In Search of an East Asian Salon

The 21st Century Tsushinshi and Abe's Japan Meet · Choi In-ho · Seoul National University

Field Trips are Studies Conducted with the Body

On the final leg of our field trip, we had a session to share our thoughts from the semester. Amidst the various reflections, our discussion converged on the reason for undertaking the field trip. 'Why wasn't lectures enough, and why did we have to set foot on Nagasaki soil?' 'How did what we saw and heard differ from what we read?' I arrived at my own answer: a study beyond mere study. I concluded that we came to Nagasaki to experiment with a study conducted not with the head, but with the body, which clarified the meaning of the field trip.

Studies conducted with the body reveal things previously unseen. The texts we read for the field trip, the Japanese landscapes and people we encountered during the trip, all spoke of diverse versions of the dream of East Asia. My fellow students, seniors, and professors taught me that my study of international politics is intertwined with the lives of my peers and seniors, and in the travel destinations, I learned that I am not separate from my studies and practice, as I am in the lecture hall.

A Corrupted Utopia: Japan's East Asia

During this field trip, my assigned topic was the East Asia strategy of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Japan

Although it is called a strategy, it was ultimately about exploring what kind of East Asia Prime Minister Abe envisions and verifying that vision on the ground. The slogan 'East Asia' is frequently heard, but in reality, East Asia was also a hypocritical dream space conceived by Japan in the early 20th century to rationalize its imperialism (Saaler and Szpilman ed. 2011, 161-220). In particular, Japan created a new discourse of a 'New Order in East Asia' in the 1930s, and its vision of an 'East Asian Federation' was so appealing that it even captivated left-wing intellectuals in Korea (Ha Young-sun 2012). Consequently, despite the diverse appeal of the discourse of East Asia as a vision transcending the West, Japan's theory of East Asia has always evoked suspicion among Asian countries. Perhaps it is a dual emotion evoked by a corrupted utopia? The successor to the 21st-century theory of a New Order in East Asia is Prime Minister Abe. Prime Minister Abe is also drawing a new vision of a Japan-led East Asia from various perspectives. The Abe government's vision for East Asia is detailed in the newly established National Security Council's document, the 'National Security Strategy' (hereinafter NSS). Chapter 3 of this document identifies shifts in global security situations, such as power transitions and rapid technological innovation, as the most significant changes. It points to the rise of emerging powers including China and India due to power transitions, with China's rise being considered the most critical issue. However, it also notes that the United States remains the greatest power, combining soft power, economic strength, and military might, and thus analyzes that the US-centric system will not change for the time being. Furthermore, it points out that power in international politics is shifting not only between states but also from states to non-state actors due to technological change and globalization, identifying these as major actors (National Security Council 2013, 6-10).

Following this analysis of the global situation, the NSS presents an analysis of the East Asian situation, with the term 'gray zone' being particularly distinctive. This concept also received significant attention during the discussion session that led to the creation of the NSS (安全保障と防衛力に関する懇談会 2013). The NSS assesses that while an order centered on the United States is maintained in East Asia, the rapid military buildup by China and North Korea's nuclear development are gradually increasing conflict-prone gray zones, leading to a precarious balance where conflict could erupt at any time (National Security Council 2013, 11-12).

The Abe government's East Asia strategy in response to this new situation can be summarized in two words: proactive pacifism and international cooperation. The NSS articulates the fundamental principles of Japan's national security policy as follows:

In the new strategic environment, Japan will continue on the path of a peace-loving nation it has followed thus far,

and as a major player in global politics and economics, it will contribute more proactively to the pursuit of peace, stability, and prosperity in the international community.

At the same time, as a 'proactive contributor to peace' based on international cooperation, it will achieve its own security and the peace and stability of East Asia.

This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan intends to uphold (National Security Council 2013, 4).

This short paragraph encapsulates several of Japan's concerns. The first keyword in this paragraph is 'proactive peace.' The 'new strategic environment' refers to the aforementioned East Asian situation, the rise of China, the North Korean nuclear threat, the increase in gray zones, and the emergence of global non-traditional security issues. In this context, adhering to the principle of a peace-loving nation as in the past carries a completely different meaning. As indicated by the adjective 'proactive,' the peace Abe is discussing now can be seen as a declaration of a break from the passive concept of peace of 'exclusive defense,' which only involves defense. Under the exclusive defense system, Japan maintained a stance of not invading other countries and, to ensure this, did not create a national military, maintaining only the Self-Defense Forces for defense purposes (Park Cheol-hee 2004, 175-177).

However, as seen in the situational analysis above, the threats to security and peace are no longer interstate wars, but non-traditional security elements such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and even among states, conflicts in gray zones surrounding territorial disputes rather than outright war. Therefore, peace can no longer be maintained simply by not invading other countries; it must be protected through expanded peace activities that proactively address these problematic elements and sometimes use military force to eliminate non-traditional security threats (National Security Council 2013, 28-31). Although the word is the same, the substance is diametrically opposed.

The next important keyword is 'international cooperation.' Another major concern for Abe is the revitalization of the Japanese economy. Economic revival is a matter of survival for Japan as a nation, and Abe's concern in this regard is profound. In a speech at the Hudson Institute in the United States in September 2013, Abe frankly admitted that young Japanese people have lost hope and are falling into despair, believing that tomorrow will be more miserable than today (Abe 2013). Due to this situation, Japan feels the need to play an active role on the global economic and security stage to revitalize its economy and boost national morale. Therefore, the term 'international cooperation' aims to achieve prosperity for Japan and the region through cooperation not only in the security domain but also with Asian countries like China, extra-regional countries like the United States, and various organizations (National Security Council 2013, 23-27).

Despite its offensive tendencies, this situational analysis is timely. It is particularly welcome from the perspective of the United States, which is pressuring China through its rebalancing policy and must manage the world order with reduced defense budgets. In this sense, international cooperation aligns with the US in terms of security and economic cooperation. Furthermore, the argument that Japan will actively revitalize economic cooperation at regional and global levels to provide an opportunity for Japan's economic resurgence is also plausible. With China emerging as a threat and the US rebalancing towards Asia, Abe's East Asia strategy, which seeks to revive Japan's economy and its military-political standing by expanding globally, centered on security cooperation with the US, is at least logical within the context of the situational analysis described above.

As a successor to the construction of a new order in East Asia in the 21st century, does Abe's vision possess the same appeal as the theory of a New Order in East Asia in the 1930s? Firstly, judging by the US reaction, the two countries have maintained a close common line, at least on paper. According to the joint statement of the Japan-US 2+2 Ministerial Meeting agreed upon in October 2013, the US has clarified its stance towards Japan's expanded responsibilities and roles within the Japan-US alliance, moving towards burden-sharing. Both sides reaffirmed the US rebalancing strategy and agreed to realign the Japan-US alliance to contribute more proactively to the regional and global strategies pursued by the US. Simultaneously, regarding Japan's new security strategy, the US stated, 'The United States welcomes Japan's proactive contribution to the peace and security of the region and the globe,' acknowledging the expansion of Japan's role within the framework of the US-led Japan-US alliance (US Department of Defense 2013, 1).

The next important keyword is 'international cooperation.' Abe's other top priority is the revitalization of the Japanese economy. Economic revitalization is a matter of survival for Japan as a nation, and Abe's concern for it is deeply felt. A statement made by Abe at the Hudson Institute in the United States in September 2013 reveals that Abe frankly admits that Japanese youth are losing hope and are mired in despair that tomorrow will be more miserable than today (Abe 2013). In this situation, Japan feels the need to play an active role on the global economic and security stage to revitalize its economy and boost national spirit. Therefore, the term 'international cooperation' aims not only at the security domain but also at achieving shared prosperity for Japan and the region through cooperation with Asian countries such as China, extra-regional countries such as the United States, and various organizations (National Security Council 2013, 23-27). 9. Visiting the East Asian Salon: A Meeting Between the 21st Century Communications Company and Abe

Despite its aggressive tendency, this analysis of the situation has a timely aspect. It is particularly welcome from the perspective of the United States, which needs to pressure China through its rebalancing policy and manage the world order with reduced defense budgets. In this sense, international cooperationism aligns with the U.S. in terms of security and economic cooperation. Furthermore, the argument that Japan intends to create an opportunity to revitalize the Japanese economy once again by actively promoting economic cooperation at regional or global levels is also plausible. With China emerging as a threatening power and the U.S. rebalancing towards Asia, Abe's East Asia strategy, which seeks to revive Japan's economic and military-political status by expanding globally centered on security cooperation with the U.S., is logical at least within the context of the aforementioned situational analysis.

However, on the first day of our field trip, at the US Fleet Activities Sasebo naval base, I sensed a subtle gap between the positions of Japan and the United States. During the field trip program, the base commander gave a briefing on the role of Sasebo in the US Asia-Pacific strategy, followed by a Q&A session. Amidst this, Professor Ha Young-sun, who was guiding us, asked about the US perspective on Japan's strategy toward China. The base commander's perplexed reaction was quite intriguing. This moment confirmed a subtle difference in perspective: while Abe's proactive peace and international cooperation strategy appears largely consistent with the US rebalancing strategy discourse on the surface, there is in fact a subtle divergence between the US, which seeks to include China as a partner in its order, and Japan, which seeks to exclude China from an alliance centered on Japan and the US.

If the closest ally is like this, it is easy to infer that East Asian countries like China and South Korea are not very favorable towards Abe's vision for East Asia. Among the three East Asian countries, China has shown the most critical stance towards Japan's new East Asia strategy. For instance, quoting Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong (王冠中) at the Shangri-La Dialogue, China stated that it has always resolved territorial disputes through peaceful means and intends to continue doing so, but it will never accept provocations aimed at securing its own interests under the hollow pretext of 'proactive contribution to peace,' thereby directly refuting Japan's theory of proactive peace and its related territorial dispute policies (Wang 2014).

What about South Korea? In a joint press conference with the US President in April, President Park Geun-hye stated that improving South Korea-Japan relations would be difficult, regardless of shared security and economic interests, until Japan demonstrates sincere actions (<News 1> 2014/04/25). In other words, while South Korea does not necessarily oppose Japan's assertion of proactive pacifism and international cooperation from the perspective of its national interest, for South Korea, which faces territorial disputes and historical issues with Japan similar to China, Japan's overly expansive new East Asia strategy is bound to be a subject of suspicion. Therefore, Japan's proactive pacifism and the strengthening of the Japan Self-Defense Forces based on it are bound to face backlash from South Korea unless there is a change in Japan's historical perception and attitude towards its past (Park Young-jun 2014, 114-117).

Abe's proactive pacifism, which receives only half-hearted acknowledgment from allies and lacks significant persuasion for key neighbors like China and South Korea, appears far less appealing compared to the East Asian New Order theory of the 1930s, which even deceived intellectuals in colonial countries. In short, it is in the position of lonely singing about their own utopia, which failed to even become a corrupted utopia.

(王冠中)

peaceful

The Nagasaki East Asia and the 21st Century Tsushinshi

Abe's proactive pacifism, which offers only half-hearted recognition to allies and fails to persuade key neighbors like South Korea and China, seemed far less appealing than the 'New Order in East Asia' of the 1930s, which even fooled intellectuals in colonized nations. In short, they were in the lonely position of singing the praises of their own utopia, which failed to even become a corrupted utopia.

East Asia and the 21st Century Communications Company in Nagasaki

Despite Abe's meager vision for East Asia, the East Asia within Nagasaki, as confirmed by the 21st-century Tsushinshi, still retained its past splendor. To start with familiar culinary matters, although Nagasaki is a small city, its dessert shops possessed enough charm to attract the 21st-century female Tsushinshi, accustomed to the diverse and sweet flavors of Seoul. In fact, Nagasaki's sweet pastries have a very long history. As mentioned in the Dejima Report, they originated from the import of sugar and Western baking techniques in the 17th century, marking the beginning of the creation of the now-famous Nagasaki Castella, a history of nearly 400 years.

The traces of East Asia and the world embedded throughout Nagasaki and Kyushu revealed that Nagasaki had long strived for external exchange and greatly benefited from it. In Arita, which we visited on the first day, we saw how the village has been sustained for centuries by the pottery industry, with Tojo Isabeyo, who came from Korea, leading the way. At the Korea-Japan Exchange Exhibition Hall, we could directly witness the long history of Korea-Japan exchange from prehistoric times to the present day.

Arita

At Dejima, we saw how the Japanese, who engaged in exchanges with the West much earlier than Joseon, were able to more easily prepare for the great transformation of the 19th century, despite the small size of the island. At Glover Garden, we witnessed Japan's glorious past as a leader in East Asia at the forefront of modernization in the 19th century. The name of the famous Castella shop, 'Bunmeido,' in front of Glover Garden, exemplified this past glory. While Abe's East Asia strategy appears open and outward-looking on the surface, its underlying intentions were closed off; in contrast, the numerous glories, large and small, witnessed by the 21st-century Tsushinshi in Nagasaki were achievements attained by Japan embracing East Asia and the world on its own terms.

Nagasaki was not unique in this regard. The demeanor of the Tsushinshi who traversed East Asia within Nagasaki was also far removed from the rigid stance of the Korean media or government towards Abe. The Tsushinshi team already included two graduate students fluent in Japanese and a Master's student from the UK, embracing Japan, East Asia, and the world as much as Nagasaki did. In fact, we were busy enjoying the various charms of Japan throughout the field trip. In particular, the Tsushinshi from Korea were deeply moved by Japan's unique meticulousness, such as the bus driver who maintained a smile despite communication difficulties and the hotel mirror with anti-fog treatment only around the size of one's face. Unlike their criticism of Abe's policies in class, the Tsushinshi in Nagasaki were engrossed in enjoying the diverse charms that Japan offered.

Both Nagasaki, which welcomed the Tsushinshi, and the Tsushinshi who visited Nagasaki, were far removed from the stifling East Asia of Abe or the narrow-minded reactions of South Korea. The lives of the Korean Tsushinshi and the residents of Nagasaki were already open to the dimensions of nation, East Asia, and the world, embracing and being embraced by each other, and were busily moving towards finding a new equilibrium.

Glover's Glorious Rise and the Reality of the 21st Century Tsushinshi

However, we have not sufficiently understood the complex interweaving of our lives and sought new practices in response. As we observed the traces left by the figures who led the modernization period in the 19th century in Nagasaki, we could not help but feel ashamed and envious of our inability to lead 21st-century East Asia in the same way.

Especially at Glover Garden, overwhelmed by Glover's grand life and the park and mansion overlooking Nagasaki's beautiful coastline, I couldn't stop lamenting, 'Glover's twenties were so splendid, why are my twenties so shabby and dull?' 'Is there any possibility of regaining the splendor of youth, even belatedly?' I constantly wondered if I had any chance of living an interesting life comparable to Glover, an ordinary middle-class boy from a Scottish coastal town who became a hero of Japanese modernization through a life-risking gamble. Glover struck gold by exploiting the gaps in international politics and the divide between civilization and barbarism, but will the Tsushinshi have opportunities to dream grand dreams and put them into action? These questions constantly swirled in my mind.

Throughout the short, three-day field trip, the stage of dreams called East Asia occupied my thoughts. I thought that if the Tsushinshi of the Sarangbang could newly shape the East Asia that Japan initiated in the 20th century and that Abe is trying to revive in a meager form, I too might have the possibility of becoming a 21st-century Glover. To achieve this, the integration of study and practice was crucial. I realized that if I didn't let go of the idea that the study conducted in lecture halls and libraries is directly linked to the ascent of a 21st-century Glover, my studies would not stop at the intellectual level but could lead to practice. Due to a long-standing habit from graduate studies, I used to think that studying was merely about writing papers and becoming an expert. However, through this field trip, I gained the realization that the study history remembers is the study that transforms our actual lives.

The first voyage of a 21st-century Glover is to concretely envision a 21st-century utopia of East Asia that embraces not Abe's meager utopia or Japan's corrupted utopia of the 1930s, but Korea, China, Japan, and the world. This involves combining key elements of current East Asian transformation, such as democracy, capitalism, East Asian traditions, and new technological advancements, to present a normative vision of East Asian civilization with universal appeal. This is not a naive attempt to simply mix things together, but rather an endeavor to select and refine the strengths and weaknesses of each country and culture to create a new form of order. Such attempts are already underway worldwide, and one example in East Asia is the movement to combine elements of Confucian tradition with democratic reforms (Kim 2014).

In Search of an East Asian Salon

At the final session, after we had all presented our reflections, our professor, who had guided us throughout the semester, spoke about the meaning of the name 'Sarangbang' (salon). The professor recounted instances of 19th-century Japanese intellectuals spending countless nights discussing the nation and their future, concluding that ultimately, what matters is a 'room of love' (sarangbang), a place where people meet with love, study with love, and dream of the future with love, gathering anytime, anywhere to discuss study, life, and dreams. He stated that such a place is a Sarangbang, and that you are the ones who will create such places in the future.

The professor's words about the Sarangbang reminded me of the orientation at the beginning of the semester. Back then, the professor also began the class with a story about the gathering of young intellectuals like Yu Kil-chun in the 19th century at Park Gyu-su's Sarangbang. What intrigued me then was the fact that their homes were located in the center of Seoul, and that seniors and juniors from the already familiar yangban class gathered to discuss the future of 19th-century Joseon. It was as if a neighborhood elder had taken a bright child and started discussing the new wave of modernization in 19th-century Joseon. The strange emotion I felt when the familiar scene of a child greeting an elder on a bridge merged with the political task of modernization in 19th-century Joseon resurfaced at the end of the field trip. The fact that my daily life is the first step towards the ideal of East Asia, which is the most non-ordinary, was both moving and daunting.

A three-day Sarangbang was held in Nagasaki in the summer of 2014, but we had not yet found the East Asian Sarangbang. While young Koreans were present, young people from Japan, China, and other regions were not. When will a Sarangbang where young people from East Asia and the world gather become possible? In Nagasaki, we briefly enjoyed the freedom of a Sarangbang, but upon returning, we will once again be ordinary students, worrying about grades, papers, career paths, and studying abroad, rather than the ideal of East Asia. Will a permanent Sarangbang, where young people from East Asia discuss dreams throughout the night for months or years, ever become a reality? Or, as times have changed, should we seek to create such a Sarangbang not by finding it, but by realizing a new dream together, albeit scattered in our daily lives? Perhaps an East Asian Sarangbang is not something to be found, but something to be created in reality. ■ References News 1. 2014. “[Full Text] ROK-US Joint Press Conference-2.” April

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Park Cheol-hee. 2004. “From Exclusive Defense to Proactive Defense—The Politics of Changes in the Japan-US Alliance and Threat Perception and Japan's Defense Policy.” <Journal of International Politics> 44, 1:169-190. Ha Young-sun. 2012. “Historical Transformation of the East Asian Order—From Tianxia to Complex, Part 4.” Presentation at <EAI Social Science Grand Lecture>, Seoul, October

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u5.pdf. 9. Visiting the East Asia Salon: Encounters between 21st Century Communicators and Abe Appendix • Salon Semester Program • Supporters Salon Semester Program Reading Contemporary World Politics Course 1: Modern Europe and International Political Thought Course 2: World War I and the Birth of International Politics Course 3: The Cold War and Realist International Politics Course 4: Presentation of Research Plans Course 5: Debates in International Politics Methodology: Science Course 6: Détente and Paradigm Debates Course 7: The New Cold War, Post-Cold War, and Neorealism/Neoliberalism Course 8: Debates in International Politics Methodology: Positivism vs. Post-Positivism Course 9: Complexification and Constructivism Course 10: Complexification and World Historical Sociology Course 11: International Politics in East Asia Course 12: International Politics in Korea Course 13: Seminar Conclusion Course 14: Field Trip

u5.pdf. 9. Finding the East Asian Salon: A Meeting Between the 21st Century Communicator and Abe Appendices • Salon Year Semester Program • Sponsorship Membership Salon Year Semester Program Reading Modern World Politics Correctly Weekly Modern Europe and International Political Thought Weekly The Birth of World War II and International Politics Weekly The Cold War and Realist International Politics Weekly Research Plan Presentation Weekly International Politics Methodology Debates History Science Weekly Détente and Paradigm Debates Weekly New Cold War, Post-Cold War, and Neorealism, Neoliberalism Weekly International Politics Methodology Debates Positivism, Post-Positivism Weekly Complication and Constructivism Weekly Complication and World Historical Sociology Weekly International Politics in East Asia Weekly International Politics in Korea Weekly Seminar Conclusion Weekly Field Trip

