[North Korea and the World] The Outcome of the US-China Summit and Its Implications for the Korean Peninsula

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEtkFCuIttc

■ Author: Park Won-gon _Director, EAI Center for North Korean Studies. Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Contact & Editing: Lim Jae-hyun_EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr

Video Script

Key Agreements and Strategic Implications of the US-China Summit

The outcome was less than expected. I believe China achieved more of its demands from the US. Thank you to everyone watching "North Korea and the World" with Park Won-gon. Today, we will analyze the US-China summit held on May 14th and 15th. The US-China summit has a significant impact on the entire world, and especially on the Korean Peninsula. As the global order undergoes major changes, closely observing the strategies each of the US and China brought to this meeting is crucial for the future of the Korean Peninsula.

To put it bluntly, it was a case of "much ado about nothing," with no significant results beyond expectations. I believe China achieved far more of its objectives from the US in this summit. It can be said that China has ascended to the status of a G2 nation, and we can find significance in many of China's actions during the US-China summit. The meeting, the first in nine years since 2017, garnered global attention. On the first day, after a 135-minute summit, they visited the historic Temple of Heaven, concluding the day with a banquet at the Great Hall of the People. On the second day, May 15th, they engaged in five agenda items, including a tea ceremony, before returning to the US.

The summit lasted for two days and one night. There was no specific joint statement or joint press conference; instead, both sides announced their respective outcomes. Here, I will explain what the US under Trump and China under Xi Jinping gained and how they approached the discussions. Let's start with China. President Xi Jinping made remarkably bold statements towards the US, encompassing three core concepts. The first is the "Thucydides Trap." The Thucydides Trap is a concept devised by Professor Graham Allison of Harvard University.

It describes the structural tendency for a rising power challenging an established hegemon to collide. It originates from the analysis of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides in his account of the Peloponnesian War. At that time, Athens, a rising power, posed a threat to Sparta, the existing hegemon, leading Sparta to initiate war out of fear of losing its dominance. Thucydides analyzed that the cause of the war was not a direct conflict but rather a shift in the balance of power. Professor Graham Allison has modernized this concept. The confidence of a rising power leads it to feel that the existing order is disadvantageous and to demand more from the hegemon.

Conversely, the hegemon perceives its position as threatened and seeks to preemptively suppress the rising power. When these two forces clash, they are drawn into conflict, even if neither side desires it. This is the fundamental argument. Professor Allison analyzed 16 instances of power transitions over the past 500 years; 12 of these resulted in war. He posited that the current US-China power struggle is the 17th case that could fall into the Thucydides Trap. The crucial point is that Xi Jinping's invocation of the Thucydides Trap was intended to send a clear message: the US and China are currently in the Thucydides Trap.

Historically, falling into this trap leads to war. Therefore, to avoid this trap, he is essentially saying, 'The US must recognize China as a partner.' In other words, he is demanding that the US accept China's rise without fear and acknowledge its status. Furthermore, the second core concept Xi Jinping introduced was that the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" and "making America great again" can coexist. Xi Jinping's "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" refers to the "China Dream," the aspiration to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049. In essence,

it signifies making China prosperous and powerful, positioning it at the center of the world stage. "Making America great again" implies a form of selective isolationism where America focuses on its own affairs and refrains from intervening in regions not vital to its interests. The Trump administration, with its "America First" policy, has emphasized focusing on the American continent. This has been a central theme in the National Security Strategy released in November of the previous year and the National Defense Strategy released in January of this year. This statement is an extension of Xi Jinping's long-standing rhetoric. Since 2013, Xi Jinping has been advocating for the idea that "the vast Pacific Ocean is wide enough to accommodate both China and the United States." This implies a division of spheres of influence.

This suggests that the US should maintain its sphere of influence in the Eastern Pacific, and the Western Pacific should be recognized as China's sphere of influence. This carries significant strategic implications. The third concept, presented as a concrete proposal, is the "constructive strategic stability relationship." The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs elaborated on this, defining it as positive stability centered on cooperation, sound stability accompanied by fair competition, enduring stability with manageable disagreements, and sustained stability that promises peace. In essence, it means recognizing China as an equal partner and competing within an established framework. China's proposal is distinct from previous ones. In 2012, Xi Jinping proposed a "new model of major power relations." This proposal goes a step further than the "new model of major power relations" because the US did not accept that previous proposal.

US Lack of Strategy Towards China and Trump's Personalized Diplomacy

However, this time, the "constructive strategic stability relationship" implies that the US and China are competing and that this competition needs to be calmed and managed. It signifies a demand for the US to recognize China as an equal competitor, and as mentioned earlier, to acknowledge its sphere of influence. This is all encompassed within the "constructive strategic stability relationship." What is different from the previous "new model of major power relations" is that this concept is explicitly included in the fact sheet released by the US after the summit. The fact sheet states that "the US and China should jointly pursue a constructive relationship for strategic stability," and the US announcement uses the phrase "constructive relationship of strategic stability," which directly incorporates the terms used by China for "constructive strategic stability relationship."

This suggests that the US has essentially adopted China's proposals. It appears that, to a significant extent, the US has accepted many aspects of China's desired strategic direction without much deliberation. This forces us to reconsider what Trump's strategy towards China actually is. The reason is that there was no clear answer regarding how to define the relationship with a rising China. As explained, China presented various frameworks for defining its relationship with the US, but the US lacked such a clear approach. There was no discernible consistent perception or policy direction or strategy. Of course, the playing field was tilted from the outset.

This was disadvantageous for Trump. The trade war led to economic difficulties in the US and a decline in Trump's domestic approval ratings. His highly personalized approach to diplomacy, among other factors, contributed to the absence of any noteworthy achievements or strategic direction at this summit. To elaborate further, President Trump's approval ratings hit a low of 34%, and his approval for economic policies dropped to a historic low of around 30% due to economic challenges. It is widely believed that if this situation continues, the Republican Party is likely to lose the House of Representatives in the November midterm elections.

There are even concerns that the Senate could be at risk. Therefore, Trump needed to package this US-China summit favorably and declare it a victory to appeal to American voters. Consequently, using his characteristic rhetoric, he claimed to have achieved a "fantastic trade deal," which is also reflected in the fact sheet. For example, it states that China agreed to purchase 200 Boeing aircraft, and that China committed to purchasing at least $17 billion worth of agricultural products, with a full resumption of imports. These were presented as outcomes beneficial to US economic interests. The issue is that these details are absent from China's official statements. While discussions may have occurred, and China has not raised objections, their absence from China's official announcements is clear. President Trump significantly softened his aggressive stance on seeking economic concessions from China. Of course, it is inappropriate to attack the host country during a state visit, but he presented a very different demeanor compared to his previous interactions.

The Taiwan Issue and the Realization of "Korea Passing"

He frequently referred to Xi Jinping as "my friend," a term he has used before, but he also described him as a "great leader" and a "warm person." In the early days of Trump's presidency, after the US began its full-fledged competition with China in 2018, Trump referred to Xi Jinping as the "Communist Party leader of a bankrupt socialist country," even stating he would not use the title "President" but rather "General Secretary" to emphasize his role as a Communist Party leader and the nature of the country as socialist. The contrast with how Trump treated Xi Jinping during this US-China summit is stark. Another issue that caused concern for South Korea was the Taiwan issue. Shortly before traveling to Beijing for the summit, President Trump told reporters that "President Xi Jinping does not want us to sell arms to Taiwan, and I will discuss this issue," a statement that could have far-reaching consequences.

The US has a policy known as the "Six Assurances," established during the Ronald Reagan administration in 1982, which states that the US will not consult with China in advance regarding arms sales to Taiwan. President Trump's statement directly contradicted this principle. Subsequently, Trump stated that he had "discussed the issue of arms sales to Taiwan in detail with President Xi Jinping." After the summit, Trump announced that arms sales to Taiwan would be put on hold, and that China's decision would determine the outcome, causing significant repercussions.

This refers to a $14 billion arms package that the Department of Defense announced in January but delayed. The implication is that this was used as leverage for negotiations with China. This situation is inherently concerning for South Korea because the US, which acknowledges a significant responsibility for Taiwan's defense, has abandoned a core principle of not discussing arms sales to Taiwan with China. Applying this logic to the Korean Peninsula, it could mean that the US might negotiate with North Korea's Kim Jong Un and reach agreements without South Korea's involvement.

North Korea's Denuclearization Agenda and the Imbalance in US-China Strategy

This could lead to what is called 'Korea Passing.' Given that negotiations might occur without reflecting our understanding of the nuclear issue, and a certain agreement is reached, there's a possibility, particularly with the Trump administration, that North Korea could be presented with a fait accompli and be told to accept it. We believe this is a situation that cannot be entirely ruled out. This is bound to cause significant concern for the Republic of Korea. However, the North Korean nuclear issue was discussed at the US-China summit. The US fact sheet stated, 'The United States reaffirmed the shared goal of denuclearization of North Korea,' but this was absent from the Chinese announcement. The Chinese statement merely mentioned, 'The two leaders exchanged views on major international and regional issues such as the situation in the Middle East, the crisis in Ukraine, and the Korean Peninsula.' China has not discussed the denuclearization of North Korea for the past several years. This is because, from China's perspective, which strongly opposes it and to some extent sides with North Korea, they avoid such discussions to avoid provoking North Korea.

China's Long-Term Strategy and Concerns Over Reduced Diplomatic Options for South Korea

Nevertheless, it is fortunate that the US discussion is reflected in the fact sheet, and China has not shown any reaction of opposition, confirming that the discussion did take place. In particular, the phrase 'denuclearization of North Korea' was used accurately. As mentioned, this US-China summit could be a historical turning point, marking China's official ascent to the G2 status as an equal partner with the United States. China operates with a long-term perspective. This is because, unlike the United States or South Korea, where leaders are changed through free democratic elections, President Xi Jinping, having secured a third term, can serve as a leader for an extended period, allowing for a long-term approach and relationship building. China aims to manage its relationship with the US with a long-term strategy. Conversely, President Trump's characteristic is to focus on very short-term interests, reflecting immediate material, economic, and domestic political gains. If the two countries have different approaches, which side will ultimately create a more advantageous situation? Naturally, the side with the longer-term perspective might appear to make concessions in the short term, but in the medium to long term, it will inevitably move towards the strategic direction of the party with the longer-term perspective. That is what concerns us. Although President Trump's term has less than three years remaining, meetings are expected to continue during this period, and there is a high probability of a second US-China summit in September. In such circumstances, with each meeting, President Xi Jinping is likely to advance step by step, whereas if Trump continues with an unprincipled, personalized diplomacy, he will inevitably be seen as retreating step by step. If the United States loses its strategic consistency, South Korea's options will inevitably narrow, as explained with the Taiwan issue. Observing this US-China summit, I cannot help but feel a sense of profound complexity. As the US-China summit and the US-China relationship have a significant impact on the Korean Peninsula, we will continue to analyze future summits and major agendas. Thank you for watching.

That long-term perspective will inevitably lead to the strategic direction of the party with the longer-term perspective. That is what concerns us. Although President Trump's term has less than three years remaining, meetings are expected to continue during this period, and there is a high probability of a second US-China summit in September. In such circumstances, with each meeting, President Xi Jinping is likely to advance step by step, whereas if Trump continues with an unprincipled, personalized diplomacy, he will inevitably be seen as retreating step by step. If the United States loses its strategic consistency, South Korea's options will inevitably narrow, as explained with the Taiwan issue. Observing this US-China summit, I cannot help but feel a sense of profound complexity. As the US-China summit and the US-China relationship have a significant impact on the Korean Peninsula, we will continue to analyze future summits and major agendas. Thank you for watching.