[Future Leaders of North Korea] IV. North Korea's Power Succession Viewed from a Comparative Authoritarianism Perspective | Song Won-jun, Professor at Hanyang University

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moYTCzfYrSU&si=hyxy7Cy5Av4YKFt2

Video Script

The Importance and Types of Power Succession in Authoritarian Regimes

It is true that the possibility of Kim Ju-ae succeeding to power has become a matter of significant interest, given various reports and statements. I do not solely study North Korea; rather, I aim to generalize across various authoritarian regimes to identify patterns and use that theoretical framework to evaluate North Korea, other political systems, and the potential for Kim Ju-ae's succession. My presentation plan is as follows. First, I will explain why the issue of power succession is important in authoritarian regimes,

and then I will describe the types of methods dictators have used to resolve and ensure a smooth transition of power in response to such threats. Following that, I will discuss the advantages and disadvantages for dictators of pre-designating a successor, and then I will address the theory of Kim Ju-ae as a successor. The most significant characteristic and advantage of democracy, in contrast to authoritarian regimes, is the regularity and predictability of power succession. In democracies, the supreme leader is elected through regular, competitive elections, and the start and end of their terms are predictable. In authoritarian regimes, power elites, like dictators, experience significant anxiety regarding succession. The primary concern is uncertainty. Dictators operate under the illusion of perpetual rule, so discussions about when they will step down or when their term will end are considered highly threatening and disloyal.

Consequently, power elites or dictators find it difficult to predict their own fate, unsure of whom to align with, who will be the successor, or when that succession will occur. Another characteristic that contrasts with democracy is the very high cost for the loser. If one aligns with the wrong faction or bets on the wrong successor, or even if one gains favor through loyalty competition with a pre-designated successor, there is no certainty about what will happen after that successor assumes power.

In democracies, a wrong political choice might simply lead to retirement from politics, but in dictatorships, one's physical safety and even life can be threatened. Therefore, mutual fear and tension constantly exist, increasing the incentive for preemptive military action. Data shows that approximately 47% of power transitions in dictatorships lead to the collapse of the entire regime. To control this and ensure a smooth transition, many attempts have been made, a prominent example being the one-party dictatorship model, which contrasts with North Korea. This model is characterized by a structured process within the ruling party forming the primary basis of power and achieving a high level of institutionalization. The party's institutions, rules, norms, and established procedures determine the tenure of the supreme dictator and the method for selecting the next leader, which reduces uncertainty among power elites and effectively manages internal conflicts.

From the dictator's perspective, this also reduces uncertainty by guaranteeing their safety after stepping down. Specifically, term limits or norms of power rotation among factions ensure that no single faction faces permanent defeat, and they can contend again after the dictator's term ends. This reduces the incentive for preemptive use of force, as individuals do not risk losing everything. China since Deng Xiaoping is a prime example, having achieved stable power transitions through term limits, retirement ages, clear promotion paths, and pre-coordinated selection of successors. Xi Jinping has significantly dismantled this system, and comparative authoritarian literature predicts an increase in uncertainty and instability after Xi Jinping loses power or dies.

This is also related to the one-party dictatorship model within competitive authoritarianism, where a highly skewed multi-party system with limited opposition participation is regularly held to secure domestic and international legitimacy. Although elections occur, the ruling party consistently wins by mobilizing state resources. Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) regime exhibited similar characteristics to China after Deng Xiaoping. It was intentionally designed with a six-year single presidential term, allowing different factions to take turns in power.

Factors for Stability in Hereditary Succession and Monarchical Cases

This allowed for the stable management of power succession by mediating factional interests. Hereditary succession is highly stable when feasible. Studies on European monarchies show that direct patrilineal primogeniture significantly increases the survival probability of the regime and the state, while reducing the likelihood of coup attempts by elites or potential successors. There are three main reasons for this stability. First, it narrows the pool of potential successors based on genetic principles, reducing uncertainty.

Second, once the successor is determined, power elites can adjust their behavior accordingly. Third, due to the blood ties and shared interests within the royal family, it is easier to unite collectively against challenges from non-royal factions. Primogeniture, in particular, has the psychological effect of extending the 'time horizon.' Children are younger than their parents, providing sufficient incentive to wait for the father's natural death. In contrast, adult male siblings may feel time is running out, increasing the desire to seize power quickly through a preemptive coup. However, the significant age difference between parents and children, along with biological hierarchy and kinship ties, allows monarchs to confidently implement hereditary succession.

