[Global NK Commentary] The Preemptive Strike Scenario on the Korean Peninsula and a Great Transition to Peaceful Unification

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In 2023, North Korea proclaimed the doctrine of two hostile states at the plenary session of the Workers' Party of Korea. This signifies not the abandonment of unification, but the declaration of South Korea as the principal enemy to be annihilated, with the intention of achieving territorial integrity through nuclear missiles. The United States, following the extradition of Venezuelan President Maduro, has joined forces with Israel to assassinate Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei and is conducting large-scale military operations. If the US prevails in this war, the possibility of a preemptive strike against North Korea cannot be ruled out. A preemptive nuclear missile strike by North Korea or a preemptive strike by the US against North Korea would be a catastrophe for the Korean Peninsula. We are at a historical juncture where we must make a great transition from the crisis of mutual annihilation to peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Based on this understanding of the situation and history, this paper will theoretically examine preemptive strikes, and then consider scenarios of North Korea's preemptive nuclear strike against South Korea and the US's preemptive strike against North Korea, evaluating the final outcomes if they were to be executed. Finally, it will explore strategies for realizing a unified Korea, which is the path to escape this crisis and prevent a national catastrophe.

I. Theoretical Considerations of Preemptive Strikes

A preemptive strike is defined as "an act of aggression undertaken in self-defense when there is a clear indication of an enemy's surprise attack or intent to wage war, in order to gain the initiative."[1]A preemptive strike (Preemptive Strike), executed before the opponent when clear signs of attack are present, is a lawful and justifiable anticipatory action under international law, unlike a preventive strike (Preventive Strike) which is carried out in anticipation of future threats.[2]A preventive strike, motivated by concerns of future disadvantage over time, constitutes an illegal overreaction, involving the pre-emptive targeting of specific enemy military facilities during peacetime.[3]Exceptionally, a preventive strike may be permissible against oppressive regimes that systematically violate human rights or threaten the survival of their citizens, if a resolution is adopted by the UN Security Council under the framework of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)[4]resolution.

A preemptive strike, particularly one involving nuclear weapons when clear signs of attack are present, is a lawful use of force. Given the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapon use, a preemptive strike to prevent such an event could be considered meaningful, and thus, the effective implementation of a preemptive strike against North Korea could be examined.[5]While critical of America's arrogant actions, discussions on preemptive strikes are active, and the possibility of future preemptive strikes cannot be dismissed.[6]

Both preventive and preemptive strikes share the commonality of initiating military action before the opposing state. However, a preemptive strike is executed in a situation where the adversary's armed attack is imminent, whereas a preventive strike is a military action taken in peacetime to eliminate a significant future threat in the absence of an immediate danger.

II. Preemptive Strike Scenarios

1. Unification Strategy through North Korea's Preemptive Nuclear Strike

The short-term objective of North Korea's nuclear and missile policy is to secure its status as a nuclear power, akin to India and Pakistan, by miniaturizing nuclear warheads and developing the capability for re-entry into the atmosphere with intercontinental ballistic missiles. The medium-to-long-term objective is to pursue the lifting of sanctions and economic compensation under the guise of reducing nuclear weapons and cooperating with non-proliferation, while maintaining a certain quantity of nuclear weapons as a nuclear state, and to achieve the withdrawal of US forces from Korea and the dissolution of the UN Command. Ultimately, the goal is to achieve the complete realization of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il's ideology across the Korean Peninsula through a "Great War" initiated by a preemptive nuclear and missile strike.[7]

North Korea's military strategy and preemptive strike capabilities can be inferred through its strategic doctrines, military strength, command structure, war plans, training patterns, and missile test analyses. The North Korean military pursues four major strategic doctrines: strengthening the military through political ideology, moral fortitude, tactical prowess, and diverse military branches. In 2022, North Korea enacted the Law on Nuclear Force Policy, which specifies the conditions for nuclear weapon use. The North Korean military is exploring various strategies and tactics based on its military strategy of surprise attack, combined warfare, and swift victory, as well as its nuclear force strategy.

