[Global NK Commentary] Visit of Xi Jinping to Pyongyang After 7 Years and the Search for a New North Korea Strategy

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1. Xi Jinping's Visit to North Korea After 7 Years and the Significance of the North Korea-China Summit

President Xi Jinping visited North Korea on June 2026 for the first time in 7 years and held a summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un. This was the first North Korea-China summit in 9 months since Chairman Kim Jong-un's visit to Beijing in early September 2025 to attend the 80th anniversary of China's Victory Day. The North Korea-China summit itself carries an important message, making it crucial to examine the timing, reasons, background, and content of the meeting from various angles.

First, due to the unique nature of North Korea-China relations, where summits are difficult to hold without mutual visits, regular mutual visits have become a tradition, symbolizing the North Korea-China "blood alliance." However, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992, the frequency of North Korea-China summits decreased, and especially during Xi Jinping's tenure, the tradition of regular summits through mutual visits effectively disappeared. President Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang in 2019 was his first in his 7-year tenure. It was the first visit to North Korea by a top Chinese leader in 14 years since President Hu Jintao's visit in 2005. And after another 7 years, in 2026, his second visit finally took place. Chairman Kim Jong-un's visits to China have also been irregular. After inheriting power in 2011, Chairman Kim Jong-un did not visit China for 7 years, but then visited 4 times consecutively between March 2018 and January 2019. And again, after nearly 7 years, he visited China in August 2025 to attend the 80th Victory Day celebrations.

Since Xi Jinping took office, the practice of holding North Korea-China summits almost annually has disappeared, and the frequency has significantly decreased, showing a trend of occurring only in special circumstances. Although North Korea-China relations have shown signs of recovery since the inauguration of the second Trump administration, they are no longer the special relationship that once boasted of being a blood alliance.

Second, recent North Korea-China summits have tended to occur only when special circumstances arise, rather than being regular. For example, the summits were resumed after interruptions due to events such as the succession of Kim Jong-un's third-generation leadership in 2010-2011, the North Korea-US summits in 2018-2019, and the 80th Victory Day celebrations in 2025. Therefore, there is naturally high interest in the reasons and background for the summit held after a 7-year hiatus. In particular, given that the US-China summit was held on May 14-15, followed by the China-Russia summit on May 19-20 a week later, and then Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea shortly thereafter, there are many questions and debates surrounding the reasons and background for the visit.

Given that President Xi Jinping's summit schedule has been exceptionally packed this year, it is unlikely that this series of summits was meticulously planned from the outset. Nevertheless, amidst the volatile regional situation, including the recent strengthening of North Korea-Russia military cooperation, the possibility of North Korea-US summits, Japan's rearmament, and the instability of US-China relations, China likely felt the need to preemptively manage the risk of North Korea, its neighbor, drifting away from its sphere of influence.

Third, President Xi's visit to North Korea was, in fact, inevitable and only a matter of timing. Chairman Kim Jong-un's attendance at the 2025 Victory Day celebrations was a special occasion, necessitating a reciprocal visit from President Xi Jinping after a 7-year hiatus. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping first visited South Korea on the occasion of the APEC summit in 2025, followed by President Lee Jae-myung's visit to China in January 2026, resulting in two consecutive South Korea-China summits within two months. From the perspective of balanced diplomacy towards both North and South Korea, President Xi's visit to North Korea was necessary, and it is likely that the symbolism of the 65th anniversary of the North Korea-China Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (Friendship Treaty) also played a role.

In summary, Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea was not driven by any urgent bilateral issues or new agendas between North Korea and China. It appears that China is seeking new changes in its North Korea strategy and bilateral relations in the process of reconfiguring its global and US strategies in the medium to long term. In the context of an unstable and volatile international situation, China's visit to North Korea seems aimed at stably managing North Korea, a traditional socialist ally, within its sphere of influence and creating a surrounding environment conducive to China's pursuit of its global and US strategies.

North Korea, given the 65th anniversary of the Friendship Treaty and President Xi Jinping's visit after 7 years, prepared the highest level of state reception and reaffirmed its commitment to developing North Korea-China relations by emphasizing the expansion of strategic cooperation. Notably, President Xi Jinping proposed advancing bilateral relations to a "new stage," to which Chairman Kim Jong-un responded by stating that "significant agreements have been reached to promote North Korea-China relations with new historical implications in accordance with new changes in the situation" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026b).