The Pros and Cons of Pre-designating a Successor and the 'Crown Prince Problem'

In the GWF typology of authoritarian regimes, monarchies, though few in number, tend to be relatively stable. Pre-designating a successor has both advantages and disadvantages. A decision can be made whether to pre-designate and systematically train a successor during the ruler's lifetime or to postpone designation as much as possible due to concerns about the dictator's personal power erosion. The statistical advantage of pre-designation is the possibility of a peaceful power transition, which is further enhanced by official designation. It also strengthens the power base of the incumbent dictator. Since the successor's fate is tied to maintaining the designated system, any coup or rebellion against the incumbent dictator would mean facing the successor's resources and allied forces. Consequently, the expected success rate and probability of a coup decrease. It also provides a degree of clarity, reducing uncertainty for power elites. A disadvantage is that if someone other than the expected successor is chosen, it can lead to backlash from existing core support groups. If the successor is perceived as weak, there is a possibility of regrouping around alternative figures. The most significant problem is what comparative politics calls the 'crown prince problem.' Once a successor is officially designated, the dictator cannot live forever, and a subtle shift in power begins. Existing power elites may seek access to the successor, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.

That is, if the incumbent dictator senses a potential for power erosion or early lame-duck status, the successor might initiate a preemptive coup out of impatience, or the incumbent dictator might feel threatened and attempt to replace the successor. Alternatively, both might mistakenly believe this is not happening and attack each other. This increases instability. A notable example is Qatar in 1995, where the crown prince staged a coup during the king's overseas visit and assumed power. However, if a successor is not pre-designated, the probability of civil war and coups increases.

North Korea's Personalist Regime and the Possibility of Hereditary Succession

I will now present theoretical grounds that could support the theory of Kim Ju-ae as a successor. There is a sufficient demand for pre-selecting and nurturing a successor. In comparative authoritarian literature, North Korea is classified as a strong personalist regime. In such regimes, the constitution, party positions, rules, norms, and institutions are nominal, and all state power is absolutely concentrated in the hands of one individual dictator. Consequently, there is no systematic training of successors or institutional framework for selecting the next leader. In a situation where power is concentrated in the hands of an individual dictator, if that dictator loses power or dies, the probability of factional struggles, coups, or civil wars is highest. In other words, as it is a regime that experiences the greatest political instability during succession, the need or demand for designating a successor is considerable.

These points could be largely resolved if a hereditary succession were attempted and actually succeeded in a one-man rule system like North Korea. There are two success factors for hereditary succession in non-royal authoritarian regimes. First, the ruler (dictator) must be superior to the ruling party, meaning Kim Jong-un must be superior to the Workers' Party. Second, there must be no established precedent for the selection of leaders within the party. Since there is no precedent for selecting a successor within the North Korean Workers' Party, and it has succeeded twice, North Korea appears to have a relatively higher probability of successful fourth-generation succession compared to other non-royal authoritarian states. Kim Jong-un, while in power for three years as a successor and purging Jang Song-thaek, may believe that more time should be given to the next successor, such as Kim Ju-ae.

Critical Grounds and Statistical Limitations of the Kim Ju-ae Succession Theory

Therefore, by clarifying the succession structure early, it can create expectations among the ruling elites that power succession based on the Paektu bloodline will continue in the long term. It can also resolve the 'crown prince problem,' which was the biggest issue with pre-designating successors. Unlike older male elites who could challenge Kim Jong-un, or Kim Yo-jong, who is similar in age and statecraft experience, Kim Jong-un has an advantage in designating and nurturing a successor without worrying about power leakage, as Kim Ju-ae is his daughter, significantly younger, and female. Critical grounds include the low probability of success for hereditary succession in non-royal authoritarian regimes, and Kim Ju-ae's young age and gender. Analysis of 258 dictators who ruled for at least three years showed that 76% lost power or died naturally without the opportunity to freely designate and nurture a successor. Regardless of heredity,

only 62 cases involved pre-prepared successions, and of the 23 non-royal dictators who attempted hereditary succession, only nine succeeded. All of them were sons, and five of them died in their 60s, while the other four died in their 80s. The youngest ruler was Duvalier of Haiti at 19, while the rest were all over 30. The average age of commencement of rule for all 258 dictators who ruled for over three years was 49.

Statistically, hereditary succession can be considered an exceptional outcome that occurred among elderly dictators who survived for a long time and were able to directly manage the regime's transition. Considering the stability-oriented nature of North Korean elites, who prioritize maintaining the status quo and survival, the attempt itself may receive a certain level of support. However, both Kim Jong-un and Kim Ju-ae are currently too young. Even based on Duvalier's case, it would take about 6-7 more years, around their 30s, or if we consider the relatively safer age of 30, approximately 15-17 more years. This suggests that if Kim Jong-un can rule stably and provide a protective shield for Kim Ju-ae to mature sufficiently, the possibility of success is high; however, if not, various risks can be foreseen.

In conclusion, it is not an unrealistic scenario, considering the cases of other authoritarian countries. However, it is difficult to consider it a complete succession, and as other colleagues have mentioned, the variable of time is likely the most crucial factor. Thank you.

I believe the variable of time is the most important factor. Thank you.