The First Sino-Japanese War and Japanese Imperialism: A Beginning Announced in Shimonoseki - I, Commemorative Hall of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty

21st Century Joseon Tongsinsa Visit Kyushu: The Youth of Sarangbang Embrace Kyushu

Lee Ju-won Korea University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: January 14, 2016

Lee Ju-won · Korea University

Introduction

On July 25, 1895, the roar of cannons in Asan, Chungcheongnam-do, marked the clash of two world orders. One was that of Qing China, which sought to maintain East Asia under the existing Sinocentric order, and the other was that of Japan, which had embraced the modern international order. The outcome of the clash was unexpected. Mocking the prediction of a German newspaper that the war would favor Qing, which had superior overall mobilization capabilities, it flowed towards a victory for Japan, which had fought with its national destiny on the line through thorough preparation (Paine 2003, 146). This was the moment when Japan, for the first time in the history of Sino-Japanese relations, or indeed in the history of East Asia, became the power that thoroughly disregarded and pressured the other.

The place we visited, the Commemorative Hall of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty

(下関日淸講和記

念館)

were the plenipotentiaries appointed by the Emperor of Japan for negotiations, namely Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu

(伊藤博文) (陸奥 6. The First Sino-Japanese War and Japanese Imperialism: A Beginning Announced in Shimonoseki: Commemorative Hall of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty I

宗光)

We traced the First Sino-Japanese War here, which marked the beginning and challenge of Japanese imperialism. In the late 19th century, when the encroachment of Western imperialist powers intensified in East Asia, we toured this commemorative hall, contemplating the worldview of the Japanese leaders of the time who perceived this as both a national crisis and an opportunity. This article will first examine what dreams the Japanese leaders of the time harbored, leading them to perceive the First Sino-Japanese War as inevitable. It will then explore the efforts Japan made to realize these dreams and how they actually led to the war. Subsequently, through the meeting between Li Hongzhang and Itō Hirobumi in Shimonoseki, we will examine what Japan truly sought to gain from the First Sino-Japanese War and how it was frustrated by the Triple Intervention. Finally, we will glimpse the echoes of East Asian stories that still resonate in Shimonoseki 120 years after the First Sino-Japanese War.

(李鴻章)

Itō Hirobumi

The Dreams of Itō and Mutsu: What Path Should Japan Take?

Mutsu Munemitsu's "Kenkenshō" (建言録), a memoir recalling his time as Minister of Foreign Affairs, can be considered a diplomatic record written from Japan's perspective, based on his own experiences and related materials, concerning various events involving Qing, Joseon, Japan, and the surrounding powers before and after the First Sino-Japanese War (Mutsu 1993). As the highest-ranking official directly involved in the diplomatic events of the time, his memoir is highly valued as a historical text and research document. In this book, Mutsu Munemitsu describes the underlying dynamics of the conflict between Qing and Japan as follows:

Japan has now transformed into a new nation, achieving a resurgence

that is sufficiently advanced to surprise the European powers, then the leading nations of the world. However, Qing remains as it was,

and has failed to adapt to changing domestic and international circumstances. Thus, one side represents Western civilization,

while the other clings to the old ways of the East. This disparity has become evident. We now disparage China

as a stubbornly conservative nation. In response, they likely view us as... a mere imitation, a small island nation...

The fundamental conflict is undoubtedly between the new Western civilization and the old Eastern civilization (Mutsu 1993, 64-65).

The notion of Qing representing the old Eastern civilization and Japan the new Western civilization can be understood in two main ways. Firstly, it pertains to national capabilities. While Japan rapidly achieved Western-style modernization, Qing failed to pursue it effectively. This led to a remarkable narrowing of the power gap between Japan and Qing.1

Secondly, becoming the 'new Western civilization' meant Japan's full entry into the ranks of the Western imperialist powers. This is well exemplified by Fukuzawa Yukichi

Because they looked down on them as "small island dwellers"... an internal

In it, he declared that Japan no longer had the "patience to wait for the enlightenment of neighboring countries and jointly prosper Asia," and concluded that Japan should "walk together with the civilized nations of the West" and that China and Joseon should be "dealt with according to the way Westerners approach them" (Fujimura 1997, 30). At this point, Fukuzawa had already affirmed Japan's imperialist stance towards China and Joseon.

The clash between the so-called 'old Eastern civilization' and 'new Western civilization' manifested geographically on the Korean Peninsula. As Mutsu Munemitsu explains in "Kenkenshō," the most fundamental conflict between Qing and Japan lay in the issue of Qing-Joseon tributary relations (淸韓宗屬). Qing sought to keep Joseon under its order, referring to it as a tributary state, while Japan emphasized Joseon's independence to reject Qing's influence there. In essence, Japan's strategy was to increase its influence in Joseon by recognizing it as an independent nation separate from Qing. Conversely, Qing emphasized the long-standing special relationship between Qing and Joseon to assert Joseon's status as its tributary. Qing's actions are clearly reflected in a Joseon official document introduced by Mutsu Munemitsu.

Joseon was originally a tributary of China, but its internal affairs and diplomacy have always been conducted autonomously by the sovereign of the Great Joseon State... Even if the Great Joseon State is a tributary of China, all its duties (義) and responsibilities have always been fulfilled according to the established articles... (Mutsu 1993, 136)

[Table 1] Power Gap Between Qing and Japan Before the First Sino-Japanese War2

1 Indeed, the power gap between Qing and Japan gradually narrowed due to their respective modernization speeds. The share of global manufacturing output held by Japan and China showed a difference of about 17 percent in 1860, which decreased to about 10 percent by 1880, and to a mere 3.8 percent five years after the end of the First Sino-Japanese War, in 1900 (Bairoch 1982, 296; Jo Han-seung 2006, 117).

2 [Table 1] shows the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) between Qing and Japan. China's national power showed a rapid declining trend in the latter half of the 19th century, while Japan's national power gradually increased and then sharply rose just before the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) (Jo Han-seung 2006, 116-117).

Although official treaties between Japan and the Western powers, and Joseon, explicitly state Joseon's independence, Qing explicitly informed various Western countries that Joseon was its tributary. Another example illustrating the relationship between Qing and Joseon at the time is the Geomun-do incident in 1885. In this case, Britain did not immediately return the occupied Geomun-do to the Joseon government but first went through the procedure of handing it over to Qing.

To counter Qing's strong influence in Joseon, Japan was looking for an opportunity. The opportunity that finally presented itself was the "Donghak Party Rebellion," or the Donghak Peasant Revolution, which is mentioned at the very beginning of "Kenkenshō." When the Joseon government requested support from Qing to suppress the Donghak Peasant Revolution, Japan, using the Treaty of Tianjin (

天津條約)

as a pretext, dispatched its own troops to Joseon. Once Japanese and Qing forces were simultaneously stationed there, Japan began to raise the issue of Qing-Joseon tributary relations under the guise of internal reforms in Joseon. In other words, the Qing forces dispatched under the pretext of Joseon being a 'protected tributary state' were presented as violating the rights of Joseon as an independent nation vis-à-vis Japan, and pressure was applied to expel the Qing troops (Mutsu 1993, 139). From this perspective, Mutsu Munemitsu states that the fundamental cause of the First Sino-Japanese War stemmed from the 'issue of Qing-Joseon tributary relations' (Mutsu 1993, 139).

Korea

(Fukuzawa Yukichi) "Jiji Shinpō" on March 16, 1885

can be found in the "Datsua Ron" written in

(時事新報)

In it, he declared that "patience to await the enlightenment of neighboring countries and jointly promote the revival of Asia" no longer existed, and concluded that Japan should "advance and retreat together with the civilized nations of the West," and that regarding China and Korea, "they should only be dealt with in the manner in which Westerners approach them" (Fujimura 1997, 30). At this time, Fukuzawa had already affirmed Japan's imperialistic stance towards China and Korea.

The collision between the so-called 'Eastern traditional civilization' and 'Western new civilization' manifested geographically in the Korean Peninsula. As revealed by Mutsu Munemitsu in "Kenkenshi," the most fundamental conflict between Qing and Japan was the issue of Sino-Korean tributary relations. Qing wished to keep Korea under its own order, calling it a tributary state, while Japan emphasized Korea's independence to reject Qing's influence on the peninsula. In other words, Japan's strategy was to increase its influence over Korea by recognizing it as an independent nation separate from Qing, whereas the Qing dynasty asserted its suzerainty over Korea by emphasizing the long-standing special relationship between Qing and Korea. This action by the Qing dynasty can be clearly seen in the official documents of Korea introduced by Mutsu Munemitsu. 6. The Sino-Japanese War and Japanese Imperialism: Announced at Shimonoseki: I

Korea was originally a tributary state of China, but in terms of internal affairs and diplomacy, it had traditionally

In his treatise "On Diplomatic Strategy" (

外交政略論)

written in March of the same year, he further elaborated on this.

3720f466

Although official treaties between Japan and Western powers and Korea stipulated that Korea was an independent nation, China explicitly informed the Western powers that Korea was a tributary state of China. Another example illustrating the relationship between Qing China and Korea at the time is the Geomun-do incident in 1885. In this case, Britain, after occupying Geomun-do, went through the procedure of handing it over to Qing China before returning it to the Korean government.

(山縣有朋)

delivered the following speech in his administrative address in December of that year:

"There are two paths for a sovereign nation: first, to defend the line of sovereignty, and second, to protect the line of interest."

So why did Japan dream of extending its influence into Joseon? In 1890, Prime Minister Yamagata

Then why did Japan dream of extending its influence to Korea? In 1890, Prime Minister Yamagata

d5da96bd

(Yamagata Aritomo)

9fe65656

In such writings,

(Theory of Diplomatic Strategy)

revealed that its sphere of interest was Joseon. Yamagata, however, was aware that its sphere of interest would be severely threatened upon the completion of Russia's Trans-Siberian Railway (Kim Yong-gu 1989, 364). Therefore, he believed it was necessary to firmly plant Japan's flag in Joseon before it was too late. In other words, Joseon was Japan's sphere of interest, a target for invasion, and ultimately, a target for colonial rule.

In summary, Japan's primary objective through the Sino-Japanese War was to secure the Korean Peninsula, its sphere of interest. To achieve this, it was necessary to expel Qing China, which still exerted superior influence over Joseon. The Donghak Peasant Revolution, which occurred at that time, led to the dispatch of Chinese troops to the Korean Peninsula, and Japan seized this as a golden opportunity. Thus, Fujimura, the author of "The Sino-Japanese War," states that "the truth of the matter is that Japan decided to go to war first and then sought a pretext for it" (Fujimura 1997, 7). However, Japan was not merely waiting for an opportunity. It had been steadily preparing to realize this dream. 6. The Sino-Japanese War and Japanese Imperialism: Its Beginning Announced at Shimonoseki: Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall I

Preparations to Realize the Dream: Expansion of the Army and Navy

Yamagata's "Opinion on Military Preparedness" clearly explains why Japan was engrossed in expanding its army and navy.

The situation in the East is such that prolonged peace is difficult. The Great

Powers' strategic plans indicate that upon the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in about ten years, Russia will

It will surely invade not only Mongolia but also Beijing under the Qing.

Qing China's efforts in military preparedness began to decline around 1884-1885.

In this situation, Japan's priority should be to organize its military preparedness for the next 8-9 years until the Trans-Siberian Railway is completed.

This will ensure that Japan is not harmed even if peace in the East is disrupted.

Furthermore, when an opportunity arises, Japan must actively pursue its interests.

(Choi Seok-wan 1999, 215-222).

This "Opinion on Military Preparedness" was submitted in 1893, about a year before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. At this time, Japan had already made it clear its intention to directly participate in the territorial division competition among the great powers for Qing China. To this end, it was essential to remove Qing China's influence from Joseon, the gateway to China. The possibility of armed conflict was high in this process, and Japan expanded its military capabilities without ruling it out. [Table 2] shows the increase in the number of personnel and warships in the Japanese army and navy. From ten years before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War to the time of its outbreak, the number of army and navy personnel and warships approximately doubled. [Table 3] shows the total military expenditure of the army and navy, with naval power increasing by about 2.5 times between 1881 and 1891. As a result, as shown in [Table 4], the Imperial Japanese Navy held a relative advantage, both quantitatively and qualitatively, over the Beiyang Fleet of Qing China at the time of the war. This thorough preparation, combined with a disciplined and well-trained military and systematic military tactics, led to Japan's overwhelming victory, overturning the predictions of most Western countries that Qing China would still hold a slight advantage.

[Table 2] Changes in the Number of Personnel and Warships in the Japanese Army and Navy 3

Number of Personnel Number of Warships

Year

Army Navy Total Units (Vessels) Units (Tons)

1869 - - - 4 3,416

1871 14,841 1,798 16,639 14 12,351

1872 17,901 2,641 20,542 14 12,351

1885 54,124 11,399 65,523 25 28,243

1894 123,000 15,091 138,091 55 62,866

1895 130,000 16,596 146,596 69 77,436

Source: Seo Min-gyu 2006, 139

3 Survey and statistics from the Returned Soldiers Assistance Division, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Seo Min-gyu, "The Japanese Army and Joseon during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895," in Duel of Dragons and Samurai, compiled by Kang Seong-hak (Seoul: Libook, 2006), 139. 6. The Sino-Japanese War and Japanese Imperialism: Its Beginning Announced at Shimonoseki: Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall I

[Table 3] Japanese Military Expenditure (Army) (Unit: Yen) 4

Army Expenditure

Year General Expenditure Special Expenditure Total

1878 6,409,005 220,739 6,629,744

1881 8,179,712 559,060 8,738,772

1884 10,764,593 771,190 11,535,783

1887 11,842,619 565,917 12,408,536

Naval Expenditure (Total General and Special Expenditure)

1871 886,856

1881 3,108,516

1891 9,501,692

Source: Norman 1940, 132 (Reprinted in Jo Han-seung 2006, 118)

[Table 4] Comparison of the Japanese Fleet and the Qing Beiyang Fleet (September 1894) 5

Imperial Japanese Navy Qing Beiyang Fleet

Capital Ships 4 2

Armed Cruisers 1 0

Protected Cruisers 7 3

Unprotected Cruisers 12 5

Gunboats 7 10

Torpedo Boats 26 5-16 (Min-Max)

Source: David Evans and Mark R. Peattie 1997, 39

4 E. Herbert Norman, Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p.132. Reprinted in Jo Han-seung (2006.118)

5 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. 1997. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. (Annapolis. Maryland: Naval Institute Press), 39.

The Confrontation Between Itō Hirobumi and Li Hongzhang: Sharing the Tension

The gunfire in Asan led to the gunfire in Pyongyang and finally reached the Liaodong Peninsula. Facing a national crisis, Qing China requested negotiations with Japan to cease hostilities. Japan's overwhelming victory against Qing China, which was still considered the most powerful in East Asia despite its decline, instilled immense pride among the Japanese people. Mutsu Munemitsu described the prevailing public sentiment in Japan at the time as follows: "The general sentiment was that what was ceded by Qing China should be substantial, and that the glory of our Empire should be widely proclaimed" (Mutsu 1993, 223). In this context, Mutsu Munemitsu and Itō Hirobumi revealed that they had already agreed upon three essential demands to be obtained through the Sino-Japanese War. The three articles submitted by Mutsu Munemitsu to the Emperor were as follows:

This draft treaty shall generally consist of three articles. The first article shall stipulate the confirmation of the independence of Joseon, the primary cause of this war.

The second article shall stipulate two matters: the territories to be ceded by Qing China to our country as a result of victory and reparations.

The third article shall concern the matters that our country must take in terms of diplomatic relations with both Japan and Qing China.

To solidify interests and privileges, our country's future relations with Qing China

should be made equal to the relations between Western countries and Qing China, ...

establish new open ports... to facilitate trade with Qing China. 6. The Sino-Japanese War and Japanese Imperialism: Its Beginning in Shimonoseki - Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall I

regulated my sovereign rights concerning navigation to invigorate it (Muss 1993,

227).

Considering Japan's aspirations mentioned earlier, Proposal 1 can be seen as the most crucial agenda item. Through Proposal 1, Japan anticipated resolving the issue of Qing's suzerainty and expelling Qing's influence from Joseon. In other words, Proposal 1 was what Japan absolutely sought to achieve in the Sino-Japanese War and was a non-negotiable condition.

The issue lay in the extent of Proposals 2 and 3. At the time, the mood within Japan was jubilant with victory, and the military was demanding greater reparations and territory. In his "Opinion on the Occupation of Enemy Territory" submitted in January 1895, Chief of Staff Kabayama proposed, "In addition to reparations, we should annex the Liaodong Peninsula, Shandong Peninsula, Penghu Islands, Taiwan, and parts of the Zhoushan Islands, and also secure permanent use of Busan, Jeoryeong Island, Geoje Island, and Mokpo in Joseon." Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi suggested demanding 1 billion taels, and Minister to Germany Aoki Shūzō advised demanding 100 million pounds in reparations (Fujimura 1997, 192). In this context, Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu described the domestic demands as "a situation that only moves forward and does not know when to stop," and external pressure as "return to the Triple Intervention." He judged it difficult to expect harmony between these two (Mutsu 1993, 225).

However, neither Itō Hirobumi nor Mutsu Munemitsu seemed to expect these demands to be accepted smoothly. For instance, Itō Hirobumi reported to the Emperor, "Before discussing the success of negotiations with the Qing envoys, if we clearly state the terms of peace, there is no guarantee that we will be free from the interference and intervention of the third powers; in fact, it would be better to assume that we cannot avoid their intervention." Mutsu Munemitsu also believed that a good strategy would be "to announce or hint at the terms our government will demand from Qing, and to obtain prior internal approval or tacit consent from the Western powers, thereby defending against potential misunderstandings in the future" (Mutsu 1993, 230). What is clear is that both Itō Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu were more concerned about the intervention of the Western powers than the negotiations with Qing, and they adopted a cautious attitude towards it.

Now, the stage moves to Shimonoseki, where we visited. The short one-act play that Minseon and I performed at the Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall depicted this very moment. In the Shimonoseki negotiations, the Japanese side consistently maintained an offensive stance. Li Hongzhang, on the other hand, adopted a defensive posture. Mutsu Munemitsu describes Li Hongzhang as "repeatedly admiring Japan's reforms and development, praising the achievements of Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi, and discussing the situation in the East and West, emphasizing the necessity of peace as if they were brothers" (Mutsu 1993, 252). In contrast, Itō Hirobumi, leveraging Japan's favorable war situation, strongly pressured Li Hongzhang. A tense atmosphere prevailed between Itō Hirobumi, who proposed the occupation of Tianjin as a condition for an armistice, and Li Hongzhang (Li and Hirobumi 1895, Tientsin Press). I strongly conveyed Itō Hirobumi's intention to occupy Tianjin, which can be considered the throat of Beijing. The highest leader of a victorious nation can indeed appear very imposing. In this part, I wanted to accurately portray the confidence with which he pressured Li Hongzhang, who was 18 years his senior, with a 'take it or leave it' attitude.

However, on March 24, 1895, an incident occurred where Li Hongzhang was shot by a lone assailant. This was the highlight of our one-act play. I personally wore a mask and played the role of the assailant, firing a pistol at Li Hongzhang, while Minseon directly applied an adhesive bandage to the wound, creating a detailed scene. Teacher Ha Young-sun also smiled brightly during this part, which gave me even more energy.

This assassination attempt caused the negotiations between Itō Hirobumi and Li Hongzhang to become volatile. Japanese diplomatic documents from this period show that Japan was making every effort through its envoys in Western countries to gauge the reactions of Western powers and prevent any opportunity for intervention. For example, Minister Aoki wrote to Mutsu Munemitsu, "If the assassination attempt on Li Hongzhang is true, do everything possible immediately to prevent Europe from despising Japan's superficial civilization" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1895). Thus, Japan, which had to be conscious of world opinion, had no choice but to conclude an armistice agreement on Li Hongzhang's original terms to cover up this unfortunate incident.

Following the unconditional conclusion of the armistice, Li Hongzhang and Itō Hirobumi resumed negotiations for the peace treaty. Although Japan was forced to accept the armistice, Itō Hirobumi's negotiating stance remained coercive. He employed the following pressure tactics, based on the favorable war situation:

Warfare, in its tactical measures and their results, is always

about moving forward, not about stopping. Therefore, please

deeply understand that peace terms that Japan is fortunate enough to accept now can also be accepted in the future.

(Mutsu 1993, 285).

Itō Hirobumi pressured Li Hongzhang in this manner and sent a final ultimatum on April 10, during the 5th Shimonoseki negotiation, demanding a decision within three days.

Under such coercive circumstances, based on the overwhelming superiority in the war situation, there was not much Li Hongzhang could do on the Japanese side. After a tug-of-war, as can be seen in [Table 5], the peace treaty was signed with almost no changes from the Japanese original proposal, except for a reduction in the indemnity and some open ports. Particularly noteworthy is that, as Mutsu Munemitsu had predicted, there were almost no changes in Article 2. Up to this point, the war had yielded Japan more than it had initially envisioned, namely, the removal of Qing's influence from Joseon.

[Table 5] Sino-Japanese Negotiation Content6

Japanese Original Qing Amendment Japanese Re-amendment

Issue

(April 1) (April 9) (April 10)

Joseon

Confirmed by Qing only Confirmed by both Qing and Japan As per Japanese original

Independence

Southern part of Fengtian Province An-dong in Fengtian Province Taiwan and Penghu

Territory Taiwan and its attached islands, Guanqian Prefecture, Feng huangcheng, and the Penghu Archipelago. As per original, southern part of Fengtian Province

Cession of islands and Penghu Archipelago, and Suamju and the Penghu Archipelago. reduced area

(excluding Taiwan)

Indemnity 300 million taels over 5 years 100 million taels and 200 million taels without interest

 Treaties concluded with Western powers and Qing's treaties with Western powers As per original (however, opening of 4 ports

Equal new treaty conclusion and basis for treaties with Western powers, and Japanese steamship

Trade  Additional opening of 7 cities with most-favored-nation status. At that time, both countries' most-favored-nation status

Provisions  Expansion of Japanese steamship routes. routes reduced)

 Reduction of import duties

 Permission to engage in manufacturing in Qing

 Provision of various privileges

Treaty Japanese military's temporary occupation of Fengtian Province and Weihaiwei Qing amendment

Treaty on the Mukden and Weihaiwei Areas of the Qing Dynasty by the Japanese Army Amendment

Enforcement Guarantee accepted. 6 Jin Gu. 2006. "The Process, Outcome, and Significance of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty," edited by Kang Seong-hak, Duel of the Dragon and the Samurai, Seoul: Ribook. 383. However, Japan's cession of the Liaodong Peninsula posed a significant threat to Western powers, particularly Russia, in securing national interests from Qing. As Itō Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu had feared, on April 20, a verbal note from the Russian Minister was delivered to the Japanese side, stating the following:

None. Request for arbitration by a third country. Not required.

Having reviewed the terms of peace demanded by Japan from Qing, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor's government views the possession of the Liaodong Peninsula by Japan not only as a constant source of fear threatening the Qing government

but also as undermining the independence of Joseon and posing an obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East in the future. Therefore, the Russian government... hereby

advises the Japanese government to definitively abandon its intention to permanently possess the Liaodong Peninsula (Mutsu 1993, 296).

Thus, led by Russia, with the participation of France and Germany, three countries intervened to halt Japan's post-war settlement, an event known as the Triple Intervention. Initially, Mutsu Munemitsu stated, "Our government is currently in a precarious position, like riding a tiger. Therefore, regardless of any danger, we must maintain our current stance and show no intention of yielding even an inch; there is no other way." He appeared ready to respond to the intervention (Mutsu 1993, 297). However, it soon became apparent that this Triple Intervention was not merely a diplomatic discourse but was accompanied by physical pressure involving military mobilization. Mutsu Munemitsu later described the situation: "The Russian government had ordered its forces in all ports in this region to be ready to set sail at any time within 24 hours, indicating that something was about to happen" (Mutsu 1993, 297).

At this time, Mutsu Munemitsu's emotions must have been extremely complex. The outcome of the negotiations was a diplomatic achievement resulting from the combined efforts of the Japanese army and navy's victory and the government's deliberation. He lamented the situation, saying, "Even if we, the responsible parties, could endure the deep pain in our hearts for the future of the nation and be prepared to yield an inch to avoid future difficulties, how would our army and navy react once this news became public, and how disappointed would our general populace be?" (Mutsu 1993, 298).

To escape this intervention, Japan sought support from Britain, Italy, and the United States. However, it was too difficult to expect them to strongly support Japan against the three powers that were prepared to intervene at any moment. Ultimately, after several failed diplomatic efforts to mitigate the terms, Japan submitted a memorandum to each country stating, "The government of the Empire of Japan hereby promises to abandon the permanent possession of the Liaodong Peninsula in accordance with the friendly advice of the governments of Russia, Germany, and France" (Mutsu 1993, 314).

Shimonoseki: A Witness to the Fate of Japanese Imperialism

Now, it is time to leave Shimonoseki. The path back to the bus after leaving the memorial hall also ran alongside the sea. The sea looked different from before. The image of the seventy-year-old Li Hongzhang, who had crossed the long sea route and was being disdained by Itō Hirobumi in a small restaurant in Shimonoseki, seemed to ripple alongside. While cargo ships pass by now, the Japanese naval vessels must have been clearly visible then. Li Hongzhang, who tried to remain composed even in front of the enemy navy conducting a show of force, and Itō Hirobumi, who skillfully manipulated him through meticulous calculation. Shimonoseki appeared to me as a seaside town that held the traces of that fierce confrontation.

Fujimura, who offers a sharp analysis of the Sino-Japanese War in his book "The Sino-Japanese War," writes, "Although militarily it was a war that overwhelmed Qing, politically it was a failure" (Fujimura 1997, 8). This keenly points out that despite the Japanese army's undefeated victories against the Qing army in the Sino-Japanese War, the outcome led to the Triple Intervention, and Japan failed to achieve its objectives. Ultimately, Japan failed to achieve the war's primary objective: the reform of Joseon's internal affairs, i.e., its de facto colonization. Instead, it provided Russia with an excuse to intervene in Joseon, effectively returning to the Tianjin Treaty, or even earlier, after ten years of preparation.

However, that was not the end. The temporary retreat at Shimonoseki was merely a step forward for Japanese imperialism. The Sino-Japanese War at least "achieved the goal of independence, which had been a national task since the Meiji Restoration, through war with Asian nations and means of oppression" (Fujimura 1997, 6. The Sino-Japanese War and Japanese Imperialism: Its Beginning in Shimonoseki - Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall I 277). And what was most important about the Sino-Japanese War for Japan was that it demonstrated Japan's capability to pursue imperialism in East Asia, rivaling the Western powers. In other words, Japan achieved a somewhat equal footing with the Western powers in the East Asian region. This is also related to Japan's national pride; for example, Tokutomi Sohō pointed out that "Japan was drawn into the global sphere of life" and defined the period after the Sino-Japanese War as "a time of imperial self-awareness" (Fujimura 1997, 277). In summary, the Sino-Japanese War can be seen as an event that consolidated national unity in Japan and imprinted 'Imperial Japan' on the minds of Western powers as well as its own citizens.

Shimonoseki: Sharing the Fate of Japanese Imperialism

In short, the Shimonoseki Peace Memorial Hall, a small building by the sea, is a place that fully embodies the paradoxical fate of Japanese imperialism. Unlike the Chinese memorial hall, which boasts a large scale with exhibits like warship models covering an area of 10,000 square meters, the modest Japanese memorial hall, with its sparsely displayed furnishings used during the peace conference and Itō Hirobumi's relics, perhaps serves as a stark example of their contrasting historical perceptions. 7 Furthermore, the Shunpanrō (春帆楼), the negotiation venue at the time,

was burned down by American bombing in 1945.

(Shunpanrō)

Considering that it was burned down by American bombing in 1945, this place truly marks the beginning and end of Japanese imperialism.8 Mutsu Munemitsu, the Foreign Minister who led Japan at the dawn of the 20th century, titled his memoirs

8 Shunpanro Official Website. http://www.shunpanro.com/about/history.html

In other words, 'staggering gait' might have been a sharp critique of Shimonoseki and

(蹇蹇)

Japan's imperialist narrative. This was the space that whispered the story of East Asia, which stumbled amidst the waves of modernization. This was the site of the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall that I visited. ■

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: Rhee Book.

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(Accessed: January 18, 2015).

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Power, and Primacy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter

The End of China's World Order

Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall II

Gu, Min-seon

Yonsei University

Arriving in Shimonoseki

In [Year] [Month] [Day], we disembarked at the parking lot of Karato Market in Shimonoseki. A chilly sea breeze was blowing. In the distance, Shunpanro, the site where the Shimonoseki Treaty

下関条約, 马关条约 was negotiated and signed, came into view. Having purchased a lot of sushi at Karato Market, we received services like raw fish bowls and ate heartily, filling our stomachs with sushi and fugu tempura and fugu croquettes while enjoying the sea breeze outside the market. The strait we gazed at while eating sushi was likely the same strait viewed by Li Hongzhang (李鴻章), the plenipotentiary envoy of the Qing Empire, during the negotiations. This year marks the [Number]th anniversary of the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, and interest in the war is particularly high in China. Japan, victorious in its first foreign war, garnered the attention of all Japanese citizens during the Shimonoseki Treaty negotiations; however, unlike in China, there seems to be little interest in the First Sino-Japanese War in Japan today. The End of China's World Order: Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall II

After filling our stomachs with sushi, we walked for about [Number] minutes to reach Shunpanro and the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall (清日講和記念館). The entrances to Shunpanro and the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall were simpler than expected, and I was surprised that there was no mention of the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall at the entrance of Shunpanro.

After filling our stomachs with sushi, we walked for a little less than an hour to reach Chupon Road and the Qing-Japan Peace Memorial Hall (清日講和記念館). The entrances to Chupon Road and the Qing-Japan Peace Memorial Hall were simpler than expected, and I was surprised that there was no information whatsoever about the Qing-Japan Peace Memorial Hall at the entrance to Chupon Road.

Background of Shunpanro and the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall

Originally, the treaty negotiations and signing took place at Shunpanro, an inn. The Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall was built by the Shimonoseki city government between [Year] and [Year] and is currently a cultural property designated by the Japanese government. Shunpanro, which was destroyed by a US air raid in [Year], was not restored until [Year], and the current Shunpanro, built of concrete, was restored in [Year]. Interestingly, the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall suffered no damage during the US air raid in [Year]. However, considering the international political significance of Japan's victory in the First Sino-Japanese War and the peace treaty, the scale of the memorial hall commemorating the victory and the peace treaty seemed small and modest. Furthermore, despite being built during a period when Japan was expanding its influence in China, it failed to showcase Japan's international ambitions at all. Between the Shunpanro building and the memorial hall building stand statues of Ito Hirobumi (伊藤博文), then Prime Minister of Japan and chief negotiator for Japan, and Mutsu Munemitsu (陸奥宗光), then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, side by side. In Japan, they seem to be revered as heroes. Shunpanro became famous as the site of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, but it is currently a well-established brand in Japan as a high-end fugu (pufferfish) restaurant and inn.

A brief history of Shunpanro reveals that it was originally used as a clinic called Gepparo (月波楼). After the death of Fujino Genyo (藤野玄洋), a physician and the owner of the building, his wife converted the clinic into an inn and restaurant. In [Year], fugu cuisine was prohibited by law in Japan. However, the people of Shimonoseki traditionally ate fugu dishes only at home. Ito Hirobumi tasted fugu cuisine in [Year]. Then, in [Year], Ito Hirobumi lifted the ban on fugu cuisine, and Shunpanro became Japan's first fugu restaurant. Since then, famous Japanese figures such as Ito Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu became regular customers. Zong Zeyah The End of China's World Order: Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall II

Shimonoseki was chosen as the negotiation site for Shunpanro due to its proximity to Hiroshima, where the Japanese Emperor was located, and Ito Hirobumi's personal preference. There are several reasons why Ito Hirobumi chose Shunpanro as the negotiation site, but Shunpanro has a deep connection with him. First, Shunpanro means 'sailing in the spring sea,' a name Ito Hirobumi personally gave it. Also, the fact that the negotiations were held at his favorite restaurant, Shunpanro, reveals Ito Hirobumi's composure as a victor and Japan's dismissive attitude towards China. I also thought that if I had had the financial means during my visit to Japan, I would have stayed at Shunpanro for a day and enjoyed fugu cuisine to deepen my understanding of the Shimonoseki Treaty. To enhance understanding of the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall and the First Sino-Japanese War, it is essential to understand the background and process of this treaty. Even after [Number] years, the traces of the peace negotiations and the First Sino-Japanese War are still clearly visible, so I decided to study the background and process of the peace negotiations in advance. I decided to examine and recreate the background and process of the peace negotiations held at Shunpanro through primary sources, namely the negotiation records, and secondary sources, namely historical books.

The First Sino-Japanese War in [Year]: Was it Li Hongzhang's War?

In fact, the name 'First Sino-Japanese War' is a very neutral term. In China, the war occurred in the Jiawu (甲午) year, so it is called the Jiawu War or the Sino-Japanese Jiawu War. In Japan, it is called the Meiji [Number] War or the Sino-Japanese War. In the West, it is called

the Sino-Japanese War. However, the reason for calling it the First Sino-Japanese War here is twofold: first, it is a neutral term; second, to distinguish the Qing Dynasty from present-day China; and third, because it was a war between the Qing government and Japan, not between the Japanese people and the Chinese people. Some also refer to the First Sino-Japanese War as a war fought by Li Hongzhang alone against an entire nation. The reason Japan wanted to negotiate with Li Hongzhang was not only because he was the de facto leader but also because the Qing's defeat in the war was largely due to the Beiyang Fleet, commanded by Li Hongzhang. Foreign media also pointed to the lack of patriotism in China, referring to the First Sino-Japanese War as Li Hongzhang's personal war. In reality, the Qing military was not unified at the time. Li Hongzhang, the head of the Beiyang Fleet, had built the Beiyang Fleet, which was considered the strongest in the East at the time, before the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War. However, due to insufficient funding, training and reinforcement were not properly carried out, leading to the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. In essence, from the beginning of the First Sino-Japanese War to the signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty, Japan was dealing not with the Qing government but with Li Hongzhang as an individual. However, Japan made many demands on China through Li Hongzhang, and the Shimonoseki peace negotiations must have been an extremely difficult task for Li Hongzhang, whose influence in China was waning before and after the First Sino-Japanese War. Li Hongzhang's burden is clearly evident in his meeting with Ito Hirobumi. The End of China's World Order: Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall II

Recreating the Shimonoseki Treaty

For this Kyushu trip, I was assigned to present on the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall, and it was only upon arriving in Kyushu that I decided to perform there. The reasons were twofold: first, my preliminary research indicated that the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall was very small, making it insufficient and potentially boring to simply explain; second, the primary source material I found was the record of the Shimonoseki Treaty negotiations between Li Hongzhang and Ito Hirobumi, making a play the best way to express the confrontation between China and Japan. I took on the role of Li Hongzhang, the plenipotentiary envoy of the Qing Dynasty, and Lee Ju-won took on the role of Ito Hirobumi. We selected the difficult issues of the negotiations between Japan and China at the Shimonoseki talks and strived to accurately portray the psychological battle between Li Hongzhang and Ito Hirobumi. However, as it was the last day of the trip, time was very limited, so we could only present a performance focusing on a few issues. Moreover, as I left for Kyushu right after the end of the semester, I had to go to Japan without properly memorizing the lines. Fortunately, thinking about the negotiation process and content from Li Hongzhang's and China's perspective, the role-playing did not feel too difficult. Reviewing the negotiation records before the trip, I easily felt Li Hongzhang's frustration and despair during the negotiations. He must have negotiated until the end, considering not only the negotiations for China but also his domestic reputation. He was in a position where he had to negotiate in a peace conference after China's inevitable defeat, and his sincerity is well reflected in the negotiation records. Unlike Japan, China had not adopted Western civilization, and thus was defeated by Japan, which had undergone modernization, in the First Sino-Japanese War. In fact, the First Sino-Japanese War was a war between two civilizations rather than a war between two countries. That is, at the end of the 19th century, China was a very backward society compared to Japan, and was weaker or inferior to Japan in various aspects, including military, politics, society, and national character. Considering these points, Li Hongzhang, who likely foresaw China's defeat, had to engage in negotiations that were almost like begging, rather than negotiating as a representative of a defeated nation, and he likely had few cards to play at the negotiation table. With these thoughts in mind, I wanted to express Li Hongzhang's difficult position and frustration during the negotiations well through a performance at the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall.

The Shimonoseki Peace Negotiations: A Meeting Fraught with Difficulty

To better understand the First Sino-Japanese War and the Sino-Japanese War Peace Treaty Memorial Hall, it is essential to be familiar with the process and content of the peace negotiations between China and Japan. This is because, from the beginning of the negotiations, the chief negotiator for China was not Li Hongzhang. After many twists and turns, the Qing government sent Li Hongzhang, and only then did Japan seem satisfied and proceed with the negotiations.

Two months after the war began, in March [Year], the Qing military strength began to falter. In early April, the Japanese army began to land on the Liaodong Peninsula, and discussions about a ceasefire and negotiations began. The Shimonoseki peace negotiations, initiated with the mediation of the United States, were not easy. Looking at the historical records until the signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty on April 17, [Year], some records state that there were three rounds of negotiations, while others state there were two. In conclusion, there were significant differences between China and Japan during the Shimonoseki peace negotiations, and the prolonged negotiation period was not unrelated to Japan's negotiation strategy. Japan sought to prolong the negotiations for two main reasons: first, to buy time for Japan to continue its military attacks on China; and second, to maximize Japan's gains from China by expanding the territories occupied by Japan. Furthermore, Japan adopted a strategy of not disclosing the peace terms to China or other countries, which not only delayed the negotiations but also prevented interference from Western powers. In other words, Ito Hirobumi had already predicted that if the peace terms were leaked externally, Western powers would not remain idle.

The Fourth Meeting: The Failed First Meeting in Hiroshima

In March, Li Hongzhang asked the resident official in Tianjin, Gustav Detring, a naturalized German customs officer, to deliver a handwritten letter to Ito Hirobumi. However, Ito Hirobumi refused the meeting, stating that the Qing government's representative was unsuitable. Two days later, Detring left Hiroshima. Fourth Meeting: The attempt at a meeting in Hiroshima fails again.

One month after the fourth meeting was decided, the Qing lost battles in Weihaiwei, a port city at the northern tip of the Shandong Peninsula, and Haicheng, which had been the base of the Beiyang Fleet and was occupied by the Japanese army in 1895 during the Sino-Japanese War. The Qing government, following the advice of the United States, appointed two plenipotentiary envoys: Zhang Yinheng, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Revenue and a member of the Zongli Yamen, and Shao Youlian, Vice Minister of the Board of War and Governor of Hunan. They were dispatched to Japan, and Japan was notified of this. In Japan, Ito Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu were appointed as Japan's special plenipotentiary representatives. The reason why China ultimately did not appoint high-ranking officials was likely because they did not yet consider Japan an equal opponent.

Finally, on April 1, Zhang Yinheng and Shao Youlian arrived in Hiroshima as Qing plenipotentiary representatives. Before the meeting could even begin, Japan again became fixated on the word "plenipotentiary" (全权). Japan did not recognize the documents submitted by Zhang Yinheng and Shao Youlian to the Japanese side as letters of full authority, and Mutsu

argued that they lacked the authority or ability to negotiate and make decisions, and decided to suspend the peace talks. However, according to Chinese sources, the word "adjudication" (裁决) in the Qing documents was used with the same meaning as "full authority," which the Japanese government valued. Qi Qizhang. Consequently, on April 2, Japan unilaterally informed Zhang Yinheng that the meeting was suspended because the Qing representatives lacked full authority. As the Qing entourage was about to leave the meeting venue, Ito Hirobumi called out to Wu Tingfang, whom he had seen among the entourage during the Tianjin negotiations in 1895, and asked him to convey a message to Li Hongzhang, explaining why the Japanese government valued letters of full authority. Mutsu

In other words, Japan wanted to negotiate with individuals who could implement the agreements reached in the negotiations.

However, Japan's obsession with plenipotentiary representatives can be interpreted differently, relating to the negotiation strategies of Ito Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu. These two, from the outset of devising their negotiation strategy, aimed to prolong the negotiation period as much as possible (Qi Qizhang). Thus, the negotiations in Hiroshima ended without properly beginning, wasting time without any results. Meanwhile, the war continued, and the longer the negotiations were delayed, the more advantageous it became for the Japanese army, putting the Qing side at a disadvantage. Ultimately, the peace talks in Hiroshima, which were decided twice, only benefited Japan. Fourth Meeting: Li Hongzhang goes to Shimonoseki as Qing's plenipotentiary representative.

On April 17, Zhang Yinheng and Shao Youlian left Nagasaki to return to China, and on the same day, Weihaiwei was captured by Japan, and the Beiyang Fleet was almost annihilated. As the two rounds of negotiations yielded no results and the Qing suffered consecutive defeats, the Qing government notified Japan on April 21 through its minister in the United States that Li Hongzhang had been appointed as the supreme plenipotentiary representative and granted full authority. Mutsu. Accordingly, Shimonoseki was chosen as the meeting place, and from April 23 to April 29, a total of five negotiation sessions were held. Both countries had no disagreement on the independence of Joseon, which was the original purpose of the Sino-Japanese War, but the negotiation content shows that Li Hongzhang and Ito Hirobumi engaged in a fierce war of nerves over other issues. Among the most prominent challenges were the armistice treaty, issues of indemnity and interest, territorial cession, and the timing and location of the exchange. Judging from the actual negotiation records between Li Hongzhang and Ito Hirobumi, there was almost no room for negotiation; Japan did not consider Li Hongzhang's demands at all. Imagining Li Hongzhang, who was compared to Bismarck of Prussia, begging Ito Hirobumi for a reduction in the indemnity on the negotiation floor, one can understand how humiliating the Sino-Japanese War is for China today.

Ito Hirobumi, well aware of Li Hongzhang's power and influence, insisted on exchanging letters of full authority from the first day of negotiations, even though Li Hongzhang had come to Shimonoseki as Qing's plenipotentiary representative. Although China found Japan's insistence on full authority unwelcome, Japan had its own valid reasons. According to the records of Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu, the reason China sent unsuitable individuals was that China had not yet acknowledged its defeat and lacked the will to end the war. Foreign observers even evaluated China's initial choice of a German envoy as a lack of sincerity on the part of the Qing government.

Overall, Japan's distrust of China appears to have been very significant. Furthermore, the meeting between Li Hongzhang and Ito Hirobumi was conducted in English to prevent misunderstandings or ambiguities caused by mistranslation. This was stated by Ito Hirobumi, who believed that conducting negotiations in English would be clearer. Therefore, in case of disputes related to the treaty, an English version of the final treaty was prepared in addition to the Chinese and Japanese versions to prevent misunderstandings.

Therefore, in case of disputes related to the treaty, an English version of the final treaty was prepared in addition to the Chinese and Japanese versions to prevent misunderstandings.

Thus, after much difficulty, Li Hongzhang, who arrived in Shimonoseki on April 23, likely did not anticipate Japan's unreasonable demands. In the first three meetings of the Shimonoseki negotiations, which primarily focused on the armistice treaty, both countries engaged in a tense tug-of-war. Japan repeatedly rejected Li Hongzhang's demands for an armistice and, far from considering an armistice, occupied Dagu, Tianjin, and Shanhaiguan, which were under Qing control at the time, during the negotiations. Furthermore, Japan confiscated the Qing army's equipment and weapons and even proposed a condition that China would bear all costs incurred by the Japanese army during the armistice period. Mutsu. In response, Li Hongzhang requested a relaxation of the conditions for the sake of his reputation, as these three locations were under his jurisdiction, but Ito Hirobumi flatly refused, stating it was to see China's sincerity towards peace. As no agreement on the armistice treaty terms could be reached by the third meeting, Li Hongzhang withdrew his armistice proposal.

