[East Asia Institute-Choi Soon-ho Institute for Global Strategic Studies-Seoul National University Institute for National Future Strategy Joint Academic Forum] The Future of the ROK-US Alliance and North Korea Strategy

YouTube Link : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QeS9UudW9nQ

Video Script

The current meeting was prompted by a conversation held shortly after the inauguration of the new administration with Director Kang Won-tae and CEO Kim Yun-sik. During that dinner, it was mentioned that the new administration faced considerable difficulties in preparing its foreign policy. Due to a de facto six-month diplomatic vacuum from the declaration of martial law on December 3rd until June 3rd, the new administration, set to launch on June 4th, faces the challenge of addressing accumulated pending issues. Concerns were raised that there would be very little opportunity to strategize and forecast the future of South Korea's long-term foreign policy. Consequently, the idea emerged that the three institutions should collaborate. A month later, we are now holding this meeting to put that discussion into action.

I believe there are three main purposes behind this initiative. First, as I just mentioned, the new administration needs to draw up a grand vision for the next five years, looking towards 2030. The new administration, having started without a transition committee due to an early presidential election, was insufficiently prepared and has not yet clearly articulated a foreign policy vision or slogan. "Pragmatic diplomacy" is merely an approach or methodology; the vision and grand strategy to guide South Korea's diplomacy for the next five years must be formulated from this point forward.

Therefore, if we become solely engrossed in immediate diplomatic issues, such as the peace treaty negotiations, defense cost-sharing negotiations, negotiations on the costs of the US Forces Korea, or the THAAD deployment issue, without a concrete or realistic vision, or in the absence of a vision and strategy altogether, we risk losing sight of the bigger picture. This could lead to South Korean diplomacy becoming reactive, not commensurate with our national strength. Thus, the first purpose is to build consensus on the direction of the new administration's foreign policy with a longer-term perspective.

Second, there is a need to discuss South Korea's role and identity in shaping foreign policy. At the heart of the discourse on complex crises, which is the theme of today's meeting, is President Trump, and I believe discussions on his strategic direction and intentions have been sufficiently covered. Now, it is important to diagnose how these changes affect the international, regional, security, economic, and advanced technology orders, and to predict the future. Within this diagnosis and prediction, we must explore South Korea's foreign policy.

This implies that we must play a significant role in shaping the international order that is approaching or evolving. If we have been conducting diplomacy as rule-takers until now, it is time to fully assume the role of a rule-maker in South Korean diplomacy. From this perspective, various discussions can be held. Lastly, there is the issue of bipartisan foreign policy, which was raised during that dinner.

There have been differences in perspectives between governments on major foreign policy issues, and these have changed with the change in government. There are also differences in perception between the ruling and opposition parties on major international issues, with the North Korean issue leading to intra-party conflicts and differences in perspective surrounding the Japan issue being representative examples. It is unfortunate that these foreign policy issues have become subjects of domestic political conflict. Therefore, today's meeting should discuss ways to formulate bipartisan foreign policy and identify what foreign policy is necessary for South Korea. The meeting has been organized with these three purposes in mind. We ask for your understanding regarding any shortcomings during the meeting.

I hope today's meeting will be of great help in establishing the new administration's foreign policy, and with that, I conclude my opening remarks. Thank you very much. >> As we need to proceed with the meeting, I will speak briefly. I would like to talk about the significance of this meeting. While there have been various meetings and discussions on similar topics, it is rare for three institutions to hold a meaningful event with the same awareness and concerns.

I believe the most significant aspect of this meeting is that three institutions, which have long contemplated and researched national strategy and the future, have joined forces to create a meaningful occasion. I would like to express my gratitude to CEO Kim Ji-seok of the Institute for Basic Spiritual Culture and his colleagues for preparing today's event, and also to Director Son Yeol, Professor Lee Ah-haeng, and our colleagues from the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, who are co-hosting this event.

As you know, the Choi Soon-hyun Academic Foundation has a long history of 50 years, and the East Asia Institute has played a crucial role as a think tank for nearly 30 years. In contrast, the Seoul National University Institute for National Future Strategy is a relatively new institution, established about four years ago. We will continue to collaborate on meaningful events like this, engage in thoughtful discussions, and organize more opportunities to share important discourse with distinguished individuals. In particular, selecting foreign policy and security as the first topic, as Director Son Yeol mentioned, is due to the difficult situation we face and the need to establish a bipartisan direction for the national interest, transcending partisan stances such as conservative or progressive.

Therefore, there was also the intention to showcase cooperation by having various institutions join forces. I thank the moderator, speakers, and panelists who have joined us today for this important event, and I anticipate a meaningful and productive session. Thank you. >> As we have ambitiously included three topics today with excellent speakers and panelists, time may be limited. I will also speak briefly before concluding. Director Son Yeol mentioned the occasion earlier; it seems the food and drinks at that dinner were quite good. We were able to naturally find common ground, and I am grateful to both of you for providing this opportunity. It is an honor and a great pleasure to be with such distinguished individuals. I will share my brief thoughts.

Looking at current diplomatic issues, we can see that the government is facing complex challenges at a critical juncture. The upcoming August 1st deadline for tariff negotiations, securing strategic flexibility in conjunction with the Northeast Asian situation, the defense cost-sharing issue, the transfer of wartime operational control, and the reshaping of ROK-Japan relations on the occasion of their 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties – none of these are minor issues. There are also one-off decisions, such as whether to attend the NATO summit or the upcoming Chinese Victory Day celebration, which require consideration of both national interest and regional dynamics. These matters are not simple yes-or-no decisions.

Foreign policy is always a space where principles and reality, strategy and values collide, and where complex interests intersect, further complicated by the need to consider domestic politics, making its weight inevitably substantial. Nevertheless, I personally believe that this government has responded with relative responsibility over the past fifty-odd days. Now is the time to expect and support choices that are closer to the best, rather than merely avoiding the worst. I trust that the panelists and attendees here today share this sense of urgency, and I hope for realistic and strategic discussions that do not shy away from the complexity and tension of foreign policy and security, but approach them with a balanced perspective and genuine care.

I am confident that many of you, the speakers, panelists, and moderator, have come to this forum with high expectations. I have diligently reviewed the meticulously prepared materials by these individuals over the past few days, and I personally believe they will fully meet those expectations. To ensure we have as much time as possible, I will conclude here. Thank you once again to everyone who has taken valuable time to be here today.

The Triple Challenge from Trump and the Future of the ROK-US Alliance

Thank you. >> I will now discuss the current status of the ROK-US alliance. We will discuss how we should perceive and respond to the multifaceted challenges posed by the Trump administration. The discussion will begin with problem identification, and alliance issues can be broadly categorized into three areas. First is defense cost-sharing. While narrowly focused on the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) negotiations, it broadly includes the issue of increased defense spending. Second is the overall readjustment of US Forces Korea (USFK), encompassing strategic flexibility, potential troop reductions, and the possibility of reorganizing the Combined Forces Command in the Indo-Pacific region. Third is the issue of transferring wartime operational control, which is intertwined with the above.

There are inherent contradictions in the alliance transformation that the United States is demanding, which presents a dilemma for us. We will examine these aspects and, in conclusion, discuss how we should view them. I have termed this 'proactive alliance transformation.' I believe it is difficult to maintain the status quo or prevent change. Moving forward, we must acknowledge the inevitable reality and, while recognizing that these changes undoubtedly pose challenges, also view them as opportunities, thus adopting a proactive stance in our alliance transformation.

First, as a problem statement, the international order is undergoing a major transformation, and there is a possibility of seismic shifts within the ROK-US alliance. I will elaborate on this later. The same applies to the three alliance issues mentioned earlier. Domestically, there has been discussion about a package deal, negotiating various issues from tariffs to alliance matters in a quid pro quo manner. There have been thoughts about what we should uphold, what we should concede, and what we should demand. While a comprehensive approach is possible, difficult issues are not automatically resolved by adopting a package deal approach. Upon closer examination of the content,

it is difficult to prioritize and concede or differentiate any issue. Therefore, in-depth analysis and consideration of each individual issue must precede, and discussing a package deal thereafter is not a future concern but rather a matter of sequence. The 'triple challenge' I mentioned in the title refers to the following:

As the United States shifts its global strategy, its commitment to the defense of the Korean Peninsula is weakening. Simultaneously, with the proposal of strategic flexibility for USFK, the risk of entanglement in US-China conflict is increasing, and alliance costs are rising. This is a contradictory situation. They are reducing their commitment to Korean Peninsula defense, expecting South Korea to align with US priorities, while simultaneously demanding more payment for USFK presence and alliance costs. I have termed this the 'triple challenge.' While each issue is problematic in itself, the fundamental challenge to the alliance is the growing divergence between ROK and US perceptions of threat and strategic direction. This is a critical issue, and I will address it to discuss more typical and proactive response measures.

Regarding the three issues mentioned earlier, the first is cost pressure and burden-sharing. As agreed at NATO, if demands such as increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP were applied to South Korea, this would be a significant issue. Realistically, 5% of GDP is an almost unattainable figure. Currently, our defense spending as a percentage of GDP is 2.33%, meaning it would need to more than double. Defense spending currently accounts for about 10% of our government budget; to meet this target, it would need to more than double, making it nearly impossible. Those familiar with government finances know that there is little room for reduction due to a large portion of rigid expenditures. While increasing defense spending and strengthening defense capabilities are desirable, the available flexibility within the government budget is less than one might expect. Of course, 5% may not be applied directly, and like NATO, it could be divided into pure defense spending of 3.5% and other security costs of 1.5%, but even that would not be easy.

