[Global NK Commentary] Xi Jinping's Visit to Pyongyang After Seven Years and a New Search for North Korea Strategy

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1. President Xi Jinping's Visit to North Korea After Seven Years and the Significance of the North Korea-China Summit

President Xi Jinping visited North Korea on June 2026, for the first time in seven years, and held a summit with Chairman Kim Jong Un. This was the first North Korea-China summit in nine months since Chairman Kim Jong Un visited Beijing in early September 2025 to attend the 80th anniversary of China's Victory Day. As North Korea-China summits carry significant messages in themselves, it is important to examine the timing, reasons, background, and content of the meetings from various angles.

First, due to the unique nature of North Korea and China, where summit meetings are difficult to hold without mutual visits, regular mutual visits have become a tradition, symbolizing the North Korea-China 'blood alliance.' However, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992, North Korea-China summits decreased, and especially during President Xi Jinping's tenure, the tradition of regular summit meetings through mutual visits virtually disappeared. President Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang was his first in seven years since taking office in 2019. It was the first visit by a top Chinese leader to North Korea in 14 years since President Hu Jintao's visit in 2005. And it was only after another seven years, in 2026, that the second visit was realized. Chairman Kim Jong Un's visits to China have also been irregular. Chairman Kim Jong Un did not visit China for seven years after inheriting power in 2011, but he visited four times consecutively between March 2018 and January 2019. And after nearly seven years, he visited China in August 2025 to attend the 80th Victory Day celebrations.

Since Xi Jinping took office, the practice of holding North Korea-China summit meetings almost annually has disappeared, and the frequency has significantly decreased, showing a trend of occurring under special circumstances. Although North Korea-China relations have shown signs of recovery since the launch of the second Trump administration, they are no longer a special relationship that flaunts past blood alliance.

Second, recent North Korea-China summit meetings tend to occur not on a regular basis but when special circumstances arise. For example, the summits were resumed due to events such as the succession of Kim Jong Un's third-generation leadership in 2010-2011, the North Korea-US summits in 2018-2019, and the 80th Victory Day celebrations in 2025. Therefore, there is considerable interest in the reasons and background of the summit meeting through President Xi's visit after seven years. In particular, given that the US-China summit was held from May 14-15, followed by the China-Russia summit on May 19-20 a week later, and then Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea shortly thereafter, there are many questions and controversies regarding the reasons and background of the visit.

Given that President Xi Jinping's summit schedule has been particularly dense this year, it is difficult to assume that these consecutive summit meetings were meticulously planned from the outset. Nevertheless, amidst the volatile regional situation, including strengthening North Korea-Russia military cooperation, the possibility of North Korea-US summits, Japan's rearmament, and the instability of US-China relations, China likely felt the need to preemptively manage and prevent the possibility of neighboring North Korea drifting away from its sphere of influence.

Third, President Xi's visit to North Korea itself was only a matter of timing and was fully expected. Chairman Kim Jong Un's attendance at the 2025 Victory Day celebrations was a special occasion, necessitating President Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea, which had been suspended for seven years, as a reciprocal visit. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping first visited South Korea on the occasion of the 2025 APEC Summit, followed by consecutive South Korea-China summit meetings within two months due to President Lee Jae-myung's visit to China in January 2026. From the perspective of balanced diplomacy toward both Koreas, President Xi's visit to North Korea was necessary, and it is likely that the 65th anniversary of the signing of the North Korea-China Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (Treaty of Friendship) this year also played a symbolic role.

In summary, Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea was not due to any urgent bilateral issues or new agendas between North Korea and China. China appears to be seeking new changes in its North Korea strategy and North Korea-China relations through this summit as part of its process of reconstructing its global strategy and strategy toward the US in the medium to long term. Amidst an unstable and volatile international situation, China's visit to North Korea seems to have been aimed at stably managing neighboring socialist ally North Korea within its sphere of influence and creating a surrounding environment conducive to pursuing its global strategy and strategy toward the US.

Given that it was a summit held on the 65th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Xi Jinping's visit after seven years, North Korea prepared the highest level of state reception and reaffirmed its commitment to developing North Korea-China relations by emphasizing the expansion of strategic cooperation. In particular, President Xi Jinping proposed advancing bilateral relations to a 'new stage,' and Chairman Kim Jong Un responded, stating that they had reached important agreements to promote North Korea-China relations with new historical significance in response to new changes in the situation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026b).