Although China decided to abandon the armistice treaty, the heavens seemed to favor the Qing on the third day of the meeting. On April 12, as Li Hongzhang was returning to his lodging after the meeting, a Japanese youth named Koyama Toyotaro attempted to assassinate him. The assassination attempt by the Japanese youth reflected the widespread euphoria and radicalism in Japanese society at the time (Zong Zeya). These extremist groups argued that it was too early for Japan to gain sufficient benefits through peace negotiations with China. Therefore, they believed that assassinating Li Hongzhang was a way to halt the ongoing peace talks and acted accordingly (Zong Zeya).

Fortunately, the bullet fired by Koyama Toyotaro at Li Hongzhang's sedan chair lodged in his cheek, just below his left eye, posing no serious threat to his life. However, since surgery to remove the bullet would prolong his recovery period, Li Hongzhang decided not to have the bullet removed and continued to negotiate for the remaining period

with a bullet lodged in his face. ◀ Interior of the Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall: A restored view of the negotiation venue during the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty.

After the assassination attempt, Japan's treatment of Li Hongzhang changed dramatically. The Japanese Empress even bestowed imperial bandages upon him, and people across Japan visited Li Hongzhang's lodging to offer their condolences. Mutsu. Moreover, the Japanese government had to consider the opinions of Western countries, as there was a possibility that China might use the assassination attempt as a reason to suspend negotiations and seek intervention or mediation from Western powers. Mutsu.

Therefore, after careful consideration, the Japanese government agreed to an armistice with China on April 17. Mutsu. Ultimately, perhaps the blood Li Hongzhang shed in Shimonoseki was the most valuable blood for China.

When Li Hongzhang returned to the negotiation venue for the fourth meeting on April 24, Ito Hirobumi did not make any concessions. The fourth and fifth meetings primarily dealt with the indemnity issue. Li Hongzhang tried to beg for a reduction in the indemnity, stating that the 200 million taels demanded by Japan was excessive. However, after holding out until the sixth negotiation, Li Hongzhang had no choice but to accept Japan's peace terms, which included an indemnity of 200 million taels and the cession of Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula. The reason for this was likely that he directly saw the Japanese fleet in the Kanmon Strait from the negotiation venue.

Li Hongzhang Road

As you exit the memorial hall, there is a very narrow alley to the left of the entrance to Chunghwa Road, and this is Li Hongzhang Road (李鸿章道). This alley was created by the Japanese government between the negotiation venue and Li Hongzhang's lodging at the Injoksa Temple (仁接寺) for Li Hongzhang's safety during the negotiations. Zong Zeya.

This alley is also where the assassination attempt on Li Hongzhang occurred. However, the interesting fact is that the city of Shimonoseki designated this alley as a cultural property. Was it designated because Li Hongzhang was so popular in Japan? Or was it another way for Japan to assert its national pride by marking the Japanese soil that Li Hongzhang, the "Bismarck of the East" of Qing China, trod during his negotiations in Shimonoseki?

I lean towards the latter. After touring the Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall, we tried to find the Injoksa Temple where Li Hongzhang stayed by following Li Hongzhang Road, but we couldn't find it. Looking back, it was located quite far from Chunghwa Road.

European Intervention Against Japan: The Triple Intervention and the Return of the Liaodong Peninsula

The small size and modest interior of the Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall are likely due to the influence of the Triple Intervention that occurred after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Immediately after the Sino-Japanese War, Japan was filled with the joy of victory, but this festive mood did not last long. On April 23, 1895, the day the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, the German government sent its fleet to the Far East, arguing that the cession of Qing territory threatened Germany's commercial interests. Russia also opposed Japan's territorial demands extending to the Yalu River. France agreed with Russia's stance, and the three Western powers began demanding the return of the Liaodong Peninsula on April 25. As the stance of Russia, Germany, and France became more assertive, Japan permanently returned the Liaodong Peninsula to China on November 8. This Triple Intervention demonstrates that a balance of power was at play in East Asia at the turn of the century, with Germany, in particular, restraining Japan on racial grounds. In other words, Germany, despising the Yellow race, constantly monitored and suppressed Japan's expansion. Generally, Western powers could not tolerate a non-white nation like Japan taking away the benefits gained by white nations in Asia. Zong Zeya. Thus, at the turn of the century, East Asia was incorporated into the international political order led by the West as the Chinese world order collapsed.

120 Years Ago Today and the Future of East Asia

While much has changed over the past 120 years, some things have remained the same, as I learned during my visit to the Sino-Japanese War Memorial Hall. If Japan's economic stagnation and China's simultaneous economic rise have reversed the positions of China and Japan, then what has remained unchanged over the past 120 years is the distrust between China and Japan. This mutual distrust appears to be very severe today. In the Sino-Japanese War, Japan's distrust of China was profound, and this distrust is also very evident in the current relationship between China and Japan. While 120 years ago Japan feared that China would not keep its promises, today China fears that Japan will not revert to a militaristic state, and at the same time, Japan is also engulfed in anxiety that a powerful China might pose a threat to Japan. Resolving this distrust is the most urgent task that not only China and Japan but also East Asian countries must address today.

Furthermore, the Sino-Japanese War of 120 years ago has had a profound impact not only on the bilateral relationship between China and Japan today but also on East Asia and the entire world. From an international political perspective, the Sino-Japanese War of 120 years ago signifies the dismantling of the Chinese world order and is a war that represents the theory of power politics in realism. As the world order centered around the Qing Dynasty collapsed, Japan emerged as a new regional power, but its new status was short-lived due to the Triple Intervention.

Having lost its world order due to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China has been striving to regain its self-esteem and regional hegemony by reconstructing the East Asian order, emerging as an economic and military power in the 21st century after enduring a century of humiliation. If Japan achieved its dream through the Sino-Japanese War 120 years ago, China today is trying to achieve the "Chinese Dream" through various means. There is growing interest in whether China will resort to the use of force or war to realize the "Chinese Dream." Especially since Xi Jinping became president, China has been regaining its pre-Sino-Japanese War status through new diplomatic strategies such as "new type of great power relations" and "border diplomacy." As China continues to rise, changes in the East Asian order are inevitable, and there is growing interest in whether it will revert to a China-centric world order. Furthermore, the choices and strategies of South Korea, which perceives China's rise as a threat, and Japan, caught in between, will be a matter of concern for future generations. ■ References

Doosan Encyclopedia, Weihai (Retrieved).

Mutsu Munemitsu, Kenkenroku, translated by Kim Seung-il, Seoul: Beomusa, Chunghwa-ro.

Qi Qizhang, History of the Sino-Japanese War, Beijing: People's Publishing House. Zong Zeya, Sino-Japanese War, Beijing: Hou Lang.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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