[Global NK Commentary] From Unification to Occupation: North Korea's Doctrine of Hostile Adversaries

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At the 8th term, 9th plenary meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea held on December 8, 2023, North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un declared, "The North-South relations are no longer those of compatriots or of the same nation, but have been completely fixed as relations between two hostile states, two belligerent nations at war."[1]Subsequently, in his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024, he asserted, "The primary military strategic task should be to completely occupy, pacify, and reclaim the Republic of Korea in case of emergency and incorporate it into the territory of the Republic."[2]In his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in March 2026, he warned, "We will recognize South Korea as the most hostile country and deal with it by thoroughly rejecting and disregarding it with the most explicit language and actions. We will mercilessly make South Korea pay the price for any actions that provoke our Republic, without the slightest consideration or hesitation."[3]

This article frames these series of remarks within the context of the 'hostile adversary nation doctrine',[4]and aims to analyze its implications along two axes: first, the abandonment of the discourse on peaceful and federal unification and the full implementation of a policy of armed occupation of South Korea; and second, the justification of nuclear attacks against South Korea and the hostile restructuring of inter-Korean relations. Through this, the article seeks to derive policy implications on how North Korea's doctrine of hostile adversary nations is altering the military crisis structure on the Korean Peninsula, and how South Korea should design its mid- to long-term strategy toward North Korea by combining deterrence, management, and risk reduction.

Abandonment of the Peaceful Unification Discourse and Full Implementation of the Armed Occupation Policy

North Korea's doctrine of hostile adversary nations signifies the abandonment of the existing discourse on peaceful and federal unification and the full implementation of a logic of armed occupation and territorial incorporation of the Republic of Korea. In the past, while defining inter-Korean relations as a special relationship of military confrontation, North Korea maintained, at least formally, unification discourses such as 'fatherland unification,' 'national great unity,' and 'federal unification.' However, in the latter half of the Kim Jong-un era, North Korea has ceased to view inter-Korean relations as an intra-national relationship oriented towards unification, and has begun to define the Republic of Korea as an object that can be militarily occupied, pacified, and incorporated.

This change is particularly evident in the expressions used by Kim Jong-un in his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024, mentioned earlier. In this speech, Kim Jong-un referred to the issue of "completely occupying, pacifying, and reclaiming the Republic of Korea in case of emergency and incorporating it into the territory of the Republic."[5]This was the first time the supreme leader of North Korea used the terms 'occupation,' 'pacification,' 'reclamation,' and 'incorporation' simultaneously. This is interpreted as signifying not merely military victory or regime change, but an intention to eliminate the state of the Republic of Korea itself and absorb it under the North Korean system.

In the past, North Korea's concept of unification by force was fundamentally understood within the framework of the 'Great Fatherland Liberation War.' North Korea maintained a scenario of liberating the South through war, then forming a pan-national assembly with representatives from the North, South, and overseas, and thereby establishing a federal unified state. Therefore, the existing theory of unification by force was not entirely separate from the discourse of nation and unification, but rather functioned as a means to achieve federal unification.[6]In this process, North Korea even considered the possibility of progressive forces or unification movement forces within South Korea participating in the formation of a new regional government after the war.

However, the policy recently presented by Kim Jong-un fundamentally differs from the past concept of the 'Great Fatherland Liberation War.' North Korea no longer presupposes federal unification or the construction of a pan-national unified state. Instead, it posits a method of defining the Republic of Korea as a separate belligerent nation, militarily occupying it, and incorporating it into the territory of the Republic. This signifies a shift from the existing perception of approaching the issue of unification between North and South as an intra-national problem to one of war between states and territorial annexation. In other words, North Korea is redefining unification not as 'national reunification' but as a matter of military victory over an adversary nation and territorial consolidation.