Although the summit announced an agreement to advance bilateral relations to a 'new stage,' no specific new cooperation details worthy of attention were presented overall. The general atmosphere of the summit focused on reminiscing about and emphasizing traditional friendly relations, with no particularly future-oriented new agendas presented. This North Korea-China summit, like previous ones, emphasizes traditional friendship and ideological solidarity as socialist countries. President Xi emphasized traditional friendly relations by visiting the China-North Korea Friendship Tower, symbolizing the blood alliance, and the Central Cadre School of the Workers' Party of Korea. This indirectly confirms the structural limitations that make it difficult for North Korea-China relations to advance to a 'new stage' toward the future.

Nevertheless, there are sensitive issues revealed in the North Korea-China summit that require continuous observation. First, the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons and UN sanctions. Second, comprehensive economic exchange and cooperation between the two countries related to the UN sanctions issue. These two matters will be examined in more detail in the following section.

Third, military exchanges. The new mention of military exchanges and the presence of defense ministers from both countries at the summit have raised discussions about whether military cooperation is being pursued between North Korea and China, similar to that between North Korea and Russia. However, substantial military cooperation did not occur between North Korea and China even during the period when they flaunted their blood alliance. Furthermore, since Xi Jinping took office, conflicts between the two countries over North Korea's nuclear issue have intensified, making military cooperation and even exchanges a non-topic. Therefore, the mention of the military, even in the context of exchanges, at this summit is unusual.

However, military exchanges were presented as a specific area of exchange, along with diplomacy and law, within the framework of President Xi Jinping's four proposals for the development of North Korea-China relations, which emphasized strengthening the foundation of political trust between the two countries through high-level exchanges. It is unlikely that China proposed open military cooperation, considering UN sanctions and its cautious approach to non-military exchanges and cooperation with North Korea. China appears to have proposed strengthening high-level military exchanges and communication to restore mutual trust in the military and security fields. Behind this, there is also the possibility that China intends to understand and check the North Korea-Russia military cooperation, which China is wary of. North Korean media, such as the Korean Central News Agency, mentioned the expansion of exchanges in politics, economy, and culture, the strengthening of strategic communication, and cooperation on international and regional issues, similar to China's statements, but excluded the content related to military exchanges disclosed by China, thus sending a message that North Korea is rather passive about it.

In this summit, both countries reaffirmed traditional friendship and solidarity among socialist countries, as is customary. However, North Korea-China relations are no longer based on ideology and history but have transformed into a relationship where interests and strategic considerations take precedence. China now recognizes and evaluates the strategic value of North Korea from the perspective of its global strategy and strategy toward the US, and intends to adjust and manage its relations with North Korea accordingly. On the other hand, North Korea seeks to manage its excessive dependence on its powerful neighbor China while securing leverage against China as a relatively weaker nation, using it to sometimes check and pressure China to extract support and assistance. In this process, while mutual distrust is growing, there are differing strategic needs that necessitate maintaining relations due to geopolitical specificities. Therefore, North Korea-China relations will continue to exhibit fluidity, repeating a series of complex processes of estrangement, restoration, and improvement, while outwardly promoting traditional friendship and socialist solidarity, being influenced by changes in the international situation including US-China relations, and simultaneously engaging in mutual checks, push-and-pull, and selective cooperation.

2. Linking China's Global Strategy, Strategy Toward the US, and North Korea Strategy

The most notable aspect of this summit was the new emphasis on discussions about the international situation and order, while the Korean Peninsula itself was not mentioned. President Xi Jinping actively presented China's global strategy and diplomatic discourse, and Chairman Kim Jong Un supported and responded to it. For example, Chairman Kim Jong Un stated that they 'exchanged views broadly on international and regional issues of common concern' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026b). Although the specific international and regional issues discussed were not disclosed, the fact that the two leaders discussed international issues and the international order, excluding the Korean Peninsula, is a noteworthy change from the past.

President Xi Jinping presented the direction of North Korea-China relations through four proposals at the summit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026a): strengthening the foundation of mutual political trust through high-level exchanges, enhancing the level of practical cooperation, strengthening people-to-people exchanges and bonds, and solidifying strategic cooperation. The four proposals by President Xi Jinping, in broad terms, are a more concrete realization of the practical exchanges and cooperation and strengthening of strategic communication that China has consistently proposed to North Korea, and are not new in themselves.

However, a new element emerges in the fourth proposal, 'solidifying strategic cooperation,' which differs from the past. Previously, China's proposals for strategic cooperation with North Korea essentially focused on strategic communication for the stability and crisis management of the North Korean regime and the Korean Peninsula. However, at this summit, the Korean Peninsula was excluded entirely, and instead, it was replaced by China's global vision and world strategy, with discussions on the international situation and order becoming the central agenda.

For instance, 'equal and orderly multipolarization of the world and open, inclusive, and comprehensive economic globalization,' which China has consistently emphasized on the diplomatic stage since presenting it as a global initiative at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference held in December 2023 for the first time in five years, emerged as a major agenda item at this summit. The four major global initiatives (GDI, GSI, GCI, GGI) and the concept of a community of shared future for mankind, which are representative global visions of the Xi Jinping administration, were also presented.

The fact that China's world strategy and global initiatives were presented as the main agenda items at the North Korea-China summit, while the Korean Peninsula issue, which should have been the core agenda, was excluded, suggests that a new shift is being sought in China's perception and strategy toward North Korea. China has traditionally maintained a pattern of classifying diplomatic targets as major powers, neighboring countries, developing countries, and multilateral diplomacy, setting priorities accordingly, and adjusting its diplomatic tone and direction. However, since 2023, China has broken away from its existing diplomatic patterns and has begun to develop a full-fledged great power diplomacy strategy by considering the entire world as a single diplomatic stage, presenting global initiatives, and thereby expanding its international role and influence. It appears that President Xi Jinping presented a change in his North Korea strategy at this summit, moving away from the narrow focus confined to the Korean Peninsula and approaching it anew in conjunction with China's world strategy.

Although North Korea agrees with China's advocacy for multipolarization as a pillar of its world strategy, it is not realistically a key player that can fulfill a central role in China's multipolarization plan. Furthermore, North Korea is not an important partner for China in promoting its economic globalization strategy. On the other hand, North Korea possesses various leverage points, such as the advancement of its nuclear weapons, strengthening military cooperation with Russia, and the possibility of negotiations with the United States, which allow it to manage its dependence on China and potentially deviate from China's sphere of influence, thereby undermining China's world strategy. Consequently, China faces the diplomatic challenge of managing North Korea, a neighboring socialist and traditional ally, to prevent it from deviating from the new world order and sphere of influence that China aims to lead, even though North Korea is not a crucial partner in its world strategy initiatives. In short, through this visit to North Korea, President Xi Jinping, unlike before, actively presented China's world strategy and global vision, emphasizing comprehensive cooperation and strategic communication to ensure North Korea's acceptance and management within its sphere of influence.

3. Challenges of China's New North Korea Strategy: North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and UN Sanctions

For China to manage North Korea within its sphere of influence, it must secure leverage over North Korea. Currently, North Korea holds more leverage to steer and check China. First, to secure its status as a patron, China must be able to accommodate North Korea's demands to some extent. However, North Korea's strongest demands to China are the recognition of its status as a nuclear-weapon state and the lifting of UN sanctions. Both demands are realistically difficult for China to accept. The issues of North Korea's nuclear weapons and UN sanctions are, in fact, the most critical issues and obstacles in North Korea-China relations. If a North Korea-China summit is held, these two issues should naturally be the core agenda items. Nevertheless, there is no mention of these two issues in any of the summit-related announcements. This indicates that not only is it difficult to find common ground between North Korea and China on these issues, but they are also highly sensitive matters whose discussion, even if it occurred, would be difficult to disclose due to their significant impact on the international community.

First and foremost, the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons is the most sensitive issue inherent in North Korea-China relations. As expected, in this North Korea-China summit, North Korea's nuclear weapons, let alone the Korean Peninsula, were not mentioned at all in the official statements from both sides. Since the US-China summit in Bali in 2022, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has either not mentioned the Korean Peninsula issue, including North Korea's nuclear weapons, or has only referred to it in general terms and to the minimum extent. The fact that the North Korea-China leaders held a meeting without mentioning the Korean Peninsula issue at all is itself intentional. China's decision not to publicize the issue of the Korean Peninsula, including denuclearization, is partly due to awareness of North Korea's strong opposition, but also because it cannot fully agree with North Korea's claims of being a nuclear-weapon state.

