[Global NK Commentary] Inter-Korean Dialogue Channels Replaced by Media

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Severed Dialogue

Currently, there is no dialogue between North and South Korea. Following the collapse of the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit in 2019, North Korea's bombing of the liaison office in June 2020 signified not just the severance of physical communication channels but also the collapse of symbolic communication channels. Subsequently, with Chairman Kim Jong Un's designation of inter-Korean relations as 'relations between two hostile states' in December 2023, expectations for restoring liaison channels or resuming dialogue have receded further. To this day, North and South Korea remain in a state of severance, unable to engage in direct dialogue without official liaison channels.

However, there was also a period when North and South Korea communicated constantly through direct telephone lines. At the first preliminary meeting held in anticipation of the 1st Inter-Korean Red Cross Main Meeting on September 20, 1971, an agreement was reached to establish a permanent liaison office within Panmunjom and connect it via a direct telephone line, thus resuming inter-Korean dialogue after approximately 26 years of silence since 1945.[1] Subsequently, the establishment and operation of direct telephone lines were institutionalized through agreements such as the 'Agreement on the Installation and Operation Procedures for Direct Telephone Lines between Seoul and Pyongyang' promulgated with the announcement of the July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué in 1972, and the 'Agreement on the Operation Procedures for Direct Telephone Lines between the Central Bodies of the South-North Red Cross' agreed upon at the 25th Inter-Korean Red Cross Preliminary Meeting on August 11, 1972.[2]

Direct telephone lines between North and South Korea were connected via Panmunjom or through separate circuits, serving as a foundation for promoting exchange and cooperation. Indeed, for a certain period, dialogue and exchange between North and South Korea proceeded relatively smoothly, and various communication systems were operated, including hotlines between leaders, the joint liaison office, military communication lines, and channels between intelligence agencies. However, these liaison channels did not become a stable communication structure, repeatedly being suspended and resumed due to North Korea's unilateral actions, depending on the changes in inter-Korean relations.

The severance of liaison channels is also rooted in the 'two hostile states' as defined by Chairman Kim Jong Un. Since redefining inter-Korean relations as a hostile relationship rather than one between compatriots in December 2023, North Korea has shifted towards effectively dismantling existing liaison channels. Consequently, communication lines for the South-North Joint Liaison Office and military communication lines in the eastern and western sectors have ceased to respond since April 2023, and hotlines between leaders and channels between intelligence agencies have also lost their functionality. Although direct communication, known as the 'red phone,' was maintained through the JDO (Joint Duty Officer) responsible for liaison between the UN Command and North Korea, even this failed to function in matters such as the repatriation of fishermen, and silence persists.[3]

Although direct inter-Korean channels are currently severed, responses to mutual statements and actions continue. What has replaced the official liaison channels is the media. By confirming and responding to each other's announcements and actions through news reports and statements, inter-Korean relations are operating as a real-time response structure mediated by the media.

Inter-Korean Dialogue Channels Replaced by Media

North and South Korea read and respond to each other's 'actions and statements' through the media. When there are actions and announcements from the North Korean authorities, such as our military's exercises or the government's official stance, or statements by ministers, they are typically announced in the form of statements and communiqués through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and selectively published in the Rodong Sinmun. These responses are mostly related to ROK-U.S. joint exercises, strategic asset deployments, denuclearization remarks, and the positions of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Unification, all of which are elements verifiable through the media.

The problem lies in the fact that these responses rely on subjective interpretations of public messages without confirming the exact stance through direct communication. Actions and statements conveyed through the media serve as signals for the other party to read and interpret. This media-based interaction operates within the asymmetry of the inter-Korean media structure. In North Korea, the regime's stance is strictly controlled and selectively conveyed, primarily through the party organ 'Rodong Sinmun,' and the Korean Central Television also functions as virtually the sole official broadcasting channel. In contrast, South Korea has a media environment where various media outlets and channels coexist based on freedom of the press, with differing interpretations and stances on the same issue existing concurrently.

Examining the content of statements and communiqués issued by North Korean authorities under the names of specific individuals or organizations reveals a tendency to react sensitively to specific inter-Korean events as well as statements by our government ministers. When positions from the Ministry of National Defense or the Ministry of Unification are announced, a communiqué directly targeting them follows. This pattern demonstrates that statements themselves are becoming a substitute for dialogue in the absence of direct inter-Korean communication. Although North and South Korea do not meet, they maintain a de facto interaction by reading and immediately responding to each other's announcements and statements.

Notably, communiqués issued under the name of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, primarily cover inter-Korean affairs, U.S. affairs, and the ROK-U.S. alliance. Our side's response to these also occurs through spokesperson briefings or official statements from the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Unification. In the absence of direct dialogue between North and South Korea, a structure has formed where each side confirms the other's actions through announcements and responds accordingly. The difference is that while the North Korean authorities use emotional and direct language in communiqués under personal names, South Korea responds with refined language centered on its spokespersons.

On January 10, 2026, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on a statement issued by the spokesperson of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army on January 9. The expression used in this statement, 'must pierce even a needle's point,' can be seen as a quote from remarks made by President Lee Jae-myung regarding inter-Korean relations. This demonstrates that public statements from the South Korean government are being reflected in North Korea's official communiqués. Even in the absence of direct communication channels, a method of understanding content through the other party's statements and reflecting it in responses is emerging.

In this context, on January 10, 2026, Minister of Unification Jeong Jong-wook stated at a mass for national reconciliation and unity held at Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul, regarding the drone issue, "We express deep regret to the North for the reckless drone infiltration that occurred recently." In response, Kim Yo Jong, in a statement on the 12th, commented, "I am pleased that Jeong Jong-wook, the Minister of Unification of South Korea, officially expressed regret on the 10th regarding the anti-Republic drone intrusion incident that occurred at the beginning of the new year. I evaluate this as a relatively common-sense action," directly referencing and evaluating the statement.

Furthermore, on April 6, 2026, President Lee Jae-myung stated at a State Council meeting presided over at the Blue House regarding the 'North Korean drone infiltration incident,' "Although it was not the intention of our government, we express regret to the North for the unnecessary military tension caused by some irresponsible and reckless actions." In response, Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, in a statement released through KCNA that evening, stated, "We evaluate it as a very fortunate and wise action for self-preservation that the President directly expressed regret and mentioned measures to prevent recurrence," and "Our head of state evaluated this as demonstrating the attitude of a frank and magnanimous person," immediately responding to and evaluating President Lee's remarks. This illustrates the pattern where public statements from high-ranking South Korean officials and the head of state are reflected in North Korea's official communiqués without significant time lag and are re-interpreted as responses.

Thus, North and South Korea continue to interact by confirming each other's statements through the media and responding based on them, without direct communication. Public statements become the basis for responses, and these responses, in turn, trigger the other party's interpretations and reactions, creating a structure. Within this structure, statements by the authorities of North and South Korea are conveyed and interpreted through the media, effectively functioning as diplomatic acts.

Messages Reconstructed as Hostility

Why has this structure taken root? The collapse of inter-Korean liaison channels and North Korea's refusal to engage with them restrict our government's access to information about North Korea, consequently deepening reliance on North Korean media. While these issues have existed in the past, the situation has worsened recently as North Korea has shown a tendency to strategically reduce and conceal public information.

As the media fills the void left by the absence of direct communication, inter-Korean relations tend to be reorganized into an interpretation-centric structure. This is particularly evident on the North Korean side. When actions and statements occur, their meaning is interpreted through the media, primarily defined as hostile acts, and this meaning is then reconstructed to justify policies. For instance, ROK-U.S. joint exercises are interpreted as expressions of confrontational intent and used as justification for hardline responses, such as strengthening nuclear capabilities. Thus, the North Korean side tends to reconstruct the actions or statements of the South Korean government as evidence of hostile intent.

Currently, North and South Korea indirectly confirm, infer, and interpret each other's positions through their respective media, government statements, and communiqués. When there are policies, actions, or statements from the South Korean government, a response from the North Korean authorities follows. Subsequently, South Korean media reports emerge, leading to government interpretations and responses, which in turn connect to North Korean communiqués. Even the same event is reconstructed in meaning through interpretation, and as a result, responses and policy directions are determined. For a long time, amidst conflict, the communication methods of North and South Korea have also changed following the severance of liaison channels. Inter-Korean relations now operate not through dialogue but through an interpretive structure. Direct communication channels are blocked, relations are defined as hostile, messages are publicly uttered, and interpretation relies on the media. Under these conditions, indirect communication through the media creates a structure that amplifies tensions without the possibility of correcting misunderstandings.

The Dangers of Interpretation Without Dialogue

This issue is not unique to North and South Korea. In the context of North Korea-U.S. relations, we also see patterns such as President Trump's use of social media to convey his stance and its subsequent re-dissemination through the media. As social media develops and new media platforms become increasingly diverse, diplomacy today is shifting towards a structure that operates through the interpretation of public messages rather than direct negotiation.

This interpretation-centric structure carries inherent risks. As the same message is interpreted in various ways, meaning distortion occurs, and even small expressions are likely to be over-interpreted and amplified. Policies may operate based on assumptions rather than confirmed facts, and the possibility of misjudgment increases in the absence of a buffer mechanism to correct misunderstandings. In a structure that relies on interpretation without confirming the other party's exact stance, misunderstandings can accumulate continuously.

The core task in current inter-Korean relations is to manage the way interpretations occur. Efforts are needed to manage the media-dependent interpretive structure, strategically design statements, and simultaneously restore minimal direct communication channels. Government official statements must be constructed with the expectation of interpretation, and the media must also recognize its role as a mediator that amplifies and reconstructs interpretations. In particular, the media must be aware of its function as an intermediary that amplifies and reconstructs interpretations in reporting on North Korea. As the media replaces dialogue, what matters in inter-Korean relations is no longer what is conveyed, but how it is interpreted.

[1] 1st Preliminary Meeting of the South-North Red Cross, Ministry of Unification, Inter-Korean Dialogue Office Website, https://dialogue.unikorea.go.kr/ukd/a/ad/usrtaltotal/View.do?id=2

[2]'Inter-Korean Direct Telephone Lines', National Archives of Korea, Ministry of the Interior and Safety, https://www.archives.go.kr/next/newsearch/listSubjectDescription.do?id=010084&pageFlag=&sitePage=1-2-1

[3] Richard Kim, "Inter-Korean Dialogue Channels Tested... What About the 'Repatriation of North Korean Fishermen'?", BBC Korea, 2025.6.27. https://www.bbc.com/korean/articles/c79q8y0d2p2o

■ Ha Seunghee_Research Professor, Institute for North Korean Studies, Dongguk University.

■ Editor/Manager: Lee Sangjun_EAI Researcher; Oh Inhwan_EAI Senior Researcher

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