What we should particularly consider here is that rather than easily assuming that what applies to NATO can also apply to Asian alliances, it is important to consider the differences between NATO and the ROK-US alliance. In fact, NATO members accepted the 5% figure under Trump's pressure,

Although 5% was accepted, European countries themselves acknowledge that Europe has neglected its security. Therefore, the issue of defense cost-sharing among NATO European members has been a chronic problem for the NATO alliance. The war in Ukraine has awakened NATO member states, and an agreement was reached on that basis. However, the ROK-US alliance cannot be characterized as a security free-rider. South Korea has the highest defense spending as a percentage of GDP and maintains a regular army of 500,000 personnel. These differences must be clearly recognized.

If possible, accepting the US demand for 3.5% or 5% like NATO is an option, but there are certainly areas where South Korea needs to increase its defense capabilities. Identifying these areas based on genuine needs, sharing them with the US, and enhancing defense capabilities is the correct approach to reduce the US burden.

Rather than setting a number first and trying to meet it, or submitting implementation plans annually like NATO, it is more desirable to identify areas where South Korean defense needs strengthening and enhance capabilities accordingly. The renegotiation of defense cost-sharing is currently underway, with the 12th SMA having been agreed upon 7-8 months ago and set to take effect next year. It will start at approximately 1.5 trillion won next year and gradually increase. Trump has consistently mentioned $10 billion for South Korea, which is nearly ten times the currently agreed amount.

This is an unrealistic figure, and it is questionable whether it will be scrapped and renegotiated. I believe we must maintain the position that existing intergovernmental agreements should be upheld. If negotiations are unavoidably reopened, it would be preferable to shift from the current approach of reaching a broad agreement on a lump sum and then identifying costs, to an approach similar to Japan's, where the total sum is calculated based on identified costs. In the past, we worried that itemizing costs would increase the total,

While the total amount was maintained to avoid increasing costs by itemizing each expenditure, Trump's unreasonable demands could be effectively curbed by meticulously itemizing costs based on actual needs. Of course, defense cost-sharing consists of three categories: personnel, logistical support, and facility construction, and this is assuming no new categories are introduced. If the US were to discuss defense cost-sharing, there is a possibility they might demand new categories beyond the existing framework.

Demands may arise for South Korea to bear the costs of joint exercises or the deployment of strategic assets. The cost of a B-1B bomber is calculated per hour, and the daily operating cost of an aircraft carrier strike group is $6.5 to $7 million. Assuming the carrier stays for ten days, the cost would be enormous. We need to consider these aspects as well. Due to time constraints, I cannot elaborate further, but we will continue this discussion. The second issue is the adjustment of US Forces Korea.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the US Department of Defense is considering a reduction of 4,500 USFK troops. There is also the issue of strategic flexibility. USFK is no longer solely focused on North Korea but can be utilized in regional contingencies. This raises the issue of South Korea potentially being used as a launchpad in the event of a US-China conflict, which was a sensitive alliance issue during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. There was an agreement between Rice and Ban Ki-moon in 2006.

At that time, the Roh Moo-hyun administration attempted to establish detailed procedures and conditions for the proposal of strategic flexibility for USFK but was unsuccessful. Ultimately, a compromise was reached with the phrase "mutual respect," which meant that South Korea respected the US's strategic flexibility, and the US respected the South Korean people's sentiment of not wanting to be involved in conflicts against their will. This issue may become more sensitive.

Third, there is also discussion about which units would be adjusted in the event of a USFK reduction. The most likely candidate is the Strike Brigade (approximately 4,500 personnel), and there is also an A-10 attack aircraft squadron. The A-10 attack aircraft squadron is already scheduled for retirement, and F-16s are dispersed across Osan and Kunsan Air Bases. The new deployment of F-35s to Kunsan has been discussed, but it is uncertain. There is also the possibility of Kunsan Air Base being closed. According to a recent report by a US think tank, there are even radical proposals to reduce USFK by more than 50% to maintain it at around 10,000 personnel.

This is not merely about adjusting USFK but is linked to the broader readjustment of the Indo-Pacific region. Specifically, in the context of strengthening the US-Japan alliance, Japan has established a Combined Operations Command. In response, discussions have been ongoing to reorganize the US Forces Japan (USFJ) Command into a Combined Forces Command. While no conclusion has been reached yet, the current USFJ Command does not have operational command authority over US forces in Japan. It performs base management and administrative coordination roles, but the proposal is to change this so that the Commander of USFJ, as Commander of the Combined Forces, would have operational command authority over US forces in Japan.

These discussions are underway, and if the strategic value of the USFJ Command increases, its rank could be elevated. Currently, the Commander of USFK holds a three-star rank, but this could be reduced to two stars, while the Commander of USFJ could be promoted to four stars. In such a scenario, the Commander of USFJ, rather than the Commander of USFK who also serves as Commander of the UN Command, could become the Commander of the UN Command. There is even speculation that the UN Command itself could be relocated to Japan. If these changes are significant, concerns may arise that the hierarchy of US alliances in the Indo-Pacific region is being redefined and that USFK is being subordinated to USFJ. This could also increase the demand for the transfer of wartime operational control.

These contradictions in US-led alliance transformation stem from the gap in threat perception and strategic direction. To resolve this, the suggestion is that South Korea must make certain concessions to minimize concerns about alliance erosion and fragmentation.

We must respond to the increased demand for defense cost-sharing and postpone the transfer of wartime operational control to maintain the institutional linkage of the alliance and prevent it from loosening. Furthermore, there is a suggestion that South Korea must somewhat align with the US strategy of containing China to gain recognition for the strategic value of the ROK-US alliance. However, I have reservations about the feasibility and sustainability of maintaining the status quo through such concessions, as well as their impact on national interests, including relations with China.

The United States expects South Korea to take primary responsibility for the defense of the Korean Peninsula, and the focus of USFK is shifting from North Korea to China. They expect us to use USFK bases for that purpose while bearing more of the costs of stationing and operation. The utility of the alliance (deterring North Korea, maintaining regional power balance) is decreasing, while the costs of the alliance (financial, military risks) are increasing.

In this situation, if we prioritize preventing a reduction in USFK troop levels and postponing the transfer of wartime operational control to maintain the alliance, we will have to bear costs such as increased defense cost-sharing and a heightened risk of US-China military tension. Furthermore, there is doubt about the sustainability of paying these costs. In conclusion, we must proactively accept and acknowledge South Korea's primary responsibility for the defense of the Korean Peninsula. Remaining complacent with the existing combined defense posture is unrealistic and potentially dangerous.

We need to make an effort to recognize this. The transfer of wartime operational control should not be seen as a burden but as an opportunity. If we show a willingness to accept it when the US desires, it can proceed smoothly. There is insufficient discussion about meeting the conditions for the transfer of wartime operational control and our readiness, and discussion about the specific content and level of tasks required is also needed. We are merely arguing that the conditions have not been met without concrete details.

There is much room for different thinking on this matter. Regarding conventional forces, combined ROK-US response is unavoidable, and efforts are needed to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of extended deterrence.

The certainty of extended deterrence is not inherently guaranteed. Just as West German states were anxious during the Cold War, North Korea perceives and believes in the effectiveness of US extended deterrence. Therefore, while efforts to develop and deepen extended deterrence are necessary, excessive pessimism or skepticism is unhelpful. A certain level of USFK presence is important for the credibility of extended deterrence.

Therefore, a rapid reduction could be problematic. Regarding China containment, it will be difficult to completely reject the strategic flexibility of USFK. If we do, the US may re-evaluate the value of USFK and reconsider its presence altogether. While basic acknowledgment is necessary, we need to seek compromises that minimize the risk of entanglement.

One idea is to allow the deployment of USFK troops overseas if necessary during contingencies. For example, deployment to the Taiwan Strait might be acceptable, but using the Osan Air Base as a launchpad for operations in the Taiwan Strait and then returning is problematic. If used in such a manner, it would be difficult for South Korea to avoid entanglement in a Taiwan contingency. From the US perspective, launching operations to Taiwan from Korea is also irrational. The distance to Taiwan is considerable, making it more rational to deploy from Okinawa or other bases closer to Taiwan.

From a military and American perspective, rational operation is possible, so perhaps a compromise could be considered if necessary? More fundamentally, the issue will be how our internal perspective on containing China is organized. What exactly is China to us? Will we view it as a threat as the US does, or as a challenge? This will be another discussion. Therefore, I will summarize this.

Therefore, it is uncertain how far the Trump administration can push this major shift, but if such a change occurs, we should not attempt to block it but rather seize the opportunity to accelerate our efforts. Does this mean the alliance is heading in different directions? I do not believe so. The ROK-US alliance still has common ground, and there are clearly areas that can be maintained and developed based on this.

Deterring North Korean nuclear weapons is a common interest of South Korea and the United States. We must prevent a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia and maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, neither the US nor we desire a rapid shift in the regional balance of power. To this end, there is a common interest between South Korea and the US in the continued maintenance and deepening of extended deterrence, and in the sustained presence of US Forces Korea above a certain level. Therefore, let us respond more proactively to these changes based on the realistic recognition and confidence that we can further develop this relationship.