Around the time of the public announcement of Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea by the Korean Central News Agency on June 5, Chairman Kim Jong Un unusually engaged in a series of military activities, showcasing his confidence in and unwavering stance on nuclear armament. On the 3rd, he conducted an on-site inspection of a new nuclear material production facility; on the 4th, he observed the sea trial of the new 5,000-ton class destroyer Kang Geon Ho with Kim Ju Ae; and on the 6th, he visited a ballistic missile production facility. Notably, Kim Yo Jong, in a statement released on the 6th, vehemently criticized the US State Department's fact sheet, which stated that the leaders of the US and China agreed on the 'complete denuclearization of North Korea,' calling it 'a typical propaganda trick of lies by the United States.'

With Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea after seven years imminent, North Korea prepared elaborate welcoming ceremonies while simultaneously sending a strong, albeit indirect, message to China, likely aimed at compelling it to acknowledge North Korea's nuclear status or at least refrain from mentioning denuclearization. China did not directly comment on the US State Department's fact sheet and remained silent regarding Kim Yo Jong's statement. While China remains silent on denuclearization, it also does not comment on North Korea's persistent claims of being a nuclear-weapon state.

The Xi Jinping administration cannot help but be concerned about the repercussions in the East Asian region if North Korea's nuclear weapons are recognized. Discussions on nuclear weapon development could spread intensely to neighboring South Korea, especially Japan, which is pursuing rearmament, and even to Taiwan. At the very least, demands for strengthening the US's extended nuclear deterrence in the region would increase, leading to heightened military confrontation with the US in China's surrounding areas and a rapid deterioration of the regional security environment. This could be the worst-case scenario for the Xi Jinping administration, which must focus on economic recovery and self-reliance in advanced technologies by launching the 15.5 Plan this year and concentrate on preparing for its fourth term. Therefore, China seeks to block these repercussions by simply excluding the issue of the Korean Peninsula from discussion.

Second, the issue of UN sanctions against North Korea, linked to the North Korean nuclear issue, is another sensitive point of contention between North Korea and China. China's cards for stably managing North Korea within its sphere of influence are political support and economic assistance to the North Korean regime. At this summit, China has further clarified its commitment to support and economic cooperation with North Korea. China proposed closer coordination of development strategies with North Korea, expanding practical cooperation in areas such as trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, and health, and expanding people-to-people exchanges by fully reopening the border and resuming civilian flights and international passenger train services.

However, for economic cooperation between North Korea and China to be effectively pursued and for bilateral relations to advance to a new stage, the issue of UN sanctions against North Korea must first be discussed and resolved. Yet, China has not yet officially stated its intention to break through UN sanctions and pursue economic cooperation with North Korea. In the joint statement of the China-Russia summit in May, China indirectly raised the need for sanctions relief against North Korea by stating its opposition to 'threatening North Korea's security through diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military pressure' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026c). However, at the summit with North Korea itself, despite the expected strong requests from North Korea, there was no mention of sanctions relief.

China does not appear to have an intention to proactively ease or lift UN sanctions against North Korea. Yet, it shows a contradictory behavior by actively proposing comprehensive cooperation with North Korea at the summit. At the North Korea-China summit held in 2025 on the occasion of Chairman Kim's attendance at the Victory Day celebrations, economic cooperation was also a major agenda item. North Korea included a large number of economic officials in its delegation and Chairman Kim proposed deepening mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation between the two countries (Lee Dong-ryul 2025). Since then, there have been some measures to revitalize exchanges and cooperation, such as the resumption of railway and air transport between the two countries, but substantial results remain limited. According to Chinese customs statistics, the trade volume between North Korea and China in 2025 was approximately 2.73 billion US dollars, an increase of 25.4% compared to the previous year, showing a significant recovery (Choi Jang-ho, Choi Yu-jeong. 2026). However, this is still far below the 5.82 billion US dollars in 2016, before the sanctions. Despite the recovery of bilateral relations, economic cooperation, including trade between North Korea and China, is still limited due to the structural constraints of UN sanctions.

China officially maintains a position of not recognizing North Korea's nuclear weapons and adhering to UN sanctions. China faces a dilemma of managing North Korea within its sphere of influence without accepting North Korea's demands. China must find ways to provide a level of economic support that is somewhat satisfactory to North Korea while keeping it within its sphere of influence, without violating UN sanctions. It is necessary to continuously track and observe how China will proceed with economic exchanges and support for North Korea in terms of specific methods and channels in the future. This can provide clues to gauge how China is internally seeking a way out of the sensitive issues of North Korea's nuclear weapons and UN sanctions, on which it remains silent.