North Korea possesses the forces capable of executing these strategies and tactics, including a standing army of 1.28 million, reserve forces totaling 7.62 million comprising the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Red Youth Guard, special operations forces, and the Storm Corps,[8]and possesses 50 nuclear warheads and fissile material capable of producing up to 40 additional nuclear warheads.[9]It possesses a "three-missile set" capable of simultaneously striking the Korean Peninsula, Guam, and the US mainland: the short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) "Hwasong-11Ga" specialized for attacks on the Korean Peninsula, the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) "Hwasong-16" capable of striking Guam, and the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) "Hwasong-20" capable of striking the US mainland.[10]

Furthermore, it possesses 8,800 artillery pieces deployed in forward areas capable of surprise massive concentrated firepower attacks on the Seoul metropolitan area and central regions, including 600mm super-large multiple rocket launchers with a range of 420 km, over 5,500 multiple rocket launchers/artillery pieces including 240mm, over 6,900 tanks and armored vehicles for high-speed maneuver warfare, 420 combat ships and 70 submarines, 810 fighter jets and 290 helicopters, and a cyber warfare force of over 6,800 personnel.[11]

Additionally, North Korea is increasing its asymmetric drone capabilities, conducting infiltration into South Korea, and has a "7-day war plan."[12]The movement of North Korean forces identified during the declaration of a quasi-war state on August 20, 2015, its experience in 21st-century modern warfare from the Russia-Ukraine war, and the prolonged distribution of trash balloons towards the South from May 28 to November 28, 2024,[13]are indicative of frequent tactical nuclear unit operations and territorial integrity commander mobility drills. Analysis of North Korean ballistic missile launches over the past five years reveals 78 missile test launches, with 38 launched near Pyongyang and 30 towards the East Sea, the most frequent launch direction. SRBMs were launched 45 times, and in 2022, an ICBM with the longest flight range of 4,500 km was launched.[14]Assuming these missile and multiple rocket launcher launches are conducted with adjusted elevation and firing directions, they would accurately strike Guam, US military bases in Japan, and South Korean army, navy, and air force bases. It resembles a rehearsal for war.

A characteristic of North Korea's military command structure is that Kim Jong Un, as Chairman of the State Affairs Commission and Supreme Commander, exercises operational command over the subordinate North Korean forces through the General Staff Department under the guidance of the State Affairs Commission, and wields full authority over the military in emergencies. The North Korean military maintains a unified command system through the chain of command from the General Staff Department, which consists of the Army, Special Operations Forces, Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Force, under the Supreme Commander and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. The Army is organized into 10 corps, the 91st Capital Corps, the Anti-Aircraft Corps, an armored division, 5 mechanized infantry divisions, and 1 mechanized artillery division. 70% of the army's forces are deployed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, maintaining a posture for preemptive attack.

<Figure> North Korean Military Command Structure

Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, "2022 Defense White Paper" (Ministry of National Defense, 2023), p. 26.

North Korea would first use long-range ballistic missiles such as SRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs to strike the naval and air force bases of US forces in Japan, as well as staging bases in Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, and California, thereby blocking reinforcement of forces to the Korean Peninsula. It would then conduct a preemptive nuclear strike with tactical nuclear weapons mounted on hypersonic missiles to neutralize South Korea's war command and the ROK-US combined command and control.

Simultaneously, it would paralyze South Korea's air defense, power grid, and communication networks using cluster munitions, carbon fiber bombs, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, and launch a massive firepower assault with its over 13,300 long-range artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, and rocket artillery to devastate high-value targets. Concurrently, mechanized units would break through the DMZ, bypass and encircle Seoul, and advance south, employing combined tactics with sympathetic forces within South Korea and forces entering the second front, aiming to seize control of the entire Korean Peninsula.

2. Preemptive Strike Scenario Against North Korea

The preemptive strike scenario against North Korea can be inferred by revisiting the 1994 precision strike plan against the Yongbyon nuclear facility, the military demonstration in the East Sea on November 30, 2017, involving two US carrier strike groups and dozens of strategic bombers, and the current US-Iran war, where the US and Israeli forces conducted preemptive strikes and military operations against Iran.