Although the summit announced an agreement to advance bilateral relations to a "new stage," no specific new cooperation content worth particular attention was presented overall. The general atmosphere of the summit remains focused on recalling and emphasizing traditional friendly relations, with no particularly future-oriented new agendas presented. This North Korea-China summit, like previous ones, emphasizes traditional friendship and ideological solidarity as socialist countries. President Xi emphasized traditional friendly relations by visiting the Sino-Korean Friendship Tower, symbolizing the North Korea-China blood alliance, and the Cadre School of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. This indirectly confirms the structural limitations that make it difficult for North Korea-China relations to advance to a "new stage" towards the future.

Nevertheless, there are sensitive issues revealed in the North Korea-China summit that require continuous observation. First, the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and UN sanctions. Second, comprehensive economic exchange and cooperation between the two countries related to the UN sanctions issue. These two matters will be examined in more detail in the following section.

Third, military exchanges. The mention of military exchanges and the attendance of defense ministers from both sides at the summit have raised discussions about whether military cooperation is being pursued between North Korea and China, similar to that between North Korea and Russia. However, substantial military cooperation has not occurred between North Korea and China even during periods when they emphasized their blood alliance. Moreover, since Xi Jinping took office, tensions between the two countries over the North Korean nuclear issue have intensified, further reducing any mention of cooperation or exchange in the military field. Therefore, the mention of the military, even if only in terms of exchanges, at this summit is unusual.

However, military exchanges were presented as a specific area of exchange, alongside diplomacy and law, within the first of President Xi Jinping's four proposals for the development of North Korea-China relations: strengthening the foundation of mutual political trust through high-level exchanges. It is unlikely that China publicly proposed military cooperation, given its cautious approach to non-military exchanges and cooperation with North Korea due to UN sanctions. It appears that China proposed strengthening high-level military exchanges and communication to restore mutual trust in the military and security field. Furthermore, there is a possibility that China intended to understand and counter the North Korea-Russia military cooperation, which it is wary of. North Korean media, such as the Korean Central News Agency, mention the expansion of exchanges in political, economic, and cultural fields, strengthening strategic communication, and coordination on international and regional issues, all of which are consistent with China's statements, but they omit the mention of military exchanges, thereby sending a message that North Korea is rather passive about it.

In this summit, as in the past, both countries reaffirmed their traditional friendship and solidarity as socialist states. However, North Korea-China relations are no longer based on ideology and history, but have transformed into a relationship where pragmatism and strategic considerations take precedence. China now recognizes and evaluates the strategic value of North Korea in the context of its global and US strategies, and adjusts and manages its relations with North Korea accordingly. On the other hand, North Korea seeks to manage its excessive dependence on China, a powerful neighbor, while simultaneously securing leverage over China as a relatively weaker nation, using it to sometimes check and pressure China to gain support and assistance. In the process, mutual distrust is growing, yet due to geopolitical specificities, there are differing strategic needs that necessitate maintaining and managing the relationship. Therefore, in the future, North Korea-China relations will continue to exhibit fluidity, repeating a series of cycles of estrangement, restoration, and improvement, influenced by changes in international affairs, including US-China relations, while outwardly promoting traditional friendship and socialist solidarity, and inwardly engaging in mutual checks, push-and-pull, and selective cooperation.

2. Linking China's Global Strategy, US Strategy, and North Korea Strategy

The most striking aspect of this summit was the new emphasis on discussions about the international situation and order, while the Korean Peninsula itself was not mentioned. President Xi Jinping actively presented China's global strategy and diplomatic discourse, and Chairman Kim Jong-un supported and responded to it. For example, Chairman Kim Jong-un stated that they "exchanged views broadly on international and regional issues of common interest" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026b). Although the specific international and regional issues discussed are not disclosed, the fact that the two leaders discussed international issues and the international order excluding the Korean Peninsula is a significant change from the past.

President Xi Jinping presented the direction for North Korea-China relations through four proposals at the summit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026a): strengthening the foundation of mutual political trust through high-level exchanges, enhancing the level of practical cooperation, strengthening people-to-people exchanges and bonds, and solidifying strategic cooperation. The four proposals by President Xi Jinping, in broad terms, are a more concrete realization of the practical cooperation and strategic communication that China has continuously proposed to North Korea, and are not new in themselves.