4. Policy Implications for South Korea

Ahead of the North Korea-China summit, the South Korean government expressed expectations for China's constructive role in North Korea's denuclearization and inter-Korean dialogue. The attempt to leverage China's role in the North Korean nuclear issue has been a long-standing challenge for South Korean diplomacy. The current reality is unfolding in a way that makes it even more difficult to fulfill this diplomatic challenge. It seems necessary to accurately recognize this difficult reality and seek policy priorities and new alternatives on that premise.

First, as China's diplomatic strategy rapidly expands from a regional to a global strategy targeting the entire world, the Korean Peninsula issue is relatively being pushed back or becoming a secondary variable in its world strategy. In particular, the Xi Jinping administration, which must prioritize managing relations with the United States stably, is concerned that the North Korean nuclear issue could rather escalate conflict with the US on the Korean Peninsula.

Second, in conjunction with the evolution of China's world strategy, significant changes are underway in its North Korea strategy. China judges that the denuclearization of North Korea is not achievable in the short to medium term. It is concerned that insisting on unrealistic denuclearization could lead to North Korea breaking away from its sphere of influence and weakening its influence on the Korean Peninsula. China believes that rather than getting bogged down in the unrealistic issue of denuclearization, it is more aligned with its world strategy to keep North Korea within its sphere of influence and manage it. In this context, China is not attracted to mediating North Korea-US or inter-Korean dialogues and may even seek to counter North Korea-US dialogues from which it is excluded.

Third, although South Korea-China relations are said to be recovering, there is not yet sufficient trust built to persuade and leverage China's role on two very sensitive and difficult issues. In fact, there has been no basic strategic understanding or communication regarding the gap between the 'role of China' that South Korea expects and the role that China envisions. In this situation, there is a risk of facing a situation where even the recovery of South Korea-China relations becomes difficult by prematurely demanding and expecting a role. It is also necessary to recall the historical experience that the development of South Korea-China relations does not directly translate into cooperation between the two countries on North Korea and the North Korean nuclear issue.

In the initial stage of South Korea-China relations recovery, it is necessary to prioritize promoting mutual understanding and solidifying relations at the bilateral level. This will lay the groundwork for behind-the-scenes communication on sensitive issues such as North Korea's nuclear weapons. At present, it is necessary to gradually seek dialogue on less sensitive issues that South Korea and China can share and discuss, and to acquire experience and know-how that can lead to discussions on more difficult topics. For example, following the North Korea-China summit, efforts should be made to consult at various levels of high-level contact between South Korea and China on the principle of Korean Peninsula stability, thereby sharing mutual understanding and information on the North Korean issue and broadening consensus.

It is also necessary to be prepared in advance, keeping in mind that South Korea-China relations, although recovering, are structurally vulnerable to external variables. In particular, while the US-China relationship professes to be a 'constructive strategic stability relationship,' it remains complex and unstable. Coupled with the modernization of the ROK-US alliance and Japan's rearmament, South Korea-China relations risk falling into an unwanted vortex again. Furthermore, North Korean provocations and threats are a constant factor and can always act as a major challenge to South Korea-China relations. Maintaining the recovery and stability of South Korea-China relations is a prerequisite for seeking strategic communication on the Korean Peninsula issue between the two countries. Therefore, considering that South Korea-China relations may face conflict and crisis situations again due to unintended external factors, it is necessary to prioritize the creation of communication channels and systems that can enable rapid response and management during conflicts and crises. ■

References

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026a. “Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Kim Jong Un.” June 08. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202606/t20260608_11939783.shtml

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026b. “Xi Jinping Attends Welcome Banquet Hosted by Kim Jong Un.” June 08. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202606/t20260608_11939903.shtml

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026c. “Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Further Strengthening Comprehensive Strategic Coordination, Deepening Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation.” May 21. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202605/t20260521_11914932.shtml

Lee Dong-ryul. 2025. “From Victory Day to APEC: New Pursuits and Challenges in North Korea-China Relations.” GLOBAL NK (EAI).

Choi Jang-ho, Choi Yu-jeong. 2026. “2025 North Korea-China Trade Assessment: Recovery of National Distribution Networks and Deepening Trade Deficit.” 『KIEP Today's World Economy』 vol.26 no.7

■ Lee Dong-ryul_EAI Senior Fellow, Professor of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University.

■ Editor: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher; Oh In-hwanSenior Researcher, EAI

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr