The Imperialist Betrayal of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s ‘Civilization Enlightenment Theory’ and Joseon

Kyushu National Museum of History and Culture · Ju Yeon-jeong · Seoul National University

Introduction

As the Kyushu National Museum of History and Culture, our final destination, was closed for the year-end and New Year holidays, we were unable to visit it during this expedition. We had high expectations for the exhibits that explore the formation and history of Japan from ancient times to the Edo period through its exchanges with Asian and European countries, so our disappointment was also significant. The Kyushu National Museum of History and Culture's main exhibition concept is to illuminate the formation of Japanese culture from an Asian historical perspective. I believe that examining pre-modern Japan in relation to Asian countries is important. This is because considering a nation's history within a larger context provides a crucial perspective when thinking about how Korea, China, and Japan can construct their mutual relations in the future.

Photograph 1. Exterior and interior of the Kyushu National Museum of History and Culture (Kyushu National Museum of History and Culture brochure)

East Asia continues to grapple with interstate relations that are seldom improved due to historical issues stemming from emotions and memories. The origins of this can be traced back to the late 19th century, a period of significant transition in the East Asian regional order. The East Asian world disintegrated with the advent of modernity, and Japan, a constituent member of this world, actively promoted its dissolution. In a situation where only Japan succeeded in imperial expansion, it advocated for the "Datsu-A Ron" (Leaving Asia Theory), invaded its East Asian neighbors, and particularly colonized the Korean Peninsula. For Japan, Asia became an object of domination, while for Asia, Japan became the principal perpetrator. The legacy of this imperialism, coupled with the inadequate resolution of historical experiences and emotions during the post-World War II reorganization of the East Asian regional order under the San Francisco System, continues to influence East Asian international politics. Currently, interstate relations in East Asia are defined by emotions, stemming from a stagnation of 19th-century experiences.

I believe this is largely due to the individualistic perception of modern Korea, modern China, and modern Japan. The dichotomy of invasion and victimhood is emphasized because various actions arising from Japan's process of othering and excluding its neighboring Asian countries have been perceived in a nationalistic manner, focusing on the situations of specific countries rather than within the broader context of the entire East Asian region undergoing a transition of order. However, generalizing perpetrators and victims in past history and collectivizing memories can hinder universal empathy. This is because identity can foster political isolationism, thereby weakening understanding and empathy towards other groups. There is a need to pursue new elements that transcend the politics of identity and memory rooted in the past in East Asia. (Jeon Jae-seong 2012, 335)

I propose to begin by looking back at the modernity of Asia. Instead of viewing East Asian history from a single-nation perspective, we should consider relationally how countries navigated periods of historical transition. If the origins of the current conflict-ridden relations between East Asian countries can be traced back to the late 19th century, I suggest we analyze relationally how the East Asian world transitioned into modernity, how Japan decided to break away from Asia, and under what circumstances Korea and China failed to achieve a smooth landing into the flow of Western civilization.

From this critical perspective, this paper aims to re-examine Fukuzawa Yukichi's "Bunmei-kaika Ron" (Civilization Enlightenment Theory) during the late 19th-century transition of civilizations, considering its convergence into the "Datsu-A Ron" within the context of regional relations, as he possessed the keenest understanding of the era's order transformation and new civilizations. The analysis will explore how Fukuzawa's theory of civilization led to imperialism, examining his attempts to civilize the East Asian world as he envisioned, and the subsequent "Datsu-A Ron" that arose from their failure. Fukuzawa believed that East Asia should unite through the enlightenment of Korea to counter Western powers. This aspiration was frustrated by the failure of the Gapsin Coup, which served as a crucial turning point towards the "Datsu-A Ron." However, a critical stance is necessary regarding whether Fukuzawa's theory of civilization was something Korea could readily accept. Korea faced a complex dilemma: first, the need to navigate the shifting order resulting from power struggles among Qing China, Japan, and Western nations, and second, the imperative for a weak nation to readjust its disciplinary relationship with great powers. Fukuzawa's theory of civilization had limitations in fully addressing these issues.

The Transition of Civilization and East Asia at the End of the 19th Century

The East Asian world order began to be shaken by new international political mechanisms propagated by the West, starting with the First Opium War in 1840. Concepts such as international law and the treaty system, along with notions of sovereignty, balance of power, and the competition for wealth and military strength, which differed from existing East Asian principles, were being imposed on East Asia as new standards of civilization. The transition of East Asian civilization at the end of the 19th century was not limited to a mere change in lifestyle. East Asia faced a situation where it had to accept new standards for everything from basic ways of thinking, concepts, and societal operating systems to the principles governing international relations. As these were introduced through the power politics of Western imperialism, nations were compelled to seek responses to the new civilization under coercive and urgent circumstances, rather than experiencing a natural paradigm shift through a process of anomalies and crises.

In international politics, the most crucial aspect related to the transition of civilization was the concept of sovereignty and the regulation of relations between states. The East Asian world order operated on the principle of '天下禮儀之邦' (a region of propriety and righteousness under heaven) as the standard of civilization, with '字小事大' (serving the great while attending to the small) as the basic principle of conduct. In contrast, the modern European international order presents the standard of civilization of sovereign states. This means that international relations are not established through expected roles within a hierarchical order, as in the Sinocentric world order, but rather through the principle of independent sovereign states pursuing self-strengthening and a balance of power through wealth and military strength. (Ha Young-sun 2012, 19-24)

The Western standard of civilization arrived, supported by the imperial competition of great powers seeking to expand their influence in Asia after the Opium War. Consequently, East Asia's existing civilization was forcibly replaced by Western civilization. The protagonists, stage, and principles of action changed: from the Sinocentric world order to modern nation-states, from propriety to wealth and military strength, and from serving the great while attending to the small to self-strengthening and a balance of power. In East Asia, where the principle of hierarchical regulation based on propriety, rather than the horizontal competition for wealth and military strength among sovereign states, formed the basis of interstate relations, and where the principle of conduct was 'serving the great while attending to the small' rather than 'self-strengthening and a balance of power,' nations faced the challenge of accepting the international order of Western civilization. (Ha Young-sun 2012, 24-25)

The reception of new civilizations and its outcomes differed among Korea, China, and Japan. Japan, having undergone a rapid transition to Western civilization, succeeded in its imperial ambitions. In contrast, China and Korea, less proactive in adopting new civilizations, ended up as semi-colonies and colonies, respectively. Japan pursued complete Westernization through a comprehensive restructuring of the state. China, while adopting Western technology for national strength, modernized based on the principle of "Chinese spirit as the essence, Western technology for practical use" (中體西用). Furthermore, as evidenced by agreements like the Sino-Korean Trade Regulation Treaty, China sought to survive in the new era by transforming into a modern empire and compelling tributary relations with Korea, but ultimately lost the First Sino-Japanese War. Korea, facing a triple pressure from the West, Japan, and China, sought to navigate changes in state relations and pursue reforms, but the Gapsin Coup failed. Following China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, Korea began to pursue reforms as a modern state but ultimately fell under Japanese colonial rule.

How can we interpret the different ways Japan, Joseon, and Qing responded to Western civilization? Is a retrospective judgment that Japan simply understood and adapted to the changing times well, while Joseon and Qing did not, appropriate? We need to examine the considerations each nation made during a period of immense systemic transition. We must understand the logic each nation employed, the background that gave rise to those logics, and how those logics were realized or distorted in reality.

Fukuzawa Yukichi promoted the civilization of the East Asian world based on his theory of civilization as a means to counter Western powers, believing that Asia's future would be precarious without Westernization. He particularly harbored a sense of Asian solidarity, anticipating the enlightenment of Korea. However, with the failure of the Gapsin Coup and the difficulties in reforming Korea, he abandoned his hopes for Asian civilization and shifted to the "Datsu-A" stance, after which Japan moved towards imperialism. Before criticizing Japan's corrupted imperial modernity, it is essential to accurately recognize the limitations inherent in the Asian solidarity advocated by Japan in the early 1860s-1880s, based on its theory of civilization, within the broader Asian context.

Photograph 2. Display in the Cultural Exchange Exhibition Hall, structured around the perspective of viewing Japanese history through exchanges with Asia.

Cultural Exchange Exhibition Hall. (Kyushu National Museum of History and Culture brochure)

Fukuzawa and Joseon: The Civilization of the East Asian World

Fukuzawa's theory of civilization possesses a one-directional characteristic that advocates for progress from barbarism to Western civilization. In the context of the Western powers' expansion, he held the view that Asia's fate should no longer remain in the past but should actively embrace Western civilization. The early theory of solidarity for Asia that Fukuzawa envisioned can be described as the Westernization of the East Asian world, and he recognized that Japan, being the most advanced nation in Westernization, should lead other Asian countries. Fukuzawa's advocacy for the East Asian solidarity theory, which proposed that Asian nations unite under Japan to repel the Western powers and revive Asia, emerged in 1880, while his announcement of the theory of abandoning Asia occurred in 1885. It can be said that the presentation of these entirely opposing discourses by Fukuzawa within this five-year span was decisively influenced by his encounters with Korea and the fluctuations in Korea's political situation.

Starting with the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity in 1876, Joseon began to establish interstate relations with Western powers in the manner of the modern European international order. With the opening of its ports, Joseon was significantly influenced not only by Western technology but also by Western culture, politics, society, and economy. Consequently, Joseon likely felt the need for enlightenment and dispatched envoys to Japan. Fukuzawa, through his interactions with Joseon envoys, particularly with Yu Gil-jun and Yun Chi-ho, who enrolled in Keio University, felt he was witnessing Joseon people and Joseon at the crossroads of tradition and modernity, reminiscent of himself and Japan twenty years prior. He recalled himself walking the streets of developed London with guns and swords at his waist, and the conflicted and chaotic atmosphere within Japan following Perry's arrival. He thus felt sympathy for the chaotic situation in Joseon at the time. Fukuzawa's initial perception of Joseon can be said to stem from 'empathy.' (Tsukiashi Tatsuhiko 2015, 8-12) 6. The Imperialist Betrayal of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s ‘Civilization Enlightenment Theory’ and Joseon_Kyushu National Museum of History and Culture

Fukuzawa believed that Joseon needed to undergo the same difficult process of adapting to Western civilization that Japan had experienced twenty to thirty years earlier upon its opening. Just as one does not contract measles again after having it once, he thought that Joseon, after experiencing the 'Western civilization disease' just once, would emerge from its confusion and enter the path of enlightenment. Furthermore, he recognized Japan's responsibility as the leader of Asia to support Joseon's modernization and independence. Fukuzawa positioned Japan as the leader because he assumed that only Japan among Asian nations was progressing in civilization, and Joseon was lagging behind. He held the conviction that forcing the adoption of Western civilization, even through the use of force, was the correct path. The theory of Asian leadership can be seen as a sense of responsibility for Japan, as the most advanced in adopting Western civilization, to navigate the crisis in East Asia as a member of Asia. (Tsukiashi Tatsuhiko 2015, 13-21)

In other words, Fukuzawa's early pan-Asianism advocated for achieving Joseon's enlightenment, even through direct interference in its national affairs, and subsequently for Asia to be civilized to counter the West and protect itself. The fact that Fukuzawa published 'Jiji Shogen' (時事小言) during his interactions with Joseon and while hosting Joseon students at Keio University suggests that he began to perceive the region of Asia as a space for political solidarity through his engagement with Joseon, linking this theory of Joseon's enlightenment and Asian leadership.

It is not easy to dichotomously classify Fukuzawa as either a proponent of Joseon's invasion or a supporter of its civilization. However, connecting Fukuzawa's idea of Asian solidarity through the civilization of the East Asian world directly to a theory of invasion also seems questionable when viewed in the context of that era. If Fukuzawa's desire for Joseon's enlightenment and his theory of Asian leadership stemmed from empathy following his encounters with Joseon, it is plausible to believe that his vision, which sought to sever Joseon from traditional Sinocentric civilization and lead it towards Westernization from the time of the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity until the mid-1880s, prioritized a regional consciousness of Asia uniting to counter the West over personal nationalistic ambitions of invasion. Fukuzawa's civilization theory towards neighboring countries can be seen as existing within a conceptual framework where Japan, as a civilized nation, perceived Joseon as representing its own barbaric past. Whether this framework could be directly applied to the East Asian situation at the time has its limitations, which will be explained later. For now, let us examine how Fukuzawa's perceptions changed according to the shifts in Joseon's political situation within this conceptual framework. 6. The Imperialist Betrayal of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s ‘Civilization Enlightenment Theory’ and Joseon_Kyushu National Museum of History and Culture

Development and Failure of the Theory of Joseon's Civilization: From the Ganghwa Treaty to the Gapsin Coup

Although Korea opened its ports by concluding the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Korea and Japan, it was difficult to sever ties with the existing order, and a strong sentiment of "Chukhwa" (rejection of Westerners) prevailed, viewing Western powers as barbaric. Fukuzawa emphasized that "Japan abandoned the theory of rejecting the West because it realized that foreigners are not "ijeki" (barbarians) or "geumsu" (beasts), but good friends with whom to share civilization enlightenment, and that interacting with foreigners and competing in enlightenment is the great cause of serving the nation and being loyal" and stressed the need to "induce Korea to enlighten itself through civilization." (Takashiro 2013, 63)

In 'Jiji Shogen' (時事小言), published on July 29, 1881, he presented the 'Theory of Asian Leadership,' arguing that Japan should forcibly civilize Joseon and Qing China, thereby forming an alliance centered around Japan to defend against Western powers' invasion of Asia and preserve independence. The content of the Theory of Asian Leadership was reiterated in the editorial 'Discussing Relations with Joseon,' published in 'Jiji Shinpo' (時事新報) in 1882. (Takashiro 2013, 53)

Accordingly, Fukuzawa maintained continuous contact with Joseon's reformist faction, even as the anti-reformist faction gained influence in Joseon. He interacted with figures like Yi Dong-in and Eo Yun-jung. In 1882, Kim Ok-gyun and Seo Gwang-beom visited Japan. Kim Ok-gyun also visited Japan again with Park Young-hyo's delegation after the Imo Incident, and it is said that he arranged a meeting between Fukuzawa and Park Young-hyo. Through his interactions with Joseon's reformists, Fukuzawa gained an understanding of Joseon's reality, and Joseon's reformists, in turn, formulated plans for Joseon's reform by emulating modern Japan through their exchanges with Fukuzawa. (Takashiro 2013, 63-64)

However, amidst a growing atmosphere of resistance against Japan and the West in Joseon, an incident occurred on March 31, 1882, before the Imo Incident, where Japanese individuals were injured or killed by Joseon people in Wonsan. Regarding the Japanese government's dispatch of warships to respond with force, Fukuzawa's position was that it was more important to guide Joseon towards enlightenment through opening its ports rather than intimidating it with military force. He argued that Joseon was in the process of transitioning from barbarism to civilization, and that various confusions could arise during this process, which were due to the ignorance of the barbaric stage. Therefore, Japan should help Joseon escape barbarism.

The period when the people of barbarism gradually enter the realm of enlightenment

is the most crucial and difficult time.

It is clear that the Joseon people felt triumphant by killing hundreds of resident foreigners. While we can pity their foolishness and hate their ferocity, we cannot simply stop at attributing it as the fault of the Joseon people. (Takashiro 2013,

He clearly rejoiced. Pitying their foolishness, and

71-72)

Regarding the Imo Incident, he also critically viewed the situation where the anti-reformist and pro-Western factions gained dominance within Joseon, preventing Joseon from moving towards civilization through enlightenment. (Takashiro 2013,

83-84)

Furthermore, he expressed dissatisfaction with the Japanese government for failing to guide Joseon towards civilization during the approximately six years from the signing of the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity in 1876 to the outbreak of the Imo Incident in 1882.

Regarding incidents like the Wonsan Incident in Joseon, I argued for the necessity of implementing swift and effective measures (opening ports rather than using force) and discussed the dangers of neglecting them. Before these measures were adopted, the Seoul Incident (Imo Incident) suddenly occurred in July. Even then, despite my past advice not being heeded,

I repeatedly discussed Joseon strategy. (Takashiro 2013, 93)

It is clear. If one is already hostile to the theory of advancement, it is

not only hindering the enlightenment of the nation of Joseon...

(Takashiro 2013, 83-84)

He also expressed dissatisfaction to the Japanese government for failing to guide Joseon towards civilization for approximately six years, from the conclusion of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Korea and Japan in 1876 to the outbreak of the Imo Incident in 1882.

Regarding incidents like the Anbyon Incident (Wonsanjin Incident) in Joseon, I discussed the need for rapid and effective measures (opening ports rather than military force), and the dangers of neglecting them.

Before these measures were adopted, the Gyeongseong Incident (Imo Coup) suddenly occurred in July. At that time too,

Despite my past advice not being heeded,

I repeatedly discussed Joseon strategy.

(Takashiro 2013, 93)

Following the outbreak of the Imo Incident, Fukuzawa pursued the civilization of Joseon in three directions. The first was direct intervention through military force, stemming from distrust in the Joseon government after the incident. He recognized that Joseon's civilization enlightenment was still possible but emphasized that persuasion through civilian means (文) might be ineffective, necessitating coercion through military means (武). Indeed, he stationed resident supervisors in Joseon, backed by military force, to interfere in internal affairs. Concurrently, as pro-enlightenment factions in Joseon actively pursued state reforms amidst the ascendancy of conservative factions and Qing influence following the Imo Incident, civilization through civilian means (文), by educating Joseon scholars in Western learning, was also promoted. Furthermore, Japanese capital was provided to Joseon in the form of loans to advance modernization projects in transportation, education, mining, manufacturing, and military organization. The source of these economic loans to Joseon was the remaining 400,000 yen from the 500,000 yen indemnity received by Japan as a result of the Treaty of Jemulpo after the Imo Incident, after compensating for damages. (Takashiro 2013, 106-120)

After the failure of the Gapsin Coup, Fukuzawa abandoned his intention to enlighten Joseon. Fukuzawa had extensive discussions with Joseon's reformist figures like Kim Ok-gyun and Seo Jae-pil when they formulated reforms, even reportedly providing Japanese funds under pseudonyms, and harbored expectations for Joseon's enlightenment. However, witnessing the suppression of the Gapsin Coup by Qing China and the subsequent execution or exile of its leaders, Fukuzawa appears to have perceived it as the annihilation of the Japanese reform efforts aimed at Joseon's reform. Subsequently, Fukuzawa proposed the "Datsu-A Ron," retracting his ideology of Asian solidarity. The "Datsu-A Ron," published in the Shishinpo newspaper in March 1885, consists of three parts. (Tsukikyaku Tatsuhiko 2015, 29)

The first part concerns the necessity of adopting Western civilization. The second part argues that East Asia as a whole must also respond to Western invasion through civilization, but only Japan has achieved civilization. The third part asserts that relations with Joseon and Qing offer no benefit to Japan.