(1) Case of Suspension of the 1994 Precision Strike Plan Against Yongbyon Nuclear Facility

The suspension of the precision strike plan against the Yongbyon nuclear facility in 1994 offers significant insights into the pursuit of preemptive strikes. Despite international pressure to halt nuclear development, North Korea proceeded with its nuclear program, including the extraction of fuel rods, threatening to expel IAEA inspectors and declaring that sanctions would be tantamount to a declaration of war. Military tensions escalated. As North Korea's nuclear development continued, the US anticipated a loss of control and pursued a precision strike against the Yongbyon facility.[15]

The US Department of Defense accelerated the deployment of forces to the Korean Peninsula and surrounding areas, which had been underway covertly for several months. Phase 1 involved the deployment of approximately 1,000 logistical personnel to receive, stage, and integrate reinforcement forces and operational planning elements at South Korean air and naval bases, in addition to the existing US Forces Korea.

Phase 2, by mid-April 1994, saw the deployment of Patriot batteries, Apache attack helicopters, Bradley tanks, counter-battery radar systems, spare aircraft parts, and new loading equipment to the Korean Peninsula to neutralize the long-range artillery concentrated in the Seoul metropolitan area, which was expected to be heavily targeted in a precision strike. Other heavy combat equipment was loaded onto maritime transport vessels and put on standby. Phase 3 involved the deployment of additional forces from the US Marine Expeditionary Force and Army reinforcement corps.

On the morning of June 14, 1994, President Bill Clinton held a meeting at the White House with Secretary of Defense William Perry and Commander of US Forces Korea Gary Luck to review and decide on the execution of the Phase 3 reinforcement plan.[16]At the same time, former US President Jimmy Carter was engaged in behind-the-scenes negotiations with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang. As a result, an agreement was reached whereby North Korea explicitly agreed to freeze its nuclear development program, including refraining from loading new fuel rods into the 5MW reactor and reprocessing spent fuel rods, and allowing IAEA inspectors to remain. Kim Il Sung signed the agreement, leading to the suspension of the military action for a precision strike on Yongbyon.

(2) Case of US Military Deployment Against North Korea in 2017

In another instance, on November 30, 2017, the United States deployed two carrier strike groups and dozens of B-2 stealth strategic bombers to the East Sea in an effort to eliminate the Kim Jong Un regime and North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, bringing the situation to the brink of war.

In March 2017, President Trump, presiding over the National Security Council, determined that North Korea would neither collapse nor reform, and decided to abandon the past failed policies and pursue a policy of maximum pressure. He established the principle of not lifting sanctions until negotiations with North Korea were compensated or complete denuclearization was achieved.[17]

Tensions between North Korea and the United States escalated when North Korea launched the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile on July 4, 2017, the U.S. Independence Day. Following North Korea's sixth nuclear test on September 3, a series of meetings were held consecutively by the U.S. Policy Coordination Committee, the Deputies Committee, and the Principal Committee to discuss policy toward North Korea. The Kim Jong Un regime was testing nuclear missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland, posing an existential threat to U.S. national security. On October 17-19, 2017, the United States conducted bombing drills with strategic bomber formations in the Ozarks training area in Missouri, a region similar to North Korea.

On November 18, 2017, Kim Jong Un declared the completion of the state nuclear force, reporting that the Hwasong-15 ICBM was launched at a maximum range in a lofted trajectory from the Pyongyang International Airport on November 19.[18]The Trump administration, which pursued a hardline policy symbolized by maximum pressure and "Fire & Fury," deployed two carrier strike groups, B-2 stealth bombers, attack submarines, and F-22 formations into the international waters of the East Sea, adjacent to North Korea, under the cover of darkness on November 30. They were prepared to respond ruthlessly if North Korea engaged in any military action. When North Korea showed no reaction to this large-scale military show of force, the United States withdrew the deployed forces.[19]

(3) Preemptive Strike Scenario Against North Korea

On August 18, 2023, the leaders of South Korea, the United States, and Japan declared at Camp David that they would jointly respond to regional challenges, provocations, and security threats.[20]Accordingly, South Korea, the United States, and Japan could participate in a preemptive strike against North Korea. However, it was assumed that South Korea would not participate due to concerns that a preemptive strike could escalate into war through North Korean retaliation.

The justification and legitimacy for a preemptive strike are abundant. Since the Korean War, North Korea has repeatedly committed infiltrations and localized provocations, violating the Armistice Agreement. These include the attempted raid on the Blue House on January 21, 1968, and the armed infiltration into Uljin and Samcheok in November of the same year; the bombing of the Aung San Mausoleum in 1983; the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 in 1987; the armed infiltration into Gangneung in 1996; the First Battle of Yeonpyeong in 1999; the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002; the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in March 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November of the same year; the landmine incident in 2015; the toilet paper balloon incident in 2024; and frequent incursions across the Military Demarcation Line within the Demilitarized Zone from 2025 to the present. In total, North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 3,121 times, including 2,022 infiltrations and 1,119 localized provocations.[21]

Furthermore, North Korea's persistent hostile acts have resulted in American casualties. In the Korean War, triggered by North Korea's invasion of the South, approximately 4.85 million personnel (2.83 million Army, 1.6 million Navy, 420,000 Air Force) participated, with 54,246 killed and 468,659 wounded. In 1968, the USS Pueblo was hijacked, resulting in the death of one crew member and the detention of 82 others for 11 months before their release. Additionally, in 1969, an EC-121 Navy reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over the East Sea, killing all 31 U.S. crew members. In 1976, two U.S. Army officers were killed in the Panmunjom axe-murder incident. In 2016, North Korea released American student Otto Warmbier, who had been detained, in a comatose state; he died after returning to the United States.

North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs, advanced conventional military capabilities, cyber activities, combat experience in the Russia-Ukraine war, and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) flight tests capable of reaching all parts of the U.S. mainland[22]pose a direct threat to the United States.

North Korea's hostile actions have also caused significant damage to Japan and pose a direct threat from North Korean nuclear missiles. From 1959 to 1984, North Korea, with the leadership of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), promoted a repatriation program for Korean residents in Japan and their families who supported North Korea. Between 1959 and 1967, 93,340 people were transferred to North Korea through this program. After receiving the Korean residents, North Korea, contrary to its promises, discriminated against them and effectively abducted and imprisoned them by confining them to designated areas, preventing their return to Japan.[23]Furthermore, from the 1970s to the 1980s, North Korean agents abducted 17 individuals in 12 separate incidents. North Korea officially acknowledged the abduction of Japanese nationals in 13 of these cases, and while 5 returned to Japan, it claims that "8 died and 4 are unverified" for the remaining 12.[24] Japan is also under the direct threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

Under Kim Jong Un's oppressive regime, 25 million North Korean citizens suffer from human rights abuses and precarious living conditions. South Korea and the United States have pursued the denuclearization of North Korea through negotiations, but North Korea has not complied and has instead advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities. The United States and Japan launched a large-scale offensive operation on D-day at H-hour to eliminate the Kim Jong Un regime, liberate the people, and remove the nuclear missiles threatening international peace. The targets included Kim Jong Un's command facilities, nuclear missile bases, naval and air force bases, military airfields, special operations forces and Storm Corps launch bases, ammunition, missile, and drone facilities, and key military infrastructure such as power generation facilities.

The U.S.-Japan combined forces focused their attacks to secure air superiority. In naval operations, U.S. naval vessels attacked North Korean warships, destroying most of them in the early stages of the conflict, thus conducting multi-domain operations simultaneously in the air and at sea. This approach involved selectively attacking targets by combining precision strike capabilities with intelligence assets. B-2 stealth bombers dropped dozens of 2,000-pound bombs, neutralizing missile launch sites across North Korea. The leadership, including Kim Jong Un, who had ruled for 15 years, was killed by GBU-72 bunker buster penetration bombs, and not only nuclear weapons and missiles but also uranium enrichment and ballistic missile manufacturing facilities were destroyed. A less hostile leader emerged, leading to negotiations and the declaration of an end to the war.

(4) Assessment

While it is true that the Trump administration favored decapitation strikes and emphasized limited military options, reducing the War Powers Resolution to a mere formality, some experts believe these factors would only provoke North Korea's sense of crisis and that the likelihood of the United States launching a preemptive strike against North Korea is not high.[25] This is because the United States cannot afford to risk nuclear retaliation from North Korea, the possibility of intervention by China and Russia could escalate the conflict into a major power confrontation, and if a decapitation strike were carried out without South Korea's consent, South Korea would suffer extreme damage from North Korean retaliation. Furthermore, the difficulty in locating the North Korean leadership significantly reduces the probability of mission success.

