[EAI Webinar] Implications of the US-China Summit and the Future of Korea-US-China Relations

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umXqH9qtxK8

Video Transcript

Good morning. Thank you for joining the EAI webinar today. It has only been a week since the summit. Today we will discuss what the Trump summit means for Washington, Beijing, and Seoul. I am very pleased to have you with us today. We have excellent speakers. We will discuss the implications of this summit for not only Washington D.C. and Beijing, but also for Seoul and other countries in East Asia.

Our core question today is not simply whether the summit went well or poorly. The more important question is what strategic game is unfolding between the United States and China, what new strategic rules are emerging between the two countries, and what are the implications of this summit for East Asia and particularly for Korea.

There have been a wide range of assessments of this summit in both countries. So we will be tracing all of these important points with three excellent speakers. Let me briefly introduce our three speakers, who are already very well known not only domestically but also globally.

First, we have Professor Robert Ross from Boston College. Professor Ross is one of the most distinguished scholars in the field of Chinese foreign policy, US-China relations, and East Asian security. His work has influenced how many people understand the politics of great powers in Asia, particularly the interactions between great powers, geography, and strategy. We look forward to his assessment of what this summit tells us about US strategy, Chinese behavior, and the broader balance of power in East Asia. He visited EAI last December.

If you want to hear Professor Ross's general views on China, please visit our website. His excellent lecture from last December is posted there. Second, we have Professor Yu Jun from Peking University, a long-time friend. Professor Yu is a leading scholar in the study of Chinese international relations and security, and he has also worked on international relations theory and history. He is an excellent scholar. He will provide a valuable perspective from Beijing at a time when much of the discussion about China proceeds without a sufficient understanding of Chinese strategic thinking. His insights into how Chinese analysts interpret the Trump summit, what Beijing can expect from Washington, and how China views the future of the regional and world order will be particularly important. Finally, we have Professor Cui from the University of Hong Kong. Professor Cui is the leading Korean expert on Chinese foreign policy and Northeast Asian security. Her perspective will help us connect the summit to Korea's strategic choices. For Seoul, the issue is not just understanding the relationship, but how to act wisely between the United States and China. She will help us think about the implications for Korean diplomacy, alliance policy, and regional strategy. We have a brief format. We will wrap up at 10:30 AM Seoul time. First, our three speakers will each give 10 minutes of opening remarks.

Outcomes and Strategic Implications of the US-China Summit

After that, I will pose some questions for discussion, and we will have a panel discussion among the speakers for about 20 to 30 minutes. First, we will hear opening remarks from Professor Robert Ross. Thank you. President Chung, to answer your first question, I think the summit was a great success.

I think it's a somewhat critical view from the United States. Most people criticize Trump for coming back with nothing. But I think it was a great success personally. Because after Trump 1.0, and after Biden, we are rebuilding a relationship that was effectively on the brink of a new Cold War. We have to start over. So it was unrealistic to expect great achievements, and to do so, you have to understand that this is also a great power relationship. It was unrealistic to expect great achievements and breakthroughs between the two most important great powers in the world. So many people expected great breakthroughs and agreements, but that was the wrong baseline. There was no new joint statement, but there was no possibility of a new joint statement in the first place.

Also, there were no new major agreements with details. Because that generally doesn't happen at summits. Even if there were agreements, they would be very vague. If you look at the recent Putin-Xi agreement, it's very vague with promises but no specifics.

So the expectation of breakthroughs was unrealistic. Some people will say that Donald Trump could have been a Richard Nixon going to China. I think that's foolish. Others will say that he could have been a Ronald Reagan going to China with a new SALT agreement. I think that's also foolish. We live in a very different world with intense competition between great powers, and this is a long process of managing the relationship. So from that perspective, I think we did quite well. There were no details,

this was to be expected. Like the Putin statement, the Chinese call this a preliminary agreement, and I think that's correct. That's appropriate too. Because there's so little trust on either side that the other side will deliver on its promises, neither side is prepared to deliver until they see what the other side is prepared to do.

So we are in an era not of promises, but of looking for reciprocity and a step-by-step process, and seeing if this country does this, then we can do this. So we saw promises or assurances that countries are prepared to do something going forward, but we are watching to see if the other side will act reciprocally.

So we are in a world of reciprocity and a step-by-step approach rather than prior promises. Now, the first step is whether this reciprocity is possible. Everything is difficult. Both sides are cautious because we had difficulty fulfilling promises in the first trade agreement after Trump 1.0. And we remember that during the first Trump administration, Trump was initially cautious about Taiwan, but later expanded US cooperation with Taiwan. So there is also a lack of trust here. So we

are waiting for reciprocity. The first step of reciprocity and give-and-take is for China to expect that the US will be restrained regarding Taiwan. If the US proceeds with these reported arms sales, if the US proceeds with the phone call between Donald Trump and President Tsai Ing-wen, there will be no reciprocity, and any agreement reached will fail.

And if Donald Trump believes Taiwan is a good bargaining chip, I think he is wrong, and China will call his bluff, and the relationship will not advance. Perhaps he is simply acting like Donald Trump and is out of his mind. I don't know. Perhaps he wants someone in the administration to talk to the administration in Taiwan and say, 'Don't make trouble.' In that case, China might be satisfied as long as Donald Trump doesn't call. So many things

could be, but until the Chinese mainland is assured that there will be restraint from the United States regarding Taiwan, and if Donald Trump continues his remarks that he does not want a war over independence, then I don't think the relationship can advance.

Now, I think there were some interesting achievements in the summit. We created new committees. There is an investment committee. There is a trade committee. During the Obama administration, we created several committees, and these were consolidated into security and exchange dialogues.

Trump canceled these, and Biden did not renew them. So we are beginning to rebuild bilateral relations, bilateral dialogues, where experts get together and discuss real issues. This is an important step in recovering from the cancellation of these meetings in the past. Moreover, the dialogues in the Obama administration were just dialogues. I believe these panels, meetings, and committees are designed to negotiate real issues and see if we can actually

However, despite the US's restraint on the Taiwan issue and (former President Trump's) statement that he did not want a war for independence, I believe relations will be difficult to advance until mainland China can trust it.

I believe this summit has yielded several interesting results. A new Investment Committee and Trade Committee have been launched. During the Obama administration, several committees were also created, but they were integrated into security and exchange dialogues at the time.

Former President Trump canceled these committees, and the Biden administration did not restore them. Therefore, it is about rebuilding bilateral relations and bilateral dialogues where experts can gather and discuss real issues. This is an important step in recovering from the cancellation of past meetings. Furthermore, the dialogues during the Obama administration were merely dialogues. I believe these panels, meetings, and committees will negotiate real issues and

examine whether some trade barriers can be eased through investments in each other's countries. Both sides want investment, but this must be in a mutually beneficial relationship, not a unilateral agreement. These committees will allow for the examination of individual issues and the reaching of agreements. I believe this is a positive outcome.

I see the possibility of tariff reductions. We want China to reduce tariffs on Chinese goods, and China will also want to phase out US tariffs. These committees can negotiate these individually. I don't know if this will materialize. But the establishment of these committees should not be dismissed as irrelevant. Especially considering that they were canceled during Trump 1.0 and were not renewed by the Biden administration.

Second, there was the mutually beneficial Boeing 200 aircraft deal. The US provides China with the necessary technology and equipment, and China promises to purchase the Boeing aircraft that the US needs. This was an important reciprocity. China needs Western technology to increase the success rate of new civil aircraft. Boeing also needs China's aircraft purchases to reduce inventory and recover. Boeing's stock price has been on a downward trend for the past four years.

It needs the Chinese market. Therefore, I believe an agreement has been reached that both sides need. Of course, there was also an agreement on soybeans and beef. Trump said he wanted China to lower tariffs on US goods. That is his mandate. If he doesn't, I don't think China will buy soybeans. They won't buy soybeans and beef either. But that was the first step. Trump will want to find a way there, but US politics and

regulations can take some time. The next step, of course, is tariff reduction and investment. This could happen, but it will be a long process. At the same time, there are limitations on technology transfer in this relationship. Both sides are well aware that neither will provide any capabilities to the other.

The US will not provide any advanced technology that enhances the capabilities of the PLA (People's Liberation Army) to Taiwan. China knows this and does not expect us to lift regulations that would benefit the PLA. On the US side, we fully understand that the mainland will not ease rare earth exports to help the US military.

These are mutual constraints that both sides accept. But behind them, there is a lot of room for flexibility. Under the Biden administration, I believe there has been a decoupling effort to minimize China's access to any US technology. Trump made it clear that this is a strategic operation, not an economic one. Therefore, there is still potential to ease technology restrictions. We saw the case of Trump and Nvidia, and Biden would never have done that. Therefore,

there are constraints on cutting-edge technologies that contribute to military power. Of course, there are constraints on what can be done regarding Ukraine and Iran. I believe it is significant that the word Ukraine was not mentioned in the joint statement between China and Russia after Putin's visit.

I believe this is a signal that China is ready to do something if the situation ripens or is appropriate. And we know what that means. It is Taiwan. And we have seen China's signal regarding Ukraine and Iran that they want the Strait opened, but what about reciprocity on Taiwan?.

So this is a very delicate operation. Because China does not trust the US's promise to maintain constraints on Taiwan. But nevertheless, the potential exists. That said, in this modern era where the US is building alliances with its security partners in East Asia, including Japan, it is unrealistic to expect China to unilaterally cooperate with the US on Ukraine and Iran.

So there are constraints that will persist there. Now, the regional implications of all this are still interesting, I think. What does this mean for US security partners in East Asia? I believe this summit has solidified the perception that the Trump administration is reducing its commitment to East Asian security partners.

This includes our commitment to South Korea, our commitment to the Philippines, and our commitment to Taiwan. I believe this summit has solidified the Eldridge KBY strategy. First, because this summit was held, and second, because Donald Trump did not discuss US security relations in East Asia at all. It is unusual for a president not to remind or reaffirm our commitments to partners during a US-China summit.

There was a phone call with the President of South Korea after the summit. There was also a phone call with the Prime Minister of Japan after the summit. It is important that there was no discussion with Taiwan or the Philippines. These countries have more to fear than others. But even South Korea, I believe, will not have much confidence in the administration after this summit.

The fact that this president has not said anything publicly about Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, or the Philippines, I think, makes it clear that he does not want US cooperation with these countries in East Asia to interfere with US-China cooperation.

He made that clear regarding Japan. He made that clear regarding Taiwan. And our policy toward the Philippines is, if you don't want to help us with a flexible strategy, we don't want to make this a US-China issue. I think that will be the long-term policy. The only question we have is the impact. If a Democratic administration comes in and all the old Biden advisors return, I think they will try to renew the Cold War again.

Personally, I think it will fail and be costly. In my opinion, there is a growing perception that what is happening now is a long-term trend in US strategy. Thank you. >> Thank you very much. You have covered very comprehensive issues. There is a slightly optimistic assessment, which is good. I will ask two questions. You have already mentioned them. The first is Taiwan, and the second is Iran. In South Korea, President Trump mentioned that future

arms sales to Taiwan could be more conditional, raising very serious questions about the credibility of US policy toward Taiwan. Could you interpret President Trump's approach to Taiwan in a broader historical context for the audience? >> Yes, what message does this send to South Korea and Japan? Is this part of a broader pattern where security commitments are becoming more conditional, not just a Taiwan issue? This is a major concern here. The second is that you have already mentioned Iran. Iran

Does it represent a new opportunity for US-China cooperation due to mutual interests in regional stability and non-proliferation? Or will it be another area of strategic competition where both countries pressure Iran? Beijing uses its influence over Iran. So I will speak again after these three remarks.

Redefining US-China Relations: Strategic Stability and Constructive Competition

>> Okay. Very good. And >> And I will ask Professor Hu to speak. >> Thank you. Chairman Zheng. I am happy to be here. Yes. I agree with Professor Bob Ross's commentary on the summit. um This was considered a historic landmark visit, even though no joint statement was issued from this side.

Substantive issues are more important than practical matters. um um I believe the most important aspect of this summit is defining the China-US relationship as a constructive one based on strategic stability. um um This is very important given the very complex and challenging security environment. um um At the time of the start of the dialogue between the two presidents,

President Xi Jinping mentioned that the international environment is undergoing tremendous changes, and as major global powers, the US and China must cooperate to do more good and substantive things for the world. He added that this meets the expectations of the times and the world. This is the first point that President Xi mentioned. The second is that stabilizing China-US relations is very important.

Under the Trump administration's first term, China was designated as the US's most important strategic competitor according to the 2017 National Security Strategy. Since then, US-China relations have significantly deteriorated, and President Trump's visit to China after nine years is considered very symbolic.

Strategic stability is needed in US-China relations. Even if we cannot return to normal orbit, strategic stability must be restored. I believe both sides recognize this necessity after nine years of interaction. I believe this is the most important part defining US-China relations, and the discussion about this summit is ongoing. People are paying a lot of attention to it.

There is a discussion about what the concept of strategic and constructive stability means. Here is a somewhat official explanation: positive stability centered on cooperation, healthy stability through competition within appropriate limits, enduring stability through manageable differences, and perpetual stability through respectful peace. These are four explanations of what strategic stability means.

My personal understanding is that if we define US-China relations as strategic competition, although we previously refused to use this concept, it now appears we are accepting the concept of strategic competition. However, there is a very important constraint that this strategic competition must be peaceful, fair, and sustainable.

Therefore, I believe that being partners is like sportsmanship, fair competition, and different from zero-sum game competition. I believe it is very important to clarify this during the remaining three years of a future Trump administration. Also, there will be several summits between the two presidents this year.

There are several opportunities for the two presidents to meet this year, including the APEC summit and the G20 summit, and President Trump's state visit to China in September. I believe this has laid a fairly solid foundation for the coming years. Many people, especially in the US, say it might be a definition based on empathy, as Bob mentioned. However, given the deterioration of relations and the difficult international security environment, I believe it is particularly important for the leaders of the two great powers to make such a definition at this juncture.

Second, there are trade issues. Here, there are concerns about tariffs, and on the US side, concerns about technology issues. As Bob mentioned, this relates to Boeing, soybeans, beef, investments, and the trade committees. This is also about creating direct mechanisms to promote investment and trade issues between the two countries in the future. Regarding trade, this is also a very good thing. This might have been the part President Trump considered most important during his visit, especially considering the unfavorable domestic situation, such as the November midterm elections.

There are economic conditions and inflation, etc. Therefore, he is very expectant about trade with China. China also considers trade with the US very important, especially regarding technology issues. Of course, it is also very important for us, such as aircraft, aircraft purchases, soybeans, and beef purchases. So this is also something we can do.

Third, there are regional security issues. The Iran crisis, and the Korean Peninsula issue and the Ukraine issue were also mentioned. Perhaps the most important is the Strait of Hormuz crisis. This has caused very serious problems for the global economy and is related to the energy crisis worldwide, including in South Korea, China, Japan, and India. Therefore, it is clearly more important for Trump.

Managing this issue without a clear strategic objective does not seem good for him. It is about how to conduct the war and how to end it. China also agreed with the US's strategic objectives to a large extent. First, reopening the Strait, which is important for all countries. And not allowing any country or international organization to impose tolls. Also, a nuclear-free Iran.

China also agrees with this and always wants to mediate and resolve it because this war is not good for anyone. Therefore, there was an agreement on this. However, this issue is very complex and difficult. Many spiritual and religious leaders of a sovereign nation were killed in a surprise attack. Therefore, it is not easy to resolve.

China wants to do something, but it cannot be resolved in a short period. Regarding Taiwan, President Trump is probably the biggest concern on the US side. For those who traditionally attach importance to the issue of commitment to Taiwan.

China has made it very clear how serious the Taiwan issue is in US-China relations. On this side, this point has been reported extensively. Trump's response was not widely covered in all reports. In an interview with Fox News, he said he did not want people who wanted independence or to send US troops into a long-distance war. I think that is sufficient. Also, the suspension of arms sales sent a good signal to the Chinese side. However, the Taiwan issue is a fundamental problem of decades. We cannot have high expectations that this problem can be resolved with a single summit.

Therefore, I believe the Chinese side's position is quite reasonable. Also, regarding the Ukraine crisis, we do not know much about it. Following President Trump's state visit, President Putin also visited China, and we issued two very long and interesting joint statements. Regarding the Ukraine crisis, China's position is principled neutrality, and it wants to mediate the crisis, not stop the fighting. It would have been good if President Trump could have resolved the crisis overnight, but that is impossible. China also wants to help, but it does not know how much it can help. However, China clearly wants to play a constructive role in crisis management and mediation of the Ukraine crisis.

Regarding the Korean Peninsula, it is very interesting. According to the US fact sheet posted on the White House website, it says denuclearization of North Korea. However, in the Chinese version, it has changed from the US Embassy to the Korean Peninsula. I believe this is a difference that shows the gap between the two sides. We clearly want a stable situation in East Asia.

I believe that countries like Japan, which are becoming more autonomous and assertive, are becoming unstable, which is a challenge for both China and the US. It is a challenge on how to manage the situation. I will conclude here. Thank you.

I believe this is a challenge for both China and the US. It is a challenge on how to manage the situation. I will conclude here. Thank you.

I believe this is a challenge for both China and the US. It is a challenge on how to manage the situation. I will conclude here. Thank you.

I believe this is a challenge for both China and the US. It is a challenge on how to manage the situation. I will conclude here. Thank you.

Thank you. Very interesting. Professor Su has provided a comprehensive assessment across various fields. First, you have clearly explained the concept of strategic stability, which is widely discussed not only in South Korea but also globally. You have defined what that concept means and provided a clear definition. Fair competition. Therefore, although I know that the concept of competition was not accepted in China, both countries are now beginning to discuss the concept of competition. Competition is fine.

I have always said that rules-based competition will actually improve the situation in the region and around the world. I have a few questions. The first is a very general question. Since President Trump's re-election, there have been many views on US foreign policy toward China, which has become more transactional. President Trump preferred a leader-to-leader approach, and there were criticisms that it was unpredictable. After the second summit, the perception of US foreign policy

has changed for better or worse? How do you view President Trump's performance during the summit? This is the first general question. The second is about rare earths. There is a view that the US is maintaining a temporary truce with China because it feels pressured by China's dominance over rare earths and other critical minerals. Do you think this will continue to provide new momentum to long-term US-China relations?

Finally, you mentioned the China-Russia relationship, which is very interesting. China seems to be balancing between its policies toward the US and Russia. What is China’s long-term strategic alignment with Washington and Beijing? Will Beijing move much closer to Russia in terms of world order, anti-hegemonic rhetoric, defense, the Golden Dome, etc.? The future of the China-Russia relationship, while there are questions for the Korean Peninsula, I think the audience will raise those questions. Thank you. Finally, Professor Joo, please.

Focus, management, and cooperation in international disputes in US-China relations

Yes, I am happy to join this webinar. My name is Joo Jae-hyun, and I am affiliated with Yonsei University. I have drawn three implications from the recent US-China summit in Beijing and the China-Russia summit held a few days ago. I would like to share the implications from the China-Russia summit. Because there was an interesting phrase in the joint statement.

which could be very meaningful for the Iraq-US alliance and our defense against North Korea’s nuclear threat. I have drawn implications based on publicly available materials, including President Trump’s Fox TV News interview, Senator Marco Rubio’s NBC News interview, the China-Russia joint statement, and other media reports. Regarding US-China relations,

As I mentioned, I would like to share three implications. The first is that the focus of the bilateral relationship has become very clear. Basically, we can understand what each country’s top priority concerns are. One of the US’s biggest concerns is the expansion of the Chinese market opening. President Trump and other cabinet members have repeatedly emphasized this point. For China, it starts with Taiwan and ends with Taiwan. Everything is about Taiwan. They may buy more soybeans, beef, and Boeing planes from the US, but they want to see where President Trump stands on the one-China policy and the Taiwan issue.

This is my first implication. The second implication is management. The two leaders declared that they want to manage their bilateral relationship in the context of strategic stability. But I think management here means that competition will prevail and continue. And perhaps management will mean establishing committees to manage economic and trade relations, as Professor Ross pointed out. Perhaps at a lower level than we would like. That is, major industries related to agricultural products, primary and secondary industries. And all these non-tariff trade barriers. And I don’t think we can go further to the tertiary and quaternary industries or the AI industry level. As Senator Marco Rubio clearly stated, advanced technology is what the US wants to maintain its edge over China, and competition will continue. They have no intention of transferring advanced technology to China, and they have been very clear about this.

So basically, my implication is that the US and China have drifted apart at a specific point, which is advanced technology.

Basically, the US and China will go their separate ways, and I think this has many strategic implications for their allies and like-minded countries. The third implication is that the US will not seek China’s help or support in resolving international disputes.

This is quite interesting. Both leaders discussed Iran and the situation on the Korean Peninsula, etc. But Senator Marco Rubio said that the US did not come to seek China’s help.

Yes, but to get an agreement from China, which is to get support for the US position on the tricky issue that arose from the Iranian situation. Also, President Xi Jinping made it clear that he shares the US position on freedom of navigation and the Strait of Hormuz and the toll system that Iran is currently contemplating. And the third one, um, the, the, the, the third one was what? Anyway, yes, we all know what it is. So basically, there was an agreement that Iran would not have nuclear weapons, and there was basically an agreement between the two leaders. And I think this will be the basic tone when we look at the Iranian situation and other international disputes. And the US still wants to play a leading role in resolving these issues.

On the other hand, China seems to take a more cautious approach to international disputes. And I think that basically China will be very cautious about events far from its own country, but will be very proactive about potential situations around China, especially in the Taiwan Strait. But otherwise, unfortunately, we cannot expect too much cooperation between the US and China in resolving international disputes in the future. And the implications from the recently concluded China-Russia summit are that both Russia and China oppose some of the measures taken by non-nuclear states against nuclear threats, such as pre-emptive strike capabilities, nuclear extended deterrence measures, and nuclear sharing programs.

including the counterattack capabilities that the Iraq-US alliance is currently pursuing. Therefore, I think this has many political implications not only for the Iraq-US alliance but also for future China-Korea relations and China-Russia relations. Because if Korea pursues better relations in the future, I think this will be on the agenda.

Also, the current government hopes for improved relations with Russia after the Ukraine war ends. However, at this stage, looking at the joint statement considering all the defensive measures we are taking against North Korea’s nuclear threat, China and Russia have made it very clear that they oppose all the measures we are pursuing. This is very regrettable. They will not see North Korea’s nuclear threat and how much of a threat it poses to Korea. This is very regrettable. Overall, my concluding remark is that we should not overestimate the great competition between great powers that is ongoing between the US and China.

China will take a more cautious approach to international disputes, and while it will be cautious about matters far from China, it will take a very proactive stance on emergencies that may occur around China, such as the Taiwan Strait.

Beyond that, it is difficult to expect the US and China to cooperate in resolving international disputes in the future. What is interesting about the recently concluded US-China summit is that both Russia and China have expressed their opposition to some of the countermeasures taken by non-nuclear states against nuclear threats, such as pre-emptive strike capabilities, nuclear extended deterrence measures, and nuclear sharing programs.

This includes the counterattack capabilities that the South Korea-US alliance is currently pursuing. Therefore, this will have significant political implications not only for the US-South Korea alliance but also for future China-South Korea relations and China-Russia relations. If South Korea pursues better relations with China in the future, this issue may be on the agenda.

Also, the current government hopes for improved relations with Russia after the Ukraine war ends. However, as seen in the joint statement on all our defensive measures against North Korea’s nuclear threat, China and Russia have made it very clear that they oppose all these measures we are pursuing. This is very regrettable. They will not see the extent of North Korea’s nuclear threat and the threat it poses to South Korea.

In conclusion, I think it has become clear that we should not overestimate the great competition between great powers that is ongoing between the US and China.

I don’t think we should raise our expectations for cooperation on international issues between the two countries. Especially in terms of global supply chains, it has become clear that the US is not interested in transferring or sharing advanced technology with China. Although former President Trump said he welcomed Chinese investment in the US, we must look at the US Congress over the past five or eight years.

Many bills have been introduced since 2018 to block Chinese investment, but not all have passed, and none have been legislated. However, at least these bill introductions show concerns about the potential threat that Chinese investment could pose to the US, which is very telling. Even if former President Trump welcomes Chinese investment, he will face great difficulty in persuading the US Congress to oppose it.

This is a long-term game. Therefore, South Korea must clarify its role and position not only in the US alliance structure but also in the global supply chains that the US is rebuilding. Unfortunately, I am somewhat skeptical about the outlook for US-China relations, and this applies to the US-South Korea alliance and China-South Korea relations as well. However, I would like to conclude with an optimistic outlook.

I still think we should cheer for the US and China to improve their relations. As an ally of the US, it is better to cheer for the US to have better relations with China. After all, in the eyes of Beijing, the enemy of my friend is my enemy. The friend of my friend is my friend.

Therefore, I think the better the relationship between the US and China, the better our situation will be for South Korea. Thank you. >> Thank you very much. You have covered many interesting issues. The first question is about new technologies you mentioned in the second point. There were negotiations about the Nvidia H20 chip. It was reported that President Trump authorized the transfer of H20 chips, but Beijing did not accept it. Apparently, Chinese companies are reluctant to purchase it. How do you interpret this?

Does President Trump’s move indicate a shift from the US approach of denying China access to a more transactional approach that allows the transfer of some advanced technologies to China? This has implications for the so-called ‘small yard, high fence’ policy, i.e., the policy of the Trump administration to restrict China’s access to US technology.

You mentioned the Taiwan issue and the Iran issue. In South Korea, there is a very conservative and provocative interpretation that the Iran and Venezuela issues are not regional issues but a game for China. Because the US is trying to restrict the flow of oil to China. What do you think of this interpretation? Is this interpretation valid, or are there aspects of the US-China game in these moves? I would like to ask Professor Ross to answer the question, or add about 5 to 7 minutes to what was not covered in the initial remarks.

Thank you. I agree with all my colleagues’ comments on the summit. An agreement was reached here. First, perhaps the most important aspect of the US policy toward the summit is, I think, its success, which is that this is the first time in 20 or 30 years that the US has agreed to negotiate with China on a reciprocal basis. We are not lecturing or demanding. We are asking what is needed to achieve our goals in negotiations with China.

This is an acknowledgment that China has now become a great power, and we no longer have hegemony. In fact, I don’t think there is any aspect of power that the US currently dominates. Even in advanced technology, there may be some edge, but in all other measures of power, China is ahead. In applied technology, we all know that China can develop technology faster and better than US consumer technology. This affects GDP growth, market share, and international influence.

So I think the Trump summit reflects this recognition. We can no longer demand, and we must now negotiate. This is something that Americans have been very slow to recognize over the past decade. And I think this is the achievement on the Taiwan issue. President Trump said on the plane, ‘We don’t want to fight a war 9,000 miles away.’ And I think he is right.

Second, he said, ‘I don’t want independence.’ And I think that was a good statement. US policy has long stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence, but it has been able to sell weapons to Taiwan.

This has been a very constructive policy of supporting the people on both sides of the strait, supporting stability, economic cooperation, and dialogue. At the same time, the US has supplied Taiwan with the necessary military power to deter invasion from the mainland. I think this is the way forward. As Professor Wei mentioned, we cannot resolve this issue overnight. We will continue to sell weapons to Taiwan, but we can reduce the quantity, lower the technological dependence, and sell less provocative weapons.

At the same time, we must make it clear that we support stability across the strait and oppose independence. This is the direction Donald Trump wants to move in to remove the Taiwan issue from the obstacle. This is good for South Korea. South Korea has made it clear that it does not want to be caught in a war between the US and China over Taiwan. This is another expression that South Korea does not want a war over Taiwan, and it means that South Korea wants the US and China to manage this relationship to avoid war.

And I think that is correct. Is US credibility at stake? No. Of course, it is. But the main reason for the US credibility problem is not Taiwan. It is the decline of US power and the rise of China. Therefore, the resolve of the US to defend its allies is weakening. Because the cost of defending them will be greater, and the outcome will be less certain. This is the problem for Singapore, the Philippines, and South Korea. Every country in East Asia is concerned that the US will become a less reliable ally due to the rise of China.

This is not a diplomatic issue, but a matter of commitment. This is simply what happens when a power shift occurs. And I think it is inevitable. So I am not worried. Also, of course, if you want to reassure South Korea after the Taiwan compromise, you can increase troop presence in South Korea. You can also increase troop presence in Japan. It is not difficult to do so to compensate for compromises elsewhere. I think it is less likely to do so for South Korea, but more likely for Japan.

Regarding the Iran issue, the main obstacle to improving relations is, as I have made clear through the remarks of my fellow panelists, that the US does not welcome China’s role in reaching an agreement with Iran, nor does it welcome China’s role in reaching an agreement with Russia concerning Ukraine.

Donald Trump does not want to share the international stage. It might be possible if Donald Trump forms a five-party coalition including Europe, China, the US, Russia, and Ukraine. And China's role in bringing peace and cooperation as a great leader of the world would be important to China, and they might be willing to cooperate to pressure Russia. Because China's commitment is not entirely firm.

But Donald Trump does not want to share. I think the same applies to Iran. He has made it clear that he will resolve this issue himself. Marco Rubio said, ‘We are not going to seek China’s help. They don’t want China’s help. Donald Trump doesn’t want help. Ask China for support.’

I think that is a mistake. We could have resolved these issues faster and easier. Because China would have been more willing to use all the influence it has to reach a mutually acceptable agreement for international prestige, non-proliferation, free flow of oil, and stability in the Middle East. But that is not Donald Trump’s goal. I don’t think Donald Trump is considering the China element in Iran or Venezuela. The importance of Venezuela to China is still very small.

Purchasing oil from Iran is still not very important for China. China’s game is in East Asia. China’s game is not in Latin America. China’s security game is not in Latin America. China’s security game is not in the Middle East. I think the reason Donald Trump is doing these things is ‘to make America great again,’ because he believes that America can no longer face resistance from small and insignificant countries.

He aspires to remain a great leader who has resolved issues that other US presidents could not resolve, namely Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. This is a personal goal unrelated to China’s or Iran’s, Cuba’s, or Venezuela’s interests in the US.

>> Thank you. >> Thank you very much. You have made a wonderful opening. >> Yes, um, there are three questions. Um, yes, Trump is very transactional, but I think he is less ideological and more pragmatic. He doesn’t care much about issues like human rights, like the slogan MAGA, ‘Make America Great Again.’ And making China a great country, we can benefit each other. So it’s not that serious a problem for China.

The guiding principle for the Trump administration and China in their relations is to pursue the best and prepare for the worst. There is an old Chinese wisdom. Because both President Trump and the bilateral relationship are very uncertain. As Professor Zheng said, competition is likely to continue, so we must prepare for it. While this summit is very good, historic, and useful for both countries and the world, we must prepare. The devil is always in the details. In that sense, you mentioned rare earths, how the two countries will treat each other in the next stage. Both sides made it clear at the summit. The next step is how to implement the important common understandings and agreements reached.

Based on the agreements we have reached, we must better utilize communication channels in the political, diplomatic, and military fields. Therefore, I expect the two countries to expand these exchanges and cooperation in many areas, including economy and trade. There will still be problems going forward. Therefore, we need boards in areas such as investment, trade, health, agriculture, tourism, private exchange, and law enforcement. In fact, military exchanges

will resume and discuss crisis management issues in the short term. We have had such talks before, but they have almost ceased after problems arose. So, they are expected to resume.

So, how we will develop stability and cooperation in these specific areas is the next step we will watch. Third, regarding China-Russia relations, although two statements were issued at the summit, I don’t think there will be any major changes in the bilateral relationship. The basic principle is non-alignment, non-confrontation, and not targeting any third party. So, if we maintain this tone, we can have a good relationship with Russia.

We can have a strategic partnership, a comprehensive strategic partnership. But we also have a bottom line. So we still respect sovereignty and territorial integrity regarding the Ukraine crisis. That is our principle and unwavering position. We can coordinate and cooperate on many strategic issues with Russia, but it is still a normal bilateral relationship.

Thank you. >> Thank you very much. That was very insightful. >> Yes. I received two questions. The first is about Nvidia and Trump’s approval of the HB200 semiconductor sale to China. I think that approval is a bit late. If you recall that China succeeded in developing DeepSeaK last year, China gained confidence that it could make its own semiconductors, and perhaps even sophisticated semiconductors like HB200. Jensen Huang’s proposal, I think, came last summer. I made a similar proposal to the Korean government a year ago. I said that all semiconductor manufacturing bases in China are closed, and we cannot sell advanced semiconductors to the Chinese market. And I proposed to the government. Like Jensen Huang,

Let’s sell low-end semiconductors to China and share the profits, but unfortunately, the Korean government did not want to put it on the agenda. Anyway. So I think the reason Jensen Huang’s presence did not attract much attention from Xi Jinping is that.

And second, Trump likes to show off. So he brought 30 world-leading advanced technology CEOs to this summit to show off to Xi Jinping. That was my impression. As the moderator pointed out, there has already been a shift in Trump’s moves regarding the transfer of advanced technology to China.

The second question is about the implications that can be drawn from the Taiwan issue and the cases of Iran and Venezuela. I fully agree with Professor Ross’s answer. China’s security interests are really small and negligible in this region.

They do not have a significant impact on their policies, but rather, I think the Venezuela case had more implications for Cuba. And we are already seeing the effects. It is good to see that Trump has at least approved humanitarian aid to go to Cuba. In the case of Iran, yes, it might be a bit more concerning for Trump. We recall the 40-year constructive partnership, strategic partnership signed by Xi Jinping and the Iranian government in 2022 or 2023.

China has pledged to invest $400 billion in Tehran. And I think this is what prompted the US to seriously consider the relationship between China and Iran recently.

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and differences in positions between the US and China

So this is my interpretation of these two cases. Thank you. >> Thank you very much. We have about 10 minutes left. I have one short question about North Korea. I would like Professors Ross and Pyo to answer. Looking at the White House fact sheet and President Xi Jinping’s statement, there are slightly different nuances regarding North Korea. The US mentioned the denuclearization of North Korea.

However, the Chinese side only mentioned that they exchanged views. How should this be interpreted? In South Korea, there were almost no expectations that North Korea would be on the agenda, so is this a good sign, or does it indicate a difference of opinion on North Korea?

Please give a short answer. >> There are more Korean Peninsula experts in South Korea. So I don’t want to say too much about this issue, but I think China’s perspective is, in some ways, similar to Trump 1.0’s perspective. That is, we must recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. We have failed to reverse this program with sanctions, pressure, and threats for 30 years. And we have failed. Therefore, China is no longer interested in trying coercive policies toward North Korea.

Because it cannot succeed. And they think the status quo is acceptable. Many people in the US also believe that coercion and threats have failed, and the best way toward denuclearization is to borrow from South Korea’s ‘Sunshine Policy’ from years ago. Let’s try to create a new environment that makes the North Korean regime less threatening by promoting more of the Western, capitalist, and Korean presence. Donald Trump is not ready to go there yet, but China is. They have been doing so for 20 or 30 years through border trade and supplying consumer goods to North Korea. South Korea has also tried several times, but not always successfully, but perhaps this is the best policy. Of course, the second issue is how much of a threat North Korea poses to South Korea. It is easy for me, living in Boston or Washington, to say that it is not a big threat, but the South Korean government reported yesterday.

So this is my interpretation of these two cases. Thank you. >> Thank you very much. We have about 10 minutes left. I have one short question about North Korea. I would like Professors Ross and Pyo to answer. Looking at the White House fact sheet and President Xi Jinping’s statement, there are slightly different nuances regarding North Korea. The US mentioned the denuclearization of North Korea.

However, the Chinese side only mentioned that they exchanged views. How should this be interpreted? In South Korea, there were almost no expectations that North Korea would be on the agenda, so is this a good sign, or does it indicate a difference of opinion on North Korea?

Please give a short answer. >> There are more Korean Peninsula experts in South Korea. So I don’t want to say too much about this issue, but I think China’s perspective is, in some ways, similar to Trump 1.0’s perspective. That is, we must recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. We have failed to reverse this program with sanctions, pressure, and threats for 30 years. And we have failed. Therefore, China is no longer interested in trying coercive policies toward North Korea.

North Korea has been strengthening its defenses in the demilitarized zone to prevent an invasion from South Korea through its fortress. And those fortresses cannot threaten South Korea because they cannot move across the demilitarized zone. So all the talk from North Korea over the past two, three, or four years is that they accept the status quo and are defensive against South Korean attacks.

Of course, South Korea has an absolute advantage in all war-fighting capabilities except for nuclear weapons. It has complete conventional dominance, complete conventional hegemony over North Korea, which has one of the weakest economies and weakest militaries in the world. The only threat they can pose is a unilateral North Korean nuclear attack, which would, of course, mean the end of the Kim Jong-un regime, which is what they value above all else. Therefore, such a

From a strategic perspective, maintaining the status quo is a belief that your government believes it can best deal with issues through cooperation rather than coercion. Therefore, I see no contradiction between China's policy, the US policy, and the Korean policy.

>> Thank you. >> Well, I think that China's position on the Korean Peninsula, as you know, is consistent with this Korean policy. It does not change. It is still denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution, and creating a sustainable peace negotiation mechanism. So this time, as I mentioned earlier, there were some minor changes in the fact sheet from the US side.

This can be seen as an indicator that China does not want to provoke on this issue. Therefore, there is no need to discuss this issue this time. However, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is China's consistent position.

It is to accept this issue not as a unilateral targeting of North Korea, but as a regional stability issue. In that sense, South Korea's development of nuclear-powered submarines is also a problem for China. But generally, we know that the security environment in Northeast Asia is quite unstable. President Trump himself believes that he is interested in North Korea. Because during his first term, he met with North Korean leaders three times.

I can't believe it. Well, so I don't know what steps he will take next. But that will be something to watch. Thank you. >> Thank you very much. Professor Chu, would you like to speak for a few more minutes? >> Yes, I will speak briefly. My opinion. My gut feeling is that China and Russia have already lost on this particular issue. They are not interested in resolving this North Korean nuclear issue at all. And that position changed in 2023. And if you look at the joint summit statements with Russia in 2023 and 2024, you can see that they have lost interest and have left the responsibility of resolving this issue to the parties concerned, namely the United States and North Korea. And unfortunately, what we have is the United States, Japan, and South Korea. These are the only parties interested in North Korean denuclearization, and this is why the trilateral relationship is becoming increasingly important.

important. Thank you. >> Thank you very much for your excellent presentation and thoughtful answers. Although there were negative and positive assessments of the summit, I am hearing a much more nuanced and cautious positive assessment, and I know that competition will not disappear. However, this summit can be remembered as the early stage of a new moment moving towards a new form of relationship, as Professor Ross and Professor Yoo mentioned, where competition and coexistence

coexist simultaneously, and this has significant implications for South Korean diplomacy. As Professor Chu mentioned, it depends on whether it will provide more diplomatic space. So I think this has been a very fruitful discussion. On behalf of EAI and Yuhwa University, and the Ministry of Unification, which sponsored this seminar, I sincerely thank you. And I am confident that we will continue to work together for other events. So thank you to all the audience as well. Have a nice day. Good night.

Have a nice day and good night.

Have a nice day and good night.