The Future of the Pacific as Seen from Sasebo Base: Myung-jung Kim & Si-ri Sung

Johns Hopkins SAIS / Yonsei University Graduate School

Introduction

Our Sarangbang, which looked back at the cultural exchanges of the past at the Il Museum, headed to its next destination: the Sasebo US Naval Base, a place where we could contemplate the present and future of Korea-US relations and the maritime security order in East Asia. Sasebo is a port city in the northern part of Nagasaki Prefecture, Kyushu, Japan. The Sasebo Naval Base located here was the Imperial Japanese Navy's base until World War II, but after the war, it was decommissioned and a US naval base was established in 1946. The US Naval Base in Sasebo also played a crucial role in transporting supplies for the US and UN forces during the war. Since the end of the war, the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the US Navy have shared the port of Sasebo to this day. Today, the US Naval Base in Sasebo supports the US 7th Fleet and conducts training in preparation for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Although not large in scale, it is a very significant location in terms of the East Asian maritime order and security on the Korean Peninsula. It was here that our Sarangbang's meeting with Commander O'Brien awaited us. Sasebo Base was the only place during our visit where we could speak with a living person, so we headed to Sasebo with excitement. Maritime security is not a topic that directly touches us as we study international politics at our desks. However, for students of international politics, being able to interview the commander of a base on the edge of the Pacific is undoubtedly a precious opportunity. Therefore, to make the most of this opportunity, we conducted preliminary research on the East Asian maritime order and sent an English report we prepared to the commander before the meeting. As the meeting with the commander was limited to one hour, we wanted to convey that we had a basic understanding of East Asian security and the Sasebo Base, and by sharing our understanding beforehand, we aimed to have a more substantive discussion during the meeting.

The title of the preliminary research report we sent to the commander was "China's Dream, America's Rebalance Strategy, and the Sea of Peace." As the title suggests, through our preliminary research, we aimed to examine the policies of various countries navigating East Asian waters today and to envision the future order of the East Asian seas. The topic of the East Asian maritime order is very broad, and we had a superficial understanding of military security issues, so we faced difficulties in writing the report. However, we began our research focusing on the following questions that had not been organized in our minds: To what extent has China's naval power caught up with that of the US and its allies? Is America's Asian rebalance policy aimed at balancing China's military rise and maintaining the status quo, or is it a policy to increase military strength in response to China being perceived as a real threat? What impact are the actions of US allies Japan and South Korea having on regional security in the Asia-Pacific? Is the East Asian sea heading towards peace or an arms race? We diligently examined various statistics, data, and the policies and behaviors of East Asian countries, but we could not find clear answers to our questions. We returned to the fundamental theoretical assumptions we had when we first encountered international politics: Can states trust each other? Can they cooperate? Thus, we looked forward to the meeting with the commander even more.

A Minor Incident at the Entrance of Sasebo Naval Base

Driving along the open coastal road, we arrived at the naval base, seeing the fleet majestically floating on the sea. When we got off the bus upon arrival, the Ms. Yuki Teresaki we were supposed to meet was nowhere to be seen. Our bus had gone to the Japan Self-Defense Forces base instead of the US base. After turning the bus around and driving for about ten minutes, we saw a sign that read "US Naval Base." We saw personnel in white uniforms or t-shirts with visible muscular forearms. The Future of the Pacific as Seen from Sasebo Base.

The Future of the Pacific as Seen from Sasebo Base

A small incident occurred at the entrance of the Sasebo Base. While having lunch in Sasebo city before arriving at the base, we wondered if passports would be required to enter the base. Checking quickly on the bus, we discovered that two members had not brought their passports. Having already traveled far from the hotel, we worried about not being able to enter the base. When we explained the situation to Ms. Yuki Teresaki, whom we met at the entrance of the US Naval Base, she informed us that while identification was normally required to enter the base, she would take care of it since she had not notified us in advance. We could only wait anxiously as Yuki spoke with the security guards. I felt very sorry for my friends for not checking beforehand. Although there was a delay of about twenty minutes, fortunately, all members, without any stragglers, were able to enter the base. We then took a base bus and drove for about ten minutes inside the base to reach the building where the commander was located.

The Future of the Pacific as Seen from Sasebo Base

There was a small incident at the entrance of the Sasebo Base. While having lunch in Sasebo city before arriving at the base, we wondered if passports would be required to enter the base. Checking quickly on the bus, we discovered that two members had not brought their passports. Having already traveled far from the hotel, we worried about not being able to enter the base. When we explained the situation to Ms. Yuki Teresaki, whom we met at the entrance of the US Naval Base, she informed us that while identification was normally required to enter the base, she would take care of it since she had not notified us in advance. We could only wait anxiously as Yuki spoke with the security guards. I felt very sorry for my friends for not checking beforehand. Although there was a delay of about twenty minutes, fortunately, all members, without any stragglers, were able to enter the base. We then took a base bus and drove for about ten minutes inside the base to reach the building where the commander was located.

Meeting with Commander O'Brien

A few minutes after arriving at the conference room for the meeting with the commander, Commander O'Brien of the US Naval Base Sasebo entered. Commander O'Brien is from Massachusetts, received a master's degree from the US Naval War College in 1997, served in various locations including the Arabian Sea and Rhode Island, and was appointed commander of Sasebo in 2015. The commander appeared kind and humble, like a gentle country boy, rather than the sharp and rugged figure we had imagined.

from Massachusetts, received a master's degree from the US Naval War College in 1997, served in various locations including the Arabian Sea and Rhode Island,

and was appointed commander of Sasebo in 2015. The commander appeared kind and humble, like a gentle country boy, rather than the sharp and rugged figure we had imagined.

After a brief greeting with Sarangbang, the commander gave a briefing for about twenty minutes on the overall role of the Sasebo Base and its operations. The commander's briefing covered much of what we had learned through our preliminary research, and we felt anxious that the discussion time would be reduced. After the commander's briefing, the main session began. We took turns asking the questions we had prepared. Since we had organized our questions on the bus to Sasebo and assigned questioners, the discussion proceeded smoothly. Here is a partial translation of the Q&A session conducted in English. The Future of the Pacific as Seen from Sasebo Base.

The Future of the Pacific as Seen from Sasebo Base

As a military officer, how do you view China's military buildup?

Daily duties have become a bit more challenging. As the Chinese Navy becomes a world-class navy, it has become tiring. Of course, it is a good thing that China is beginning to follow internationally accepted rules and procedures at sea. The Chinese Navy's movements are more proactive and professional than before. While this is a good thing, in some ways, it has made our work more difficult. The US Navy used to operate more freely at sea, and the only country we were concerned about was Russia, around 1990. However, the situation has become more complex due to the actions of regional actors and their military buildup. Do you believe there is an arms race or security dilemma in the region?

I definitely believe there is a security dilemma. You may have heard the US Secretary of State's announcement regarding China's activities in the South China Sea. In my personal opinion, the issues that could arise from miscalculations and differences in naval power between countries are more dangerous and important than the fact that there is an arms race in the region.

What do you believe is the essence of security?

What do you think is the essence of security?

It is the respect for the sovereignty of nations. However, from the perspective of someone wearing a naval uniform, I believe it is important to ensure freedom of navigation on the high seas, allowing free access to the world's common oceans, and for all nations to adhere to established rules and general practices. It is about a common agreement upon which all nations can base their activities.

How can the US military buildup in the Asia-Pacific be justified? China's defense spending is maintained at a certain level, while the US is strengthening its alliances and redeploying its forces to Asia. Isn't this element making China even more anxious?

US interests exist in this region. The Asia-Pacific is a particularly important region for the US in terms of trade. Historically, one of the main roles of the navy has been to maintain and guarantee free trade and free sea lanes. A significant portion of the US economy relies on Pacific trade, Malacca Strait trade, and South China Sea trade, and the same is true for China. Since China also exports to the US, both China and the US have an interest in maintaining security and peace in this region. The reason the US is concentrating and redeploying a large portion of its military power to this region is because the US economy depends on the security and stability of this region. Half of the US coastline faces the Pacific. This justifies our military buildup and our presence.

Will the new US-Japan Security Alliance Guidelines bring any changes to Sasebo's role? If so, in what aspects?

As far as I know, there are no changes. In fact, I anticipated this question and spent time reviewing the guidelines. However, the new guidelines apply to a higher level than our daily operations. We maintain close relations with Japan and perform missions, supporting vessels. Of course, changes in such policies may affect our daily work and practical operations in the future, but currently, there is no impact on Sasebo Base or myself. Do you think the US and Japan are moving in the same direction? What are your thoughts on Japan potentially causing regional tensions?

Of course. All US allies are concerned about regional security and instability and are moving in the same direction. However, there may be differences in how they intend to achieve those goals. It is impossible to be perfectly aligned, and such things are included in forming an alliance. Because the US has promised to support Japan, there is a risk that Japan might drag us into something the US does not want. This possibility exists in the discussions related to Japan's collective self-defense. I believe the US and Japan have a very close relationship.

One of the roles of the Sasebo Base is to prepare for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. What are your thoughts on the possibility of such a situation?

Contingencies on the Korean Peninsula seem to be a separate issue. Earlier, we were discussing the South China Sea, and while the Korean Peninsula is also a security issue and an important one, I believe it is a separate matter. The actions of regional actors in this region seem to revolve around the South China Sea. Contingencies on the Korean Peninsula are also difficult and important issues, but they seem to be separate.

Which does the Sasebo US Naval Base prioritize more: East Asian security or preparing for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula?

I would say they are equal. When I spoke with the commander of my fleet, I could tell that he was contemplating both security issues daily. Both issues are equally difficult and equally significant. The ships and units deployed here are prepared for both types of contingencies. We cooperate with regional partner nations, establishing relationships from Australia to the South China Sea and even the Indian Ocean. We also maintain our capabilities through regular training with the ROK Navy. The forces currently in this region are ours. Our ships are in Australia, and if something happens on the Korean Peninsula tomorrow night, we would arrive much faster than ships departing from San Diego.

How much do you trust China?

Naturally, my trust is higher in allies like Japan and South Korea than in China. However, that does not mean I distrust China. I believe China pursues its own interests, and those interests may differ from the interests of the region or other countries outside the region.

In addition to these questions, there were various other questions and answers regarding the role of the Sasebo Base. The commander emphasized that for a maritime nation like the United States, the Pacific is a crucial region for trade, and therefore, the US military's presence in the Pacific to secure trade routes and protect economic interests is one of their important duties. Finally, Ms. Ha Young-sun thanked the commander for answering questions that students might ask the US President today, concluding the Q&A session. The commander stated that as he is a military officer executing the missions set by policymakers, rather than a policymaker himself, he could not provide definitive answers to many questions. We took a commemorative photo and exchanged final greetings with the commander.

Most of the Sarangbang 5th cohort participated in the Q&A session, freely sharing their thoughts and questions. We spent about twenty minutes longer with the commander than scheduled. We were satisfied that we could ask more questions than we had anticipated, and we were grateful to the commander, who, despite appearing flustered and blushing at our challenging questions, did his best to answer. However, we briefly worried if we had pushed the commander too hard and if this might lead to the rejection of future Sarangbang visits. At the same time, we regretted not asking more practical questions that could have yielded more substantial insights. Nevertheless, we left the place with light hearts after an interesting meeting. Then, with brighter expressions, we took our final photos in Sasebo.

Conclusion

The meeting with the commander was a meaningful experience, offering a glimpse into East Asian security from the perspective of a military officer and practitioner. In particular, the commander's practical answer that daily duties have become more complex, regardless of whether China is a threat, was very refreshing. It made us reflect on how abstractly we perceive the world, approaching international politics only through texts, and whether we were viewing phenomena within the frameworks presented by terms like arms race and security dilemma. Furthermore, when the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines were revised, we, as students of international politics, reacted very sensitively and often made hasty political interpretations. However, the commander's response that such policy changes are not significantly felt in actual operations made us consider whether we tend to exaggerate reality while sitting at our desks. Learning that overly embellished armchair theories, rather than reality, can lead to mistrust between nations, we were reminded of the statement that it is very dangerous to consider concepts before reality. In this era of turmoil with China's military rise, America's Asian rebalance, Japan's militarization, and North Korea's continued nuclear threats, we hope that we, as students of international politics, will become "dreaming realists" who face reality while dreaming of a peaceful ocean, so that the Pacific can become a sea of peace rather than a sea of fire. ▒

Chapter

Ceramics: Traveling Civilizations Along the Maritime Route

_Arita Ceramic Village

Kim Yu-jeong

Master's candidate, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

Embarking on a Journey

In Arita, a small town in northern Kyushu, Japan, the year marks a special occasion. It is a monumental year that celebrates the 400th anniversary of the birth of Japanese porcelain and the founding of Arita ware, the first porcelain produced in Japan. The Saga Prefecture

has been preparing various projects and events since [Year] through an executive committee to commemorate this event and to create an attractive town for the next 100 and 200 years. This project, proceeding under the grand slogan of 'Industrial Revitalization, Tourism Revitalization, Traditional Culture Revitalization,' aims to foster pride in Japanese-made ceramics and, based on this, revitalize the local economy. 1 Arita Ware Founding 400th Anniversary Project Executive Committee. Heisei [Year] Project Basic Plan Executive Committee. Search on official website. 6. Porcelain: Traveling through civilizations along maritime routes: Arita's porcelain town. Ambitious, long-term vision is evident. On the second day, on the way from the Tōzan Shrine to the Sasebo Naval Base, the Arita town signpost and the advertisements celebrating the 400th anniversary of Arita ware, which were erected along the road, made us feel that we had finally arrived at the scene we had only seen in pictures.

Arita is a small city with a population of about 20,000, based on its porcelain industry. The Saga Prefecture tourism website introduces that the porcelain festival is held annually between April and May, attracting over 1 million tourists from all over Japan to the Arita porcelain market. Especially during the Arita Porcelain Market, over 100 stores line the approximately 4 km distance from Arita Station to Kami-Arita Station, bustling until sunset. Although the Love Room visited the town long after the festival ended and was quiet, I wonder what kind of atmosphere would be felt locally if the full-scale

400th anniversary commemorative events are held next year.

Fighting the 'Porcelain War' on the Periphery of Japan

The cultural assets we commonly refer to as Goryeo celadon or Joseon white porcelain are, strictly speaking, not porcelain but stoneware. Stoneware is made by shaping clay into a form, glazing it, and firing it at high temperatures to complete the ceramic. It is a unique human invention that, when fired at high temperatures above approximately 1200°C, transforms the brittle clay into a glass-like substance. The creation of kilns capable of withstanding incredibly high temperatures and the process of producing stoneware with beautiful shapes and colors can be considered the pinnacle of the most advanced scientific technology of the era. Before Japan began producing its own stoneware in the 17th century, the only regions in East Asia capable of producing stoneware were China, the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam, and Japan. Among these, China was the center of stoneware production, and the ability to produce stoneware in the Korean Peninsula and Vietnam was also due to the influx of technology from China. I became curious about how Japan became a new center for stoneware production. 6. Porcelain: Traveling through civilizations along maritime routes: Arita's porcelain town.

Tea and Tea Utensils: Fusion of Technology and Culture

China held a monopolistic position in porcelain exports until the 17th century, and even after that, although alternatives like Vietnamese or Japanese ceramics emerged, Chinese ceramics were still treated as the premier product in East Asia. This indicates that Chinese ceramics not only held aesthetic superiority but also possessed the status of technological standards at the time. To properly understand the meaning of standards, one must not only consider which technology was most advanced. Meeting standards means more than just adopting the technology itself; it implies the absorption of the culture and human elements embedded in the technology, as well as complex socio-economic changes that enable the consumption of products realized by that technology, leading to a form of assimilation mechanism towards the developers of the standards. In other words, it encompasses the entire spectrum of human life, including the evaluation and consumption systems that naturally assume that only products manufactured in accordance with standard technology possess the best quality, and the socio-cultural environment that abundantly enjoys such products. Therefore, being able to produce products similar to those made in China signifies possessing a considerable level of technological prowess and, by extension, being closer to the center of civilization at the time. The phenomenon where tea culture spreads widely in a region and the demand for tea utensils surges before the full-scale production of ceramics is a clear indication of the transmission of technology and the expansion of civilization. This phenomenon is observed not only in the Korean Peninsula and Japan but also in Europe, and it is noteworthy that active demand and consumption patterns for ceramics as tools for properly enjoying tea are found as tea culture spreads. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, it is estimated that independent stoneware production, beyond importing Chinese ceramics, began around the 10th century. One view suggests that this was because tea consumption was increasing, but due to political instability at the time, imports of Chinese ceramics were insufficient, creating an environment where Goryeo had to produce its own tea utensils. National History Compilation Committee. Among the types of Goryeo celadon, a large portion consists of forms reflecting tea culture rather than everyday tableware, indicating that tea culture played a significant role in the development of Goryeo celadon. National History Compilation Committee. In Japan, from the mid-16th century onwards, as tea ceremony became widely popular, the demand for tea utensils increased, which is believed to have provided the motivation for independent ceramic production. Kim Jae-gyu ( ) states that the demand for ceramics significantly increased as the samurai class began to enjoy tea ceremony in Japan, evaluating this as an act of 'packaging the samurai class's ambition with refined tea culture.' Kim Jae-gyu. Here, it can be seen that the cultural element of tea and the technological element of ceramics are closely integrated, providing a strong incentive to not merely import goods but to adopt the technology and become a producer.

Joseon Potters Become Midwives to the Birth of Japanese Porcelain

The process of technological transmission and adoption is accompanied by the establishment of cultural elements and human exchange. In particular, in traditional societies, ceramic production technology was a key technology for generating added value at the national level, thus having a high potential for strict protection. Furthermore, since it involved the skills of highly trained artisans, it was difficult to transmit and adopt effectively through mere manual transmission. While some ceramics were produced for practical purposes, many works possessed symbolic meaning or high artistic value. This suggests that ceramics have a nature that cannot be easily replicated. Therefore, human networks, where artisans directly migrate and settle to transmit their skills, must be considered one of the most crucial prerequisites for technological diffusion. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, the earliest independent stoneware, Goryeo celadon, was first produced by Chinese potters.

The fact that the kiln construction technology, materials, detailed structures, and the types and forms of ceramics produced in the 10th century Goryeo are identical to the techniques employed by artisans at the Yue ware kilns in the southern coastal region of Zhejiang Province, China, during the Five Dynasties period (907-960) clearly demonstrates the direct influence of Chinese potters on the Korean Peninsula. National History Compilation Committee. Of course, Goryeo potters became the main force of Goryeo pottery production thereafter, but it is noteworthy that in the initial stages of technological transmission and settlement, a method of direct transmission from those who had acquired the skills to others was adopted.

Unlike the Korean Peninsula, which possessed independent stoneware production technology relatively early, Japan relied on ceramics produced in China and the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, as observed earlier, the period when tea culture spurred significant demand for tea utensils was about a century later in Japan compared to the Korean Peninsula. While there could be various reasons for such differences in international technological diffusion, it can be pointed out that Japan, located on the periphery of East Asian civilization and having the unique geographical characteristic of being an island nation, inevitably experienced slower diffusion of culture, civilization, and human networks. In particular, it would have been quite difficult for highly skilled individuals possessing ceramic production technology to voluntarily migrate and settle in peripheral Japan. In this context, the Imjin War, which broke out in 1592, served as an 'opportunity window' that enabled forced human migration.

The assertion that the Imjin War was a 'porcelain war' is based on the fact that a significant number of Joseon people were abducted during the war and brought to Japan, and a considerable number of them were potters. Choi Young-soo. While there is debate in both academic circles regarding the purpose of the Japanese invasion of Joseon at the time, Min Deok-ki states that it is a fact that a large number of Joseon potters were abducted and settled in large numbers in the northern Kyushu region of Saga. Noh Seong-hwan. Among them, a figure named Yi Sam-pyeong (李參平) is revered as the 'ancestor of pottery' (dojo) for Japanese Arita ware, and a monument and shrine dedicated to him exist, indicating his significant presence in Japan. When Yi Sam-pyeong developed a white porcelain quarry and began producing porcelain, potters began to gather, and Arita became a famous porcelain town in Japan. The Arita Town History Compilation Committee summarizes him as follows:

Our ancestor of pottery, Yi Cham-pyeong, was from Geumgang, Chungcheong Province, Joseon.

He provided considerable assistance to Nabeshima during Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion.

In the first year of Keichō, the Shogunate, Nabeshima Naoshige, improved upon this,

and upon returning to his domain, he naturalized him and entrusted him to his chief retainer, Takū Yasunori.

Because he was from Geumgang, he was made to use the surname Kanegae.

Initially, he lived in Takū, Ogi Province, and began the work of the Japanese system that he had learned and mastered,

but he could not obtain high-quality raw materials.

Therefore, during the Genwa era (1615-1624), the Matsuura clan, in Arita town,

came to Midarebashi and engaged in pottery, finally discovering kaolin at Izumiyama.

After that, he moved to Sukagawa and was the first to produce white porcelain.

This is truly the beginning of porcelain manufacturing in Japan. Since then,

the manufacturing method has been continuously passed down, leading to today's prosperity.

Considering this, Mr. Lee is not only the ancestor of pottery in our Arita,

but also a great benefactor to the Japanese pottery industry. Therefore, anyone engaged in the pottery business who has benefited from his grace

cannot help but respect the achievements left by Mr. Lee. Arita Town History Compilation Committee. Noh Seong-hwan,

Reprinted for use

The purpose of this visit was to experience the spirit of Arita and Imari porcelain, so we first visited the Saga Prefectural Kyushu Ceramic Museum (佐賀県立九州陶磁文化館) to get a taste of Japanese porcelain, and then planned to visit Yi Sam-pyeong's tombstone and the Tōzan Shrine (陶山神社) dedicated to him. After that, we planned a somewhat tight schedule that included visiting the pottery streets of Imari and Ōkawachiyama (伊万里大川内山), which, along with Arita, are centers of Japanese porcelain production. Unfortunately, due to taking the wrong turn, I could only see the tip of the tombstone rising among the trees from afar, without being able to see it directly. However, I was able to thoroughly explore the Tōzan Shrine, which enshrines him. As it is a shrine dedicated to Japan's greatest potter, there were ceramic fragments reminiscent of blue and white porcelain everywhere, and the gate pillars at the entrance of the shrine, unlike those of other shrines, were also reminiscent of ceramics. According to the Arita Tourism Association's guidebook 'Arita Style,' the Tōzan Shrine was built around the year [Year], and the gate pillars are a national treasure made of white porcelain. The pillars within the precincts are made of ceramics donated by potters, and amulets (omamori, お守り) made of Arita porcelain are sold. Arita Tourism Association

The Tōzan Shrine, dedicated to pottery, for pottery, and by pottery, was more impressive than any other shrine in Japan.

Although human exchange through war takes a violent form, it is highly effective in directly transmitting technological and cultural elements in a short period. Japan's provocation, which occurred on the periphery of the traditional East Asian world order, can be interpreted as a challenge to the existing East Asian order and an attempt to alter the status quo. While there is room for debate on whether Yi Samsaeng and Toyotomi Hideyoshi directly intended this and initiated the war, it is clear that the Imjin War began to create cracks in the East Asian order, which was nearing the end of its stable period. In particular, on the Chinese continent, it triggered a political upheaval during the Ming-Qing transition, creating conditions that made it difficult to maintain the existing Han-centered world order. Of course, the Imjin War alone cannot explain all subsequent historical changes. However, the fact that the subsequent changes are connected to the context of fundamental changes in the East Asian order, beyond a mere change in the traditional world order, makes the geopolitical shifts of the 17th century noteworthy. The rise of Japanese porcelain can be considered a key indicator of this change.

Arita: A Hub of the Porcelain Network Connecting Civilizations

Japan's porcelain industry grew through the 17th and 18th centuries, based on Joseon potters as a crucial human element in technological diffusion, and eventually captivated Europe. The foundation was laid for Japan's rapidly growing ceramic industry to be exported to Europe. At the Saga Prefectural Kyushu Ceramic Museum, the Kanbara (蒲原) Collection, which particularly caught our attention, is a special exhibition corner showcasing Ko-Imari (古伊万里) porcelain, which was exported to Europe from the port of Imari during the Edo period. This is also one of the museum's representative collections, and its vibrant red color seemed to awaken dormant aesthetic cells. Although we did not have enough time to fully appreciate it, for a brief moment, we were captivated by the unique charm of Arita and Imari porcelain, which differs from the Goryeo celadon and Joseon white porcelain that we are always familiar with when we think of ceramics.

Falling for the Red Charm

The core question of this visit was how Japan, a barren land for porcelain production, came to produce world-renowned ceramics, gain a foothold in the global ceramic market, and eventually play a role in partially replacing Chinese ceramics. Before the visit, I researched related literature and looked at Arita and Imari porcelain online, pondering various thoughts. However, upon actually seeing the Arita and Imari ceramics at the site, I intuitively felt that their inherent charm played a significant role. I was completely captivated by the red allure of Arita and Imari porcelain, to the extent that I could clearly distinguish it from other ceramics at subsequent locations during the trip.

In the global ceramic market of the 17th century, the most highly regarded ceramics were Chinese blue and white porcelain. Compiled by Hwang Jong-rye and Yoo Seong-woong.

Comparing the blue and white porcelain from the Dejima exhibition hall that I saw previously with the Arita and Imari ceramics of the same period, we can see that they exude distinctly different charms. In fact, the vivid red hues found in Arita and Imari ceramics are rarely found in other types of ceramics. This is closely related to the chemical reactions that occur within the high-temperature kilns where porcelain is made. In the case of blue hues, cobalt pigment was primarily used. This pigment was produced only in limited regions of West Asia, making it expensive to import. Therefore, it was exclusively used for ceramics consumed by royalty and a small elite. Although difficult to obtain and expensive, cobalt pigment does not evaporate at high temperatures of 1200°C, making it easy to achieve colors in hard-fired porcelain. On the other hand, red pigments, which are brighter and more vivid than the reddish-brown iron oxide pigments, were not only difficult to produce but also required a more delicate process as they did not last as long at high temperatures compared to blue. Cho Yong-jun.

6. Porcelain: Traveling through civilizations along maritime routes: Arita's porcelain town

Of course, various factors such as prejudices about color and socio-cultural symbolism influenced this, but it is clear that there had never been a product with such a red charm as Arita and Imari porcelain that emerged in the global ceramic market at that time. At that time, porcelain was not a daily necessity but served as a luxury item or a positional good to flaunt one's wealth. In this context, it is conceivable that European elites sought to enhance the relative value of their collections by collecting and actively consuming this new form of porcelain. Furthermore, considering the art movements and styles prevalent in Europe at the time, which featured much more vibrant and diverse colors compared to those popular in the East, the red charm of Arita and Imari porcelain may have stimulated the aesthetic sensibilities of Europeans.

Imagining New Opportunities Amidst Upheaval

The year was quite significant in terms of the transformation of the East Asian order. The Later Jin changed its name to Qing and Emperor Hong Taiji (the second Khan of Later Jin and Emperor of Qing, reigned 1626-1643) invaded Joseon, triggering the Second Manchu Invasion of Joseon. In Japan, Dejima Island, which served as a channel for trade and communication with the Netherlands, was constructed. Amidst the full-blown Ming-Qing transition, the Korean Peninsula was once again engulfed in war. Under the Shogunate, Japan found a period of relative stability and encountered the West as a new partner. On the continent, full-scale wars and historical conflicts were unfolding. 6. Ceramics, Traveling Through Civilizations Along Maritime Routes: Arita Ceramic Village While Japan was relatively distant from the center of civilization, both physically and culturally, it appears to have been able to undertake a 'new civilization experiment' based on the stability of its domestic politics, which were reorganized after the Imjin War. In particular, by creating a limited but irreversible communication channel and space called Dejima, Japan began to systematically observe and gradually attempt to adopt Western civilization with curiosity. The unique structure of the buildings on Dejima, where the Dutch could not see across, but the Japanese on the opposite side could observe them, offers a faint glimpse into these experimental endeavors. Ultimately, at the crossroads of war and stability, conditions were created for Japan to be incorporated into a 'global ceramic network' that allowed for active ceramic exports.

The widespread export of Japanese porcelain to Southeast Asia and Europe cannot be solely attributed to the superiority of Japanese porcelain technology or design over any other existing ceramics at the time. It must be examined within the context of more complex international political and economic situations. Porcelain was a highly expensive commodity in Europe, and along with silk, it had been a product with consistent demand, particularly among European royalty, for a long time.

In 17th-century Europe, white porcelain from the East was treated as a precious commodity, even called 'white gold.' Cho Yong-jun. However, around the 17th century, due to China's maritime ban policy and the Ming-Qing transition, which led to turmoil, Jingdezhen, the core porcelain production center, was paralyzed, and Chinese porcelain could not be supplied adequately. This created a demand for alternatives.

In other words, even if it was not produced in China, Japanese ceramics that were similar were supplied to meet the excess demand. Furthermore, the active acceptance of orders from Europeans, particularly the Dutch, created favorable conditions for the widespread consumption of Japanese-made ceramics. While [Source] points out that Japan produced ceramics in the Chinese style to cater to the tastes of Europeans, especially the Dutch, a closer examination of the ceramics from that period suggests that it was not merely a copy of Chinese styles. Rather, the introduction of new Japanese-style ceramics during this process enabled Japanese porcelain to function as an excellent alternative to Chinese porcelain.

In addition to the inherent appeal of the product itself, Japanese ceramics were ideally positioned to be distributed to Europe via the most active global trade network at the time, facilitated by the Dutch East India Company. Ceramics transported from Imari Port to Nagasaki were exported to Europe via Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Cape of Good Hope. It is reported that Japanese porcelain first arrived in the Netherlands between the years [Year] and [Year]. As can be seen from the map displayed at the Saga Prefectural Kyushu Ceramic Museum, Japan served as the easternmost point of the trade network, creating conditions for exporting new cultural products. This is considered the most significant factor that allowed Japanese porcelain to gain greater recognition and popularity in the global market compared to existing ceramics, particularly Korean ceramics. If Japan had not been included as a member of the trade network extending to Europe, like Joseon, another porcelain-producing country, the ceramics produced in Japan might have been consumed only within the country by royalty or high-ranking officials, or traded only within Northeast Asia due to geographical proximity.

Japanese ceramics are said to have first arrived in the Netherlands between 1647 and 1651. As can be seen from the map below, exhibited at the Saga Prefectural Museum of Kyushu Ceramic Culture, Japan served as the easternmost point of the trade network, creating conditions for exporting new cultural products. This appears to be the most significant factor that allowed Japanese ceramics to gain greater recognition and popularity in the global market compared to existing ceramics, particularly those from the Korean Peninsula. If Japan had not been included as a source within the trade network extending to Europe, similar to Joseon, another major producer of ceramics, then the ceramics produced in Japan might have been consumed only within the domestic royal court or among the high-ranking elite, or their trade might have been limited to the geographically proximate Northeast Asian region.

Japan as a Leader or Mediator of Civilization

In the 17th century, when European kilns began to compete, the influence of China and Japan was absolute, but a century later, Europe's ceramic industry had developed to surpass that of its origin, China. By Kim Jae-gyu.

European ceramics, which began with imitation, came to secure their own value and became the new standard. According to Kim Jae-gyu, the European ceramic industry was able to grow rapidly by quickly acquiring the glazing techniques of the East, building upon the color-making techniques of its existing stained glass and enamel crafts. European ceramics, starting with Meissen in Germany, were later branded across Europe and even re-exported to China, the origin of ceramics. In particular, Delft Blue, created by the Netherlands, which connected East and West in the global ceramic network, is still loved by many today. Jo Yong-jun suggests that similar to how Chinese ceramic production spread to the Korean Peninsula and Japan, the rapid growth of European ceramic production, which began with imitation, was driven not only by technological conditions but also by strong economic and cultural desires for independent ceramic production, allowing it to surpass its origin.

As such, we can observe a shift in the center of civilization in the ceramic industry from China to Japan and then to Europe, beginning in the 17th century. This is closely related to changes in the world order or international political order. The changes observed from the 17th to the 19th centuries, and into the 20th century, are closely related to the shift in the center of the world order, much like the production of cutting-edge ceramics moved from China to Japan and then to Europe. From the 16th century onwards, as European powers began to expand into new spaces, including East Asia, through maritime routes, from the Age of Discovery to colonial rule, a new concept of the world was formed. In this new world, Western powers, armed with military and economic strength, became the new center, and in East Asia, the Western modern international political order was superimposed on the existing world order, leading to a reorganization of the order. 6. Ceramics, Traveling Civilization Along Maritime Routes: Arita Ceramic Village

In this process, Japan, on the periphery, made efforts to emerge as a new center in East Asia, but its success was only partial. Japan adopted the Western modern state model early on through the Meiji Restoration and gained an advantage in the modern nation-state game by developing military and economic power, the standards of power set by Western nations. Furthermore, in the East Asian space, it used Joseon as a stepping stone to expand into China and the Eurasian continent, aiming to form a new order called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, due to its defeat in the Pacific War and World War II, Japan's plan for an East Asian order ultimately failed to materialize.

However, what is very interesting is that Japan, which was on the periphery, repeatedly made significant progress in areas where it took new initiatives, only to face decisive defeat at the critical moment. It is as if Japan was on the verge of becoming the center of the ceramic network but ultimately ceded that position to Europe.

In the construction of the East Asian order in the 17th and early 20th centuries, Japan could have played a leading role, but due to its defeat in the war, it was forced to accept the regional projection of the Cold War order, divided between the United States and the Soviet Union. While this overlap can be interpreted as ceramics, the pinnacle of cutting-edge technology at the time, serving as a leading indicator of the international political and economic order, it also raises the question of why Japan, despite its persistent challenges and dreams, could not become the center and was ultimately defeated. In other words, it prompts us to question Japan's position in the long historical flow of the East Asian regional order: is Japan a leader of civilization, or merely a transitional mediator acting as a bridge during the transition of civilization? 6. Ceramics, Traveling Civilization Along Maritime Routes: Arita Ceramic Village

The most regrettable aspect of this visit to the Arita Imari Ceramic Village was that most of the shops and galleries were closed after 5 PM. To see them properly, one would need to visit earlier and allow more time for a leisurely exploration. For example, upon arriving at Imari Okawachiyama Ceramic Street after 6 PM, all the shops had already closed, leaving only the serene atmosphere of the village. While it was somewhat disappointing to wander through the empty streets, it also allowed me to fully and freely experience the essence of Imari. This experience led me to reflect further on the questions I had posed earlier. How did the shift in the standard of civilization, which began in this serene village, fail to remain here and instead move across the sea to Europe, and then across the vast ocean to America? Will it eventually return to Asia? The puzzle pieces that I need to continue to uncover began to emerge. With these thoughts about the tasks ahead, I left, promising to return earlier next time to explore various workshops, carrying with me the village's maps and landscapes, all crafted from ceramics, filling my heart. ▒ 6. Ceramics, Traveling Civilization Along Maritime Routes: Arita Ceramic Village References National History Compilation Committee. . The Clay of the Korean Peninsula, Born as Ceramics. Seoul:

Gyeongin Munhwasa.

Kim Jae-gyu. . Tempting European Ceramics. Paju: Hangilsart.

Noh Sung-hwan. . 'A Study on Joseon Potters in Saga Prefecture, Japan.'

Journal of Japanese Language and Literature, .

. 2014. 'A Study on Joseon Potter Lee Cham-pyeong in Arita, Japan.'

Journal of Japanese Language and Literature,

Lee In-seong. . War and Peace in East Asia: Korean Peninsula in the Traditional East Asian

2000 Years. Paju: Doso Chulpan Hangilsa.

National History Teachers' Association. . The First History of Japan: The Trio of Emperor, Warrior, and Merchant, Japan. Seoul: Humanist.

The Trio of Emperor, Warrior, and Merchant, Japan. Seoul: Humanist.

Jo Yong-jun. . European Ceramic Journey: Northern Europe Edition. Seoul: Doso Chulpan Dodo. Choi Young-soo. . The Tears of Joseon Potters in 1700: The Imjin War was a Ceramic War. Seoul: People.

War. Seoul: People.

Saga Prefecture Tourism Website ( ) Arita Tourism Association ( )

Japan Ceramic Birth - Arita Founding Anniversary Project Official Website (Accessed: 2015.06.10.)

Arita Tourism Association. Arita Town Tourist Guide Map: Arita Starts. Special Feature: Ceramics - Issue

Chapter

Meeting Li Hongzhang in Shimonoseki

_Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall

Im Seong-woo

Graduate School of Tsinghua University

Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 The day he arrived in Shimonoseki 馬關

On the third day of our journey to Shimonoseki, we visited the Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall. The intense atmosphere of the first day reached its peak on the second day and continued into the third. The Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall is located overlooking the sea of Shimonoseki and is a very small facility. Before visiting the Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall, I thought about Li Hongzhang's dreams, life, and knowledge, and pondered what thoughts he had when the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed in 1895. The presentation at the Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall proceeded as follows. First, a brief explanation of the Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall was given, followed by Huang Eun-ji's presentation on the lives, dreams, and knowledge of Mutsu and Ito, and my presentation on the history of the Sino-Japanese War and the inevitability of China's defeat.

On the way to the Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall, I looked out at the sea and wondered what Li Hongzhang was thinking in Shimonoseki. He must have looked out at the distant homeland with the burden of saving his war-torn country, accompanied by his son, Li Jingfang. Perhaps Li Hongzhang, gazing at the sea, pondered why Qing, which was once considered a barbarian, was so helplessly defeated by Japan. It is likely that Li Hongzhang, more than anyone else, keenly felt the reality that China, which had led the world order, had been shamelessly defeated by Japan and lost its suzerainty over Joseon, and could no longer be treated as a great power. Therefore, the core of the visit to the Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall can be said to be entering Li Hongzhang's mind.

The Course of the Sino-Japanese War

The Sino-Japanese War began with the Battle of Pungdo, where the Japanese navy attacked the Chinese transport ship Gaosheng without a declaration of war. Following the outbreak of the Battle of Pungdo, the Japanese army advanced relentlessly towards Pyongyang after the Battle of Seonghwan. Liang Qichao, who wrote 'The Biography of Li Hongzhang,' evaluated that Japan's momentum had already waned before the Battle of Pyongyang, and if Li Hongzhang had taken the initiative to attack, there would have been a good chance of victory. However, Li Hongzhang instructed his troops to respond only if the Japanese army initiated an attack, and while China hesitated, Japan reorganized its forces, attacked Pyongyang, and defeated the Qing army.

In the Battle of the Yellow Sea, which turned the tide of the Sino-Japanese War in favor of Japan, Li Hongzhang, recognizing the superiority of Western weaponry, was defeated by the Japanese army even with his Beiyang Fleet, which was organized accordingly. Li Hongzhang, through the Self-Strengthening Movement, recognized that Western countries held a superior position due to their advanced weaponry and imported weapons in large quantities. He also made efforts to train the military by adopting Western-style training systems. However, Li Hongzhang focused only on quantity and neglected quality. While the quantity of superior weapons increased, familiarity with them was insufficient. Furthermore, the lack of a comprehensive leader to command the newly organized forces, coupled with the foolishness and incompetence of the existing leaders, made it difficult for the Qing army to resist the Japanese army. The defeat of the Qing army in the Battle of the Yellow Sea, with the sinking of four ships including the Zhiyuan and the Jingyuan, and the loss of over 1,500 soldiers, effectively ceded the initiative to the Japanese army. 梁启超

After winning the Battle of the Yellow Sea, the Japanese army invaded mainland China and captured Lushun. In Lushun, the Japanese army indiscriminately massacred Qing civilians, regardless of gender or age. The Japanese side claims that the Japanese army did not carry out the massacre and that the majority of the victims in Lushun were Qing soldiers in civilian clothes who attacked the Japanese army from civilian areas, and that the Japanese army retaliated accordingly. However, Qi Qizhang, a leading Chinese scholar of the Sino-Japanese War, states that the most important aspect of the Lushun massacre is who was targeted by the Japanese army and how many were sacrificed. While Japan claims it was an accidental killing because they could not distinguish between Qing soldiers in civilian clothes and civilians, he refutes this, citing a Japanese account that states that in every household, two or three out of ten bodies were infants and the elderly, and that a white-haired couple lay dead together. He argues that the claim of accidental killing of civilians is untenable. Furthermore, he argues that the number of victims was downplayed, stating that the Japanese figure of 20,000 is incorrect and that the actual number of victims in Lushun reached 60,000. Qi Qizhang's analysis of the Lushun massacre suggests that the Japanese army acted in direct opposition to Mutsu's peace diplomacy. 戚其章 Chinese scholar and Japanese historian Zong Zeya criticizes the massacre of innocent civilians as an inexcusable immoral act. However, Zong Zeya traces the origin of the Japanese Lushun massacre to the invasion of the Yellow River civilization by ethnic minorities, arguing that the Lushun massacre is similar to the warfare culture of the Manchu people. According to Qing historical perspective, those who lose a war are killed by the victor, and this logic holds true in warfare. The Lushun massacre is akin to the Manchu people's subjugation of the Han Chinese and their rule over the world, and it can be said to be a tragedy of history that reveals the ambition of both China and Japan. 宗泽亚

Regardless, after the Lushun massacre, Japan captured the Weihaiwei fortress on the Shandong Peninsula, and the two countries entered into negotiations for the Treaty of Shimonoseki. During the treaty negotiations, Japan attacked and quickly captured the Penghu Islands in Taiwan to force China to comply with its demands, threatening Qing. However, after a Japanese youth attacked Li Hongzhang, Japan faced international criticism and eventually negotiated with Qing under a revised treaty, signing the treaty in April 1895.

Meeting Li Hongzhang in Shimonoseki: Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall

The Defeat in the Sino-Japanese War Dealt a Severe Blow to Li Hongzhang

The defeat in the Sino-Japanese War was a severe blow to Li Hongzhang. He had confidently stated to the Emperor that the army had been trained for decades, and with newly purchased modern weapons, it was prepared to confront the enemy, even if the budget was insufficient and not all of his plans could be realized. He expressed great confidence. Having introduced Western weapons and conducted training in the manner of Western countries, it was natural for Li Hongzhang to believe that he could now prevent foreign invasions. However, the Beiyang Fleet, which Li Hongzhang had relied on, was utterly defeated by Japan. Li Hongzhang's dream of enriching the country and strengthening the military, and his reputation gained through the Self-Strengthening Movement, vanished in an instant.

Li Hongzhang personally traveled to Shimonoseki to negotiate a ceasefire with Japan.

In March 1895, Li Hongzhang of China and Ito Hirobumi of Japan began their first round of talks. Li Hongzhang requested to conclude a peace treaty and a peace treaty simultaneously, but Ito cited the lack of the Emperor's personal seal on the credentials brought by Li Hongzhang as a reason why the conditions for negotiation were not met. Li Hongzhang responded in dismay, 'If my country, Qing, had not prepared diligently, it would not have sent me here, and if I had not focused on peace negotiations, I would not be here.' 戚其章 Ito approached the talks with the confidence of a victorious nation, while Li Hongzhang, as the representative of a defeated nation, bowed his head and made continuous efforts to accommodate Japan's position, displaying a scene rarely seen in the world order from the first round of talks.

Through the first and second rounds of talks, Japan began to pressure Li Hongzhang by demanding that China cede the Liaodong Peninsula, pay for Japanese troops stationed in China, and cede Taiwan. Li Hongzhang pleaded that these demands were harsh, but Japan remained unyielding. When Li Hongzhang could not give a definitive answer, Japan attacked the Penghu Islands, repeatedly defeated the Qing navy, and established an administrative office in Penghu to manage the islands. 戚其章

However, an unexpected variable emerged: a Japanese youth shot Li Hongzhang while he was briefly visiting a general store. Upon learning of this incident, Ito and Mutsu Munemitsu proposed a ceasefire to Li Hongzhang, and an armistice agreement was signed on April 1, followed by the third round of talks on April 8. Japan presented a draft treaty that included the following terms: China's recognition of Korea's clear independence; cession of the southern part of Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan, and its affiliated islands to Japan; payment of 200 million taels of silver by China to Japan as reparations and for the cost of stationing Japanese troops; opening of additional ports such as Shashi, Chongqing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou, in addition to the existing ones. However, it was soon realized that both Li Hongzhang's arguments and the Qing government's claims were very stubborn. From Japan's perspective, prolonging the peace talks was not beneficial. Ito and Mutsu found Li Hongzhang's son, the acting envoy Li Jingfang, and threatened him, saying, 'The current Chinese envoys must recognize that Japan is the victor and China is the vanquished.' In the third round of talks, they demanded a definitive answer on whether to accept the revised treaty with reparations increased to 200 million taels. Li Hongzhang requested a reconsideration of the treaty draft through the fourth round of talks, but failed. Under Japan's continuous pressure, Li Hongzhang eventually yielded, and on April 17, China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which is more commonly known to us as the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Treaty of Shimonoseki included the following provisions: Korea is a clearly independent state.

China ceded the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan, and the islands affiliated with Taiwan.

China paid 200 million taels to Japan as reparations and for the cost of stationing Japanese troops.

This payment was to be completed in installments over time.

Japanese nationals were granted the right to trade in Chinese treaty ports.

Shashi, Chongqing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou were opened. 戚其章

While negotiating the Treaty of Shimonoseki, what was Li Hongzhang thinking? As a representative of a defeated nation, he must have been going through a very difficult time. Meeting Li Hongzhang in Shimonoseki. The text is from the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall. In the meeting, Li Hongzhang stated that Japan and China are major powers emerging in Asia and share similar cultures and social structures. Therefore, he argued that a confrontational relationship involving constant struggle would not be beneficial for the relationship between the two countries, speaking to Ito in a tone that seemed to beg for leniency. Ito mentioned his experiences in China, saying he had heard much about reforms but that no changes had been made. Li Hongzhang explained the Qing dynasty's situation, citing its large population and numerous administrative districts, which made reforms a time-consuming process. He also spoke about the lessons learned from the war, stating that he had come to understand European land and naval warfare and expressing gratitude to Japan for awakening China. Zong Zeyya

According to Liang Qichao, when Li Hongzhang visited Europe, he disregarded the warnings that one should not ask about age and wealth, which Europeans were reluctant to answer. He also noted that Li Hongzhang always had an arrogant demeanor when dealing with people. In short, he had immense self-confidence and a biased view of Westerners. Liang Qichao,

However, looking at his attitude towards Ito, one wonders if this was truly Li Hongzhang's character. For Li Hongzhang, who possessed strong self-confidence, the Shimonoseki negotiations must have been extremely difficult and painful.

From before the First Sino-Japanese War until the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and even after, Li Hongzhang must have been a very lonely man. During the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, he participated in the negotiations alone, with an injured body. Japan urged him to sign the treaty quickly, and the Qing court, unable to consider the disadvantaged position of China, instead blamed Li Hongzhang. Furthermore, his son, Li Jingfang, despite being a high-ranking official, possessed inferior abilities compared to Li Hongzhang and showed a weak demeanor, fearing Ito and Mutsu's threats. Thus, the overall crisis made Li Hongzhang's situation extremely difficult. He alone harbored the dream of a rich and strong nation, but the era did not support his dream, and it was thwarted by Japan, remaining unfulfilled until the year of Li Hongzhang's death. Instead, the dream and hope for a rich and strong China gradually faded. The division of the Qing dynasty into the Emperor's Party (帝黨) and the Empress's Party (后黨) led to the failure of the Hundred Days' Reform after the First Sino-Japanese War, and the Boxer Rebellion and the Xinhai Revolution, occurring in 1900 and 1911 respectively, brought an end to the Qing dynasty. Meeting Li Hongzhang in Shimonoseki. Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall.

Li Hongzhang's Mistakes

While leading the Self-Strengthening Movement, Li Hongzhang established foreign language educational institutions in Shanghai, sent officials to study in the United States and Japan, and notably dispatched naval officers to Germany to understand German weaponry and tactics. He purchased ironclad warships and opened a naval school in Tianjin, striving to develop China. While his efforts cannot be denied, Li Hongzhang also bore a significant responsibility for the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. What mistakes did Li Hongzhang actually make?

Firstly, from a diplomatic perspective, Li Hongzhang tended to rely excessively on foreign powers whenever a problem arose. This behavior contributed to China becoming a stage for the power struggles among the great powers. Through the Triple Intervention, China, which had restrained Japan, was to receive the Liaodong Peninsula. However, unlike Russia and France, Germany received no benefits after the Triple Intervention and consequently occupied Jiaozhou Bay. Jiaozhou was originally within Russia's sphere of influence according to the Sino-Russian Secret Treaty. However, when Germany occupied it, China signed another treaty with Russia and ceded Lushun and Dalian. In response to these moves by the great powers, Britain also demanded Weihaiwei from China under the pretext of maintaining a balance of power. Meeting Li Hongzhang in Shimonoseki. Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall.

Furthermore, when problems arose regarding loan issues, France, which offered assistance, leased Guangzhou Bay for 99 years, prompting Britain to respond by leasing the Kowloon Peninsula for 99 years. When Li Hongzhang agreed to lease the Kowloon Peninsula, he stipulated that no fortifications could be built on the mountain. The British envoy argued that Hong Kong was endangered because China had leased Guangzhou Bay to France and stated that Britain would only withdraw if the treaty with France was nullified. It is said that Li Hongzhang remained silent. This illustrates how weak China was and its inability to counter the great powers. Liang Qichao criticized Li Hongzhang's diplomacy of relying on foreign powers, pointing out that only by becoming self-reliant could one strengthen one's own power to suppress others. Through Liang Qichao's insights, we should consider how to build strength. Liang Qichao

There were also issues on the military front. Firstly, Liang Qichao pointed out that the leadership was extremely incompetent and foolish. Although the Western military training system was introduced, effective training cannot be achieved without leaders who can properly guide it. Due to the lack of suitable leaders for the training system, Li Hongzhang's army became a mere mob. The weakening of military strength due to the absence of leadership ultimately became a cause for China's defeat by the Japanese army.

Next is the issue of weaponry, mentioned earlier. The quantity of weapons increased, but without proficiency in using them, the weapons were useless, no matter how excellent their performance. Liang Qichao criticized that the guns were already broken, the bullets were fake, and the navy did not understand how to use speedboats and cannons. Liang Qichao

Thirdly, regarding military morale (軍氣), according to Zong Zeyya's argument, Japan introduced the concept of the nation-state, with the Emperor as the spiritual pillar, fostering the idea that national interests were one's own interests. Based on this, they unified the people and organized an Emperor's army where the military and the nation were integrated. Zong Zeyya Conversely, the Qing military prioritized the interests of their own families to maintain their power and status, considering national interests secondary. Even at the time when the Beiyang Fleet's operations were decided, the Qing military prioritized protecting their own self-organized private armies (自家軍), which served their families, and thus could not engage in a decisive battle. Zong Zeyya Because the Qing military prioritized individual interests, they could not break the morale of the Japanese army, which was united under the spiritual pillar of the Emperor. Lastly, as mentioned earlier, the failure to launch a preemptive strike during the Battle of Pyongyang, despite Japan being in a weakened state, indicates a failure to seize the timing of the attack, which can also be considered a cause for the Qing army's defeat. Meeting Li Hongzhang in Shimonoseki. Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall.

The First Sino-Japanese War and Lessons from History

The Beiyang Fleet and the Beiyang Navy, responsible for the First Sino-Japanese War, were both forces organized by Li Hongzhang during the Self-Strengthening Movement, and the Treaty of Shimonoseki was also signed by Li Hongzhang. Li Hongzhang was thus a high-ranking official with significant influence in diplomacy and domestic politics. However, his mistakes, combined with the international and domestic situations, ultimately led to the downfall of the Qing dynasty, and I believe the decline of the Qing is inseparable from the decline of Li Hongzhang.

In a way, losing hegemony in East Asia must have been a very shocking event for China, which had enjoyed a glorious status for a long time. Although they did not show signs of reflection immediately after the Sino-Japanese War, China has contemplated what went wrong by understanding and reflecting on its history from the 1980s to the present. As a result, China has drawn lessons from history through the collection and systematization of historical materials in historical analysis and the evaluation of figures from that era. Furthermore, it has made considerable efforts to build a more developed China based on this.

China is no longer the weak nation that bowed before Ito and Mutsu in Shimonoseki in 1895 and begged for peace. It now exerts immense influence on the global economy and is challenging the United States through

In addition to the economic sphere, China's cultural and military endeavors, as well as the overseas visits of its leadership, including President Xi Jinping, are receiving global attention. In the current situation, the image of Qing China, which was treated as a weak nation and scorned by the great powers just 120 years ago, is nowhere to be seen. However, China remembers the bitterness of losing its hegemony through the defeat in the Opium Wars in 1840 and the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. There is a Chinese idiom, "Yong Xin Liang Gu" (用心良苦), which means to go to great lengths. Perhaps China had to overcome many pains and wounds to regain its current position, a position it held just 120 years ago. Research on the First Sino-Japanese War is an essential process to avoid repeating such pains. China will strive to maintain its position, having endured so much hardship. It will continue to be a place where "Yong Xin Liang Gu" is practiced.

What about Korea? Is Korea making efforts comparable to China's in overcoming its painful history? While observing the research trends on the First Sino-Japanese War, I wondered if Korea is truly preparing to move forward by learning from history. In fact, when we research the First Sino-Japanese War, we often connect it to the Donghak Peasant Revolution. Instead of viewing the First Sino-Japanese War objectively, politically, and historically, we merely connect it to historical events in Korea. The text on Li Hongzhang's biography is translated and published by Prism. The biography of Li Hongzhang by Park Hee-seong is complete. Examining Li Hongzhang's struggles, his dreams, and the process of their downfall will be of great help in considering how we will write the future history. Meeting Li Hongzhang in Shimonoseki. Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall.

Upon searching the library, I found that only the original texts were available, and no translations existed. I felt that "The Complete Works of Li Wen Zhong Gong" would be a valuable resource for understanding Li Hongzhang's psychology in more detail, but unfortunately, the figure of Li Hongzhang seems to receive less attention in Korean academia. I believe there are no unimportant figures in history; every figure has a message to convey to posterity, which can be of great help to us. I want to believe that the reason for learning history is simply a matter of respect for those who came before us.

It was drizzling on the day we arrived in Shimonoseki. Despite the rain, the participants of the salon listened attentively to our presentations. Inside the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall, there was a calligraphy by Li Hongzhang titled "Hai Yue Yan Wu" (海岳煙霧). Although I searched extensively, I could not determine its exact meaning, but a literal translation would be "mist and fog over the sea and mountains." Perhaps Li Hongzhang wanted to express the reality and future of Qing China with these four characters. At that time, the future of Qing was bleak and uncertain, like a foggy day. He might have believed that if this fog could be cleared, Qing could develop and become a strong nation. Therefore, he strived to clear that fog, but the fog only thickened due to the First Sino-Japanese War, and China had to endure many hardships afterward. However, today, China is a nation that has cleared that fog and is progressing towards a brighter future. Studying in detail how this transformation occurred and considering what efforts are truly being made to clear the fog is a task given to us. ■

Meeting Li Hongzhang in Shimonoseki. Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall. References: Liang Qichao, "Biography of Li Hongzhang," translated by Park Hee-seong and Moon Se-na, Seoul: Prism. General Administration of Customs, "Complete Collection of Sino-Foreign Old Treaties" Compilation Committee, Complete Collection of Sino-Foreign Old Treaties (Vol. 2), Beijing: Beijing Customs Press.

Liang Qichao, "Biography of Li Hongzhang," translated by Wu Manlan Jiang, Beijing: Shaanxi Normal University Press.

Qi Qizhang, "History of the First Sino-Japanese War." Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House. Zong Zeyya, "The Sino-Japanese War." Beijing: Beijing United Publishing Company.

Jang

Mutsu Munemitsu: The Myth and Reality of Diplomacy

Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall

Hwang Eun-ji

Yonsei University

Introduction

Mutsu Munemitsu (陸奧宗光): What was the era he lived in, and what were his dreams? And as a Korean, how should I evaluate him? This was the question that occupied my mind and the task I had to undertake during the preparation for our salon trip to Japan.

Shimonoseki is located at the starting point of the Sanyo Road, which runs from Hiroshima to Osaka, Kyoto, and Tokyo, and is a major route connecting Honshu and Kyushu. Thanks to this, it prospered as a port of call for maritime trade ships during the Edo period and as an international port after its opening. Looking down at Shimonoseki from the bus traveling over the Kanmon Bridge, which connects Honshu and northern Kyushu, I could imagine the bustling scene filled with majestic warships and merchant vessels of that era. The Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall, located in this grand port city, is a historic site where Japan, in April 1895, summoned the Qing plenipotentiary envoy Li Hongzhang to Japan and concluded the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The first thing that catches the eye upon visiting the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall are the busts of two figures with tightly closed lips, gazing straight ahead: Ito Hirobumi, the then Prime Minister who was granted plenipotentiary powers by the Emperor of Japan and led the negotiations with Qing, and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. Although it was a gloomy, drizzly day on the day of our visit, the towering busts seemed to silently proclaim the victory over the great power of China.

Ito Hirobumi is undoubtedly a figure who left a significant mark on Japanese history, but Mutsu Munemitsu, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Ito cabinet, cannot be overlooked when discussing Japanese diplomacy. This is because Mutsu's statue can be found not only at the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall but also at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in Chiyoda Ward, Tokyo. Therefore, despite many Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs leaving their names in Japanese diplomatic history, I pondered why Mutsu is the first person encountered upon entering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and what his achievements mean and symbolize for Japan. Thus, I traced Mutsu's diplomacy before and after the First Sino-Japanese War, focusing on his book, "Kenkenroku" (蹇蹇錄). "Kenkenroku" is a work written from the Japanese perspective, detailing the diplomatic negotiations between China and Japan, negotiations with various Western countries, internal reforms in Korea, and the circumstances of the Triple Intervention after the Treaty of Shimonoseki, starting from Mutsu's dispatch of troops to Korea, triggered by the Donghak Peasant Revolution, up to the eve of the First Sino-Japanese War. In other words, it is a diplomatic memoir in which Mutsu himself, based on his own experiences and documents, recalls the reactions of various Japanese factions and surrounding powers to the invasion of Korea and China, the Japanese government's response, and the dynamic diplomatic structure and interests among Japan, China, and Korea. Through this work, which embodies Mutsu's life and dreams, I sought to understand why Japan perceived the situation in East Asia at the end of the 19th century, when the invasion by Western imperialist powers began to intensify, as both a crisis and an opportunity. Furthermore, I examined why Japan judged the First Sino-Japanese War as an unavoidable conflict and risked the nation's fate to confront Qing China. Moreover, the First Sino-Japanese War cannot be simply evaluated as a war fought between China and Japan over dominance in Korea; its significance in the post-war international order is immense. Therefore, I considered what Japan sought to gain from the First Sino-Japanese War and how it was thwarted by the Triple Intervention. 8. Mutsu Munemitsu: The Myth and Reality of Diplomacy: Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall.

On one hand, Mutsu is praised as a symbolic figure representing Japanese diplomacy, while on the other hand, he is condemned as a pioneer of imperialist aggression. Therefore, the greatest difficulty I faced while preparing for the trip was deciding which aspect of Mutsu's character to focus on and how to understand the significance of the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall. There are many existing interpretations regarding whether Mutsu's diplomacy was based on a balance of power, imperialistic, defensive, or aggressive. Nevertheless, I aimed to deconstruct the myth and reality of Mutsu's diplomacy by taking a critical look at the situation leading up to the ratification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and Mutsu's recollections recorded in "Kenkenroku."

The Meeting Between Mutsu Munemitsu and Li Hongzhang

In a downtown area with a clear view of the Kanmonkyo Strait and the waters off Shimonoseki, the Shunpanro, an inn and a specialty fugu restaurant, is located alongside the Treaty of Shimonoseki Memorial Hall. Ito Hirobumi, who frequented this place so much that he even personally chose the name, meaning "Spring Tide Pavilion," chose Shunpanro as the stage to conclude the Sino-Japanese War. The negotiations held at a restaurant were extremely humiliating for China, as Japan did not even observe the minimum courtesy towards the Qing Dynasty. 8. Mutsu Munemitsu: The Spirituality and Reality of Diplomacy: Treaty of Shimonoseki Memorial Hall

Contrary to the world's expectations, China ceded Pyongyang to Japan in late July 1894 and began to falter after suffering successive defeats in the Yellow Sea battles. As Japan gained the upper hand in the First Sino-Japanese War, China was placed in a significantly disadvantageous position from the preparatory stages for peace negotiations.

In August 1894, China proposed negotiations to Japan through the United States, with the conditions for peace including the independence of Korea and war reparations. However, Japan rejected this proposal. Initially, Japan cited the status and qualifications of the envoys dispatched by China, suggesting that China had not yet acknowledged its defeat and intended to end the war without genuine commitment. Japan stipulated that it would not reveal its representatives until China officially notified it of the plenipotentiary delegate's name and title, and Chichijang

Before the negotiations even began, China's peace envoys, Zhang Yinheng and Shao Youlian, were deemed unsatisfactory and sent back to their home country. Japan's unilateral termination of the first round of negotiations was for strategic reasons. Not only did Ito Hirobumi desire negotiations with Li Hongzhang, but he also used the unsuitability of the plenipotentiary representative as a pretext to delay the negotiations until Japan occupied Liuqiu Island, thereby allowing Japan to steer the negotiations in its favor. Furthermore, Japan, concerned about intervention from Western powers, ultimately kept the terms of the meeting confidential. Chichijang

Regarding the venue for negotiations, Japan insisted on holding them on its own territory, contrary to China's preference for Shanghai or Yantai. In addition, Japan pressured China by suggesting that the plenipotentiary representatives of both China and Japan should meet and negotiate after the armistice, and then decide on the terms. 8. Mutsu Munemitsu: The Myth and Reality of Diplomacy: Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial Hall.

Finally, in October 1894, the Chinese peace delegation's ship, the Taiyuan, docked at Shimonoseki port, and the negotiations began at Shunpanro the following day. Initially, the Japanese side presented humiliating terms, demanding the cession of territory and war reparations of 100 million taels. In response, Li Hongzhang argued that the forced cession of territory by Japan was unacceptable and that 30 million taels was the maximum possible amount for reparations. Meanwhile, on March 24, after the first round of negotiations in Shimonoseki, Li Hongzhang was shot by a young man who opposed the peace talks on his way back to his lodging. Although his life was not in danger, he sustained a serious injury with a bullet lodged below his left eye. March

In the resumed negotiations, Li Hongzhang accepted the demand for territorial cession but succeeded in reducing the war reparations demanded by Japan from 100 million taels to 30 million taels, using the assassination attempt against him as leverage. However, upon returning to his home country, Li Hongzhang was branded a traitor and dismissed from his post. The hero who had once controlled major diplomatic issues of the late Qing dynasty was reduced to a traitor who sold out his country in a moment.

On April 17 of the same year, both countries signed the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki. The main terms of the treaty are as follows:

1. China shall recognize the complete independence of Korea.

1. China shall cede the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Penghu Islands to Japan. 1. China shall pay Japan war reparations of 200 million taels.

1. China shall open the ports of Sashi, Chongqing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou, and allow Japanese

ships free passage on the Yangtze River and its tributaries.

1. China shall grant Japanese residents the freedom to reside, engage in business, and trade.

On the path leading to the entrance, there is a signpost called 'Li Hongzhang Road'. This road is said to have been used by Li Hongzhang to travel between the meeting venue and his lodging, avoiding the main road after being attacked by an assassin. Seeing Li Hongzhang Road, which I had only encountered through photographs, I realized it was so narrow that two people could barely walk side-by-side. The winding path along the hillside, with its shabby appearance, reminded me of the humiliation China had to endure from Japan over a century ago. 8. Mutsu Munemitsu's Diplomacy: Ideals and Reality: Sino-Japanese War Peace Memorial Hall

Was Japan Power-Balancing or Imperialistic?

As revealed earlier, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was concluded between victorious Japan and defeated China, and the First Sino-Japanese War marked the end of Chinese civilization. It is speculated that the subjugation of Japan, a barbarian nation not even included in the framework of the East Asian order, to China, which led the East Asian order, must have been a more devastating blow than submission to Western powers.

The escalation of the rivalry between China and Japan into a war was an inevitable outcome. Setting aside the internal reforms of Joseon or its subordinate relationship with China, the fundamental cause can be found in the power struggle over Joseon. Originally, China, as the suzerain of Asia, held a position as a leading nation that established the foundations of civilization in all fields, including politics, law, literature, and religion, while Japan remained in a state of being a latecomer or a follower. However, as Western powers gradually expanded into the East, Japan, since the Meiji Restoration, embraced Western civilization and achieved national development. In contrast, the Qing Dynasty adhered to its traditional order and failed to implement flexible reforms in response to internal and external changes, making a major clash between the two countries foreseeable at some point. Therefore, it is necessary to examine what objectives Japan sought to achieve through the First Sino-Japanese War and how it perceived and responded to the international situation. 8. Mutsu Munemitsu's Diplomacy: Ideals and Reality: Sino-Japanese War Peace Memorial Hall

The first diplomatic initiative, the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity, Mutsu's policy, emphasizes that the fundamental and primary cause of the Sino-Japanese War stemmed from the subordinate relationship between China and Joseon. After the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity, also known as the Ganghwa Treaty, in 1876, Joseon gradually began to open its doors under semi-coercive conditions. The main contents of the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity, composed of 11 articles, are as follows: The Academy of Korean Studies, Encyclopedia of Korean Culture.

① Article 1: Joseon is a sovereign nation and possesses equal rights with Japan.

② Article 2: The two countries shall dispatch envoys to each other periodically within months to discuss affairs.

affairs.

③ Article 3: Joseon shall open two ports besides Busan within months.

and engage in trade.

④ Article 4: For the safety of navigation within the year, Joseon shall allow Japanese navigators

to survey the coast.

⑤ Article 5: Criminal cases occurring between nationals of the two countries in the open ports shall be

handled according to the principle of extraterritoriality, under their respective national laws.

⑥ Article 6: To facilitate trade between the nationals of the two countries, regulations for trade shall be concluded later.

concluded.

The point Mutsu particularly emphasized was that Article 1 of the Treaty of Amity, stating that Joseon possesses equal rights with Japan as a sovereign nation, was included. Japan, as a neighboring country to Joseon, supported Joseon's internal reforms and sovereignty, while China insisted that Joseon was merely a vassal state of China and could never be recognized as an independent kingdom. Mutsu criticized this by stating that China's claim of suzerainty over Joseon, while simultaneously avoiding responsibility as a suzerain by not interfering in Joseon's internal affairs or foreign policy, could only be seen as an evasion of its responsibilities as a suzerain.

As a concrete example of this, Mutsu cited the Geomundo Incident in 1885, when the British government occupied Geomundo within Joseon territory. Due to the Geomundo Incident, both Britain and Russia demanded that China guarantee their respective interests. Thus, even in the midst of crucial diplomatic negotiations, they dealt only with China, treating it as if it were responsible for Joseon's affairs, rather than Joseon itself, which was the victim. Munemitsu

However, although Article 1 of the Treaty of Amity appeared to uphold Joseon's rights on the surface, Japan's true intention was to clearly establish Joseon as an independent sovereign nation under international law, and to use this as a pretext to exclude China's exclusive influence over Joseon. In 'Kenkenroku,' Mutsu argued that Japan sought a path to preserve national honor without destroying the existing peace, even amidst imminent crisis, and merely followed the provisions of international law. However, observing Mutsu's continuous issuance of directives to Joseon, it is difficult to consider Japan's actions as pursuing defensive power balancing. 8. Mutsu Munemitsu's Diplomacy: Ideals and Reality: Sino-Japanese War Peace Memorial Hall

Joseon became a stage for the Sino-Japanese power struggle due to its geopolitical location. Since it was impossible for Japan to extend its influence to the Eurasian continent without passing through the Korean Peninsula, Japan had to continuously secure its influence over Joseon after the Treaty of Amity. However, because Joseon had maintained a tributary relationship with China for a long period, Japan's objective was to detach Joseon from this special Sino-Joseon relationship. To this end, Japan, while ostensibly recommending internal reforms to Joseon, practically demanded reforms that were difficult to accept.

Sugimura Fukashi, who was a secretary at the Japanese Legation in Joseon during the Sino-Japanese War, mentions in his book 'Reminiscences of Joseon' that Mutsu issued secret orders to create a pretext for opening hostilities by any means necessary. Upon receiving the orders, the legation divided the resolution of the Joseon issue into the problem of independence and secession and the problem of internal reforms, devising a mechanism to detach Joseon from China regardless of which option the Joseon government chose. Considering the aforementioned plan, the Joseon government's reform investigation committee and the Japanese minister held a meeting at Noin-jeong, an old people's pavilion located in Namsan, regarding the adopted articles of internal reform. However, after the Noin-jeong meeting, the Joseon government agreed to the reform plan proposed by Japan, but indicated that due to the anxiety of the people since the dispatch of Japanese troops to Joseon, there were difficulties in implementing the reforms and thus they hoped for the withdrawal of Japanese troops first. As planned, upon receiving the Joseon government's confirmation on [Date, e.g., Month Day], 1882, the Japanese minister immediately sent an official document to recall the troops. Sugimura Fukashi interprets the content of the official document as follows:

Until now, Japan has maintained friendly relations with Joseon, believing it to be for the benefit of Joseon and East Asia.

However, since the Joseon government did not accept our recommendations,

we can no longer extend our friendship. From now on, matters concerning Japan's interests or rights

will be carried out ruthlessly, without considering Joseon's interests.

will be carried out ruthlessly, without considering Joseon's interests. However, it is unclear whether the Joseon government understood this intention. Sugimura

understood this intention. Sugimura

understood this intention. Sugimura

In addition, the Japanese Legation cited the inconvenience of the Gyeongbu telegraph line and unilaterally commenced telegraph line construction work without the Joseon government's approval. When the Joseon government expressed its refusal to these various forced internal reforms, Japan illegally occupied Gyeongbokgung Palace on [Date]. Following this incident, Japan secured a pretext for war with China and disarmed the Joseon army, placing the Joseon government, which had previously supported China and opposed Japan, in a position where it had to follow Japan's directives and not antagonize China. Sugimura Furthermore, when the Joseon government, still claiming Joseon was a neutral country, complained to foreign envoys that it was inappropriate for Japan and China to wage war in Joseon, Japan pressured them to sign the Japan-Korea Treaty of Alliance on [Date]. This alliance eliminated any room for Joseon to raise objections later. 8. Mutsu Munemitsu's Diplomacy: Ideals and Reality: Sino-Japanese War Peace Memorial Hall Of course, after the treaty's conclusion, Joseon could no longer mention neutrality. Therefore, Japan was preparing for war with China under the pretext of Joseon's internal reforms.

Furthermore, Japan's plan for internal reform in Joseon largely stemmed from a condescending view of Joseon. Since the Meiji era, Japan had been politically and socially stabilized, but it had internal contradictions and was dissatisfied with the unequal treaties signed successively with Western powers after the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1858. At this point, Japan began to publicize the so-called 'Conquest of Korea Theory' (Seikanron). Although Seikanron had existed since the early Meiji period, its momentum exploded after the 'Letter Incident' where Joseon rejected the state letter sent by Japan, adhering to its isolationist policy. Watanabe Toshio, president of Takushoku University, argues that Joseon, by confining itself within the Chinese tributary system, showed a lack of spirit by looking down on Japan, which was pursuing national strength and military power amidst the trend of Western encroachment, and by turning away from opening up and dialogue. Watanabe explains that Seikanron thus emerged and intensified as an attempt by Japan to break into the Chinese-centric tributary system, arguing that Joseon, riddled with factional strife, needed to be conquered because it failed to grasp the changing times.

Among the travelogues of Joseon written by Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War period, the most representative is 'Joseon Japtgi' (Miscellaneous Records of Joseon) by Honma Kyusuke, which well illustrates Orientalism and the specificity of Japan's perception of Joseon. Honma perceived Joseon as a nation whose internal and external independence and autonomy were constrained by China. He also argued that Joseon's obsession with reputation and empty talk prevented it from pursuing practical interests, which ultimately hindered public consciousness and prevented economic development. Based on his inaccurate historical facts and prejudices, the Joseon depicted had no future. Thus, the duty of civilization to save such a powerless and corrupt Joseon was defined as Japan's mission. Kim Dae-rae et al.

Mutsu held a similar view.

Following the Incident of [Date, e.g., Month Day], 1894, Japan, using Daewongun as a proxy, illegally occupied Gyeongbok Palace, overthrew the government, and established the Gabo (Reform) Office. Daewongun subsequently organized a cabinet with moderate reformists such as Kim Hong-jip and Eo Yun-jung, and recruited members of the Enlightenment faction, also known as the 'Japan Party,' into the Gabo Office, enabling the establishment of reform plans. However, after the establishment of the Gabo Office, it was discovered that Daewongun and the cabinet ministers of Joseon were secretly bribing and exchanging secret letters with Chinese officers stationed in Pyongyang. In response, Mutsu expressed displeasure, viewing the laziness and ignorance of the Joseon people, their so-called 'barbaric virtues,' as another reason why internal reforms in Joseon were not being realized. Munemitsu.

Second Justification: The Treaty of Tianjin. 'Kenkenroku' begins with a mention of the Donghak Peasant Revolution. However, 8. Mutsu Munemitsu's Diplomacy: Ideals and Reality: Sino-Japanese War Peace Memorial Hall it is cautious to consider the Donghak Peasant Revolution as the most direct cause, although it could serve as a pretext for the Sino-Japanese War. The Donghak Peasant Revolution began as a revolt by Joseon peasants against the corruption of officials and the exploitation by foreign powers. Triggered by Jeon Bong-jun's capture of the Gobu government office, the flames of rebellion spread to neighboring villages, escalating into a peasant war by March. Despite the dispatch of suppression troops by the court, Jeonju in Jeolla Province soon fell under the control of the peasant army. In desperation, the court requested military assistance from the foreign power, China, and China stationed 1,500 troops in Asan Bay on [Date]. In response, Mutsu, citing the Treaty of Tianjin concluded in 1885 for the balance of power between China and Japan in Joseon, argued that since the Joseon government could not resolve its internal disturbances on its own, Japan also had an obligation to provide military support, and used this as a pretext to land 2,000 troops in Jemulpo Port on [Date]. In addition to the Treaty of Tianjin, the right under the Treaty of Jemulpo allowed for the dispatch of troops to Joseon, meaning there was no need to be constrained by China regarding the size or movement of troops.

With Japanese troops stationed in Joseon, Mutsu sought a way to prevent their withdrawal at all costs. This was because if Japan were to withdraw its troops first, it would, as Li Hongzhang intended, be acknowledging the presence of Chinese troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula. Watanabe At this point, Mutsu recalled the proposal for joint Sino-Japanese internal reforms in Joseon. Through this, Mutsu created a pretext that would allow Japan to unilaterally undertake internal reforms in Joseon if China opposed it, and also to avoid criticism for doing so.

Mutsu's narrative of the confrontation between Japan, representing Western new civilization, and China, representing East Asian old civilization, Munemitsu shows Japan's aspirations and realities regarding the following two points. First, Japan rapidly adopted Western civilization and achieved modernization, while China did not, leading to a narrowing gap in national strength between China and Japan. Particularly,

during the latter half of the 19th century, China's national strength tended to decline, while Japan's national strength gradually increased and then rapidly surged just before the Sino-Japanese War. In fact, in terms of the proportion of global manufacturing, the difference between Japan and China was about % in 1870, which narrowed to about % in 1900, and to only % in 1910, three years after the end of the Sino-Japanese War. Kang Seong-hak, that is, Japan, through the Im-o Incident and the Gapshin Coup, realized that it held an advantageous position not only in terms of practical advantages like the Sino-Joseon tributary relationship or the Chinese tributary system, but also militarily, and subsequently concentrated on strengthening its military power. Second, from the expression 'Western new civilization,' we can infer that Japan at the time harbored dreams of becoming an imperialist great power. Therefore, Japan's emphasis on Joseon's independence from China can be interpreted as an effort to exclude China's influence, which was an obstacle to its dreams.

Ultimately, China and Japan, with their contiguous territories and similar national strengths, grew increasingly envious of each other. 8. Mutsu Munemitsu's Diplomacy: Ideals and Reality: Sino-Japanese War Peace Memorial Hall Consequently, hatred and jealousy between the two countries intensified daily, reaching a point where, despite having nothing outwardly to quarrel about, they were in a state where anger could erupt at any moment. Munemitsu Mutsu also believed that the Sino-Japanese War originated from the desire of both sides to extend their influence into Joseon, using Joseon's internal affairs as a pretext to satisfy their own ambitions. Munemitsu Furthermore, China's decision regarding the joint commission in Joseon, proposed by Japan, was made with the understanding that a clash between the two countries was inevitable, and it was something that had already begun, making it impossible to avoid. Munemitsu

The First Sino-Japanese War and Japan's Court and Public Opinion

Mutsu, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the so-called First Ito Hirobumi Cabinet during the Sino-Japanese War, is a figure of great historical significance in the development of Japanese diplomacy. However, in the history of Korean modernization, he is regarded as a vanguard of Japanese aggressive diplomacy. Nevertheless, 'Kenkenroku,' which contains Japan's diplomatic secrets, holds significant importance not only for Japan but also for understanding the modern history of East Asia during the turbulent late 19th century. Throughout 'Kenkenroku,' Mutsu repeatedly expresses strong pride in having been able to transform the diplomatic relations between China and Japan by concluding the Treaty of Shimonoseki, despite the fluctuating circumstances. This can be seen as a reflection not only of Mutsu's personal pride but also of the change in the perception of the Japanese people towards foreign affairs at the time, and the nationalistic superiority that was strengthened through the Sino-Japanese War. Therefore, in relation to this, we intend to examine Japan's foreign perception and its diplomatic strategy based on contemporary historical materials written by Japanese intellectuals, as well as 'Kenkenroku.'

Following the victories in the Battles of Pyongyang and the Yellow Sea, Mutsu proudly reported the victories in the second major battle between the Japanese and Qing armies, the Battles of Pyongyang and the Yellow Sea, which took place on [Date] in the [Year] year of Meiji (1894). With the successive victories of the Japanese army in the Battles of Pyongyang and the Yellow Sea, all Qing forces on the Korean Peninsula were annihilated, which can be inferred to have had a significant and profound impact on Japan's domestic and foreign affairs. Prior to the major battles in Pyongyang and the Yellow Sea, most of the Western powers speculated that the conflict between China and Japan would ultimately turn out in China's favor. However, with Japan's successive victories, the thoughts and attitudes of the Western powers changed dramatically. The Western powers, who had harbored doubts about Japan's intentions in dispatching troops to Joseon in violation of the Treaty of Tianjin, began to send congratulatory messages upon Japan's victory. In response to these reactions, Mutsu wrote that while the Western powers had previously scoffed at Japan's attempts to emulate European systems or reform its laws to establish a constitutional monarchy, they seemed to have been greatly shocked by these battles. Munemitsu

Subsequently, Britain and Japan allied to prevent Russia's southward advance, leading to the abolition of British concessions within Japan and the signing of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Britain and Japan in 1894, which stipulated the cancellation of extraterritoriality after a period of years. Starting with this, the Western powers began to revise their unequal treaties with Japan. In other words, the Sino-Japanese War was an event that enabled Japan to achieve diplomatic success, surpassing its East Asian neighbors and overturning the existing geopolitical order, while also allowing it to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the Western powers.

The Sino-Japanese War was the foundation for the development of Japanese capitalism. Subsequently, China's colonialization was accelerated and deepened in the process of borrowing foreign debt and repaying large reparations. Conversely, Japan obtained enormous reparations, using them on one hand to fund the Industrial Revolution and expand its military, and on the other hand, obtaining funds to adopt the gold standard. It gained entry into the international financial market centered in London. Japanese capitalism acquired more favorable terms than European powers by utilizing its geographical proximity to China and its relatively small concessions, and embarked on a new journey of pioneering the Chinese market. Seizaburo The victory in the Sino-Japanese War also significantly altered the domestic situation in Japan. Until the victories in the Battles of Pyongyang and the Yellow Sea, public opinion in Japan was divided regarding the gains and losses of the war. However, after receiving news of the victory, everyone became convinced of Japan's victory and began to think only about when the victorious army would enter the gates of Beijing. Mutsu added that people became intoxicated with excitement, with their minds elated and their desires and greed running rampant, leading to arrogance and deceit, and that the people became deaf to any words other than 'advance bravely.' Munemitsu

borrowing foreign debt and repaying large reparations. Subsequently, China's colonialization was accelerated and deepened in the process of borrowing foreign debt and repaying large reparations.

Conversely, Japan obtained enormous reparations, using them on one hand to fund the Industrial Revolution and expand its military, and on the other hand, obtaining funds to adopt the gold standard.

and on the other hand, obtaining funds to adopt the gold standard.

It gained entry into the international financial market centered in London. Japanese capitalism acquired more favorable terms than European powers by utilizing its geographical proximity to China and its relatively small concessions, and embarked on a new journey of pioneering the Chinese market. Seizaburo

and its relatively small concessions, and embarked on a new journey of pioneering the Chinese market. Seizaburo

and its relatively small concessions, and embarked on a new journey of pioneering the Chinese market. Seizaburo

acquired more favorable terms than European powers by utilizing its geographical proximity to China and its relatively small concessions, and embarked on a new journey of pioneering the Chinese market. Seizaburo

The victory in the Sino-Japanese War also significantly altered the domestic situation in Japan. Until the victories in the Battles of Pyongyang and the Yellow Sea, public opinion in Japan was divided regarding the gains and losses of the war. However, after receiving news of the victory, everyone became convinced of Japan's victory and began to think only about when the victorious army would enter the gates of Beijing. Mutsu added that people became intoxicated with excitement, with their minds elated and their desires and greed running rampant, leading to arrogance and deceit, and that the people became deaf to any words other than 'advance bravely.' Munemitsu

The Sino-Japanese War and the Change in Japanese Consciousness. Japan, having won two major foreign wars, the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, within less than a decade, strengthened its imperialist path, and thus its desire for national expansion through aggressive wars was inevitable. However, it was evident that if the Western powers deemed Japan's expansion of influence a threat to their Asian colonial policies, they would strongly restrict and regulate Japan's actions. Therefore, Japan's diplomatic strategy inevitably had to take on a cooperative tone towards the West. Consequently, the existence of unequal treaties between Japan and the Western powers, and on the other hand, Japan's coercion of its East Asian neighbors to accept these unequal treaties, created a dual national character for Japan as both an oppressor and an oppressed. This compelled Japan's leaders to pursue the goal of completing imperialism while simultaneously urging their neighbors, who had not adopted Western civilization, to act as agents of civilization. 8. Mutsu Munemitsu's Diplomacy: Ideals and Reality: Sino-Japanese War Peace Memorial Hall

With Japan gaining the upper hand in the Sino-Japanese War, it emerged for the first time as a non-Western great imperial power, instilling a strong sense of superiority throughout Japanese society. For example, Fukuzawa Yukichi, known as the father of Japanese modernization, described Japan's subsequent foreign wars after the Sino-Japanese War as a 'holy war' waged by civilization against barbarism. As nationalistic sentiment and patriotism were stimulated, Japanese intellectuals also moved away from reverence and subordination to Chinese culture, developing a sense of contempt for China. Yoshino Sakuzo, a prominent Japanese democrat, stated the following in his article 'Views on China After the Sino-Japanese War':

When the war began, China proved to be unexpectedly weak. Japan, in a vision of the great powers,

achieved a fair victory and easily obtained an unexpected great success.

From Japan's perspective, this was naturally a great joy, and

It was a blessing that also greatly stimulated the pride of the Japanese people, leading to a different relationship with neighboring countries than in the past.

It evoked a tragic boom of contempt for neighboring countries and allies, which was a tragedy. (Omitted)

What particularly drew people's attention was that Japan, in order to incite and promote the animosity of its people during the war,

widely disseminated a song called 'Jingeongjeomino' (懲膺豬尾奴).

It was like an overdose of a potent medicine that caused a strong trend of despising China.

This trend of despising China became rampant. Sakuzo, that is, with the victory of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan came to believe that China was no longer a rival, and compared to China and Joseon, Japan had become a superior nation worthy of worship.

Limping After Glory

The lame Mutsu used "Kenkenroku," the title meaning "Record of Limping." Through "Kenkenroku," I pondered what Mutsu intended to argue, and concluded that it is unlikely that this collection of writings was written by Mutsu as a memoir for atonement after the end of the Sino-Japanese War. Perhaps, while limping and limping, he wrote this long and detailed war and diplomacy memorandum to justify himself, claiming that he did his best for the national interest, and although the Triple Intervention could not be avoided, his choices were ultimately correct.

Mutsu repeatedly emphasized that as the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, he fully expected Western powers to intervene in the situation between Japan and China, and that Japan could not avoid this. However, the Japanese public was intoxicated with the joy of victory over Qing China, and the criticism for Japan's submission due to the Triple Intervention intensified. In particular, when the clause regarding the cession of the Liaodong Peninsula, achieved through the sweat and blood of the people, was deleted, within Japan, 8. Mutsu Munemitsu's Diplomacy: Idealism and Reality: Japan-China Peace Memorial Hall, the people lamented that Japan had won the war but failed in diplomacy, and vehemently criticized the government's foreign policy. Mutsu expressed his indignation that such an evaluation was being made, even though the Sino-Japanese War was a war that ended the order that had dominated East Asia for several decades.

From the government's perspective, it sought to deal with the situation by considering the urgency and importance of matters, and to handle important and urgent matters first, while postponing less important and less urgent matters. Regarding internal difficulties, it sought to harmonize them as much as possible, and regarding external difficulties, it sought to contain them to achieve a smooth resolution.

it sought to handle important and urgent matters first, while postponing less important and less urgent matters.

and to handle important and urgent matters first, while postponing less important and less urgent matters. Regarding internal difficulties, it sought to harmonize them as much as possible, and regarding external difficulties, it sought to contain them to achieve a smooth resolution.

Regarding internal difficulties, it sought to harmonize them as much as possible, and regarding external difficulties, it sought to contain them to achieve a smooth resolution.

it sought to contain them to achieve a smooth resolution.

Nevertheless, since it was not possible to completely resolve these issues, diplomacy's role was to postpone the occurrence of such crises for as long as possible, but it was impossible to completely resolve them.

it was impossible to completely resolve them.

Therefore, the Sino-Japanese War he recalls has a dual nature. It was a significant achievement in that it succeeded in separating Joseon from Qing China, which was an eyesore. However, on the other hand, despite Japan's successive victories, the Triple Intervention by Russia, Germany, and France led to the return of most of what was gained in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, resulting in a situation where much had to be returned. From Mutsu's perspective, the Sino-Japanese War was a war that left only scars of glory, as if it had been lost despite winning.

Munemitsu

Therefore, the Sino-Japanese War he recalls has a dual nature. It was a significant achievement in that it succeeded in separating Joseon from Qing China, which was an eyesore. However, on the other hand, despite Japan's successive victories, the Triple Intervention by Russia, Germany, and France led to the return of most of what was gained in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, resulting in a situation where much had to be returned. From Mutsu's perspective, the Sino-Japanese War was a war that left only scars of glory, as if it had been lost despite winning.

Memories and Implications of the Sino-Japanese War

From Month Year to Month of the following year, Japan and China fought a war with the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria as the main stage. This war, the first large-scale war involving all three East Asian countries directly or indirectly since the Imjin War, is recorded as a major event that greatly influenced the history of international relations on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia. I have deconstructed the international political situation at the time when Qing China, the center of the declining traditional order, and Japan, a rising power, were competing for influence over Joseon. Through this, I have examined Japan's perception of international affairs and worldview at the time.

In the latter half of the 19th century, imperialist powers repeatedly engaged in alliances and confrontations based on political and military pressure to protect their national interests, engaging in fierce diplomatic warfare. In the process, Joseon also sought to protect its national sovereignty through diplomacy with the great powers, responding to external pressure. However, the Sino-Japanese War, regardless of Joseon's will, as it was not a party to the war, caused damage to Joseon and ultimately decided its fate. Today's unstable Northeast Asian situation makes us look back at the history of the Sino-Japanese War. Amidst the competition surrounding the Korean Peninsula, driven by China's military rise due to rapid economic growth, Japan's rightward shift, and the Korean Peninsula wavering between them, we must offer wiser solutions to avoid repeating past mistakes by remembering and reflecting on the history of the Sino-Japanese War. ■ 8. Mutsu Munemitsu's Diplomacy: Idealism and Reality: Japan-China Peace Memorial Hall References Kim Dae-rae, Park Hee-jung, Miyaki Keiina. "Joseon Jabgi" by Gusuke, a Joseon person, as seen in travelogues of Japanese people during the opening of Korean ports.

Focusing on Gusuke's "Joseon Jabgi"

Gyeongnam Historical Society, "History and Boundaries"

Yang Jeong-hyeon, "A Japanese Memory and Victory of the Sino-Japanese War," Hyowon Historical Society

"History and the World"

Jeong Ui, "Modern Japan's Worship of the West and Nationalism: From the Meiji Restoration to the Sino-Japanese War," Korean-Japanese Thought Society, "Japanese Thought"

Cho Han-seung, "The Sino-Japanese War from the Perspective of Relative National Power," Seo-ul Libook

"Duel of Dragons and Samurai," edited by Kang Seong-hak, Seo-ul Libook

Shinobu Seisaburo, translated by the Institute of Japanese Studies, Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences, "History of Japanese Diplomacy," Vol. 1, Commercial Press

"History of Japanese Diplomacy," Vol. 1, Commercial Press

Lu Ao Zongguang, translated by Kim Seung-il, "Kenkenroku," Seo-ul Beomusa

Sugimura Jun, translated by Han Sang-il, "In-Korea Troubled Mind," Konkuk University Press; Qi Qizhang, "History of the Jiawu War," Shanghai People's Publishing House, First Edition

Watarai Toshio, "Geopolitical Studies of East Asia and Lu Ao Zongguang - Reading 'Kenkenroku'," Pacific Business Information

Reading 'Kenkenroku'," Pacific Business Information

Encyclopedia of Korean National Culture, Ganghwa Treaty, Korea Foundation for Advanced Study

http://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=565722&cid=46623&categoryId=46623 (Search Date

Date

Dreaming of True Co-Prosperity in East Asia

_Kyushu National Museum

Park So-young

Waseda University

The Changing Power Balance in the Asia-Pacific Region, and the Kyushu National Museum

The Kyushu National Museum, Japan's fourth national museum after Tokyo, Kyoto, and Nara, opened in Dazaifu City, Fukuoka Prefecture in 2005. This museum, with the concept of "Formation of Japanese Culture from an Asian Historical Perspective," asks how it portrays Japan and Japanese culture. The area that Park So-young focused on at the Kyushu National Museum was the Cultural Exchange Exhibition Hall, which displays artifacts from the Paleolithic Age to the modern era under the theme "The Road to Asia, the Sea Route." The explanations for the 10 zones, divided by focusing on cultural exchange between Japan and various other countries, felt like seeing a map of global powers for each era, drawn from a Japanese perspective. Looking at the guide map, it is easy to feel that the zone showing cultural exchange between Japan and the West, under the theme "The Round Earth and Approaching the West," occupies a considerable portion. It is reminiscent of Prime Minister Abe's foreign policy, which is biased towards the Japan-US alliance. Will the guide map of the Cultural Exchange Exhibition Hall created by the Kyushu National Museum still look the same ten years later? Or can it not be so?

Looking back now, I feel fortunate that the Kyushu National Museum was the last place visited during the expedition. This is because I was able to see the changes in the world order that Japan experienced from the end of the 19th century to the 20th century, as it began to adopt Western civilization, at the previous expedition sites such as Glover Garden, Dejima, and the Atomic Bomb Memorial Museum. However, unlike the nature of the previous expedition sites, I want to talk about the power shifts that Japan, East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region will experience in the future – or rather, what is already happening. For 70 years since World War II, the power balance in the Asia-Pacific region has been maintained with relative peace under the absolute military superiority of the United States. But should we continue to adhere to the power map drawn during World War II, which has been used to this day without major revisions? Will countries in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region still be looking at the same map ten or twenty years from now? As I interpret it, Abe, at least, seems to be saying "yes" to that answer, or rather, "yes, it must be so."

Prime Minister Abe, upon beginning his term in 2012, presented "proactive pacifism" as Japan's foreign policy. The concept of "proactive pacifism" as spoken by Prime Minister Abe differs from the concept commonly used in international political science and in peace studies. While passive peace is simply the absence of war, proactive peace is contrasted with this concept, and it refers to reforming structural power that suppresses human potential, even in the absence of war. However, the "proactive pacifism" advocated by Prime Minister Abe is further strengthened by the Japan-US alliance and the inevitable strengthening of Japan-US security cooperation, which will accelerate Japan's military expansion, revealing its true nature.

While passive peace is simply the absence of war, proactive peace is contrasted with this concept, and it refers to reforming structural power that suppresses human potential, even in the absence of war. However, the "proactive pacifism" advocated by Prime Minister Abe is further strengthened by the Japan-US alliance and the inevitable strengthening of Japan-US security cooperation, which will accelerate Japan's military expansion, revealing its true nature.

revealing its true nature.

The strong message conveyed by Prime Minister Abe's foreign and security policy moves is that Japan, centered on the Japan-US alliance, intends to contain China in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, Xi Jinping defined the US-China relationship as a "new type of great power relationship," stating that while avoiding direct confrontation with the US as much as possible, he would actively pursue what needs to be done to protect core interests such as territory and resources in diplomacy with neighboring countries other than the US. This signifies a bold departure from Deng Xiaoping's "hide your strength, bide your time" (韜光養晦), which aimed for quiet and cautious development by aligning with the existing international order, and emphasizes a much more active role for China in the international community. Compared to this transformed China, the signal Japan is currently sending does not differ much from Japan's stance in the 1990s, and in fact, it shows further regression. For example, in a speech delivered at the US Congress in April 2013, Prime Minister Abe thoroughly emphasized "American-style democratic values." This suggests that Japan remains within the extension of its Western or US-centric foreign policy, represented by the "Japan-as-a-Western-country" ideology it has pursued since the 1950s.

Abe and the Message Japan Sends Towards a Changing Map

Rather, the US and China are leaving open possibilities for each other as potentially cooperative partners. In contrast, Japan, by asserting its territorial rights over the Senkakus, is expressing a firm stance of confrontation in Sino-Japanese relations, which, in China's words, corresponds to China's core interests. And unfortunately, this message from Japan seems to have been accurately conveyed to China. For China, which, like Korea, has painful memories of its modern history, Japan's active pursuit of becoming a normal state will inevitably make the Japan-US alliance appear as an aggressive action to contain China's rise. Furthermore, it will inevitably lead China to perceive Japan as an untrustworthy country once again concealing its aggressive intentions. It is thought that South Korea's perspective on Japan's actions will not differ significantly from China's, if not more so. As the power balance in the Asia-Pacific region, which has remained unchanged for 70 years, is currently shifting, Japan's dualistic approach towards the US and China carries the potential for more dangerous outcomes and therefore requires careful and complex consideration.

Not a Matter of Either/Or, but China and the US

Not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also in the world order, the US is relatively declining while China is rapidly rising. In this situation, I find it quite uncomfortable that most international political analyses are reduced to a matter of choosing sides between China and the US. This is because the competition between China and the US is about how to construct a new order, and it differs in nature from the competition between China and Japan, which carries a high risk of direct conflict over core interests, such as the territorial dispute over the Senkakus/Diaoyutai.

Now, I will discuss in detail how Japan's actions will affect the power order in the Asia-Pacific region, which is currently undergoing change. While it is said that illuminating only China and the US can cover a significant part of international politics, there are clear limitations. This is because relations between great powers can face new phases at any time depending on changes in leadership or government. Therefore, East Asian countries, which are not direct parties to the power struggle, should not gamble their national fate by choosing sides between the US and China. Instead, they should actively consider how the US-China relationship should be newly established in the Asia-Pacific region to guarantee and promote peace and security in East Asia.

In conclusion, this attitude is precisely the "proactive pacifism" that East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region are demanding from Prime Minister Abe in the 21st century. The paradigm shifts experienced over centuries have inevitably led to East Asian countries being confined to a passive role in the process of establishing order in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the situation has changed significantly. Over the past 70 years, many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including East Asian countries, have overcome the wounds of the past and achieved remarkable development. Now, the task of constructing a new order in the Asia-Pacific region, where the direct interests of East Asian countries are at stake, can no longer be left solely to the great powers as in the past; doing so would be tantamount to handing over the practical leadership of regional order to others. Even though the dynamics of US-China relations are a decisive factor in the construction of a new regional order, it is not impossible for Asian countries to make active contributions. Rather, I believe that active roles from countries within the region are required for regional peace and prosperity.

Turning Crisis into Opportunity

Through World War II and the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific region has constantly been a battlefield for hegemonic powers. And now, the power struggle between China and the US is once again emerging in the Asia-Pacific region. Should we not break this vicious cycle now? Moving beyond the outdated security perspective of the Cold War era, where we were forced to choose sides between the US and the Soviet Union, Japan and other East Asian countries must exercise their strategic thinking suitable for the 21st century.

A recent research report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in the United States

states that it is realistically impossible for the United States to maintain its exclusive military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region as it did in the past. China is also actively seeking leadership to enhance its national bargaining power in political, economic, and diplomatic aspects, and it can be seen that its goal is not to completely replace the US's role in the Asia-Pacific region. In other words, both countries understand that direct military competition in the Asia-Pacific region would lead to a major war of attrition. For both the United States, which is experiencing relative decline, and China, which has taken on many domestic and international challenges due to its rapid economic rise, the US-China military competition is a significant burden. Given this situation, Abe's foreign policy towards East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region is even more lamentable.

Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently suggested in the US foreign policy journal Foreign Affairs that the US-Japan alliance has the potential to make a key contribution to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, dreaming of genuine peace in East Asia. This, conversely, suggests that the US-Japan alliance also has the potential to provoke conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. If Prime Minister Abe continues to pursue a foreign policy that does not seek the consensus and understanding of China and South Korea, neighboring countries will inevitably view the US-Japan alliance as a stepping stone for Japan's military normalization and will look upon it with suspicion and distrust. The seeds of security instability spreading within the Asia-Pacific region will encourage neighboring countries to compete for alignment with either China or the United States. This will ultimately lead the US-China relationship to devolve into a hostile rivalry.

A New Map of the Asia-Pacific Region We Envision

The US-China relationship differs from the US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. This is because the power shifts in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, coupled with China's rapid rise, inevitably entail hegemonic struggles, leading to areas of conflict such as the South China Sea dispute. However, there are also many areas where cooperation is unavoidable, such as the environment, culture, and science and technology. Therefore, in completing the future power map of the Asia-Pacific region that will be newly drawn based on the US-China relationship, not only the United States and China, but also neighboring countries including Japan and South Korea need to exercise more proactive and future-oriented leadership. To this end, countries in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region

must accept that the overwhelming military superiority of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region is no longer possible with China's rise, and instead of clinging to the old power map, they must proactively lead the change and build a security environment dominated by balance of power, not power balance. This is the future vision that corresponds to the changing power dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region, and when such imagination is shared, the Asia-Pacific region can move beyond a theater of power struggles to a space of peace and prosperity. The power order in the Asia-Pacific region, maintained under the exclusive military superiority of the United States for the past decades, appeared peaceful. However, beneath the surface, it contained an inherent instability that could transform into a theater of hegemonic struggle at any time due to the rise of other powers, even if not due to the inevitable power shifts caused by China's rise. The Asia-Pacific region must seize the crisis as an opportunity and be reborn as a space of peace and prosperity, not a space of endless conflict, which is also in the interest of the countries in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

Must Be Reborn as a True Maritime Route of Peace

From the first site visit, Glover Garden, to the Kyushu National Museum, what they commonly showed was a power map drawn from a Japanese perspective. In fact, there were many aspects I was not comfortable with before the Kyushu visit. Last

month, I began a journey called 'Sarambang' with the question, 'What kind of international politics should I study?' 9. Dreaming of Genuine Peace in East Asia: Kyushu National Museum

Starting with my encounters with Rousseau and Machiavelli, I delved into Western international politics, which truly blossomed as an academic discipline, and then, through contemplation and consideration of international politics in East Asia, including South Korea, I have now concluded the weekly seminars. When I started 'Sarambang,' I embarked on a journey to seriously explore the question posed by Professor Dongju Lee Yong-hee and Professor Ha Young-sun: 'What international politics should we, in the Korean Peninsula, pursue?' At that time, it was uncertain what insights a visit to Kyushu could provide. Furthermore, I felt lost about how to concretely develop the topic assigned to me, 'Prime Minister Abe's Vision for the Century,' into a narrative about the future of East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region within the space of the Kyushu National Museum.

Even now, at the end of the visit, I stand at an extension of my contemplation. However, one thing I can dare to say is that I have vaguely come to understand why Professor Ha Young-sun wanted to discuss South Korean international politics and the future of the Asia-Pacific region from Kyushu, the southernmost part of Japan. Prime Minister Abe's foreign policy has had a significant impact not only on the foreign policies of South Korea and Japan but also on those of various countries including China and the United States. Therefore, the regional power dynamics envisioned by Japan are one of the essential factors to understand and predict the changing flow of power in the Asia-Pacific region. This is why Japan's Kyushu can illuminate one aspect of South Korean international politics. The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, another site of our visit, immediately displayed the devastation of Urakami Cathedral upon entry. Seeing this, the professor asked, 'In the current century, if Abe were to build an atomic bomb museum again, what would we see upon entering? Similarly, would we see the face of an angel from the cathedral?' I recall this question. It is a part that allows us to deeply feel the international politics Japan has pursued thus far. Likewise, while touring the Kyushu National Museum, I could sense Japan's current worldview and Japan's place within that world. To the question I raised earlier, 'Will the interior of the Cultural Exchange Exhibition Hall at the Kyushu National Museum be the same in 100 years?', I want to say that it should not be the same. Japan is no longer living in an era of a round Earth and the approaching Western age. As we enter a new era, the time has come to move beyond the description of 'Western-like' which is not like Asia. I hope that Japan will be reborn as a true maritime route of peace, connecting Asia and the West, gaining the empathy of Asian countries, and take the lead in building a stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. ▒ 9. Dreaming of Genuine Peace in East Asia: Kyushu National Museum References 20 世紀を振り返り 21 世紀の世界秩序と日本の役割を構想するた

めの有識者懇談会(「21 世紀構想懇談会」). Appendix • Sarambang 20XX Semester Program • Supporters Sarambang 20XX Semester Program: Viewing Contemporary World Politics Directly Weekly: Modern Europe and International Political Thought Weekly: World War I and the Birth of International Politics Weekly: The Cold War and Realist International Politics Weekly: Research Proposal Presentation Weekly: Debates on International Politics Methodology: History and Science Weekly: Détente and Paradigm Debates Weekly: New Cold War, Post-Cold War, and Neorealism/Neoliberalism Weekly: Debates on International Politics Methodology: Positivism vs. Post-Positivism Weekly: Complexity and Constructivism Weekly: Complexity and World Social History Weekly: East Asian International Politics Weekly: South Korean International Politics Weekly: Seminar Conclusion Weekly: Field Trip

The Young

Sarambang Embraces Kyushu

Supporters of the East Asia Institute. Kang Myung-hoon Kim Seung-bin Noh Bong-il Sun Seung-hoon Kang Eun-mo Kim Si-yeon Noh Ho-sik Sung Jeong-eun Kang Chan-soo Kim Young-gu Noh Hwan-gil Son Dae-hyun Kang Hyun-wook Kim Young-seop Ryu Jae-hee Son Jae-ki Ko Byung-hee Kim Young-won Myung Jeong-mo Song Ki-choon Ko Seung-yeon Kim Yong-gu Min Seon-sik Song Woo-yeop Ko Hye-sun Kim Yong-nam Min Seon-young Song Ji-yeon Gong Seong-won Kim Won Park Geun-ah Shin Dong-won Gong Jeong-moon Kim Yoo-sang Park Mi-young Shin Myung-cheol Gong Chang-wi Kim Yoo-ju Park Sa-ra Su-hyeon Shin Bo-hee Gu Sang-hwan Kim Eun-sun Park Sang-min Shin Sang-hwa Gu Won-jeong Kim Eun-young Park Sang-yong Shin Seong-soo Gu Jun-seo Kim Jae-doo Park Seok-won Shin Seong-ho Kwon Se-rin Kim Jeong Park Seon-jeong Shin Young-jun Kim Ga-hyun Kim Jeong-seop Park Seong-man Shin Young-hwan Kim Geon-min Kim Jeong-on Park Su-jin Shin Jun-hee Kim Kyung-sool Kim Jeong-eun Park Yeon-ho Ahn Yong-chan Kim Kyung-ji Kim Jeong-ha Park Young-taek Ahn Jung-gu Kim Kwang-deok Kim Jun Park Yong-joon Ahn Jung-ik Kim Guk-hyung Kim Jin Park Jang-ho Ahn Hyun-jung Kim Ki-jeong Kim Jin-tae Park Jae-si Ahn Hyun-ho Kim Ki-joon Kim Jin Park Jeong-seop Yang Ho-sil Kim Nam-hee Kim Jin-young Park Jin-won Um Chan-seop Kim Dae-young Kim Chang-soo Park Chan-geun Yeo Dong-chan Kim Dong-geon Kim Tae-gyun Park Chan-yeol Yeo Hyun-jung Kim Dong-ho Kim Han-ki Park Hyung-min Won Jong-sook Kim Man-ho Kim Hyun-seong Bae Ki-wook Yoo Seung-hoon Kim Min-gyu Kim Hyun-jeon Bae Wi-seop Yoo Jae-seung Kim Byung-guk Kim Hyun-cheol Baek Song-hyun Yoo Jeong-seok Kim Byung-pyo Kim Hyung-woon Baek Hye-young Yoo Ji-young Kim Byung-hee Kim Hyung-chan Bae Ki-wook Yoo Chang-soo Kim Bong-ha Kim Hee-jung Seo Eun-sook Yoo Kyung-eun Kim Sang-rae Kim Hee-jin Seo Jeong-won Yuk Eun-kyung Kim Su-jin Nam Yu-ho Seo Hee-jung Yoon Byung-seok Supporters of the East Asia Institute. Yoon Young-doo Lee Jeong-ho Jeong Byung-gap Choi Cheol-won Yoon Yong-jip Lee Jeong-hee Jeong Seok-hee Ha Hyung-il Yoon Woo-sung Lee Jong-jin Jeong Young-jin Han Geum-hyun Yoon Jae-hoon Lee Jong-ho Jeong Yong-hwa Han Sang-cheol Yoon Jeong-rim Lee Ju-yeon Jeong Won-chil Han Suk-hyun Yoon Jeong-sun Lee Ju-yeon Jeong Won-seok Han Seung-hye Yoon Chang-min Lee Jung-gu Jeong Won-ho Han Il-bong Yoon Hye-seong Lee Ji-won Jeong Jae-gwan Han Jeong-won Lee Geun-woo Lee Ji-hee Jeong Ju-yeon Han Ji-hyun Lee Ki-ho Lee Chang-won Jeong Jin-young Heo Se-hong Lee Nae-young Lee Hang Jeong Hae-il Hong Seong-woo Lee Dong-hoon Lee Hae-wan Jeong Hyun-woong Hong Seong-won Lee Mi-hye Lee Hyun-ok Jeong Hyun-ju Hong Ho-young Lee Min-gyu Lee Hyun-hee Jeong Hyun-cheol Hwang Soo Lee Bong-jae Lee Ho-jun Cho Gyu-nam Hwang Jeong-won Lee Bong-jae Lee Hong-gu Cho Gyu-wan Hwang Jun-ho Lee Sang-won Lee Hong-jae Cho Dong-hyun W1 Lee Sang-hoon Lee Hee-jung Cho Eun-hee

Lee Seo-hyun Im Ji-seop Cho Hyun-sun Lee Seon-ju Im Hyun-mo Ju Young-ah Lee Seon-hee Im Hyun-jin Ji Hye-ri Lee Seong-ryang Im Hong-jae Jin Seon-hee Lee So-min Jang Dong-woo Jin Jae-wook Lee Suk-jong Jang Se-rin Cha Guk-rin Lee Seung-hoon Jang Se-hyung Cha Dong-min Lee Si-yeon Jang Jae-hoon Chae Gyu-min Lee Shin-hwa Jang Jun-hyuk Chae Gyu-ho Lee Yeo-hee Jang Jin-ho Choi Geon Lee Young-seok Jang Hee-jin Choi Gyu-nam Lee Young-ju Jeon Kyung-soo Choi Dong-gyu Lee Won-jong Jeon Myung-sun Choi Byung-gyu Lee In-ok Jeon Hye-jin Choi Bok-dae Lee Jae-seop Jeong Ki-yong Choi Jong-ho Lee Jeong-eun Jeong Rang-ho Choi Jun-won