Thank you. I am a professor of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University and am currently assisting with national security matters at the East Asia Institute. Today's presentation topic is the new administration's North Korea strategy. While preparing for this presentation, I realized that the new administration lacks a clear North Korea strategy. The government was formed very quickly, so it seems impossible to analyze an existing strategy. It has been 32 years since the North Korean nuclear issue began, and the international order is undergoing fundamental changes, thus the fundamental purpose of the North Korea strategy

its timeframe, that is, the maximum achievable within the government's five-year term. Ultimately, unification would be the best objective, but at a minimum, it could be preventing war. In between, there could be denuclearization of North Korea and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. However, with the entire spectrum open, we need to set new goals for the North Korea strategy. North Korea seems to be strategically making many changes, rightly or wrongly, in what is called a new Cold War. In contrast, our government, over the past two administrations, has either approached North Korea in bilateral relations or completely avoided relations, leading to confusion between conservative and progressive approaches. However, the conditions have changed so much that it is now difficult to address it within that conservative-progressive spectrum. Therefore, I thought it would be necessary to first examine the key variables in the current North Korea strategy.

The conditions are changing too much. In the past, inter-Korean relations were the most important variable in our North Korea policy, and North Korea's internal situation or its strategy towards South Korea were the most crucial variables. Now, North Korea has already become a military actor in Europe, the North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship is progressing to a significant extent, and North Korea-US summits could occur without direct involvement from us. Therefore, the way North Korea is handled can differ significantly from our North Korea strategy. Consequently, the extent to which our North Korea strategy will be an important variable in inter-Korean relations is diminishing, and thus, our North Korea strategy might become a result of our foreign policy or economic strategy.

In a sense, the North Korea strategy can no longer be the top priority or an independent variable, but I do not see this as necessarily negative. If we manage our other strategies well, as Professor Kim Jung mentioned earlier regarding our strategies towards the US and China, new opportunities for the North Korea strategy may arise. Therefore, I believe our perspective on the new administration's North Korea strategy needs to differ from the past. In this regard, I have briefly noted a few variables to consider. First is North Korea's external strategy. As we have observed and analyzed, North Korea has been pursuing its own external strategy for the past two to three years, largely independent of our North Korea policy. This includes its external diplomatic strategy, military strategy, and external economic strategy. Many analysts believe that North Korea's current international strategic position is, in some respects, the best it has been since the impeachment of Park Geun-hye.

While North Korea's participation in the Ukraine conflict may have negative long-term consequences, in the short term, it has provided it with a very advantageous position in terms of diplomatic standing, military technology transfer, and economic strength. This is weakening our leverage over North Korea. Therefore, how North Korea's own timeline and strategy are progressing is a crucial variable. Second is the variable of North Korea's weakness, namely its economic situation. There have been many analyses on this, but those specializing in the North Korean economy say it is still difficult to accurately ascertain the internal situation. While a comprehensive assessment is expected as the year's plans conclude, changes in various North Korean economic indicators, particularly exchange rates and prices, have shown the largest fluctuations since the impeachment period. It is too early to determine whether this indicates instability in the North Korean economy or is simply a facet of the state-controlled rationing economy and economic changes that began last year. The important point is that while positive incentives, such as obtaining something actively, may motivate North Korea to engage in negotiations with South Korea or the US, there are also incentives related to resolving internal political and economic turmoil, such as the lifting of economic sanctions or changes in relations. However, it is difficult to consider the North Korean economic situation as dire enough to drive such actions, which is the second variable. Third is the Russia variable. While there have been many analyses, the economic exchange between North Korea and Russia has increased nearly tenfold, but in absolute terms, it remains very small, especially compared to border trade.

and it is very difficult for Russia to resolve North Korea's economic issues in place of China. I have also interviewed defectors; the rice provided by Russia, for instance, does not perfectly align with North Korea's economic situation, and thus, it does not provide direct assistance, especially in the form of state rations. On the other hand, the strategic effect, such as the advanced weapon technology that North Korea is currently pursuing, or the provisions in Article 8 of the alliance treaty last year regarding AI and other advanced technology transfers, could subjectively play a significant role in North Korea's strategic calculations. From this perspective, it is likely that the Kim Jong-un regime perceives its cooperation with Russia as significantly strengthening its position in the short term. Most forecasts suggest that a North Korea-Russia summit will definitely take place. It seems highly unlikely that a US president after Trump will actively pursue a North Korea-US summit. The US president

will likely not pursue a North Korea-US summit in concrete terms among the many diplomatic issues that will arise. For us, this is a significant opportunity as well as a cause for concern. Will a North Korea-US summit be held in the form desired by the US? Even if it is held and yields results, the possibility of it significantly contributing to resolving the entire Korean Peninsula issue is not high. This is a subjective opinion: North Korea, through Director Kim Yo-jong, stated during the summit with President Trump during the first administration that while President Trump was very friendly, there was no policy shift because the US as a whole did not change its view on North Korea. President Trump's foreign policy over the past six months has also shown a tendency to prioritize short-term US interests rather than fundamentally resolving security issues in each region. While in the past, the US played roles as a stabilizer, balancer, or mediator, it has now pursued a deal-oriented diplomacy focused on short-term US interests, with less concern for the overall regional security structure. Therefore, even if a North Korea-US summit is held, it is unlikely to result in a resolution in the form we desire, as mentioned by the professor earlier, for the stability of the Korean Peninsula, given the conflicting interests of both countries.

The greater problem is the potential ripple effect of failure, similar to the numerous subsequent difficulties after the failure of ROK-US relations. This is purely speculative, but there could be increased skepticism about the possibility of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, a weakening of US influence, and consequently, potential disappointment or negative reactions in South Korea towards President Trump's approach. Military tensions could escalate, leading North Korea to conduct nuclear tests, and so on. Therefore, from our perspective, it is necessary to consider the changes in North Korea-US relations comprehensively, looking at President Trump's term and the subsequent US presidential term within the new administration's five-year tenure.

The variable of military deterrence posture towards North Korea was well explained by Dr. Kim earlier. Our North Korea policy must ultimately be centered on a very strong and long-term military posture towards North Korea, upon which engagement or diplomacy with North Korea can be established. The variables that define our deterrence against North Korea are now determined by factors such as China, US strategy towards China, and as mentioned earlier, Taiwan. Therefore, it is difficult for our stance towards North Korea to be determined solely by bilateral relations between the two Koreas. Furthermore, there is the relationship between Russia and North Korea, which varies depending on the outlook of the war in Ukraine, and there are also European variables. In this context, while it is certainly important for us to proceed independently in determining our posture towards North Korea, there are now many variables that need to be resolved beforehand. Our strategic environment is not merely due to the emergence of the new administration; we are facing a very new environment amidst the changing world order and North Korea's evolving external strategy.

We have already encountered this, and the question is whether we have responded effectively. North Korea, for its part, has more positive incentives than negative ones in the short term, despite having both positive and negative environmental factors. In contrast, our North Korea strategy environment is not something that can be resolved solely by implementing a good North Korea strategy; it requires a response strategy based on considering variables such as the US, China, and military power, which is not easy. At the East Asia Institute, we have consistently advocated for a complex strategy encompassing military and economic sanctions against North Korea, engagement, and North Korea's development. While our bilateral deterrence against North Korea is certainly important, and economic leverage is necessary, and the US is also important, China and Russia are also significant variables in our North Korea policy. In fact, when examined individually, there are few external powers that the new administration can rely on easily. This applies to the US, and even more so to China and Russia. Japan also has its own position. Therefore, the new administration's North Korea strategy is not yet fixed. While the president's statements, various content, and state affairs agenda may emerge, the core principle is to maintain peace through military deterrence based on the ROK-US alliance, while engaging when opportunities arise. Thus, it is time to concretize this principle into specific policies.

The specific policies that have been announced, such as the suspension of loudspeaker broadcasts and the restoration of military exercises, are the minimum objectives for maintaining peace and preventing war in inter-Korean relations. Beyond that, what North Korea policy should be pursued remains uncertain. In that sense, these are factors that we must consider. When we address each of these factors effectively, such as managing our policy towards the US well, handling the China-Russia variables, and particularly the changes in the global deterrence system—as the US's global deterrence force weakens, long-standing rivalries in various regions become militarized and escalate into war, nuclear proliferation is exacerbated, the threshold for war is lowered, and even discussions of nuclear war are occurring—the overall security situation will inevitably influence North Korea's various strategies towards South Korea and its military strategies. Therefore, when pursuing North Korea policy, we cannot help but consider the changing international variables and variables related to neighboring countries. In this regard, the new administration appears to be at a fundamental stage of resetting its strategic objectives. It is akin to 1993, when the North Korean nuclear issue first emerged, and we began to contemplate what we needed to do. In a drastically changing international order, the North Korean nuclear issue will be one item, but North Korea has already defined our relationship as that of two hostile states.