The Young People

Of the Salon

Embracing Kyushu These are the individuals who support the East Asia Institute. Kang Myung-hoon Kim Su-jin Kim Hyung-chan Bae Wi-seop Kang Eun-kyung Kim Seung-bin Kim Hee-jeong Baek Song-hyun Kang Eun-mo Kim Si-yeon Kim Hee-jin Baek Hye-young Kang Chan-soo Kim Yeon-ok Nam Yu-ho Seo Eun-sook Kang Hyun-wook Kim Young-gu Noh Bong-il Seo Jeong-won Go Byung-hee Kim Young-seop Noh Ho-sik Seo Hee-jeong Go Seung-yeon Kim Young-won Noh Hwan-gil Seon Seung-hoon Go Hye-sun Kim Yong-gyu Ryu Jae-hee Seong Jeong-eun Gong Seong-won Kim Yong-nam Myeong Jeong-mo Son Dae-hyun Gong Jeong-moon Kim Won Moon Ji-wook Son Jae-ki Gong Chang-wi Kim Yoo-sang Min Seon-sik Song Ki-choon Gu Sang-hwan Kim Yoo-ju Min Seon-young Song Woo-yeop Gu Eun-jeong Kim Eun-seon Park Geun-ah Song Ji-yeon Gu Jun-seo Kim Eun-sook Park Dae-gyun Shin Dong-won Kwon Se-rin Kim Eun-young Park Mi-young Shin Myung-cheol Kim Ga-hyun Kim Jae-doo Park Sa-ra Su-hyeon Shin Bo-hee Kim Geon-min Kim Jeong Park Sang-min Shin Sang-hwa Kim Kyung-seop Kim Jeong-seop Park Sang-yong Shin Seong-soo Kim Kyung-ji Kim Jeong-on Park Seok-won Shin Seong-ho Kim Kwang-deok Kim Jeong-eun Park Seon-jeong Shin Young-jun Kim Guk-hyung Kim Jeong-ha Park Seong-man Shin Young-hwan Kim Ki-jeong Kim Jun Park Soo-jin Shin Jun-hee Kim Gi-jun Kim Ji-eun Park Yeon-ho An Yong-chan Kim Nam-hee Kim Ji-tae Park Young-taek An Jeong-gu Kim Dae-young Kim Jin Park Yong-jun An Jung-ik Kim Dong-geon Kim Jin-young Park Jang-ho An Hyeon-jeong Kim Dong-ho Kim Jin-hyuk Park Jae-si An Hyeon-ho Kim Man-ho Kim Chang-soo Park Jeong-seop Yang Ho-sil Kim Min-gyu Kim Tae-gyun Park Jin-won Eom Chan-seop Kim Byeong-guk Kim Han-ki Park Chan-geun Yeo Dong-chan Kim Byeong-pyo Kim Hyeon-seong Park Chan-yeol Yeo Hyeon-jeong Kim Byeong-hee Kim Hyeon-jeon Park Chang-wan Woo Mi-kyung Kim Bong-ha Kim Hyung-wook Park Hyeong-min Won Jong-sook Kim Sang-rae Kim Hyung-jun Bae Ki-wook Won Jong-ae These are the individuals who support the East Asia Institute. Yoo Seung-hoon Lee Yeo-hee Jang Jin-ho Chae Gyu-min Yoo Jae-seung Lee Young-seok Jang Hee-jin Chae Gyu-ho Yoo Jeong-seok Lee Young-ju Jeon Kyung-soo Choi Geon Yoo Ji-young Lee Won-jong Jeon Myung-seon Choi Gyu-nam Yoo Chang-soo Lee In-ok Jeon Hye-jin Choi Dong-gyu Yuk Eun-kyung Lee Jae-seop Jeong Ki-yong Choi Byeong-gyu Yoo Byeong-seok Lee Jeong-eun Jeong Rang-ho Choi Bok-dae Yoo Young-doo Lee Jeong-ho Jeong Byeong-gap Choi Jong-ho Yoo Yong-jip Lee Jeong-hee Jeong Seok-hee Choi Jun-won Yoo Woo-seong Lee Jong-jin Jeong Yeong-jin Choi Cheol-won Yoo Jae-hoon Lee Jong-ho Jeong Yong-hwa Ha Hyeong-il Yoo Jeong-rim Lee Ju-yeon Jeong Won-chil Han Geum-hyun Yoo Jeong-seon Lee Ju-yeon Jeong Eun-seok Han Sang-cheol Yoo Chang-min Lee Jung-gu Jeong Eun-ho Han Suk-hyun Yoo Hye-seong Lee Ji-won Jeong Jae-gwan Han Seung-hye Lee Geun-woo Lee Ji-hee Jeong Ju-yeon Han Il-bong Lee Ki-ho Lee Chang-won Jeong Jin-young Han Jeong-won Lee Nae-young Lee Hang Jeong Hae-il Han Ji-hyun Lee Dong-hoon Lee Hae-wan Jeong Hyeon-eun Heo Se-hong Lee Mi-hye Lee Hyeon-ok Jeong Hyeon-ju Hong Seong-woo Lee Min-gyu Lee Hyeon-hee Jeong Hyeon-cheol Hong Seong-won Lee Beom-ju Lee Ho-jun Jo Gyu-nam Hong Ho-young Lee Bong-jae Lee Hong-gu Jo Gyu-wan Hwang Soo Lee Sang-won Lee Hong-jae Jo Dong-hyun Hwang Jeong-won Lee Sang-hoon Lee Hee-jeong Jo Eun-hee Hwang Jun-ho Lee Seo-hyun Im Ji-seop Jo Hyeon-seon W1 Lee Seon-ju Im Hyeon-mo Ju Yeong-ah

Lee Seon-hee Im Hyeon-jin Ju Jin-gyun Lee Seong-ryang Im Hong-jae Ju Han Lee So-min Jang Dong-woo Ji Hye-ri Lee Suk-jong Jang Se-rin Jin Seon-hee Lee Seung-hoon Jang Se-hyeong Jin Jae-wook Lee Si-yeon Jang Jae-hoon Cha Guk-rin Lee Ik-hwa Jang Jun-hyuk Cha Dong-min Publications, Diplomacy and Security, Public Opinion Analysis Research

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