However, a new element appears in the fourth proposal, "solidifying strategic cooperation," which differs from previous ones. Previously, China's proposal for strategic cooperation was essentially focused on strategic communication for managing the instability and crises of the North Korean regime and the Korean Peninsula. However, at this summit, the Korean Peninsula was excluded altogether, and instead, China's global vision and world strategy became the central agenda, based on which discussions on the international situation and order took place.

For instance, the 'equal and orderly multipolarization of the world and an open, inclusive, and comprehensive economic globalization,' which China has consistently emphasized on the diplomatic stage since presenting it as a global initiative at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference held in December 2023 after a five-year hiatus, emerged as a major agenda item at this summit. The signature global visions of the Xi Jinping administration, the four global initiatives (GDI, GSI, GCI, GGI), and the concept of a community of shared future for mankind were also presented.

The fact that China's global strategy and global initiatives, rather than the Korean Peninsula issue which should have been a core agenda, were presented as major agenda items at the North Korea-China summit indicates that a new shift in China's perception and strategy towards North Korea is being sought. China has traditionally maintained a pattern of classifying diplomatic targets as great powers, neighbors, developing countries, and multilateral diplomacy, setting priorities accordingly, and adjusting its diplomatic tone and direction. However, since 2023, China has broken away from its existing diplomatic patterns, conceptualizing the entire world as a single diplomatic arena, presenting global initiatives, and thereby launching a full-fledged great power diplomatic strategy to expand its international role and influence. At this summit, President Xi Jinping appears to have presented a change in approach to North Korea strategy, moving away from the narrow focus confined to the Korean Peninsula and linking it to China's global strategy.

Although North Korea agrees with China's call for multipolarization as one pillar of its global strategy, it is not a country that can play a key role in China's multipolarization vision in reality. Nor is North Korea an important partner in China's pursuit of economic globalization. On the other hand, North Korea possesses various leverage points, such as the advancement of nuclear weapons, strengthening military cooperation with Russia, and the possibility of negotiations with the United States, which allow it to manage its dependence on China and potentially deviate from China's global strategy, causing damage. Consequently, China faces the diplomatic challenge of managing North Korea, a socialist neighbor and traditional ally, to prevent it from deviating from the new world order and sphere of influence that China seeks to lead, even though North Korea is not a crucial partner in China's global strategy initiatives. In short, through this visit, President Xi Jinping, unlike before, actively presented China's global strategy and global vision, emphasizing comprehensive cooperation and strategic communication to ensure North Korea's acceptance and management within China's sphere of influence.

3. Challenges of China's New North Korea Strategy: North Korea's Nuclear Program and UN Sanctions

To maintain North Korea within its sphere of influence, China faces the challenge of securing leverage over North Korea. Currently, North Korea holds more leverage to drive and check China. First, to secure its position as a patron, China must be willing to accommodate some of North Korea's demands. However, North Korea's strongest demands to China are the recognition of its status as a nuclear-weapon state and the lifting of UN sanctions. Both demands are realistically difficult for China to accept. The North Korean nuclear issue and UN sanctions are effectively the most critical issues and obstacles in North Korea-China relations. Given the North Korea-China summit, these two issues should naturally be core agenda items. However, there is no mention of these two issues in any of the summit-related announcements. This indicates that not only is it difficult to find common ground between North Korea and China on these issues, but they are also highly sensitive matters with profound implications for the international community, making them difficult to disclose even if discussed.

First and foremost, the North Korean nuclear issue is the most sensitive internal issue in North Korea-China relations. As expected, the North Korean nuclear issue, or even the Korean Peninsula itself, was not mentioned in the official announcements from either side at this North Korea-China summit. Since the US-China summit in Bali, Indonesia, in 2022, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has either not mentioned the Korean Peninsula issue, including the North Korean nuclear issue, or has done so only in a perfunctory manner. The fact that the North Korea-China leaders met without mentioning the Korean Peninsula issue at all is itself intentional. China's decision not to make the Korean Peninsula issue, including denuclearization, a public topic is partly due to awareness of North Korea's strong opposition, but also because it cannot fully agree with North Korea's claims of being a nuclear-weapon state.

Around the time of the public announcement of Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea by the Korean Central News Agency on June 5, Chairman Kim Jong-un, in an unusual display of military activity, showcased his confidence in nuclear armament and his refusal to give it up. On June 3, he conducted an on-site inspection of a newly built nuclear material production facility; on June 4, accompanied by Kim Ju-ae, he observed the sea trials of the new 5,000-ton class destroyer Kang Gung; and on June 6, he visited a ballistic missile production facility. Notably, Kim Yo-jong, in a statement released on June 6, harshly criticized the US State Department's fact sheet, which claimed that the US and Chinese leaders agreed on the "complete denuclearization of North Korea," calling it a "typical tactic of the US to spread lies."

While North Korea prepared an exceptionally welcoming event for President Xi Jinping's visit after 7 years, it simultaneously conveyed a strong, albeit indirect, message to China, perhaps aimed at it: either acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state or at least do not mention denuclearization. China did not directly comment on the US State Department's fact sheet and remained silent regarding Kim Yo-jong's statement. While China remained silent on denuclearization, it also refrained from commenting on North Korea's persistent claim of being a nuclear-weapon state.

The Xi Jinping administration cannot help but be concerned about the repercussions in the East Asian region if North Korea's nuclear status is recognized. Discussions on nuclear weapons development could spread rapidly to neighboring South Korea, especially Japan, which is pursuing rearmament, and even to Taiwan. At the very least, demands for strengthening the US's extended nuclear deterrence in the region would increase, leading to heightened military confrontation with the United States in China's periphery and a rapid deterioration of the regional security environment. This could be the worst-case scenario for the Xi Jinping administration, which must focus on economic recovery and self-reliance in advanced technology by launching the 15.5 Plan this year and concentrate on preparing for its fourth term. Therefore, China aims to preemptively block such repercussions by entirely excluding the Korean Peninsula issue from discussion.

Second, the issue of UN sanctions related to the North Korean nuclear program is another sensitive point of contention between North Korea and China. China's cards for stably managing North Korea within its sphere of influence are political support and economic assistance to the North Korean regime. At this summit, China has further clarified its commitment to supporting North Korea and expanding economic cooperation. On the occasion of this summit, China proposed closer coordination of development strategies with North Korea, expansion of comprehensive practical cooperation in areas such as trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, and health, and expansion of people-to-people exchanges through the full reopening of the border and the resumption of civilian flights and international passenger train services.

However, for economic cooperation between North Korea and China to be effectively pursued and for bilateral relations to advance to a new stage, the issue of UN sanctions must first be discussed and resolved. Yet, China has not yet officially stated its intention to break through UN sanctions and pursue economic cooperation with North Korea. In the joint statement of the China-Russia summit in May, China indirectly raised the need for sanctions relief against North Korea by stating, "We oppose threatening the security of North Korea through diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military pressure" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026c). However, at the summit with North Korea, the party directly involved, despite expected strong requests from North Korea, there was no mention of sanctions relief.

China does not appear to have an official intention to lead the way in easing or lifting UN sanctions against North Korea. Yet, it proposes comprehensive cooperation with North Korea at the summit, showing a contradictory behavior. At the North Korea-China summit held on the occasion of Chairman Kim's attendance at the Victory Day celebrations in 2025, economic cooperation was a major agenda item. North Korea included a large number of economic officials in its delegation at that time, and Chairman Kim proposed deepening mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation between the two countries (Lee Dong-ryul 2025). Since then, there have been some measures to revitalize exchanges and cooperation, such as the resumption of railway and air services between the two countries, but substantial results remain limited. According to Chinese customs statistics, the bilateral trade volume between North Korea and China in 2025 was approximately 2.73 billion USD, an increase of 25.4% compared to the previous year, showing a significant recovery (Choi Jang-ho, Choi Yoo-jung. 2026). However, this is still far below the 5.82 billion USD in 2016, before the sanctions. Despite the recovery in bilateral relations, economic cooperation, including trade between North Korea and China, is still limited by the structural constraints of UN sanctions.

China officially maintains a position of not recognizing North Korea's nuclear status and adhering to UN sanctions. China faces a dilemma: it must manage North Korea within its sphere of influence without accepting its demands. China must find a way to provide North Korea with a level of economic support that is somewhat satisfactory while avoiding violations of UN sanctions, and thereby incorporate it into its sphere of influence. It is necessary to continuously track and observe how China will proceed with economic exchanges and support for North Korea in terms of specific methods and channels in the future. This could provide clues as to how China is internally seeking an exit from the sensitive issues of North Korea's nuclear program and UN sanctions, about which it remains silent.

4. Policy Implications for South Korea

Ahead of the North Korea-China summit, the South Korean government expressed expectations for China's constructive role in North Korea's denuclearization and inter-Korean dialogue. Attempting to leverage China's role in the North Korean nuclear issue is a long-standing challenge for South Korean diplomacy. The current reality is unfolding in a way that makes it even more difficult to carry out this diplomatic task. It seems necessary to accurately recognize this difficult reality and seek policy priorities and new alternatives based on that premise.

First, China's diplomatic strategy is rapidly expanding from a regional to a global strategy targeting the entire world, and consequently, the Korean Peninsula issue is being relegated to a lower priority or becoming a secondary variable in its global strategy. In particular, the Xi Jinping administration, which must prioritize managing relations with the United States stably, is concerned that the North Korean nuclear issue could inadvertently escalate conflict with the US on the Korean Peninsula.

Second, in conjunction with the evolution of China's global strategy, significant changes are underway in its North Korea strategy. China has judged that North Korea's denuclearization is unlikely to be achieved in the short to medium term. It is concerned that insisting on unrealistic denuclearization could lead to North Korea breaking away from its sphere of influence and weakening its influence on the Korean Peninsula. China believes that rather than getting bogged down in the unrealistic issue of denuclearization, it is more consistent with its pursuit of global strategy to keep North Korea within its sphere of influence and manage it. In this context, China is not interested in mediating North Korea-US or inter-Korean dialogue and may even seek to counter North Korea-US dialogue from which it is excluded.

Third, although South Korea-China relations are said to be recovering, there is not yet sufficient trust to persuade and leverage China's role on two very sensitive and difficult issues. In fact, there has been no fundamental strategic understanding or communication regarding the gap between the "China's role" that South Korea expects and the role that China envisions. In such a situation, there is a risk of making premature requests and expectations, potentially leading to difficulties in even recovering South Korea-China relations. It is particularly important to recall the historical experience that the development of South Korea-China relations does not necessarily translate directly into cooperation between the two countries on North Korea and the North Korean nuclear issue.

In the initial stage of recovering South Korea-China relations, it is necessary to prioritize promoting mutual understanding and strengthening substantive relations at the bilateral level. This will lay the groundwork for behind-the-scenes communication on sensitive issues such as the North Korean nuclear program. At present, efforts should be made to gradually seek dialogue on less sensitive issues that South Korea and China can share and discuss, thereby gaining experience and know-how to progress to more difficult conversations. For instance, following the North Korea-China summit, South Korea and China should attempt consultations at various levels and through high-level contacts on the principle of stability on the Korean Peninsula, thereby sharing mutual understanding and information on the North Korean issue and broadening consensus.

It is also necessary to be prepared for the structurally vulnerable nature of South Korea-China relations to external variables, even though they are said to be recovering. Especially while the US-China relationship espouses a "constructive strategic stability relationship," it remains complex and unstable. The modernization of the South Korea-US alliance and Japan's rearmament could plunge South Korea-China relations into an unwanted vortex again. Furthermore, North Korean provocations and threats are a constant factor and could pose a significant challenge to South Korea-China relations at any time. First and foremost, maintaining the recovery and stability of South Korea-China relations is the prerequisite for seeking strategic communication on the Korean Peninsula issue between the two countries. Therefore, considering that South Korea-China relations may face conflict and crisis situations again due to unintended external variables, it is necessary to prioritize the creation of communication channels and systems that can enable rapid response and management during conflicts and crises. ■

References

中华人民共和国外交部. 2026a “习近平同金正恩举行会谈.” 06-08 https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202606/t20260608_11939783.shtml

中华人民共和国外交部. 2026b “习近平出席金正恩举行的欢迎宴会.” 06-08. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202606/t20260608_11939903.shtml

中华人民共和国外交部. 2026c. “中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于进一步加强全面战略协作、深化睦邻友好合作的联合声明.” 05-21. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202605/t20260521_11914932.shtml

Lee Dong-ryul. 2025. “From Victory Day to APEC: New Explorations and Challenges in North Korea-China Relations.” GLOBAL NK (EAI).

Choi Jang-ho. Choi Yoo-jung. 2026. “Evaluation of North Korea-China Trade in 2025: Recovery of National Distribution Networks and Deepening Trade Deficit.” 『KIEP Today's World Economy』 vol.26 no.7

■ Lee Dong-ryul_EAI Senior Fellow, Professor of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University.

■ Responsible for and edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher; Oh In-hwanСтарший научный сотрудник EAI

    Контакты: 02 2277 1683 (доб. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr