5. Why Did the Qing Participate in the Sino-Japanese War? The Qing's Participation in the Sino-Japanese War at the Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall

Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall · Kim Dong-jin · Tsinghua University

Introduction

On December 28, 2017, the last day of the Sarangbang 9th group's visit to Japan, we began our itinerary at the Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall (日淸講和記念館). The Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall is where the Qing Dynasty and Japan met to conclude the Sino-Japanese War, and it was here that the Treaty of Shimonoseki, a turning point in East Asian history, was signed. Immediately after arriving at the Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall, the most striking sight was the hotel located right next to the memorial hall. It is said that this hotel was also used as Ito Hirobumi's lodging during the Shimonoseki peace talks. Although the exterior was not ornate, it was a cozy accommodation with a great view, directly facing the Kanmon Strait. I could imagine Ito Hirobumi, who was over 70 years old at the time, confidently leading the negotiations with Li Hongzhang, who was also over 70, in this place, which was like his own home about 120 years ago, while staying there peacefully.

Photo 1. Busts of Ito Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu

On the other hand, Li Hongzhang tried to change the venue of the talks until the very end, but Ito, who had already gained the upper hand in the war, had no intention of yielding even an inch. In the end, Li Hongzhang, who was in a hurry to sign the peace treaty as soon as possible, had no choice but to come to Shimonoseki as Ito demanded. From this moment on, perhaps, the unilateral flow of negotiations led by Japan was foreseen. For about a month, the treaty was signed not so much as negotiations, but rather as the Qing Dynasty reluctantly accepting most of Japan's demands. The fact that Li Hongzhang, who held the strongest political power in the Qing Dynasty, which had been the central country in East Asia for a long time, personally came to a peripheral country for negotiations with Ito, who was nearly 20 years younger, seemed to represent the declining status of the Qing Dynasty, which rapidly began to wane with the Sino-Japanese War as a turning point.

Photo 2. The venue of the Shimonoseki peace talks. The Sino-Japanese War was a shocking and humiliating war for the Qing Dynasty. In the history of international politics, no war has brought about such a significant change in East Asia as the Sino-Japanese War. This is because the regional order, led by China, which had lasted for over 5,000 years in East Asia, collapsed due to the Sino-Japanese War and the subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki. In the preamble of the peace treaty, both China and Japan declared, "The Chinese Empire hereby recognizes the complete and full independence and autonomy of Korea. Hereafter, all tribute formerly paid by China to Korea shall be abolished, and all relations therewith shall be thus terminated, ensuring the rights and ceremonies of independent autonomy." (Lee Seung-man, 2015) This meant that the traditional tributary system centered around China completely collapsed, and a new world system based on the Western principles of capitalism and international law, which Japan pursued, namely the principle that all nations are equal, had arrived. Furthermore, with the Sino-Japanese War as a turning point, Korea became a colony of Japan, and China began a humiliating history of being invaded by Western imperialist powers and becoming a semi-colonial state. Based on its victory in the war, Japan further accelerated its modernization based on the theory of a strong military, embarking on a path of imperialism that led to the Russo-Japanese War, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Pacific War. Thus, the Sino-Japanese War marked the end of China's complete transfer of regional hegemony, which had lasted for 5,000 years, to Japan, and the beginning of a history of humiliation and shame for the Chinese people, as China became a target of imperialist aggression by Western powers.

If the Sino-Japanese War resulted in such a humiliating outcome for China, a war that is counted among the most shameful in history, why did the Qing Dynasty participate in the Sino-Japanese War? Based on the basic common sense of international politics that all nations pursue survival and prosperity as their highest interests, no nation would go to war to lose. Therefore, did the Qing Dynasty participate in the war based on a rational judgment that it could win against Japan, or was it forced to participate despite anticipating defeat? If it was a war entered into without confidence in victory, what were the background and reasons for making such a decision? This report on the visit to the Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall started with these questions. We sought to find the reasons for the Qing Dynasty's participation in the war by focusing on the domestic political factors within the Qing Dynasty.

Photo 3. A painting depicting the Shimonoseki peace talks

1894: The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War

The important background to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War was the Donghak Peasant Revolution and the Treaty of Tianjin. In 1894, the Donghak Peasant Revolution, which arose in protest against the flaws in Korea's feudal social structure, rapidly spread throughout the country, and the Korean government was unable to suppress it. Consequently, on June 3, 1894, King Gojong requested military aid from the Qing Dynasty to suppress the Donghak Peasant Revolution. For the Qing Dynasty, it was not unusual to send troops to Korea when it requested help, as Korea was a tributary state. However, the problem arose from the Treaty of Tianjin, signed ten years earlier in April 1885, to resolve the Gapsin Coup, which stipulated that both the Qing Dynasty and Japan must notify the other party before dispatching troops to Korea. For about ten years after the Gapsin Coup, there were no significant armed conflicts in Korea, so the Qing Dynasty had no reason to send troops. However, due to the Donghak Peasant Revolution, the Qing Dynasty decided to dispatch approximately 2,000 troops. The Qing Dynasty, in accordance with the Treaty of Tianjin, notified Japan of this fact, and Japan immediately dispatched a larger number of troops to Korea. After the Donghak Peasant Revolution issue was resolved, the Qing Dynasty proposed a joint withdrawal of troops, stating that their dispatch was for the stability of the Korean government. However, Japan sent a diplomatic note twice rejecting the Qing Dynasty's proposal for withdrawal. Finally, on July 23, 1894, the Japanese army occupied the Korean royal palace, and on July 25, it launched a surprise preemptive attack on the Qing navy at Pungdo. Subsequently, on August 1, Japan and the Qing Dynasty simultaneously declared war, and the Sino-Japanese War officially began. (Lee Seung-man, 2015)

The Qing Dynasty sensed the impending war and began full-scale preparations only after receiving Japan's second diplomatic note on July 14, 1894, stating that withdrawal from Korea was impossible. Two days later, on July 16, the Zongli Yamen (Office for Foreign Affairs), responsible for the Qing Dynasty's foreign policy, instructed Li Hongzhang to immediately commence war preparations. (Gao Zhenglong, Da Ri, 2008) However, looking at the process leading up to that decision, not all Qing officials advocated for war. Examining the imperial court meetings held around July, we can see that officials were fiercely debating between advocating for war and advocating for peace. (Qi Qizhang, 1989) The most surprising fact is that Li Hongzhang, who commanded the Beiyang Army in the Sino-Japanese War and wielded immense influence in the Qing Dynasty at the time, was the most vehement opponent of war with Japan. He continuously requested intervention from Russia and sought to resolve the conflict with Japan diplomatically until the very end. (Liang Qichao, 2013) So, who were the factions advocating for war? They were the political faction known as the 'Zediang' (帝黨). They were the opposition to the mainstream faction led by Empress Dowager Cixi and Li Hongzhang and had received relatively little attention until then. This report will examine their arguments and logic and review how their ideas could have been reflected in actual policy.

1894: A Look Inside the Qing Dynasty

The domestic political situation in the Qing Dynasty before and after the Sino-Japanese War was a complex entanglement of various political factions pursuing their own interests. The competition between the 'Zediang' (帝黨), represented by the Guangxu Emperor, and the 'Houdang' (后黨), led by Empress Dowager Cixi, best illustrates this political conflict. In 1894, it had been five years since the Guangxu Emperor began his personal rule after Empress Dowager Cixi's long regency. However, Empress Dowager Cixi still held the core of power, including personnel appointments and actual policy decisions, and the Houdang, her political support base, formed the mainstream of the Qing government. However, the Zediang, centered around the Guangxu Emperor who sought to escape Empress Dowager Cixi's shadow, also exerted considerable checks. The Zediang officials were traditional Confucian scholars who had passed the imperial examinations and obtained official positions through their study of traditional Neo-Confucianism. They exerted significant influence on policy decisions based on perceptions that contrasted with those of the Houdang. Furthermore, they opposed the Self-Strengthening Movement led by Li Hongzhang and shared the stance of 'anti-Li Hongzhang' and 'anti-Self-Strengthening faction.' This was because the Zediang officials were conservative and were not involved in fields related to the Self-Strengthening Movement. They harbored considerable resentment towards the Yangwu faction, which received full support from state budgets with Empress Dowager Cixi's backing, and thus showed clear differences with Li Hongzhang in foreign policy, national defense policy, and the war with Japan. The tendency of the Zediang faction to criticize Li Hongzhang's foreign policy and advocate for war became even stronger on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War. They argued that the Self-Strengthening faction's passive and compromising foreign policy in the face of foreign invasions should cease, and a proactive and assertive response should be adopted. This stemmed from their traditional perception of foreign affairs based on Neo-Confucianism and the Sinocentric worldview. In contrast, the Houdang, represented by Li Hongzhang, advocated for peace.

Conversely, the focal point of the Zediang was the Guangxu Emperor. The Guangxu Emperor, rather than sympathizing with the Zediang officials' perception of foreign affairs, strategically allied with officials holding opposing views to check Empress Dowager Cixi's immense power. The Guangxu Emperor's primary political objective was to strengthen his independent power base against Empress Dowager Cixi. Although the Guangxu Emperor was the second most powerful figure, overshadowed by Empress Dowager Cixi, he could exert considerable influence as the emperor of a nation, thus playing a central role in rallying the Zediang faction. The initial connection between the Guangxu Emperor and the Zediang faction was through Weng Tonghe (翁同龢). Weng Tonghe was the Guangxu Emperor's childhood tutor and held important positions even after the Guangxu Emperor ascended the throne. Whether the Guangxu Emperor approached the Zediang to reclaim his actual imperial power or whether the Zediang used the Guangxu Emperor for their political purposes is unknown, but it is certain that once the Guangxu Emperor began his personal rule and a chance for opposing factions to rally arose, Weng Tonghe formed the Zediang with officials who shared similar positions and thoughts, creating a confrontational relationship with the Houdang, centered around Empress Dowager Cixi and Li Hongzhang.

What, then, is the core value that unites the Zediang, and what can be considered their origin? To understand this, we need to pay attention to the political faction known as the 'Qingliu' (清流), which emerged in Beijing politics from the 1870s to the 1880s and was primarily composed of junior officials. (Min Du-gi, 1985) The Qing government's humiliating attitude in resolving domestic and foreign affairs from the 1870s onwards led to strong criticism and attacks on the Yangwu faction. In this process, individuals with the same political background and guiding ideology combined anti-Li Hongzhang sentiments with a hardline stance on foreign affairs, and this was the Qingliu. Of course, they were not called Qingliu from the beginning, nor did they share the perception of being a single political group. Initially, they were considered a group of officials and opinions with a certain tendency, rather than a group bound by common and firm principles and organization. However, from the mid-1880s onwards, around the Sino-French War, they began to voice their opinions in policy formation by advocating for a hardline stance against Japan from an anti-Li Hongzhang position. Their similar social, political, and ideological backgrounds enabled the birth of the Zediang as a political force. (Min Du-gi, 1985) Because they shared a value system that emphasized Confucian moral norms, they held a more Sinocentric view of foreign affairs than any other political group. In addition, their common backgrounds, such as their inclination towards Neo-Confucianism, emphasis on moralism, clean living, and pride in the authority and cultural traditions of the Qing Dynasty, placed them in a principled and orthodox conservative position. In the early 1880s, the Qing government was in a situation where war and peace factions were fiercely debating the conflict with France over Vietnam. Around this period, they began to emerge as a significant political check in domestic and foreign policy formation. The Qingliu demanded a more assertive military response against the mainstream faction seeking to resolve the issue diplomatically, which led to the Sino-French War. In this context, the Qingliu demanded a hardline stance against Korea and Japan about ten years later. From the end of 1892, after the Qing Dynasty dispatched troops to suppress the Donghak Peasant Revolution in Korea, and Japan also dispatched troops to Korea, a hardline stance advocating for war began to emerge as an opinion within the Qing government. In contrast, Li Hongzhang maintained a cautious stance. Li Hongzhang revealed a passive foreign policy perception in the process of transmitting telegrams regarding the dispatch of Qing troops to Korea to the Zongli Yamen, and this attitude of Li Hongzhang remained consistent before and after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. On the other hand, the Zediang faction had been demanding an increase in Qing troops in Korea even before the Sino-Japanese War. After Japan submitted the first diplomatic note, they formed a strong critical public opinion and sought to influence policy decisions by advocating for a war policy and an alliance with Britain, which contrasted with the peace policy and appeasement strategy led by Li Hongzhang.

Characteristics of the Zediang's Hardline Pro-War Stance

There are two essential characteristics for understanding the Zediang's hardline pro-war stance before and after the Sino-Japanese War. First, their pro-war stance was based on traditional Sinocentrism. The Zediang faction shared a common perception of the traditional East Asian order as a Sinocentric hierarchical system. To them, the traditional East Asian order was a tributary system centered around China. This immersion in Sinocentrism led the Zediang officials to perceive Japan as a perpetually weak nation and underestimate it as a mere 'barbarian from the East.' This tendency made it difficult to predict that Japan would pursue war after dispatching troops to Korea on the occasion of the Donghak Peasant Revolution in 1894. The Zediang defined Japan's dispatch of troops to Korea as an act that disrupted the Sinocentric order and condemned Li Hongzhang's pacifist stance for not responding actively. In other words, the reason the Zediang consistently advocated for a hardline stance against Japan was that, within the traditional Sinocentric perception, actions that denied the China-centered order were an affront to China's dignity and violated Confucian morality and righteousness. The second characteristic of the Zediang's hardline pro-war stance is that they conveyed their opinions to the central government through memorials. Under the name 'Qingliu,' they represented the opinions of the literati and critically discussed reforms or the actions of the court. Based on their pride in their scholarship, they continuously expressed their ideals and values to the regime through the traditional and official means of 'memorials.' They harbored dissatisfaction and frustration in a situation where Empress Dowager Cixi and Li Hongzhang monopolized power, and they possessed the academic ability, values, and moral convictions to realize these aspirations. The specific tendency shown in their memorials was to develop critical discourse based on moral principles, with the aim of upholding the morality of a Confucian state, pursuing individual interests, strengthening their influence on central politics, rectifying corruption, and checking the growing power of local authorities during the expansion of the Self-Strengthening Movement.

Influence of the Zediang on the Sino-Japanese War

The Zediang sought to preserve Sinocentrism from a traditional, conservative Confucian perspective. They entered officialdom through the imperial examinations and maintained their Confucian, moral, and traditional stance, viewing the world from this perspective without engaging in matters related to the Self-Strengthening Movement. This movement, aligning with Guangxu Emperor's political objective of independence from Empress Dowager Cixi, grew into a more powerful political force. The Zediang officials opposed anything that deviated from the Sinocentric, Confucian order. The Neo-Confucianism they revered was a discipline that emphasized propriety, and they believed that propriety operated not only in interpersonal relationships but also in relations between states. In the relationship with Korea, a tributary state, the logic of propriety governed China, and in accordance with Confucian tradition, they advocated for dispatching troops to aid Korea and punish Japan, which was disrupting the Sinocentric order. As an extension of these efforts, the Qing court eventually ordered Li Hongzhang to wage war against Japan, seeking to restore the China-centered order.

Then why did Empress Dowager Cixi, on the other side, approve the Sino-Japanese War? Although we have not specifically examined Empress Dowager Cixi's perception of foreign affairs, her basic stance can be considered similar to Li Hongzhang's, as she has largely taken a similar position to him in terms of foreign policy. In that sense, Empress Dowager Cixi would have been closer to the peace faction, so why did she approve Li Hongzhang's war? The most basic reason is likely that she could not find a valid reason to reject the Zediang's request. The starting point of all the Zediang's perceptions of foreign affairs and policy logic was Neo-Confucianism and Sinocentrism, which were considered the mainstream scholarship and absolute truth in society at the time. In Chinese society, where the inertia of the traditional order was still strong, there was no clear reason to oppose the argument of aiding a tributary state in distress and suppressing barbarians based on the principle of propriety. Furthermore, all the Zediang's arguments were presented through official memorials and correspondence. In terms of domestic politics, not responding to numerous memorials could weaken their legitimacy.

However, a more important factor is the motive of Empress Dowager Cixi to maintain her power. Just as the Guangxu Emperor's political objective was to check Empress Dowager Cixi, Empress Dowager Cixi's primary objective was to maintain her domestic political power. In particular, as the opposing faction against her grew after the Guangxu Emperor began his personal rule, Empress Dowager Cixi harbored great vigilance. This can be inferred from the fact that she eventually poisoned the Guangxu Emperor. For Empress Dowager Cixi, by partially accepting the demands of the Zediang, who formed the Guangxu Emperor's political base, she could prevent their dissatisfaction from coalescing and maintain practical authority and control over the war by deploying Li Hongzhang, the core of her faction, to lead the actual war. If the war were won, her position and that of Li Hongzhang, who directly commanded the war, would be elevated, and their legitimacy would be enhanced. If the war were lost, the political standing of the Zediang, who formed the Guangxu Emperor's base, would be significantly weakened, making it not a bad choice for Empress Dowager Cixi. In other words, it was a strategy to maintain her power base through the competition between her faction and the opposing faction. Although Empress Dowager Cixi shared Li Hongzhang's pacifist stance and basic perception of foreign affairs, the more fundamental motive for her power and political actions was the maintenance and strengthening of her domestic political power. In that sense, Empress Dowager Cixi, while appearing to accommodate the opposing side's argument based on traditional, Confucian legitimacy, made the decision for the Sino-Japanese War, which allowed her to check the opposing political faction by utilizing Li Hongzhang, the foundation of her political power.

Ultimately, the Qing Dynasty's decision to participate in the Sino-Japanese War was significantly influenced by the policy proposals of the Zediang faction, which had been steadily expanding its independent political power since the Guangxu Emperor's personal rule. In particular, their arguments were difficult to reject because they were supported by the Guangxu Emperor's solid power base and utilized the logic of Neo-Confucianism, which had dominated Chinese society for a long time, and emphasized propriety and righteousness. Historically, the activities of the Qingliu, the origin of the Zediang, were concentrated in the late 19th century when the traditional China-centered international order was challenged by Western powers. As the sense of crisis regarding China's security intensified, the Zediang faction's perception of foreign affairs tended to become more fixated on Chinese values or the concept of Sinocentrism. During the Sino-French War in 1884 and the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, which can be considered the most severe military crises, the Zediang faction consistently advocated for a hardline pro-war stance. Although their weakening political standing in reality resulted from the Sino-French War, which was initiated by accepting the Zediang's pro-war arguments, the traditional Sinocentric view of China, which always regarded Japan as inferior and weak, was something the Qing government could not easily reject. The Zediang faction's perception of and response to Western powers, based on traditional China-centered values, was replicated in their persistent hardline pro-war stance in the Sino-Japanese War. These policy proposals from the Zediang, aligning with Empress Dowager Cixi's strategy to maintain her power base as the supreme ruler, albeit a political opponent at the time, led to the outcome of participation in the Sino-Japanese War.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki, Which Reversed the Northeast Asian Order, and Its Aftermath

When the armed conflict between China and Japan actually broke out, it ended in Japan's overwhelming victory. Despite the Qing regime's efforts to prepare its military through the Self-Strengthening Movement, it was defeated by Japan in both land and naval battles. And the treaty that the Qing Dynasty, cornered, reluctantly signed to end the war was the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed at the Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall, which we visited.

Photo 4. Full text of the Japanese version of the Treaty of Shimonoseki

In international politics, war often serves as a significant historical turning point, leading to shifts in the balance of power, readjustment of national interests, and changes in regional order, beyond a mere clash between two nations. The historical significance of the Sino-Japanese War is immense. It is difficult to find another example in history where a single war so rapidly altered the international order as the Sino-Japanese War. The Sino-Japanese War involved all three East Asian nations and clearly revealed the outcome of the competition between China and Japan for influence over the Korean Peninsula. The Sino-Japanese War was also a war that marked the first victory in the competition for modernization based on a strong military between Japan and China, and it was through this war that Japan finally came to be recognized as a military power by Western nations. Imperialism began to accelerate, and as a result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the foundation for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was laid. On the other hand, as China's military weakness was exposed to the world, Westerners' perceptions of China, previously considered a potential world power, began to change, and direct aggression by Western powers against the Chinese mainland commenced. (Kim Ki-jeong, 1991) The balance of power, structural issues, and international order surrounding the East Asian region were all transformed by the Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Approximately 120 years have passed since the Sino-Japanese War, and the East Asian region is now facing a new period of upheaval. China is preparing for its rise as a new world power, shedding the history of humiliation of the past century, while Japan seeks to sustain its past influence with the help of the United States. Furthermore, the division of the Korean Peninsula persists, and North Korea's nuclear weapons development is increasing the possibility of war. U.S. President Trump, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, and the political leaders of South Korea and Japan are uttering harsh words based on their domestic political backgrounds, and at times, they offer gestures of peace. The peaceful sea visible immediately after leaving the Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall seemed to symbolically represent the fleeting boundary between war and peace.

Photo 5. The sea viewed from the Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall

The outcomes of war and peace can stem from small choices. In that regard, it is meaningful to look back at the history of the Sino-Japanese War and examine how the countries in this region decided to go to war. This report examined the causes of the Sino-Japanese War through the domestic political situation and underlying perceptions of foreign affairs in the Qing Dynasty, and efforts to analyze the foreign policy decision-making process of a nation in a detailed and complex manner will be necessary in the future.

References

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Liang Qichao. 2013. Biography of Li Hongzhang: A Great Thinker of Modern China, Liang Qichao, and Li Hongzhang, a Powerful Figure of His Time (Original Title: 李鴻章 評傳). Translated by Park Hee-seong, Moon Se-na, Prism.

Park Hee-seong, Moon Se-na translation, Prism.

Park Hee-seong, Moon Se-na translation, Prism.