Justification of Nuclear Attacks Against South Korea and Hostile Restructuring of Inter-Korean Relations

The North Korean doctrine of hostile adversary nations holds significant implications in that it is restructuring inter-Korean relations in a way that institutionally and ideologically justifies the possibility of nuclear use against South Korea. In the past, while explaining the purpose of nuclear weapons as deterrence against U.S. nuclear threats and for self-defense, North Korea maintained a stance of not explicitly mentioning the possibility of nuclear use against South Korea. This was because, even though the North and South were militarily confronting each other, they fundamentally maintained the minimal national framework of being 'compatriots.' However, since the Kim Jong-un era, by redefining inter-Korean relations as a hostile state-to-state relationship, North Korea has begun to define South Korea as an independent adversary nation that could become a target of nuclear attack.

This change began to manifest in earnest from 2022. Notably, Kim Yo-jong, in a statement on April 5, 2022, publicly declared that the mission of North Korea's nuclear forces is not limited to simple deterrence but serves as a practical means to eliminate South Korean military forces early in case of emergency. She argued, "The mission is to eliminate the adversary's military forces at once," and "Nuclear combat forces will be mobilized to seize the initiative in the early stage of war, burn out the adversary's will to fight, prevent a protracted war, and preserve our military forces."[7]This signifies that North Korea is developing tactical nuclear concepts for actual use on the Korean Peninsula, not limiting its nuclear weapons to strategic weapons for deterring the U.S. mainland.

Subsequently, in his speech at the military parade commemorating the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army on April 30, 2022, Kim Jong-un formalized the possibility of preemptive nuclear use by stating, "We will preemptively and thoroughly suppress and crush all dangerous attempts and threatening actions, including the nuclear threats continuously and increasingly posed by hostile forces, if necessary."[8]The 'hostile forces' mentioned here were interpreted to include not only the United States but also South Korea, which is integrated into the ROK-U.S. combined forces. This implies that North Korea is effectively redefining inter-Korean relations as a belligerent state relationship where nuclear deterrence and the possibility of nuclear war coexist.

North Korea subsequently began to accelerate the establishment of actual operational systems for tactical nuclear weapons. At the 3rd enlarged meeting of the 8th Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea in June 2022, the issue of "adding operational missions for frontline units and revising operational plans" was discussed, which is assessed as signifying the forward deployment of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and the realization of the so-called 'Seoul nuclear inferno' strategy.[9]North Korea has since designated super-large multiple rocket launchers and short-range ballistic missiles as 'tactical nuclear delivery vehicles,' thereby fully implementing a nuclear attack system capable of directly striking South Korea.

In particular, the law "On the Policy of the Nuclear Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," enacted in September 2022, is assessed as a measure that effectively institutionalizes the possibility of nuclear use against South Korea. In this law, North Korea stipulated five conditions for nuclear use, explicitly stating that nuclear weapons can be used even against non-nuclear states if they conspire with nuclear-armed states to engage in aggression or attack against North Korea.[10]This logic effectively includes South Korea, which receives extended deterrence from the United States, as a target for nuclear strike. In other words, North Korea is constructing a logic that defines South Korea as an adversary force identical to the United States based on the ROK-U.S. alliance and extended deterrence system, and justifies its own nuclear use as the 'exercise of the right to self-defense.'

This trend has been further strengthened since 2023. Kim Jong-un publicly displayed maps showing key South Korean military facilities and command centers during military command training and operational meetings in 2023, and in August, conducted a 'full-army command exercise' simulating the occupation of the southern half of the peninsula.[11]Subsequently, in late 2023 and early 2024, he officially designated inter-Korean relations as 'relations between two hostile states,' thereby formalizing South Korea as a belligerent target nation, no longer a compatriot. This change has the effect of removing the psychological and ideological barriers to nuclear use. By defining the North and South not as the same nation but as mutually hostile states, North Korea seeks to justify the possibility of nuclear attack against South Korea not as an 'attack on compatriots' but as an 'act of war between sovereign states.'

The recent amendment of North Korea's constitution is also connected to this direction. The North Korean constitution, publicly released in 2026, deleted the concepts of unification and nation, emphasizing instead 'territorial integrity' and the nuclear force command system. In particular, the constitutional enshrinement of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission's nuclear force command authority and the possibility of delegation is assessed as a measure that further strengthens the automaticity and practical usability of nuclear use in case of emergency.[12]This can be understood not merely as a declaration of nuclear possession but as a process of institutionalizing nuclear weapons as actual instruments of warfare.

Ultimately, North Korea's doctrine of hostile adversary nations is not simply a declaration of abandoning unification but is closely linked to the process of restructuring inter-Korean relations into a hostile state-to-state relationship of nuclear versus nuclear. By defining South Korea as an independent adversary nation, North Korea seeks to remove the political and ideological burden of nuclear use against the South, thereby aiming to secure strategic superiority based on nuclear capabilities on the Korean Peninsula. Simultaneously, by defining U.S. extended deterrence and ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation as 'nuclear threats' against them, North Korea continues its attempts to justify nuclear armament and a preemptive nuclear use doctrine under the guise of 'the right to self-defense of a sovereign nation.' These changes carry the risk of transforming future inter-Korean relations from mere military confrontation into a state where nuclear crisis is normalized.

In conclusion, North Korea's doctrine of hostile adversary nations compels South Korea to move beyond the existing framework of 'special relations within the nation' and peaceful coexistence, demanding the parallel implementation of deterrence, management, and crisis response strategies. First, South Korea must refine a multi-layered deterrence system that presupposes North Korea's nuclear and missile threats against the South and its discourse of armed occupation as constants. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen integrated deterrence posture against North Korea's nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and conventional forces, based on extended deterrence and ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, while simultaneously establishing a crisis management and rules of engagement system that can prevent miscalculation and accidental conflict during crises.

Second, a strategic shift in perception is required to redefine inter-Korean relations as an object of long-term management, rather than a simple dichotomy of 'unification versus confrontation.' Rather than solidifying a regime of mutual exclusion by accepting North Korea's hostile discourse as is, inter-Korean relations should be reconstructed in a direction that maintains risk reduction measures such as stabilizing the armistice regime, preventing accidental conflicts, and facilitating humanitarian exchanges, along with minimal functional cooperation channels.

Third, domestically, it is crucial to consistently foster bipartisan consensus and social consensus on North Korea policy, avoiding entanglement in the inter-Korean conflict and deepening unification fatigue that North Korea's doctrine of hostile adversary nations intends to provoke. Setting the prevention of armed conflict and nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula as the supreme national interest, while strengthening deterrence and defense, and designing a mid- to long-term strategy toward North Korea that combines deterrence, management, dialogue, and risk reduction within that framework, can be considered the core task facing South Korea going forward. ■

[1]"Report on the Work of the 8th Term, 9th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea," Rodong Sinmun, December 31, 2023.

[2]KCNA, January 16, 2024.

[3]"Respected Comrade Kim Jong-un Delivered a Policy Speech at the First Session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," KCNA, March 24, 2026.

[4]Domestically, the doctrine proclaimed by North Korea is widely referred to as the 'two hostile states doctrine.' However, depending on the context, emphasis may be placed on 'hostile' or 'two states.' Therefore, despite the potential for redundancy, 'hostile adversary nations' is used in this text to maximally capture North Korea's intent. This is because the term 'adversary' already implies hostility, yet each word sufficiently expresses North Korea's intentions. Furthermore, Kim Jong-un himself has referred to relations with South Korea as 'relations between two belligerent nations.'

[5]Rodong Sinmun, January 16, 2024.

[6]Kim Il-sung, "On the Founding Plan for the Confederal Republic of Koryo," Report to the 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, October 1980; Kim Jong-il, "Ten Great Programs for National Reunification," (Pyongyang: Workers' Party of Korea Publishing House, 1993).

[7]KCNA, April 5, 2022.

[8]KCNA, April 30, 2022.

[9]KCNA, June 22, 2022.

[10]KCNA, September 9, 2022.

[11]KCNA, August 31, 2023.

[12]Yonhap News, “North Korea's Constitution Removes 'Unification' and Codifies Nuclear Command Authority… Reflecting 'Two-State Theory', May 6, 2026.

■ Park Won-gon_Director of EAI North Korea Research Center; Professor at Ewha Womans University.

■ Edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow; Oh In-hwan_EAI Senior Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr