[Commentary] The Prolongation of the US-Iran Conflict and the Geopolitical Realignment of the Middle East

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elhHcCvkxLg&si=zJrQHa9qzrOrJAig

■ Go to English Video & Transcript

Introduction and Outlook on Conflict Scenarios

Jeon Jaeseong: I will begin with the first question. It has been nearly two months since the conflict began, starting from an unstable ceasefire that President Trump mentioned was highly unlikely to be extended indefinitely. Operations by the U.S. Navy continue in the Strait of Hormuz, and talks in Pakistan have been intermittent. From your perspective, Professor, what are the realistic scenarios you foresee for the next six months to a year? Is a genuine diplomatic resolution possible, or is it more likely to become a periodically recurring frozen conflict, similar to what we've seen between Israel and Hezbollah for years?

Brandon Ives: That's a very good question. I'll first talk about the U.S. and Iran, and then touch a bit on the conflict currently unfolding in Lebanon. The most important question is, 'What happens next?' I think from the outset, we have to frame this situation as a kind of game of chicken. Both sides are heading towards the finish line in a weakened state, trying to either finish each other off or achieve some kind of agreement, but who will blink first? The real question here is what factors will cause each actor to go off track. That's the key question here. In terms of the conflict, we have to look at this from the perspective of a conflict that comes at an enormous cost to both sides. For Iran, the big cost of the conflict is, of course, its current poor economic situation. Its military power has been greatly depleted, and it faces the real risk of even greater economic collapse if the United States were to launch further attacks.

For the United States, it faces enormous costs as well, particularly concerning the well-being of its Gulf allies. Iran still has the capacity to attack the civilian infrastructure of the Gulf states, which could have absolutely devastating consequences for some of these countries. Even if countries like the UAE have the capacity to defend against Iranian attacks with about a 90% success rate, that means about 10% of Iranian attacks could still reach their targets. If Iran decides to retaliate or launch attacks against civilian infrastructure, such as water desalination plants, that could be absolutely devastating. Therefore, I think the high cost of the conflict will drive both actors to seek a negotiated settlement. That being said, will there be an overlapping negotiation space? Will there be a mutually acceptable agreement? The United States under a second Trump term has been discussing the issue of enriched uranium, particularly highly enriched uranium, reaching perhaps 60%.

It should be noted that there are other places with 20% enriched uranium, which is another serious concern. One possibility is that Iran allows Russia to take that enriched uranium, which would allow Iran to claim, 'We didn't hand it over to the U.S., we didn't destroy it, we handed it over to a third party.' So, there's a possibility that a third party, such as Russia, could intervene and take some of the enriched uranium. Of course, Iran would want not only sanctions relief but also numerous economic benefits and integration into the global economy. That might be what a potential negotiation looks like. Another major concern right now, of course, is the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has stated, somewhat extremely, that it wants to impose tolls on ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and it continues to express that desire.

This would be unacceptable to the United States. Freedom of navigation has been a cornerstone of the global economy under the U.S. hegemonic system. I think these two issues are the main core issues that both sides will pursue. It's uncertain whether they can reach an agreement. There appears to be some fragmentation within the Iranian leadership. There are very significant negotiation and logistical challenges, such as enabling Iranian insiders to talk to each other, getting people into the same room in Pakistan, and so on. I believe they will pursue a negotiated settlement because the cost of war is extremely high for both sides, but we will have to see if there is actually an overlapping negotiation space. The issue of support for proxy forces like Hezbollah, I think, is secondary. It remains to be seen how Trump will push this as part of a negotiated settlement.

Excluding the issues of enriched uranium and the Strait of Hormuz, I believe the other issues are secondary. I see the core issues in a negotiated settlement as being at these points.

The Strategic Roles of China and Russia

Jeon Jaeseong: That was an excellent explanation. Following up, I have a question about China. You mentioned Russia's strategic advantage stemming from this war. So, some argue that China has gained a significant strategic advantage, observing the U.S. whose position has considerably weakened in various aspects, including alliances. In other words, they believe China can win simply by waiting. What are your thoughts on the advantages and disadvantages for China resulting from this war?

Brandon Ives: Yes, this is a very difficult question because China's role is very much looking into the distant future. There are several points. One is related to the role of the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and other potential countries in the Gulf that have security agreements with China, primarily Iran. This is particularly true for Qatar, which has access to Pakistan. This is significant because Pakistan has quite a close alliance not only with the U.S. but also with China. This could be an opportunity for China to exert some influence in the region through Pakistan. Now, regarding the broader impact on China, the most important aspect is, of course, energy. China, like East Asia and other parts of the world, receives a significant amount of oil from Iran and the Gulf region. So, we have to see how China will be affected. And there are other issues related to the concept of tolls in the straits.

If Iran can develop and maintain a toll system, the ripple effects on the rest of the world could be potentially very destructive, not only for the U.S. but also elsewhere. China has several key maritime routes, and various regions, including the South China Sea, have already become points of contention between China and its neighbors. If this opens up a new institutionalized toll system, it will be interesting to see whether it benefits or harms China in the future, but it could ultimately encourage China to participate in such activities. Another concern is precisely how the positions of the U.S. and Iran will unfold in the future. I think it's still a bit unclear whether the U.S. will emerge stronger or weaker as a result of this conflict. We need to wait for the situation to settle down a bit to understand this clearly.

If, as a result of this conflict, Iran becomes emboldened and feels it can threaten its neighbors whenever it wishes, or at least perceives that U.S. deterrence has diminished, this could be an opportunity for China to push its interests through Iran, Pakistan, or other allies. This is because U.S. military bases may not serve their intended purpose as U.S. deterrence diminishes. So, this is a somewhat undecided issue, and I think it will depend to some extent on how the current conflict is resolved. However, much of it will depend on what U.S. deterrence looks like. In the short term, another key question is the supply of military materiel for the U.S. In this regard, the issue of the military map that people have been discussing has been significant. It's the question of how much it costs and how many weapons are needed to intercept a very cheap weapon fired by the adversary.

In the short term, the U.S. is dedicating a significant portion of its resources to this conflict. What does this mean in the long term? It's difficult to say definitively, as I don't think China will take extreme measures immediately. Therefore, I believe the U.S. will have time to rebuild its arsenal. In conclusion, I don't see the supply of military materiel as a major concern in the long term.

Responses of Gulf States and Middle Powers

Jeon Jaeseong: Next, I would like to ask about the countries situated between the U.S. and Iran. You've already mentioned the Middle Eastern countries earlier. When the war began, Iran retaliated not only against Israel but also against U.S. military bases located in countries such as Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. How are the Gulf states navigating this impossible situation of being neighbors with Iran while simultaneously hosting U.S. troops? Also, what positions do you anticipate countries like Turkey and Pakistan will take as this conflict prolongs?

Brandon Ives: Yes, that's an excellent question regarding the Gulf states. We need to think deeply about geography here. Geography is very important. Clearly, the Strait of Hormuz provides Iran with an excellent opportunity to demonstrate capabilities beyond its weight class. It allows them to do things they wouldn't normally be able to do. Conversely, this puts the Gulf states in a somewhat difficult position. I think this is also largely due to geographical factors. Look at countries like Kuwait; they are geographically right next to Iran. They cannot help but be very concerned about the threat from Iran. Countries like Iraq share a long border with Iran. In northern Iraq, there is the Kurdistan Federal Region, where various rebel groups voice their support for Iran's self-determination movements. These groups also face a delicate balancing act concerning Iran.

Meanwhile, countries like the UAE have adopted a much more aggressive stance compared to Iraq. And it should be noted that the UAE is in a territorial dispute with Iran over two islands. There is a precedent of historical rivalry between the two countries. Currently, the UAE has been significantly impacted by Iranian attacks. It should be noted that Iran's attacks were not limited to military facilities. They attacked not only U.S. military bases but also various civilian and energy infrastructure facilities. Countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are very concerned about facilities such as water desalination plants. This is a major concern. We will probably see. Let's go back a bit. The biggest question, in my opinion, is whether there will be more cooperation and coordination among the Gulf states, or if there will be differences in their responses.

As hinted earlier, while all Gulf states are under some threat, the core of the question is what tactics they will employ to counter that threat. I believe countries like Kuwait or Qatar will try to utilize a more balanced diplomatic approach when dealing with Iran. The UAE, in particular, has been more aggressive in its actions. I also believe Saudi Arabia will try to strike a balance. It should be noted that the UAE has a different relationship with Iran than Saudi Arabia does. Looking at Saudi Arabia, while it has significant energy infrastructure in its eastern region, it also has population centers in its western region. It also has more pipelines that can be used for oil exports. Geographically, it forms a slightly different relationship with Iran compared to the UAE. Therefore, I believe each country will show somewhat divergent responses.

In terms of security, some of these countries will continue to maintain their security relationship with the United States. However, I expect them to attempt some diversification. This could mean looking more towards Pakistan. Also, various countries may keep an eye on China depending on the situation. In other words, it will be about adding external powers to some extent, rather than excluding the U.S. from the security framework. I believe geography will be a key factor influencing how each country responds. There will be a mix of countries like the UAE and Bahrain, which want to strengthen ties with the U.S. and Israel, and countries like Qatar and Kuwait, which will pursue a more balanced diplomacy.

Long-Term Regional Order and Future Prospects

Jeon Jaeseong: Very well. I have a question about the long-term impact of this war. Maritime route safety and maritime security are crucial for East Asian countries like South Korea and Japan, which import a significant amount of oil from the Gulf states. What will the region look like five or ten years from now, after the Iranian economy collapses and it suffers immense military damage? What are your expectations for the future relationship between the U.S. and Iran, and are we witnessing the emergence of a new regional order?

Brandon Ives: That's an excellent question about the future of the region in five to ten years. I think much of it will depend to some extent on how the current conflict is resolved. If the U.S. and other countries cannot prevent Iran from imposing tolls on the Strait of Hormuz, then we will see other countries attempting to pursue these new institutionalized tolls (norms). Therefore, whether Iran can be prevented from imposing tolls on ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz, or at least attempting to do so, will be a key issue.

The second major issue is whether the current conflict will lead to a negotiated settlement or if kinetic military attacks will resume. If military conflict resumes, it will be very deadly, so this will be the biggest picture. Much of the civilian energy infrastructure in both the Gulf states and Iran will be hit, and it is difficult to predict which direction the situation will take. It could be very deadly for both sides. I do not foresee the U.S. and Iran developing a great and friendly relationship anytime soon. Even if a negotiated settlement is reached, I surmise it will be similar to the agreement under the Obama administration. It might involve more constraints on Iran's actions. I don't expect relations to be restored anytime soon. I anticipate continued low-level conflict.

And I suspect Iran will receive a significant windfall in terms of economic benefits. My guess is that they will rebuild their military capabilities in certain ways. That is, they will rebuild their ballistic missile program and their drone capabilities. They are also likely to continue funding proxy forces throughout the region. Therefore, while Iran may be somewhat deterred, I believe we will see a similar pattern to what we have seen in the past. The wildcard in all of this is whether the Iranian regime can survive. The Iranian regime has taken several drastic measures to survive. They have attacked not only U.S. military bases and Gulf state military facilities but also civilian and infrastructure facilities. They have also shut down their domestic internet for over 50 days, up to nearly 60 days. Their economic situation is also not good.

In recent domestic protests, they have killed between 6,000 and 30,000 people, with the death toll appearing to be closer to 30,000. Therefore, they will need to find ways to rebuild their economy. As mentioned earlier, if some form of negotiation is reached, they are likely to experience a significant economic boom as they integrate into the global economy. However, the wildcard is whether the regime survives. Of course, this is difficult to predict. Will large-scale protests erupt? How will they deal with them? They may survive. The economic boom might help with reconstruction and provide jobs, helping them overcome this crisis. If that happens, I believe things will unfold similarly to what we have seen before. Since the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian regime has had a rather hostile relationship with Israel and the U.S. at various levels. At times, there has been some level of adjustment and cooperation. I anticipate seeing a slow rebuilding process of what Iran has done in the past.

They will foster proxy forces, strengthen their conventional weapons program, and develop their drone weapons program. Even without a nuclear program, as demonstrated in this conflict, they will still possess considerable capabilities to damage and threaten their neighbors and key economic zones of the world economy. The final point I would like to make about changes in the next five to ten years is that the nature of warfare is changing. The drone attacks we saw from Iran, particularly in the Gulf states or the Strait of Hormuz, were essentially 'dumb drones.' However, what we are seeing in Ukraine are 'smart drones,' that is, drones that are beginning to exhibit autonomous capabilities.

In the next five to ten years, as warfare technology evolves, and as Iran develops more autonomous drones and the world develops autonomous drones, how will warfare change? Simultaneously, the Gulf states and the U.S. will look at this conflict and think, 'Wow, drones were a key tool in Iran's arsenal.' Autonomous drone activity will be a key feature of future conflicts. What technologies will they develop to counter this? Therefore, I believe the type of warfare we are witnessing today will evolve further in the next five to ten years. Both sides will continue to develop the weapons they possess, and we will see how that affects their relative power assessments in future conflict zones.

In summary, even if a negotiated settlement is reached, we may see similar dynamics, and we will see how changes in warfare technology affect (or do not affect) the prospects of success for the belligerents or the countries currently involved in the conflict.

U.S. Domestic Politics and Historical Assessment

Jeon Jaeseong: One additional realistic question is, from the U.S. perspective, has President Trump gained anything compared to the situation in Iran prior to the war? How do you think history will assess this Iran war from the perspective of U.S. national interests? Please provide your final thoughts on this.

Brandon Ives: Wow, the U.S. and domestic interests. That's a very difficult question. As you know, going back to the Biden, Obama, and George W. Bush administrations, most of the previous administrations we've seen, all these presidents have portrayed the Iranian regime as a major threat to U.S. interests. Not only these presidents but also presidential candidates like Hillary Clinton have described the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran as something the U.S. could never live with. Therefore, a nuclear-armed Iran seems to be a consistent and core view of U.S. presidents and candidates as being a significant threat. However, as we can see in this war, dealing with the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran comes at an enormous cost. It poses immense challenges.

How history will write about Trump's Iran war will depend to some extent on how the war unfolds in the future and what actions the Democratic Party takes afterward. If, for example, a negotiated settlement is reached between Iran and the U.S., and Iran hands over some of its enriched uranium to Russia, that doesn't mean Iran cannot restart its program. Of course, if they give up 60% and 20% highly enriched uranium, it might take longer. But the technology is already out there in the world. They potentially possess the resources to restart the program. Iran has a highly developed scientific community and many brilliant physicists. They have the capability to do it. And there may be situations where future U.S. presidents have the capacity and will to restart the war years later.

So, if Iran can achieve some kind of agreement, gain economic benefits from that agreement, rebuild its conventional weapons stockpile, and use its economic power to foster proxy forces, while still keeping the nuclear weapons development card in its back pocket, history will view this outcome very negatively. Again, Iran has achieved all of this without nuclear weapons right now. Even with conventional weapons alone, it has been able to impose enormous costs on the global economy and the world. Therefore, if the same pattern repeats in the future, this settlement will merely be a way to buy time. Will this issue recur in the future, with the problem not being fully resolved? I believe this will be the perspective from which history looks back and assesses it.

Therefore, I believe there is a high probability that the problem will not be fully resolved. Of course, it depends on the future trajectory. However, if the Iranian regime can maintain its existence, enjoy economic prosperity in the future, and redevelop some of its core programs, I believe this issue will become a lingering problem that will need to be addressed later.

Jeon Jaeseong: Yes, that's all for today. Thank you. ■

■ Brandon Ives_Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Translation and Editing: Oh Inhwan_Senior Research Fellow, EAI; Lee Sangjun_Research Fellow, EAI
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr

Video Script

Realistic Scenarios and Negotiation Possibilities of the US-Iran Conflict

I will start with the first question. We have been in an unstable ceasefire for almost two months, and President Trump has stated that it is very difficult for this ceasefire to be extended permanently. The United States continues its naval operations in the Strait of Hormuz, and in Pakistan, negotiations have been starting and delaying repeatedly. From your perspective, Professor, what are the realistic scenarios for the next six months to a year? Is a genuine diplomatic solution possible, or will we see more of a frozen conflict periodically flaring up between Israel and Hezbollah?

>> That is a good question. I will talk about the US and Iran first, and then a little bit about the current conflict going on in Lebanon. The million-dollar question, what happens next? I think I have to describe this as a kind of a 'game of chicken' from the very beginning. Both sides are heading towards the finish line to either take each other out or to strike some kind of a deal. But who will blink first?

Who will blink first? The real question behind this is what are the factors that will cause each of the actors to go off the road. That is the key question here. When it comes to the conflict, we have to consider that it is an extremely costly conflict for both sides.

The high cost of the conflict for Iran is, of course, the economy. The economy is not doing well. The military has been largely depleted, and there is the risk of economic ruin if the United States were to attack further. There are costs for the United States as well. This is particularly true with regard to the well-being of the Gulf allies. Iran still has the capacity to attack the civilian infrastructure of the Gulf states, which can be lethal for some of those states. While states like the UAE have the capacity to defend themselves from Iranian attacks with about a 90% success rate, still about 10% of Iranian attacks can reach their targets. If Iran decides to retaliate or launch attacks on civilian infrastructure, such as water distillation plants, this can be lethal.

So the high cost of the conflict will push both sides to seek a negotiated settlement. So is there an overlapping negotiation range? Is there a mutual agreement that is acceptable to both sides? The United States under the Trump administration has discussed at least the role of 60% enriched uranium. I should mention that another location with 20% enriched uranium is also a serious concern.

Now, one possibility is that Iran might allow Russia to take that enriched uranium. Then Iran can say that it did not give it to the United States, nor did it destroy it, but rather it gave it to a third party. So a third party, such as Russia, might step in and take some of that enriched uranium.

Iran, of course, will want the lifting of sanctions, as well as several economic benefits, and Iran's integration into the global economy. This is what a potential negotiation might look like.

Another major concern right now is the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has somewhat radically stated that it will impose tolls on those who pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and it says that it will do so in the future. This will be unacceptable to the United States. Free passage through the strait has been a key pillar of the global economy under the US hegemonic system. So these two are the key urgent issues that both sides will be pursuing.

It is not clear whether they will be able to reach an agreement. There appears to be some division within the Iranian leadership. There are major logistical difficulties in negotiation. Getting people within Iran to talk to each other, and then to meet in the same room in Pakistan. All of this is a very big challenge. Despite the extremely high costs of war for both sides, I think they will pursue a negotiated settlement, but we will have to see if there is indeed an overlapping negotiation range.

I think that other issues, such as support for proxy forces like Hezbollah, are secondary. We will have to see how Trump pursues this in the negotiation process. But other than the issue of enriched uranium and direct passage rights, I think they are secondary. They will be key issues in a negotiated settlement.

China's Strategic Position and the Middle East Situation

>> That was an excellent explanation. Let's move on to the question of China. You mentioned the strategic advantage that Russia has gained from this war. Some people say that China has actually gained a strategic advantage because the US position has been considerably weakened, particularly in terms of alliances. So some people say that China can win simply by waiting. What are your thoughts on the losses and gains for China from this war?

Yes, the role of China is a very difficult question. Because it is looking quite far into the future. There are a few things. One is the role of the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, which has a security agreement with China, and other Gulf states like Qatar also have access to countries like Pakistan. This is important because Pakistan has a close alliance with the United States, but it also has an alliance with China.

This could be an opportunity for China to exert influence in the region through Pakistan. With regard to the broader implications for China, one is, of course, energy. China imports a significant amount of oil from Iran and the Gulf region, as does East Asia and other parts of the world. We will have to see how China is affected. And then there is the issue related to the seas. If Iran is able to develop and maintain a toll system, the implications for other regions could be very detrimental not only to the United States but to other regions as well.

China, of course, has had major shipping lanes, such as the South China Sea, be a point of contention between China and its neighbors. If this opens the door for a new institutionalized toll system, it will be interesting to see whether this benefits China in the future or harms it. But that might push them to engage in this kind of activity.

Another potential concern or interest is what the current position of the US and Iran is. It is somewhat unclear whether the US has been strengthened or weakened as a result of this conflict, and we will have to wait until the dust settles to understand the implications. If Iran becomes emboldened as a result of this conflict and feels that it can threaten its neighbors at any time, or at least if the US deterrent is reduced, that could provide an opportunity for China to pursue its interests through Iran, Pakistan, and other allies.

Because US deterrence may simply be reduced, and US military bases may not serve the same purpose as they did in the past. So, I think this is a rather open question. It will depend on how the current conflict is resolved. But I think it will depend a lot on what US deterrence looks like.

In the short term, another key question is the US military supply. There has been a big question related to the military calculus that people have been discussing. How much money and how many weapons does it take to blow up very inexpensive weapons coming from the other side. In the short term, China will probably see that the US is putting a lot of resources into this conflict. What that means in the long term is unclear. Because I do not think that China will do anything radical in the near future.

So the US will have time to rebuild its arsenal. So I do not think that the military supply will be that much of a problem in the long term. Next, I will ask about the countries between the US and Iran, the countries in the Middle East.

Security Dilemmas and Response Strategies of the Gulf States

You mentioned that when the war began, there were retaliations not only against Iran but also against US military bases in Israel, and in Gulf countries like Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. How are the Gulf states navigating their difficult position, hosting US troops while bordering Iran and also bordering other countries like Turkey and Pakistan? How do you see them building their position as this conflict drags on?

>> Yes, that is another good question related to the Gulf states. We have to think a lot about geography here. Geography is really important here. Clearly, the Strait of Hormuz provides a great opportunity for Iran to exert some power. They can do things that they otherwise could not. Conversely, it puts the Gulf states in a somewhat difficult position.

Countries like Kuwait, because they are geographically very close to Iran, cannot help but be seriously concerned about Iran's actions. Also, in the Federal Kurdistan region of northern Iraq, there are several rebel groups that make claims related to Iranian self-determination, and they too have to conduct delicate balancing diplomacy with Iran.

The UAE has taken a much more aggressive stance towards Iran. It should also be noted that the UAE has a territorial dispute with Iran over some islands. So there is some historical rivalry between the two countries.

Iran's attacks were not limited to military bases. They attacked not only US military bases but also civilian and energy infrastructure. Countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are very concerned about issues such as desalination plants. This is a major concern. Now, we will probably... Let's go back for a moment. The biggest question is whether cooperation and coordination among the Gulf states will be strengthened, or whether the response will be fragmented.

The Gulf states are somewhat threatened, but the question is what tactics they will use to deal with that threat. So I expect the response to be fragmented.

Countries like Kuwait and Qatar will use more balancing diplomacy in dealing with Iran. The UAE will be particularly more aggressive, and Saudi Arabia will also try to balance. It should be noted that the UAE has a very different relationship with Saudi Arabia than Saudi Arabia has with Iran. Saudi Arabia has a lot of energy infrastructure in its eastern part, but it also has densely populated areas in the west.

It also has more pipelines for oil exports. So it has a somewhat different relationship geographically compared to the UAE. So I think we will see a somewhat fragmented response. In terms of security, I think some of these countries will continue to maintain their security relationship with the United States, but they will try to diversify to some extent.

This might mean that they will consider Pakistan or China more. It will be a matter of adding to it, rather than completely excluding the United States from the security arrangement. I think geography will be a key factor in how these countries respond, and we will see a mix of countries like the UAE and Bahrain, which will strengthen their relationship with the US and Israel, and countries like Qatar and Kuwait, which will pursue balancing diplomacy.

Long-Term Implications of the Middle East Conflict and Prospects for a New World Order

My last question is about the long-term implications of this war. Maritime passage safety, maritime safety and security are very important for East Asian countries like Korea. Japan imports a lot of oil from the Gulf states. So what will this region look like in five or ten years, when the Iranian economy collapses and suffers a lot of military damage? What do you foresee for US-Iran relations in the future, and are we witnessing the emergence of a new regional world order?

What is the future of this region in the next five to ten years? Again, a great question. I think this will depend to some extent on how the current conflict is resolved. And if other countries, such as the United States, are unable to prevent Iran from collecting tolls on passage through this strait, then I think other countries will seek to pursue this new institutionalized norm. So the big question is, can the United States prevent Iran from collecting tolls in the strait for its own benefit?

This is the main issue. The second main issue is whether the current conflict will lead to a negotiated settlement, or whether acts of military aggression will resume.

This will be the big picture. Because if military aggression resumes, it will be very destructive. A lot of civilian energy infrastructure in both the Gulf states and Iran will be hit. It is difficult to predict which way it will go, but it could be very destructive for both sides. I do not see the United States and Iran moving towards a truly friendly relationship in the future. Even if a negotiated settlement is reached, it will be in the form of something similar to the Obama deal under the Obama administration, and perhaps with some additional restrictions on what Iran can do. But I do not see the relationship being restored anytime soon.

I think there will be continued conflict at a low-intensity level. And I expect Iran to benefit economically significantly. My guess is that they will rebuild in one way or another. This means rebuilding their ballistic missile program and drones. They may also continue to fund their proxy forces throughout the region. So I think it will be somewhat deterred, but similar things will happen in the future. The variable in all of this is whether the Iranian regime can survive.

The Iranian regime has taken several drastic measures to survive. They have attacked not only the United States and regional military bases, but also civilian and infrastructure in the Gulf region. They have also shut down the internet for more than 50 days, almost 60 days. The economic situation is not good. They have killed between 6,000 and 30,000 people in recent protests.

It looks like it will be closer to 30,000. So they will have to find a way to rebuild the economy. As I mentioned earlier, with any negotiated deal, there is a possibility of significant economic boom as they are reintegrated into the global economy. But the variable is whether the regime survives. Of course, these things are difficult to predict. What will happen if there are large-scale protests? Perhaps they will survive. Perhaps the economic boom will help them rebuild and provide jobs for people to overcome this situation.

And then I think we will see a situation similar to what we have seen before. The Iranian regime has maintained a fairly tense relationship with both Israel and the United States since the Islamic Revolution. Although there have been varying degrees of coordination and cooperation at times. I expect Iran to slowly begin to rebuild what it has done before.

That is, they will build up their proxy forces, strengthen their conventional weapons program, and strengthen their drone weapons program. Even without a nuclear program, as evidenced by the recent conflict, they will still have plenty of capacity to threaten and inflict damage on their neighbors, and they will threaten key economic zones of the global economy. The last thing I will mention about the next five to ten years is that the nature of warfare is changing.

If you look at Iran's use of drones in the Gulf states and the Strait of Hormuz, they are essentially dumb drones. But in Ukraine, we are seeing smart drones. Drones with enhanced autonomous capabilities. As warfare changes over the next five to ten years, and Iran develops more and more autonomous drones, and the world develops autonomous drones, what will warfare look like? At the same time, the Gulf states and the United States will look at this conflict and think, 'Wow, drones were a key tool in Iran's arsenal. Autonomous drone activity will be a key feature going forward. What technologies will we develop to counter this?'

So I think the way warfare is being conducted, which we are seeing now, will evolve further over the next five to ten years. And both sides will develop the tools they have, and then it will affect how they see their relative capabilities in future conflict situations.

US National Interests and Historical Assessment of the Iran War

But to summarize, if a negotiated settlement is reached, we will see somewhat similar dynamics, and we will see whether changes in warfare technology will affect the success of the current belligerents or participants. One additional question is, from the US perspective, do you think President Trump has achieved anything with regard to Iran compared to the pre-war situation? If so, how do you think future historians will assess the Iran war from the US perspective?

But to summarize, if a negotiated settlement is reached, similar dynamics appear to be in play, and we will have to see whether changes in warfare technology will affect the success of the current belligerents or participants. One additional question is, from the US perspective, do you think President Trump has achieved anything with regard to Iran compared to the pre-war situation, and how do you think future historians will assess the Iran war from the US perspective?

national interests? Any final words about that? Well, US national interests and domestic interests are very difficult questions. Previous administrations, the Biden administration, the Obama administration, the Bush administration, have all described the Iranian regime as a major threat to US interests. Presidential candidates like Hillary Clinton have also explained that a nuclear-armed Iran is something that the United States cannot tolerate.

So this appears to be a core and consistent feature of US presidents and presidential candidates. A nuclear-armed Iran is a major threat. But as we see the current war, dealing with the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran comes at a very high cost.

This poses a tremendous challenge. How history books will talk about Trump's war with Iran will depend to some extent on the course of the war and the future actions of the Democratic Party. Even if a negotiated settlement is reached between Iran and the United States, and, for example, Iran hands over some of its enriched uranium to Russia, this does not mean that Iran cannot restart its program. Of course, if they give up both highly enriched uranium, both 60% and 20%, it may take longer.

But the technology is already there. Iran has the resources to have the potential to restart its program. It has a highly developed scientific community, and there are many excellent physicists in Iran. Iran has the capacity to do this, and this may require future US presidents to have the capacity and the will to restart the war in the coming years.

So if Iran can reach some kind of agreement, enjoy the economic boom that comes from the agreement, restore its conventional weapons stockpile, rebuild its proxy forces with the economic boom, and keep its nuclear weapons in its pocket, then I think history will view this negatively. Iran has done all of this without nuclear weapons. Even with conventional weapons, it can impose a huge cost on the global economy.

So if the situation repeats itself in the future, as it has in the past, it will simply be a matter of buying time. And if the problem is not fully resolved, then the question will be whether this will repeat itself in the future. This is how I think history books will record this. We will look back at this. So my thought is probably not. I would have to say it depends on the trajectory. But if

Iran can maintain its regime, enjoy an economic boom, and redevelop its major programs, then I think this will be a problem in the future. All right. Thank you.

Okay. Thank you.