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[North Korea's Future Leader] III. The Disconnect Between Visual Authority and Institutional Succession: Re-examining the Kim Ju-ae Succession Theory | Oh Kyung-seob, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification

Category
Multimedia
Published
May 7, 2026
Related Projects
Understanding North Korea Properly (Global NK Zoom & Connect)

Editor's Note

Senior Research Fellow Oh Kyung-seob of the Korea Institute for National Unification re-examines the theory of Kim Ju-ae as the fourth-generation successor, which has recently spread through the media and intelligence agencies, from the perspective of the disconnect between visual authority and institutional succession. The author points out that while Kim Ju-ae has acquired symbolic visual authority through her participation in official events, she has not yet undergone the institutional succession process of official election by the Workers' Party. Therefore, considering the various political implications and variables contained in Kim Ju-ae's public appearances, the author emphasizes that her status as a successor must ultimately be determined through institutional procedures, such as the granting of official titles by the party and military in the future.

[0427] NorthKoreaFuture_OhKyungSeob.jpg
[0427] NorthKoreaFuture_OhKyungSeob.jpg

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzupLVH6Lyk&si=3-uNrA9o_Pjiwa85

Video Script

Current Status of the Kim Ju-ae Successor Debate and the Discrepancy with Institutional Succession

Hello. This is Oh Kyung-seop from the Institute for North Korean Studies. Today's topic is the succession debate surrounding Kim Ju-ae. As the previous two speakers mentioned, many people speculate that Kim Ju-ae is the successor. It can be seen that she has already secured authority through visual exposure as a successor. However, since she has not yet been elected as the successor within the Workers' Party of Korea and has not been publicly announced, it should be considered that institutional succession has not occurred. Due to this discrepancy, and as the previous two speakers mentioned that time would be a significant variable, we need to wait and see for a longer period whether Kim Ju-ae will indeed become the successor and whether she will inherit Kim Jong-un's power as she is currently presented to us. The theory of Kim Ju-ae as the successor seems to be widely accepted as a fait accompli.

Not only domestic media but also outlets like The New York Times and Nikkei Shimbun have conducted a comprehensive analysis of videos showing Kim Jong-un and Kim Ju-ae together, concluding that the analysis accurately indicates Kim Ju-ae as the successor. The Director of the National Intelligence Service also stated that the judgment was based on credible intelligence, but did not elaborate on the specific intelligence details. To my knowledge, given the near collapse of HUMINT, it is not yet clear whether the judgment was based on truly reliable information or if it was concluded based on the high probability of succession, as analyzed by The New York Times and Nikkei Shimbun.

Institutionalization and Stability of North Korean Power Succession

Even after the media reported that the NIS acknowledged Kim Ju-ae as the successor, there has not been much follow-up reporting. Therefore, I believe there is a lack of additional explanation. We have confirmed that North Korea has historically maintained regular power succession through succession debates. Because other socialist countries experienced significant political turmoil due to power struggles over succession, North Korea has, through Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un, effectively institutionalized power succession, stabilizing it through hereditary succession. Therefore, the possibility of power struggles surrounding succession is judged to be significantly reduced. Even if Kim Jong-un were to die immediately, the transition of power to his children is relatively unlikely to cause major turmoil.

A characteristic of North Korea's power succession is that it has been institutionalized through three generations of succession. The leader decides the successor, and the party elects the successor, but the party has no decision-making power and goes through the process of supporting the successor according to the leader's directives. In other words, the party has no decision-making authority.

When a successor dies, power is transferred to the next successor. Once power is transferred, various processes are undertaken to perpetuate one's own power. Kim Jong-un had a relatively long succession period, resulting in fewer power struggles. However, Kim Jong-un's succession period was very short, necessitating large-scale purges and power struggles. It is expected that Kim Ju-ae's case will follow a similar process to the fourth hereditary succession. If the succession period is long-term, it will proceed stably, but if a sudden succession occurs in a short period, it may unfold with large-scale purges and power struggles, similar to Kim Jong-un's case.

The reason for considering North Korea's power succession as institutionalized is that hereditary succession has succeeded more than twice, and elites and residents have already formed expectations. Elites and North Korean residents, seeing Kim Ju-ae's exposure, understand that it is moving towards a fourth hereditary succession. Among the elites, the actions of potential competitors are already significantly constrained by the fait accompli of hereditary succession.

The elites have a narrow range of choices for successors, and conditions are not favorable for potential candidates outside the Paektu bloodline to compete. Therefore, large-scale power struggles, as experienced in the former Soviet Union or China, are unlikely to occur. Power struggles or large-scale purges on the scale of Kim Jong-un's succession process may occur depending on the circumstances. The second and third hereditary successions have already been well explained, so we will move on. Kim Ju-ae's possibility of becoming a successor should be considered significantly higher due to the NIS announcement. However, personally, I believe there was insufficient decisive evidence in the NIS's recent announcement. Therefore, it is necessary to observe the situation more cautiously.

Especially since Kim Ju-ae has not yet entered the institutional succession process as a successor, it is more important to wait and see how the successor will be decided rather than definitively concluding she is the successor, as she is in the preceding stage. The decision of the successor will be announced by North Korea when the time comes, so there will be no major issue in confirming the successor then. However, it is more important to focus attention on whether power struggles will occur during the fourth hereditary succession or whether North Korea's current Paektu bloodline ruling power will become unstable.

Political implications and effects of Kim Ju-ae's early exposure

With the second and third hereditary successions, the momentum for power struggles has been decreasing with each generation. The pool of potential competitors has narrowed considerably, making it unlikely for power struggles over succession to occur internally, unless North Korea's ruling power becomes severely weakened. If so, why is North Korea exposing the young Kim Ju-ae early on with Kim Jong-un? What does North Korea aim to gain from this? There are two points I can make. First, if Kim Ju-ae is the successor, as many analyze, she is still young and female. North Korea is highly patriarchal, and hereditary succession has often been through males.

Although there are exceptional cases where succession occurs through a female if there is no male heir or no one in the line of succession, in North Korea's case, to resolve these issues, it would be necessary to prolong the succession period, as Kim Jong-un and Kim Jong-il did, to concentrate power on Kim Ju-ae. Therefore, it can be interpreted that North Korea is carrying out a long-term power succession to Kim Ju-ae. However, if Kim Ju-ae is not the successor, this has various political effects.

The fourth hereditary succession of the Paektu bloodline has been formalized. Whoever becomes the successor will inherit Kim Jong-un's power by absorbing the symbolic authority that Kim Ju-ae holds. Second, the theory of Kim Yo-jong as the successor had been spreading, but with the emergence of Kim Ju-ae's succession issue, the Kim Yo-jong issue has completely disappeared. The perception of Kim Yo-jong as the second-in-command was instantly overshadowed. Interest in Ri Sol-ju has also decreased, and interest in Kim Jong-un's children is limited to whether he has a son. Excessive interest in the royal family has diminished.

Stability of power succession is more important than the succession debate

It can be seen as having had a definite political effect. Kim Ju-ae is currently securing symbolic and visual authority as a successor without being elected or holding an official position. If you ask the general public in South Korea, they will answer that Kim Ju-ae is likely the successor. In that sense, North Korea is already achieving significant political effects. However, unless there are variables such as Kim Jong-un's health issues or the need for rapid power succession, even if Kim Ju-ae is the successor, the power succession is likely to occur at least 10 years from now.

In the Kim Ju-ae succession debate, while it is important to be interested in who is or is not the successor, what is more important is whether North Korea's power can achieve stable power succession in the process. It is more important to be interested in under what conditions it might become unstable and under what conditions it can become stable. Yeah.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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