessarily wrong to uphold values that must be protected and maintain one's identity, even if one has to kneel before the 'barbarians,' and thereby plan for the future, lies here.

There are the sayings 'enduring hardship for future success' (woshin sangdam) and 'making a comeback' (gwontong jungrae). We all wish to be the protagonists of glory, not the protagonists of humiliation. However, just as glory follows hardship, sometimes someone must bear the stigma of humiliation when the times demand it. If we try to view them from our current perspective without examining the circumstances of that era and the feelings of the people within it, it cannot be considered a proper attitude toward history. If I were to return to the era in which King Injo lived, could I have made a better choice than he did? This was the conclusion I reached while trying to defend him.

It seems it is truly time to finish. The bus that will take us has arrived. We now leave behind our regrettable journey in the Forbidden City and board the bus for our next destination, the Yuanmingyuan. What stories await us at Yuanmingyuan, our next destination? References: Kim Han-gyu. 2005. "Cheonhagukga: Dongasia Segye-ilseo in the Traditional Era." Seoul: Sonamu. National Institute of Korean History, Annals of the Joseon Dynasty Official Website. http://sillok.history.go.kr

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National Institute of Korean History, Korean History Database, Chinese Official Histories: Joseon Records. http://db.history.go.kr

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Jo Il-su. 2017. "A Critical Examination of Injo's Diplomacy Toward China." "History Criticism,"

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Gye Seung-beom. 2009. "Joseon Dynasty Overseas Dispatch and Sino-Korean Relations." Seoul: Pureun Yeoksa. Lee Young-chun. 2011. "Records and Diplomatic Activities of the Investiture Envoys Dispatched After the Restoration of King Injo,"

"Journal of Joseon Dynasty History," November 2011.

Choi Jeong-woon. 2009. "Introduction of Western Power." "Formation History of Social Science Concepts in Modern Korea."

Ha Young-sun et al. Seoul: Changbi.

Tian Jiesen. 2015. "Nurhaci: Builder of the Qing Empire." Translated by Hong Soon-do. Seoul: Dolbegae. Han Myung-gi. 2013. "Historical Commentary on the Byeongja War." Seoul: Pureun Yeoksa. Hans J. Morgenthau. 2013. "Politics Among Nations." Translated by Lee Ho-jae and Eom Tae-am. Seoul: Kim Young-sa.