The reason for Western invasion of Asia is attributed to the power of Western civilization. To

defend national independence against this, Asia itself must

fully embrace Western civilization. In that regard,

Western civilization is like the measles that everyone gets. Therefore, Asian countries must also experience this Western civilization disease. (Tsukiashi Tatsuhiko 2015, 22-23) In Joseon, the nation and the government are blocking the path to progress. The entire nation, without distinction between the court and the common people, must adopt Western civilization in all matters. The arrival of Western influence through the Japan-US Treaty of Peace and Amity meant that Japan's customs at the time were incompatible with the West. In Japan, the nation and the government were considered different entities, so for the sake of national independence, they overthrew the existing government (the Tokugawa Shogunate) and established a new government (the Meiji government) to rapidly adopt Western civilization. This was achieved only in Japan. Japan alone among the Asian states achieved de-Asianization (modern Western civilization). (Tsukiashi Tatsuhiko 2015, 23-24)

If a person like those who led the Meiji Restoration were to appear in Joseon and China, overthrow the government, and adopt Western civilization, they might be able to preserve their independence. However, if things remain as they are, they will be partitioned by the Western civilized nations... Even if we enlighten our neighbors, the current China and Joseon are not only unhelpful to Japan but will also be regarded as backward countries like China and Joseon due to their geographical proximity. Therefore, what Japan needs is not to wait for the enlightenment of China and Joseon and prosper Asia together, but to bring the Western countries into contact with China and Joseon by making them adjacent. Thus, Japan must, from the heart, reject intercourse with both countries. (Tsukiashi Tatsuhiko 2015, 25-27) 6. Fukuzawa Yukichi's "Civilization Enlightenment Theory": Imperialist Betrayal and Joseon_Kyushu National Museum of History

Fukuzawa's intention with the "De-Asianization Theory" was not to partition China and colonize Joseon. It was that the world was changing due to Western civilization, and neighboring countries were not properly grasping this; waiting for neighboring countries to civilize was not beneficial to Japan for the purpose of joint response. Ultimately, the De-Asianization Theory can be seen as a result of Fukuzawa's shift in perception regarding the civilization of the East Asian world, in the context of the failure of the Gabo Reform in Joseon.

At this time of fundamental transformation in the East Asian regional order, it is necessary to examine not only the superficial and expressive aspects of the actions and discourse of each East Asian country in their entry into the Western modern order, but also the situational structures within the relationships between East Asian countries. In this regard, Fukuzawa's theory of Joseon's civilization can be seen as Fukuzawa's attempt to establish a relationship between Joseon and Japan in the process of confronting the modern international order. However, limitations clearly exist. Given the differing positions and situations of each country in the existing East Asian hierarchical order, could Fukuzawa's theory of civilization be unconditionally applied to neighboring countries? Was Fukuzawa's consideration sufficient regarding the situational structure of Joseon's encounter with Western civilization?

Joseon's Complex Dilemma and the Limitations of the Theory of Joseon's Civilization

Fukuzawa's theory of civilization has a monistic character, emphasizing that adopting Western civilization is the ultimate goal, and that it is necessary to move from barbarism, where Western civilization has not yet been adopted, towards Western civilization, and that this is achievable. The idea was that Western civilization should be recognized as the new standard, and all countries, despite their current differences, should strive to catch up. (Fukuzawa 2012)

However, why was it difficult for Joseon to civilize in the Western sense, despite the penetration and imposition of Western civilization? There are two reasons why Joseon had more difficulty than Japan in absorbing the monistic view of civilization. The first is the degree of its connection to the East Asian international order of the traditional era, and the second is the complex interplay of Joseon's position as a weak nation, which acted as a dilemma for Joseon. 6. Fukuzawa Yukichi's "Civilization Enlightenment Theory": Imperialist Betrayal and Joseon_Kyushu National Museum of History

However, what were the reasons why Joseon found it difficult to Westernize despite the penetration and imposition of Western civilization? There are two reasons why Joseon had more difficulty than Japan in absorbing a monistic view of civilization. The first is the degree of its ties to the East Asian international order during the traditional era, and the second is the belief that the complex interplay of Joseon's position as a weak nation contributed to Joseon's dilemma. 6. Fukuzawa Yukichi's Imperialist Perversion of 'Civilization Enlightenment Theory' and Joseon_Kyushu National Museum

Photo 3. The presentation and discussion at Canal City, instead of the Kyushu National Museum of History, concluded successfully.

concluded successfully.

In the hierarchical order of the world, the East Asian system of conceptualizing "interests" politically differed from the West. While Western international politics was determined by material capabilities in the tension between power structures and interest structures, in East Asia, conceptual status was the factor determining the correlation between power structures and interest structures. Therefore, East Asia showed a tendency to adapt and adopt the conceptual status system based on the Hua-Yi distinction of Sinocentrism, centering on its own nation. This transformation of identity was more clearly evident in Japan, which was geographically distant from China. Japan not only had its own Hua-Yi perspective centered on Japan but also recognized Sinic civilization as achievable by other nations, thus not equating the worship of Sinic civilization with the worship of the Central Plain dynasty. In contrast, Joseon, while possessing a Sinocentric ideology of "Little China," was submissive to the Central Plain dynasty due to China's realistic pressure. Japan, compared to Joseon, possessed a relatively more flexible concept of civilization internally.

East Asian international politics had a tradition of setting interests based on the issue of conceptual status, and in this context, Sinic civilization served as the standard. Based on this, East Asian countries subjectively established conceptual status in their relations with neighboring countries. In the case of Joseon, depending on the nature of the Central Plain dynasty, it generally submitted to the Central Plain dynasty and formed a "Little China" with its neighbors. On the other hand, Japan had a more concrete sense of self in conceptual competition, which is thought to be due to its lower degree of connection with Sinic civilization, both geographically and culturally, compared to other countries within the hierarchical order. While Japan was not perceived as a major threat to China or neighboring countries, except for the Imjin War, within the hierarchical order, it had an advantage in terms of its conceptual and attitudinal shift when it encountered Western civilization compared to China or Joseon.

The second is the dilemma that Joseon, as a weak nation, inevitably faced. In confronting the new order, Joseon was complexly entangled in the adaptation to the competition between the Western civilization order and the East Asian civilization order, and secondarily, in the issue of how to be bound to the higher unit as a subordinate unit. For Joseon, the transition of order meant a change in the nature of the imperial order and the logic of subordination, while the imperial nature of the order remained unchanged. If Japan, in the process of becoming a great power through the Meiji Restoration, was only tasked with resolving the primary power competition with Qing, Joseon had to endure not only the power competition between great powers but also the competition for the allegiance of weak nations to great powers during that competition. Given that Qing and Joseon also sought to bind Joseon through the logic of power, and Japanese and Western powers were expanding their influence in Joseon, it is thought that it would have been difficult for Joseon to shift towards Western civilization, despite Fukuzawa's monistic direction regarding the personal, social, and national legitimacy of achieving Western civilization.

For a Progressive Relationship between China, Japan, and Korea

Based on his theory of civilization, Fukuzawa Yukichi clearly had a vision and expectation for the civilization and solidarity of the East Asian world. He particularly felt a strong sense of solidarity with Joseon, but from the time of the Gabo Reform, he abandoned this Asian solidarity and shifted his stance to the De-Asianization Theory. Subsequently, Japan moved towards imperialism, not only colonizing Joseon but also initiating the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War. The origins of current issues of memory and sentiment among East Asian countries can be found in these events from the late 19th century to 1945. However, if these are viewed solely through the dichotomous framework of invasion and defense, there is a limitation in that only the perspectives of the aggressor and the victim may be emphasized.

In preparing this field trip report, I wanted to raise the issue that it is necessary to re-examine the responses of China, Japan, and Korea, especially Joseon and Japan, during the transition to modernity, from a relational context, moving beyond the dichotomous view of aggressor and victim. This is not to justify Japan's imperialist actions and the suffering of neighboring countries, but rather to suggest the need for each country to reflect on its normative historicity by creating a space for fundamental consideration of the nationalistic history and memories that each East Asian country has carried. To this end, I aimed to include in this report a critical re-examination of how Japan perceived the issues and what the logic of Korea was, by returning to Fukuzawa's initial motivations for his theory of civilization and Asian solidarity.

Fukuzawa's theory of civilization had limitations in understanding Joseon in the late 19th century as East Asia moved towards modernity. The dilemma Joseon faced in shifting its thinking towards Western civilization was a much deeper and more complex problem than what Japan experienced. In this situation, Fukuzawa failed to show a broader intellectual horizon beyond the dichotomous thinking that Japan would de-Asianize because Joseon's civilization was becoming remote. If the perception of threats during the transitional period of modernity, when East and West were politically united by the logic of power, had been well combined with an intersubjective understanding of Asian neighbors and civilizations, could the concept of Asian solidarity to counter Western powers have taken a different form?

Bibliography Takashi Koichi. 2013. "A Study on Fukuzawa Yukichi's Strategy Towards Joseon: Focusing on "Jiji Shinpō" Articles Related to Joseon (1882-1900)".

Seoul: Do-seo Publishing Seonin. Jeon Jae-seong. 2012. "A Normative Basis for Complex Network Norms Theory in East Asia and Korean Strategy."

Edited by Ha Young-sun and Kim Sang-bae. "Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order." Seoul: Hanul.

Edited by Ha Young-sun and Kim Sang-bae. "Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order." Seoul: Hanul.

Edited by Ha Young-sun and Kim Sang-bae. "Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order." Seoul: Hanul.

Ha Young-sun. 2012. "Historical Transformation of the Concept of East Asian Order: From Tianxia to Complexity."

Edited by Ha Young-sun and Son Yeol. "History of the Formation of Social Science Concepts in Modern Korea, Vol. 2." Seoul: Changbi.

Fukuzawa Yukichi. 2012. "Theory of Civilization." Translated by Jeong Myeong-hwan. Seoul: Giparang. Tsukiashi Tatsuhiko. 2015. "Fukuzawa Yukichi's Joseon: 'De-Asianization' within Japan-Korea-China Relations."

Tokyo: Kodansha. Appendix

Tokyo: Kodansha.

Appendix

Nagasaki Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II as Seen Through Historical Materials

The End of World War II

_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

Noh Ga-yeon

Seoul National University

Introduction

The first field trip destination for Sarangbang Group 9, as we prepared this report, was the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. Located close to Nagasaki city in a tranquil village, not far from the very site where the atomic bomb fell, the museum is housed in a sophisticated modern building. Information is provided in Japanese, English, Korean, and Chinese, making the visit accessible to us.

Following the wall with years from the present to the past engraved on it, the exhibition room, filled with objects and records that preserve the horrors of the atomic bombing, recreates that day in 1945. The second space, which appears after leaving the exhibition room, includes references to the history of aggression by the Japanese Empire, the developments and course of the Pacific War and World War II, and the history of atomic bomb development from the US's development of the atomic bomb to the present day, even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

From the website address of the atomic bomb museum, 'Nagasakipeace,' to the Peace Park created around it, present-day Japan and Nagasaki seem to want to talk about peace. However, the content and scope of that 'peace' did not seem so easily definable. Photo 1. Entrance to the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum.

Restored by the U.S. National Security Archive in August 1945

'The first atomic bombs in human history, dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and on Nagasaki on August 9, led to the surrender of Imperial Japan, which had resisted until the end, accepting the Potsdam Declaration, and brought complete victory in World War II to the Allied nations and liberation to the Korean Peninsula.' This is the generally accepted historical narrative. However, atomic bombs and nuclear energy are not merely weapons; they have redefined the meaning of war and strategy in international politics and human society completely. The weapon of extreme destructive power that marked the end of decades, or for Europeans, centuries of war, even sparked debates about morality. Did the United States have to use the atomic bomb? Was the second atomic bomb, dropped on Nagasaki after Hiroshima, truly necessary? Is the U.S. government's claim that this horrific weapon prevented 'more casualties' valid? In short, the central question is, 'Were the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki truly essential to ending the war?' Debates on these questions are ongoing among historians, political scientists, politicians, military experts, social activists, and the general public worldwide. To find answers to these questions, it is crucial to accurately understand the thoughts and judgments of the policymakers of the Allied powers, including the US and the Soviet Union, and Japan, during this critical period. Above all, if the United States' intention in using the atomic bomb was to 'hasten Japan's surrender,' the extent to which the means achieved the end would depend on how the Japanese government leaders at the time reacted to the situation and what perceptions they held.

The weapon of extreme destructive power that marked the end of decades, or for Europeans, centuries of war, even sparked debates about morality. Did the United States have to use the atomic bomb? Was the second atomic bomb, dropped on Nagasaki after Hiroshima, truly necessary? Is the U.S. government's claim that this horrific weapon prevented 'more casualties' valid? In short, the central question is, 'Were the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki truly essential to ending the war?' Debates on these questions are ongoing among historians, political scientists, politicians, military experts, social activists, and the general public worldwide. To find answers to these questions, it is crucial to accurately understand the thoughts and judgments of the policymakers of the Allied powers, including the US and the Soviet Union, and Japan, during this critical period. Above all, if the United States' intention in using the atomic bomb was to 'hasten Japan's surrender,' the extent to which the means achieved the end would depend on how the Japanese government leaders at the time reacted to the situation and what perceptions they held. Photo 2. Sarangbang students observing a replica of "Fat Man".

In short, the central question is, 'Were the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki truly essential to ending the war?' Debates on these questions are ongoing among historians, political scientists, politicians, military experts, social activists, and the general public worldwide. To find answers to these questions, it is crucial to accurately understand the thoughts and judgments of the policymakers of the Allied powers, including the US and the Soviet Union, and Japan, during this critical period. Above all, if the United States' intention in using the atomic bomb was to 'hasten Japan's surrender,' the extent to which the means achieved the end would depend on how the Japanese government leaders at the time reacted to the situation and what perceptions they held.

The extent to which the means achieved the end would depend on how the Japanese government leaders at the time reacted to the situation and what perceptions they held. Photo 2. Sarangbang students observing a replica of "Fat Man".

The National Security Archive, a non-governmental, non-profit organization located on the campus of George Washington University in Washington D.C., provides briefing books that categorize and organize stored documents by subject. Among these, "The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II" (Burr 2017) selects and includes important primary source materials from various sources, along with background information, controversies, and the arguments of existing researchers regarding the atomic bomb and the end of the war, stating that it aims to "help readers make their own judgments about whether the use of nuclear weapons was justified." In particular, this briefing book includes some translations into English of internal documents from the Japanese government and related individuals, which is of great help to researchers worldwide.

Photo 4. Sarangbang Group 9 taking a quiz related to the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum visit. Among the over 100 documents continuously updated until 2017, four particularly important documents that reveal the intentions of the Japanese government during the three days between the bombing of Hiroshima and the bombing of Nagasaki (August 6-9) and the six days until the announcement of Japan's unconditional surrender (August 9-15) are introduced below.

<List>

[1] Document 67A (1945. 8. 7-8.): Excerpt from "Chronicle of the End of the War" compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

concerning Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima.

Collection.

[2] Document 75 (1945. 8. 9-10.): Memorandum by Naval Affairs Bureau Director Hoshina Zenshirō regarding Emperor Hirohito's first "sacred decision" after the bombing of Nagasaki.

Memorandum by Naval Affairs Bureau Director Hoshina Zenshirō regarding Emperor Hirohito's first "sacred decision" after the bombing of Nagasaki.

Memorandum.

[3] Document 86 (1945. 8. 13.): Excerpt from "Chronicle of the End of the War" compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerning the ongoing debate within the Japanese cabinet and military regarding surrender.

concerning the ongoing debate within the Japanese cabinet and military regarding surrender.

[4] Document 89 (1945. 8. 14.): From Information Bureau Director Shimomura Hiroshi's "Chronicle of the End of the War," regarding the Emperor's second "sacred decision."

regarding the Emperor's second "sacred decision."

[1] Document 67A (1945. 8. 7-8.)

Compilation of excerpts concerning Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo immediately after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, from <The Historical Records of the End of the War> compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Togo’s Meetings with the Cabinet and the Emperor, August 7-8, 1945 Appendix. Nagasaki Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II as Seen Through Historical Documents_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum Source: Gaimusho (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ed. Shusen Shiroku (The Historical Records of the End of the War), annotations by Jun Eto, volume 4, pp.57-60

[Excerpts] Translations by Toshihiro Higuchi On the morning of August 7th, the American radio conveyed President Truman’s statement, saying that “The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima … is a weapon that brought a revolutionary change to warfare. Unless Japan is willing to surrender, we will drop bombs in other places.” Upon hearing this broadcast, Foreign Minister [Shigenori] Togo felt an urgent need to make a protest against the United States with regard to its atomic use, if it was the case. Communicating with the Army for the confirmation of the event, the Army replied that, contrary to the American argument, the bomb seemed to be not an atomic bomb, but an extremely powerful conventional bomb. The foreign minister then asked the Army for an urgent investigation.

On the 7th concerned ministers met to discuss the issue. Togo made a detailed report about the American broadcast on the atomic bomb. The Army took a position that they needed to wait for the result of the current investigation before taking any steps, an attitude which tended to downplay the bomb’s effects. At the meeting, the foreign minister suggested that the advent of the atomic bomb offered a reason for the military to terminate the war and, therefore, they should consider the end of the war on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. At that time, however, the foreign minister’s proposal did not become an agenda item for further discussion.

The next morning, Togo, well aware of the continuous publicity blitz of the Anglo-American broadcast about the atomic bomb, was admitted to the Emperor’s presence at the Court after consulting with Prime Minister [Kantaro] Suzuki. Informing the Emperor of the broadcast, the foreign minister rep orted that there was no option but to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Hearing this, His Majesty stated that the advent of the new weapon like the atomic bomb made it impossible to continue the persecution of war and steps should be taken to the end the war without delay. His Majesty ordered the foreign minister to relay his remark to the prime minister.

Telling Lord [Koichi] Kido [the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal] and Prime Minister Suzuki about the emperor’s statement, Togo asked the prime minister to convene the Meeting of the Principals of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War (Kosei’in Kaigi) as soon as possible. Accordingly, the prime minister arranged for a meeting to take place the next day, the 9th. Then, on the morning of 9th, the Soviet Union entered the war, and in the middle of the hastily convened Meeting of Principals, the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. …

[W]e should not overlook the fact that, on August 7, the night after the Hiroshima bombing, Togo and Army Minister [Korechika] Anami had a long conversation alone at the Army Minister’s residence. At this occasion, the army minister was said to express his agreement, in a candid manner, with Togo’s opinion that the defeat would be only a matter of time. Their conversation continued from around 6:30pm to near 9.

[Excerpts from post-war accounts] Seiji Hasegawa, “Hokai no zenya” (The night before the collapse), in Fujin Koron, August 1947.

…On August 6, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. With Hiroshima thoroughly destroyed, a special telephone line at my office (Domei News Agency) went out of order. Everyone, including the head of the [agency’s Hiroshima] branch, had died, so I could hardly grasp what happened at all. When I asked the Communication Bureau, I was told that one or two airplanes flying over Hiroshima dropped only one or two bombs, and that they crushed Hiroshima and tossed the [Domei] branch in to a mess, too. Still, I couldn’t understand what they were talking about at all. Then, shortly after 9 in the evening, I returned to the hotel (I was then staying at the First Hotel) and went to bed. On the 7th, around 1:30am, the phone rang in my room. [By then, Domei’s receiver station had been relocated to Kawagoe so that it could receive Anglo-American broadcasts]. The phone call told me that President Truman announced that the United States attacked Hiroshima with an atomic bomb, and that British Prime Minister Atlee said the same thing. But since I didn’t know how terrible the atomic bomb was, I felt I was shaken out of bed for a trifling matter. Anyway, I went back to the agency, and relayed the report to Foreign Minister Togo and Chief of Cabinet Secretariat [Hisatsune] Sakomizu. But neither of them knew anything about the atomic bomb. The military knew it, but believed the fact that it was an atomic bomb should not reach the public; it made deceptive propaganda reports that it was a “new bomb,” and [claimed] that people did not need to worry if they covered themselves with white cloth. Transcript of Foreign Minister Togo’s Testimony, “Shusen ni saishite” (At the time of the end of the war), September 1945.

On August 6, the United States attacked the city of Hiroshima with an atomic bomb, and the Anglo A merican camp began a massive propaganda campaign about the atomic bomb, saying that the atomic bomb not only changed the situation of the war completely, but also brought a revolutionary change to the society. It also stated that if Japan did not accept the three-power joint declaration [the Potsdam Declaration], it would continue to use atomic bombs until Japan was annihilated. On the afternoon of the 7th, cabinet ministers had a consultation about the atomic attack. The army appeared to be trying to discount its effects as much as possible.

The next day, on the 8th, I was admitted to the [Imperial] presence in the underground room of the Court and reported to the Emperor about the enemy’s announcement about the atomic bomb and other related matters in detail. His Majesty observed that, now with this kind of weapon in use, it had become even more impossible to continue the war; we should no longer miss an opportunity to end it with an excuse to wait for a favorable term [of the surrender]. We would not completely discard the possibility of negotiating conditions, but should make every effort to put an end to the war as soon as possible. Thereafter, I met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal [Koichi Kido] and the prime minister, conveyed His Majesty’s will, and decided to hold a session of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War next day, on the 9th.

[2] Document 75 (1945. 8. 9-10.)

Memorandum by Navy Vice-Admiral Zenshiro Hoshina, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, concerning Emperor Hirohito's first 'sacred decision' after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki.

Zenshiro Hoshina, Daitoa Senso Hishi: Hoshina Zenshiro Kaiso-roku [Secret History of the Greater East Asia War: Memoir of Zens hiro Hoshina] (Tokyo, Japan: Hara-Shobo, 1975), pp.139-149.

Section 5: The Emperor made go-seidan [= the sacred decision] - the decision to terminate the war

[H]ere I will report the conversation that actually took place during the council, the Supreme War Council, held in an air-raid shelter at the Imperial Palace on the late night of the same day. (Note from the Hoshina memorandum: [the council started] at 11:30 P.M. on August 9, 1945 ... )

Those present at the council in the Imperial presence were: Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki (navy admiral)

Minister of Navy Mitsumasa Yonai (navy admiral) Minister of Army Korechika Anami (army general) Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo

Chief of the Army General Staff Yoshijiro Umezu (army general) Chief of the Navy General Staff Soemu Toyoda (navy admiral)

President of the Privy Council Kiichiro Hiranuma Chief Cabinet Secretary Hisatsime Sakomizu

Chief of Army Military Affairs Bureau Masao Yoshizumi (army lieutenant general)

Chief of Navy Military Affairs Bureau Zenshiro Hoshina (navy vice-admiral) Chief of Cabinet General Planning Bureau Sumihisa Ikeda (army lieutenant general)

Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor Shigeru Hasunuma (army general)

The council in the Imperial presence [proceeded as follows]:

[The final text approved by the council was] “The Japanese Government is ready to accept the terms enumerated in the tripartite joint declaration which was issued on the 26th of last month, with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.”

(Note: The original proposal by the Foreign Minister read as follows: “The Japanese Government is ready to accept the terms enumerated in the tripartite joint declaration which was issued on the 26th of last month, with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the status of the Emperor under national laws.”)

Prime Minister Suzuki presided over the meeting (by the command of His Majesty). President of the Privy Council Hiranuma was summoned to the meeting by the command of His Majesty. Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu read aloud the text of the Potsdam Declaration. The Prime Minister read aloud the draft meeting agenda and then explained the background of the proposed agenda.

[Prime Minister Suzuki:]

“The following conditions discussed by the Supreme War Council this morning were referred to the Cabinet Meeting [later this afternoon] without solving the final differences in opinion:

(1) The terms will not include any demand regarding the Imperial House.

(2) The Japanese military forces abroad will voluntarily withdraw and be

demobilized.

(3) The issue of war criminals will be dealt with by the Japanese

government.

(4) There will be no occupation of the Japanese territory to secure [the

achievement of the objectives set forth in the said Declaration].

But the Cabinet Meeting could not reach a conclusion, either. [Therefore] six members [of the council] agreed that the agenda of the day would be the draft proposal by the Foreign Minister. (Note: The six members of the Supreme War Council were: Prime Minister Suzuki, Foreign Minister Togo, Navy Minister Yonai, Army Minister Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu, Chief of the Navy General Staff Toyoda) Three me mbers had argued for the proposal developed during the Supreme War Council [, which included all four conditions], (Note: Army Minister Anami, Chief of the A rmy General Staff Umezu, Chief of the Navy Genral Staff Toyoda). [But] there was a minority opinion that, though the first condition is indispensable, we should limit the number of conditions to the minimum, therefore the majority of the council agreed to adopt the Foreign Minister’s proposal as the basis of discussion.” Foreign Minister Togo explained the purpose of his proposal:

“Although the Council had earlier decided that we could not accept the Declaration, the Cabinet reached the conclusion that there would be no choice but for us to accept it in the current situation. We have to limit our demand to only those conditions that we absolutely cannot accept.

“The military situation is now more favorable to the United States and Britain given the current state of the enemy forces and because of Soviet participation in the war, so it is difficult for us to demand that they change the terms of the ultimatum any further. From their standpoint, it seems there is no room for compromise through negotiations. Knowing that the Soviet Union decided to enter the war, ignoring the conditions that we had proposed t o them, it is reasonable not to add too many conditions [to our acceptance of the declaration],

“More precisely, regarding the voluntary withdrawal of our military forces abroad, there can be an opportunity for us to raise the issue later when we negotiate the agreement on a ceasefire. Also, though it is hard for us to accept their terms, the condition about war criminals is not so essential as to justify the continuation of the war. However, our position about the Imperial House is non- negotiable, because it will be the fundamental basis for the future development of our nation. Therefore, it is essential that our demands focus upon this issue.”

Navy Minister Yonai stated his opinion by request: “I totally agree.”

Army Minister Anami stated his opinion by request: “I totally disagree. The reason is that our country is going to lose its life as a moral nation if we accept the Cairo Declaration, which includes the annihilation of the Manchurian state. Even if we have to accept the Declaration, we need to have the four conditions accepted. I especially cannot agree with an idea that we will make a unilateral proposition to an immoral nation like the Soviet Union. We should live up to our cause even if our hundred million people have to die side by side in battle. We have no choice other than to continue the war by all means. I am confident that we are ready for the battles. I am sure we are well prepared for a decisive battle on our mainland even against the United States. Our military forces stationed in foreign countries might not be willing to retreat unconditionally. There is also considerable sentiment among the people at home in fighting the war until the end, thus we may well face a civil war.”

Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu:

“I absolutely agree with the opinion of the Army Minister. We are prepared for a decisive battle on our mainland. Although the Soviet entry into the war is disadvantageous to us, we are still not in a situation where we should be forced to agree to an unconditional surrender. If we surrender unconditionally now, we have no excuse to make to those who have sacrificed their lives during the war. At the minimum, the four conditions proposed at the Supreme War Council this morning should be included before we make any concessions.”

President of the Privy Council Hiranuma spoke:

“I want to pose questions before expressing my own view. I have four questions altogether. To the Foreign Minister, I want to ask you about the development and the terms of the negotiations with the Soviet Union.”

Foreign Minister Togo replied:

“On July 13 we conveyed the thoughts of His Majesty, requesting [the Soviets] to mediate an end to the war in order to terminate it as soon as possible. Also we proposed the dispatch of our special envoy. We later pressed them for a reply, but we didn’t receive one.

“On August 7 we received a telegram to the effect that Foreign Minister Molotov would meet us at 17:00 on August 8. Last night, on the 8th, Foreign Minister Molotov rejected our request for an agreement and [the Soviet Union] declared war.”

Privy Council Minister (President of the Privy Council Hiranuma is referred to hereafter as Privy Council Minister):

“Did you propose anything specific to the Soviet Union?” Foreign Minister Togo replied:

“We told them that we were going to propose specific conditions to them through our special envoy but we didn’t have a chance to do so.”

Privy Council Minister:

“Then why did the Soviet Union declare war against Japan?” Foreign Minister Togo replied:

“I assume the Tass report indicates the true intention of the Soviet Union.” Privy Council Minister:

“What about the allegation in the Soviet statement that the Japanese government formally rejected the tripartite declaration issued on July 26?” Foreign Minister Togo replied: “We didn’t take steps to reject it.” Privy Council Minister:

“Then on what ground does the Soviet government claim we rejected it?” Foreign Minister Togo replied:

“They must have imagined that we did.” Privy Council Minister:

“There is a clause in the tripartite joint declaration which says that we inflicted cruelties upon prisoners. And what about the handing over of war criminals? Can we assume that this matter should be handled domestically?” Foreign Minister Togo replied:

“There are quite a few precedents in which war criminals were handed over.” Privy Council Minister:

“Foreign Minister, do you think that we can agree to hand them over?” Foreign Minister Togo replied:

“In my opinion, we will have no alternative but to hand them over under certain circumstances. Our enemies consider that the disarmament of the military should be forcibly executed.”

Privy Council Minister:

“I also have questions for the Army Minister and the Chief of the Army General Staff.

“You claim that we can still pursue the war but I have doubts because air raids will go on every day and eveiy night. And are you confident in our defense against atomic bombs? Also, please explain to us how to deal with the paralysis of public transportation caused by air attacks on the mainland.”

Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu replied:

“Though we haven’t made sufficient progress so far in dealing with air raids, we should expect better results soon since we have revised our tactics. But there is no reason we should surrender to our enemies as a result of air raids.” Privy Council Minister:

“I want to ask the Navy Minister what measures you have taken against bombardment from offshore battleships (against enemy task forces).”

Chief of the Navy General Staff Toyoda:

“We had plans to attack enemy task forces solely by planes but we couldn’t mobilize enough forces for it because we had to prepare for battles on the mainland. From now on, we will revise our plan of operations so that we will be able to defeat them with additional forces as necessary.”

Privy Council Minister: “I want to ask the Prime Minister. It is essential to maintain domestic order, so what measures do you plan to take [in this regard] in the future? What is your plan regarding the food situation? It is getting really b ad. The [domestic] situation these days is gradually getting closer to the point where we have to be seriously concerned. We should also think about the possibility of domestic disturbances, not by ending the war, but by continuing the war.”

Prime Minister Suzuki replied:

“I absolutely agree and I am also worried.” Privy Council Minister:

“There is no room for further consideration but, since we are at a critical moment, I would like to express my own opinion. I agree with the Foreign Minister’s proposal in essence. I have the same opinion that what matters most is the preservation of the kokutai [= national polity]. But there is one part in this draft text where the terminology is very wrong. It is not legitimate to imply that the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler are derived from national laws. The essence of the Imperial rule was not established by the Constitution; the Constitution merely describes it. In terms of wording, I propose the text be changed to read: ‘[the declaration] does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.’

“Next, regarding the four conditions, while the Foreign Minister says that the enemy will not allow any negotiation about these conditions, what the Army Minister and the Chief of the Army General Staff have argued sounds reasonable to me. If there is no hope for negotiations or if we are confident in our plan of operations, we must continue the war.

“[At the same time,] His Majesty has a responsibility to the Imperial ancestors. If this [foundation of our nation] should be shaken, His Majesty’s responsibility would be grave. Those of us in the position of giving advice to him would also deserve a thousand deaths.

“Therefore, I suggest that we decide based on the development of the situation and the prospect for the future. We should take into full account whether the situation today is acceptable. We won’t be able to solve this problem simply by force of arms. We also won’t be able to pursue the war if we ignore the people. “In summary, I argue that we must push forward if we are confident; if not, we will not be able to continue the war however strong our Army and Navy are. And we have to preserve the kokutai and maintain the Imperial House at any rate, even if the whole nation must die in the war.”

Chief of the Navy General Staff Toyoda:

“The Navy General Staff mostly agree with the opinion of the Army Minister and the Chief of the Army General Staff. Though I can’t say that we will succeed without doubt, I am confident that we will be able to inflict major damage on the enemy. There are some people at home who still have a burning passion for war while morale among many others is low.”

Prime Minister Suzuki:

“I deeply regret that we could not reach a consensus despite the deliberations for many hours. This matter is extremely important and it is indeed a critical question as the President of the Privy Council described. Since opinions are still divided, we have no choice but to ask for the sacred decision.”

The Prime Minister stood up and walked in front of His Majesty, then declared that “we would ask for sacred decision and accept His Majesty’s opinion as the final decision of the council”.

Here is what His Majesty said in his sacred decision (according to the Hoshina memorandum):

“Regarding our response to the Allied Powers, I have the same opinion as the Foreign Minister has. In my view, foundation for the nation’s survival will remain as long as the Imperial House, the people and the national territory remain. We will risk losing everything if we continue a hopeless war. I have no expectation for victory after considering our material power compared to [the enemy’s] and various situations in and out of the country.

“I have been told that we have confidence in our victory but the reality doesn’t match our projections. For example, the Army Minister told me that the defense positions along the coast of Kujukuri Hama would be ready by mid August but it is not yet ready. Also I have heard that we have no more weapons left for a new division. In this situation, there is no prospect of victory over the American and British forces with such technological power. It is very unbearable for me to take away arms from my loyal military men and to hand them over to the Allied Forces as war criminals. But I should bear the unbearable from a broader perspective, following the example of the Emperor Meiji’s decision on the occasion of the Tripartite Intervention, so I decide this way in order to save the people from disaster and to bring about happiness to mankind around the world.”

After these words, I humbly observed His Majesty wipe his tears away with his hand in a white glove. It was exactly at 2:30 A.M. on August 10.

Deeply moved by these words of His Majesty, those present at the council burst into wails. I was also present on the occasion, so I wailed together with the other participants and tears kept streaming down both of my cheeks. I am assured that this gush of an emotional cry came from our sincere intent ion to devote ourselves to the rebuilding of a new Japan with His Majesty’s will in mind.

It is an ordinary reading of the Constitution that His Majesty will follow the advice of the cabinet. I presume that His Majesty overruled the Constitution in making sacred decision because he was determined to terminate the war by his own decision in this exceptional case.

Just after the Imperial council, His Majesty sent the following message to Chief of Army Military Affairs Bureau Yoshizumi through Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor Hasunuma: “I am ready to go to the Imperial Headquarters or anywhere else to announce that it is my will to end the war if either the Army Minister or the Navy Minister has difficulty in persuading his subordinates. So tell the Army and the Navy [if it is necessary].”

I received the message from Chief of Army Military Affairs Bureau Yoshizumi, so I said, “I think the Navy should be alright, but how about the Army?,” to which he replied that Army Minister Anami intended to ask His Majesty to come over. Then Navy Minister Yonai clearly stated as follows when I went to ask for his decision: “Both the Navy Minister and the Army Minister have responsibility to give advice to His Majesty. If a minister cannot handle the matter with his own capacity, he should tell His Majesty that he cannot carry out his responsibility to advise His Majesty and resign. I will have to resign as the Navy Minister if I need to ask for His Majesty’s visit.” I was impressed anew that the minister was a great person. After I conveyed this message to Chief of Army Military Affairs Bureau Yoshizumi, Army Minister Anami also agreed with the Navy Minister’s opinion, so he replied to His Majesty that His Majesty’s visit to the Imperial Headquarters would not be necessary. Then a Cabinet Meeting decided to agree with the Imperial decision following His Majesty’s will and a telegram to the effect that we accept the Potsdam Declaration was sent at 7 A.M. on August 10 via Switzerland and Sweden. In this telegram, we conditioned our acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration upon “the understanding that it does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.”

[3] Document 86 (1945. 8. 13.)

From "Historical Record of the End of the War," compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regarding the ongoing debate within the Japanese Cabinet and military factions concerning surrender.

The Cabinet Meeting over the Reply to the Four Powers (August 13) Source: Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shusen Shiroku [Historical Record of the End of the War] (Tokyo: Hokuyosha, 1977-1978), vol. 5, 27-35

Next day, on August 13, the official reply from the Four Powers was also handed [to the Japanese]. Near 9:00, at the Prime Minister's residence, a meeting was convened with only the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Army Minister, the Navy Minister, and both Chiefs of Staff to exchange opinions [Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Yoshijiro Umezu, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and Chief of the Navy General Staff Soemu Toyoda]. The meeting, after being interrupted from 9:00 to 10:30 when the Chiefs of Staff visited the Imperial Palace, eventually lasted for approximately five hours in total until 15:00, with repeated arguments and heated debate. The opening of the cabinet meeting was consequently much delayed until 16:00. Regarding the reply from the Four Powers, the Prime Minister asked each member clockwise around the table to express their candid opinion.

Justice Minister [Hiromasa] Matsuzaka: I would like to clarify some unsettled

issues concerning the wording of the Third Point regarding the national

polity [kokutai]. However, if there is no room for further negotiation, I cannot

accept it, as our sentiments as loyal subjects to the Emperor cannot

tolerate the provision that the future of the Imperial House shall be

decided by the people. I believe we have no choice but to redouble

our resolve to fight to the end. Foreign Minister Togo: I believe it is indeed

impossible for us to request anything further, similar to the case of the non-

aggression pact [the Paris Treaty]. I reach this conclusion only after

fully considering the current circumstances in Japan.

Matsuzaka: The notion that the people as sovereign will decide [the national polity]

is fundamentally different in concept [from the existing system].

Togo: At the time of His Majesty's Sacred Decision at the Supreme War

Council on August 9, "There is no hope of continuing the war. I

will accept the [Potsdam] Declaration, in a spirit of enduring the

unendurable," His Majesty stated. It is contrary to our wishes, but,

following His Majesty's words, I feel we must retreat.

Matsuzaka: If that is His Majesty's intention, there is no room for argument. I

would not dare to oppose his sacred judgment.

Supply Minister [Teijuro] Toyoda: On the Third Point, I am in complete agreement

with Minister Matsuzaka's observation. It is very difficult to accept its

wording, but considering the sacred judgment mentioned by the Foreign

Minister and taking it into account, this issue might have been

resolved by the decision as well. No words can adequately describe His Majesty's

feelings when he made the decision... (and he was prepared to await His

Majesty's Sacred Judgment).

Interrupted by Interior Minister [Genki] Abe: You have frequently referred to

the Supreme War Council, but it is not part of the institutions that the Appendix. Nagasaki Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II as Seen Through Historical Materials_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

Constitution defines. In short, the whole matter is in the Government's

responsibility, and it is quite troublesome if the Government fails to

fulfill its role as an adviser to His Majesty.

Togo: I just mentioned the fact of the Sacred Judgment. Of course, we, as the

members of the Cabinet in charge of advising His Majesty, should

express opinions freely based on each one's belief. Exactly for this

purpose we have this Cabinet meeting.

Abe: If I remember correctly, our Cabinet decision was to continue the war

unless we can preserve our national polity...

Then Cabinet Secretary [Hisatsune] Sakomizu challenged him over the phrases

concerning the preservation of the national polity and the Emperor's

prerogatives as a sovereign ruler. The Prime Minister steered the debate

away by asking Minister [Hyogoro] Sakurai for his opinion...

Minister Sakurai: It is beyond our reasoning. I will leave the whole matter to

the Prime Minister. I believe that the national politics and the supreme

military command should be in harmony. There is no hope left to us for

the continuation of the war, now with the atomic bombs dropped and

the Soviet Union joining in the war. The current reality in Germany

indicates our ever greater difficulty as a nation. Having said that, the

lack of harmony between national politics and the supreme military

command could also lead our nation to collapse. The same can be said

also in case of continuing the war. To die is easy, but to live is difficult.

Today, it is totally impossible for us to see any sort of harmony between

the national politics and the supreme military command. It is this very

point which demands our redoubled efforts. I would like to trust the

whole matter to the Prime Minister, in fear that we might be following

the same destiny as the Heike clan. Prime Minister Suzuki: I will

present my opinion last. First, please give your opinions... Minister

Hirose?

Treasury Minister [Housaku] Hirose: There is no other way but to accept it as

the Foreign Minister said, insofar as the national polity will be mostly

preserved. Thinking about the continuation of the war, our productivity

in major items after April and May is estimated to decline to the level of

Showa First [1926] as early as at the end of this year. Moreover, entire small- and middle-size cities will be destroyed, and in addition, we now

have the Soviet Union's entry into the war. =How much worse the

situation could get, I don't know. At this moment, we should preserve

our nation with the losses at the current level, in hope of a future

restoration.

Agriculture Minister [Tadaatsu] Ishiguro: According to the judgment about our

national capacity, there is no choice but accept. Having heard about His

Majesty's deliberate Sacred Judgment at the Privy Council, I am but

deeply impressed by his care about his subjects as the Emperor of Japan.

I would like to hear from the Prime Minister more about the Sacred

Judgment. I regret I missed an occasion to hear about this before.

Suzuki: It is as the Foreign Minister said, I am afraid...

Minister [Touji] Yasui: I already said on a previous occasion that I cannot help

but be against [acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration]. But our nation

might be in danger of collapse anyway without harmony between the

national politics and the supreme military command, between the

civilians and the military. On this point, the Prime Minister and both the

Ministers of the Army and of the Navy should act with a broader vision,

and I hope even more efforts by the Prime Minister [toward the

harmony] according to His Majesty's will. On the national polity I

understand the point made by the Justice Minister. However, [the Four

Powers have different ideas [about the polity]. I believe that to be in

harmony with His Majesty's will is our nation's will. The conclusion is

far from satisfying, but it is inevitable to achieve the harmony of the

national politics and the supreme military command.

Suzuki: You have mentioned harmony, but I do not know what kind of harmony.

In this time of making an important decision, we first had the session of

the Supreme War Council at the supreme military command and then

the Cabinet meeting, only to reach no consensus. Because of this, at the

Privy Council, I let each of you speak your own opinion, and asked the

attendance by the Chairman of the Privy Council [Kiichiro] Hiranuma

and requested His Majesty's Sacred Judgment after the two-hour

discussion. Even with these exhausting deliberations on both war and

peace, we are still far from any sort of consensus. Appendix: Nagasaki Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II as Seen Through Historical Materials_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum Yasui: When I mentioned harmony, I meant our attitude. As the problem

is very grave, it is inevitable to see the confrontation of opinions. If a

consensus is reached, however, we should be in harmony.

Suzuki: We are already in harmony due to the Sacred Judgment.

Transportation Minister [Naoto] Kohiyama: Simply follow His Majesty's will.

Very unsatisfying, but, considering the current circumstances at home

and abroad as well as our national power, it is the only choice but to accept. Abe: It seems to me that the word "subject to" in the First Item suggests strict

obeisance rather than mere restriction. The phrases about the national

polity, I think, are also against our current national polity. On top of that,

if accompanied by military occupation, we cannot but have much

doubt as to whether we can preserve our national polity. In Yanan [in

China] there is a movement led by communists to liberate Japan. I

cannot but shed tears when I hear about His Majesty's will, but we

should firmly proceed to preserve the national polity. If there is no

victory, we all should die. We should do it anyway. I would like to

leave to the Prime Minister the choice between negotiations and war. Education Minister [Kozo] Ohta: I talked with the Foreign Minister about a

plan of inquiring again about the possibility of seeking changes [in the

surrender terms], but it did not work out. This time, we have no choice.

By His Majesty's will, I am thoroughly impressed. The

arguments are as before...

Minister [Hiroshi (Kainan)] Shimomura [Director-General of Information

Bureau]: I have already proposed that we should convey our will of

acceptance with some words about our hope for information [about the

Four Powers' intentions]. I understand some disagreement over Point

Three, but what if our nation of Japan were to be destroyed for good?

Now is the time to follow only His Majesty's will.

[Minister of State Masazo] Sakonji: I understand that the Army Minister feels

that [the situation] is more difficult than cutting himself, but at this

moment we should consider our endurance for the next hundred years.

We should launch negotiations without delay to terminate the war. Welfare and Health Minister [Tadahiko] Okada: We should accept in the spirit

of a worm that bends itself. Army Minister Anami: As I said before, I am thoroughly worried. Here

everybody concerned has some doubts. Some argue that any condition

proposed by us would break off negotiations, but we should put forward

a proposal at least like this. Where we negotiate with firm

determination against any retreat, there is hope. I believe that our

demands will be incorporated to some degree without continuing the

war. We should do what we should do.

(In a reply to Foreign Minister Togo's argument)

Anami: You argue there is no room for further negotiation concerning

disarmament and military occupation, but I believe there is some leeway.

We should resolutely make our demands. Disarmament does not

necessarily lead to peace. Putting forward conditions does not

necessarily mean the continuation of the war. We are still left with some

power to fight. Here over this point we differ in judgment. No need to

listen to counterarguments any more. Now it is time for us to

completely determine ourselves to be decisive.

Navy Minister Yonai: To my great regret, it seems that there is no option left to us

but to accept.

Prime Minister Suzuki: As we have listened to each of your opinions, I would

like to present my own opinion. Up to this day, I had determined myself

to carry out the war thoroughly, but a big shift in the circumstances

forced my idea to change.

Having found some unacceptable items in the reply from the other side, I made

my mind not to retreat from the war even a bit. However, putting it

candidly, after I was advised by Chairman of the Privy Council

Hiranuma yesterday and repeatedly read the reply, I came to realize that

the United States might have not written it with malicious intent. Both

countries differ in the state of affairs and in the way of thinking. I

concluded that they would change little in substance concerning the

Emperor and therefore we should not complain over the wording. After

all, they will not understand our complaints about the wording. Having

said that, we should be careful about military occupation and

disarmament. I do not believe that they would resume the war after

filling in our moats like the battle of Osaka, but nevertheless we cannot Appendix. Nagasaki Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II as Seen Through Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Materials

be too careful about this point in time of accepting. If there is no malice

about this point, there will be no problem. But if the way of occupation

is ill-intentioned, it might be possible to find the war resumed again.

This is the very situation both of the sides should prevent to happen.

Finally, we feel some danger to the preservation of our national polity,

but in asking to ourselves if we would continue the war thoroughly, we

should remind ourselves that His Majesty desires peace. Even if we

fight with our back to the wall, it is too late in the age of atomic bombs.

If we do, we will be never able to preserve our national polity. Perhaps,

there might be a dim hope in the dark. There might be a way out of a

fatal situation. It is not hopeless yet. But I should say this is a gamble

too dangerous to make in preserving our national polity. We should

remember His Majesty's desire to care for all of his people. For us as

loyal subjects, it may be possible to fight to the end. In this way we may

be able to satisfy ourselves, but if we contemplate on how Japan would

be as its result, we will find it too dangerous. As His Majesty has

already taken into account such a danger in time of making his Sacred

Judgment, I believe there is no other way for us but to follow it and

serve him. Therefore, in this sense, I will report today's discussion to

him as it is and ask for his Sacred Judgment.

Anami: In fact, allowing us to disarm ourselves voluntarily is the way to

expedite peace. If military occupation ever comes, we will be totally

naked while the other side has warships and airplanes. Should we ever

violate our promise, they would be able to do whatever they want. They

can do the task of occupation with only a few supervisors. This way will

help both sides. At this time with some power left to us, we should grab

a diplomatic opportunity.

Togo: Without a firm resolution to fight more, we will present our opinions at

every appropriate opportunity.

Anami: Please add this to our reply. Yasui: I agree.

Yonai: For the two proposals we have discussed, this opinion is about the one

on which His Majesty has already made his Sacred Judgment. I think it

inappropriate to discuss a thing we have already rejected before.

Suzuki: I think so too. Yasui: But simply communicating our desire will be a good way to take

initiative. We should not say this is a condition...

Anami: The current situation is totally different from the time of the Sacred

Judgment. [At the last Privy Council on August 9] we had the only one

proposal from the Foreign Minister. I would like to ask the Navy

Minister [whether it is true], but I don't think it is wrong.

Togo: It seems impossible for us to insist on our voluntary disarmament with

small arms left to us, but I will make a representation when the time

comes.

Some proposals are made by Shimomura, Ishiguro, and Kohiyama.

Togo: There is an opposition [to peace with Japan] on the other side. I would

like to handle a problem of condition as a separate matter.

Toyoda: How about touching it in a nonchalant manner?

This all happening, the Cabinet meeting dissolved without conclusion. [...]

[4] Document 89 (1945. 8. 14.)

Regarding the Emperor's second 'sacred decision' in Hiroshi Shimomura's <Account of the End of the War>

The Second Sacred Judgment

Source: Hiroshi [Kaian) Shimomura, Shusenki [Account of the End of the War] (Tokyo, Kamakura Bunko, [1948], 148-152

The night of the 13rd passed by without the dream [of peace] coming true. On August 14, Tuesday, in the anteroom in Prime Minister's Residence were the Cabinet members in anticipation of a regular Cabinet meeting at 10:00 a.m., exchanging the whisper in anxiety. Now against the peace talk sprouted all sorts of argument, throwing all the corners of the nation into chaos. Some hardliners, in collaboration with right-wingers, ultra-nationalists and middle- ranking military officers, were beginning to stir about restlessly. Appendix. Nagasaki Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II as Seen Through Historical Materials_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

It was near 10:00. We received an order to call on the Court at 10:30 by His Majesty's request. It was shortly after the Prime Minister had reported the latest development and returned from the Court. Without a doubt, the order was a result of his visit. At any rate, we were told that there was no need to change the clothes because of the urgent order. In fear that it would be too much discourtesy to proceed in front of His Majesty [in that way], however, some borrowed neckties from their secretaries and others attempted to make an open collar shirt look like a closed one. Some even exchanged clothes with their secretaries. I was lucky to be wearing the national uniform. Keeping a medal hanging on it, I joined all and headed to the Court.

The Inner Palace of the Fukiage Imperial Gardens, a place I still freshly remembered when I had paid my sole visit to His Majesty for two hours before August 6, is a very simple house, with the entrance of the air raid shelter in front of its main entrance. The tunnel after descending to it is quite long, running straight for a while, and then turning to right to the conference room. Facing the imperial chair are two rows of chairs. From right to left are Prime Minister Suzuki, Chairman of the Privy Council Hiranuma, and then five to six cabinet members including Army Minister Anami, with Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu and Chief of the Navy General Staff Toyoda at its end. Behind them are the rest of the cabinet members and myself, and behind us are Chief of the Comprehensive Planning Bureau [Masasumi] Ikeda, Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, Chief of the Army Military Bureau [Masao] Yoshizumi and his naval counterpart [Zenshiro] Hoshina, all sitting down and anticipating His Majesty's arrival. The sheer silence just before his arrival prevailed in the room, interrupted only by whispers. Soon, His Majesty arrived with the lead by Chief aide-de-camp [Shin] Hasunuma. After all paid to him their best respects by bowing deeply, Prime Minister Suzuki reported all the latest developments in a summary. The Cabinet meeting, he said, found about four-fifth of the members in favor of the original plan, but failed to reach a unanimous consensus. He deeply apologized of bothering His Majesty again and asked him to listen to some opinions against the plan and make another Sacred Judgment.

Following the Prime Minister's explanation, both of the Chiefs and the Army Minister, standing up one by one, made an impassioned plea in tears, insisting that we should qualify our acceptance out of fear that the plan as it is now might endanger our goal of preserving our national polity. Here I do not bother to detail it. Hearing this sort of opinion, I remembered the words "Koudou" (The Emperor's Way) and "Shindou" (The Loyalists' Way) which Prime Minister Suzuki always mentioned. "The loyalists deserve death should their Highness be disgraced," according to an ancient saying. No other words can express more correctly the feeling of the generals today than this word. Surely they deserve death. They have already dedicated themselves to His Majesty. But as the situation goes, His Majesty will be disgraced. Our national polity might be put in danger. Although I sympathized with their willingness out of their pride as military officers to search for a faint hope in another battle, I cannot but wonder if there would be any way out of the situation even without atomic bombs or the Soviet entry. Nowadays our problem gets much worse than simply seeing our Emperor disgraced. It is much and much worse than that. We are leading our homeland, our people, and even Japan itself to total destruction. In this time of losing everything, we should weigh the Emperor's Way caring for Japan and its 80 million people more than the Loyalists' Way.

I kept my eyes on Prime Minister Suzuki nearby me. I also looked toward Navy Minister Yonai. Admiral Yonai, now the Navy Minister; had long told us that few chances to win were left to the military, even less if another day passed by. Even at this point, the situation was many times as against us as against the other side, and he had called for a preservation [of Japan's power] as early as possible. Even from a point of view of pride, he refrained from any bravado and bravely — I dare to call it bravely — demanded that the sword we blandished be laid down. I felt that it was the very example which demonstrated true bravery. One day he said to me, "Toward the ruler the military insisted that we should single-mindedly redouble our efforts to carry the war to the victory. When asked if they had any estimate for a victory, they could not answer." True, man is a creature which cannot live without food. Nowadays the shortage of food is clear to all. The enemy's weapons have upgraded from air-fortress B- 17s to super air-fortress B-29, even to atomic bombs. Our weapons have downgraded from cannons to grenades, even to bamboo spears. Which is the winning side? Now our national power is nose-diving.

I expected some argument in favor of acceptance after the opposition by Anami, Umezu and Toyoda, but, given the previous Sacred Judgment, it Appendix. Nagasaki Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II as Seen Through Historical Materials_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum seemed that there was no need for it. Soon, the time came for His Majesty's words. It was around 11 a.m. on August 14.

In our deep emotional state, none of us prepared a draft or transcript of His Majesty's words. I took a memorandum by recalling them from my fresh memory before my emotion cooled off. As they lie at the core of the drama leading to the end of the war, His Majesty's words I am here describing are a product after referring to two hand-written memos by Minister Sakonji, and Education Minister Ohta, besides mine, and also being reviewed by Prime Minister Suzuki. Therefore, it can be said that the following text is the transcript closest to His Majesty's words:

His Majesty's Words

"If there is any other opinion to be presented, I would like to make my own comment.

I have carefully listened to the opposition, but my idea has little changed from what I told before. As a result of taking into full consideration the circumstances in the world and at home, I conclude that it is impossible for us to continue the war any more.

There seemingly remain some doubts about the issue of the national polity, but I would interpret from the implication of the reply that the other side is considerably well-intentioned. I understand the opinions pointing out a touch of uncertainty in the attitudes on the other side, but I would not like to suspect so. In short, as the whole matter can be reduced to the faith and determination of our whole nation, I think it appropriate to accept the offer. Please think so, too.

Furthermore, it is fairly understandable to me that something like disarmament and military occupation is truly unbearable to the soldiers. But I would like to save my people's lives even at my expense. If we continue the war, the result will be that our homeland will be reduced to ashes. It is really intolerable for me to see my people suffering any more. I cannot be accountable to the spirit of our ancestors. If we choose peace, of course we cannot put our unconditional trust on the other side. But compared to the result of losing Japan itself we can at least hope for reconstruction as long as some seeds remain. Remembering the bitterness and grief Emperor Meiji went through in time of accepting the Tripartite Intervention! We, with the nation firmly united, should set out for a future restoration by tolerating the intolerable and bear the unbearable. I cannot be sadder when I think about soldiers dead at battlefields, those dead on their duty, and their beleaguered families. I am also deeply worried about the lives of those who suffer in war and lose their way of making their living. At this time, if there is anything I should do, I will do it. If it is to make an announcement to the nation, I will stand in front of the microphone at any time. As we have not informed people of anything so far, our sudden decision will be very disturbing to them. It is all the more so to the soldiers. It will be very difficult to sooth this disturbance, but, both the Ministers of the Army and of the Navy, please understand my feeling and make your best efforts to put the situation under firm control. If necessary, I will go to public and explain. I think we need to issue an imperial edict, so I would like the government to draft it without delay.

The above is my idea."

It should be my duty, as one of those who attended the Privy Council at the crossroads of the Greater Japanese Empire, an unprecedented Privy Council in history and perhaps also in the future, to record all the details. But that is beyond my power.

While listening to his holy words, from every corner of the room the sound of sobs prevailed. Every single word he uttered was impressive. As he pronounced his determination to save the nation even at the expense of his own life and loudly wondered how we can honor the spirits of our ancestors if our homeland is burned to ashes and our people are lost in the blazing fire of war, the sound of our sobs became louder. Furthermore, when he said he would do anything and stand in front of the microphone if necessary, I could not suppress my sobs and tears, loudly crying despite being in a public place. The members could barely get up from their chairs. Through the long tunnel back to the surface, in the car, back to the Prime Minister's residence, in our dens and in attendance at the Cabinet meeting, we could not suppress our tears every time we remembered the scene. Even in front of the press I could not stop shedding tears. Both the interviewers and the interviewee uttered few words, just shedding tears together. That night, next day and the day after another, I Appendix. Nagasaki Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II as Seen Through Historical Materials_Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum remembered and cried, and remembered and sobbed. Now one and half a month later, in writing this manuscript, I cannot help but remember the day and find myself overwhelmed by a flood of emotions with my pen hardly moving forward. I stop writing here tonight (September 26, 1945, 9:30 p.m.).

Bibliography

Burr, William, ed. 2017. “The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II: A Collection of Primary Sources.” National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and- the-End-of-World-War-II/ (accessed on January 18, 2018

Photo 5. The 9th Love Room in front of the Statue of Peace in Peace Park