[East Asia Institute-Choi Soon-hyuk Academy-Seoul National University Institute for National Future Strategy Joint Academic Forum] China and Japan Strategies Amidst US-China Strategic Competition

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=94o6OmE24-M

Video Script

This is about Korea-Japan relations. Regarding Korea-Japan relations, as I briefly mentioned earlier, both Korea-Japan relations and policy toward Japan have shown considerable fluctuations depending on the administration. When the East Asia Institute conducted a survey after the five-year term of the Moon Jae-in administration's foreign policy evaluation, policy toward Japan was ranked the lowest. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration's term has been too short to conduct a survey yet, but policy toward Japan and Korea-Japan relations are likely among the highest-rated policies. In this short period, there has been a significant amplitude, meaning it has moved like a roller coaster. Therefore, there seem to be considerable concerns about whether the policy toward Japan under the Lee Jae-myung administration will also experience another roller coaster ride. What I intend to discuss today is, first, the policy toward Japan of the new administration, and whether this policy can smoothly continue on the extension line of the policy toward Japan of the past three years, which depends on President Lee Jae-myung's

said immediately after taking office. First, he said he would inherit the policies of the previous administration. Second, he said that agreements made in the past must be observed. Third, historical issues are important, but it is not good to mix historical issues with cooperation tasks. These are the three points. These are being perceived as inheriting the basic tone of the previous administration's policy toward Japan, and therefore, Japan and the United States are in a relatively relieved mood. I will first discuss whether this tone can be maintained for five years, and in relation to that, there seem to be two things to consider. One is how the domestic situation in our country will unfold. This is because, looking at the roller coaster of Korea-Japan relations over the past decade, it has been more of a roller coaster related to domestic political changes in both countries rather than a result of external changes. Therefore, the domestic situation in Korea, and similarly, Japan is also a variable.

We will also need to discuss Japanese politics for the next few years. This is the first point. The second point is whether this tone will be maintained, and if it is maintained, then what about the so-called future-oriented cooperation between Korea and Japan? In other words, what needs to be done? If time permits, I will discuss this further. We need to look at two main points. First, I should start by discussing the changes in Japan. Since the Trump administration came into power, the overall atmosphere of Japanese diplomacy has been one of anxiety and distrust, even distrust. Originally, the basic stance of the Japanese government toward the US until last year, and this year as well, is that the liberal international order is a crucial condition for protecting Japan's national interests. Therefore, to protect this liberal international order, it must pursue a global partnership with the United States. This is the position of the Japanese government. In other words, there is the US-Japan alliance, and this US-Japan alliance is to be elevated beyond mere defense of Japan to the level of protecting regional and global order and a great power order. Thus, the title of US-Japan summit meetings has consistently been global partnership. This changed through the Trump risk.

From Japan's perspective, it is a rather ambitious vision and goal to actively fill the vacuum created by the relative decline of US global leadership, in partnership with the US, in terms of US hegemony or the global liberal order. That is, to exercise joint leadership as a junior partner. However, this was critically shaken with the advent of the Trump administration. The reason is that the Trump administration does not recognize, and in fact denies, the international order based on values that the Japanese government has promoted with the Biden administration, and it is also stating that alliances are no longer based on values. From Japan's perspective, this value-based diplomacy, or value diplomacy, which was a core of Abe's diplomacy, has entered a period of profound confusion in the Trump era. Therefore, in Japan, regarding alliances...

There seem to be two ways of talking about alliances with the Trump administration: one is about the cost relationship. First, despite being security alliances, how much benefit do allied countries bring to American workers and businesses? This is the number one criterion for evaluating alliances. Second, how much can they reduce security risks to the United States? That is, if an allied country like Japan faces a security threat or risk, it is transferred to the United States. In this process, how much of the burden that the US has to bear can the allied country take on?

As Professor Kim Jung mentioned in the first session, this creates a dilemma for Japan where alliance utility decreases while costs increase. This would be the second criterion for alliances. Therefore, Japan is now proceeding with a readjustment of its alliance with the United States based on these two criteria. In the negotiation process, Japan is keenly realizing that, as always, the United States is actively utilizing the disproportionate dependency structure of its allies on the US, both economically and in terms of security, in negotiations with its allies. This is because the negotiations are structured in such a way that deals are made within this context. Therefore, one of the sentiments in Japan regarding this Trump risk is that while the integration of alliances must continue, at the same time, the excessive dependence on the US must be reduced to a certain extent.

In other words, in the process of significantly de-risking from China, the dependence on the US has greatly increased. Tariffs are also a consequence of this problem. Therefore, the idea that we must seriously consider de-risking from China, reducing dependence on China, and reducing dependence on the US is now emerging. Therefore, this may become one axis for observing Japan's changes over the next five years. Here, I have roughly divided it into Plan A and Plan B. Plan A is the Japan we are currently observing, which actively pursues the US-Japan alliance to help maintain the US hegemonic order. To achieve this, it aims to expand collective freedom, expand Japan's military intervention globally, further strengthen integration with the US, promote the Indo-Pacific strategy of freedom and openness as a pillar, and actively pursue it.

In that context, the biggest challenge for the US-Japan alliance is how to make Japan independent. Ultimately, it is about trying to meet the two criteria for alliances of the Trump administration as much as possible. So, that is the direction for alliances. Second, on the economic front, it involves expanding investment in the US to meet the interests of American workers and businesses as much as possible, and opening up the Japanese domestic market to achieve a long-term balance in the current trade imbalance between the US and Japan. This is one aspect. Simultaneously, Plan B is emerging, which questions whether this will lead to increasing dependence on the US. If excessive dependence deepens, how should Japan strategize in the face of current anxiety and distrust towards the US? Plan B is now being discussed extensively. The core of Plan B is that the US hegemonic order may no longer be sustainable.

If this happens, rather than new alternatives emerging, the order will likely become very fluid for the time being, and risks will expand significantly. Therefore, risk management is the most important thing. That is, maximizing utility should be abandoned, and dependence on the US should be reduced in a direction related to risk management or risk reduction. This is not about advocating for Japan's self-reliance, but rather about establishing an appropriate level of interdependence with the US and other major powers. To achieve this, military power should be strengthened, and defense spending should be used not just for spending, but for self-reliance, as mentioned earlier, and for self-strengthening. Furthermore, due to distrust of the US, multilateralism must be actively pursued, and also plurilateralism, that is...

The solidarity of countries that share values must be actively pursued. In that sense, it is necessary to gradually balance alliances with self-reliance. However, the deterrence system against China must be thoroughly maintained. Economic diplomacy, as briefly mentioned, requires an appropriate balance of interdependence between the US and Japan, and an appropriate balance among the US, China, and Japan. Also, a very important mechanism is the active expansion of CPTPP, and the restoration of the liberal order through it. These are the ideas that are being discussed a lot recently. And as you know, there was an election last Sunday. This table shows the major parties' foreign policy platforms compiled by the Japanese side. As you know, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan expanded from 1 seat to 15 seats, and the Democratic Party also made significant gains. Those two parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party is a far-right party. That party has now expanded to 15 seats.

And the Democratic Party also states in its foreign policy that it must prepare alternatives to the asymmetry of alliances. Therefore, looking at the two minor parties that made significant gains this time, the election results show a slight shift towards Plan B, which I discussed earlier. Of course, this does not mean that Japan is heading in that direction, but I am saying that the atmosphere in Japan is changing quite fluidly.

Time is up. If it goes like this for Korea and Japan, then in this context, what about Korea and Japan? I have discussed Japan's dilemma, and many people here perceive it as Korea's dilemma as well. To that extent, there is a shared sense of suffering regarding the Trump risk between Korea and Japan, and it is true that this is increasing the need for strategic cooperation. And along with this necessity, domestic conditions for strategic partnership are also being created to a considerable extent. Therefore, this...

table needs to be mentioned. This is the result of a public opinion survey conducted by our institute. It is an impression of Japan. Starting from 2020, it has increased enormously, by 50%, meaning fivefold, and negative impressions have decreased accordingly, resulting in a significant golden cross. Paradoxically, the top 1, 2, and 3 reasons for disliking Japan are all historical issues. That is, the reason we dislike Japan is historical issues, and even though these issues have not been resolved, the impression of Japan has been steadily and firmly increasing. That is...

There is a reason for the improvement in the impression of Japan. And our analysis shows that the factors are the direct experience of Japan, tourism in Japan, Japanese popular culture, and Japanese food culture, which are the biggest factors influencing the impression of the Korean public. This is even driving trust in Japan considerably. What does this mean? The existing grammar of Korea-Japan relations is this: when historical issues arise, distrust of the other country occurs as a result, leading to a spiral of distrust between the two countries, and consequently, a vicious cycle where cooperation is avoided. However, looking at recent phenomena, historical issues remain as they are, and despite the continuous emergence of various issues related to historical problems, the fact that it does not lead to distrust seems to be a major change. Therefore, from now on, rather than falling into the spiral of distrust mentioned earlier, it seems that historical issues and cooperation can operate separately, as seen in public opinion surveys. This is from the perspective of the public. There are a few additional points. Nevertheless, there are still significant differences in the views on Korea-Japan relations between progressives and conservatives, and between the ruling and opposition parties. As you can see here, conservatives expect Korea-Japan relations to improve after the launch of the new government, while progressives overwhelmingly expect them to worsen. This is because of the nature of progressive governments that conservatives hold, and because of that. Second, this is an evaluation of attitudes toward improving Korea-Japan relations by ideological orientation. As you can see here, polarization is occurring very strongly starting from 2022. You can see that the impression of Japan is rapidly increasing among conservatives, while it is decreasing or stagnating among progressives regarding the improvement of Korea-Japan relations.

This means that while the conservative camp and those who supported Yoon Suk-yeol in the last election are very supportive of the policy toward Japan, the opposing forces are very dissatisfied with the improvement of policy toward Japan. Considering the results of this election, the recent remarks by President Lee Jae-myung, and the current government's stance towards Japan, there is a positive evaluation of the improvement of Korea-Japan relations from the conservative camp. On the other hand, although the progressive camp feels that way, the progressive camp is continuously and actively supporting the Lee Jae-myung administration. Therefore, at present, regarding Korea-Japan relations, smooth sailing can be expected to some extent.

In summary, the first variable for future Korea-Japan relations will be domestic politics in Korea. Within the context of significant division between progressives and conservatives on the issue of Japan, the domestic political dynamics related to whether the progressive camp will continue to support the Lee Jae-myung administration's policy toward Japan, and whether the Lee Jae-myung administration can maintain its current policy stance toward Japan, will be a variable. Second is Japan. I will discuss this further if I have the opportunity, but the coalition government of the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito seems to be largely established. Therefore, political instability due to coalition politics among various parties is likely to continue in Japanese politics. This is because the coalition of just the LDP and Komeito cannot govern the country, so it will enter a phase of issue-by-issue coalitions with other parties or other forms of coalition. In such a case, politics can become quite...

unstable. Second is the variable of the Constitutional Democratic Party. The support for the Constitutional Democratic Party this time was due to the defection of votes from the Liberal Democratic Party to the far-right Constitutional Democratic Party. Therefore, within the Liberal Democratic Party, there are voices saying that they must strengthen their right-wing stance to avoid losing more votes, and this could become a variable for future Korea-Japan relations. I will discuss the remaining parts further through the discussion session if there is an opportunity. Thank you very much.

To put it briefly, the first variable for future Korea-Japan relations will be domestic politics in Korea. Within the context of significant division between progressives and conservatives on the issue of Japan, the domestic political dynamics related to whether the progressive camp will continue to support the Lee Jae-myung administration's policy toward Japan, and whether the Lee Jae-myung administration can maintain its current policy stance toward Japan, will be a variable. Second is Japan. I will discuss this further if I have the opportunity, but the coalition government of the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito seems to be largely established. Therefore, political instability due to coalition politics among various parties is likely to continue in Japanese politics. This is because the coalition of just the LDP and Komeito cannot govern the country, so it will enter a phase of issue-by-issue coalitions with other parties or other forms of coalition. In such a case, politics can become quite unstable. Second is the variable of the Constitutional Democratic Party. The support for the Constitutional Democratic Party this time was due to the defection of votes from the Liberal Democratic Party to the far-right Constitutional Democratic Party. Therefore, within the Liberal Democratic Party, there are voices saying that they must strengthen their right-wing stance to avoid losing more votes, and this could become a variable for future Korea-Japan relations. I will discuss the remaining parts further through the discussion session if there is an opportunity. Thank you very much.

unstable. Second is the variable of the Constitutional Democratic Party. The support for the Constitutional Democratic Party this time was due to the defection of votes from the Liberal Democratic Party to the far-right Constitutional Democratic Party. Therefore, within the Liberal Democratic Party, there are voices saying that they must strengthen their right-wing stance to avoid losing more votes, and this could become a variable for future Korea-Japan relations. I will discuss the remaining parts further through the discussion session if there is an opportunity. Thank you very much.

This is Son In-ju from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. The reason I am introduced on stage today, in place of a distinguished senior professor specializing in China, might be partly due to my seniority, but more importantly, because this forum is co-hosted with the Institute for National Future Strategy. Therefore, I believe I was asked to speak as the Vice President of the Institute for National Future Strategy at Seoul National University. Today, I will focus on two main topics within the foreign policy of the new administration, primarily concerning China strategy. The first is the issue of how we should view China today. In relation to this topic, I will briefly discuss China's duality and its two-sided nature.

Second, I will present the direction and three strategies for coexisting with China and responding strategically. In today's Xi Jinping era, China is, on one hand, showing a very assertive and confident diplomatic posture. However, on the other hand, it also possesses internal instability and structural vulnerabilities in its system. Without understanding these two faces simultaneously, it will be difficult to accurately understand and interpret China's strategies and actions. First, let's discuss the assertive China.

