Mao Zedong, the Romantic Realist

Museum of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War · Oh In-hwan · Seoul National University

Introduction: Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong

MacArthur, who had successfully carried out the Incheon Landing Operation and the northward advance, believed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would not intervene in the Korean War, and even if they did, the U.S. military could sufficiently defeat them. At the 1950.10.15 Wake Island Conference, MacArthur conveyed the same belief to President Truman. However, the Chinese forces, which had been organized as the Northeast Border Army (東北邊方軍) since July for potential emergencies, crossed the Yalu River into the Korean Peninsula on October 19. They achieved unexpected results through the first and second offensives, delivering a significant shock to the United States and the international community. The commander-in-chief of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPV), which achieved such military feats in the Korean War, was Peng Dehuai. Contrary to popular belief, the CCP did not simply overwhelm the UN forces with superior numbers; they fought by maximizing their strengths and compensating for their weaknesses through a strategy and tactical concept known as 'divide and destroy,' with Peng Dehuai at the forefront.

104 The Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPV), which achieved such military feats in the Korean War, was Peng Dehuai. Contrary to popular belief, the CCP did not simply overwhelm the UN forces with superior numbers; they fought by maximizing their strengths and compensating for their weaknesses through a strategy and tactical concept known as 'divide and destroy,' with Peng Dehuai at the forefront.

However, after the first and second offensives by the CPV achieved unexpectedly great success, Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong engaged in continuous conflict over the timing and objectives of the offensives in 1951. Peng Dehuai, as the commander-in-chief, argued that the troops were extremely exhausted after fighting without rest through the second offensive, the supply lines were overextended, and resupply was hampered by U.S. air attacks, necessitating sufficient time for regrouping. Mao Zedong, however, insisted on a rapid advance as soon as possible, believing that if possible, the UN forces should be driven out of the Korean Peninsula and the 38th parallel secured. Peng Dehuai had no choice but to carry out the third and fourth offensives, following the directives of his superior political leader. Only after the fourth offensive concluded, and Peng Dehuai directly visited Beijing in late February to early March 1951 to present his views to Mao Zedong, did Mao Zedong concede, though he still left a lingering remark about achieving a swift victory (Peng Dehuai 1981) if possible.

105 if possible, achieving a swift victory.

The clash of opinions between Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai, which erupted in 1951, resurfaced eight years later at the Lushan Conference in 1959. On September 15, 1956, the Chinese Communist Party, at its Eighth National Congress, decided to pursue rapid development in the future, as the First Five-Year Plan had progressed faster than anticipated. In 1958, the General Line for Socialist Construction was formulated, and the Great Leap Forward was launched under the slogan "Mobilize the entire populace to discuss the Four Pests campaign and usher in a new upsurge in agricultural production" through the People's Communes. However, due to unrealistic production targets and low productivity, the national economy faced further difficulties, leading to food shortages for the peasantry. The CCP Central Committee convened the Wuchang Conference on November 21, 1958, followed by the Zhengzhou Conference in February 1959 and the Shanghai Conference in late March of the same year, to revise the regulations for the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes. Peng Dehuai, aware of the errors of the excessive Great Leap Forward and the exaggeration of production figures, meticulously prepared a letter to Mao Zedong on July 14, 1959, to be presented at the Lushan Conference, which began on July 2, to voice his dissenting opinions.

106 Peng Dehuai, aware of the errors of the excessive Great Leap Forward and the exaggeration of production figures, meticulously prepared a letter to Mao Zedong on July 14, 1959, to be presented at the Lushan Conference, which began on July 2, to voice his dissenting opinions. Contrary to Peng Dehuai's intention that Mao Zedong would read the letter privately and make his own judgment, Mao Zedong had the letter printed and distributed to other party members on July 16. Mao Zedong then criticized Peng Dehuai for having right-leaning deviationism and declared his letter an anti-Party program. Consequently, the Lushan Conference, which was intended to correct the left-leaning problems of the Great Leap Forward, devolved into criticism of Peng Dehuai. The criticism of Peng Dehuai escalated into an "anti-rightist struggle," and fearing being labeled as rightists, members of the CCP leadership were unable to freely express their opinions. The Lushan Conference thus broke the tradition of the CCP adjusting issues through free expression and debate among top leaders (Kang Myung-hwa 2005). This event led to Peng Dehuai's resignation from his positions as Vice Chairman of the Military Commission and Minister of National Defense.

107 This event led to Peng Dehuai's resignation from his positions as Vice Chairman of the Military Commission and Minister of National Defense.

Then why did Mao Zedong, despite Peng Dehuai's opinion, demand a hasty advance through the third and fourth offensives in 1951? And why did he, at the 1959 Lushan Conference, criticize Peng Dehuai's letter, label those who agreed with Peng as right-opportunists, and exhibit behavior that seemed to run counter to the times, even into the Cultural Revolution?

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The Success of Romantic Realism: The Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War

Mao Zedong, who began to make his presence known through the Jinggangshan guerrilla warfare in 1927 (Military History Department, Korea Military Academy 2006, 257), achieved great success as a romantic realist through two Chinese Civil Wars, the Anti-Japanese War, and the CPV's first and second offensives in the Korean War, as examined above. Here, 'romantic' refers to the tendency to make adventurous choices in situations where, objectively, one is at a significant disadvantage compared to the opponent, a situation that would typically lead to surrender. 'Realist' refers to Mao Zedong's strategic approach of avoiding all-out confrontation in situations of physical disadvantage and opting for a war of attrition, as seen in the period before 1950 when Sino-Soviet relations began to exert significant influence, and in the post-1950 period, considering the geopolitical impact of Sino-Soviet relations.

In this sense, Mao Zedong's life can be broadly divided into two periods: a period of success for his romantic realism and a period where this romantic realism became excessive, leading to detrimental consequences. The Museum of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War, visited on the last day of the 8th Sarangbang expedition, was a place where one could confirm the key phases of the period when Mao Zedong's romantic realism brought about success. In late 1927, Mao Zedong commanded only a few hundred troops for guerrilla warfare. However, after repelling the Kuomintang's encirclement campaigns three times, the Red Army's strength grew to 300,000. Yet, during the Long March, a 12,500 km journey to evade the Kuomintang's pursuit from October 1934 to 1935, the Red Army, which had numbered 300,000, was reduced to 30,000 due to harsh battles and marches (Military History Department, Korea Military Academy 2006, 259).

109 during harsh battles and marches, the Red Army, which had numbered 300,000, was reduced to 30,000 (Military History Department, Korea Military Academy 2006, 259). Subsequently, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which broke out in 1937 when the Japanese army besieged Wanping City under the pretext of searching for a missing Japanese soldier near Lugou Bridge, presented both an opportunity and a greater gamble for Mao Zedong. In terms of objective military strength, the Chinese forces were at a disadvantage compared to the Japanese army, which had over 500,000 troops. Mao Zedong's Red Army numbered only about 42,000 around 1938. Japan initially stationed a significant number of divisions in Manchuria to counter the Soviet Union, starting with an invasion force of 500,000, which later increased to 1 million (Military History Department, Korea Military Academy 2006, 276).

Subsequently, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which broke out in 1937 when the Japanese army besieged Wanping City under the pretext of searching for a missing Japanese soldier near Lugou Bridge, presented both an opportunity and a greater gamble for Mao Zedong. In terms of objective military strength, the Chinese forces were at a disadvantage compared to the Japanese army, which had over 500,000 troops. Mao Zedong's Red Army numbered only about 42,000 around 1938. Japan initially stationed a significant number of divisions in Manchuria to counter the Soviet Union, starting with an invasion force of 500,000, which later increased to 1 million (Military History Department, Korea Military Academy 2006, 276).

Nevertheless, Mao Zedong, following the Second United Front, waged a war of resistance against Japan centered on guerrilla warfare. The Red Army, which grew through repeated raids and evasions, continued to increase in number. The force, which was only 42,000 strong, grew to 180,000, and by 1940, it reached a total of 500,000.

110 By 1940, it reached a total of 500,000. Ultimately, after Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the tide began to turn as the importance of the Pacific theater for both the Japanese and U.S. militaries increased.

By 1944, Mao Zedong's Red Army numbered 750,000, increasing to 1.3 million in 1945. As the Japanese army was engaged in a two-front war, fighting in the Pacific theater and China simultaneously, the Japanese forces occupying China began to weaken. Finally, starting August 9, 1945, the Chinese army launched a strategic counteroffensive, leading to the defeat of the Japanese army (Military History Department, Korea Military Academy 2006, 278).