This is not merely a matter of nomenclature; it is a situation that requires comprehensive consideration of how we will establish inter-Korean relations within a rapidly changing international order, and prioritization is crucial. The Trump administration is also discussing a fundamental reset of priorities. We need to view the priority of North Korea policy within the overall foreign policy, and whether US strategy is more important, in parallel. The priorities for each item within the external strategy are significantly different. Within North Korea policy itself, there is a need to formulate a package. While various policies have been implemented by progressive and conservative administrations, and we have written several reports synthesizing these elements, it is time to launch a strategy that effectively combines these components. I will elaborate further during the discussion session. Thank you.

Thank you. We will proceed with the first session as planned. Since two leading domestic experts have presented on the topic of the first session, we will now officially move to the discussion. Professor Pyo Chang-won from Hanyang University, and Dr. Kim Jung-seok, who has served as the Minister of Unification and possesses deep theoretical and practical experience in inter-Korean affairs and South Korean foreign policy and security, will serve as discussants. Both of you will have approximately 10 to 15 minutes for your discussion. Before we begin the discussion, I will take a little time if time permits.

Thank you. I am Professor Hong Young-pyo from Hanyang University. Thank you for inviting me to this wonderful event. Mr. Geum Ha-young mentioned that this is a discussion but also a presentation. Since I am also a discussant, and I was asked for a presentation paper, I was a bit confused as to whether it was a discussion or a presentation, so I will try to speak somewhere in between. In fact, I largely agree with the content presented by Dr. Kim Jung-seok and Professor Jeon Ju-seong, and I do not have any specific comments to make. However, I would like to share my thoughts on ROK-US relations and inter-Korean relations in relation to this. Frankly, ROK-US relations are not my area of expertise, so I will raise issues from a broader perspective, and I will discuss more specific details regarding inter-Korean relations.

I will discuss how our government should approach the future strategy of the ROK-US alliance. I believe the content presented by Dr. Kim Jung-seok is adequate. However, I anticipate significant political controversy regarding individual issues such as wartime operational control and defense cost-sharing, and it will be important to overcome these controversies to implement policies that are more rational and aligned with our national interests. President Lee Jae-myung stated in his remarks at the prosecutor's office, not in his inauguration speech, that he would pursue pragmatic diplomacy that serves national interests. Upon hearing this, I thought, "Pragmatic diplomacy was heavily emphasized by President Lee Myung-bak, and now it's appearing again." I then looked up President Lee Myung-bak's wording and found it to be almost identical.

I believe the content presented by Dr. Kim Jung-seok regarding the future strategy of the ROK-US alliance is adequate. However, there will likely be considerable political debate surrounding issues such as wartime operational control and defense cost-sharing, and it will be crucial to navigate these debates effectively to implement rational policies that serve our national interests. President Lee Jae-myung stated, not in his inauguration speech but in his remarks at the prosecutor's office, that he would pursue pragmatic diplomacy aligned with national interests. Upon hearing this, I thought, "Pragmatic diplomacy was heavily emphasized by President Lee Myung-bak, and now it's appearing again." I found President Lee Myung-bak's related statements to be almost identical.

I believe the content presented by Dr. Kim Jung-seok regarding the future strategy of the ROK-US alliance is adequate. However, there will likely be considerable political debate surrounding issues such as wartime operational control and defense cost-sharing, and it will be crucial to navigate these debates effectively to implement rational policies that serve our national interests. President Lee Jae-myung stated, not in his inauguration speech but in his remarks at the prosecutor's office, that he would pursue pragmatic diplomacy aligned with national interests. Upon hearing this, I thought, "Pragmatic diplomacy was heavily emphasized by President Lee Myung-bak, and now it's appearing again." I found President Lee Myung-bak's related statements to be almost identical.

President Lee Myung-bak pursued pragmatic diplomacy that served national interests, and President Moon Jae-in also conducted pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests. Why is pragmatic diplomacy continuously mentioned? President Yoon Suk-yeol also mentioned pragmatic diplomacy and values-based diplomacy together, but this was due to the judgment that previous administrations did not conduct pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests. Therefore, from the beginning of his term, he emphasized pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests. While diplomacy centered on national interests is natural, supporting it with pragmatic diplomacy can imply distrust of the other party. In other words, it can be seen as an perception that the other party is pursuing diplomatic policies based on ideology or political reasons.

I believe this issue is ultimately related to the structural limitations and dilemmas facing Korean diplomacy. While discussions on diplomatic history may seem somewhat grand, I believe there is a need to find lessons from the "Four Great Powers Diplomacy" when teaching diplomatic history. Historically, problems arose in the "Four Great Powers Diplomacy" not only due to practical aspects but also when it was exploited for domestic political purposes. Furthermore, side effects emerged when there was an obsession with principles over practical gains derived from the "Four Great Powers," and when principles were instrumentalized. The fundamental problem arises when there are more than two countries to serve.

When there are more than two great powers to serve, especially during periods of transition such as the change from the Yuan to the Ming dynasty, or the Ming to the Qing dynasty, it has always been a difficult time. At such times, when diplomatic decisions were made based on domestic political controversies or principles due to misjudgment, side effects occurred and negatively impacted national security. Recent diplomacy has been discussed since the Roh Moo-hyun administration as an issue of autonomous diplomacy and alliance diplomacy. Today, I believe the issue of expanding alliances and autonomy is intertwined with historical context and structural circumstances. Furthermore, the question of how to position relations with China in light of the United States' strategic flexibility will lead to political debates about pro-China versus pro-US stances in ROK-US relations, and overcoming these issues is considered a fundamental task.

As Professor Jang In-sung mentioned, it is extremely difficult for a small state to fully enjoy autonomy in the current international political landscape where great powers lead international relations. Autonomy is realistically enjoyed by reserving a certain degree of sovereignty. It is necessary to consider future diplomatic policies while acknowledging this reality. For pragmatic diplomacy, we must move beyond dichotomous approaches such as realism versus idealism, autonomy versus alliance, or pro-China versus pro-US. We need to acknowledge the importance of alliances, their asymmetry, and the limitations on autonomy, and then find ways to act proactively within those constraints. Not long ago, President Lee Jae-myung's attendance at China's Victory Day celebration became a controversy, and I understand it has now been decided that he will not attend.

There was also controversy when President Park Geun-hye attended the Chinese Victory Day celebration during the Park Geun-hye administration. At that time, attending was the right decision, and I believe not attending now is also the right decision. I view both as correct choices. When President Park Geun-hye attended in 2015, there was pushback from the United States and significant internal opposition, particularly from former diplomats.

Although I was not in charge of diplomacy at the time, I believed attending was the right course of action. I believe the president can make a decision to attend even if they are not a diplomatic expert. At that time, the ROK-US alliance was firm, and despite the pushback from the United States, the foundation was laid to maintain relations with China while strengthening the ROK-US alliance. President Park Geun-hye attended by effectively utilizing this situation, and ROK-China relations also improved significantly. Of course, everything turned negative afterward due to the THAAD issue, but attending the Victory Day celebration at that time was the correct choice.

In this case, I was asked by other members, and I believe not attending is the right decision this time. Given the Trump variable and the situation where the US government harbors suspicions that South Korea is somewhat pro-China, there were concerns that going to China without a ROK-US summit would have greater negative repercussions. Fortunately, the decision not to attend has been made, and this shows the direction our diplomacy should take. For example, policy decisions need to move beyond dichotomous thinking, such as ideology versus autonomy or autonomy versus alliance, as seen in the decision regarding attendance at the Victory Day celebration. The issue of wartime operational control should also be considered in the same context. Dr. Kim Jong-seok mentioned the letters between President Syngman Rhee and General MacArthur, and the decision to place wartime operational control under a ghost military command, despite its transfer, was in accordance with the 1954 ROK-US agreement minutes.

The reason the United States demanded the transfer of wartime operational control (SOTG) at the time was to prevent President Syngman Rhee's Northward Unification theory. Although inter-Korean relations and the current situation have changed, the issue of wartime operational control needs to be considered from the perspective of North Korea strategy.

I wrote an article a long time ago, and if we only consider inter-Korean relations, it might not be bad to regain wartime operational control. This is because North Korea may continue to say, 'You are trying to discuss military matters without even having operational control.' What would North Korea's reaction be if we were to regain wartime operational control? Of course, we need to consider issues such as extended deterrence and budget, but this is an issue intertwined with inter-Korean relations and requires careful consideration. As mentioned in the presentation, regarding Trump's policy, he has shown an awareness since his 1990 Playboy interview of why he should support the defense costs of wealthy countries like South Korea and Japan. I believe this awareness still persists.

After the breakdown of the South Korea-US summit in 2019, President Trump stated at a press conference that military exercises cost a lot of money and should be stopped. I believe this perception will continue. In a way, our dilemma is dealing with a transactional and pragmatic Trump. However, while Trump's policies have exceptional aspects, I believe they also embody the continuity of U.S. foreign policy. The South Korea-US alliance has always had its ups and downs, so it needs to be examined with continuity.

I don't know how much time is left. I will say a few words about inter-Korean relations. Professor Jeon Se-hoon has well explained the various influencing factors. The important point is that Kim Jong-un has put forward the theory of two hostile states, and this did not come out of the blue. Kim Jong-un has long shown a tendency to emphasize the state over the nation. When I worked for the government, there was a half-joking, half-serious remark that just as South Korean young people in their 30s showed a higher national identity than national identity, Kim Jong-un, having studied in Europe, seems to emphasize the state over the nation. This trend has become increasingly pronounced. In 2016, the word 'nation' appeared about 130 times at the 7th Party Congress, but only 7-8 times at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. Even then, it was merely a ritualistic expression. It was already at this point that the nation was being erased and statism was being promoted. In particular, after declaring the completion of nuclear armament in November 2017, state-first ideology began to appear in the Rodong Sinmun. Therefore, I believe it is directly linked to North Korea's external strategy to be recognized as a nuclear power, and North Korea strategy should be established with this in mind.

The starting point for a pragmatic approach to North Korea strategy is to view the changed Kim Jong-un as he is and formulate a strategy accordingly. The reason I say this is that although the current government emphasizes dialogue and peace, many individuals who experienced inter-Korean relations 20 years ago are involved, and I am concerned that they may be trying to redefine relations based on memories of inter-Korean relations or North Korea from 20 years ago. If we approach it that way, the probability of failure is very high. Since 2013, Kim Jong-un has elevated his pride by refusing humanitarian aid from the South. In the past, under Kim Jong-il, dialogue would begin after receiving humanitarian aid, but this approach did not work in the Kim Jong-un era. In 2018, dialogue finally began due to relations with the United States, and we must approach it cautiously now, as we risk being drawn into North Korea's strategy if we attempt dialogue by offering goodwill.

We must view and approach North Korea correctly. The President said, 'Peace is better than war,' and of course, peace is better than war. However, peace and war are not divided so dichotomously. Modern society is in a 'no war, no peace' situation, and peace and security must be pursued together, not separately. Efforts for stable peace must be made while maintaining security, thereby ensuring the safety of South Korea and the peace of its citizens.

Dialogue is necessary for peace, but dialogue itself should not be the goal. Peace is the goal, and dialogue is merely a means to achieve it. There can be various means to achieve peace besides dialogue. Dialogue requires not only incentives but also deterrence. Both carrots and sticks are needed. North Korea does not come to the dialogue simply because we give them what they want; rather, they sometimes come to dialogue when there are issues to be separated or resolved. If we only continue to provide incentives, we may be dragged along by North Korea, so we must create a situation where they cannot avoid coming out through pressure.

We have been told there are 10 minutes left until the end of the discussion. I will conclude. The most important thing when preparing for dialogue is the issue of appellations. Based on my experience in dialogue on the ground, if inter-Korean dialogue begins, North Korea will maintain its two-state theory and demand to be called the 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea.' We must carefully decide whether to accept this. Strategic preparation of the level and name of the dialogue will allow us to respond flexibly when the opportunity for actual dialogue arises.

There will be presentations by two speakers followed by an open discussion. I believe the most important role of the moderator is to act as a devil's advocate, posing challenging questions to the presenters and discussants to facilitate a convergence of ideas. My first question is that I am often surprised by the news. It seems that trade negotiations are not starting at the scheduled time, leading to a situation where a minister has to return from the airport. We are facing a situation with Kim Park-heon ahead of August 1st, and yet, compared to the urgency and impact of the topics discussed today, which are far more critical than trade negotiations, I personally feel that the preparations by both officials and academics are not sufficiently advanced. In 1880, when Kim Hong-jip went to Japan as the second envoy, Hwang Jun-won, seeing Joseon's complacent attitude, wrote 'Joseon Strategy' and concluded with the phrase 'Yeonjakcheodang' (燕雀處堂). As you know, Yeonjakcheodang refers to sparrows remaining unconcerned while their house is burning. I use this expression because I want to ask what great mountain awaits us after August 1st.

Although Dr. Kim has summarized it well, I see the issue of the US Forces Korea (USFK), one of the triple threats, as the biggest challenge. The other two are ancillary negotiations, and the USFK has undergone two difficult negotiations since the Korean War, in 1970 and 2004. Perhaps this third negotiation could be even more difficult than those.

Then will we accept it, or will we take about 30 seconds to wrap up after a few rounds? I believe that if we strategically establish the level at which we have discussions and the terminology we use, we will be able to navigate the actual opportunities for dialogue more smoothly when they arise. The three presenters will speak, and we will have a round of discussions with some roles. The best role for a moderator is probably that of a devil's advocate. Although the presenters and discussants are well-acquainted with these topics and have been leading the discussion in Korea, I think it is important to corner them with challenging questions to foster a collective national effort. My first question is that we are surprised by the news every day. The customs agreement was not reached at the scheduled time this morning.

The minister returned from the airport. We are facing a situation prior to August 1st. In fact, the topic of our first session today is far more urgent and has a much greater impact than the current customs negotiations, yet the preparation by both authorities and academia seems to be lacking, in my personal opinion. To use an interesting expression, when Kim Hong-jip went to Japan as the second envoy in 1880, Hwang Jun-won was frustrated by Joseon's complacency and wrote the book 'Joseon Strategy,' ending with the reason why he wrote it. He then uses the expression 'Yeonjak Cheodang' (연작 처당). As you know, Yeonjak Cheodang refers to the scene where pigeons, while their nest is burning, are unaware and are chirping and not gathered together. Therefore, I always say I only write for the country, not for myself. Why did Joseon Strategy contain these words?

Why am I cornering them so recklessly? It's because after August 1st, what will be the next huge mountain of negotiation? As Dr. Kim has summarized it well, among the three impending threats, I believe that the USFK is one of them. The other two are secondary difficult negotiations, and as you know, the USFK has undergone two difficult negotiations since the Korean War, in 1970 and 2004. Perhaps this third negotiation will be more difficult than that.

It seems like it will be a much larger negotiation than that. Already, the Nuclear Security Strategist, with Holby as the chairman, is drafting it. The Global Force Posture Review is expected to be released in August at the earliest, and early September at the latest. The final touches are being made now. So, what specifically will be done with the 28,500? Or, if we add the 52,000 from China, the US, and Japan, there are roughly 80,000 overseas troops. This is not a time to discuss these figures casually, as the review is in its final stages. So what will happen? The Defense Priorities report, which recently suggested reducing the number from 40,000 to 28,500 or even 10,000, is not just a simple report; they already have concrete cards to play when the Robos Review is released. Are we prepared? Are we struggling?

Because this issue is involved, it will likely involve two aspects. How well do we read their cards? And what will we do? Tell everyone to leave. Okay. Tell everyone to leave. Or hold on until the end. Looking at the cases of 1970 and 2004, no matter how we held on, the decisions were largely made according to what the US wanted: the reduction of USFK. So, what will we do this time? I believe this issue requires more serious consideration. The other two are very subordinate issues. The troops will come and go. As they say, they have already internally created their own expression: 'Pay for modern alliance costs.' The thinking is not being transferred: they reduce troops but demand money. Their thinking is that even if they reduce to 10,000 from a zero base, we should pay for those 10,000, shouldn't we?

Then, to break that logic, can we persuade them with the argument that 'this exists for your public relations effect, so you should pay too'? I don't know if I should be saying this as someone who hasn't experienced negotiations, but from their perspective, depending on how far they can go, it seems like a very urgent issue. If customs tariffs are like Baekdusan, then the readjustment of USFK is like a mountain that is already upon us, yet we are observing it from a great distance. Are we not facing the fate of the typical 21st-century 'Yeonjak Cheodang'? This seems to be the first rather awkward question.

Secondly, what if the US, particularly Trump, does not view this region separately but as a single entity encompassing the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, and operates accordingly? How will we respond in our case? Dr. Kim briefly mentioned some terms like 'withdrawal,' but the constant withdrawal is a different matter than whether it is possible or not. They will think very differently. So, from our perspective, with what logic can we hold on? What role will we play in the Korean Peninsula front, the Taiwan front, and the South China Sea front, and what roles will the US and other countries play? To what extent will we exchange these things? Therefore, a transformation in the way we view the issue itself is necessary. This is why the expression 'active alliance transformation,' beyond mere strategic cooperation, was used. I believe we are in a situation where we need to establish a more proactive spatial concept.

The third debate is again related to the North-South Korean issue or the North Korean issue. Ultimately, whether conservative or progressive, in a sense, if a war on the Korean Peninsula occurs, it cannot be called a complete failure. However, since inter-Korean relations have not improved, it cannot be called a success either. If both conservative and progressive approaches have failed, and a major tragedy occurred with the conservative approach, leading only to increased tensions, then where will a breakthrough come from, transcending bipartisan or dualistic approaches? This is a significant issue, and it is related to the previous issue: if there were no military tensions between North and South Korea, solving the previous issue would be very easy.

However, at first glance, the situation after the end of the Ukraine-Russia war seems uncertain. I believe that North Korea may benefit in the short term, but will face significant difficulties in the long term. In such a case, if South Korea pursues pragmatic diplomacy, simply mixing the existing conservative and progressive approaches will not be enough to avoid war and crisis situations and move towards improved relations. I believe a new way of thinking is needed. I will proceed with the first round with this in mind.

Dr. Kim. >> Yes. Uh, you've immediately posed a very difficult question. In Go, as you mentioned earlier, customs and security are much more serious issues, and you've rightly pointed that out. In Go, there are urgent places and important places, aren't there? Uh, consequently, it seems we are addressing the urgent matters first, and I completely agree that the truly important issues remain. Also, your point that among the three challenges I mentioned, the readjustment of USFK is the core is an accurate observation. Uh, what I want to emphasize here is that I believe there is a clear possibility of a reduction in the size of USFK. And in fact, the history of USFK can also be seen as a history of reduction. After the Korean War, it was about 70,000, then about 45,000, and then 37,000. 3,000 is a number very familiar to our generation, but it became 28,500. In reality, when USFK decreases,

We feel very anxious. Why is that? But if we think more deeply, the reduction in the number of USFK, a reduction of 4,500, or 10,000, is not that important in itself. Uh, and the loss of combat power due to the withdrawal of certain USFK units is also not the core issue. We can compensate for that. Whether a Stryker brigade or a helicopter brigade withdraws, we can actually fill that gap. The core issue is not the loss of combat power, but the symbolic effect of the US's commitment to the defense of the Korean Peninsula. Especially now, the issue of extended deterrence credibility is being affected. If we mobilize the old Cold War concept again, I believe that, whether we like it or not, no matter how much time has passed, the strategic value of USFK is the tripwire. Uh, it plays a role in guaranteeing US reinforcement in the event of a large-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, not the opposite.

The core issue is not the loss of combat power due to the withdrawal of any specific unit. Therefore, I believe that a loss of that magnitude, whether it's 4,500 or so, can be compensated for through our efforts. So, then, is the readjustment of USFK size not a big deal and something we can easily cope with? The problem is how rapidly and how without our consultation the size is adjusted, which seems quite important. As I briefly mentioned earlier, the think tank Defense Priorities recently released a report suggesting leaving about 10,000 troops and even further reductions. If that happens, I think it's quite serious. But yes, I don't know to what extent the Pentagon is truly considering this and finalizing the work, but if I had to guess, the possibility of moving towards such a rapid conclusion is relatively low? I don't know if this is mixed with some hope, but the report is excessively military-focused. Yes.

Therefore, there is a logic of deploying [forces] to rear areas that are sufficiently far from the range of China's missiles or attack range. There is a logic of deploying [forces] far into the rear, but if the reduction is too symbolic and drastic in this region, not only the U.S.'s simple military influence but also its overall geopolitical influence will be completely diminished. In that case, would the U.S. really conclude to withdraw almost all combat units from the Korean Peninsula through military optimization? If that happens, the discussion about independent capabilities on the Korean Peninsula, rather than extended deterrence, would likely unfold at a completely different level than it does now. Perhaps that could be a card to prevent such drastic changes in the U.S. forces stationed in Korea. In any case, if I were to make a prediction, I don't foresee such drastic changes.

It is not rational for the US, so it will likely be at some intermediate level. Ah, if that is the case, then perhaps we can accept such a change and utilize it. And regarding the second point you raised, the fronts such as the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, and South China Sea are all connected and discussed together. Especially in the case of the Taiwan Strait issue, will a convenient compromise point like the one I mentioned earlier work? Ah.

Of course, I am not confident about that part, but what is important is that, personally, I am somewhat skeptical about the idea that a problem in the Taiwan Strait would simultaneously open another front on the Korean Peninsula. However, there are many such discussions going on now. If such discussions exist, then I believe the stability of the Korean Peninsula is even more important. If a problem occurs in the Taiwan Strait, yes. If a conflict occurs in the Taiwan Strait, opening a second front on the Korean Peninsula is indeed not desirable for anyone.

Not even for the US. Therefore, the logic that the USFK and the ROK-US alliance should focus more on the stability of the Korean Peninsula when there is an issue in the Taiwan Strait consultations, and should not neglect it, is a logic that can certainly be accepted by the US side. And in many of the war games currently being conducted in the US, which simulate various scenarios in the Taiwan Strait, the results vary greatly depending on the variables. Among these variables, regarding allies, there are discussions about how actively Japan will participate in the conflict in the Taiwan Strait, or what about Australia, but the role of South Korea is not really highlighted. In such diverse war games, that is actually not very common.

To that extent, I think the US also views South Korea's role somewhat restrictively. Yes. Therefore, while the Taiwan Strait issue is something we should be sufficiently concerned about, we do not need to exaggerate it beyond reality. Perhaps we can find some line there. Ah, I have such thoughts. Regarding the USFK issue mentioned in the North Korean announcement >> It's all coming. >> Yes. >> Yes. Well, our Chairman has often spoken about the importance of this issue, and I also consider it very important.

Let me just make a few points. Uh, South Korea's response to changes in the regional security situation, or rather, the necessity of such a response, seems to have come late for us as well. That's why the mention of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea was included in the final ROK-US summit under President Moon Jae-in. Everyone was very surprised at the time, especially given it was a progressive administration. At the time, there was an assessment that it was a slight quid pro quo for the US's support of President Moon's North Korea policy, but although it seemed like a very minor issue then, looking back, it was about resolving the continuous interrelationship or barrier between our issues on the Korean Peninsula and the regional issues that the US considered. It was resolved.

And the previous administration also seemed to confirm this further. And although our ambassador is here, the current administration will inevitably have to discuss certain diplomatic support for the South China Sea and Taiwan during ROK-US summits, as well as ROK-US-Japan summits. Therefore, as this continues to emerge as a diplomatic issue, I feel the urgency is very high from the perspective of researchers and the government. Secondly, as mentioned by Professor Lee Sang-eui, the pressure from Trump during his first term regarding USFK is entirely different from the current situation. During his first term, the US-China relationship was not as militarized as it is now in the context of US-China strategic competition. However, after the Biden administration, it has become significantly militarized, and since the issue of USFK is centered around the Taiwan issue and US military containment of China, it is not a matter of cost. Yes, it is a question of whether to form an alliance based on a joint assessment of the future threshold of the ROK-US alliance, not about reducing 4,000 troops or by how much.

It's not about that. Our mutual defense treaty, the basis of the alliance, states that we will jointly respond to threats in the Pacific. While this was a clause to protect us, it is no longer the case. Therefore, when I talk to US scholars, there seem to be two points. First, South Korea's defense capabilities have improved, and it has become prosperous. It is incomprehensible that this prosperity is disregarded when it comes to US containment of China or deterrence. Even very pro-Korea scholars say so. However, in South Korea, when the issue of China, especially in a military context, arises, we have tended to avoid the conversation or refrain from strategic discussions. But this is no longer possible.

In that sense, if USFK is to be reduced, and if it is not a matter of cost, then we need to precisely ask what the basis is and what the US's long-term vision for USFK is, and get confirmation. Therefore, truly, 20,000 out of the 28,500 are ground troops. So, are they trying to reduce ground troops, and what will be the role of USFK after the transfer of wartime operational control? We need to start the discussion about the change in the role of USFK with some kind of master plan. If the US unilaterally starts with just reducing the size, then there are many aspects that need to be discussed.

As Professor Lee Sang-eui mentioned, I also have the impression that the Trump administration has already made significant decisions early this year and is now considering how these will be accepted in South Korea. However, without sufficient discussion about the 'lessons learned,' the issue of USFK has become different from the issue of USFK last year. My concern is whether we are prepared to deal with this, and how we should respond if an announcement is made. I believe this is very important. While we actively discuss these issues, there might be possibilities even if our role is passive. As Dr. Kim Jung-sook mentioned, Dong-a Ilbo conducted a public opinion poll, and the public is very aware that the Taiwan situation is critical to our national interest, but they seem to lean towards a cautious response.

Humanitarian aid or very indirect support—in a sense, there is still national consensus on this. So, when such an announcement is made, and as US scholars say, we actively acknowledge the trend and express our position, while also stating our limitations in response—if we discuss this with the US, they fully understand. They understand that South Korea can only do this much. However, the fact that there is no discussion about the preceding issues at all is very strange. This was the overall sentiment.

Although this may be a personal impression and could be mistaken, we need to respond to the new basis of our alliance. This is not a matter of specific items between South Korea and the US, as seen in the preceding customs negotiations and the current USFK negotiations. Looking at the history of international order formation, everything has been negotiation and transaction. Therefore, when the US was creating the liberal order, it conducted transactions on all matters, building them up step by step. The problem is not that a transactional approach is wrong, but that the current transactions on customs and alliances are formative transactions that create a new order. Therefore, our position is not about whether it is 15% or 20%, or whether USFK will be 4,000 troops. It is about building up step by step in creating the future order in East Asia or the liberal order, similar to the situation in 1945 or 1950. In that sense, I believe this is a truly important juncture, and we need to look very closely at the case of Europe.

Europe has already begun its 'strategic autonomy,' ranging from the deployment of forces, defense spending, force levels, weaponry, and even strategy, from a period of active US support to a period of complete US absence. While we cannot completely withdraw from the US due to China's presence, we need to prepare for various US-related issues. Finally, regarding North Korea, during this administration's term, the US president may change, and we do not know if Xi Jinping will serve another term. In any case, in the latter half of the term, the pace of international change will be very rapid. If the Ukraine war is in its eighth year then, after 30 years, the national strength to sustain it may diminish, thus creating significant factors for change in the latter half. In that regard, we must set clear objectives for the first and latter halves of this administration's term. There is no need to subordinate other policies for the sake of North Korea policy achievements, such as prioritizing wartime operational control or abandoning leverage.

The changes in the international situation will proceed much faster than the changes in inter-Korean relations, so it is important to find ways to achieve results while adjusting the pace and the public's expectations. Professor Hong, you have prepared particularly challenging questions, so I would like to hear them. This is related to Professor Jeon's point, but in my view, even if the Ukraine-Russia war ends in some form, many people believe that North Korea will secure significant strategic benefits. However, in my view, it will face a very difficult phase.

The reason I think so is that as long as North Korea continues its parallel pursuit of nuclear capabilities and economic development, it is difficult to gain much from Russia. Russia has a GDP slightly larger than ours, and despite fighting a war, it is only about twice the military strength of South Korea, already a middle power. In a situation where it alienates the two major powers, China and the US, it will face truly difficult challenges in two to three years. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration also has no reason to rush. No matter what attempts are made, they will not easily succeed. As the war ends and the parallel pursuit continues, the difficulties will mount, and then a time will come when a policy based on actual strength will be needed. Since you have served as a minister once,

If you have the opportunity to serve as minister again, from Professor Hong's perspective, looking further ahead, what kind of pragmatic diplomacy would you recommend for North Korea, which cannot properly deal with China, the US, or even the South, and has no significant results from Russia? I would like to ask that question. >> Yes, regardless of whether I serve again, based on my experience and as a scholar, I believe that while there may be short-term effects from close ties with Russia, there will be significant side effects in the long run.

For example, in addition to the immediate issue with China, Western and Northern European countries that were trying to do something about North Korea are now completely cutting off relations and suspending related projects because they cannot do anything with North Korea, which is fighting alongside Russia. Therefore, I believe this will have various side effects and difficulties. Then, in the end, as I mentioned earlier, pressure must also be applied along with incentives. I believe that when such difficulties arise, there is also a part where we can draw out dialogue through increased pressure. However, I believe it is very difficult for us to bring North Korea to dialogue alone, and we must ultimately go with the US. Therefore, once North Korea-US dialogue begins, and in any direction, even if it's not complete denuclearization, but even if dialogue on denuclearization begins, then inter-Korean relations can only be resolved.

Therefore, during the Moon Jae-in administration, we played the role of a mediator. However, I believe we should act as a party, not a mediator, and have a frank discussion with the US. Truly wanting to have a dialogue. So, as you mentioned earlier, the fact that the current ROK-US relations are very poor is a major problem. After resolving that, we need to work with the US to bring North Korea to the table and develop strategies together, but that will not be easy either. I mentioned President Trump's press conference in 2019 earlier, and there was a very interesting part.

I asked about his relationship with President Moon Jae-in. Then Trump said, 'I like President Moon Jae-in very much. I actually get along well with all leaders. But do you know this? There are people who try to take advantage of me. But if they know that I know that, they get flustered. Still, I get along well.' It's very much in Trump's style of speaking, but why did he mention 'people who try to take advantage of me' when asked about President Moon Jae-in? Later, even in public forums, he said, 'Don't try to take advantage of the US.' It seems to be in that context. Therefore, in leading inter-Korean dialogue, how to utilize the US, meaning

This is because it is placed in a rear area, somewhat beyond the range of China's missiles or attacks. There is a logic for rear deployment. However, when it is drastically reduced to a purely symbolic level, it will lead to a complete reduction of the US's overall geopolitical influence in this region, beyond its mere military presence. Yes, will they really conclude to the extent of removing almost all combat units from the Korean Peninsula through such military optimization? Ah, if that happens, then truly, ah, it will no longer be extended deterrence, but a discussion about the independent capabilities of the Korean Peninsula itself will likely unfold at a much different level than now. Yes, perhaps that could be a card to prevent such a drastic change in USFK. In any case, if I have to make a prediction, I don't think such a drastic change will occur.

Something must be achieved for inter-Korean dialogue and some kind of transaction to actually take place. However, I believe that creating a strategy that is discussed very closely with the US, aligns with US interests, and also benefits us is the most pragmatic approach. Yes, we were about to start the main discussion, but the prompt indicates that the next session will conclude it, so it seems realistically difficult to take questions from the floor. Despite the time elapsed, I will use one minute to conclude.

This is related to Dr. Kim's comment. The contents of the National Defense Report and Global Force Posture Review that the US is preparing for late August can actually be understood in detail. If we enter negotiations with that in mind, what we need to carefully examine is what I believe to be a slight misconception on their part: that they might attack Taiwan in 2028. They believe that in order to achieve hegemony, Xi Jinping must operate a unified front from the Korean Peninsula to Southeast Asia based on this assumption. However, I believe they are misinterpreting the virtual war plans that precede it.

I do not believe that China will easily resolve the Taiwan issue militarily in 2028. However, if we take a longer-term view, it will be extremely difficult to negotiate by saying, 'We will only consider the Korean Peninsula front.' This is a connected front, and depending on how the three layers are linked within that front, there are roles to be taken ahead and behind on each front. So, even though we have played a minimal role from behind, here, on the Korean Peninsula, we will lead, not just by our own strength, but by going together. Because the collapse of the Korean Peninsula is not just the fall of the Korean Peninsula, but the collapse of all of Asia. Therefore, you must also go together. If we say that,

Since we have to go in so much, in the South China Sea, we should be at the very back, spending 70-80%, and then engage in a ratio battle. If we fight a battle with completely different spatial concepts, it will inevitably be a very difficult negotiation. Paradoxically, there might be some level of understanding. Since time is limited, we cannot proceed further. I have enjoyed listening to the presentations of the two professors, which showcase their highest level of expertise, and the very interesting comments from the professor. I will conclude here.

The Triple Challenge from Trump and Proactive Alliance Transformation

Trump's Tripartite Challenge and Proactive Alliance Transformation

Kim Jung-sup: Hello. I am Kim Jung-sup, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute. I will be speaking about current issues concerning the ROK-U.S. alliance. There are various multifaceted challenges stemming from Trump. We will discuss how we should perceive and respond to these challenges.

Currently, there seem to be three major alliance issues. First is 'defense cost sharing.' While it narrowly refers to the negotiations for the Special Measures Agreement (SMA), broadly it includes the issue of increasing defense expenditures. That is one. Second is the 'overall readjustment of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).' This includes strategic flexibility and potential reductions in USFK. There is also the possibility of a chain of reorganizations of combined force commands throughout the Indo-Pacific region. And intertwined with all of this is the 'transfer of wartime operational control (S Oko-ji).' The U.S.'s demands involve internal contradictions in alliance transformation, which presents a dilemma for us. Therefore, we will examine these aspects and, ultimately, how we should view them. I have termed this 'proactive alliance transformation,' and I believe it is difficult to try to prevent it or maintain the status quo. Moving forward, we need to acknowledge these unavoidable realities as they are, and while these changes undoubtedly pose challenges, they also present opportunities. From this perspective, I believe we need to adopt a stance of proactive alliance transformation.

To begin with, the international order is undergoing a major transition, and there is a possibility of seismic shifts in the ROK-U.S. alliance. I will elaborate on this later. This also applies to the three alliance issues I mentioned. Domestically, there have been many discussions about a 'package deal.' That is, starting with the issue of tariffs, there are various alliance issues, and the idea has been to negotiate in a 'give-and-take' manner. What should we protect, what can we concede, and what should we demand unequivocally? While such an approach might be possible within a broader framework, I do not believe that approaching it as a package deal will automatically resolve these difficult issues.

What I mean is that, upon closer examination, it is difficult to even categorize which issues are more important or less important among the current challenges to set priorities, and to determine what can be conceded and what cannot. Therefore, I believe that thorough analysis and thought on each individual issue must precede any further considerations. Based on that foundation, package deals are a matter for later consideration.

The reason I referred to it as a 'tripartite challenge' in the title is as follows: As the U.S. global strategy changes, its commitment to the defense of the Korean Peninsula is clearly weakening. Simultaneously, as issues like strategic flexibility of USFK are raised, the risk of U.S.-China entanglement conversely increases. Amidst this, the costs of the alliance itself are rising, which is contradictory. The U.S. is reducing its commitment to the defense of the Korean Peninsula, asking South Korea to align with its priorities while demanding more in terms of USFK stationing costs and other alliance expenses. I refer to this as a tripartite challenge. While each individual issue is problematic, the fundamental challenge to the alliance is the growing divergence between ROK and U.S. perceptions of common threats and strategic directions, which form the basis of the alliance. I consider this to be a significant issue. Therefore, I will present a plan for a more forward-looking and proactive response by examining these matters.

I mentioned three current issues earlier. The first is cost pressure and burden-sharing. As agreed at NATO, increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP is being applied similarly to Korea, which presents a problem. In reality, this target is almost impossible to achieve. A GDP share of 5% is currently 2.33%. This means it needs to more than double. Our defense budget currently accounts for about 10% of the total government budget. To meet this target, it would have to more than double. This is virtually impossible. As those familiar with the government budget know, there are not many areas where rigid or semi-rigid expenditures can be reduced. Therefore, while one might argue that increasing the defense budget and strengthening defense capabilities at this juncture is a good idea, there is not much room to maneuver within our government budget.

Of course, 5% would not be applied as is, and like NATO, it could be divided into 3.5% for pure defense spending and 1.5% for broader security costs, but even that would not be easy. In particular, what we need to consider here is that rather than assuming that what was applied to NATO can be directly applied to Asian alliances, it is important to consider the differences between the ROK-US alliance and the NATO alliance.

In fact, NATO accepted the 5% under pressure from President Trump, but European countries themselves admit that they have neglected security for a long time. Therefore, the issue of defense cost sharing among NATO European member states has been a chronic issue for the NATO alliance. Although NATO European member states have awakened and reached an agreement due to the war in Ukraine, we cannot be considered a security free-rider in the ROK-US alliance.

Among Asian allies, South Korea has the highest defense spending as a percentage of GDP and maintains a strong military of 500,000 elite troops, which clearly distinguishes it. If possible, there is a way to flexibly accept the US demand, such as 3.5% like NATO, but a more direct approach is to identify areas where South Korea's defense capabilities need to be strengthened, share this with the US, and enhance defense capabilities. This is ultimately the right approach to reduce the burden on the US. Rather than setting a number first and trying to meet it, or adopting an artificial method like NATO's annual implementation plans, it is desirable to identify areas where South Korea's defense needs to be strengthened, enhance defense capabilities, and allow defense spending to increase naturally.

The current 12th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was agreed upon just 7-8 months ago and will take effect next year. It is scheduled to start at 1.5 trillion won next year and gradually increase. However, President Trump continues to mention 10 billion dollars for South Korea, which is an unrealistic figure, almost 10 times the currently agreed amount. It is questionable whether this agreement will be broken and renegotiated, and I do not think it is desirable.

We must maintain the position that the existing intergovernmental agreement should be upheld. If negotiations are unavoidably resumed, it would be better to shift from the current lump-sum method to a requirements-based method, like Japan. In the past, the lump-sum method was maintained out of concern that itemizing requirements would increase costs, but against unreasonable demands like Trump's, a requirements-based approach with careful scrutiny can sufficiently curb drastic increases.

Of course, the premise is that no new items will be added beyond the existing three categories: personnel costs, logistical support, and facility construction. It is possible that the US may demand that South Korea bear the costs of joint exercises or strategic asset deployments, going beyond the existing framework for defense cost sharing. For example, a B-1B bomber costs $6.5-7 million per hour to operate, and a carrier strike group incurs enormous costs for about ten days of operations. We need to consider these aspects as well.

The second issue is the adjustment of US Forces Korea (USFK). According to The Wall Street Journal, the US Department of Defense is considering a reduction of approximately 4,500 USFK troops as part of strategic flexibility. This means that USFK will no longer be solely focused on North Korea but will be utilized in regional crisis situations. This was a sensitive alliance issue during the Roh Moo-hyun administration and the Bush administration due to the problem of South Korea potentially being used as a staging base in the event of a US-China conflict.

The 2006 agreement between Secretaries Rice and Ban Ki-moon was a compromise. At the time, the Roh Moo-hyun administration sought to stipulate prior consultation procedures and South Korean government control over the issue of USFK's strategic flexibility, but it was eventually compromised with the phrase 'mutual respect.' This means that South Korea respects the US's strategic flexibility, and the US respects the South Korean people's sentiment of not intervening in conflicts that the South Korean people do not desire. This issue has the potential to become more sensitive.

There is also discussion about which units and capabilities would be adjusted in the event of a USFK reduction. A strike brigade of approximately 4,500 troops is the most likely candidate, and the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft are already scheduled for retirement. Currently, F-16s have been consolidated at Osan Air Base, and while F-35s are being discussed for new deployment at Kunsan Air Base, this is uncertain. In this case, Kunsan Air Base could be closed among Osan and Kunsan bases.

The New Administration's North Korea Strategy: Key Variables and Response Strategies

The New Administration's North Korea Strategy: Key Variables and Response Strategies

Jeon Jae-seong: I studied at Seoul National University's Department of Political Science and International Relations and am currently supporting national security-related work at the East Asia Institute. The topic is the new government's North Korea strategy. The new government has not yet established a clear strategy for North Korea, as its formation was rushed. It has been 32 years since the North Korean nuclear issue began, and the international order is undergoing fundamental changes, making it time to reconsider the fundamental objectives of the North Korea strategy and the scope of achievable goals within five years.

Ultimately, unification is the best goal, but passively, preventing war, and intermediately, denuclearization of North Korea and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation are also possible. We need to set new goals for our North Korea strategy with this spectrum in mind. North Korea is already strategically maneuvering within the changes of a 'new Cold War.' In contrast, the South Korean government has experienced confusion between conservative and progressive approaches over the past two administrations, either focusing on inter-Korean relations or minimizing them. The conditions have now become such that they cannot be easily handled by this conservative-progressive spectrum, so it is important to first examine the key variables of the North Korea strategy.

In the past, inter-Korean relations were the most important variable in North Korea policy, and North Korea's internal situation or its strategy towards South Korea were important. However, North Korea has now become a military actor in Europe, the North Korea-China-Russia triangle is in progress, and North Korea-US summits can be held regardless of our will. Therefore, the way we deal with North Korea can change. The influence of our North Korea strategy on inter-Korean relations is gradually diminishing, and it may manifest as a result of diplomatic or economic strategies. Although the North Korea strategy cannot be the top priority or an independent variable, this is not necessarily a bad thing. If we successfully implement our strategies towards the US, China, and Russia, new opportunities may arise for our North Korea strategy. Therefore, the new government's North Korea strategy should be approached from a different perspective than in the past.

North Korea's external strategy is the first variable. For the past 2-3 years, North Korea has been pursuing its own external diplomatic, military, political, and economic strategies, independent of South Korea's North Korea strategy. Many analysts assess that North Korea's current international strategic position is the best it has been since the end of the Cold War. North Korea's participation in the Ukraine conflict may be negative in the long term, but in the short term, it provides an advantageous position in terms of diplomatic standing, military technology transfer, and economic power. This weakens South Korea's leverage over North Korea, so how North Korea's own timeline and strategy proceed is an important variable.

The second variable is North Korea's economic situation, which is its weakness. North Korean economic experts say it is difficult to accurately grasp the internal situation. While an assessment is expected as the five-year plan concludes this year, the exchange rate and food prices have risen significantly since last year, the largest increase since the end of the Cold War. It is too early to determine whether this indicates economic instability or a change in the state-controlled rationing economy. While there may be positive expectations as an incentive for North Korea to come to the negotiating table, there may also be a desire for sanctions relief or improved relations to overcome internal economic difficulties. However, it is difficult to say that the current North Korean economic situation is bad enough to generate such momentum.

The third variable is Russia. Although trade between North Korea and Russia has increased nearly tenfold, the absolute amount is negligible, and Russia cannot replace China. According to interviews with North Korean defectors, the grain provided by Russia does not match North Korea's economic situation and is not directly helpful.

On the other hand, strategic effects, such as advanced weapons technology or provisions for AI and advanced technology transfer, could play an important role in North Korea's strategic calculations. The Kim Jong-un regime will likely judge that its position is being strengthened in the short term through North Korea-Russia cooperation. There are many predictions that a North Korea-US summit will definitely be held, but presidents after Trump will not actively pursue North Korea-US summits. This presents a significant opportunity and a cause for caution for South Korea, but it is uncertain whether it will be held in the form the US desires.

Even if a summit is held and yields results, it is unlikely to significantly contribute to resolving the entire Korean Peninsula issue. North Korea assesses that the North Korea-US summit with President Trump did not yield policy achievements, and President Trump has pursued diplomacy focused on short-term US interests. Therefore, given the respective interests of both countries, reaching an agreement for the stability or defense of the Korean Peninsula will not be easy.

A bigger problem is the ripple effect of failure, as seen after the Hanoi summit's collapse. Skepticism about resolving the North Korean nuclear issue may increase, US influence may weaken, and South Korea may become disillusioned with President Trump's approach. Subsequently, North Korea might proceed with a nuclear test. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the changes in North Korea-US relations comprehensively during the new government's term, considering both President Trump's term and the next US president's term.

The final variable is the military deterrence posture towards North Korea. A strong and long-term military posture towards North Korea must underpin engagement or diplomacy with North Korea. Our deterrence against North Korea is determined in conjunction with China's strategy towards China, the Taiwan issue, etc., making it difficult to determine solely within bilateral relations between the two Koreas. Furthermore, North Korea-Russia relations will vary depending on the outlook for the war in Ukraine, and European variables also exist. Therefore, while autonomous efforts are important in determining our posture towards North Korea, there are many variables that must be resolved beforehand.

Our strategic environment is entering a new phase not because of the emergence of a new government, but within the context of a changing world order and North Korea's evolving external strategy. We are already in a new phase, and the question is whether we have been responding effectively. North Korea also faces positive and negative environments, but in the short term, it appears to have significantly more positive incentives. Conversely, our strategic environment for dealing with North Korea is not an issue that can be resolved solely by North Korea strategy; it requires considering variables such as the US and China, and military power, to establish a basic approach to our response strategy, which is not easy.

The East Asia Institute has also continuously discussed complex strategies such as military and economic sanctions against North Korea, engagement, and North Korea's development. Our one-on-one deterrence against North Korea is important, and we need economic leverage, and of course, the relationship with the US is also crucial. However, China and Russia are also important variables in our North Korea policy. In fact, when examining each one, there are few external powers that the current government can confidently rely on. This applies to the US, and even more so to China and Russia. Japan also has its own agenda, so it can be said that the current government's North Korea strategy is undecided at this time.

Kim Jeong-seop, Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute.

Jeon Jae-seong, Director of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute and Professor at Seoul National University.

Managed and Edited by: Oh In-hwan, Senior Research Fellow at EAI

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