China's external confidence and assertive attitude are based not only on its material power, i.e., economic rise and scientific and technological strength, but also on spiritual elements, namely the worldview, historical view, and vision of the Chinese Communist Party leadership. The Xi Jinping administration has set the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as its core national objective. This narrative is not mere rhetoric but is being used as a justification for concrete foreign and security strategies that extend to issues concerning Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. For example, China tends to interpret the Taiwan issue not as a simple territorial dispute, but as a restoration of the world order that collapsed after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.

From this perspective, the loss of Taiwan is a symbol of foreign domination and a core trauma for the Chinese nation. Therefore, President Xi Jinping has repeatedly declared that he will not rule out the use of force for Taiwan's unification and is practicing his will for historical restoration through military exercises by the People's Liberation Army. The claims of maritime sovereignty in the East China Sea and South China Sea are also explained from the perspective of restoration rather than expansion. A recent representative example of assertiveness is the naval military exercises conducted by China that surprised Australia. Although reported by major media outlets including the Wall Street Journal, live-fire exercises were conducted for the first time in international waters between Australia and New Zealand. They showed military exercises circling Australia, and on the right is the number of incursions across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which is considered the de facto boundary between China and Taiwan, and this has also become very frequent.

As these military clashes become increasingly frequent to the point of becoming routine, the risk of unplanned accidental clashes or collisions between fighter jets escalating military tensions unpredictably is also increasing. On the other hand, Chinese rulers seem to feel internal anxiety as well. Please do not misunderstand what I am saying. This does not mean that the Chinese Communist Party's one-party system will collapse or that Xi Jinping's power will weaken. Social control management in state-society relations is superficially well-managed, and internal party management is also not a major problem. Nevertheless, concerns about significant internal vulnerabilities are repeatedly appearing in messages from within the party and messages directed outward, which have become more severe since the second term of Hu Jintao, after Xi Jinping's rise to power. Some possible reasons for this include the slowdown in economic growth, particularly the decline in double-digit growth rates since Xi Jinping took office, the severe youth unemployment problem, the widening gap between rich and poor and deepening inequality within China, which claims to be a socialist country, the difficulty in explaining this, the persistent corruption problems despite the anti-corruption campaign, and the possibility of power struggles in a situation where the succession issue is unclear. The most fundamental issue seems to be the concern about the sustainability of the one-party dictatorship system of the Communist Party.

The Communist Party has built a stronger system of control and surveillance with this sense of crisis. Since the appearance of General Secretary Xi Jinping, the concentration of power has accelerated. Recently, the anti-corruption campaign, particularly targeting lower-level officials in China's provinces, has been intensified since last year.

Previously, it targeted high-ranking officials, so-called 'tigers,' but now the crackdown is intensifying against grassroots, lower-level officials, so-called 'flies' or 'mosquitoes.' This year, the rectification campaign within the party has also been strengthened. However, such strong control can weaken economic vitality or hinder social dynamism, which in turn can create a vicious cycle leading to a crisis of legitimacy for the system. This anxiety can also affect foreign and military strategies. The reason China is acting assertively is not only an expression of confidence but can also be a reaction to anxiety. Therefore, when we observe China's assertive actions, we must also read the underlying structural vulnerabilities and sense of crisis.

Therefore, I will present three principles and strategies for coexisting with China, which has the duality of assertiveness and anxiety. The first is principled pluralism. Although China, an authoritarian regime, forces a single voice, Korea must adhere to principled diplomacy based on the constitutional values of freedom, diversity, and the rule of law. We believe that flexible diplomacy based on principles, not simple hawkishness or appeasement, is necessary. Diverse perspectives, including positive or critical opinions about China, optimism, and pessimism, should be freely discussed in Korea's national discourse. However, if China or other state actors unjustly infringe upon the freedom and rights of our citizens, they must be dealt with strictly according to the law.

Next, what I propose is the 'Korea-led concentric circle strategy.' This means employing a multi-layered strategy that considers both the importance of material power, such as military strength, economic power, and scientific and technological capabilities, and the importance of identity, i.e., how much it converges with Korea in terms of institutions, norms, and historical perspectives, in prioritizing Korean diplomacy. The closer it is to Korea, the greater the importance of material power.

For example, in the case of the United States, it still occupies the core concentric circle in terms of national power and the convergence of identity. However, this is just one example, and its position may change in five or ten years. Currently, China has a significant impact on South Korea's security and economy, but its influence on South Korea's scientific and technological and cultural development is relatively minimal. Furthermore, while China shares international norms with South Korea, such as respect for sovereignty based on international law and the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction, the gap in identity and principles such as liberal democracy, human rights, and historical perspectives is widening. Recently, the Chinese government has intensified ideological competition on a global scale by promoting its development model as superior to the Western model. The South Korean government must manage its relationship with China in a stable and delicate manner. At the same time, it must also soberly recognize the strategic constraints faced by South Korea as an ally of the United States amidst the escalating US-China hegemonic competition.

Third, I would like to propose 'joint resilience training.' In the context of prolonged US-China strategic competition, South Korea's unilateral response has limitations. Therefore, South Korea must seek strategies to enhance joint resilience with like-minded countries, including the United States. This was also the core logic presented in a report published by the Institute for National Future Strategy at the end of last year. This concept means that while recognizing the risks of global networks and systems, and the potential for cascading damage, we must possess the ability to recover quickly when problems arise. The intention is to constrain the coercive exercise of power by potential provocators through such response strategies. For example, supply chains and shipping networks linked to South Korea,

military alliances, and information and communication networks. This will reduce the effect of provocation and thereby constrain the provocator's capacity for coercive use of force. In addition, the trilateral cooperation between Korea, the United States, and Japan must be maintained. Although maintaining this cooperative system may not be easy given the changing circumstances, we must develop a platform that allows Korea and Japan to prevent extreme conflict between the US and China and manage China's complex challenges, while maintaining cooperative systems not only in diplomacy and security but also in economy and finance.

Furthermore, in bilateral relations with China, it is necessary to diversify diplomatic channels. Currently, China's policy decision-making process is overwhelmingly influenced by General Secretary Xi Jinping. Therefore, summit meetings are important, and working-level meetings are also important. Holding summit meetings is necessary. Additionally, in the policy decision-making process, the Chinese State Council and the National People's Congress have little power; ultimately, the Communist Party makes the decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to establish channels for consultation with the Communist Party. Since it is understood to be very difficult for South Korea's ruling and opposition parties to engage individually, I propose attempting to establish a '2+2' consultation channel involving China's State Council administration, the Communist Party, and South Korea's bipartisan party-government consultation body and the South Korean administration. Public diplomacy is also needed now. This is also necessary and will be discussed in more detail in the next session. Furthermore, I believe it is necessary to activate cooperation in culture and transnational crime, and a Korea-China-Japan cooperation body that includes Japan, not just bilateral cooperation between Korea and China.

This slide is titled 'Beyond China, Beyond US.' The United States and China are extremely important to our nation. Therefore, it is time to think globally and strategically, cooperating with the US and China while also looking beyond them.

In the medium to long term, we must reduce our economic dependence on the US and China. In this regard, it is also time to actively pursue a global strategy of expanding overseas production bases in Eastern Europe, East Africa, South America, the Middle East, India, etc., where there are private sector exchanges, and connecting these overseas base production facilities with Korea through logistics networks and maritime logistics networks. To conclude my presentation, I would like to add one more point. Even in Washington, a definitive answer to China strategy has not been found. Therefore, there is an opportunity for Korea's voice and ideas to have a real impact on the international stage. I hope that the principled pluralism, multi-layered concentric circle strategy, and network-based joint resilience enhancement that I have mentioned will serve as useful references for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in establishing its China policy and diplomatic strategy. I hope that the principled pluralism, multi-layered concentric circle strategy, and network-based joint resilience enhancement that I have mentioned will serve as useful references for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in establishing its China policy and diplomatic strategy.

Thank you. Personally, I am greatly honored to moderate this session. Director Son Yeol has a long history of engagement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has provided much advice. Professor Son In-ju is the Vice President of the Institute for National Future Strategy, where I continue to work after my retirement, and is the chairperson of the Global Cluster to which I belong. I attended university with Senior Research Fellow Lee Sang-hyun and served as Director-General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together. I am very pleased to be with these individuals due to these special connections. First, we will hear the discussant remarks from Senior Research Fellow Lee Sang-hyun, followed by the discussion. Due to time constraints, it will be difficult to take questions from the floor. If you have any urgent questions, please pass them on a note, and we will try to incorporate them if possible. Dr. Lee Sang-hyun.

Yes, thank you. Actually, I hesitated a bit about whether it was appropriate for me to discuss Japan or China. However, I believe the purpose of today's discussion is to seek broader strategic responses for Korea after the launch of the Lee Jae-myung administration. Therefore, I decided to participate in the discussion. I listened carefully to the presentations by Professor Sohn Yeol and Professor Son Hee-joo, and I learned a lot. The current situation regarding Korea-Japan relations and Korea-China relations seems to be as follows. Regarding Korea-Japan relations, perhaps thanks to Trump, the possibility of shared suffering has increased?

As mentioned in Professor Son Yeol's presentation earlier, Japan seems to increasingly feel a sense of solidarity with Korea. And you described Japan's starting point as 'anxiety, distrust, and unease.' This is the Trump shock. I personally believe that South Korea is also feeling anxiety and unease while watching the US-China negotiations that were concluded yesterday. Therefore, I feel that the Lee Jae-myung administration should lead Korea-Japan relations well on this occasion. Regarding Korea-China relations, there will likely be various difficulties due to the United States. A prime example is when Dr. Kim Jung-soo presented; personally, I think the issue of defense cost-sharing is a relatively simple matter. In the long term, what will be the role and nature of the US Forces Korea and the alliance if they shift towards containing China? There are signs that it might change from deterring North Korea to containing China, and focusing on preparations for the South China Sea and Taiwan. If that happens, how will Korea-China relations be managed? This seems to be a situation where the risk of unwanted conflict and entanglement is increasing due to Trump.

To understand this issue, since the Lee Jae-myung administration's policies toward Japan and China have not yet been precisely defined, the discussion likely needs to start from the 'pragmatic diplomacy' mentioned by Professor Hong in the previous session. Personally, I wonder why the Lee Jae-myung administration has adopted pragmatic diplomacy. It is likely a form of reaction to the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's value-based diplomacy.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration aims to be a global pivotal state based on democratic values, emphasizing freedom in particular. It emphasized strategic transparency with countries that share values, which I think is good. The problem is that the awkward relationship with countries that have different value systems than Korea, meaning that value-based diplomacy degenerated into ideological diplomacy, ultimately caused difficulties in Korea-China relations, and through impeachment and constitutional amendments, the ideological tendency led to the side effect of connecting with Chinese aversion among the Korean public. Therefore, I believe the Lee Jae-myung administration has put forward pragmatic diplomacy to overcome this. However, the problem is this: to quote President Lee Jae-myung, 'From now on, Korea will pursue flexible pragmatic diplomacy that prioritizes national interests.' And 'Whether it is a Korea-US summit, a Korea-Japan summit, or a Korea-China summit, we will try to meet as much as possible if the opportunity arises.' Right?

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration aims to be a global pivotal state based on democratic values, emphasizing values such as freedom. It also emphasized strategic transparency with countries that share values, which can be positively evaluated. However, difficulties arose in relations with countries that have different value systems than Korea. In particular, value-based diplomacy degenerated into ideological bias, causing difficulties in Korea-China relations. Furthermore, through impeachment and constitutional amendments, ideological bias is thought to have led to side effects that connect with China diplomacy in Korea. To overcome these problems, I believe the Lee Jae-myung administration has put forward pragmatic diplomacy. To borrow President Lee Jae-myung's words, he said, "From now on, Korea will pursue flexible pragmatic diplomacy that prioritizes national interests." The fact that he intends to meet as much as possible if the opportunity arises, such as at Korea-US, Korea-Japan, and Korea-China summits, supports this.

It is positive that there will be no distinction between conservative and progressive in South Korea going forward, and that policies of Kim Dae-jung and Park Chung-hee can be utilized if necessary. However, the most concerning aspect is how long this stance can be maintained amidst the current geopolitical changes around us. As mentioned earlier, pragmatic diplomacy means that all countries prioritize their national interests, so it is more a matter of attitude and stance towards diplomacy than diplomatic principles. The problem is whether this stance can be maintained when various external shocks occur.

No matter how much we pursue pragmatic diplomacy and national prestige, diplomacy inevitably reflects certain principles and values. That is our national identity. Therefore, while pursuing pragmatic diplomacy, there must be consideration on how to prevent South Korean diplomacy from becoming unprincipled or opportunistic. As I only have two minutes left, I will offer questions and discussion comments on the presentations by Director Son Yeol and Professor Son In-ju. As mentioned in the presentations, it is true that the common ground between South Korea and Japan has clearly expanded. However, Japan is currently facing serious domestic policy instability and vulnerability, raising questions about whether this will continue in the future. There are also questions about whether the separation of historical issues and diplomacy is possible. I believe that all past South Korean governments have attempted a two-track approach toward Japan. They tried to separate historical issues from diplomatic and security issues and practical matters, but ultimately...

there seem to have been no successful cases. This is a very important task that the current administration must overcome. Looking at the public opinion survey results presented earlier, although there may be differences between progressives and conservatives, the impression and trust towards Japan, and support for improving Korea-Japan relations are high across the board.

Because there are common interests, we must move in that direction. I agree with that 100%. Seeing the recent conclusion of the US-Japan trade negotiations, I would like to ask what kind of agreement South Korea should reach to be evaluated as having taken a stance that is not criticized domestically. Regarding Director Son Yeol's presentation, I would like to ask this question: You mentioned China's aggressive diplomacy and its systemic vulnerabilities.

Recently, discussions about Xi Jinping's potential downfall have emerged in the Korean media, even reaching the United States. Personally, I do not agree with these claims. However, while he may possess certain internal political capital, the question remains whether China's situation is truly that unique, and to what extent Xi Jinping can manage it going forward. Furthermore, I believe China's influence operations are becoming the root of various conspiracy theories circulating in South Korea, such as allegations of election interference by the Communist Party. I would like to discuss the extent of China's influence operations and how South Korea should respond. As briefly mentioned earlier, the most challenging aspect of the US-China relationship, in my view, is the potential conflict between South Korea and China regarding the changing nature and scope of the ROK-US alliance.

As mentioned earlier, the United States is ultimately focusing all its diplomatic efforts on containing China. As Elbridge Colby, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, stated, the US will prioritize containing China, leaving its allies to manage their own affairs. In this context, the US will likely demand that its Asian allies clarify their positions on Taiwan, and South Korea will probably face such a demand soon. If this happens, South Korea will inevitably have to align to some extent with US policy towards China to manage its relationship with the US. Therefore, a major challenge for pragmatic diplomacy will be how to manage the risks arising from the US-China relationship in such a scenario.

The cause of all these difficulties is singular: the United States has changed. It is no longer the America we once knew, and it appears to be deviating from the rules-based international order it once championed. All these challenges stem from the fact that both our major diplomatic counterpart, the United States, and the international order within which we must conduct our diplomacy are undergoing transformation. Finally, as a basic diplomatic stance for the Lee Jae-myung administration, I believe South Korea should ultimately focus on self-reliance, solidarity, and inclusivity.

and the South China Sea issues, we can no longer hide. We must engage in strategic dialogues at the ministerial level or higher with the United States, and in some cases, with Japan. We must do so to avoid various scenarios. However, this is not a strategic agreement. However, through dialogue, we must clearly convey Korea's concerns and what Korea wants to the US, our ally, and Korea must not be bypassed. In the process of creating this, we need to persuade China that Korea's voice can be heard and extreme conflict can be prevented by including Korea. In particular, regarding the Taiwan issue, Korea has the unique moral significance on Earth from the Korean War, when China intervened and caused significant damage to Korea during the unification war. Even if unification occurs, the devastation of unification through war is...

is immense. I will conclude my discussion. Yes. Thank you for the excellent discussion. You have also asked questions. Due to time constraints, it seems we will only have one opportunity to speak each, so it would be good if you could ask one more question before speaking. The most difficult thing when working in diplomacy is when foreigners ask about our government's policies. 'Will this policy still exist in five years?'

In fact, there are aspects that require bipartisan policy. In the movie 'Total Recall,' there is an impressive line: 'They are all connected.' As you just said, it is no longer an era where strategies towards the US, North Korea, and China can be pursued in isolation; they are interconnected. Regarding Japan, Director Sohn Yeol mentioned Plan B. You mentioned that there are opinions emerging about when a situation in Japan might lead to the actual implementation of Plan B, but Prime Minister Kishida's position has become uncertain, and there is instability in coalition politics thereafter. In such a situation, what is the likelihood of moving towards Plan B? Second, regarding China, what is the background behind the occasional emergence of rumors about Xi Jinping's downfall?

What is the extent of strategic flexibility of US Forces Korea that China can accept? And so on. Dr. Lee Sang-hyun is also here. Regarding the changes in the US, Japanese scholars seem to view it more pessimistically. They say, 'Back America is over. Even if President Trump leaves, Trumpism will continue.' This is not the case in Korea, it seems. Perhaps it is because the political stability differs between Korea and Japan, but many Korean scholars say that the influence of Trump will be different after the midterm elections next year. In this regard, how do you see it, and how can bipartisan foreign policy be pursued? I am asking specifically.

Yes. Yes. You have asked three questions, but how many minutes should I take? Yes. Well, you have received three questions. Then, let's take one minute each. These are not matters that can be answered in one minute. The first question was, 'Two-track diplomacy sounds easy, but has it ever been truly successful?' I also consider this the touchstone of pragmatic diplomacy. It is about how diplomacy can overcome values, emotions, and ideology towards future-oriented cooperation. The question is how the current administration can manage this, given that the progressive camp's basic view of Japan will not change. Looking at the public opinion survey results, although there are differences between the progressive and conservative camps, the impression and trust towards Japan, and support for improving Korea-Japan relations are both high.

Currently, public opinion is actively supporting Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, if the current administration is evaluated as being sensitive to public opinion, it will be difficult to revert to the past, like the Moon Jae-in administration. Second is Plan B. Although Plan B was explained here, it does not mean pursuing an independent path from interdependence with the US. As you can see...

If it were truly an independent path, there would be two options. One is self-reliance, including military buildup and nuclear armament, and pursuing an entirely anti-US independent diplomacy. The other is the typical progressive approach of non-armed neutrality. I believe the second option, non-armed neutrality, has no possibility in current Japanese politics. It is not even possible in the extreme plan described earlier for Japan. If that happens, it raises very complex issues, such as accepting China's dominance or becoming part of China's community of shared future. Therefore, while maintaining the basic US-Japan relationship, the current level of dependence is excessive, so it is believed that there is a fundamental understanding that Japanese diplomacy and economic policy should proceed in a direction that reduces this dependence. However, whether this can be realized to what extent through negotiations with the US...

If it were truly an independent path, there would be two options. One is self-reliance, including military buildup and nuclear armament, and pursuing an entirely anti-US independent diplomacy. The other is the typical progressive approach of non-armed neutrality. I believe the second option, non-armed neutrality, has no possibility in current Japanese politics. It is not even possible in the extreme plan described earlier for Japan. If that happens, it raises very complex issues, such as accepting China's dominance or becoming part of China's community of shared future. Therefore, while maintaining the basic US-Japan relationship, the current level of dependence is excessive, so it is believed that there is a fundamental understanding that Japanese diplomacy and economic policy should proceed in a direction that reduces this dependence. However, whether this can be realized to what extent through negotiations with the US...

is another variable. I can say that much. Third, the third question should probably be asked in the third session. Looking at the US-Japan negotiations, as I mentioned, the US always has the upper hand in terms of negotiation balance because the interdependence is structurally asymmetrical. Therefore, negotiations proceed in that manner. The case of Trump this time also proceeded typically as I mentioned. Looking at the agreements reached this time...

The tariff is 12.5%, meaning a 15% mutual tariff. For automobiles, which were considered most important, it is 12.5%, making it 15% when added to the existing 2.5%. The tariff reduction was lower than for other countries like Mexico or Canada. Instead, achieving numerical targets such as $550 billion in investment in the US and partial opening of the domestic rice market is flexible in the implementation process, so it seems to be a successful defense against excessive Trump demands. However, the basic 15% tariff is a very high tariff, so wouldn't it be settled around that level or thereabouts from Korea's perspective as well? In that case, in the long run, decoupling from the US market may not occur, but interdependence with the US will inevitably decrease, at least in terms of tariffs.

And investment in the US will be based on economic rationality. The key is to what extent the US can achieve industrialization of consumer goods, and that depends on the US's capabilities. Isn't Trump's re-industrialization strategy simply a consensus? Rather, the New Washington Consensus mentioned by Sullivan or Yellen earlier makes more sense. Therefore, looking at it that way, will active investment in the US market proceed as smoothly as planned? Therefore, in that sense, Korea and Japan will have to continue to enter the US market, but active cooperation to explore other markets will be necessary. This is not unrelated to what Chairman Choi Tae-hyun is talking about regarding Korea-Japan economic cooperation. Through such cooperation between Korea and Japan, expanding third markets or third options is probably...

an inevitable trend. I believe this will be discussed further in Session 3. Yes. We have 4 minutes and 30 seconds left, so I will briefly address the three or four questions. First, regarding the question about China's internal vulnerabilities, to put it very briefly, China's system is based on the leadership of the Communist Party, and its foundation is ideology, the socialist revolution, and the communist revolution. Therefore, even if political reforms are carried out, sharing power is logically inconsistent. If the leadership of the Communist Party is to achieve the ideal state for 50 or 100 years, it must hold power. The biggest problem seems to be whether the Chinese people will continue to accept this. Regarding China's influence operations, I honestly don't know. That is something that intelligence agencies would know precisely, but what I can say is that case studies from other countries, such as Australia and Canada...

and Japan research, show that China conducted influence operations, and I do not think Korea will be an exception. However, intelligence agencies must provide the precise details. In relation to this, what I would like to suggest is that Korea's institutions and laws are very inadequate. Last November, an attempt to amend the espionage law failed, but there must be legal grounds to investigate and enforce laws not only against North Korea but also against any country that acts against national interests, especially in cases of industrial espionage. The reason why many people are not active in their respective fields is the lack of legal and institutional frameworks, and I believe this is a weakness of Korea compared to other countries. Third, regarding containing China, I believe we are gathered here today to find the answer. Personally, regarding Taiwan...

From the standpoint of the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, security dialogues should not target specific countries but should be based on the principle of maintaining order in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Dialogue with the United States is also necessary from the principle that changes through peaceful negotiation are possible, but changes by force are not. Lastly, as time is running out, may I move on to the discussion of Xi Jinping's potential downfall? I still believe there is no concrete evidence, but it is unusual for anti-China media to have persisted for such a long time.

The public sentiment within China is restless, and the economic situation and various other circumstances are becoming unbearable, unlike before. I only have 54 seconds left, so how we should view the long-term changes in the United States is one of the most difficult questions. You mentioned earlier that Japan views the future of the US more pessimistically, but my feeling is that South Korea still harbors hopeful expectations towards the US and views the US's influence and status slightly higher than Japan does. Despite the assessment that Japan values the US-Japan alliance, I feel that Japan has a greater sense of strategic autonomy than South Korea. Therefore, to observe the future changes in the US, we ultimately need to look at America's choices. Currently, looking at various objective indicators, the US still holds a status as a superpower, or even a hyperpower.

The United States still spends 40% of the world's defense budget alone, and there are 128 US bases in 59 countries. Only the US can do that. In a way, the US could still maintain a unipolar order by leveraging its status, but it chooses not to. In terms of military aspects, it could be a unipolar order, and in terms of hegemonic competition, it could be bipolar. In terms of the economy, it is almost a multipolar order, and in terms of transnational issues, it is a transitional phase that is mixed like a stateless order. Therefore, what I think is that while America's choices are made by America, it is a very important issue what the rest of the countries, excluding the US, will choose regarding the future order. Will we also go with the flow without any thought about the future of this world order? Or is it time for countries with similar ideas to gather for the 'US-less rule-based international order'? Serious consideration is needed on this matter. America's choices are ultimately made by the American people, but we hope that it will return, even slightly, to the America we knew.

The Trump era is unlikely to be like that, and I hope that American politics and various leaderships will move in that direction in the post-Trump era.

Although a little time has passed, I will use about 30 seconds. I had many more questions due to the severe time constraints, so I will conclude here. When I was working in Brussels, I would meet Europeans and we would spend every day trying to interpret President Trump's tweets. The situation does not seem much different now. I hope the discussions today have been helpful in preparing reports by the Final Academic Research Institute, among other things.

I hope it has also been helpful to all of you who have joined us. Thank you for joining us. Thank you.

Proposals for the New Administration's Strategy Toward Japan

Policy Recommendations for the New Administration's Strategy Toward Japan

Son Yeol: The amplitude of change in South Korea-Japan relations and policy toward Japan has been considerable depending on the administration. In our East Asia Institute's evaluation of the Moon Jae-in administration's foreign and security policy, we ranked South Korea-Japan relations and policy toward Japan as the lowest. While the Yoon Suk-yeol administration ended too quickly for us to conduct a thorough investigation, it is likely that Japan policy and South Korea-Japan relations are among the highest-ranked achievements. In other words, it has been a diplomatic field that has shown very large fluctuations like a roller coaster over a short period. Therefore, there seem to be considerable concerns that the policy toward Japan under the Lee Jae-myung administration might also experience another roller coaster ride.

Thus, what I intend to discuss today is, first, the new administration's policy toward Japan. It is a prediction of whether it can continue smoothly on the extension of the past three years' policy toward Japan. President Lee Jae-myung made several statements immediately after taking office: that he would inherit the previous administration's policy toward Japan, that he could not help but adhere to past agreements, and that it is not advisable to mix historical issues with cooperative tasks. These are being perceived as inheriting the previous administration's policy stance toward Japan, and consequently, Japan and the U.S. are in a relatively relieved mood. I will discuss whether this stance can be maintained for five years. In relation to this, there seem to be two aspects to consider.

One is how the domestic situation in South Korea will unfold. This is because, looking at the roller coaster of South Korea-Japan relations over the past decade, the changes have been more related to domestic political changes in both countries rather than external shifts. Therefore, just as internal conditions in South Korea are a variable, Japan is also a variable, so we must also discuss Japanese politics over the next few years. This is the first point, and the second is whether the stance will be maintained, and if so, what will be the content of the so-called future-oriented cooperation between South Korea and Japan, in other words, what needs to be done? I should start by briefly discussing the changes in Japan.

Since the Trump administration took office, the overall atmosphere of Japanese diplomacy has been one of anxiety and distrust. The fundamental stance of the Japanese government towards the U.S. has been that the liberal international order is a key condition for safeguarding Japan's national interests, and therefore, Japan must actively pursue a global partnership with the U.S. to protect that order. In other words, the U.S.-Japan alliance is to be elevated beyond mere defense of Japan to the level of safeguarding regional and global order and the liberal order. Thus, the title of U.S.-Japan summit meetings was 'Global Partnership'.

This changed with the Trump risk this year. From Japan's perspective, it was a highly ambitious vision and goal to actively fill the void left by the relative decline of U.S. global leadership in U.S. hegemony or the global liberal order, acting as a junior partner to exercise joint leadership. However, this began to be fundamentally shaken with the advent of the Trump administration, because the Trump administration does not accept the value-based international order that the Japanese government, along with the Biden administration, had advocated, and states that alliances are no longer based on values. For Japan, value-based diplomacy, or 'diplomacy of values,' was a core element of Abe's diplomacy, considered a strategic diplomacy. With the second term of Trump, it has entered a phase of significant confusion.

Therefore, in Japan, the alliance with the Trump administration seems to be discussed in roughly these two ways. First, even though it is a security alliance, the extent to which an ally benefits U.S. workers and businesses becomes a very important criterion for evaluating the alliance. Second, the extent to which it can mitigate security risks to the U.S. – meaning that if an ally like Japan faces a security threat, it is transferred to the U.S., and how much of the burden the ally, Japan, can bear in that process.

Therefore, Trump is seeking to readjust the alliance with Japan based on these two criteria, and what Japan keenly feels in the negotiation process is, as always, the asymmetry of interdependence between allies and the U.S. The U.S. actively utilizes the structure of over-reliance by allies on the U.S., both economically and security-wise, in negotiations, and deals are being made in this reality. One of the sentiments in Japan regarding the Trump risk is that while the integration of the alliance must continue, the over-reliance on the U.S. within the alliance must also be reduced to a certain extent. In other words, in the process of de-sinicization from over-reliance on China economically, reliance on the U.S. has conversely strengthened; therefore, a sentiment that we must seriously consider de-sinicization and de-U.S. reliance is emerging.

Therefore, I believe this will be one axis for gauging Japan's changes over the next five years. Accordingly, it has been divided into Plan A and Plan B.

Plan A is the Japan we are currently observing, which actively pursues a U.S.-Japan alliance that supports the maintenance of the U.S. hegemonic order, as mentioned earlier. To achieve this, it involves expanding collective self-defense to globally extend Japan's military involvement, increasing defense spending to further strengthen integrated deterrence with the U.S., and actively promoting the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. Within this context, how can Japan become an 'indispensable ally'? This ultimately means conforming as much as possible to the Trump administration's alliance criteria. This involves going along with security, and on the economic front, expanding investment in the U.S. in a way that aligns with the interests of U.S. workers and businesses, and opening up the Japanese domestic market to achieve a long-term balance in the current trade deficit between the U.S. and Japan. Simultaneously, Plan B addresses the concern that if this continues, reliance on the U.S. will deepen, and if over-reliance persists and deepens, the current anxiety and distrust towards the U.S. will grow. It explores what strategies Japan should adopt.

The core of Plan B is that U.S. hegemony, which underpins the world order, can no longer be sustained. If that is the case, rather than a new alternative emerging, the order will be highly fluid for the time being, and risks will expand within it, making risk management the top priority. It suggests that we should abandon maximizing utility and instead reduce over-reliance on the U.S. in a direction related to risk management or mitigation. This does not mean complete self-reliance for Japan, but rather the need to establish an appropriate level of interdependence with the U.S. and other major powers.

To this end, strengthening military power for military self-reliance and self-strengthening, using defense spending, and hedging against the U.S. necessitate active multilateralism, and it is crucial to actively strengthen cooperation with like-minded countries, or 'comrade countries' in Japanese terminology, through minilateralism. In this regard, it is necessary to gradually strike a balance between alliance and self-reliance. However, the containment regime against China must be thoroughly maintained. Economic diplomacy requires an appropriate balance of interdependence between the U.S. and Japan, and between the U.S., China, and Japan. Furthermore, a very important mechanism is the restoration of the liberal order by actively expanding the CPTPP. These are the ideas that are frequently emerging as Plan B.

This table is from the Japanese side and summarizes the foreign policy stances of major political parties. As you know, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) expanded from 1 seat to 15 seats, and the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) also made significant gains. The CDP is a right-wing populist, anti-globalization party. The DPP also holds the position that concerns about the asymmetry of alliances must be addressed and alternatives must be prepared. Therefore, along with the general atmosphere within policy circles, the recent gains by these two minority parties suggest that Plan B is gaining some weight. Of course, this does not mean I am predicting that Japan will move in this direction, but I am indicating that the atmosphere in Japan is currently undergoing significant fluid changes.

Regarding South Korea-Japan relations, I have explained Japan's dilemma, and I believe many of you here will perceive it as South Korea's dilemma as well. To that extent, there is a shared sense of suffering between South Korea and Japan regarding the Trump risk, and it is true that this increases the necessity for strategic cooperation. Along with this necessity, domestic conditions for strategic partnership are also being considerably created.

This chart shows the results of a recent public opinion poll conducted by our institute, illustrating perceptions of Japan. Starting from 2020, positive perceptions of Japan have increased fivefold, while negative perceptions have decreased accordingly, showing a significant change.

The main reason why the South Korean public dislikes Japan is historical issues. However, even though historical issues have not been resolved, perceptions of Japan have steadily improved. Analyzing the factors behind this improvement in perceptions of Japan, direct experiences and evaluations by the South Korean public, such as Japanese tourism, popular culture, and cuisine, are acting as the most significant factors, and this is even driving trust in Japan.

The existing paradigm of South Korea-Japan relations has been that when historical issues arise, distrust towards the other country intensifies, leading to a vicious cycle of distrust and resulting in aversion to cooperation. However, the recent trend shows a significant change in that, despite historical issues remaining separate, it does not lead to distrust towards the other country. Therefore, it can be seen that instead of falling into a vicious cycle of distrust, historical issues and economic/diplomatic cooperation are likely to operate separately. This can be confirmed through the public opinion poll results.

Nevertheless, there are significant differences in perspectives on South Korea-Japan relations between progressives, conservatives, and between ruling and opposition parties. Progressives anticipate an improvement in South Korea-Japan relations following the launch of the new administration, while conservatives overwhelmingly predict a deterioration. Since 2022, evaluations of South Korea-Japan relations improvement by ideological orientation have polarized, with perceptions of Japan rapidly improving among conservatives, while declining or stagnating among progressives. This is because the conservative camp and Yoon Suk-yeol supporters endorse the current administration's proactive relationship improvement policies, while progressive forces, despite dissatisfaction with the new administration's Japan policy, hold expectations that the new administration will succeed.

Considering the recent public opinion poll results and the current administration's stance towards Japan, some degree of smooth progress is expected, as the conservative camp supports the improvement of South Korea-Japan relations, and the progressive camp is showing a supportive stance towards the current administration's policy toward Japan.

The main variables for future South Korea-Japan relations will be South Korea's domestic politics. Given the significant divergence in views between progressives and conservatives regarding South Korea-Japan relations, it will be a crucial variable whether the progressive camp continues to support the current administration's policy toward Japan, and whether the current administration can maintain its current policy stance toward Japan. If political support for the current administration weakens, there is a possibility of shifting to a critical stance towards Japan to rally traditional progressive supporters. The second variable is Japan. Japan's current ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito is losing stability, and the fragmentation and coalition politics among various parties could increase political instability. Therefore, the policy priority for managing South Korea-Japan relations may decrease.

It is difficult for the LDP and Komeito alone to govern the country, making coalition politics with other parties on an issue-by-issue basis inevitable. This can exacerbate political instability, leading to a focus on domestic politics rather than foreign affairs. Therefore, the policy priority for managing South Korea-Japan relations may decrease. Furthermore, the variable of the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) also exists. As votes defect from the LDP to the right-wing populist JIP, voices within the LDP are calling for strengthening right-wing tendencies to avoid losing votes, which could become a variable in future South Korea-Japan relations.

The New Administration's Strategy Toward China

The New South Korean Government's Strategy Toward China

My part today is to discuss two main topics regarding the new government's foreign policy, focusing on its strategy toward China. First, I will briefly explain the perspective on how to view China today, elaborating on China's duality and two faces. Second, I will propose directions and three strategies for coexisting with and strategically responding to China.

China in the Xi Jinping era, on one hand, displays an assertive and confident diplomatic posture, but on the other hand, it harbors internal anxieties and structural vulnerabilities within its system. Without understanding these two faces simultaneously, it is difficult to accurately interpret China's strategies and actions. China's external confidence and assertive attitude are based not only on its material power derived from economic rise and technological advancements but also on spiritual elements such as the worldview, historical perspective, and vision of the Chinese Communist Party leadership. The Xi Jinping government has set the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as its core national objective, which is used as a justification for its foreign and security strategy, connecting to issues concerning Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea.

China tends to interpret the Taiwan issue from the perspective of restoring the world order that collapsed after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. President Xi Jinping has declared that he will not rule out the use of force to achieve Taiwan's unification and is demonstrating his will for historical restoration through military exercises by the People's Liberation Army. Claims of maritime sovereignty in the East China Sea and South China Sea are also explained from the perspective of restoration rather than expansion. Recent maritime military exercises, including live-fire drills in international waters between Australia and New Zealand, are a prime example of this containment.

The frequency of military provocations crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait is also increasing, raising the risk of military tensions escalating due to unplanned accidental clashes. On the other hand, Chinese rulers appear to feel internal anxiety. This does not mean the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party's one-party system or the loss of power by Chairman Xi, but rather that concerns about internal vulnerabilities are repeatedly raised, despite the superficial success of social control management in state-society relations. This trend has been intensifying since the second term of Hu Jintao, prior to the emergence of President Xi Jinping.

While internal management within the party is not a major issue, repeated messages from within and outside the party reflect concerns about internal vulnerabilities. It is judged that this has intensified since the second term of Hu Jintao, prior to the emergence of President Xi Jinping.

The fundamental causes are presumed to be the slowdown in economic growth, severe youth unemployment, widening income inequality and disparity despite its identity as a socialist country, persistent corruption issues, and the possibility of power struggles related to succession issues. Concerns about the sustainability of the Communist Party's one-party dictatorship system are also important factors.

The Chinese people acknowledge the achievements and failures of the Communist Party but also question whether this system must be an eternal political model. Based on this sense of crisis, the Chinese Communist Party has established a stronger control and surveillance system, and power concentration has accelerated since the emergence of President Xi Jinping. Recently, anti-corruption campaigns targeting lower-level officials at the local level have been intensified, and a rectification movement within the party has also been strengthened this year. However, such strong control can weaken economic vitality and social dynamism, leading to a vicious cycle that undermines regime legitimacy.

This anxiety can also affect foreign and military strategies, and China's assertive actions may be a reaction to its anxieties. Therefore, it is essential to read the structural vulnerabilities and sense of crisis hidden behind China's assertive actions. The first principle for coexisting with China, which possesses this duality of assertiveness and anxiety, is 'principled pluralism.' As the authoritarian regime of China increasingly imposes a single voice, South Korea must adhere to principled diplomacy based on the constitutional values of freedom, diversity, and the rule of law. Flexible diplomacy based on principles, not mere hawkishness or appeasement, is necessary. Diverse perspectives on China must be freely discussed in South Korea's public sphere, and if Chinese or other state entities unjustly infringe upon the freedom and rights of our citizens, they must be dealt with strictly according to the law.

The second is the 'South Korea-led concentric circle strategy.' This is a multi-layered strategy that considers both material power (military strength, economic power, scientific and technological capabilities) and identity (convergence of systems, norms, and historical perspectives) in terms of the importance of South Korean diplomacy. For example, the U.S. is located in the core concentric circle in terms of national power and identity convergence, but this may change in the future.

Currently, China has a significant influence on South Korea's security and economy, but its impact on scientific and technological and cultural development is relatively minor. Furthermore, while some norms such as respect for international law are shared, the gap is widening in areas of identity such as liberal democracy, human rights, and historical perspectives. Recently, the Chinese government has intensified global system competition with its ideological offensive asserting the superiority of its development model. South Korea's new government must stably manage its relationship with China while realistically recognizing the constraints on South Korea's strategic space as a U.S. ally amidst the U.S.-China hegemonic competition. The third is the concept of 'collective resilience.' In the context of prolonged U.S.-China strategic competition, South Korea's unilateral response has limitations, so it is necessary to seek strategies to enhance collective resilience together with countries holding similar positions, including the U.S.

This concept means recognizing the risks and cascading effects within global networks and systems and possessing the ability to recover quickly when problems arise. This aims to constrain the coercive exercise of power by potential provocateurs. By enhancing the resilience of various networks, such as supply chains, shipping routes, military alliances, and information and communication networks connected to South Korea, the effect of provocations can be reduced, and the provocateur's capacity for coercion can be limited.

In addition, through trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, we must maintain a cooperative system not only in diplomacy and security but also in economy and finance, and develop a platform to prevent extreme clashes between the U.S. and China and manage China's complex challenges. Furthermore, in bilateral relations with China, it is necessary to diversify diplomatic channels. Currently, President Xi Jinping's influence is overwhelming in China's policy decision-making process, making summit meetings important, and working-level meetings are also necessary. In China's case, the State Council's power is relatively weak.

The National People's Congress is also the same; ultimately, it's all about the Communist Party. Therefore, it is necessary to establish channels for consultation with these Communist Party officials. Since it is understood to be very difficult for South Korea's ruling and opposition parties to engage individually, I propose attempting to establish a '2+2' consultation channel involving China's State Council administration, the Communist Party, and South Korea's bipartisan parliamentary body and the South Korean administration.

And supply chain dialogues are also needed now. The content will be covered in more detail in the next session, so I will move on. Discussions on cultural and transnational crime cooperation are also necessary, and it is important to activate cooperation channels not only in bilateral relations between South Korea and China but also among South Korea, China, and Japan, including Japan. This slide shows how crucial China and the U.S. are to our nation. Therefore, I believe the time has come to adopt a global strategic perspective that looks beyond cooperation with the U.S. and China.

Therefore, in the medium to long term, we must reduce economic dependence on the U.S. and China. In this regard, I believe it is time to actively pursue a global strategy of expanding overseas production bases in Eastern Europe, East Africa, South America, the Middle East, India, etc., with which we already have private-sector exchanges, and connecting these overseas base production facilities with South Korea through a maritime logistics network. Even Washington is currently unable to find definitive answers regarding its China strategy, and I believe an opportunity has opened for South Korea's voice and ideas to have a tangible impact on the international community. I hope that the principled pluralism, the enduring concentric circle strategy, and the strengthening of collective resilience based on networks that I have mentioned will serve as useful references in establishing the new government's policy toward China and its diplomatic strategy.

Son Yeol, Director of the Institute for East Asian Studies.

Son In-ju, Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

Managed and Edited by: Oh In-hwan, Senior Research Fellow, EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 202) | ihoh@eai.or.kr