111 leading to the defeat of the Japanese army (Military History Department, Korea Military Academy 2006, 278). Our 8th Sarangbang expedition shared content about Mao Zedong, the romantic realist, through a presentation at Lugou Bridge, the starting point of the Second Sino-Japanese War. We also observed the contrasting exhibits at the Museum of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War, showcasing the atrocities of the Japanese army and the achievements of the Chinese Communist Party's military leadership in securing ultimate victory despite being at a disadvantage. Seeing the crowds of local visitors, both students and adults, at the museum, we realized it serves as a crucial contemporary site for educating people about the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong.

Our 8th Sarangbang expedition shared content about Mao Zedong, the romantic realist, through a presentation at Lugou Bridge, the starting point of the Second Sino-Japanese War. We also observed the contrasting exhibits at the Museum of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War, showcasing the atrocities of the Japanese army and the achievements of the Chinese Communist Party's military leadership in securing ultimate victory despite being at a disadvantage. Seeing the crowds of local visitors, both students and adults, at the museum, we realized it serves as a crucial contemporary site for educating people about the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong.

In fact, the success of Mao Zedong's romantic realism did not end there. The Chinese Civil War, which arguably presented a greater military disadvantage than the Sino-Japanese War, remained a challenge for Mao Zedong. After Japan's defeat in 1945, when political negotiations with the Kuomintang broke down in 1946, the Kuomintang army numbered 4.3 million, compared to the Communist Party's 1.2 million. In addition to this approximately 4:1 disadvantage in troop numbers, Mao Zedong's Communist Party was also at a disadvantage in terms of weapons and equipment compared to the Kuomintang, which received U.S. support (Military History Department, Korea Military Academy 2006, 254).

112 In addition to this approximately 4:1 disadvantage in troop numbers, Mao Zedong's Communist Party was also at a disadvantage in terms of weapons and equipment compared to the Kuomintang, which received U.S. support (Military History Department, Korea Military Academy 2006, 254). Nevertheless, Mao Zedong employed a strategy of starting from rural areas and encircling cities, and the Communist forces began to absorb defecting Kuomintang soldiers. By June 1948, the Kuomintang army had decreased to 3.65 million, while the Red Army had increased to 2.8 million during the same period. By June 1949, the Red Army had grown to 4 million, and the Kuomintang army had shrunk to 1.49 million, reversing the situation. On April 20, 1949, the Communist Party launched its final offensive. In October 1949, after Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan, Mao Zedong's People's Republic of China was established.

Interestingly, Peng Dehuai, who joined the Communist Party in February 1928, was a military leader who supported Mao Zedong, his elder brother and leader from the same hometown of Xiangtan County, Hunan Province, throughout the Long March (1934-1935), the Hundred Regiments Offensive (August-November 1940) during the Sino-Japanese War, the resumed Chinese Civil War after 1946, and China's participation in the Korean War and the CPV's first and second offensives starting in 1950. The Museum of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War revealed that Zhu De was the commander-in-chief and Peng Dehuai was the deputy commander-in-chief in the CPV's military structure at the time. The top two military leaders alongside Mao Zedong throughout the arduous Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War leading up to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 were Zhu De and Peng Dehuai.

113 Peng Dehuai. In the internal debate within the Chinese Communist Party regarding participation in the Korean War, when the promised Soviet air support in 1950 became uncertain, Peng Dehuai was among those who actively supported Mao Zedong's proposal to intervene. Ultimately, with Peng Dehuai's appointment as the commander-in-chief of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in the Korean War, he attained the position of the highest-ranking military leader within the Chinese Communist Party.

The unexpected success of the CPV's first and second offensives in 1950 was also due to Peng Dehuai's unreserved support for Mao Zedong's strategic shift from securing a strategic foothold to driving the UN forces southward. However, Mao Zedong's romantic realism, built on past successes, led to overconfidence. Starting in 1951, Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong began to differ on the timing and objectives of the CPV offensives. Only after confirming that his directives were not achieving the expected success did Mao Zedong approve Peng Dehuai's proposed war of attrition in the Korean War. Furthermore, the excess of Mao Zedong's romantic realism continued in 1959, resulting in a regression for China's future.

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The Excess of Romantic Realism: 1951 and 1959

In December 1950, Peng Dehuai held different views from Mao Zedong regarding the war situation and future prospects while preparing for subsequent offensives. Peng Dehuai's predictions were remarkably accurate. Considering the international dynamics surrounding the Korean War, while Mao Zedong was optimistic about the UN forces' withdrawal or the initiation of armistice negotiations after occupying the 38th parallel, Peng Dehuai pointed out that the UN forces would not withdraw so easily and that the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea was unlikely. Furthermore, Peng Dehuai noted that in the actual war situation, the first and second offensives maximized the effect of the initial surprise attack and allowed for offensive maneuvers due to the wider front in the north compared to the south. However, as forces advanced southward, the front would narrow, favoring the UN forces. Considering the difficult supply situation, he believed it was better to prepare for a protracted war. Peng Dehuai's prediction that while defeat was unlikely, a decisive victory would be difficult, proved accurate not only for the ongoing second offensive but also for the anticipated third and fourth offensives (Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, National Archives of Korea 2002, 103).

115 In a telegram sent on December 21, Mao Zedong replied to Peng Dehuai's telegram of December 19. While ostensibly acknowledging Peng Dehuai's difficulties and dissenting opinions, Mao Zedong demanded a continuous offensive after a short respite, rather than the decisive offensive after sufficient rest that Peng Dehuai requested. This manifested as the third offensive in January, known as the New Year's Offensive, and the fourth offensive in February after the UN counteroffensive (Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, National Archives of Korea 2002, 105). Mao Zedong's decision to order the crossing of the 38th parallel and the premature third and fourth offensives from early December 1950 to February 1951, despite Peng Dehuai's opinion, can also be understood within the context of Sino-Soviet relations.

Firstly, on December 4, 1950, Andrei Gromyko advised the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union that China should continue successful offensive operations by crossing the 38th parallel to secure an advantageous position before armistice talks began. Subsequently, on December 7, Stalin and Mao Zedong agreed to continue the fighting and present difficult armistice terms to the UN. Therefore, the decision for the 1951 offensives can be seen as being made by Stalin and Mao Zedong, who were ostensibly optimistic about the geopolitical resolution of the Korean War and the current war situation (Sui, David 2011, 243).

However, even when crossing the 38th parallel, Mao Zedong

116 could have chosen to launch the offensive after a more sufficient rest and reorganization of troops, following Peng Dehuai's opinion, or compromised with Peng Dehuai and launched the third offensive in February instead of March as Peng Dehuai suggested. The specific scope and timing of the offensives were, in fact, within Mao Zedong's discretion under the agreement with Stalin. Nevertheless, Mao Zedong chose to hastily resume the offensive at the end of December to break through the 38th parallel, which seemed excessive, and then launched a fourth offensive in February.

It is here that we can better understand Mao Zedong's decision in 1951 by recalling the internal conflict in Sino-Soviet relations at the time: Stalin suspected Mao Zedong's loyalty (Shen Zhihua 2010, 33), and Mao Zedong was striving to alleviate this suspicion while simultaneously harboring dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union's lukewarm military support. Although it was a romantic judgment that contradicted the objective military situation presented by Peng Dehuai, it was a realistic decision in terms of Sino-Soviet relations. This excess of romantic realism and its detrimental consequences manifested even more significantly in 1959.

Mao Zedong had actually resigned as Chairman in April 1959 due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1958. This resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of people, including those executed,

117 and despite Peng Dehuai's criticism, the existing course was maintained, leading to a food shortage crisis from 1960 to 1963. So why did Mao Zedong ignore Peng Dehuai's rational criticism based on reality and label him a right-opportunist?

Existing research, including that by Kang Myung-hwa, points to the power struggle to check Peng Dehuai, who had a strong base of support within the People's Liberation Army, and the need to consolidate support for the Great Leap Forward and the General Line for Socialist Construction through the Lushan Conference (Kang Myung-hwa 2005, 88-89). However, just as Mao Zedong's decision in 1951 can be interpreted from the perspective of romantic realism, his actions in 1959 can also be reinterpreted through the geopolitical factor of Sino-Soviet relations at the time. We can consider the impact of the increasingly overt deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations on Mao Zedong's decision at the 1959 Lushan Conference.

First, a key difference between Sino-Soviet relations in 1951 and 1959 is the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953. As mentioned earlier, Mao Zedong had strived to alleviate Stalin's suspicion that he might become the 'Tito of Asia' during the Korean War (Shen Zhihua 2014, 36-37). The absence of Stalin, who had exercised strong leadership within the socialist bloc, is noteworthy.

118 Furthermore, after Stalin's death, Mao Zedong believed he had risen to a prominent position in the world communist movement and considered himself theoretically and experientially superior to the new Soviet leadership.

In particular, the criticism of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 marked a further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union argued that the transition from capitalism to socialism could be achieved through peaceful means, but China disagreed, leading the two countries to pursue different ideological paths. Khrushchev criticized Stalin's cruelty and inhumanity, arguing that world victory could be achieved through peaceful coexistence without the use of force against capitalist countries, as the superiority of the communist system was increasing. Moreover, in June 1959, the Soviet Union unilaterally abrogated the agreement on new defense technologies signed between China and the Soviet Union in 1957, in which the Soviets had promised to provide atomic bomb samples and technical data to China. Despite respecting territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence between nations, the Soviet Union exhibited great-power chauvinism towards China, further exacerbating Sino-Soviet conflict. It was amidst this deepening Sino-Soviet conflict that the Lushan Conference was held in July 1959.

119 For Mao Zedong, the Sino-Soviet relationship, as represented by Stalin, was a geopolitical factor that compelled him to outwardly conform while inwardly striving to alleviate Stalin's suspicions. However, after Stalin's death in the early 1950s and following 1956, when Khrushchev criticized Stalin and advocated peaceful coexistence with the West, Mao Zedong appears to have gained the confidence to confront the Soviet Union. In a conversation with the Soviet ambassador Yudin on March 31, 1956, Mao Zedong mentioned that Stalin had underestimated the opinions and capabilities of the Chinese Communist Party from a Kuomintang perspective and pointed out the flaws in Stalin's policies (illegal coercion, errors in conducting war, rejection of collective leadership and dictatorship, and failures in diplomatic policy towards countries like Yugoslavia). In January 1957, Zhou Enlai also analyzed the weaknesses in the Soviet Communist Party leadership's strategy, tactics, and international relations. China began to recognize the possibility of open conflict with the Soviet Union and sought its own path. In 1958, China insisted on installing its own long-range radio communication station, rejecting the Soviet proposal to establish one jointly.

Especially after the Soviet Union's refusal to provide nuclear weapon technology assistance in June 1959, the Lushan Conference in July provided Mao Zedong with an opportunity to clearly distinguish China's path from that of the Soviet Union.

120 In the context where Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence with the West could be seen as revisionism deviating from the established socialist path, Mao Zedong pursued a more "leftist" course domestically, despite the identified flaws of the Great Leap Forward, to maximize differentiation from the Soviet Union. Peng Dehuai cautiously expressed his hope in a personal letter for the rectification of the Great Leap Forward's flaws, so as not to undermine Mao Zedong's authority. However, Peng Dehuai's criticism came at a time when de-Stalinization was underway in the Soviet Union, and international criticism of dictatorship was emerging. Mao Zedong likely considered the possibility that this criticism could extend beyond his current endeavors to himself, even though he had stepped down to the second line but still held real power. In essence, the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations at the time may have motivated Mao Zedong to pursue China's own path, not just to counter Soviet interference or obstruction, but to assert leadership within the socialist bloc. Furthermore, the criticism of dictatorship in the Soviet Union likely made Mao Zedong feel a greater need to preemptively address any potential criticism of dictatorship within China.

Conclusion: Mao Zedong, the Romantic Realist

121 A speech delivered by Mao Zedong within the Party in September 1962 reveals that he had been in an internal conflict with Stalin since 1945. Mao Zedong recalled that the Soviet Union had not actually allowed their revolution to succeed. He stated that Stalin had instead encouraged cooperation with the Kuomintang, suggesting that a civil war should not occur, thereby attempting to prevent the Chinese revolution. However, he emphasized that he had continued the revolution and achieved victory in the Chinese Civil War. He also recalled that after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Stalin had continuously suspected that China might become like Yugoslavia and that he himself might become like Tito, and that Stalin had been unenthusiastic when they went to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. Mao Zedong stated that this suspicion from Stalin disappeared after China's participation in the Korean War and the CPV's first and second offensives in 1950, and that Stalin had become convinced of his loyalty.

122 The decision made by Mao Zedong regarding the CPV's third offensive in 1951 needs to be interpreted within the context of this internal conflict in Sino-Soviet relations. The interpretation that Stalin directed the war through Mao Zedong and therefore ordered military operations beyond the 38th parallel to be carried out swiftly is too simplistic. While Stalin's directives could not be ignored, Mao Zedong, having already largely dispelled Stalin's suspicions about him, could have adjusted the timing of crossing the 38th parallel according to Peng Dehuai's opinion, who represented the CPV's situation of not being able to rest continuously from mid-October to early December 1950 due to the UN forces' air superiority causing delays and damage to supplies, and the continuous offensives. Therefore, Mao Zedong's decision to order the New Year's Offensive and the February offensive in 1951, following the two CPV offensives at the end of 1950 without significant rest, was a kind of demonstration of China's capabilities and, at the same time, a judgment by a romantic realist seeking to more definitively alleviate Stalin's suspicions about him.

The conflict between Peng Dehuai's letter on July 14 and Mao Zedong's speech on July 23 at the 1959 Lushan Conference showed a more dramatic confrontation than the disagreement in 1951. Peng Dehuai presented a rational opinion that factors hindering actual production and the modernization of agriculture and industry, such as unrealistic harvest targets, coercive directives, exaggeration, and communist wind, must be corrected. However, Mao Zedong, as if fitting the description of a 'romantic revolutionary' or 'romantic militarist' (Zhang 1995), presented an optimistic outlook and extreme criticism of Peng Dehuai, proclaiming an anti-rightist struggle and reinforcing the existing course as 'adventurism.' However, considering the international situation after 1956, when the Sino-Soviet relationship transitioned from an internal conflict to an overt one, it can be interpreted that Mao Zedong made a more extreme choice domestically to differentiate China from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, considering the context in which Khrushchev criticized Stalin's dictatorship, it is likely that Mao Zedong also aimed to preemptively address potential criticisms of dictatorship within China.

123 Considering the international situation after 1956, when the Sino-Soviet relationship transitioned from an internal conflict to an overt one, it can be interpreted that Mao Zedong made a more extreme choice domestically to differentiate China from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, considering the context in which Khrushchev criticized Stalin's dictatorship, it is likely that Mao Zedong also aimed to preemptively address potential criticisms of dictatorship within China.

Considering the international situation, Mao Zedong can also be interpreted as having made a more extreme choice domestically to distinguish himself internationally from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, considering the context in which Khrushchev criticized Stalin's dictatorship, he likely also aimed to prevent criticism of dictatorship from arising within China.

Mao Zedong's romantic realism, which began in the 1920s, led to miraculous victories in the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, and the first and second offensives of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPV) in the Korean War in 1950. As Mao Zedong recalled, after China's intervention in the Korean War in 1950, Stalin began to shed his doubts about Mao Zedong after the CPV achieved a great victory against the US military, then considered the world's best army, through the first and second offensives. Stalin sent Mao Zedong a congratulatory telegram and, (David Suie 2011, 241-242) changed his lukewarm attitude towards military aid, deciding to immediately send 2,000 transport vehicles. (Ministry of Government Legislation, National Archives of Korea 2002, 106-107) However, amidst his success up to that point, Mao Zedong did not fully recognize that his success was driven by the larger structural factor of World War II and that it was due to the UN forces' intelligence failure regarding the CPV.

Ultimately, Mao Zedong's persistent excess of romantic realism led to the third and fourth offensives of the CPV in 1951, which achieved no significant results, and in 1959, again

124 led to political criticism of Peng Dehuai, who offered advice that might have been helpful to Mao Zedong, and to the implementation of policies that went against the times. Furthermore, the policy direction of the Chinese Communist Party at the time was not corrected and regressed, ultimately causing the Cultural Revolution, an unforgettable event in modern Chinese history from 1966 to 1976. If Mao Zedong had listened to Peng Dehuai's opinions in 1951 and 1959, and if he had been able to moderate his excess of romantic realism, would not Sino-US relations in the 21st century have unfolded differently today?

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