However, if there were even the slightest indication of a U.S. preemptive strike, Kim Jong Un might strike first. Kim Jong Un's fear of a preemptive strike is not merely a product of psychological anxiety or personal disposition; it is a structural and cognitive phenomenon shaped by a combination of factors: the structural characteristics of North Korea's political system, where leader survival and regime survival are equated; the overwhelming military power and precision strike capabilities of the United States; President Trump's unpredictability; and the contagion effect of successful leadership removal operations in Iran and Venezuela. In particular, the successful removal of Venezuelan President Maduro and Iranian Supreme Leader Khomeini served as empirical signals to North Korea that "the United States will actually carry out leadership removal if necessary," qualitatively altering Kim Jong Un's fear structure.

Whether North Korea launches a preemptive nuclear strike or the U.S. leads a preemptive strike, neither side will achieve a complete victory. Could the Korean and U.S. combined forces be annihilated in an instant if North Korea launched a preemptive strike with tactical nuclear weapons and its artillery and rocket firepower of 13,300 guns? The South Korean military would not only respond in near real-time to North Korea's nuclear missile attacks with the Kill Chain and the Korean Air and Missile Defense system but would also conduct massive retaliatory operations to devastate North Korea's war command structure. The ROK-U.S. combined forces would conduct conventional and nuclear integrated operations (C&NI). North Korea could never win.

Even in the case of a U.S.-led preemptive strike, the possibility of North Korean forces retaliating with the combined strength of the Russian Northern Fleet Command and the Chinese People's Liberation Army Northern Theater Command cannot be ruled out. By launching intermediate-range ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with strategic nuclear weapons, they could launch a nuclear retaliatory strike not only against Japan but also against the United States, potentially devastating Tokyo and Washington. A unilateral victory for the ROK-U.S.-Japan combined forces cannot be guaranteed.

No preemptive strike, in either scenario, can guarantee a complete victory. There is a high probability of mutual annihilation for both the side that initiates the preemptive strike and the side that is attacked. Simulation results show that if a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead, capable of maximum lethality, were detonated at an altitude of 800 meters over Yongsan, Seoul, there would be approximately 114,600 deaths and a total of over 534,600 casualties.[26] If North Korea launches an attack with its 13,300 artillery pieces, the damage to the Seoul metropolitan area would be unimaginable. Conversely, if the United States were to launch a nuclear retaliation against Pyongyang, one-third of Pyongyang's 3.1 million residents would become casualties.

Under no circumstances should such a war be allowed to occur. South Korea, North Korea, as well as the United States and China, must contemplate ways to escape the crisis on the Korean Peninsula and prevent a war that would lead to the mutual annihilation of both Koreas.

III. A Great Transition to Peaceful Unification

The security environment on the Korean Peninsula gives a foreboding sense of impending war. Both South and North Korea are increasing their military strength for self-defense. If this arms race continues, a coincidental military clash could escalate into war in a state where all channels between the two Koreas are severed. Regardless of which side initiates the war, in the worst-case scenario, it could escalate into a conflict between the ROK-U.S.-Japan allied forces and the North Korea-China-Russia bloc.

We must deeply consider a path to liberation from the fear of war and fundamental prevention of national catastrophe. That path is peaceful unification. If we invest our national energy in unification instead of exhausting it in war preparations, we will receive immense blessings. Unification will liberate us from the fear of war. By integrating South Korea's advanced technology and capital with North Korea's labor and vast resources, rapid economic growth can be achieved. Goldman Sachs projects that unified Korea will surpass the GDP of Japan and Germany by 2050.[27] Having overcome a history of trials and challenges including colonial rule, division, the Korean War, dictatorship, and poverty, the Republic of Korea has become an exemplary liberal democratic nation, a top 10 economic and technological power, and a cultural powerhouse.

<Table> Comparison of National Strength between South and North Korea

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Factbook 2025-2026 (Washington, D.C: Skyhorse Publishing, 2025), p.464; Global Firepower, "2026 Military Strength Ranking."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GSR8rtDjpbo, (Accessed: March 20, 2026); Ministry of National Defense, 『2022 Defense White Paper』 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2023), p.290; South Korea's defense budget allocated at 66.2947 trillion KRW for 2026.

Upon unification, a more prosperous democratic civilized nation can be built. A unified Korean Peninsula will transform from a source of conflict and dispute into a wellspring of peace and common prosperity. Furthermore, the unification of North and South Korea, which have different systems, holds civilizational significance as it signifies the end of the Cold War. Ten million separated families will be reunited. When North and South Korea unify, the Korean Peninsula will become a logistics hub, and it may be possible to establish a Northeast Asian economic community and a Northeast Asian security cooperation organization. The strategic benefits of unification are overwhelmingly greater than the sum of division and unification costs, making it sufficiently worthwhile to invest in.

Military trust-building measures must be pursued not only between North and South Korea but also between the United States and China. The leaders of North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China must meet and declare the renunciation of war on the Korean Peninsula. To manage the unstable armistice system on the Korean Peninsula, the North Korean and Chinese representative offices must return to Panmunjom so that the Military Armistice Commission can function properly. Progress must be made from operational arms control to structural arms control in a gradual and phased manner. Such arms control will have the effect of transforming the North Korean regime. Ultimately, North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China will be able to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by concluding a peace treaty.[28]

IV. Conclusion: The Leaders of North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China Must Meet

The current situation is one of heightened security crisis where the possibility of accidental or intentional war cannot be ruled out, whether it be an unexpected preemptive strike led by the United States or a nuclear preemptive strike by North Korea. Regardless of the type of war, it will not end in a unilateral victory but will inevitably lead to mutual destruction.

Under the threat of North Korea's nuclear missiles, South Korea must maintain a flawless ROK-US combined defense posture. In a situation where inter-Korean relations are severed, a chance military clash could escalate into war, presenting a grave situation. We must embark on a path to escape the crisis on the Korean Peninsula and be liberated from the fear of war. All efforts must be made to prevent war. In times like these, more than ever, the leaders of North and South Korea must meet. The hotline between the leaders of North and South Korea and communication lines between the military authorities of North and South Korea must be restored, crisis management channels must be restored, consultations must be held to restore the September 19th Military Agreement between North and South Korea, a declaration by North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China on the prohibition of nuclear use on the Korean Peninsula must be made, and the North Korean and Chinese representative bodies, withdrawn and recalled in 1994, must return to the Military Armistice Commission and, together with the UN Command, transition their mission from managing the Armistice Agreement to managing a peace treaty, continuing to exist as an international supervisory body. Furthermore, the US Forces Korea should transition from deterring the North Korean threat to maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and balancing power in Northeast Asia, while continuing their stationing.

Moreover, the leaders of the United States and China, who have direct and indirect influence over the fate of the Korean Peninsula and are parties to a peace treaty, along with the leaders of North and South Korea, who are suffering from division, must meet to find a path where everyone can win without war. If the leaders of North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China unite their will, a peace regime can be established by concluding a peace treaty for the Korean Peninsula. The leaders of North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China who lead the unification of the Korean Peninsula will be recognized as individuals who have contributed to human civilization. These leaders will undoubtedly receive the Nobel Peace Prize. ■

[1] Michael W. Doyle, Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict (Princeton University Press, 2011).

[2] Karl P. Mueller, "Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy," htttp://www.rand.org (Accessed: March 20, 2026): The Six-Day War in 1967, where Israel attacked first after detecting signs of an Egyptian attack, can be cited as an example of preemptive strike, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq led by the United States against Iraq, which was developing WMDs, can be cited as an example of preventive strike.

[3] Jeong Gyeong-young, “Strategy to Neutralize North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threats,” 『Korean Military』, Vol. 1, Inaugural Issue (June 2017); Ryu Jae-gap, “Our Response to North Korea’s Military Threats,” Global Korea Strategy Forum, April 27, 2017.

[4] Peter Hilpord, ed., The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A New Paradigm of International Law? (New York: Brill | Nijhoff, 2014): R2P was endorsed by all UN member states at the 2005 World Summit and refers to the authority to take military action under a UN Security Council resolution against oppressive regimes committing mass atrocities, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and human rights abuses. The first case was the adoption of an R2P resolution against the Gaddafi regime on March 17, 2011, amid escalating casualties of innocent civilians in the Libyan civil war, leading NATO to take military action and remove Gaddafi.

[5] Quoted in Kim Tae-seong, “A Study on the Limitations and Prerequisites of Preemptive Strike,” 『National Defense Policy Review』, Issue No. 108 (2015); Kwon Hyuk-cheol, “A Study on the Strategic Terminology of Preemptive Strike,” National Defense University Joint Chiefs of Staff Regular Course Paper (2009).

[6] Lawrence Freedman. Deterrence (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004).

[7] Jeong Sang-don, “The Nature of North Korea’s Nuclear Problem and China’s Strategic Error,” KIDA, 『Weekly Defense Forum』, No. 1618 (16-20), May 9, 2016.

[8] Republic of Korea, 『2022 Defense White Paper』 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2023). p.334.

[9] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2025 (Oxford University Press, 2025).

[10] “North Korea Breaks Through South Korean Air Defense with Hypersonic Missiles,” NK Chosun, October 13, 2025, https://nk.chosun.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=203219, (Accessed: March 20, 2026): If a tactical nuclear weapon is mounted on a hypersonic missile for an attack, it can travel at Mach 5 (6,120 km per hour) and devastate all targets within a 130 km range in under a minute.

[11] Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 『2022 Defense White Paper』 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2023).

[12] Jeong Yong-soo, “Kim Jong-un Developed a Plan for a '7-Day War',” 《JoongAng Ilbo》, January 18, 2015: North Korea has developed an operational plan to occupy the entire South within 7 days without the intervention of US forces if a surprise invasion or a local conflict escalates into a full-scale war.

[13] Nilay TAVLI and Kyung-young CHUNG, “North Korea’s Garbage-filled Balloons as a New Psychological Warfare,“ Global NK Commentary, East Asia Institute, Feb 18, 2025.

[14]Lee Hyun-ho, "Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Launches Over the Past Five Years," The Seoul Economic Daily, January 12, 2026.

[15] Sydney Seiler, “Preemptive Strikes, Deterrence, and Denuclearization: Ascertaining Pyongyang’s View of U.S. Use of Force Against Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Commentary by CSIS, July 17, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/preemptive-strikes-deterrence-and-denuclearization-ascertaining-pyongyangs-view-us-use, (Accessed: March 20, 2026).

[16] Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.305-336.

[17] H. R. McMaster, Battleground: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: Haper Collin Publishers, 2020), p.365.

[18] Michael Wolff, Fire and Fury (New York: Henry Holt and Company 2018)

[19]Chung Kyung-young, "Prospects for Security Policy Under a Second Trump Administration and South Korea's Preparedness Strategy," Military Review, Issue No. 117 (Spring 2024).

[20] The White House, “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” Aug 18, 2023.

[21] Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, "2022 Defense White Paper" (Ministry of National Defense, 2023), p.352.

[22] The U.S. Intelligence Community, 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, Mar 2026.

[23] Yoshiaki KIKUCHI , “The Repatriation Project of Koreans in Japan to North Korea and Media,” Annual Review of Migration Studies, Vol. 28(2022).

[24] “The 17 Japanese People Officially Recognized as Having Been Abducted by North Korea.” https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h01839/ (Accessed: April 1, 2026).

[25]Kwak Tae-hwan, "Is a decapitation strike on North Korea's leadership possible?... Trump's military action, fear of a preemptive strike against Kim Jong Un," Breaking News, March 8, 2026.Breaking News, March 8, 2026.

[26]Lee Hyun-ho, "If a North Korean nuclear bomb explodes 800m above Seoul... up to 530,000 casualties," The Seoul Economic Daily, March 9, 2024.

[27] Goldman Sachs Global ECS Asia research. “A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks,” Global Economics Paper No. 188.

[28] Chung Kyung-young, South Korea: The Korean War, Armistice Structure, and A Peace Regime (Berlin: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2020), pp.227-267; Chung Kyung-young, "Peace Creation: ROK-US Alliance and Peace Creation" (Paju: Hanul, 2020), pp.211-244.

References

Books

Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, "2022 Defense White Paper" (Ministry of National Defense, 2023).

Chung Kyung-young, "Peace Creation: ROK-US Alliance and Peace Creation" (Paju: Hanul, 2020).

Articles

Kwon Hyuk-chul, "A Study on the Strategic Terminology of Preemptive Strike," Joint Chiefs of Staff College, National Defense University, Regular Course Paper (2009).

Kim Tae-sung, "A Study on the Limitations and Prerequisites of Preemptive Strike," Journal of Defense Policy Research, Issue No. 108 (2015).

Ryu Jae-gap, "Our Response Direction to North Korea's Military Threats," Global Korea Strategy Forum, April 27, 2017.

Chung Kyung-young, "Strategy to Neutralize North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Threats," Korea Military, Vol. 1, Inaugural Issue (June 2017).

______, "Prospects for Security Policy Under a Second Trump Administration and South Korea's Preparedness Strategy," Military Review, Issue No. 117 (Spring 2024).

Chung Sang-don, "The Essence of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and China's Strategic Error," KIDA, "Weekly Defense Review," Issue No. 1618 (16-20), May 9, 2016.

Newspapers and the Internet

Kwak Tae-hwan, “Is Decapitation Strike Possible for North Korean Leadership?... Trump’s Military Action, a Preemptive Strike ‘Fear’ Aimed at Kim Jong Un,” Break News, March 8, 2026.

Lee Hyun-ho, “If North Korea’s Nuclear Bomb Explodes at 800m Above Seoul… Maximum 530,000 Casualties,” The Seoul Economic Daily, March 9, 2024.

_______. “Analysis of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launches Over the Past 5 Years,” The Seoul Economic Daily, January 12, 2026.

Jeong Yong-soo, “Kim Jong Un Prepared a ‘7-Day War’ Operational Plan,”,’” 중앙일보 (JoongAng Ilbo), January 18, 2015.

“Penetrating South Korea’s Air Defense System, North Korea Deploys Hypersonic Missiles,” NK Chosun, October 13, 2025, https://nk.chosun.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=203219, (Accessed: March 20, 2026).

Books

Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Factbook 2025-2026 (Washington D.C.: Skyhorse Publishing, 2025).

Chung, Kyung-young, South Korea: The Korean War, Armistice Structure, and A Peace Regime (Berlin: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2020).

Doyle, Michael W., Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

Freedman, Lawrence, Deterrence (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004).

Hilpold, Peter, ed., The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A New Paradigm of International Law? (New York: Brill | Nijhoff, 2014).

McMaster, H. R., Battleground: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: HaperCollins Publishers, 2020).

Oberdorfer, Don, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997).

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2025 (London: Oxford University Press, 2025).

The U.S. Intelligence Community, 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, Mar 2026.

Wolff, Michael, Fire and Fury (New York: Henry Holt and Company 2018).

Academic Articles

Goldman Sachs Global ECS Asia research. “A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks,” Global Economics Paper No. 188.

Kikuchi, Yoshiaki, “The Repatriation Project of Koreans in Japan to North Korea and Media,” Annual Review of Migration Studies, Vol. 28 (2022).

Tavili, Nilay and Kyung-young Chung, “North Korea’s Garbage-filled Balloons as a New Psychological Warfare,” Global NK Commentary, East Asia Institute, Feb 18, 2025.

The White House, “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” Aug 18, 2023.

Internet

Global Firepower, "2026 Military Strength Ranking." https://www.globalfirepower. com/#google_vignette, (Accessed: March 20, 2026).

Mueller, Karl P., "Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy," http://www.rand.org, (Accessed: March 20, 2026).

Seiler, Sydney, “Preemptive Strikes, Deterrence, and Denuclearization: Ascertaining Pyongyang’s View of U.S. Use of Force Against Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Commentary by CSIS, July 17, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/preemptive-strikes-deterrence-and-denuclearization-ascertaining-pyongyangs-view-us-use, (Accessed: March 20, 2026).

“The 17 Japanese People Officially Recognized as Having Been Abducted by North Korea.” https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h01839/ (Accessed April 1, 2026).

■ Chung, Kyung-young_Chairman, Korea-International Working Group for Unification; Former Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University.

■ Edited and Compiled by: Lee, Sang-jun_Research Fellow, EAI; Oh, In-hwan_Senior Research Fellow, EAI

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr