[Global NK Special Commentary Series] A Critique of Victor Cha’s ‘Cold Peace’

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Frustration of the Iran War and the US Conception of a 'Cold Peace' with North Korea

Chun Jae-sung (EAI Director, Professor at Seoul National University)

The Iran War appears to be entering its final stages after over 100 days of significant turmoil. The Trump administration presented various objectives for the war with Iran, but it was ultimately defined as a war for Iran's denuclearization. However, the immense frustration and criticism that military action did not achieve Iran's complete denuclearization are unavoidable. It remains uncertain whether this will be a complete and effective end to the conflict or if it will lead to further confusion in the next phase surrounding Iran's denuclearization through protracted negotiations. Nevertheless, a major lesson from this war is that denuclearization cannot be achieved through a hot war.

Experiencing such frustration, the United States is reconsidering its thoughts and approach to North Korea's denuclearization. A hot war with North Korea not only has an uncertain prospect of victory but is also overshadowed by the potent fear that war with North Korea, which has already deployed a significant number of nuclear weapons, is not a viable option. Iran was a country without nuclear weapons, but North Korea is a nuclear-weapon state possessing 50 nuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the US mainland.

However, achieving a 'hot peace' is also difficult. Not only is there immense distrust between North Korea and the US, but North Korea's nuclear issue also inevitably ranks lower in US diplomatic strategy. The US has entered a new phase of nuclear deterrence strategy, facing two nuclear-armed great powers, China and Russia, simultaneously. Furthermore, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired in February of this year, making even the control of nuclear weapons between nuclear powers difficult.

Dr. Victor Cha's recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, "North Korea as It Is: The Case for a Cold Peace," reflects this assessment of the geopolitical situation. The Trump administration's second term stated that readjusting the priorities of US foreign strategy in its National Security Strategy (NSS) was its most crucial mission. North Korea was not even mentioned in the NSS, and in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), North Korea is only addressed in terms of nuclear deterrence for US homeland security. The Cold Peace concept reflects the recognition of the reality that neither a hot war nor a hot peace is achievable, along with the reality that US security strategy is undergoing a major transformation.

The core of the Cold Peace concept is to maintain denuclearization as a long-term goal, while preventing North Korean nuclear attacks on the US mainland through deterrence by denial. It also involves stabilizing the situation through crisis management if there is any possibility of nuclear war, and refraining from offensive deterrence that could exacerbate crises. The logic is that in this process, diplomatic negotiations between the US and North Korea, and diplomatic strategies to gradually induce North Korea's departure from the North Korea-China-Russia alliance are important. However, at the same time, the US government still officially maintains North Korea's complete denuclearization as a policy objective. The Cold Peace concept should be viewed not as a finalized concrete policy, but as presenting key elements of North Korea policy to be considered amidst major global geopolitical shifts. This discussion appears to be the surface manifestation of a trend that has been discussed with a certain degree of consensus within the US for a considerable period.

The implications of this discussion for South Korea are twofold. First, North Korea's strategic priority in US nuclear strategy is declining, and the limits of what the US can do are becoming clear. This change can cause anxiety for South Korea. In particular, there are concerns that agreements focusing solely on intercontinental ballistic missiles threatening the US mainland might neglect short-range and tactical nuclear forces directly targeting South Korea. Paradoxically, however, this also opens up space for South Korea's North Korea strategy to be formed and presented more autonomously. The US is currently in the process of reorganizing its strategic framework amidst volatile international affairs and the limitations of its hegemonic strategy, reallocating roles by distinguishing between what it can and cannot do. Since North Korea policy also presents limitations on what the US can do, South Korea's autonomy can be significantly enhanced depending on the strategy it formulates and pursues within that context. This space in North Korea policy should be seen as opening up, given the need for active and comprehensive responses concerning the overall foreign strategy between South Korea and the US.

Second, as the Cold Peace concept is still in its conceptual stage, many aspects cannot be directly applied to policy. Even if a summit between Trump and Kim Jong-un were to occur, North Korea would likely demand recognition as a nuclear state and show little interest in improving North Korea-US relations given its strengthening ties with China and Russia. It would likely limit exchanges and cooperation with South Korea for a considerable period, adopting a discourse of two hostile states. Under these conditions, strategies such as crisis management through diplomacy, freezing North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and weakening the North Korea-China-Russia alliance are not achievable in the short term but require persistent long-term pursuit.

South Korea must reset the temporal framework of its future North Korea strategy and consider how to harmonize the US Cold Peace concept with South Korea's strategy of peaceful coexistence. South Korea must coordinate, one by one, the elements of its North Korea policy that may conflict with each other in the new international environment, ranging from North Korea's denuclearization, inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, peaceful coexistence, to unification. It will be necessary to create a concrete policy roadmap for cooperation with the US by seeking autonomous policy space, observing changes in US North Korea policy with a view to the overall US foreign and security strategy. If the US has begun to face North Korea as it is, it is time for South Korea to formulate its North Korea strategy based on the reality of the US, the reality of the Korean Peninsula, and the reality of North Korea. ■

Cold Peace: Wrong Then, Right Now?

Hwang Ji-hwan (Professor at the University of Seoul)

Both North Korea and the United States share responsibility for the course of the North Korean nuclear issue. Looking back at the nuclear diplomacy of the past 30-plus years, there are numerous moments that evoke reflection and regret. What if Washington and Pyongyang had each made minor concessions to prevent the collapse of the Geneva Agreed Framework during the conflict over North Korea's highly enriched uranium program in 2002? What if President Trump had proposed the 'Cold Peace' concept advocated by Victor Cha at the Hanoi Summit in February 2019? While it is difficult to provide definitive answers to these counterfactual questions, they clearly illustrate the numerous lost opportunities that have permeated the history of US-North Korea negotiations. In that regard, Victor Cha's presentation of a new approach to North Korea policy, given his direct involvement in the Six-Party Talks, is noteworthy.

However, structural reasons that are difficult to overcome with mere willingness exist behind past failures. There is no guarantee that changes in Washington's negotiation proposals will alter Pyongyang's response. As Victor Cha himself acknowledges, if North Korea has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons program, no agreement—regardless of its design—can guarantee sustainability.

From this perspective, Cha's article can be evaluated as an ambitious attempt to honestly acknowledge the limitations of US North Korea diplomacy over the past 30 years while seeking a new direction. However, it remains uncertain whether the 'Cold Peace' concept he proposes can succeed by overcoming past failures. North Korea may have already moved far beyond the preconditions for this proposal, and the US may be continuing to pursue diplomatic solutions that Pyongyang no longer finds attractive. At this juncture, North Korea may desire something more than a cold peace. In this regard, three concerns warrant examination.

First, it is unclear whether such an agreement would be politically sustainable within the United States. Even if President Trump reaches an agreement with Kim Jong-un through summit diplomacy, can that agreement be maintained after the administration changes? The precedent of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) raises legitimate doubts. The US-North Korea relationship has already experienced a similar cycle. The Geneva Agreed Framework, concluded during the Clinton administration, was effectively abandoned after the Bush administration took office. Washington's deeply ingrained view of 'rogue states' has historically constrained diplomatic flexibility, and those constraints have not disappeared.

Second, it is uncertain whether North Korea is prepared to accept the Cold Peace framework. Pyongyang currently demands recognition as a nuclear-weapon state and calls for nuclear disarmament negotiations rather than denuclearization. Is Cha's proposal compatible with these objectives? Furthermore, North Korea has long demanded the termination of the US 'hostile policy' toward it. Whether the Cold Peace framework can satisfy this long-standing demand remains an open question.

Third, the implications for South Korea must be carefully considered. One of the key objectives of the Cold Peace strategy is to enhance US homeland security by reducing the number of adversarial relationships Washington faces. However, it is not clear whether this approach fully aligns with South Korea's security interests. The South Korean government also adopts a phased approach of freeze, reduction, and complete denuclearization as a path to peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. However, with Pyongyang pursuing an overtly hostile policy toward South Korea, harmonizing US-North Korea relations and inter-Korean relations is becoming increasingly difficult. Pyongyang has recently redefined inter-Korean relations as 'relations between two hostile states' and has further intensified its confrontational stance and rhetoric toward South Korea. In this context, South Korea has ample reason to worry that progress in US-North Korea negotiations could undermine the credibility of US extended deterrence commitments. As Victor Cha himself points out, "If allies feel abandoned and lose faith in America's security commitments, this could trigger a regional arms race and a new nuclear domino effect."

For these reasons, Cha's proposal warrants serious consideration. A more flexible and proactive US approach to North Korea would undoubtedly be preferable to the rigid policies that have characterized Washington's diplomacy over the past 30 years. However, there were reasons why past administrations did not adopt such an approach. The political and strategic structures that constrained past US policies have not fundamentally changed in 2026. Ultimately, new US strategies alone are insufficient to achieve a sustainable solution. A willingness from the US, North Korea, and South Korea alike to move beyond narrow national interests and engage in mutual adjustment and cooperation is required. ■

Variables to Consider Before Pursuing a 'Cold Peace' Approach

Lee Dong-ryul (Professor at Dongduk Women's University)

The Cold Peace approach with North Korea, framed as a transitional strategy for crisis management while maintaining North Korea's denuclearization as a long-term objective, can be considered as an alternative from the perspective of recognizing the reality that achieving North Korea's denuclearization in the short to medium term is difficult. However, there are two important preconditions that must be deeply considered and resolved before developing this alternative.

First, it is argued that a prerequisite for pursuing the Cold Peace approach is the establishment of strong alliances, particularly a 'Collective Defense Declaration' among South Korea, the US, and Japan. However, for a strong ROK-US-Japan alliance to be formed, the US must first secure two firm trusts from its allies. First, a firm trust must be preemptively secured among the allies that the Cold Peace approach does not, under any circumstances, recognize North Korea's claim to be a nuclear-weapon state. Second, the US must dispel concerns that its Cold Peace plan prioritizes the defense of the US mainland and may lack firm commitment to nuclear extended deterrence and security guarantees for allies such as South Korea and Japan. In particular, it is necessary to face the reality that the trust of allies has been significantly weakened due to the Trump administration's excessive and inconsistent tariff policies and its America First policy. The Lee Jae-myung administration, while anticipating dialogue with North Korea, is hesitant to adopt a strategic clarity that could solidify confrontational relations with China. In short, without the establishment of firm trust among allies, a hasty Cold Peace approach could inadvertently accelerate the discussion of nuclear armament latent in Northeast Asian countries, including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, leading to a new crisis phase with great confusion in the overall Northeast Asian order and even the international nuclear order.

Second, for the Cold Peace approach to succeed, sophisticated analysis and response strategies are needed to overcome the more difficult and complex hurdle of China. It is unlikely that China possesses the will and capability to achieve North Korea's denuclearization. Nevertheless, China has not publicly agreed with North Korea's claim to be a nuclear-weapon state, despite North Korea's persistent demands. If a de facto recognition of North Korea's nuclear status occurs through a change in the status quo, China may exercise influence and play a role to protect its own security interests. While China is hesitant to act as a mediator to promote US-North Korea negotiations, it cannot be ruled out that China may be wary of, or even obstruct, direct US-North Korea negotiations that run counter to its national interests or exclude it.

China, judging that competition and confrontation with the US are inevitable and will only intensify, prioritizes maintaining and managing North Korea as a crucial strategic buffer zone over North Korea's denuclearization. In particular, if the US-ROK-Japan alliance is pursued, which the US cannot help but consider in conjunction with negotiations through a cold peace with North Korea to contain China, China may perceive the 'US-ROK-Japan alliance' as a more urgent and significant threat than North Korea's nuclear weapons. In this case, North Korea's strategic value would be further highlighted, and China might seek a trilateral alliance with North Korea and Russia, thereby exerting influence to obstruct US-North Korea negotiations in some way.

China has sought to prevent North Korea from facing a crisis due to US pressure, but at the same time, it has been wary of and responded to US-North Korea negotiations proceeding without its involvement. For example, following the Pyeongchang Olympics in February 2018, when inter-Korean and US-North Korea summits were abruptly held, China unusually held four summit meetings with North Korea between March 2018 and June 2019, after a seven-year hiatus since 2011. China essentially sought to intervene and put a brake on rapid progress in US-North Korea relations and attempts to change the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, immediately after the Hanoi US-North Korea Summit in February 2019 ended unexpectedly with 'no deal,' China maintained a calm and principled official response, adopting a 'quiet' approach as if it had anticipated the outcome. Smooth progress in crisis management negotiations, such as arms reduction between the US and North Korea, requires close strategic communication between the US and China as a prerequisite. Furthermore, possible diverse scenarios where the China variable may play a role in the negotiation process must be preemptively and precisely reviewed. In particular, if the strengthening of the US-ROK-Japan alliance is interpreted as prioritizing containment of China over deterrence of North Korea, or as a parallel effort, there is a risk of intensifying the Cold War structure surrounding the Korean Peninsula and exacerbating security anxieties.

In conclusion, for the US to pursue a crisis management approach through negotiations with North Korea, it is necessary to preemptively restore trust in weakened alliances and to achieve mutual understanding through close communication between the US and China regarding new approaches to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. ■

■ Chun Jae-sung_EAI Director, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University; Hwang Ji-hwan_Professor of International Relations, University of Seoul; Lee Dong-ryul_Professor of Chinese Studies, Dongduk Women's University

■ Responsible Editor: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow; Oh In-hwan_EAI Senior Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr